[A.C. No. 1892.

November 12, 2002]

ATTY. ARTIAGA, JR., vs. ATTY. VILLANUEVA
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 12
NOV 2002.
Adm. Case No. 1892 (Atty. Luis U. Artiaga, Jr., vs. Atty. Enrique
Villanueva.)

Before the Court for resolution is respondent Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva’s

Motion for Leave of Court for Respondent to File Motion for Clarification dated January
9, 2002 of the Resolution of the Court dated July 7, 1989, and said Motion for
Clarification.

The motion is an offshoot of the antecedental proceedings in this case, as

follows:
Despite the pendency before the Court of the complaint for disbarment
filed against respondent, he was appointed on February 9, 1987 as the Provincial
Prosecutor of Laguna.
On August 11, 1988, respondent received a telegraphic transfer from the
Secretary of Justice advising him to go on leave pending the outcome of the
administrative complaint. Respondent complied with the directive of the
Secretary of Justice and went on leave.
On July 29, 1988, the Court rendered judgment against the respondent
ordering his indefinite suspension from the practice of law from date of notice
thereof until such time that he can demonstrate to the court that he has
rehabilitated himself and deserved to resume the practice of law.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the Court
and on July 7,1989, the Court issued a Resolution granting the motion of
respondent and lifting respondent’s indefinite suspension from the practice of
law.
Respondent forthwith resumed the performance of his duties as Provincial
Prosecutor of Laguna. Even as respondent reached the retirement age of 65, the
President of the Philippines extended his term for six (6) months.
Upon his retirement from the service, respondent was not paid his basic
salaries during the period of his leave from August 11, 1988 to July 1989.
By April 10, 2001, respondent was already 76 years old, suffering from
asthma and bedridden. On said date, respondent pleaded to the Secretary of
Justice that in view of the July 7, 1989 Resolution of the Court, coupled by his
debilitating illness, he be paid his back salaries and other emoluments from
August 11, 1988 to July 1989.
 In a legal opinion dated October 17, 2001, the Chief State Counsel stated
that the Resolution of the Court granting the motion for reconsideration of
respondent and lifting his suspension from the practice of law did not exonerate
him; hence, he is not entitled to the payment of his back salaries during the
period of his forced leave. The Secretary of Justice concurred with the opinion of
the Chief State Counsel and so informed respondent thereof.
On November 22, 2001, respondent sent a letter to the court Administrator
requesting for a clarification as to whether or not, under the Resolution of the
Court dated July 11, 1989, he was exonerated from the charges filed against
him. On December 4, 2001, the Court Administrator replied to the letter of
respondent that he had no jurisdiction to interpret or render an opinion on
decisions or resolutions of the Court.
Hence, the motion of respondent for clarification as to whether or not
under the Resolution of the Court dated July 11, 1989, he was exonerated from
the charges lodged against him so as to entitle him to his back salaries and other
emoluments during the period of his forced leave.
In Pedro P. Clemente vs. Commission of Audit, we defined to “exonerate”
thus:

“To exonerate means ‘to exculpate, to relieve’ (35 C.J.S., p. 227). It is ‘to clear from accusation
or blame’ (Webster, Third New International Dictionary of the English Language). The word
‘exonerate’ may imply complete clearance not only from immediate charge or accusation but
from suspicion or attendant denigration xxx”

