RENATO

CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.

SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management,
respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five

years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis
supplied)

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what

constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

PARAS, J.:p

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of

legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing,
the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the
practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an
attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling
clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending
litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his
associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While

ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case
would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our
national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the
1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land
Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A
person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings
pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle

controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act

or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law,
or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil.
173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide

experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney
or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of
justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question
set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound
moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations
to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules
of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices
[Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation
briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice
of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in
the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a
kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession,
and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a
practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v.
Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
"To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it

has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation

which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission
on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is
equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the
Article on the Commission on Audit?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is
auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And,
therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the
necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications
under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the
answer is yes.

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by
Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" I am
quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members
of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we
would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications
regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as
long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners,
even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions
and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that
this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others,
that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit
(COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten
years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis
supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many
ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers
do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of
lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as

commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in
the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice
alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the
partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and
the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm
are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as
that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West
Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as
the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood
to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co.,
145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v.
Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform
almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm,
such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram,
op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the
most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the
average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating
lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception
of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects
history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander
SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer
as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed

laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases

before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed
laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-
litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending
more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than
in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the
diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed]
that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan.
11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage
in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal
skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And
even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from
one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one
such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram,
supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is
one of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to
the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to
have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation
are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work
that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to
remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of

these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some

lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client
and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to
perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of
corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted
are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the
traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an
accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate
law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate
legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency
planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures
in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the
sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of
major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given
courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations
of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing,
and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-
making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment
thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in

terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in
predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate
finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention
in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a
cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those
trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction
to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for
handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or
doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning
at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for
the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are
currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would
require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred
to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big
money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type
of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all
their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house
counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large

enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles
the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may
include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and
other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with
the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the
legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated
from the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the
work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs
to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is
sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running
of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law
field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is
perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate
lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced
attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in
law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein,

to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is
one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who
surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm,"
so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching
method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the
Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern
management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3)
types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which
are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction
to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a
shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's
role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization
process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he
provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a
corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is
being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but with each other often with
those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the

corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a

new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other
decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies
toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other
countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are
apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts
of systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system
dynamics principles more accessible to managers including corporate
counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions
involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it
can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in
negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in
managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate

Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all
kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary
groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable
factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising
their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders,
promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such
external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal
group processes.

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can

be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All
integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A
simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate
the point.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate

lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged.
Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial
procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and
insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that

comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ
from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such
legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are

undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach.
It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not
adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The
general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant
subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility
for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure,
creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping
internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is
not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him
a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if
the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only
the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation.
"Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more
than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their
work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial
law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security:
Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law,"
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.

Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by
the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he
took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying
that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed
the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception
in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer
for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar,
Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the
World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer
for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning
to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as
chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a
business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various
companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As

former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of

NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law.
He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec.
In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-
Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in
affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land
reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of
the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous
hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-
1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers,
for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia
Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government
functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-
list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis
supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod
used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and
which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that
arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned,
there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager,
and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff
Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11).
(Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays
down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of
any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental

parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of

closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and
legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States
Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast,
sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31,
1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in
legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a
sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an
economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical
language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the
advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate
technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the
Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate
School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is
the set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual
remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A
good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties,
but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails
to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a
devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for
foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and

international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver

Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no
drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the
equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The
Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine
Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of
law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist,
a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily
more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA
327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed
by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the
ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment

on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular

position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute
of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested
upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by
law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar,
consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . .
(Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public
Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members
shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case
shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of
law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of

law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the

eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps
practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice
once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states
that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which
really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is
what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the
definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that
the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself
that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all
situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others
on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps,
but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a
member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten
years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first
becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an
elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one
or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can
an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is
the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public

hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he

possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged
power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art.
VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is
clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In
the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's
corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion,
that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President,
may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm
the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible
that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth
life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of
Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator
placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in
front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had
happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and
fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his
word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any
blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the
letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful

Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton
for petitioners. Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their
unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become
a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally
was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public
interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar
Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to
the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be
deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have
obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling
below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court).
Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar
examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with
which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and
admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only
72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per
cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those
reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having
been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972),
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower
than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in
1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the
passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since
1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill.
Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to
and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter
the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it
approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM

NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines
in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule
numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar
candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar
examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the
August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two
per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations;
seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar
examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five
bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per
cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided,
however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a
fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in
any subject in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and
forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and
such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general

average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations

that he may take.

