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Q f ( X 1 ,..., X n )
s.t.
Example:
Cobb-Douglas Technology
C (w1 , w2 , Q) min w1 X1 w2 X 2
s.t. Q X 1 X 2
L w1 X1 w2 X 2 +[Q X1 X 2 ]
FONC:
a 1
b
LX1 w1 aX 1 X 2 0
(1)
X1 , X 2
LX 2 w2 bX 1 X 2
a
b 1
(2)
w
aX 2
aX 2 w2
(1)
1
X1
(2)
w2 bX1
bw1
aX w
b
output constraint Q ( 2 2 ) a X 2
bw1
X 2 ( w1 , w2 , Q) Q
1
a b
bw
( 1 ) a b
aw2
aw2 a b
)
bw1
X 1 ( w1 , w2 , Q) Q a b (
cost function:
C ( w1 , w2 , Q) w1 X 1 * w2 X 2 *
w1 [Q
1
a b
1
a b
aw
bw
( 2 ) a b ] w2 [Q a b ( 1 ) a b ]
bw1
aw2
b
a
b
aw
bw
Q ( 2 ) a b w1 a b Q a b ( 1 ) a b w2 a b
b
a
1
b
a
a
b
a a b
b a b
a b
a
b
a
b
Q w1 w2 [( ) ( ) ]
b
a
123
Proposition: If the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, then the cost function may be
written as C (w, Q) QC (w,1) where w (w1 ,..., wn ) .
Let X * be the cheapest bundle to produce 1 unit of output at prices w so that
Proof:
C ( w,1) wi X i * .
i 1
When Q units are produced, the cost minimizing bundle is (QX1 *,..., QX n *) .
Claim;
If not. Let X ' ( X1 ',..., X n ') be the cost minimizing bundle, i.e.
w X
i
' wi (QX i *) wi (
Xi '
) wi X i * .
Q
Xi
can be used to produce 1 unit of the good (CRS)
Q
X * is not the cost-minimizing bundle for 1 unit of the good contradiction.
Since
124
X i * (w, P)
Q * (w, P)
Example:
X1 ,..., X n
Cobb-Douglas Technology
C ( w1 , w2 , Q) KQ
1
a b
w1
a
a b
w2
a
b
where K [( ) a b ( ) a b ]
b
a
b
a b
Profit function:
1
( w, P) max PQ C ( w, Q) PQ KQ a b w1 a b w2 a b
Q
FONC:
1
a
b
1
d
K
a b
P
Q
w1 a b w2 a b 0
dQ
ab
1 a b
a
b
K
P
Q a b w1 a b w2 a b
ab
1 a b
P ( a b)
Q a b
a
b
Kw1 a b w2 a b
Q* [
a b
1 a b
P ( a b)
Kw1
a
a b
w2
b
a b
supply function
Kw1
P ( a b)
a
a b
]1 a b K{[
Kw1 a b w2 a b
1
* ( w, P) P 1 a b [
a
a b
w2
b
a b
aw
( 2 ) a b
bw1
}
1
a b
aw2 a bb
P(a b) 1a1b aw2 a bb
(
) [
]
(
)
a
b
bw1
bw1
a b
a b
Kw1 w2
* ( w, P) P[
a b
1 a b
P ( a b)
1
a b
a b
]1 a b }a b w1 a b w2 a b
Kw1 a b w2 a b
a b
ab
a
P ( a b)
]1a b K
a b
1 a b
[ P(a b) w1 w2 ]1a b
Kw1 a b w2 a b
125
Proof:
1.
Method A (for differentiable function)
C ( w, Q) min
X1 ,..., X n
w X
i 1
s.t. Q f ( X 1 ,..., X n )
L wi X i +[Q f ( X 1 ,..., X n )]
i 1
By Envelop Theorem,
C
Xi* 0
wi
w X w X '
w X ' w 'X '
i
w w ')
2.
wi X i ' wi X i
Contradiction
126
( w ) X
i
' ( wi ) X i
3.
for (0,1)
Note that C (w", Q) wi " X i " [ wi (1 )wi '] X i " wi X i "(1 ) wi ' X i "
Since X " is not necessary the cheapest way to produce Q at prices w or w '
wi X i " C (w, Q)
and
w ' X
i
" C (w ', Q)
127
FOC:
d
P MC 0 P MC
dQ
profit
Q
Q1*
128
MC
AC
AVC
P2
loss
Q
Q2*
However if P AVC , then the firm should shut down immediately. Note that in this case, the price
received is not enough to pay for the labor cost and the cost of the raw material.
