Erkenn

DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9485-9

Epistemic Disagreement and Practical Disagreement

Christopher Cowie

Received: 19 March 2012 / Accepted: 7 April 2013

 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract It is often thought that the correct metaphysics and epistemology of

reasons will be broadly unified across different kinds of reason: reasons for belief,
and reasons for action. This approach is sometimes thought to be undermined by the
contrasting natures of belief and of action: whereas belief appears to have the
constitutive aim of truth (or knowledge), action does not appear to have any such
constitutive aim. I develop this disanalogy into a novel challenge to metanormative
approaches by thinking about disagreement. The constitutive aim of belief can play
a role in adjudicating epistemic disagreements for which there is no analogue in
practical disagreements. Consequently, we have more reason, all else being equal, to
expect convergence in epistemic judgment than in practical judgment. This represents a prima facie challenge to the metanormative theorist because the extent of
(suitably specified) disagreement in an area of thought is of prima facie significance
for the metaphysics of that area of thought.
It is often thought that the correct metaphysics and epistemology of reasons will be
broadly unified across different kinds of reason: reasons for belief, and reasons for
action. A number of authors have recently attempted to develop such a unified or
metanormative approach.1 There is much to recommend this approach: reasons for
belief and reasons for action are, after all, both reasons. But there are also
disanalogies between reasons for belief and reasons for action that might be thought
to undermine it. One disanalogy sometimes mentioned in the literature concerns the
contrasting natures of belief and of action. It is claimed that whereas belief appears
1

Metanormativity is, admittedly, a broad church. Those who explicitly self-identify as metanormativists include Chrisman (2010), and especially Enoch (2011a), Ch. 4. Many more views might
reasonably be thought to fall under this classification, including (e.g.) Scanlon (1998), Gibbard (2003),
Wedgwood (2002), Parfit (2011), Skorupski (2011).

C. Cowie (&)
Fitzwilliam College, University of Cambridge, Storeys Way, Cambridge CB3 0DG, UK
e-mail: cdc33@cam.ac.uk

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to have the constitutive aim of truth (or knowledge), action does not appear to
have any such constitutive aim.2 In what follows, I develop this disanalogy into a
novel challenge to metanormative approaches.
I develop the argument by thinking about disagreement. The constitutive aim of
belief can play a role in adjudicating epistemic disagreements for which there is no
analogue in practical disagreements. Consequently, we have more reason, all else being
equal, to expect convergence in epistemic judgment than in practical judgment. This
represents a prima facie challenge to the metanormative theorist. It represents a prima
facie challenge because the extent of (suitably specified) disagreement in an area of
thought is of prima facie significance for the metaphysics of that area of thought.
The argument proceeds as follows. Firstly, I set out a requirement for
convergence in normative judgmentthe shared criteria requirement. Secondly, I
identify a sense in which this requirement is met for epistemic judgment but not for
practical judgment. Thirdly, I explain this in terms of the disanalogy in the
constitutive aims of belief and action. Fourthly, I respond to objections.

1 Disagreement and Shared Criteria

What is the source of normative disagreement, or disagreement about what reasons
one has? In this section it is claimed that the source of normative disagreement is, in
part, a lack of shared normative criteria for adjudicating normative disagreements.
This appears to apply to both practical, and epistemic, normative disagreements.
Begin by thinking about practical disagreement: disagreement about what one has
reason to do. Two sources of practical disagreement are often highlighted in the
literature. The first is ignorance of non-normative matters. An example illustrates. Two
disputants may agree that the most reasonable course of action is that which maximises
welfare. But they may nonetheless disagree on which course of action is most reasonable
if one or more is ignorant as to which course of action in fact maximises welfare. A
second obvious source of disagreement is a failing in the procedural rationality of one or
more of the disputants.3 For example, two disputants may agree both that the most
reasonable course of action is that which maximises welfare, and that a particular course
of action, A, maximises welfare. But unless they are sufficiently rational in combining
their beliefs (so as to conclude that the appropriate course of action is A), then we should
not expect them to reach agreement on what the appropriate course of action is.
That disputants are well-informed and (procedurally) rational may be necessary
for convergence in practical judgment. But it is not obviously sufficient. It is also
necessary that disputants share normative criteria for adjudicating disputes. In the
above example, the disputants share the normative criterion that the required course
2

This is expressed in the context of scepticism about companions in guilt arguments between morality
and epistemology (such as that undertaken in Cuneo 2007) in Lillehammer Lillehammer and Hallvard
(2007), and p. 170. FitzPatrick (2009), p. 757. See also Darwall (2003), pp. 483488, Tersman (2006),
p. 96.

I have claimed that disagreement often has its source in failings of procedural rationality. But it might
be claimed that disagreements also often have their source in failings of substantive rationality (that is, in
failure to respond to the reasons that one has). See Fn. 7.

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of action is that which maximises welfare. If they did not share this criterion then
factual agreement and (procedural) rationality would be insufficient to yield
convergence in their judgment about which course of action was required. This
gives rise to an intuitive requirement on convergence in normative judgment. For
disputants to converge (non-accidentally) in their normative judgments, they must
share some normative criteria for determining when those judgments are correct.4
Ill call this the shared criteria requirement: it is necessary for two (or more)
disputants to (non-accidentally) converge in their judgments that they share
common normative criteria for determining which judgment is correct. The above
example illustrates this in an over-simplified sense. In reality, disputes will not
always rest on simple normative principles (e.g. it is reasonable to do whatever
maximises welfare). Rather, disputes will rest on a number of different background
principles and particular judgments of greater and lesser degrees of determinacy and
importance. The fewer the criteria that disputants share, or the less determinate or
important these criteria are, the less convergence we should expect.
One of the sources of philosophical interest in practical disagreement is that it
appears that frequently, the shared criteria requirement is met to an insufficient degree
to ensure convergence, even amongst apparently rational and well-informed
disputants. Disputants lack sufficient basic shared normative criteria to resolve
disputes about, for example, abortion, medical research, and gun control, not to
mention in genuinely inter-cultural practical disputes.5 This gives rise to arguments for
scepticism about practical, especially moral, judgment, and to abductive arguments
for metaphysical anti-realism about practical, and again especially moral, judgment.6
And whilst the soundness of these arguments is sometimes contested, they nonetheless
represent an important prima facie challenge to the scope of our practical knowledge,
and to straightforwardly realistic views of the metaphysics of practical normativity.7
4