1948

899

409

11

1949

1,218

532

164

1950

1,316

893

26

1951

2,068

879

196

1952

2,738

1,033

426

1953

2,555

968

284

TOTAL

12,230

5,421

1,168

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed
petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others
whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still
pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for
admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first
reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not
they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found
no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it
must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should
be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or
not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this
decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act
No. 972, are appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize
more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data are set
forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1
of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:
1946 (August)

206

121

18

1946 (November)

477

228

43

1947

749

340

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination,

and only 586 have filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to
said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited
by section 2 of said Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from
two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in
any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different
subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be
sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No.
972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is
therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604
petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented
motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful
candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which
are still pending because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act
No. 972, although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no
sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the
practice of the legal profession and the administration of justice, and
because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court set
the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant
assistance of the members of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in
writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The
valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente
Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law,
and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs.
Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A.
Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and
Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for
petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and
Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema
themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the
court have exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on
the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a
long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of
the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as
humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.

the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of

reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who
took up law soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952,
5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be
admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from
"insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to
the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading
materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the
Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo
Angeles David stated:

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it

qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation
for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in
the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal
profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal
problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal
preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should
be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is
entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To
approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate
themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger.
Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading
materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions
of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the
public during those years and private enterprises had also published them
in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been
published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have
entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with
revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those
periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946,
which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes.
Those are facts of public knowledge.

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the
tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be

enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of
view of applicable principles, but the resolution of the question would
have been easier had an identical case of similar background been picked
out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the
long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the
judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the
United States, and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or
in our contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century? From
the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which
the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its
validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of
Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guaria (24 Phil., 37), aside
from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the
original bill and which the postponement of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries
had been promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without
force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold
the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the
case that has been cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law that
of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked
the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of
Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a
statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on
April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent
with the Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All
votes for either of them for any elective office except that of the Court of

Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void. They shall
not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen of
the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses
the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to
admission to practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept
is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing
them had previously rested with the judges, and this was the principal
appointing power which they possessed. The convention was evidently
dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised, and
with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to
practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was
aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting
the admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution,
evidently arose from its connection with the object of this prohibitory
clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a
disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless
the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the
word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission
spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and
that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of refusing, and
of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the
requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the
act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to
indicate that it provided that the possession of a diploma of the school of
law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was
evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of

applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote
the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or accessible private
library in the country.

(p.89)

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the
Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of the
law:

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the
question of admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be competent
evidence in certain cases upon that question. (p.93)

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College
being an institution of established reputation, and having a law
department under the charge of able professors, the students in which
department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study
before being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature
evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination, together with
the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of
legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as
rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of
preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with
that at bar may be clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:

The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of
the applicant, and for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by
the law committee of the college for that of the court. It could have had no
other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions.
We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with
the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act
contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of
the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students
before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act
admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma competent
evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To
this extent alone it operates as a modification of pre-existing statutes, and
it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the Constitution
itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject.

x x x x x x x x x

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia
College who failed in the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of
law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not
taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission of
attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines
are entirely different on the matter of admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a
judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous
and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been
demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes
the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress
by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by
this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment
and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1)

previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past
or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a
judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably
judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions
of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived,
the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at
law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. A
comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been
undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which
the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted
to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision
we quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in
the history of the English speaking people so far as we have been able to
ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the extent of the power
of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law
has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of admission has
always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute
Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an
assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and
Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for
admission to the bar are legislative in character, the Legislature is acting
within its constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such
qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its
judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the
power of the court to impose other and further exactions and

qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)

Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct,
independent, and coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch
enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which properly belongs to its
department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the other
in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and
thought of the people setting upon the form of government under which
we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford
vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon
which the administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this
respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty
to the judicial department of our state government, under 42a scheme
which it was supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment or
interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty
thus committed to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship.
The bar is an attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the
courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An
unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration
of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over
their bars, at least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries
prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England,
concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had

exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice

of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's
New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and
judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who
should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that entity.
It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is
either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of
the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging
to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign institution, but
made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the
government. They took this institution along with the power traditionally
exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is
no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this
traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be
subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers
of our constitution was to make the three great departments of
government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the
Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing
inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the
dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative
department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of
express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with
respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its
general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it
does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of attorneys at
law in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do
not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the
court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not
constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in
fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the
proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to
compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to
exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of

appointment. It is quite likely true that the legislature may exercise the
power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions.
However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit
attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states,
except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our
investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice law
by their admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor.
Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland, 4
Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285;
Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs.
Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually
exercised by the courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the
court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and
an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon
any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the
licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function,
no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p.
451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in
answering a consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of
the laws that there be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate
learning and sound moral character. This arises from the need of
enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the
knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected
from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing
mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs.
Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851:
"Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is
admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He becomes

an "officer of the court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or agency
to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is due
"whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld."
Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government
would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the
history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and
England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without
exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in
courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the
bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of the court
entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the
judicial department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its
powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power
of such a department of government ultimately to determine the
qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting
in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking
in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief
Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19
How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and
practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to
determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney
and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)

years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the

possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel
moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and
professional character is fair. The order of admission is the judgment of the
court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and
counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein.
From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are responsible
to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good
behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and
declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has
been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the
exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power,
and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the court of
appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for
admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that
court, "are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate
almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their
appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter,
in performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the
exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure
license to practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day,
54 NE 646), the court said in part:

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded

everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need
not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to practice have
also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the
court. Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court,
holding the test oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the
nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the court,
admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient
legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the general
practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the
parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the
highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong for, three

