Constitutional Law II: Searches and Seizures

Bukidnon State University College of Law

Alih vs. Castro
151 SCRA 279
June 23, 1987
Facts:
Respondents who were members of the Philippine
marine and defense forces raided the compound
occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms,
ammunitions and explosives. A shoot-out ensued after
petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents,
killing a number of men. The following morning, the
petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger
printing, paraffin testing and photographing despite
their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and
ammunitions were also confiscated.
The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to
have the items illegally seized returned to them and
invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights
The respondents admitted that the operation was done
without a warrant but reasoned that they were acting
under superior orders and that operation was necessary
because of the aggravation of the peace and order
problem due to the assassination of the city mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking
of the fingerprints and photographs of the petitioners
and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of
the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence
against them.
Held:
The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion
that the respondents had against petitioners did not
excuse the former from observing the guaranty
provided for by the constitution against unreasonable
searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to
due process and should be protected from the arbitrary
actions of those tasked to execute the law.
Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation
was urgent nor was there any showing of the
petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit
approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court.
The items seized, having been the fruits of the
poisonous tree were held inadmissible as evidence in
any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation

by the respondents was done without a warrant and so

the items seized during said operation should not be
acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence
should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).
However, as to the issue on finger-printing,
photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the
provision against self-incrimination, the court held
that the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to
testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in
Holt v. United States, 18 The prohibition of compelling
a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself
is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be
material.
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff
Burgos,
Sr.
vs.
Chief
of
Staff
G.R. L-64261. December 26, 1984
Escolin, J.
Doctrine: A machinery which is movable by nature
becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the
tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a
tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only
temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of
the owner.
Facts: Armed with a search warrant issued by the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, law enforcement officers
searched the offices of the We forum and
Metropolitan Mail newspapers. During the course of
the search, the law enforcement officers seized office
and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia and
several other materials used in the distribution of
newspapers. Petitioner avers, among others, that the
seizure of the properties mentioned above amounts to
seizure of real properties, which cannot be validly
conducted under the strength of a search warrant. It must
be noted that real properties are not susceptible of
confiscation under a search warrant. Hence this appeal
which assails the validity of the search and the seizure of
the properties of the petitioner.
Issue: Whether there is merit in the petitioners assertion
that real property were invalidly seized under the
disputed warrants.
Held: No. The petitioners assertion does not hold
water. Under Article 415(5) of the civil code,
machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements
intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry
or works which may be carried on in a building or on a
piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs

Constitutional Law II: Searches and Seizures

Bukidnon State University College of Law
of the said industry or works are considered
immovable property. In another case decided by the
Court, in which the abovementioned legal provision was
invoked, it was ruled that machinery which is movable
by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the
owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so
when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other
person having only temporary right, unless such person
acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar,
petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land
and/or building on which the machineries were placed.
This being the case, the machineries in question, while
in fact bolted to the ground remains movable property
susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
Stonehill vs Diokno (20 SCRA 383)
Labels: constitutional
law, corporation, general
warrant, search and seizure
Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search
warrants against petitioners personally, and/or
corporations for which they are officers directing peace
officers to search the persons of petitioners and
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences
to search for personal properties books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,
and other documents showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarettes) as
the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank
Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code,
and Revised Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations and on the respective
residences of the petitioners, there seized documents,
papers, money and other records. Petitioners then were
subjected to deportation proceedings and were
constrained to question the legality of the searches and
seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as
evidence against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction and partially lifted the same on June 29, 1962
with respect to some documents and papers.
Held:
Search warrants issued were violative of the
Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being general

warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did

not particularly specify the things to be seized. The
purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of
the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not
admissible in court as a fruit of a poisonous tee.
However, they could not be returned, except if
warranted by the circumstances.
Petitioners were not the proper party to question the
validity and return of those taken from the corporations
for which they acted as officers as they are treated as
personality different from that of the corporation.
ASIAN
SURETY
and
INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., petitioner
v
HON. JOSE HERRERA, respondent
Facts:
Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued
by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the City Court
of Manila, and to command respondents to return
immediately the documents, papers, receipts and
records alleged to have been illegally seized
thereunder by agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta,
Jr.
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera,
upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso
Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of his
witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant
in connection with an undocketed criminal case for
estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax
evasion, against the Asian Surety and Insurance
Co., a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines, with principal
office at Room 200 Republic Supermarket Bldg.,
Rizal Avenue, Manila.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other
agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the
NBI entered the premises of the Republic
Supermarket Building and served the search
warrant upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance
company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao,
president and chairman of the board of directors of
the insurance firm. After the search they seized and
carried away two (2) carloads of documents, papers
and receipts.