$
MC
AC
AVC
P3
Q
closed down point
129
MC
P1
P1
P2
P2
Q2 * Q1 *
Q 2 * Q1 *
P
S
P1
SM=Si=nSi
P1
Q1
QM=nQ1
130
Long run equilibrium (when the number of firms adjusts) for a competitive firm
Remark:
In the long run, 0
Whenever 0
free entry #firms Supply S curve shifts to the right P , QM UNTIL 0
$
MC
SM=nSi
SM*=n*Si
AC
E
P1
P1
P*
P*
D
Q
Qi*
Qi
QM
QM
Whenever 0
free exit #firms Supply S curve shifts to the left P , QM UNTIL 0
$
MC
P
SM*=n*Si
AC
SM=nSi
E
P*
P*
P2
P2
E
D
Q
Qi
Qi*
Q
Q M*
131
QM
Tax revenue
Suppose the equilibrium point in a perfect competitive market is ( Q*, P * ), if an unit tax of $t is
imposed on the good, how much tax revenue will the government collect?
Note that when an unit tax is imposed, if the demand curve is downward sloping and the supply curve is
upward sloping, then the P will not go up by $t .
Let x be the increase in price, hence PC P * x and PS P * (t x) .
x
Since PC goes up by $ x, hence the % in PC
;
P*
tx
and PS goes down by $t x, hence the % in PS
.
P*
P
S
PC
P*
E
E
tx
PS
D
D
Q
Q
% in Qd Ed (
x
)
P*
Since
% in Qd % in QS Ed (
Q*
% in QS ES (
tx
)
P*
tES
x
tx
) ES (
) xEd (t x) Es x( ES Ed ) tES x
P*
P*
ES Ed
tES
x
ES Ed
(more negative, more elastic)
tES
E E
x
d
% in Qd Ed ( ) Ed S
P*
P*
tES
ES Ed
Q ' Q *(1 Ed
132
t
x
Ed
1
ES
tES
E E
d
S
P*
ES x
tES
x
ES Ed
Example:
Price ceiling
The government imposes an effective price ceiling on beef. As a result, there is a shortage of beef.
Suppose the competitive suppliers are willing to supply 1 million pounds at the maximum price P * .
Suppose there are 10,000 families and the government rations the beef by distributing 50 coupons to
each family. Each coupon will entitle a family to purchase a pound of beef at P * and also get one
pound of beef free of charge. Families are free to sell coupons to one another for a competitive market
price. Assume there is no income effect (so that the height of the demand curve represents how much
the consumers are willing to pay for different units).
By means of graphical analysis, determine the market price of coupon, the total cost of the government
(net of the revenue received for distributing coupons) and the consumer surplus of the families if
a)
all families are identical with the same demand function, or
b)
there are two types of families with different demand functions.
a)
As a family with a coupon can purchase a pound of beef at P * and also get one pound of beef free of
charge, that is, the family with a coupon can buy 2 pounds of beef at a unit price of P * / 2 .
Effectively each family get 100 coupons (altogether 100,000 coupons) and each coupon allows the
family to buy 1 pound of beef at P * / 2 .
Pbeef
A
Scoupon
Sbeef
B
price of coupon
P* G
H
Dcoupon
P*/2
.
C
F
Dbeef
Qbeef
1m
consumer surplus:
total cost to government:
Area ABFC
Area GHFC
133
b)
Sbeef
Pbeef
A
Scoupon
K
H
P*
Dcoupon
price of coupon
P*/2
.
Dbeef
Dbeef2
L
Dbeef1
Qbeef
Q1
Q2 1m
Area BCJI
Area AGHI
Area HKLI
134
Monopoly
Properties of a monopoly market
1.
one seller (firm)
2.
many buyers (consumers)
3.
homogeneous product
4.
no entry/exit
Remark:
Because there is only one seller in the market. The seller is a price-setter and is facing a
downward sloping demand curve.
2.
Economies of scale: New firms have less production capacity than do established firms. New
firms usually have higher average costs than established firms, this inhibits their entry.