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is

an inherent power of the court. A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of
California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature
respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions

of the judicial and legislative departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial
departments is that it is the province of the legislature to establish rules
that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring
subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights
and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions
that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is
a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative
action or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of
the other departments of the government. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law,
p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by
requiring of them construction of the law according to its own views, it is
very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their judgments,
compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders,
or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial
inquiry. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of
1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per
cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the
disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment revoking
those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the
bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke
these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that
only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may
be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a
clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter
or supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the
admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article
VIII of the Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power
of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall
have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law
in the Philippines. Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and
this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the
practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the
Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress
found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would
have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may
repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the
authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested
in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules
does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of
this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The
Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend,
disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of
individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or
supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment
the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this
power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend,
disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal

profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and
enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the concurrent
power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised
with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration
to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These
powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each
part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may
and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar
respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed
with high virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may,
by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any
deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent
responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the
supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these
reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and
see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the
exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and
reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise
within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather
complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that
would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the
administration of justice.
The case of Guaria (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guaria
took examination and failed by a few points to obtain the general average.
A recently enacted law provided that one who had been appointed to the
position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a
previous examination. The Government appointed Guaria and he
discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused
to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in

this case seeks admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed
examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for
the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred
and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions
and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to
read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the
Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in
good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands
at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who,
prior to the passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held,
under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of the
Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate
judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the
position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General,
assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting
attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city
attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or
assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law
in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon
motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the
satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant
took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the
examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an
average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning upon
which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required
percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty

to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of
the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of learning in
the law at the time when he presented his former application for
admission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the
courts of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his
failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the
applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the
prescribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme Court"
accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the
office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having
in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in
enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of
the context generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was
inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically
provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is
contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in
order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the
candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the
United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of
Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the
commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited
and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly
destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing,
defining or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that
extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the
positions enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guaria,
the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar
under the provisions of this statute have been considered heretofore, we
have accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as
satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of
those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been
practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the
applicant was not and never had been practicing attorney in this or any
other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal,
and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required
qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we
do not think that his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself
satisfactory proof if his possession of the necessary qualifications of
learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for license
to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell
only four points short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to
practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he has held the
responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and
presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of
the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and
approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the
Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we
think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No.
1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general
rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special

examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon his
application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do,
to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by
general rule. (In re Guaria, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the
practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities
say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been
found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and
that if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and
unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the
Supreme Court, until December 31 of that year, to grant license for the
practice of law to those students who began studying before November 4,
1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a
school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass
an examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they
commenced their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme
Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a
class legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by
virtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the
general assembly passed in 1899, under which the application is made, is
entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the
law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in
force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting
clause, consists in the addition to the section of the following: "And every
application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme
court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant

commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or

college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any
subsequent changes in said rules". In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is
that up to December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of
admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued by
any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose
regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by
the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that
the student began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and
accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other
branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years
in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the
aforesaid law school," and whose course of study began prior to November
4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the
examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If
the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is
claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named
therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to
the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special
legislation, prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the
legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the courts and
take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the character
of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of the
requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be
done by a general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section
2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose
makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to
appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and
creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil
process while attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be
general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment

for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing
classes in general, and has some reasonable relation to the end sought.
There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for
different one, having no just relation to the subject of the legislation.
Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155
Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by
experience, may furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121
Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such physician has resided and
practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary
discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs.
Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say
what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and
plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning, character,
or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class
of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This
class is subdivided into two classes First, those presenting diplomas
issued by any law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and,
second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office,
or part of the time in a law school and part in a law office, who are to be
admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present rules of
this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of
time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the
conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two
different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is
prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion
of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can
there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to
practice law resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will
furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study of
law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well
as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need
spend only two years in study, while those who commenced the next day
must spend three years, although they would complete two years before

the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a
diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31,
1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the
prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless.
Such classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just
relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for the
sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp.
647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where
the legislature attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of
law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a class
legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the
legislature has power to prescribe ultimately and definitely the
qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those applying as
attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here
attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will
apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right
of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen
callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right
of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or
profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed
upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right may in many
respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican
institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions.
All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study
and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is
sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them that is, the right to
continue their prosecution is often of great value to the possessors and
cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or personal
property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of
government that all similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications

shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of

medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of
the application of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to
practice, have been challenged, and courts have seriously considered
whether the exemption from such examinations of those practicing in the
state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State
vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel.
Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122
Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right
to practice law and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere
matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had once
established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed the
requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That
fact in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select from the
great body of the public an individual upon whom it would confer its
favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the
Supreme Court to admit to the practice of law without examination, all
who had served in the military or naval forces of the United States during
the World War and received a honorable discharge therefrom and who
(were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of
Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act,
1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the
time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the
ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of that
state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W.
179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained
in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a

classification to be valid must rest upon material differences between the
person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be based
upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the
constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real
differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore,
any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based
on some substantial difference between the situation of that class and
other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason
on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a
difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of
the class and the situation and circumstances of all other members of the
state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents
a just and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities and
burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it
operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is
made to operate on that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur.
pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per
cent in any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the
bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in
1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in
1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a
minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably
followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the
abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and
none has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before,
with the general average indicated, were not included because the
Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This
fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful
candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is

the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same
conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations
prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some
other means his right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on
account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in such
form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only
from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted
admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average
of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947
and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949,
74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which
was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by
the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable.
These changes in the passing averages during those years were all that
could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been
done cancel the license that was issued to those who did not obtain the
prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not
propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this
Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5
per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as
sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or
defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the
cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is being extended
up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the general
average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted
to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that
what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules
promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply
taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done
during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words,
the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules,
which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And
this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to

Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power
corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at
indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this system is that it does not take
into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when
a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing
laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this
manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in
the first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and
other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the
article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from
1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an
indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the
Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it
is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire
law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are
not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has
exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary
methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because
their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As
has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act
No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor
effect for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in
the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly
inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court
in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these
candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they

are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges

the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary
manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1

referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar
as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court

on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having examined their
respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this
Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons,
only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to
do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to
repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such
additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to
regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve
and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules
as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good
bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is
essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary
and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate
decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law
according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates,
which the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge
and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately
prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class
legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law,
contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the
provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.

R E S O L U T I O N
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the
magnificent and impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief
Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the members of the
Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved
colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to
take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to
this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and
under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the
examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1
which refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law,
that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in
force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who
failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all
candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of
71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions
for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be
permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So
ordered.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:
1

On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration submitted its

Report dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation"
on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative
2
Case No. 526 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel
received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the
overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar"
that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as
soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate
Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the
integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as
far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar
associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in
opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court.
3
Written oppositions were admitted, and all parties were thereafter
4
granted leave to file written memoranda.
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant
developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this
jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong
nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the
Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the
advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.

In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act
Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397.
This law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated,
out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to
carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual
appropriations for the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the
constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary factual data
bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration.
Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and
observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population
relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule
drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a
national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample
material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the
Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(1) Assist in the administration of justice;

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity,
learning, professional competence, public service and conduct;

A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the

meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the
concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its
Report, thus:

(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;

(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;

Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and
financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions
sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform,
pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench
and to the public, and publish information relating thereto;

The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear
in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must
include all lawyers.

(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and

adjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; and

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with

power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting
up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal
profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the
court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice
and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and
ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the
promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the
principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:

(6) Encourage and foster legal education;

(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.

Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the
legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and
prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or
removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except
within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may

level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and

independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting
officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly
of local practice maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up
lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not
lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to
obtain in many of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for
practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession
throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees
schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and
obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the
functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide
involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious

problems that afflict the nation.

Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the
Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the
Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed,
the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional
authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act
6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power,
but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will
promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of
the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the
Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would
be constitutional hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's
constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and
on the nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by
the Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in
issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of
law.

 The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege,

moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions of
the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.
Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is
far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective
action; but there can be no collective action without an organized body; no
organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses;
therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to
the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the
most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of
court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of
his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to
associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is
not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed
the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion
to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.

Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to
pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of
compelled financial support of group activities, not involuntary
membership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating
the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving
the quality of the legal service available to the people. The Supreme Court,
in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
power of the State. The legal profession has long been regarded as a
proper subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent
power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to
integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean
that the Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while
the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate
the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a
membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push through
an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant
expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power
to impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the

regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest

promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential
inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of
annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in
any manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions
taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to
which said member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his
freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon
membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it
should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to
fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a
"free speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection
would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The
conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might
refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end
condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private
judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the
compulsion of the agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although
the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the
members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and

through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not
heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more
effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. Because the
requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the
Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the
time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in
exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not
unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the
integration of the Bar at this time requires a careful overview of the
practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of
Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United
States, Bar integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved
discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and
ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the
individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar
facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6)
avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official
status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more
effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its
members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary
consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of
the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of
integration, Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar
associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result;
effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal
Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by

opponents of Bar integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of

Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the United States. In all
the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the
abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored public
confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the
Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration
of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official
statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the
national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the
integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over
the archipelago who have turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or
96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51
per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In
addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all
over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of
unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a
single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed
position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their
plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the
Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80
5
per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal. All
these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar
integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of
all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative
materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report
of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine
Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the
context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an
imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve
the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility fully and effectively.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13

of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar
of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective
on January 16, 1973.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M.

DACANAY, petitioner.
R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay
for leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced
law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical
attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian
citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His application
was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine
1
citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he
returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.
There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay
lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine
citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites
Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar.
Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of
the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character,
and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in

any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by
virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has
again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the
practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyers
oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the
Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with
certain modifications.
2

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so

delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of
the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect
3
and promote the public welfare.
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest
degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession,
compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement
and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the
bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer
of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence
which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his
4
professional privilege.
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted
as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with
the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar

in accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good and
regular standing is entitled to practice law.

words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to
16
foreigners.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court

mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and
5
a resident of the Philippines. He must also produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against
him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court
6
in the Philippines.

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization

as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA
9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
17
citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]." Therefore, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have
lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA
9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his
membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law
practice accrues.