Some philosophers are optimistic that informed and procedurally rational disputants would converge in
a substantial proportion of their practical judgments (e.g. Brink 1989, pp. 197210; Parfit 2011, p. 543,
and see also Jackson 1998, Ch. 5). But there is good reason to be sceptical of this e.g. Mackie (1977),
p. 37, Enoch (2011a), p. 191. I discuss this further in Objections and Replies below.

Elga (2007), (Sec. 1213) claims that disputants about the cluster of issues related to the permissibility
of abortion typically lack sufficient shared normative criteria for convergence. See Kornblith (2010) for
the view (in response to Elga) that whereas disputants may share criteria in these cases, criteria are not
shared in cases of inter-cultural practical disagreements.

Arguments from disagreement to metaphysical conclusions take a number of forms, e.g.: (1) abductive
arguments against moral realism, and for moral constructivism (e.g. Harman 1996, 2000); (2) arguments from
judgment dependent theories of moral truth to moral error theories (see e.g. Tersman 2004, Ch. 4); (3)
arguments from conceptual requirements on convergence to moral error theories (see e.g. Lillehammer 2004).

For the most thorough discussion of, and rejection of, arguments from disagreement to metaphysical
anti-realist conclusions, see Enoch (2009, 2011a) Ch. 8. One of the most obvious reasons for rejecting any
arguments of this form concerns the use of rationality (Ibid., pp. 210211). I have claimed that
disagreements amongst procedurally rational and well-informed agents pose a prima facie challenge to
claims to moral knowledge, and to straightforwardly realistic accounts of practical normativity. But it
might be objected that it is only disagreements amongst substantially rational agents that have this
consequence. And it might be thought that substantially rational agents would share normative criteria
(or at least that we have no compelling reason to think otherwise). My response is concessive. If
well-informed and substantially rational agents were to disagree, this would be sufficient for rejecting
claims to moral knowledge, and to straightforwardly realistic accounts of practical normativity. By
contrast, I have merely claimed that disagreement amongst well-informed and procedurally rational

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My concern is with whether epistemic disagreements pose an analogous prima facie

challenge to epistemic knowledge, and to straightforwardly realistic views of the
metaphysics of epistemic normativity. Do apparently rational and informed parties lack
shared criteria for resolving disputes about what they have reason to believe in anything
like the sense that their practical counterparts appear to? On a first pass, perhaps they
seem to. Suppose that we understand epistemic disagreements as disagreements about
whether a source of evidence provides a reason to believe a conclusion. Such
disagreements can often be traced to a lack of shared criteria for adjudicating whether a
source of evidence is reason-providing. For example, my friend Stuart thinks that he has
reason to believe whatever The Bible says. I dont. These are fairly fundamental
commitments for Stuart and I, and we appear to lack sufficient shared criteria to make
progress in resolving our disagreement. I use the criterion of naturalistic plausibility to
assess whether theres reason to believe what the Bible says. And so, I dont take there to
be strong reason to believe much of what it says. But Stuart rejects the criterion of
naturalistic plausibility precisely because it would lead him to deny that there is much
reason to believe what the Bible says. Our criteria are in conflict. A fortiori, the shared
criteria requirement is not met to a sufficient degree to allow for convergence.
2 Formal and Substantial Criteria
In this section I raise the possibility that, in fact, practical and epistemic
disagreement are not as similar as the above argument suggests. There is a sense in
which the shared criteria requirement may be met for epistemic disputes, but not for
practical disputes. And as a consequence, if all else is equal, we should expect a
greater degree of convergence in epistemic judgment than in practical judgment.
Consider the following rather abstract sense in which criteria requirement might
be thought to be shared for epistemic disputes: judgments about reasons for belief
are answerable to the truth of the beliefs that would result from following them. If
Stuart thought that believing whatever the Bible says was likely to lead him to form
a lot of false beliefs, then he wouldnt take himself to have much reason to believe
whatever the Bible says. And if I thought that believing whatever the Bible says was
likely to lead me to form a lot of true beliefs, then I would alter my epistemic
judgment accordingly too. Failure of either of us to revise our epistemic judgment in
this way would likely belie some irrationality or conceptual incompetency on our
part. We are, then, operating with the following, admittedly rough, shared criterion
for assessing epistemic judgments: a source of evidence provides reason for
believing a conclusion to the extent that it increases the likelihood that the
conclusion believed is true rather than false. For short, Ill say that we would share
the criterion of the reliability for truth of a source of evidence in assessing the
reason for belief provided by that source of evidence.
The reliability for truth criterion clearly admits of extensions and precisifications,
but the present formulation is (as I hope will become clear) sufficient for present
Footnote 7 continued
agents poses a prima facie challenge to claims to moral knowledge, and to straightforwardly realistic
accounts of practical normativity. This may satisfy Enoch (see Ibid., p. 213, Fn. 72).