A natural monopoly occurs when economies of scale are so large that there is room for only one
firm in the industry. Example: local public utilities that deliver telephone, gas, water and electric
service.
3.
Economies of scope: Sometimes it is cheaper to produce two related products in a single firm
rather than in two separate firms.
4.
Exclusive ownership of raw materials: Established companies may be protected from the entry
of new firms by their control of raw materials. Example: The International Nickel Company of
Canada once owned almost all of the worlds nickel reserves.
5.
6.
d dTR dTC
MR MC 0 MR MC
dQ dQ
dQ
d 2 dMR dMC
135
Monopoly equilibrium
0
$
MC
profit
AC
P*
MR
Q
Q*
0
$
MC
loss
AC
P*
Q
MR
Example:
D : P 80 Q,
TC : C (Q) 20Q
2
max (80 Q)Q 20Q 80Q Q 20Q 60Q Q 2
Q
FOC:
d
60 2Q 0 Q* 30
dQ
Example:
D : P 80 Q,
TC : C (Q) Q2
FOC:
d
80 4Q 0 Q* 20
dQ
136
MC
DWL
P*
competitive equilibrium
D
PS
Q
MR
Remark:
D
D
MR
MR
Q*
137
CS
MC=MC+tax
A A
initial DWL
P
P*
MC
A
competitive equilibrium
E
PS
B
D
B
B
government
revenue
new DWL
E
MR
Q
Q Q*
Remark:
CS
cost to
government
MC
MC=MCsubsidy
P*
P
E
I
competitive
equilibrium (QC)
G
PS
G
D
H
H
MR
DWL
Q* Q
E
I
138
Case 1
D
MC
P*
P#
MR
competitive price PC
MR
Q
Q* Q#
MR
Case 2
D
MC
P*
P#
MR
competitive price P C
MR
Q
Q* Q#=QC
MR
139
Case 3
D
MC
P*
P#
MR
competitive price P C
MR
D
Q
Q* Q#
MR
Case 4
D
MC
P*
P#
competitive price PC
Q
Q# Q*
MR
140
A two-market monopolist
Suppose a monopolist sells its product to US and Asia. If the consumers can resell the good, then by the
arbitrate process, at equilibrium PUS PAsia .
P
P
MC
P*
DUS
DW = DUS + DAsia
DAsia
MRW
QAsia* QUS*
Q W*
P
MC
P*
DUS
DW = DUS + DAsia
MRW
DAsia
QAsia*
QUS*
QW*
141
Example:
Asia : P 20 Q Q 20 P
US: P 30 Q Q 30 P
World demand : Q 50 2 P
Q 30 P
Let TC 10Q
Note that Q 50 2 P P 25
when P 20
when 20 P 30
Q
2
Q
Q2
Q2
)Q 10Q 25Q
10Q 15Q
Q
2
2
2
d
Q
15
FOC:
15 Q 0 Q* 15 P 25 25 $17.5
dQ
2
2
When P $17.5 QA * 2.5 and QUS * 12.5 QW * QA * QUS * 2.5 12.5 15
max TR TC (25
Note:
Asia: TR (20 Q)Q 20Q Q2 MR 20 2Q
US:
TR (30 Q)Q 30Q Q2 MR 30 2Q
142
Remark:
When the firm increases its sale in Asia and decrease its sale in US, PA and PUS .
Therefore PA PUS . In this case, however, the arbitrage process will make the prices
equal again. Hence, in order to increase its profit, the firm must have the ability to
separate the market and charge different consumers different prices in the 2
markets. This is called price discrimination.
1
Since MR P(1 ) , MRA MRUS PA PUS if A US
In general, A US
US
US
US
) PA (1
US
) PA PUS
Note that 0 , A US A US
(i.e. the demand in Aisa is more elastic, or more "price-sensitive,
because the income level of the Asians is lower)
Intuitively, the more price elastic the demand, the lower is the price charged.