Constitutional Law II: Searches and Seizures

Bukidnon State University College of Law
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant is void.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for
four separate and distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2)
falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance
fraud, in contravention of the explicit command of
Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no
search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense."
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby
granted; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is
nullified and set aside, and the respondents are
hereby ordered to return immediately all
documents, papers and other objects seized or
taken thereunder. Without costs.
Case Digest of Pita vs CA

hands a publication or other article charged is being

obscene may fall.

Personal determination by a Judge

2.
The authorities must convince the Court that the
materials sought to be seized are obscene, and pose a
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER of an evil substantive
enough to warrant a State interference and action;

PITA vs CA
FACTS:
An anti-smut campaign initiated by the Mayor of City of
Manila, Ramon Bagatsing, seized & confiscated from
dealers, distributors, news stand owners and peddlers
along sidewalks, magazines, publications and other
reading materials believe to be obscene, pornographic
and indecent and later burned the seized materials in
public at University belt along CM Recto Avenue.
Among the publications seized, and later burned was
Pinoy Playboy magazines and Co-edited by plaintiff
Leo Pita.
Pita assailed, Preliminary Injunction, as to whether or
not the defendants and or their agents can without a
Court order confiscate or seize plaintiffs magazine
before any judicial finding is made on which is said may
be obscene or not.
HELD:
Petition is GRANTED, reversed & set-aside.
RATIONALE:
TEST OF OBSCENITY (PEOPLE vs KOTTINGER)
1.
Whether the tendency of the matter charged as
obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds
are open to such immoral influences and into whose

2.
Those that shocks the ordinary and common
sense of men as an indecency
PASEI vs DRILON (Definition of Police Power)
State authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote
GENERAL WELFARE
PROCEDURE (OBSCENE MATERIALS)
1.
The authorities must apply for the issuance of a
Search Warrant from a Judge, in in their opinion, an
obscenity rap is in order;

3.
The Judge must determine whether or not the
same are indeed obscene the question is to be
resolved on a case-to-case basis and on his hands
sound discretion;
4.
If, in the opinion of the Court, probable cause
exists, it may issue the Search Warrant;
5.

Paper suit, Article 201;

6.

Any conviction is subject to appeal

Placer vs Villanueva
G.R. Nos. 60349-62, December 29, 1983
Facts: Following receipt of informations from
petitioners that probable cause has been
established which necessitates the issuance of
warrants of arrest, respondent judge issued an
order the hearing of said criminal cases for the
purpose of determining the propriety of issuing the
corresponding warrants of arrest. After said
hearing, respondent issued the questioned orders
requiring petitioners to submit to the court the
affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other
documentary
evidence
in
support
of
the informations to aid him in the exercise of his
power of judicial review of the findings of probable
cause by petitioners
Petitioners contended that under P.D. Nos. 77 and
911, they are authorized to determine the existence
of a probable cause in a preliminary

Constitutional Law II: Searches and Seizures

Bukidnon State University College of Law
examination/investigation, and that their findings as
to the existence thereof constitute sufficient basis
for the issuance of warrants of arrest by the court.
Issues: Whether the certification of the investigating
fiscal in the information as to the existence of
probable cause obligates respondent City Judge to
issue a warrant of arrest.
Whether or not the respondent city judge may, for
the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest, compel
the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting
affidavits and other documentary evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation.

wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in

the cases where he was satisfied that probable
cause existed.
The
obvious
purpose
of
requiring
the
submission of affidavits of the complainant and of
his witnesses is to enable the court to determine
whether to dismiss the case outright or to require
further proceedings.
Soliven v Makasiar Nov 14, 1988 G.R. No.
82585
Per
Curiam
(Topic

on

Warrant

Issued

by

RTC)

Held: 1. No. 2. Yes.