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purposes. The important point is that plausibly, the truth-values of ones subsequent
beliefs can function as a shared criterion of assessment for epistemic judgments (at
least amongst the rational and conceptually competent).8 I defend this claim further
in the following section. For present, however, I focus on introducing a challenge to
the view that there is an analogous criterion for assessing practical judgment.
I begin by taking Wedgwoods discussion of the action-guiding mental state
choice as a foil for thinking about practical reasons and the criteria for assessing
them. Is there some criterion, analogous to the reliability for truth criterion, which
could be used to assess judgments about choice? Wedgwood works with
choiceworthiness as an analogue to truth. It is plausible that (rational and
conceptually competent) disputants would agree that whether one has reason to
choose some course of action depends on the likelihood that the course of action is
choiceworthy. Much as with the discussion of belief and truth above, one who
denies this belies some form of irrationality or conceptual incompetence. So, it may
appear that just as reliability for truth is an (admittedly abstract) shared criterion for
adjudicating epistemic disputes, so reliability for choiceworthiness is an analogous
shared criterion for adjudicating practical disputes.
In fact though, reliability for choiceworthiness isnt analogous to reliability for
truth. Reliability for choiceworthiness is much weaker, or less informative, than
reliability for truth. We can see this by employing a distinction made by Velleman.
Velleman draws a distinction between two different ways in which the aim of a
practice can be specified.9 The aim of a practice can be specified either formally or
substantially. Velleman uses the example of chess to illustrate. The formal aim of
chess is winning. The substantial aim is what winning in chess consists in: checkmating the opponents king. More generally, the substantial aim of a practice is
whatever achieving its formal aim consists in. The terminology of aiming is
particular to Vellemans concerns, but the formal/substantial distinction can
usefully be applied to show how truth and choiceworthiness are dis-analogous.
They are disanalogous in that choiceworthiness is a merely formal norm on choice,
but truth is a substantial norm on belief. That choiceworthiness is a merely formal
norm on choice is intuitive. Choiceworthy simply means whatever one ought to
choose. But truth is not merely a formal characterisation of the norm that governs
belief. The formal norm that governs belief is whatever one ought to believe. But
true isnt simply a placeholder for whatever one ought to believe.10 So, truth
states a substantialalbeit very abstractnorm on belief. It follows that whereas
reliability for choiceworthiness is a merely formal criterion for assessing judgments
about what one has reason to choose, reliability for truth is an informative or
substantial criterion for assessing judgments about what one has reason to believe.11
8

I shant claim that sharing this criterion is sufficient for adjudicating all epistemic disputes. My claim
defended further below and in dealing with objections and repliesis merely that it is of some help.

Velleman (1996), p. 700. My presentation follows (in part) the discussed of Velleman in Wedgwood
(2002), pp. 1012.

10
Not unless (a particular variety of) pragmatism about belief holds as a conceptual truth. I assume it
does not.
11

Compare Darwall (2003), p. 485.

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C. Cowie

This is relevant for thinking about disagreement. All else equal, disputants are
more likely to converge in their judgment if they share a substantial criterion of
assessment of the disputed judgment than if they merely share a formal criterion.
This isnt to say that disputants who agree on a substantial criterion of assessment
for a disputed judgment will always have sufficient resource to converge on the very
same judgment. They may not. But they will still be better placed than those who do
not. Compare chess: players are more likely to agree who has won if they agree that
winning is achieved by check-mating the opponents king than if they dont (even if
they dont agree on exactly how castling works).

3 Correctness Conditions
I have suggested that there might be a substantial criterion of assessment of epistemic
judgment in terms of the reliability for truth criterion. And I have gestured toward,
though not yet argued for, the view that there is only a formal criterion of assessment of
practical judgment. In this section I present the arguments for these claims.
The argument is based on thinking about the correctness conditions of mental
states. The very general norms on mental states under discussiontruth and
choiceworthinessare explicable in terms of the correctness conditions of those
states. Correctness is a normative property of a mental state that applies to that state
merely insofar as it is the kind of thing that it is. More precisely, the correctness
conditions of a mental state specify the conditions under which a mental state goes
right or gets things right merely insofar as it is the kind of thing that it is.12 The
correctness norm is important in the present context because it allows us to identify
general norms on mental states just by reflecting on the nature of those states. I shall
claim that whereas reflection on the nature of belief allows one to see that a belief
goes right or is correct when it is true, reflection on the nature of choice only
allows one to see that a choice goes right or is correct when it is choiceworthy.
This explains why there is a substantial general norm on belieftruthon which
we can expect agreement amongst the conceptually competent, but only a formal
general norm on choicechoiceworthinesson which we can expect agreement
amongst the conceptually competent.
Begin with belief. How is it possible to arrive at the view that truth is a norm on
belief simply by reflecting on the nature of belief? The correctness conditions of a
belief state the conditions under which a belief goes right just insofar as it is the kind
of thing that it is. So in order to work out the conditions under which a belief is
correct, it is necessary to ask when a belief goes right merely insofar as it is the kind
of thing that it is. Belief is a representational state. It represents the world as being
thus-and-so. But it is not merely a representational state. It is a state which purports
to represent veridically. In this it is distinguished from other states which are
representational, but which dont purport to veridicality in their representation (e.g.
imagination, supposition, etc.).13 Given that belief is the kind of state which
12

Wedgwood (2002), p. 267. See also Thomson (2008), p. 83.

13

A point stressed by Velleman (1992), p. 12.