2
max (20 QA )QA (30 QUS )QUS 10(QA QUS ) 20QA QA2 30QUS QUS
10QA 10QUS
QUS ,QA
2
10QA QA2 20QUS QUS
FOC:
10 2QA 0 QA * 5 PA * $15
QA
dQ P
15
(1) 3 more elastic, lower price
dP Q
5
dQ P
20
US
(1)
2 less elastic, higher price
dP Q
10
1
1
1
1
Also MRUS PUS (1 US ) 20(1 ) 10 15(1 ) PA (1 A ) MRA
2
3
143
In general, a two-market monopolist which can separate the markets will solve the following
problem.
max TRA (QA ) TRB (QB ) C (QA QB )
QA ,QB
FOC:
MRA MC 0
QA
MRB MC 0
QB
MRA MRB MC
A monopolist can separate the markets by legal means, geographical regions, etc.
Block discrimination
P
A B
F
P
P*
MC
Q
Q
Q*
MR
144
MC
D
Q
Q*=QC
Q
d
P(Q) C '(Q) 0 P MC
dQ
FOC:
Two-part tariff
P
membership fee
MC
P*
Q*=QC
145
Example:
Let D : P 30 Q and TC (Q) Q2
TC (Q) Q 2 MC 2Q
Profit-maximizing condition for a perfect competitive market:P MC
30 Q 2Q Q* 10 P* 20
P
S
30
E
20
Q
10
Example:
Grocery
Telephone, gas and electricity
Amusement park
Membership fee
Rent for the equipment
Entrance fee
146
($30 20)(10)
$50
2
Multi-plant monopoly
max TR(Q1 Q2 ) TC1 (Q1 ) TC2 (Q2 )
Q1 ,Q2
FOC:
MR MC1 0
Q1
MR MC2 0
Q2
MR MC1 MC2
Example:
max [20 (Q1 Q2 )](Q1 Q2 ) Q12 2Q2 2 20Q1 20Q2 Q12 2Q1Q2 Q22 Q12 2Q2 2
Q1 ,Q2
20 4Q1 2Q2 0
Q1
(1)
20 2Q1 6Q2 0
Q2
(2)
(3)
147
Example:
The consumer goods giant, Procter and Gamble, offers 12 different versions of its Head
and Shoulders shampoo and another 12 varieties of its Crest toothpaste.
Definition:
Example:
Airline companies offer economy class, business class and first class service.
P1 t ( x
1
)
2
V P1
t
z0
x1
x2
z 1
1
1 V P1
1
1 V P1
and P1 t ( x2 ) V x2
P1 t ( x1 ) V x1
2
2
t
2
2
t
148
V P1
2N
(V P1 ) .
t
# of retail outlet
Note that the demand function is a decreasing function of P . When P , consumers who are
t
further away from the shop will buy the product. As a matter of fact, if P V , then all consumers
2
t
will buy the product. Define p( N ,1) V .
2
1 V P
1 x2
2
t
c:
the monopolists per unit cost.
1 V P
the setup costs for each retail outlet
F:
2
t
t
V P
Profit function facing the monopolist which is selling to the whole market:
2
t
t
( N ,1) N [ p( N ,1) c] F N V c F
P V
2
2
2 outlets
P
V
z0
t
p( N , 2) V ;
4
( N , 2) N V c 2 F
4
1
1 V P2
P2 t ( x2 ) V x2
4
4
t
1 1 V P
1 V P
t
P V
2 4
t
4
t
4
149
z 1
3 outlets
P
V
z0
t
p( N ,3) V ;
6
c nF
2n
z 1
( N ,3) N V c 3F
6
n outlets
p ( N , n) V
t
;
2n
( N , n) N V
max ( N , n) N V
c nF
n
2n
FOC:
Nt
Nt
F 0 n2
n
2
2F
2n
Nt
2F
Note that when n , the price will be closer to the reservation price, and thereby captures a
greater proportion of consumer surplus.
[Note that we can interpret the spatial model as a model of difference in taste. Instead of address of a
location, z can be interpreted as the taste. The retail store now becomes a product with a particular
taste, and consumers will lose some utility by consuming products differs from his taste. In this case,
n becomes the number of different varieties of products offered by the monopolist.
Also note that the monopolist has the incentive to offer many varieties of a good. Doing so allows the
monopolist to exploit the wide variety of consumer tastes, charging each consumer a higher price
because each is being offered a variety that is very close to the most preferred type. It is not surprising
that we can see extensive product proliferation in real-world markets such as those for cars, soft drinks,
toothpaste, cameras, etc.]
150