Pelobello v.

Palatino
Facts:
Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. Pelobello filed a quo
warranto proceeding alleging that Palatino is no longer qualified to hold office
because he was already convicted before and was even imprisoned. Because of
such conviction and imprisonment, Pelobello averred that Palatino is already barred
from voting and being voted upon. Palatino also invoked par (a), sec 94 of the
Election Code which supports his contention. It is also admitted that the respondentappellee was granted by the Governor-General a conditional pardon back in 1915;
and it has been proven that on December 25, 1940, His Excellency, the President of
the Philippines, granted the respondent-appellee absolute pardon and restored him
to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights.
Issue:
WoN absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification
incident to criminal conviction
Held:
YES. The pardoning power is only subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, and cannot be controlled or restricted by legislative action. After the
pardon was granted, Palatino had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected
councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected
municipal president of that municipality three times in succession (1922-1931); and
finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in
December, 1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in
granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in
deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date
mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code
for assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a
restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive.

Barrioquinto v Fernandez
Facts:
Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made
during the war. The case was proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was
nowhere to be found. Jimenez was then sentenced to life imprisonment. Before the
period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware
of Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be
charged with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the
enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Barrioquinto
learned about the proclamation and he surfaced in order to invoke amnesty as well.
However, Commissioner Fernandez of the 14th Amnesty Commission refused to
process the amnesty request of the two accused because the two refused to admit

to the crime as charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino
was the one who committed the crime being charged to them.
Issue:
granted.

WoN an admission of guilt is necessary before an amnesty could be

Held:
NO. In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation,
it is not necessary that he should, as a condition, admit having committed the
criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a
defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused,
shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty
Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that invocation of the benefits of
amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. Although the
accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the
courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For,
whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he
is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested
party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the
accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance
to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide
whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be regarded as a patriot or
hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation, or not, in accordance
with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a
public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should
take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein
to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by
the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented shows that
the accused is entitled to said benefits.

Vera vs. People

Facts:
Vera, together with 92 others were charged for the crime of kidnapping with
murder done against a certain Lozaes. The said crime was committed allegedly to
aid the Japanese occupation. During the hearing, none of the petitioners-defendants
admitted having committed the crime charged. In fact, Gaudencio Vera, the only
defendant who took the witness stand, instead of admitting the killing of the
deceased Lozaes, categorically denied it. Hence, the Amnesty Commission held
that it could not take cognizance of the case, on the ground that the benefits of the
Amnesty Proclamation, could be invoked only by defendants in a criminal case who,
admitting the commission of the crime, plead that said commission was in
pursuance of the resistance movement and perpetrated against persons who aided
the enemy during the Japanese occupation. Consequently, the Commission ordered
that the case be remanded to the court of origin for trial.

Issue:
guilt.

Whether or not the accused can avail of amnesty sans admission of

Held:
It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for
an act which, according to him, he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes the
commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed
a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation
imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to
prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of
a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the
allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening
facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the
amnesty proclamation. The present rule requires a previous admission of guilt since
a person would not need the benefit of amnesty unless he was, to begin with, guilty
of the offense covered by the proclamation.

Monsanto v Factoran Jr.

Facts:
Petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was accused of the crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and sentenced her to imprisonment and to
indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the
amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately. She was given an absolute
pardon by President Marcos which she accepted. Petitioner requested that she be
restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still
vacant, she also asked for the back pay for the entire period of her suspension.
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment. The Office of the President said that that acquittal,
not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement
to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and
emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension. In fact, in such a
situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before he can
reassume his former position. And a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. Petitioner
argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact
that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending
appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her
employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been
terminated or forfeited. The court viewed that is not material when the pardon was
bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same.
Issue:
WoN a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the
Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a
new appointment.

Held:
No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that
the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly
untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power
from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral
risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction. The absolute
disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public
documents. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To
regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo
the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

Llamas v Orbos
Facts:
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some
other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts
constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for
office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than
30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned
hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed
upon him.
Issue:

WoN a pardon can be applied to Administrative cases.

Held:
YES. The SC held that pardon is applicable to Administrative cases. The SC
does not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot
grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is a considered view that if the
President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal
offenses.