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purports to represent veridically, it is possible to state the correctness conditions of

belief. A belief is correct iff it represents veridically. Or, more simply:
Belief-Correctness: (For any agent, S, any proposition, P,) Ss belief that P is
correct iff P is true.
This quick sketch, and particularly some of the details, may of course be
contested. I discuss some worries below. But the basic idea is intuitive and
appealing. Truth is normative for belief because of the nature of belief itself.14 And
so, anyone who is fully competent with the concept of belief can come to know that
truth is normative for belief. Conceptual competence with belief suffices for some
very general knowledge of the norms on belief.
Before turing to the discussion of the correctness-conditions of choice, it is worth
developing the account a little further in the context of belief. The exact normative status
of correctness is contested. But on a number of plausible interpretations, the reliability
for truth criterion for assessing epistemic judgments falls out of Belief-Correctness
almost directly. Take Thomsons account as an example (though a number of other
similar models would serve my purpose).15 Thomson explains how the correctness
conditions of a mental state are reason-providing for that state. According to Thomsons
account, a fact provides a reason to hold a mental state with a particular content iff that
fact is evidence that it would be correct to hold in that mental state. Or:
Reasons for Mental States: For any agent S, any proposition, P: A fact, F, is a
reason, R, for S to hold some mental state A toward P iff F is evidence that P
satisfies the correctness conditions of A.16
This provides a plausible schema for the reasons for holding any kind of mental
state. Reasons for specific kinds of mental states are then specified by substituting in
the correctness conditions of that state. Substituting in the correctness conditions of
belief yields an account of reasons for belief which should be recognisable as the
reliability for truth criterion:
14
It might be objected that reasons for belief cant be explained solely in terms of the nature of belief for
reasons familiar from David Enochs Agency Schmagency and Schmagency Revisited (Enoch 2006;
Enoch 2011b). As applied to belief, the worry would take roughly the following form: one doesnt have
reason to believe what its correct for one to believe unless one has reason to be a believer (as opposed to
a schmeliever) in the first place. I dont attempt to provide a full response to Enochs worry here. I simply
note that Enochs worry applies to reasons for holding any mental state (e.g. belief and choice). And any
satisfactory response must also, I think, apply with equal generality. So, if a satisfactory response to
Enochs worry can be found, then, provided that my (independent) argument (below) for a disanalogy in
the correctness conditions of belief and choice is sound, there will be a subsequent disanalogy between
reasons for belief and reasons for choice. I leave the provision of a full response to Enochs worry to
another paper, or another author.
15

Especially Wedgwood (2007), pp. 154158. See also Kearns and Starr (2009).

16

Thomson (2008), pp. 130134. This formulation might be objected to if read from right-to-left.
According to some philosophers one doesnt have reason to believe a conclusion for which one has
(sufficient) evidence unless one has some interest in so believing (see e.g. Leite 2007; Steglich-Petersen
2011). For counter-argument see Kelly (2003, 2007). In any case, it is highly likely that agents who
disagree about a proposition do have an interest in it (if for no other reason than that they are disagreeing
about it). For the more radical view that agents have reasons to believe conclusions that they dont have
evidence for the truth of, see Sect. 5.1 below.

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Reasons for Belief: (For any agent S, any proposition, P) A fact, F, is a

reason, R, for S to believe that P iff F is evidence that P is true.
Can the approach sketched above be used to establish a substantial criterion for
assessing practical judgments? My claim is that it cannot. Reflection on the nature
of choice only allows us to establish a formal (not a substantial) norm on choosing:
choiceworthiness. To see this, suppose that we ask what the correctness conditions
of choice are. The correctness conditions of choice specify the conditions under
which ones choice goes right merely insofar as it is an instance of the kind of
thing that it is. But when does a choice go right as the kind of thing that it is?
Following the discussion of the previous section, we can, at a minimum, accept that
a choice goes right as the kind of thing that it is iff the course of action chosen is
choiceworthy. This allows us to state the following norm of correctness on choice:
Choice-Correctness: (For any agent, S, and any action, V,) It is correct for S
to choose to V iff V-ing is choice-worthy.
And so, following Thomsons suggested relation between correctness and reasons
we can deduce an approximation of reliability for choiceworthiness as follows:
Reasons for Choice: (For any agent S, and any action, V,) A fact, F, is a
reason, R, for S to choose to V iff F is evidence that V-ing is choice-worthy.
But is it possible to do any better than this? Is it possible, merely by reflecting
rationally on the nature of choice, to arrive at a substantial (not merely formal)
characterisation of choiceworthiness? Whilst it might be possible to arrive at some
constraints on choiceworthiness by reflecting on the nature of choice (e.g. that
choosing to simultaneously perform to incompatible courses of action is never
choiceworthy), I am sceptical of whether we can arrive at a more informative
characterisation of choiceworthiness (analogous to the role that truth plays in
relation to belief) simply by reflecting rationally on the nature of choice.
One intuitive reason for scepticism is similar in outline to the reasoning behind
the open question argument. It appears that one can always question, without
belying a lack of rationality or conceptual competence, whether a course of action
possessed of some specific non-normative property is in fact choiceworthy in virtue
of its possession of that property. And the burden of proof is on one who wishes to
show otherwise. If this is the case, then the burden of proof is on one who wishes to
show that there is some substantial characterisation of choiceworthiness on which
we should expect rational and conceptually competent agents to agree.17 And it is
surely reasonable to be sceptical of whether this burden could be discharged if we
think about the process by which one would go about working out a substantial
characterisation of choiceworthiness. It would require engaging in ordinary first
order practical justification, or reflective equilibrium.18 This process consists in
17

The significance of the open question argument for thinking about the disanalogy between reasons for
belief and reasons for action is pursued in greater length in Heathwood (2009).
18
Wedgwood (2003), p. 27. Compare Dworkin (2011), Ch. 8. According to Dworkin, there are no
conceptual truths in, or about, morality. All first-order and meta-ethical moral judgments are themselves
moral judgmentsjudgments whose justification rests on first-order moral theorising.

