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International Journal of Ethics.
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formoral cultureappears to be the indispensablepositiveconditionof a new avatar of the religious spirit. A new moral
earnestness must precede the rise of larger religious ideals.
For the new religioussynthesis,which manylong for,will not
be a fabrication,
but a growth. It will not steal upon us as a
thiefin the night,or burstupon us as lightningfromthe sky,
but will come in time as a resultof the gradual moral evolution of modern society, as the expression of higher moral
aspirations,and a response to deeper moral needs.
FELIX
THE
LAW OF RELATIVITY
ADLER.
IN ETHICS,
I.
IT is the intentionof this essay to prove that the validityof
all the moral laws rests on definiterelations and conditions,
and that the law of relativity-thefundamentallaw of knowledge-therefore applies also in the sphere of ethics. It will
appear in the sequel that this view helps to bring out the
essentialpoints of the nature of ethical perceptionand moral
laws.
We will begin by inquiring in what sense and with what
justice we speak of moral laws at all. The term" law" is not
used here in the same sense as it is employed in naturalphilosophy,psychology,or sociology. For it is notthe business
of ethics to point out the rules which are the basis of actual
human desire and conduct, but those principles and ideals
which oughtto underliethem; the standard to which it must
submit. That meaningof the word " law," which may be employed in philosophical ethics, reminds one of the way the
word is used in positivelaw, in theological ethics,and in the
scienceofpositivemorality,-viz.,ofmannersand the principles
on which public opinion is founded. But philosophical ethics
is distinguishedfromthese sciences in that it is not dependent
on any external authority,natural or supernatural. On the
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would not,and could not,acknowledgemorallaws. What position to take towards such individualsis a question which we
shall touch lateron. We onlymaintainherethatall morallaws
are solid only in relationto a positive psychological.,presupof ethics.*
position. This is thepsychologicalrelativity
I I.
to determinethe psychological basis
But it is not sufficient
and the correspondingethical principle. The circumstances
underwhich the rules deduced fromthe principle need to be
nay,
applied are so entangled and complex that it is difficult,
without
applied
be
might
which
impossible, to find rules
hesitancyin all special conditionsand circumstances.
The universallaw cannot foreseeall possible circumstances
in which a man might be forced to make a final resolution.
the moral law has in common with the legal
This difficulty
and theological law, as well as with the laws of positive morality. Life is too rich and manifoldto be forcedinto a cutand-dried system. The conditions pass into one anotherby
shades and colors. There are no sharp dividmany different
ing lines. The general law, underwhich all cases should be
and
classed, soon becomes inapplicablein a particular,definite,
unique instance. The moral law must,therefore,-ifit is not
to sacrificethe true right of lifeto a seeming con?istency,only judge the general directionor the tendencyof the will;
and not give any special instructionas to how one should act
unconditionallyon particular occasions. In no other way
can the general validity of the law be reconciled with the
varying circumstances that differwith occasions and ages.
This may be called the historicalrelativityof the contentsof
the morallaw.t On the same psychologicalbasis, and accorddecisions mustbe
ing to the same universalstandard,different
historicalconditionsand circumstances,
made under different
as well in regardto the order of societyas in regardto the
* I have developed this thought before,but more froma methodological
pointof view in my"Ethik" (Dan. ed., i887, pp. 35-37; Germ.ed., I888, pp.
39-42).
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* Ibid., p. 193.
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20I.
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involvingthe deteriorationand the exterminationof the individual, it is a proof of some imperfectionin the order of society. The ideal is reached onlywhen the individual'sefforts
in the cause of societyalso serve the freeand harmoniousdevelopmentof his own facultiesand impulses. The greatest
welfareis to be foundwhere every individual develops himself in his own manner,and stimulates a similar development in other individuals. The individual is, then,at once
means and end. The point is that work in the directionof
the moral aim accomplishes itselfwithin the individual,but
that the amnount
of work that may be accomplished depends
on, and varies with,the stored-up capabilities. Every law
which gives not only the direction of work, but also its
quantity-" the quantumsatis of the human will," to use Henrik Ibsen's expression-can only state an average or a minimum. Thus it fareswiththe moral law in its positivehistoric
form. The standardapplied by the individualto himselfin a
certainage and a certain countrywill bear the stamp of his
time,his social rank,and his race. He judges his conduct as
he thinksan impartialspectatorof his people would judge it.
And even if the claims he thus makes on himselfbe fulfilled,
ratherby the general tendency-the innermostsoul-of his
desires than by a numberof adequate actions,it has still its
great pedagogical value in that the demands bear the stampof
objectivityas well as that of ideality. The desire to rise beyond his actual conduct will animate him the sooner and
easier. The contrastbetweentheideal and the social demand,
on the one hand, and the actual desire of the individual,on
the other,may oftenbe a necessarytransitionalstage to the
settingfreeof those moral effortsthat lie withinthe power of
the individual. A spark is necessary to give freedomto the
locked-up energy. And there are natures whose energies
can only be set free by a painful conflict with objective
principles. The way to harmony leads with them through
discords.
The two propositions-that the morallaw should formulate
the directionof conduct,and that it should act educativelystand in close connection with one another. For both de-
45
mands are fulfilledby the types or ideals which the moral law
holds up before us. The direction points to an ideal and
calls to imitationat the same time.
The clear distinctionbetween scientificand actual ethics,
between moral philosophy and moral exhortation,obtrudes
itselfhere. It is of importance,practicallyspeaking,that the
aim for all should be high, in order to develop the energies.