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing

7
satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualifications; passing
8
9
the bar examinations; taking the lawyers oath and signing the roll of
attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of
10
the license to practice.
The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good
standing is a continuing requirement. This means continued
membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in
11
12
the IBP; payment of the annual professional tax; compliance with the
13
mandatory continuing legal education requirement; faithful observance
of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject
14
to judicial disciplinary control.
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still
practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by
15
law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar,
loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the

Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its
provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or
18
permit to engage in such practice." Stated otherwise, before a lawyer
who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law
practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so,
conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the
IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal
education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his
duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but

also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the

Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a
member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby
GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and
submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which
he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

1998, the following documents:

vs.

1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of

the Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified
public accountant;

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

R E S O L U T I O N

KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino
mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14)
years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question sought
to be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission
to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese
citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was horn in Francia West, Tubao,
La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the
Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course
at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the
1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September
1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the
condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine
citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November

2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,

Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La
Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,
showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released
and Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the
successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However,
because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not
allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20
April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In
the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required
to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the
documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the
"legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the
1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless
1
upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" in
strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625
entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect
Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a
Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only
an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon
2
reaching the age of majority." In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two

(2) conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine

citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making
the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must
3
be made upon reaching the age of majority." The OSG then explains the
meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"

3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for

Filipino citizens;

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to
mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been
interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra
at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said
period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic)
person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op.
Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it
was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made
within a reasonable time.

5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the

Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected
Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the
"reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the
peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the
relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase
"reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar.1wphi1.nt
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his
Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance,
both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in
my school records and other official documents;

4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to

vote;

6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with

Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me
before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to
(sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the
question raised is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a
"reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election
retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935
Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age
4
of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. This right to elect
Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it

provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the

provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are
5
citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973
Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that
"(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine
6
citizens. It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987
Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should
not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
7
acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If
the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter,
it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new
8
Constitution.
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the
1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in
order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1
thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and
sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to
administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said
party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance
to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time
period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made.
The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon
reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon
9
reaching twenty-one (21) years. In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice
on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this
dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this
Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions,
the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on
the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States

Government to the effect that the election should be made within a

10
"reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. The phrase
"reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should
11
be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.
12
However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, that the three (3)
year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period
after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has
ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine
citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which
period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person
13
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect
Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He
became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made
on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over
seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that
14
said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority."
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already
thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A.
No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached
the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon
reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any
reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the
privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay
in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered
voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine
citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for

acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what
Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot
15
find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, the pertinent portion
of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to
an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age,
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been
established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14,
1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban
was already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain
candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine
16
citizenship.
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances
obtaining therein are very different from those in the present case, thus,
negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625.
Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935
Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not
be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as
correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare
to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a
natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore
himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all
the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong
Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42
Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs.
Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28,
1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a

non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully

17
entitled.
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs.
18
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an
informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held
that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In
the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes
a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage.
He has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be
excepted to have elected Philippine citizenship as they were already
citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for
those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when
the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot
be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in
public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election
time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature
are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is

an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries.
There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he
turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the
private respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also
have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine
19
citizenship?
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However,
even if we consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his
having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is
a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree
with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching
failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years
that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond
the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age
of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his
election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All
that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil
registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his
election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be
20
claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is
privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such
citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm
and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect
Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away
from his grasp.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D.

Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

MARCIANO P. BRION, JR., petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.,

respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
In this petition for disbarment, complainant Marciano Brion, Jr., charges
the respondent, Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., of having willfully violated a
lawful order of this Court in A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel
1
Atienza v. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr. The decretal portion of our
resolution in Atienza reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of
all leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in
any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is
immediately executory.
2

SO ORDERED.
Respondents dismissal in the aforesaid case was ordered after he was
found guilty of Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety during his
incumbency as presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20,
Manila.
Petitioner now avers that respondent violated our decree of perpetual
disqualification imposed upon him from assuming any post in government
service, including any posts in government-owned and controlled
corporations, when he accepted a legal consultancy post at the Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), from 1998 to 2000. Said
consultancy included an appointment by LWUA as 6th member of the
Board of Directors of the Urdaneta (Pangasinan) Water District. Upon
expiration of the legal consultancy agreement, this was subsequently
renewed as a Special Consultancy Agreement.

Petitioner contends that while both consultancy agreements contained a

proviso to the effect that nothing therein should be construed as
establishing an employer-employee relationship between LWUA and
respondent, the inclusion of this proviso was only a ploy to circumvent our
order barring respondent from appointment to a government agency.
Petitioner points out in reality, respondent enjoys the same rights and
3
privileges as a regular employee, to wit:
1. Issuance of LWUA properties such as a cellular phone with accessories,
as evidenced by the covering Property Issue Slips with respondent signing
4
as "Accountable Employee";
2. Official travel to various places in the country as shown by Reports of
5
Authorized Travel kept by LWUAs General Services Division and Report of
6
Travel accomplished by respondent himself;
3. Designation as supervising officer over other LWUA employees as
7
brought to light by written instructions personally signed by respondent;
4. Attendance in water district conventions and meetings held in various
8
provinces;
5. Membership in several sensitive LWUA committees such as the
Prequalification, Bids, and Awards Committee (PBAC), Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) Committee, among others, with receipt of corresponding
9
honoraria as borne out by various Disbursement Vouchers;
6. Sitting at meetings of the LWUA Board of Trustees as evidenced by the
10
minutes of such meetings; and
7. Receipt of Productivity Incentive Bonus in 1999.
Petitioner submits that all of the foregoing constitute deceitful conduct,
gross misconduct, and willful disobedience to a decree of this Court, and

show that respondent is unfit to be a member of the Bar.