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reflecting on ones existing judgments about what is choiceworthy, both in the form
of particular judgments and general principles, and coming to a conclusion on this
basis. And there is no reason to expect disputants to settle on the same equilibrium
point. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, different agents may start with
commitments to different practical principles and intuitions. And secondly, even
those who start with similar intuitions and principles may weigh them differently,
thereby arriving at different equilibria. So, reflection on the process by which one
would go about working out a substantial characterisation of choiceworthiness does
not encourage optimism for convergence in that judgment.
There is a second kind of reason, sometimes mentioned in the literature, for
scepticism of convergence on a substantial characterisation of choiceworthiness. It
is that, in contrast to belief, there are many kinds of (good) reason that one can
adduce for choosing. Consider, for example, Scanlon:
since believing is believing to be true, the only kind of reason that one can
have for believing something is a reason for thinking it true Reasons for
action, on the other hand, are plural.19
Scanlon puts the point in terms of reasons for action rather than in terms of
reasons for choice. But I take it that the same point applies to choice too (I discuss
this further in the following section). Reasons for choice are plural: there are many
different dimensions along which a consideration might count in favour of choosing
some course of action. A consideration might count in favour of choosing some
course of action on account of its pragmatic properties, its moral properties, its
aesthetic properties, its comic properties, its legal properties, and so on.
This plurality of reasons for choice might be thought to undermine the prospect
of a substantial characterisation of choiceworthiness in two ways. Firstly, it is
reasonable to be sceptical of whether there really are all-things-considered reasons
for choice encompassing these many different dimensions. Consider, for example,
the possibility that at least some of the kinds of reason provided by these different
dimensions are incommensurable.20 It would be a consequence that there are at least
some cases in which there is no uniquely correct answer as to which course of action
is choiceworthy. But even if there are all-things considered reasons for choice we
might be sceptical of whether disputants would agree on them. Different agents may
weight the reasons provided by different dimensions of assessment differently. This
could lead to disagreement concerning which course of action is choiceworthy and it
is not obvious that any such differences would belie rational failings or conceptual
incompetencies on behalf of the disputants.

4 Extending the Argument: Action

I have argued that whereas conceptual competence may be sufficient to arrive at
substantial criterion of assessment for judgments about reasons for belief, the
19

Scanlon (1998), p. 36.

20

A possibility discussed in e.g. Chang (1997).

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C. Cowie

analogous claim cannot be made for judgments about reasons for choice. In this
section I extend the argument from choice to action and other action-guiding
mental states.
It might be thought that the argument presented above turns on the selection of
choice as the practical analogue of belief. Specifically, it might be thought that
there is a substantial criterion governing judgments about action on which we
should expect disputants to agree. But this would be mistaken. The argument
sketched above generalises. To show this, suppose that we ask whether there is
some norm which governs action and which would could be used as a criterion for
assessing judgments about reasons for action. It might be thought that there is: the
good. If so, then the good stands to action as truth stands to belief. I dont think,
however, that this is right. To see this, note that there are two ways in which we
might understand the good. One obvious way to understand it is simply as a placeholder for whatever one ought to do. So understood, we might reasonably expect
agreement that the good normatively governs actions. Any dissenters would belie a
conceptual incompetence. But if we think of the good in this way, then it is merely a
formal, not a substantial norm on action. And so it is not analogous to the role that
truth plays with respect to belief. Suppose, though, that we understand the good in
more substantial terms, not merely as a place-holder. This involves thinking of the
good as embodying some substantial first-order normative commitmentsfor
example, some form of consequentialism. Insofar as we do this, the good is a
substantial, not merely a formal, norm on action. And so it may ground a substantial
criterion of assessment for judgments about reasons for action. However, we no
longer have reason to expect agreement on that criterion. Much as with substantial
characterisations of choiceworthiness, defending a substantial conception of the
good would require engaging in first-order practical justification that goes beyond
mere reflection on the concept of action. And, as claimed above, we should be
sceptical of agreement on conclusions that must be reached by such a process.
Indeed, it is worth noting that we might think that a similar argumentative
strategy applies to, for example, moral emotions such as shame, guilt, regret, and so
on. There are purely formal normative relations between shame and shamefulness,
guilt and guiltworthiness, trust and trustworthiness. But as these are formal, not
substantial relations, they are not analogous to the role that truth plays relative to
belief. One might propose some substantial characterisation of shameworthiness,
guiltworthiness, trustworthiness, and so on. But, it would be necessary to engage in
first-order practical justification in order to arrive at such a substantial characterisation. And so we should be sceptical of agreement on that characterisation.
This response may not satisfy. It might be objected that the response given above
misses an important point. I have claimed that mere rational reflection on the nature
of action-guiding mental states (e.g. choice) yields only a formal characterisation of
the norms that govern these states. Many authors working on the correctness
conditions of action-guiding mental states would agree.21 But there are a number of
views in the literature according to which action itself does have a substantial
constitutive aim that can be ascertained just by thinking about the nature of those
21

e.g. Wedgwood (2003), Thomson (2008) (e.g. p. 132), Shah (2008), Shah and Evans (2012).