It seems necessaryto ask too much when we desire to get the
necessaryamount of work done. But scientificethics,in determiningthe conception of the moral law, can take no
cognizance of practicalnecessities. It does not enterintothe
in pracscientificconsideration,whetherit be easy or difficult
tice, to find the law which is appropriateto the particular
nature of a certain individual. Scientificethics,on the other
hand, in spite of seeming contradiction,presents an ideal
to the art of right conduct,forit can hardlybe doubted that
moral teaching will become efficientin proportionas it is
individualized. General moralizing cannot be held to be
effectual.
3. It may be asked, " Is not the moral law deduced from
the principle of welfare? Is this not a conclusion which no
regard for the natureof the individual can shake ? What is
thereforefairand just according to the general principle,must
be valid forall individuals." But, as we have alreadypointed
out, each individual,withall his capacities,is part and parcel
of that organismwhose well-beingis to be promoted. When,
consequently,an inexorable demand is made for something
which transcendshis powers,thereresultsan incongruitybetween societyand the individualwhich contradictsthe principle of welfareitself,-an incongruitywhose cause may be
which is inflicted
other than the individual. That suffering
on the individual by the irreconcilabledemands of his own
nature and those of society is to be looked upon not only as
a punishment,-like the sufferingthat arises from the disagreementof the individual natureand externalnature,-but
also as a misfortune, When it is found that changes in the
structureof society and the consequent conditionsestablished
forthe individualhave oftenmore influenceon the occurrence
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one's self,as Socrates,the founderof ethics,taughtso impressively. The great importanceof the fundamentalthought of
Socrates shows itselfhere. Self-deceptionis veryeasy when
we tryto discover our capacityand determineits limits. No
in this case. One must
objectivecriterionis wholly sufficient
always risk something. Every choice is here a practical
hypothesisto be verifiedby experience. An individualwho
in his ethical formulawould
introducesincorrectco-efficients
not be able to accomplish his task.
The same holds when,as an example to illustratethe law
of relativityin ethics, we consider self-controlinstead of
vocation.
Self-controlin some things may coexist withtotal absence
of self-controlin otherthings. The Indians, forinstance,are
when they fall into
able to bear the most horrible sufferings
the hands of theirenemies,or when, by voluntarysubmission
to castigations and tortures,they aim to propitiate and do
honor to their gods. Illness, too, they sufferwithout complaint; and theydemand of theirwives to bring forthwithout
exclamationsof pain. In theiroutwardbehavior they always
preserveperfectcalmness,spotless gravityand decency,even
when the strongestpassions upheave them inwardly. But in
the presence of enjoymentsof food,drink,and games, they
cannot restrainthemselves. It needed great exertionon the
part of some chiefsto lay down the rule that drunkennessis a
vice. This is a proofthatself-controlis not a constantfactor,
independentof all otherparts of the innerlifeof man.
A special application of the principleof individualization
has to be made in relation to the sexual instinct. Different
individualsare very dissimilarin this respect. There are persons whose instinctharmonizeswiththeir moral feelings,not
demandingsatisfactionwhereit is not the basis of a deep devotion to another individual,who is looked upon with joy and
admiration. This is the more important,consideringthatthe
satisfactionof the sexual instinct,not being possible without
relationto another,is specially subject to a moral judgment.
the
Apart fromthis relation and the resultingresponsibility,
satisfactionof the sexual instinctwould have to be judged
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of punishmentbe fixed.* By what right,then,can one demand absolute eliminationin some cases ? For the unreliabilityof the insightinto a criminal's character,which causes
the period of punishmentnot to be fixed beforehand,must
also destroythe possibilityof laying down eliminationas the
only possible expedient.
(b) A new problem arises when the incorrigibleantisocial
dispositions are explained by atavism. How could such
marked peculiarities that influencenot only one side of an
individual's character,but his whole nature maintain themselves in the race along with peculiaritiesof a totallydifferent
kind ? How could the thread which connects the individual
with the primitiverace escape being woven togetherwiththat
otherthreadwhich links it to the directlypreceding generations and the institutionsand traditionsproduced and transmitted by them? To put it in other words: granted that
the explanationby atavism is correct yet atavism is noproof
that societyowes no debt,and consequently
no dutyto the individual. For if the antisocial germs have maintainedthemselves in the race in a latent formfor so long a time without
that must be the resultof failingsand imbeing transformed,
perfectionsin the life of mankind itself. The perfectionof
social conditions and the moral life generallymust be measured,not by the positive advance alone, but by the lost and
neglectedpossibilities. The more perfectthe state of society
is, the more does it act on the innermostbeing of individuals.
Atavism, therefore,is in itselfa sign of social imperfection,
and does not justifyplacing society and the criminal over
against each otheras absolute rightand absolute wrong. In
placing criminals,both as regardsbody and mind,outside the
* " Criminologie,"p. 395.
t G. Tarde has criticisedthisexplanationin his " Criminalitecomparee." He
arrivesat the conclusionthat,thoughthereare unquestionablephysiologicaland
anatomicalanalogiesbetweenborncriminalsand savages, and thoughcriminals,
like all monsters,exhibitretrogressive
traits,
yetthesetraitsare combinedin them
in apeculiar manner. It is wrong,therefore,to judge our ancestorsby this
method(p. 46). The combination,
then,mustbe explained,and it surelycannot
be independentof social evolution.
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THE
ETHICS
OF LAND
H6FFDING.
TENURE.