11

In his comment, respondent admits the existence of the Legal

Consultancy Contract as well as the Special Consultancy Contract.
However, he raises the affirmative defense that under Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1993, services
rendered pursuant to a consultancy contract shall not be considered
government services, and therefore, are not covered by Civil Service Law,
rules and regulations.
Further, says respondent, according to the same Memorandum Circular
issued by the Commission, consultancy contracts do not have to be
submitted to the Commission for approval. With respect to his designation
as the 6th Member of the Board of Directors of the Urdaneta Water
District, respondent reasons out that the same is not a "reappointment",
which is prohibited by our ruling in Atienza, as said designation is not an
organic appointment to a LWUA plantilla position. Hence, according to
respondent, the CSC need not pass approval upon his temporary
designation.

respondent willfully violated a lawful order of this Court and

recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
one (1) year and fined ten thousand (P10,000) pesos.
There is no question that the LWUA is a government-owned and controlled
12
corporation, created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 198. As such,
our ruling in the Atienza case, A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, which categorically
prohibits respondents appointment to any position in any government-
owned and controlled corporation, clearly encompasses and extends to
LWUA positions.
In the instant case the respondent does not deny the petitioners
13
allegations. Instead, he offers the existence of Memorandum Circular No.
27, Series of 1993 (MC No. 27, s. 1993) to exculpate himself from the
charge against him. However, it does not escape our attention that the
very Memorandum Circular that respondent cites before this Court
provides that the duties enumerated in the consultancy contract are mainly
14
advisory in nature.
15

Respondent also argues that all the members of the Urdaneta Water
District Board, especially the 6th Member, who comes from the LWUA,
assumed such functions merely by virtue of a designation and only in
addition to their regular duties. In any event, says respondent, his
designation as 6th Member was revoked in April 2000 and the Special
Consultancy Contract was pre-terminated on April 30, 2000. It has never
been renewed since then. With respect to his use of LWUA properties,
respondent admits receiving the cellular phone unit but insists that he
merely borrowed it from one Solomon Badoy, a former LWUA Board of
Trustees Member.
In our Resolution of February 19, 2001, we referred this case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found that

Without belaboring the definition of "advisory," it appears obvious to us

that the tasks and duties that respondent performed pursuant to the
consultancy contract cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be deemed
merely advisory in nature.
An adviser does not exercise supervisory powers over LWUA employees
nor does he issue written instructions to them. An adviser is not entitled to
a seat in such vital LWUA committees like PBAC and the BOT Committee.
Also, respondents continuous receipt of honoraria for sitting as a member
of certain LWUA Committees, particularly the BOT Committee, belies his
claim that he is a mere consultant for the LWUA. The evidence on record
clearly shows that the LWUA Office Order implementing National
16
Compensation Circular No. 75-95 refers to payments of honoraria to
officials/employees in consideration of services rendered.

Most telling, in our view, is respondents acceptance of his 1998

Productivity Incentive Bonus (PIB). The Board of Trustees Resolution No.
17
26, Series of 1999, of the LWUA, which governed the release of the PIB,
limited the entitlement to said bonus only to "officials" and "employees"
(permanent, temporary, casual, or contractual) of LWUA.
In sum, we find that for all intents and purposes, respondent performed
duties and functions of a non-advisory nature, which pertain to a
18
contractual employee of LWUA. As stated by petitioner in his reply, there
is a difference between a consultant hired on a contractual basis (which is
governed by CSC M.C. No. 27, s. 1993) and a contractual employee (whose
appointment is governed, among others, by the CSC Omnibus Rules on
Appointment and other Personnel Actions). By performing duties and
functions, which clearly pertain to a contractual employee, albeit in the
guise of an advisor or consultant, respondent has transgressed both letter
and spirit of this Courts decree in Atienza.
The lawyers primary duty as enunciated in the Attorneys Oath is to
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect
19
for law and legal processes. That duty in its irreducible minimum entails
obedience to the legal orders of the courts. Respondents disobedience to
this Courts order prohibiting his reappointment to any branch,
instrumentality, or agency of government, including government owned
and controlled corporations, cannot be camouflaged by a legal consultancy
or a special consultancy contract. By performing duties and functions of a
contractual employee of LWUA, by way of a consultancy, and receiving
compensation and perquisites as such, he displayed acts of open defiance
of the Courts authority, and a deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer
of the court. It is also destructive of the harmonious relations that should
prevail between Bench and Bar, a harmony necessary for the proper
administration of justice. Such defiance not only erodes respect for the
Court but also corrodes public confidence in the rule of law.
What aggravates respondents offense is the fact that respondent is no

ordinary lawyer. Having served in the judiciary for eight (8) years, he is very
well aware of the standards of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession. His propensity to try to "get away" with an indiscretion
becomes apparent and inexcusable when he entered into a legal
"consultancy" contract with the LWUA. Perhaps realizing its own mistake,
LWUA terminated said contract with respondent, but then proceeded to
give him a "special consultancy." This travesty could not be long hidden
from public awareness, hence the instant complaint for disbarment filed by
petitioner. Given the factual circumstances found by Commission on Bar
Discipline, we have no hesitance in accepting the recommendation of the
Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, that respondent be
fined and suspended from the practice of law. The Code of Professional
Responsibility, Rule 1.01, provides that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For violating the Code
as well as transgressing his oath as an officer of the court, his suspension
for one (1) year and a fine of ten thousand (P10,000) pesos are in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., is found liable for
having willfully violated a lawful order of this Court in our decision of
March 29, 1995 rendered in A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel
Atienza vs. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr. He is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one (1) year and ordered to pay a FINE of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar conduct shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of
this Decision be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent as well
as circulated to all courts in the Philippines. This decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.