It is clear from the July 7, 1989 Resolution of the Court that respondent
was not exonerated from the charges in the complaint for disbarment lodged
against him. Although the Court granted respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration
and lifted his suspension from the practice of law, it also declared that his
suspension from the practice of law was sufficient disciplinary action against him:
“A careful examination of the records of the case shows that the
acts of respondent may he attributed to his extreme zeal and enthusiasm
in prosecuting the cause of his client. There is no proof of any dishonest
motive or fraud, much less of any contemptuous act committed by him
towards the courts or towards the adverse party or counsel. While the
courses of action he took tended to delay the disposition of the
controversy and were redundant, his suspension from the practice of law
is sufficient disciplinary action against him. Moreover, there is proof that
the fault cannot be attributed entirely to the respondent. Complainant and
his counsel also contributed to the delay in filing Civil Case No. 183 for
recovery of’ possession, which is still pending appeal, and in failing to
comply with the agreement to settle the dispute by arbitration.
Respondent and his client Aquino were willing to settle the problem but
Estolano and his counsel did not care to pursue this course, of action
which could have terminated the matter once and for all.
The attestations of responsible persons in the public and private
sector as to the integrity and good moral character of respondent show
 that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve another chance to resume
the practice of law.” (Underscoring supplied.)
In fine, respondent was meted the disciplinary penalty of suspension from
notice of the Decision of the Court up to the issuance of the Resolution granting
his Motion for Reconsideration.
It is clear from the foregoing that the issuance of the Court’s Resolution
dated July 11, 1989, did not exculpate respondent from the charges filed against
him in the complaint for disbarment. Hence, he is not entitled to back salaries
during the period of his leave of absence, in accordance with our ruling in
Ricardo Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, thus:
The principle governing entitlement to salary during suspension is
cogently stated in Floyd R. Mechem’s A Treatise on the Law of Public
Offices and Officers as follows:
§864. Officer not entitled to Salary during Suspension from
Office.- An officer who has been lawfully suspended from his office is not
entitled to compensation for the period during which he was suspended,
even though it be subsequently determined that the cause for which he
was suspended was insufficient. The reason given is “that salary and
prerequisites are the reward of express or implied services, and therefore
cannot belong to one who could not lawfully perform such services.
Thus, it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the
charges against him. In addition, his suspension must be unjustified. The
case of Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals itself similarly states that payment
of salaries corresponding to the period [1] when an employee is not
allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges
which caused his suspension and [2] when the suspension is unjustified.
xxx
In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, a public school teacher who was
found guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for
having been absent without leave and reprimanded was given back
salaries after she was exonerated of the charge of having taken part in
the strikes.
Moreover, it is evident that respondent’s motion for clarification is merely
an afterthought. As aforesaid, we issued our resolution granting the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent as early as July 11, 1989. Respondent retired
from government service sometime in 1991 and failed to receive any back
salaries from the Department of Justice during the period of his leave of absence.
And yet, respondent filed his motion for clarification, with the Court only on
January 17, 2002, or after the lapse of well-nigh more than eleven (11) years
after his retirement from the government service.
WHEREFORE, respondent’s Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Clarification is GRANTED and his Motion for Clarification is ADMITTED.
However, the Court hereby declares that its Resolution dated July 7, 1989
granting the respondent’s motion for reconsideration and lifting respondent’s
indefinite suspension from the practice of law did not exonerate him from the
charges of engaging in unethical acts in the practice of his profession, but merely
shortened the penalty of suspension meted on him under the Decision of the
Court dated July 29, 1988. Accordingly, respondent is not entitled to back
salaries and other emoluments corresponding to the period of his suspension.
Very truly yours,

LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D.
VILLARAMA
Asst. Clerk of Court
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1892 July 29, 1988

ATTY. LUIS V. ARTIAGA JR., complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ENRIQUE C. VILLANUEVA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on April 2, 1978, Atty. Luis V. Artiaga Jr.
sought the disbarment of Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva for alleged unethical
practices.

By a resolution dated May 24, 1978, this Court required respondent Atty. Enrique
C. Villanueva to answer the complaint. To the answer of respondent dated July 5,
1978, complainant Atty. Luis V. Artiaga Jr. filed his reply of July 31, 1978.

After considering the answer of respondent, this Court resolved to refer the case
to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. The
solicitor General forwarded to the Court his Report and Recommendation dated
May 4, 1988 with the finding that respondent was guilty of misconduct and with
the recommendation that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of at least six (6) months.

The complaint for disbarment arose from four (4) separate cases and several
incidental cases with Juliano Estolano, client of complainant Atty. Artiaga, Jr. and
Glicerio Aquino and/or Florentina Guanzon, clients of respondent Atty.
Villanueva, as adversaries in all of these cases involving the same property.

The factual background of these cases is summed up in the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP06600 dated November 16, 1977, a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, an offshoot of Civil Case No. 183-C for Recovery of
Possession filed by Estolano against Aquino and Guanzon before the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI on June 11, 1974. Quoted hereunder are
pertinent portions of the Court's decision:

There were three parcels of land involved herein. All continuos and adjoining to
each other and located in Bambang, Los Banos, Laguna. The first covered an
area of 2.6793 hectares; the second, an area of one hectare; and the third, an
area of one-half hectare. On July 20,1950, petitioner Juliano Estolano was issued
original Certificate of Title No. P-286 in his name over the first parcel. There is no
controversy, therefore, in respect of this first parcel, the dispute being confined to
the second and third parcels.