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states. Consider, for example, the views of David Velleman and Alan Millar.
According to (at least one time slice of) Velleman the constitutive aim of action is
autonomy, or the conscious control of ones action.22 And according to Millar the
constitutive aim of action is that the action have some end, point, or purpose.23
These are both substantial, or informative views of the constitutive aim of action.
And so they might be thought to represent a challenge to my argument.
In fact, I dont think these views do represent a challenge, nor would their authors
intend them to. To see this, it is necessary to be clear on the difference between
correctness as a property of mental states, and constitutive aims as Millar and
Velleman are understanding them. Correctness for mental states is a normative
property. It states when a mental state goes right as the kind of thing that it is. This
should not be confused with the constitutive aim of action in the sense that
Velleman and Millar are using it. The constitutive aim of action (in the sense that
they are understanding it) is not necessarily a normative property. It doesnt state the
conditions under which an action goes right as the kind of thing that it is. Rather, it
states what is intrinsic to all intentional actions.24 In claiming that action
constitutively aims at purposiveness or autonomy, these authors should be thought
of as claiming that autonomy or purposiveness are properties that are intrinsic to
action. They are properties such that to the extent that any putative action does not
possess them, it is not a bona fide action.
We can see the difference between correctness conditions and constitutive aims
clearly by contrasting the consequences of ones action failing to meet its
correctness condition with the consequences of ones action failing to meet its
constitutive aim. If ones action fails to meet its correctness conditioni.e. if that
action is not worthy of being performedthen one is worthy of criticism for
performing that action. One is worthy of criticism because one has performed an
action that one ought not to have performed. But the consequence of ones action
failing to meet its constitutive aimfailing to be autonomous, or purposiveis
rather different. It isnt necessarily that one is blameworthy at all. Rather, the
consequence is that one hasnt performed a full-blooded intentional action at all.
This highlights the sense in which whereas correctness is a normative property, a
constitutive aim is not.25
Given that the constitutive aim of a mental state neednt be normative for that
mental state, the views of Velleman and Millar arent in competition with my claim
that the correctness conditions of action (and action-guiding mental states) are
uninformative. The views of Velleman and Millar would represent a challenge to
the view that action doesnt have a substantial constitutive aim. But I have not
claimed that action does not have a substantial constitutive aim (in the sense that
they are using it). It may. I have only claimed that action (or choice) doesnt have a
22

Velleman (1996), p. 719.

23

Millar (2004), p. 68.

24

Ibid.

25

This point is nicely made by Millar: an action may achieve the constitutive aim whilst being subject
to criticism in all sorts of ways that are not explicable just in terms of the constitutive aim (Millar 2004,
p. 68).

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C. Cowie

substantial correctness condition. And their views do not (and are not, I think,
intended to) represent a challenge to this.

5 Objections and Replies

5.1 Objection 1
The first objection concerns the significance of my conclusion for the scope of
disagreement that we should expect in the epistemic and the practical domains
respectively. It might be objected that the existence of a substantial norm on a
mental state is neither necessary nor sufficient for convergence in judgments about
reasons for holding that mental state. Note firstly why the existence of a substantial
criterion of assessment is not necessary. Focus once again on the practical
judgment. According to some authors we should expect convergence on at least
some fixed points in their practical judgment, from which more general agreement
may follow.26 Disputants might agree, for instance, that some particular courses of
action (e.g. torturing children) are not choiceworthy. In this case, they will share
some criteria for resolving disputes. And yet their agreement is not a consequence of
any prior agreement on a substantial norm governing choice. Rather, it is a
consequence of agreement on particular cases. Note secondly that the existence of a
substantial norm governing a mental state is not sufficient. To see this, focus on the
mental state of belief. It is surely possible for disputants to agree on the reliability
for truth criterion for resolving an epistemic dispute without thereby having the
means to resolve that dispute. This will be the case if they disagree on what the
evidence available to them supports. The disagreement discussed above between
Stuart and myself over the status of the Bible is a relevant example.
My response to this objection isnt to contest these claims. I concede that the
existence of a substantial norm governing a mental state is neither necessary nor
sufficient for convergence in judgments about reasons for holding that mental state.
However, properly understood, this concession should not be thought of as
undermining my argument. This concession would undermine my argument if the
intended conclusion of my argument was:
(C1): In order for disputants to converge in their judgments on whether they
have reason to hold some mental state, it is necessary and sufficient that they
agree on some general, substantial criterion for assessing judgments about
reasons for holding that state.
But my intended conclusion is not as strong as this. Rather, my intention is to
draw a weaker conclusion which is compatible with the worries stated above. It is:
(C2): All else equal, we should be more confident that disputants will
converge in their judgments on whether they have reason to hold certain

26

See, for example, Pettit (2001), p. 123.

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mental states if they agree on some general substantial criterion for assessing
judgments about reasons for holding that state, than if they do not.
C2 is weaker than C1 in two ways. Firstly, the conclusion is qualified by an all
else equal clause. It is only if all else is equal that we should expect the disanalogy
in the correctness conditions to result in a disanalogy in the degree of convergence.
If, for example, there are more fixed points of convergence in practical judgment
than in epistemic judgment, then all else may not be equal. Secondly, the conclusion
is comparative (i.e. it is of the form we should expect a greater degree of
convergence in x than y). It does not state that we should expect convergence in
epistemic judgment, or that we shouldnt. Rather, it states that (all else equal) we
should be more expectant of convergence in the former than in the latter.
This weakened conclusion is no longer susceptible to the worries raised above.
But a sceptic may worry that the weakened conclusion fails to represent much of a
challenge to the metanormative theorist. The sceptic may concede that, all else
equal, we should expect some positive comparative degree of convergence in
epistemic judgment as a result of sharing the reliability for truth criterion. But he
may claim that the degree is very small indeed. Reliability for truth is, after all, a
highly abstract criterion, and is not of much use in resolving many epistemic
disputessuch as that between Stuart and myself. There are two lines of response to
this sceptical worry. The first line of response is direct. The reliability for truth
criterion may not settle all epistemic disputes. But it already does a lot of work in
helping to resolve many epistemic disputes. To see this, note that if epistemic
disputants did not share this criterion, then we ought not to expect them to resolve
their disputes even in those cases in which they come to agree on how reliable or
unreliable for truth a certain epistemic judgment is. But this is precisely how
ordinary, everyday, epistemic disputes are, with great frequency, resolved. The
sceptical worry may be accused of overlooking this. The second line of response is
more dialectically focussed. It is that the weakened conclusion implies that there is
prima facie reason to expect the degree of convergence in epistemic judgment and
practical judgment to differ. And the metanormative theorist must at least get his
hands dirty with the arguments to show that the difference in degrees of
convergence is insufficiently significant to trouble him.
5.2 Objection 2
The second objection concerns the correctness conditions of belief. The objection is
that although the correctness-condition of belief ground some reasons for belief, it is
not the only source of reasons for belief. Rosens Jingle Bells example helps to
illustrate the worry.27 There is a correct way to play Jingle Bellsby playing the
right notes in the right order in the right time. But it may be that one has reason to
play Jingle Bells incorrectlyfor comic purposes, or to teach a pupil, for example.
So, we shouldnt assume that one ought to play Jingle-Bells correctly. Analogously,
perhaps, for belief. There may be reasons for belief that are not exhausted by the
27