The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial
function; it calls for the exercise of judicial
discretion
on
the
part of
the
issuing
magistrate. This is clear from the following
provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court:

Facts:

Warrant of arrest, when issued. If the judge be

satisfied from the preliminary examination
conducted by him or by the investigating officer that
the offense complained of has been committed and
that there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant
or order for his arrest.

Issue: WON Beltran's rights were violated when the

RTC issued a warrant of arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses to
determine
probable
cause.

Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of

the
existence
of
probable
cause
before
issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of
the information the judge finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscals certification and require
the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a
probable cause. This has been the rule
since U.S. vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas. An
d this evidently is the reason for the issuance by
respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15,
16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982. Without the
affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other
evidence which, as a matter of long-standing
practice had been attached to the informations filed
in
his sala,
respondent
found
the informations inadequate
bases
for
the
determination of probable cause. For as the
ensuing events would show, after petitioners had
submitted the required affidavits, respondent

In satisfying himself of the existence of probable

cause to issue a warrant of arrest, the judge isn't
required to examine the complainant and the
witnesses.

Soliven broadcasted the statement that President

Aquino hid under her bed during a coup d' etat. The
President sued for libel. Soliven claimed that he
can't be sued because the President was immune
from
suit.

Held:

No

Ratio:

He shall only personally evaluate the report and

supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and
issue a warrant of arrest on the basis thereof.
Also, if he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and required the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to
aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence
of
probable
cause.
Otherwise, judges would be burdened with
preliminary investigation instead of hearing cases.
Enrile V. Salazar

Constitutional Law II: Searches and Seizures

Bukidnon State University College of Law
n February 1990, Sen Enrile was arrested. He was
charged together with Mr. & Mrs. Panlilio, and
Honasan for the crime of rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder which allegedly occurred
during their failed coup attempt. Enrile was then
brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed for the
habeas corpus alleging that the crime being
charged against him is nonexistent. That he was
charged with a criminal offense in an information for
which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary
investigation was conducted, hence was denied
due process; denied his right to bail; and arrested
and detained on the strength of a warrant issued
without the judge who issued it first having
personally determined the existence of probable
cause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court should affirm
the Hernandez ruling.
HELD: Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he
was denied bail although ordinarily a charge of
rebellion would entitle one for bail. The crime of
rebellion charged against him however is
complexed with murder and multiple frustrated
murders the intention of the prosecution was to
make rebellion in its most serious form so as to
make the penalty thereof in the maximum. The SC
ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder. What Enrile
et al can be charged of would be Simple Rebellion
because other crimes such as murder or all those
that may be necessary to the commission of
rebellion is absorbed hence he should be entitiled
for bail. The SC however noted that a petition for
habeas corpus was not the proper remedy so as to
avail of bail. The proper step that should have been
taken was for Enrile to file a petition to be admitted
for bail. He should have exhausted all other efforts
before petitioning for habeas corpus. The
Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other crimes
committed in carrying out rebellion are deemed
absorbed. The SC noted, however, that there may
be a need to modify the rebellion law. Considering
that the essence of rebellion has been lost and that
it is being used by a lo t of opportunists to attempt
to grab power.
MAXIMO SOLIVEN VS HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR
167 SCRA 393 (1988)
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were
raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due
process when informations for libel were filed against

them although the finding of the existence of a prima

faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of
Justice and, subsequently, by the President; (2) whether
or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated
when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his
arrest without personally examining the complainant
and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause;
and (3) whether or not the President of the Philippines,
under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of
a complaint-affidavit.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot
and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of
Justice denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of
Justice sustaining the City Fiscals finding of a prima
facie case against petitioners. A second motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied
by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal,
the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed
the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2,
1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these
developments, petitioners contention that they have
been denied the administrative remedies available
under the law has lost factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner
Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in
the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that
instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a
Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed, in effect
waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing
counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require
that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his
counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation
is deemed completed. All that is required is that the
respondent be given the opportunity to submit counteraffidavits if he is so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for
an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the
issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision
reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search

Constitutional Law II: Searches and Seizures

Bukidnon State University College of Law
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word personally after the word
determined and the deletion of the grant of authority
by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to other
responsible officers as may be authorized by law, has
apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the
Constitution now requires the judge to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses in his
determination of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report
and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the
basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscals report and require the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges
would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints
instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases
filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously
adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein
provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has
deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with
regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a
finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.

Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that

the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity
from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit. He
contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of
the Presidents filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution,
bringing her under the trial courts jurisdiction. This,
continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her
privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the
witness stand, she would be exposing herself to
possible contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the
privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise
of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office holders time, also
demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked
only by the holder of the office; not by any other person
in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal
case in which the President is complainant cannot raise
the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the
case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would
prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus,
if so minded the President may shed the protection
afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he
could not be held liable for libel because of the
privileged character or the publication, the Court
reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a
defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after
receiving the evidence of the parties.
As to petitioner Beltrans claim that to allow the libel
case to proceed would produce a chilling effect on
press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to
rule on the point.

Constitutional Law II: Searches and Seizures

Bukidnon State University College of Law
The petitions fail to establish that public respondents,
through their separate acts, gravely abused their
discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence,
the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot
issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to
DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and
83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained
in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7,
1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26,
1988 is LIFTED.
SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO [183 SCRA 145;
G.R. NO. 81510; 14 MAR 1990]
Wednesday, February 04, 2009 Posted
by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a
sworn statement filed with the POEA,
charged petitioner with illegal recruitment.
Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez
sent petitioner a telegram directing him to
appear to the POEA regarding the complaint
against him. On the same day, after knowing
that petitioner had no license to operate a
recruitment agency, public
respondent
Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a
Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to
petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure
of the documents and paraphernalia being
used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having
verified that petitioner has (1) No valid
license or authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy
workers for overseas employment; (2)
Committed/are committing acts prohibited
under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in
relation to Article 38 of the same code. A
team was then tasked to implement the said
Order.
The
group,
accompanied
by
mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen,
went to petitioners residence. They served
the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar,
who let them in. The team confiscated
assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with

POEA a letter requesting for the return of the

seized properties, because she was not given
prior notice and hearing. The said Order
violated due process. She also alleged that it
violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the
properties were confiscated against her will
and were done with unreasonable force and
intimidation.
Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (or the
Secretary of Labor) can validly issue
warrants of search and seizure (or arrest)
under Article 38 of the Labor Code
Held: Under the new Constitution, . . . no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting
officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or
arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was
based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The
Supreme Court held, We reiterate that the
Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may
no longer issue search or arrest warrants.
Hence, the authorities must go through the
judicial process. To that extent, we declare
Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code,
unconstitutional and of no force and effect
The power of the President to order the
arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously,
exceptional. It (the power to order arrests)
cannot be made to extend to other cases,
like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it
is the sole domain of the courts.
Furthermore, the search and seizure order
was in the nature of a general warrant. The
court held that the warrant is null and void,
because it must identify specifically the
things
to
be
seized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code

Constitutional Law II: Searches and Seizures

Bukidnon State University College of Law
is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null
and void. The respondents are ORDERED to
return all materials seized as a result of the
implementation of Search and Seizure Order
No. 1205.
Alvarez vs. CFI
64 Phil. 33 (1937)
ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES >
Examination of witnesses
Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of
Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit
that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of
books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money
lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of
law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didnt
say that the information was based on his personal
knowledge but was only received by him from a
reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the
warrant ordering the search of Alvarez house. On
June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place
and seized different documents namely, banknotes,
bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit
receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was
not brought immediately to the custody of the judge
who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents
of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and
prays that all articles in question be returned to him
because the SW issued was illegal. On the other
hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be
allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for
further investigation. When the judge sustained the
latters motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the
SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as
the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury
Board to retain custody be declared null and void.
Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is
illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of
Agent Almeda in whose oath the latter declared
that he had no personal knowledge of the facts
which were to serve as basis for the issuance of the
warrant but he had knowledge thereof only through
information secured from a person whom he
considered reliable.
Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the
Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58
require that there be not only probable cause

before the issuance of a search warrant but that the

search warrant must be based upon an application
supported by oath of the applicant and the
witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense,
an oath includes any form of attestation by which a
party signifies that he is bound in conscience to
perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is
sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by
the person taking it that his attestation or promise is
made under an immediate sense of his
responsibility to God. The oath required must
refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance
of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit
to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it has been drawn in such a manner
that perjury could be charged thereon and
affiant be held liable for damages caused. The
affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the
search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective
by reason of the manner in which the oath was
made, and therefore, the search warrant and the
subsequent seizure of the books, documents and
other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in
this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the
applicant or complainant to the application. It is
admitted that the judge who issued the search
warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the
affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not
require nor take the deposition of any other
witness. The Constitution does not provide that it is
of an imperative necessity to take the depositions
of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or
complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter.
The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of
depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the
committing magistrate of the existence of probable
cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or
complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense
with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the
affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely
hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the
affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose
of determining the existence of probable cause to
warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When
the affidavit of the applicant or complainant
contains sufficient facts within his personal and
direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is