The second and third parcels were the object of Revocable Permit Applications
by Paciano Malabayabas and Canuto Suyo, both filed on March 31, 1951. On
June 12, 1956, Canuto transferred his right over the third parcel to petitioner. On
March 4, 1958, Malabayabas also sold his rights over the second parcel to
petitioner. On May 15, 1958, petitioner filed Insular Government Property Sales
Application No. 1772 (New) covering the second and third parcels.

On November 7, 1958, Glicerio Aquino, private respondent, filed his Revocable

Permit Application over an area of 8,000 square meters, which was later found to
cover a part of the first parcel already titled in favor of petitioner and of the third
parcel transferred to him by Suyo. On December 29, 1958, private respondent
Florentina Guanzon, Aquino's sister-in-law, also filed Revocable Permit
Application over the second parcel.

Eventually, the conflicts were taken cognizance of by the Bureau of Lands (B.L.
Conflict No. 3-953, and B.L.O. Conflict No. 236). On May 21, 1962, the Director
of Lands rendered a Decision against private respondents, as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is ordered that the Revocable Permit

Application No. V-14105 of Glicerio Aquino be, as hereby it is,
rejected, forfeiting in favor of the Government whatever amount
has been paid on account thereof. The Revocable Permit
Application No. V-14142 of Florentina Guanzon shall remain, as
it is, rejected. Glicerio Aquino and Florentina Guanzon shall
vacate the land within sixty (60) days from their receipt of a copy
hereof The new Insular Government Property Sales Application
of Julian Estolano shall be given due course after the survey of
the land covered thereby.'

Private respondents moved for the reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision,

and the Director of Lands, in an Order of August 13, 1962, amended his previous
Decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, our decision of May 21, 1962, is hereby modified

by awarding to protesting Glicerio Aquino preferential right to that
area actually occupied and cultivated by him, indicated as
portion "K" in the sketch drawn on the back hereof, and
amending the Insular Government Property Sales Application
(New) of Juliano Estolano so as to exclude therefrom the said
portion. With this modification, the decision stands confirmed.

Petitioner and private respondents appealed the amended Decision of the

Director of Lands to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who, in a
Decision dated September 9, 1963, dismissed the appeals of private
respondents, set aside the Order of the Director of Lands dated August 13, 1962,
and affirmed the latter's Decision of May 21, 1962. Respondent Guanzon moved
for the reconsideration of the Secretary's Decision but said Motion was denied.

Respondent Aquino appealed the Decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and

Natural Resources to the Office of the President of the Philippines, which
likewise affirmed the Decision appealed from.
 The Decision of the Director of Lands having become final, an order of Execution
thereof was issued on January 4, 1967, but this notwithstanding, private
respondents remained in possession of the subject property. For failure to obtain
possession thereof, petitioner filed, on June 15, 1974, the principal case, (Civil
Case No. 183-C) in the lower court which eventually gave rise to the proceedings
now challenged in this Petition." (pp. 3-7, Decision in CA-G.R. No. Sp-06600)

The restraining order issued in Civil Case No. 183-C on October 27, 1976
enjoining the Director of Lands from enforcing the Order of Execution was set
aside by the Court of Appeals and the writ of prohibition prayed for by petitioner
Estolano was granted.

Meanwhile, on April 13, 1974, respondent's clients, Aquino and Guanzon, filed a
complaint for forcible entry against complainant's client, Estolano, in the
Municipal Court of Los Banos Laguna docketed as Civil Case No. 192. This case
was dismissed by the Municipal Court on January 5, 1977. On appeal to the
Court of First Instance (CFI), the order of dismissal was affirmed on November 4,
1979 in Civil Case No. 386-C. No appeal was interposed from this decision, thus
it became final.

The third case for annulment of Estolano's title over the same land was filed by
respondent's client, Aquino, with the CFI on May 15, 1974 docketed as Civil
Case No. 179-C which was dismissed on April 23, 1976. On appeal to the Court
of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 62576-R, the dismissal by the
trial court was affirmed on June 25, 1981. On October 21, 1981, the case was
remanded to the trial court for execution.