Example from Rosen, in Shah (2003).

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C. Cowie

correctness conditions of belief. Specifically, there may be pragmatic reasons for

belief.
One response to this challenge is concessive. Provided that it is accepted that the
reliability for truth of an epistemic judgment provides some reason to believe that
judgment, some progress has been made toward showing that practical disagreement
is problematic in a way that epistemic disagreement is not. This is because we have
found no criterion of assessment for practical judgment that would be accepted on
the basis of mere reflection on the relevant concepts. So, the fact that there is some
(merely conceptually based) substantial criterion for assessing epistemic judgmenteven if there are also some pragmatic criteria of assessmentconstitutes
progress toward my intended conclusion.
Nevertheless, this concession would weaken my argument. And it is in any case,
I think, possible to avoid it. The objection above relies on the existence of nonevidential or pragmatic reasons for belief. And the existence of pragmatic reasons
for belief is questionable.28 One obvious response to the claim that there are
pragmatic reasons for belief is that such reasons are merely motivating reasons for
belief. They are not normative reasons for belief. According to this response, it is
true that one can be caused to form a belief for pragmatic reasonsone can think
wishfully, for examplebut it is not true that ones belief can ever be justified by
pragmatic reasons. Only evidential reasons can justify ones belief. If this obvious
response is correct, then it is possible to admit that there are pragmatic reasons for
belief, but to deny that that this undermines my central claim. My central claim is
that truth is the only norm on belief. I am concerned with normative, not motivating,
reasons.
This therapeutic argument can be extended. It is possible to admit that
pragmatic concerns provide normative reasons for states very much like belief, just
not for belief itself. So, for example, pragmatic considerations may provide
normative reasons for supposing a proposition, or imagining a proposition. But they
neednt thereby provide normative reasons to believe that proposition. The fact that
I desire that P may indeed provide me with a normative reason to suppose that p.
But it neednt thereby provide me with a normative reason to believe that p. Once
again, it is possible to make sense of why one might think that there are normative
pragmatic reasons for belief without admitting that there in fact are any.
Obviously, this isnt a knockdown argument against (normative) pragmatic
reasons for belief. That is a project beyond the scope of this paper. But it goes a long
way to undermining the motivations for thinking that there are pragmatic reasons for
belief. So, it supports the view that the only reasons for believing a conclusion take
the form of evidence that the belief is correct.
28
There are a number of arguments against the existence of pragmatic reasons for belief in the literature.
For example, Thomson has argued that pragmatic reasons for belief represent a category mistake: if
there were pragmatic reasons for belief then one could believe whatever one wants to; but one cant
believe whatever one wants to; so there are not pragmatic reasons for belief. Thomson (2008), p. 138.
Relatedly, Pamela Hieronymi has argued that pragmatism about belief explains the impossibility of
believing at will Hieronymi (2006). See also Shah and Vellemans argument that the psychological
phenomenon of the transparency of belief is best explained by evidentialism. See Shah (2003), Shah and
Velleman (2005).

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5.3 Objection 3
The third objection concerns my claim that there is no substantial general norm on
action, or action-guiding mental states on which we should expect agreement. It
might be objected that this claim is too strong: there must be some substantial
general norm on action, or action-guiding mental states. This source of resistance
might be motivated by interpretative constraints associated with Davidson.
According to Davidson, in order for radical interpretation to be possible, we must
assume that the desires of any agent we are interpreting overlap (to some degree)
with ours.29 But if my argument is sound, then one might worry that there is no
reason to assume that the desires (or as I have said, choices) of other agents would
overlap with ours at all. So, we would have no reason to think that radical
interpretation is possible. But radical interpretation is possible. So, my argument is
unsound. We can express this objection in terms of the following argument:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

If there is no substantial general norm on desire, then one could rationally

regard anything as desirable;
If one could rationally regard anything as desirable, then there is no reason to
think that two rational disputants would overlap at all in their desires;
It is necessary for two rational disputants to be able to interpret one another that
there is some overlap in their desires;
Any two rational disputants could interpret one another;
So, there is some substantial, general norm on desire.