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Bukidnon State University College of Law
satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the
applicants knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay,
the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a
personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus
the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was
based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no
personal knowledge of the facts
Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano Case Digest
Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)
FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested
together with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary
Security Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted
as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest
took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon
of the same day, her premises were searched and
428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes
were seized.
Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Pao issued a search
warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roques leased
residence allegedly an underground house of the
CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized,
charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG
were filed by but the fiscals office merely charged
her and Nolasco with illegal possession of
subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for
suppression of the evidence on the ground that it
was illegally obtained and that the search warrant is
void because it is a general warrant since it does
not sufficiently describe with particularity the things
subject of the search and seizure, and that
probable cause has not been properly established
for lack of searching questions propounded to the
applicants witness.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?
HELD:
NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution,
guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. It also specifically
provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the
Judge or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he

may produce, and particularly describing the place

to be searched and the things to be seized.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search
Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal
properties vaguely described and not particularized.
It is an all- embracing description which includes
everything conceivable regarding the Communist
Party of the Philippines and the National
Democratic Front. It does not specify what the
subversive books and instructions are; what the
manuals not otherwise available to the public
contain to make them subversive or to enable them
to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is
absent a definite guideline to the searching team as
to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving
the officers of the law discretion regarding what
articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also
were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.
It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and
infringes on the constitutional mandate
requiring particular description of the things to
be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court,
search warrants of similar description were
considered null and void for being too general.

20th Century Fox Film v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. Nos. 76649-51, August 19, 1988
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

I.

THE FACTS

Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation

sought the assistance of the NBI in conducting
searches and seizures in connection with the NBIs
anti-film piracy campaign. Petitioner alleged that
certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are
engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of
copyrighted films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old
Intellectual Property Law).

The NBI conducted surveillance and

investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the
petitioner and subsequently filed three (3)
applications for search warrants against the video

Constitutional Law II: Searches and Seizures

Bukidnon State University College of Law
outlets owned by the private respondents. The
lower court issued the desired search warrants.
The NBI, accompanied by the petitioner's agents,
raided the video outlets and seized the items
described in the three warrants.

Private respondents later filed a motion to

lift the search warrants and release the seized
properties, which was granted by the lower court.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied
by the lower court. The CA affirmed the trial court.

II.

THE ISSUE

Did the judge properly lift the search

warrants he issued earlier?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the petition and
AFFIRMED the questioned decision and resolution
of the CA.]
YES, the judge properly lifted the search
warrants he issued earlier.
The lower court lifted the three (3)
questioned search warrants in the absence of
probable cause that the private respondents
violated P.D. 49. NBI agents who acted as
witnesses during the application for search warrant
did not have personal knowledge of the subject
matter of their testimony, which was the alleged
commission of the offense of piracy by the private
respondents. Only the petitioners counsel who was
also a witness during the application stated that he
had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes
owned by the private respondents were pirated
tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the
petitioner. The lower court lifted the warrants,
declaring that the testimony of petitioners counsel
did not have much credence because the master
tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown
to the court during the application.

The presentation of the master tapes of the

copyrighted films, from which the pirated films were
allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of
search warrants against those who have in their

possession the pirated films. The petitioner's

argument to the effect that the presentation of the
master tapes at the time of application may not be
necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in
nature and not determinative of whether or not a
probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the
search warrants is not meritorious. The court
cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes
were necessarily reproduced from master tapes
that it owns.

The essence of a copyright infringement is

the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
purported pirated works to the copyrighted work.
Hence, the applicant must present to the court the
copyrighted films to compare them with the
purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly
pirated to determine whether the latter is an
unauthorized reproduction of the former. This
linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films
must be established to satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Mere allegations as to the
existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as
basis for the issuance of a search warrant.