Magdalo v Comelec
Facts:
Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking its registration and/or
accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR)
for participation in the 2010 National and Local Elections. It was represented by its
Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV (Trillanes), and its Secretary General,
Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo). Taking cognizance of the Oakwood incident,

the COMELEC denied the Petition, claiming that MAGDALOs purpose was to employ
violence and unlawful means to achieve their goals.
Issue:
WoN in light of the Amnesty grant to the petitioner, COMELEC had
gravely abused its discretion in rejecting the application of Magdalo
Held:
NO. An amnesty grant guarantees the freedom from the burden of having
been convicted in all aspects; however, it cannot be said that the COMELEC had
gravely abused its discretion in rejecting Magdalos application as the COMELEC
have stated sufficiently its grounds for doing so. Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of
the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations, and coalitions that seek to achieve
their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be denied registration. This
disqualifications is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that no
political party which seeks to achieve its goals through violence shall be entitled to
accreditation. In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was
attended with violence. As publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during
the siege, their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the
administration of former President Arroyo and to divulge the alleged corruption in
the military and the supposed sale of arms to enemies of the state. Ultimately, they
wanted the President, her cabinet members, and the top officials of the AFP and the
PNP to resign. To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied by
civilians, march in the premises in full battle gear with ammunitions, and plant
explosives in the building. These brash methods by which MAGDALO opted to
ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw its support from the
government constituted clear acts of violence.

Spouses Constantino vs Cuisia

Facts:
During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce
the countrys external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts.
Three restructuring programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts
including buyback and bond-conversion programs. Constantino as a taxpayer and in
behalf of his minor children who are Filipino citizens averred that the buyback and
bond-conversion schemes are burdensome and that these do not constitute the loan
contract or guarantee contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the Constitution. And
assuming that the President has such power unlike other powers which may be
validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly
reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. They argue that the
gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that
the President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of
prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitutionthe Monetary
Boardreinforces the submission that not respondents but the President alone and

personally can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop
acting pursuant to the scheme.
Issue:
WoN the schemes constitute a delegation of the power enunciated in
Sec 20, Art 7 of the Constitution and whether they can be delegated.
Held:
YES. There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that
the president may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/
prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and
the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the
president can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency
of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to
execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of
establishing and executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is deep
within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to
raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet
any other sovereign debt management goals. If the President were to personally
exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause
from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming
detailed activitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and
choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting
countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the
concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal
to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to
sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very
existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders
thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running
the government. There are certain powers of the President that cannot be
delegated; the powers in Sec 20, Article 7 of the Constitution is not among these
non-delegable powers.

Commissioner of Customs v Eastern Sea Trading

Facts:
Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from Japan
onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered
the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply
with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to Executive
Order 328. On the other hand, EO 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and
Financial Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into between the
Philippines and Japan. The said executive agreement states, among others, that all
import transactions between Japan and the Philippines should be invoiced in dollar.
In this case, the said items imported by EST from Japan were not invoiced in dollar.
EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive agreement

that the EO was implementing was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue
was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The
Commissioner appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the concurrence
by the Senate.
Held:
No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the
concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by
the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive
agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the
more formal instruments treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form
of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents
denominated agreements or protocols.
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other
governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive agreements
or exchanges of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready
ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of
executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive
agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have
been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in
order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous
in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in
our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the
Executive without the approval of the Senate.
They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues,
income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and
commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration
of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific
congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of
Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still
others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign
governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.

Bayan v Executive Secretary

Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among
others, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted
to a series of conferences and negotiations, which culminated on January 12 and 13,
1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively
signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. Pres.
Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate

approved it by (2/3) votes. Petitioners assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987
constitution is applicable and not Section 21, Article VII. Following the argument of
the petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are
sufficiently met:a) it must be a treaty,b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that
purpose if so required by congress, andc) recognized as such by the other
contracting state. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII
is applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the
concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.

Issue:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of
Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?

Held:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving
foreign military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a
certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article
VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of
determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the
senate. The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and
permanent. We find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops
or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. It is
inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding
as a treaty.

Pimentel v Office of the Executive Secretary

Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the
Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed
copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the
Philippines for its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction
over the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and
crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie
du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Statute however require that it be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory state. Petitioners contend that
ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a function of
the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed
copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.

Issue:
Senate

WoN the ratification of an international treaty is a function of the

Held:
NO. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the
external relations and he is also the country's sole representative with foreign
nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign affairs. In treatymaking, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and
enter into treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3 required
vote of all the members of the Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).
The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the
field of foreign relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and
growth.