How should we respond to this argument? One obvious response is to reject

premise 4. We shouldnt assume that any two rational disputants could interpret one
another. In a sense, Davidson would agree. We certainly shouldnt assume that any
two rational disputants could interpret one another perfectly. However, Davidson
does seem to be committed to at least the possibility of partial interpretative success.
And he also seems to be committed to the claim that at least some overlap in desire
is required for even partial interpretative success. So, Davidson might alter premises
3 and 4 to:
3*. It is necessary for two rational disputants to be able to partially interpret one
another that there is some overlap in their desires.
4*. Any two rational disputants could partially interpret one another.
How should we respond to this modified argument? It is possible to reject either
3* or 4*.30 Suppose, however, that we grant both 3* and 4*. The resulting argument
still fails as it doesnt entail 5. To see this, note how weak 3* is. According to 3*, all
rational disputants must have some degree of overlap in their desires. Specifically,
they must have sufficient overlap in desires for partial interpretation to be possible.
29
We must assume that he is a lover of the good (as well as a believer of the truth). A theme discussed
in Davidson (1986, 1995).
30

Tersman (2004) rejects 3*. He argues that in order for interpretation to be possible, it is only necessary
that agents share certain logical (i.e. decision-theoretic) and functional properties of their desires. It is not
necessary that there is any overlap in the contents of their desires. Tersman (2006) extends this model
explicitly to moral judgments.

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C. Cowie

But this is too weak to imply 5 (i.e. to imply that there must be some substantial
general norm on desire). Establishing 5 would require the stronger claim:
3**. It is necessary for rational disputants to be able to partially interpret one
another that they share a substantial general criterion for assessing desires.
And there is no reason to think either that Davidson makes this claim, or that he
or anyone else would be entitled to make it. So, there is no reason to think that the
argument from interpretative constraints entails 5. So, there is no reason to think
that it undermines my overall argument.
This response might seem unsatisfactory. My argument still leaves something
unexplained. There is, as it happens, a good deal of overlap in judgments about what
is and is not desireable, across times and places. But if desire is not governed by a
substantial general norm, then this might appear mysterious. If there isnt a
substantial general norm on desire, then why should we expect there to be any
convergence in judgments about desireability at all? My response is twofold. Firstly,
although it is true that there is overlap in judgment about desireability, there is also a
great deal of disagreement. This shouldnt be under-estimated. Secondly, it is
possible to explain what overlap there is without supposing that desire is governed
by any substantial general norm. It is, as Tersman notes, possible to explain overlap
in desire in terms of our common social and biological heritage rather than in
meaning-theoretic terms.31

6 Conclusion
I have claimed that, owing to a disanalogy between the correctness conditions of
belief and action-guiding mental states, we have reason to expect a greater degree of
convergence in judgment about reasons for belief than in judgment about reasons
for action. And I have drawn the conclusion that this represents a prima facie
challenge to unified or metanormative approaches to reasons for belief and reasons
for action.
How strong is this challenge? Im not sure. I concede that it is possible for a
metanormative theorist to deny the force of the challenge in a number of ways.
Consider the following three options. Firstly, one might deny the premise that the
scope of disagreement in an area of thought is of significance for the metaphysics of
that area of thought. This is a response that some metanormative theorists will be
happy to take, others not. Secondly, one might deny the force of the challenge by
rejecting the approach to normativity taken above: namely, that reasons for mental
states can be grounded in the nature of those states. Again, this is a response
approach that some metanormative theorists will be happy to take, others not.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, a metanormative theorist may regard the
considerations in favour of metanormative approaches to outweigh arguments
against. There are after all, considerable advantages to the metanormative approach:
the shared normativity of reasons for action and reasons for belief, and the difficulty
31

Tersman (2004), p. 258.

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(in some cases) of cleanly distinguishing between those concepts and/or judgments
that belong to the realm of theoretical normativity as opposed to the realm of
practical normativity.32 How one reacts to my argument will, then, depend on ones
prior commitments, and on the results of ones philosophical scorekeeping. There
are some metanormative theorists who, given their prior commitments, could make
use of any one of the three responses suggested above in order to reject the
argument that I have provided (David Enoch is the best example). But none of these
responses are mandatory for metanormative theorists. For some, their prior
commitments may be such that the argument I have presented provides food for
thought. If so, then it is an argument worth making.
I shall conclude on a more positive note by briefly noting an interesting
connection between the argument that I have offered and a related argument for a
different conclusion elsewhere in the literature. Darwall offers an argument much
like the argument that I have offered above.33 He claims that belief is normatively
governed by truth. And he explains this in terms of the nature of the concept of
belief. Furthermore, he contrasts this with the norms governing mental states that
are relevant for practical judgment (he focuses on desire). Such norms are, he
claims, uninformative or merely formal. The resemblance between Darwalls
argument and the argument that I have offered should be clear. However, the use to
which we put these thoughts differs.
I have argued that these thoughts imply a disanalogy in practical and epistemic
disagreement. Darwall also takes these thoughts to imply a significant disanalogy.
But he is not concerned with disagreement. His concern is with freedom. He
claims that whereas reasons for belief are constrained by objective truth and
probability, reasons for acting can be grounded nowhere but within norms of free
practical reflection itself. Darwalls thought is that the nature of belief, determines
what can count as a reason for belief (i.e. evidence for the truth of that belief). But,
by contrast, the nature of action-guiding mental states doesnt completely determine
what can count as a reason for action. Hence, conceptually competent agents have a
freedom in working out what to do that they lack in working ought what to believe.
These conclusionsmine concerning disagreement and Darwalls concerning
freedommight be regarded as corollaries of one another. The nature of actionguiding mental states doesnt restrict the practical judgment of conceptually
competent agents in anything like the sense that the nature of belief restricts
epistemic judgment. A comparative practical freedom may be one consequence of
this lack of restriction. Likely disagreement is another. That these two features of
practical judgmentfreedom and the scope of expected disagreementare
explained by the same facts is an interesting result.

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For more on this point see e.g. Cuneo (2007), pp. 7780, and Enoch (2011a), p. 241.

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Darwall (2003), pp. 483488.

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