Finally, while their petition for certiorari and prohibition over Civil Case No. 183-C
was pending before the Court of Appeals, respondent's clients, Aquino, filed a
complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) at San Pablo City docketed
as CAR Case No. 7043 against Estolano and the Director of Lands on July 1,
1977. On July 2, 1977, the CAR issued an order requiring Estolano to respect
Aquino's possession. On May 18, 1979, the CAR dismissed the case and on
appeal, its dismissal was affirmed in a decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 5, 1981 in CA-G.R. No. 11635-CAR.

Respondent Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva is charged with the following unethical

practices: (1) That respondent had caused his client to perjure himself; (2) That
he lacks candor and respect toward his adversary and the courts; and (3) That
he had been abusive of the right of recourse to the courts.

We find respondent Atty. Villanueva guilty as above charged.

Anent the first charge, the complaint and amended complaint for forcible entry in
Civil Case No. 192 filed by respondent's client are clear proofs that respondent
had indeed caused his client Glicerio Aquino to perjure himself as to the date he
lost possession of the subject property so as to place the case within the
jurisdiction of the court.

Paragraph 5 of the original complaint filed on April 18, 1974 reads:

5. That sometime in the early part of 1960, defendant Julian Estolano was able to
dispossess plaintiffs spouses Glicerio Aquino and Lorenzo Magpantay of a
portion of the above-described parcel of land ... (Emphasis supplied.) 1

Paragraph 5 of the Amended Complaint dated June 19, 1974 reads:

5. That sometime in the early part of June, 1973, defendant Julian Estolano and
Segundo de los Santos unlawfully dispossessed and/or deprived or turned out
plaintiffs Sps. Aquino and Magpantay thru stealth, strategy, force and intimidation
of and/or possession over a certain portion (now caused by defendant Segundo
de los Santos to be planted to bananas now of less than a year old as of the filing
of the original complaint) located on the southern portion of their above-described
landholding . .... (Emphasis supplied. ) 2

In the original complaint, respondent's client alleged that he was dispossessed of

the subject land in 1960, while in the amended complaint, he alleged it was in
June, 1973. Clearly, this was a ploy concocted by respondent to enable the court
to acquire jurisdiction over the case since a forcible entry case must be filed
within one year from the accrual of the cause of action under Rule 70, Section 1.

Such action of respondent counsel is a clear violation of his oath that "he will do
no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court." 3 A legal counsel is of
course expected to defend his client's cause with zeal, but not at the disregard of
the truth. 4 The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of
maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth
and honor cannot be overemphasized. 5 His high vocation is to correctly inform
the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and
arriving at correct conclusions. He violated his oath of office when he resorted to
deception. 6 Worse, he had caused his client to perjure himself thus subjecting
the latter to criminal prosecution for perjury brought before the Municipal Court of
Los Banos, Laguna. 7 Instead of safeguarding the interests of his client as his
responsibility dictates, he did exactly the opposite by causing his client to commit
a felony.

From the foregoing, the lack of candor of respondent counsel towards the court is
evident. This lack of candor and honesty to the courts and his adversary is
further demonstrated by other acts of respondent.

In Civil Case No. 192, respondent's clients were restored to the possession of the
2-1/2 hectares of the untitled portion of subject property by virtue of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the court on May 21, 1974 upon filing
of a property bond by respondent. Upon the dismissal of the case on January 5,
1977, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was dissolved and
respondent's clients were ordered to restore possession of subject property to
complainant's client Estolano. However, respondent blocked the order by filing an
urgent ex-parte motion seeking clarification as to whether the dispositive portion
of the order of January 5, 1977 was immediately executory and asking the court
to allow his clients to remain in the meantime in the premises. Before the court
could even resolve the motion, respondent perfected his appeal from the order of
January 5, 1977 on January 25, 1977. Thus, when the court's order affirming its
previous order came out on January 26,1977, the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna
refused to implement the orders of January 5 and 26, 1977 until the appeal has
been finally disposed of. On appeal, the CFI of Laguna, affirmed the questioned
orders of the Municipal Court. When the decision of the CFI became final
because respondent failed to appeal, his clients refused to abide by the Order of
Execution issued by the Municipal Court.

Consequently, Estolano filed an ex-parte motion asking that the Provincial Sheriff
be authorized to forcibly evict respondent's clients. On the date set for the
hearing of the motion, respondent did not appear and instead filed his
"Opposition/ Manifestation" informing the court of a petition for certiorari filed
against the presiding judge before the Court of First Instance of Laguna. In
deference to this petition, the Municipal Court resolved to hold in abeyance the
ex-parte motion of Estolano until resolution of said petition.