DOLORES C. BELLEZA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ALAN S. MACASA,

Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
Per Curiam:
This treats of the complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Dolores C.
Belleza against respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa for unprofessional and
unethical conduct in connection with the handling of a criminal case
involving complainants son.
On November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent on referral of
their mutual friend, Joe Chua. Complainant wanted to avail of respondents
legal services in connection with the case of her son, Francis John Belleza,
who was arrested by policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day for alleged
1
violation of Republic Act (RA) 9165. Respondent agreed to handle the case
for P30,000.
The following day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to
respondent thru their mutual friend Chua. On November 17, 2004, she
gave him an additional P10,000. She paid the P5,000 balance on November
18, 2004. Both payments were also made thru Chua. On all three
occasions, respondent did not issue any receipt.
On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant
for the purpose of posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her
(complainants) son. Again, respondent did not issue any receipt. When
complainant went to the court the next day, she found out that
respondent did not remit the amount to the court.
Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on
several occasions but respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent
failed to act on the case of complainants son and complainant was forced

to avail of the services of the Public Attorneys Office for her sons defense.
2

Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint for disbarment against

respondent in the Negros Occidental chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
3
Philippines (IBP). Attached to the verified complaint was the affidavit of
Chua which read:
I, JOE CHUA, of legal age, Filipino and resident of Purok Sawmill, Brgy. Bata,
Bacolod City, after having been sworn to in accordance with law, hereby
depose and state:
1. That I am the one who introduce[d] Mrs. Dolores C. Belleza [to] Atty.
Alan Macasa when she looked for a lawyer to help her son in the case that
the latter is facing sometime [i]n [the] first week of November 2004;
2. That by reason of my mutual closeness to both of them, I am the one
who facilitated the payment of Mrs. DOLORES C. BELLEZA to Atty. Alan
Macasa;
3. That as far as I know, I received the following amount from Mrs. Dolores
Belleza as payment for Atty. Alan Macasa:
Date
Amount
November 11, 2004
P15,000.00
A week after
10,000.00
November 18, 2004
5,000.00
4. That the above-mentioned amounts which I supposed as Attorneys Fees
were immediately forwarded by me to Atty. [Macasa];
5. That I am executing this affidavit in order to attest to the truth of all the
foregoing statements.
4

x x x x x x x x x

In a letter dated May 23, 2005, the IBP Negros Occidental chapter
transmitted the complaint to the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline
6
(CBD).
7

In an order dated July 13, 2005, the CBD required respondent to submit
his answer within 15 days from receipt thereof. Respondent, in an urgent
8
motion for extension of time to file an answer dated August 10, 2005,
simply brushed aside the complaint for being "baseless, groundless and
malicious" without, however, offering any explanation. He also prayed that
he be given until September 4, 2005 to submit his answer.
9

Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions for second and third

extensions of time praying to be given until November 4, 2005 to submit
his answer. He never did.
When both parties failed to attend the mandatory conference on April 19,
10
2006, they were ordered to submit their respective position papers.
11

In its report and recommendation dated October 2, 2007, the CBD ruled
that respondent failed to rebut the charges against him. He never
answered the complaint despite several chances to do so.
The CBD found respondent guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct.
It also found him guilty of violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and
apart from his own and those others kept by him.
The CBD ruled that respondent lacked good moral character and that he
was unfit and unworthy of the privileges conferred by law on him as a
member of the bar. The CBD recommended a suspension of six months
with a stern warning that repetition of similar acts would merit a more
severe sanction. It also recommended that respondent be ordered to
return to complainant the P18,000 intended for the provisional liberty of
the complainants son and the P30,000 attorneys fees.
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of the CBD with the modification that respondent be
ordered to return to complainant only the amount of P30,000 which he
12
received as attorneys fees.
We affirm the CBDs finding of guilt as affirmed by the IBP Board of
Governors but we modify the IBPs recommendation as to the liability of
respondent.
Respondent Disrespected Legal Processes
Respondent was given more than enough opportunity to answer the
charges against him. Yet, he showed indifference to the orders of the CBD
for him to answer and refute the accusations of professional misconduct
against him. In doing so, he failed to observe Rule 12.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting
the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
Respondent also ignored the CBDs directive for him to file his position
paper. His propensity to flout the orders of the CBD showed his lack of

concern and disrespect for the proceedings of the CBD. He disregarded the
oath he took when he was accepted to the legal profession "to obey the
laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted legal authorities." He
displayed insolence not only to the CBD but also to this Court which is the
source of the CBDs authority.
Respondents unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of the CBD was not
only irresponsible but also constituted utter disrespect for the judiciary
13
and his fellow lawyers. His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is
called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand
14
foremost in complying with court directives as an officer of the court.
Respondent should have known that the orders of the CBD (as the
investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers)
were not mere requests but directives which should have been complied
15
with promptly and completely. 1avvph!1
Respondent Grossly Neglected The Cause of His Client
Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainants
son. Such undertaking imposed upon him the following duties:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND
HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
x x x x x x x x x
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
x x x x x x x x x

CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN

THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
A lawyer who accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself
(particularly his time, knowledge, skills and effort) to such cause. He must
be ever mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him, constantly
striving to be worthy thereof. Accordingly, he owes full devotion to the
interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
clients rights and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill and ability to
ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from his client, save by the
16
rules of law legally applied.
A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes
17
to serve his client with competence and diligence. He must
conscientiously perform his duty arising from such relationship. He must
bear in mind that by accepting a retainer, he impliedly makes the following
representations: that he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill
and ability other lawyers similarly situated possess; that he will exert his
best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the litigation entrusted to
him; that he will exercise reasonable care and diligence in the use of his
skill and in the application of his knowledge to his clients cause; and that
he will take all steps necessary to adequately safeguard his clients
18
interest. 1avvphi1
A lawyers negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the
relationship of counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of
justice and prejudice the rights of a litigant, particularly his client. Thus,
from the perspective of the ethics of the legal profession, a lawyers
lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is both unprofessional and
19
unethical.
If his clients case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively
represent his client by promptly filing the necessary pleading or motion
and assiduously attending the scheduled hearings. This is specially

significant for a lawyer who represents an accused in a criminal case.

20

The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution.

However, this right can only be meaningful if the accused is accorded
ample legal assistance by his lawyer:
... The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due
process which basically means that a person must be heard before being
condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic
rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed
perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections.
The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal
assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the
defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by
the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his
bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being
well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures,
21
essential laws and existing jurisprudence.

[T]he right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental
right. Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little
consequence, for it is through counsel that the accused secures his other
rights. In other words, the right to counsel is the right to effective
22
assistance of counsel.
The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by
23
the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means
an effective, efficient and truly decisive legal assistance, not a simply
24
perfunctory representation.

In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son
and receiving his attorneys fees, respondent did nothing that could be
considered as effective and efficient legal assistance. For all intents and
purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his client. Indeed, on
account of respondents continued inaction, complainant was compelled
to seek the services of the Public Attorneys Office. Respondents
lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainants son was
reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainants son, it also deprived
him of his constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the
amount entrusted to him for posting a bond to secure the provisional
liberty of his client, respondent unduly impeded the latters constitutional
right to bail.
Respondent Failed to Return His Clients Money
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client
imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or property
25
collected or received for or from the client.
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular
purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office
expenses), he should promptly account to the client how the money was
spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must
26
immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an
accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money
does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the
27
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his clients funds or properties
28
as they fall due or upon demand. His failure to return the clients money
upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it
for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in
29
him by the client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and

30

deserves punishment. Indeed, it may border on the criminal as it may

constitute a prima facie case of swindling or estafa.
Respondent never denied receiving P18,000 from complainant for the
purpose of posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her son. He
never used the money for its intended purpose yet also never returned it
to the client. Worse, he unjustifiably refused to turn over the amount to
complainant despite the latters repeated demands.
Moreover, respondent rendered no service that would have entitled him
to the P30,000 attorneys fees. As a rule, the right of a lawyer to a
reasonable compensation for his services is subject to two requisites: (1)
the existence of an attorney-client relationship and (2) the rendition by the
31
lawyer of services to the client. Thus, a lawyer who does not render legal
services is not entitled to attorneys fees. Otherwise, not only would he be
unjustly enriched at the expense of the client, he would also be rewarded
for his negligence and irresponsibility.
Respondent Failed to Uphold the Integrity and Dignity of the Legal
Profession
For his failure to comply with the exacting ethical standards of the legal
profession, respondent failed to obey Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who fails to abide by the Canons and Rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility disrespects the said Code and everything that it
stands for. In so doing, he disregards the ethics and disgraces the dignity of
the legal profession.

Lawyers should always live up to the ethical standards of the legal

profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Public
confidence in law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
32
improper conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, every lawyer should act
and comport himself in a manner that would promote public confidence in
33
the integrity of the legal profession.
Respondent was undeserving of the trust reposed in him. Instead of using
the money for the bond of the complainants son, he pocketed it. He failed
34
to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings with his client. He
failed to live up to his fiduciary duties. By keeping the money for himself
despite his undertaking that he would facilitate the release of
complainants son, respondent showed lack of moral principles. His
transgression showed him to be a swindler, a deceitful person and a shame
to the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa is hereby found GUILTY not
only of dishonesty but also of professional misconduct for prejudicing
Francis John Bellezas right to counsel and to bail under Sections 13 and
14(2), Article III of the Constitution, and for violating Canons 1, 7, 17, 18
and 19 and Rules 12.03, 16.01, 16.02, 16.03 and 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is therefore DISBARRED from the practice
of law effective immediately.
Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Dolores C.
Belleza the amounts of P30,000 and P18,000 with interest at 12% per
annum from the date of promulgation of this decision until full payment.
Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment
of the amount within ten days from payment. Failure to do so will subject
him to criminal prosecution.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be entered into the records of respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa and the
Office of the Court Administrator to be furnished to the courts of the land

for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.