Indeed, the manner in which respondent counsel handled the forcible entry case
filed against the client of complainant shows his total lack of candor and respect
for the courts and the rights of his adversary. He had employed every step
necessary to forestall complainant's client from taking rightful possession of
subject property. He has shown utter disregard of the proper rules of procedure
to suit his purpose. While he filed his urgent ex-parte motion for clarification, he
chose not to wait for its resolution and instead perfected his appeal to the Court
of First Instance. When finally the decision became executory because of his
failure to appeal to the Court of Appeals, he filed a petition for certiorari against
the decision of the CFI which petition is obviously frivolous and a mere tactic to
delay enforcement of the court's decision. In the meantime, the clients of
respondents refused to obey the order of execution.

A lawyer should obey all lawful orders and rulings of the court. 8 He should have
counseled his clients to submit to the order of the court instead of encouraging
them to resist such order. The actuations of respondent of employing dilatory
tactics by filing a clearly frivolous case amounts to obstruction of the
administration of justice which constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary
action against him. 9

Respondents counsel further demonstrated his questionable motive by filing

another case, this time for annulment of the title of complainant's client to the
other 2-1/2 hectares of subject land with the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
Branch VI. This case was dismissed on the ground of res judicata and
prescription. Respondent appealed this ruling to the Court of Appeals where it
was pending resolution at the time the instant complaint for disbarment was filed.
The decision of the trial court was affirmed and remanded to the lower court for
execution.

Not satisfied with the above-mentioned appeal, respondent counsel brought

another case against complainant's client this time before the Court of Agrarian
Relations (CAR Case No. 7043) for determination allegedly of who had a better
right over the subject property when he was well aware e of the absence of any
tenancy relationship between the parties.

An examination of the records shows that respondent did not disclose before the
Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) prior law suits and decisions rendered relative
to the subject land. As a result, respondent was able to secure ex-parte from the
CAR a restraining order against the Director of Lands and Estolano on July 2,
1977. So when the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Civil Case
No. 386-C affirming the decision of the trial court in the forcible entry case No.
192 was rendered on November 4, 1977 ordering the immediate restoration of
subject land to Estolano, because of the restraining order issued by the agrarian
court, the execution of the said decision cannot be fully satisfied, To make
matters worse, respondent even filed a criminal complaint against complainant
and his client, among others, for alleged violation of P.D. 316 and the restraining
order issued by the Court of Agrarian Relations in CAR Case No. 7043. 10 The
CAR dismissed this case and on appeal, the dismissal was affirmed.

We also note that after respondent filed the case with the CAR on July 1, 1 977,
he filed on July 5, 1977 in Civil Case No. 179-C before the CFI of Laguna, a
motion to dismiss the present action without prejudice to his clients' right to
prosecute their present action with the Court of Agrarian Relations. The lower
court denied the motion since it had already dismissed the case on some other
ground and their appeal was already perfected without plaintiffs' manifesting that
they are abandoning their appeal. Thus, respondent was able to elevate two (2)
separate appeals--CA-G.R. No. 62576-R re: annulment of title (Civil Case No.
179-C) and CA-G.R. No. 11635-CAR arising from the CAR Case No. 7043,
before the Court of Appeals over the same issues involving the same subject
property titled to Estolano.

The cause of respondent's clients is obviously bereft of merit. Respondent was

aware of this fact so he resorted to forum shopping, continuously seeking the
court where he may possibly obtain favorable judgment, thereby adding to the
already clogged dockets of the courts with the unmeritorious cases he filed. He
grossly abused his right of recourse to the courts by filing multiple petitions or
complaints for a cause that had been previously rejected in the false hope of
getting some favorable action, somehow, thus, obstructing the administration of
justice. 11 He was derelict in his duty as counsel to maintain such actions or
proceedings only as appears to him to be just, and such defenses only as he
believes to be honestly debatable under the law. 12 He had thus prostituted his
office at the expense of justice.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to

certain standards of mental and moral fitness. 13 For a counsel who has been
sworn to assist in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law,
respondent has miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a
member of the Bar. Instead of assisting in the speedy disposition of cases, he
made a mockery of our system of justice, thus deserving to be censured and
penalized by this Court. No doubt, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct in
office.

WHEREFORE, the respondent is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the

practice of law from date of notice until such time that he can demonstrate to the
court that he has rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume the practice of
law. Let this decision be noted in the bar records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.