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MOVING UPMARKET
We have very strong brand awareness, with around 70
per cent recognition of Seiko as a watchmaker. But
there was some confusion about the brand Customer
perception of the brand should be the same in Tokyo,
London, Paris, New York or Sydney. That meant building
a brand image that conveys core values, no matter what
the market.
- Kenji Hagiwara, managing director of Seiko
UK1
Founded in 1881, Tokyo-based Seiko rose to international
prominence in 1969 by commercialising the worlds first watch
based on quartz technology. 2 As a vertically integrated
watchmaker, Seiko held an advantage over its rivals in the Swiss
watch industry, which comprised thousands of firms specialising in
various aspects of mechanical watch production. Seiko invested
heavily in research and development and by the 1980s had
unveiled several timepieces featuring technological innovations: the
first quartz watch with day and date; the first LCD watch with an
hour, minute and second display; the first quartz chronograph; the
first calculator watch; the first TV watch; and the worlds first
automatic quartz watch.
Through internal development, mergers and acquisitions, Seiko
diversified into new businesses over the years. But the watch
businessfor which the name Seiko was best knownwas being
challenged by forces that were transforming the worlds watch
industry. The advantage derived from Seikos automated production
capabilities during the quartz revolution had been eroded by
inexpensive Chinese watch producers and a resurgent Swiss watch
industry, dominating the low and higher ends of the market
respectively. Meanwhile, competition from Citizen, Casio and a
profusion of new fashion brands meant that Seikos position in all
market segments was being challenged by an ever-growing
number of competitors. In the face of these changes, Seikos watch
sales declined throughout the 1990s, prompting the decision to
establish Seiko Watch Corporation in 2001 as a completely
autonomous subsidiary of Seiko Corporation. The move was intended
to streamline internal decision-making and allow for a more focused
brand vision.
In 2005, the high-end segment of the watch market was emerging as
the most lucrative, while narrowing margins plagued the lower-priced
segments. Shinji Hattori, president and CEO of Seiko Watch
Corporation, felt adamantly that Seiko should raise its perceived
image outside Japan, move upmarket and even challenge the
Swiss in the domain of mechanical watchmaking. During the
year, Seiko launched an innovative new watch movement, the
Technology Development
Mechanical Watchmaking
Every watch contained certain common elements: a movement to
measure the passage of time, an energy source, a display, a casing
and a bracelet or strap. The mechanical watch movement was driven
by the release of energy from an unwinding mainspring and
transmitted through a series of gears to a balance wheel that
controlled the hands on an analogue display as it rotated back and
forth at regular intervals. Mechanical watch movements typically
contained over 100 parts and varied in quality according to the
precision of the individual components and the care taken in
assembly. In the production of the highest quality mechanical
timepieces, very skilled workers were needed to finish the surfaces
on the components and to adjust watch movements at diferent
positions.
Having mastered all aspects of watchmaking and earning renown
for the mass production of mechanical timepieces, Seiko launched
the Grand Seiko line in 1960 to cater to the high end of the
domestic watch market. After dominating the domestic watchquality competition in the late 1950s, in 1964, Seiko participated for
the first time in the wristwatch category at the Swiss chronometer
competition held each year in Neuchtel. The results in Seikos first
year of participation were disappointing. The highest placing
produced by the Suwa Seikosha plant was 144th. In 1967, the
movements of an entry produced at Daini Seikosha took the second
place award at Neuchtel, while an entry from Suwa Seikosha
placed third. When the following years competition was
cancelled, Seiko opted to participate in the Geneva Observatory
competitions, where its entries were awarded every place from
4th to 10th, making Seiko the overall winner.
During the 1960s, the Grand Seiko line of mechanical watches was
produced for the Japanese market by a development team aiming
to exceed Swiss chronometer standards. Watches bearing the
fiContrle Officiel Suisse des Chronomtres (fiCOSC) designation
were tested and certified by the official Swiss chronometer testing
institute to a level of accuracy of 4/+6 seconds per day. Grand
Seiko watches were not submitted for COSC certification, but were
Quartz Technology
By the late 1950s, the horological industry had entered a period of
technological revolution with the application of electronics to watch
technology. The Hamilton Watch Company of Pennsylvania
launched the worlds first electric watch, the Ventura, in 1957,
employing a battery in place of the mainspring that stored energy
within mechanical movements. In 1962, New York-based Bulova had
miniaturised the technology for a line of high quality watches
introduced under the fiAccutron brand. Within five years, the
Accutron (which was claimed to be five to six times more accurate
than the best mechanical watches at the time) had become the
best-selling watch over US$100 in the US.12 Quartz timekeeping
technology had been available in the public domain and was
based on the properties of a quartz crystal oscillating at precise
frequencies. By the 1940s, quartz clocksmore accurate than the
most accurate mechanical clockswere being used for timekeeping
in scientific laboratories. Yet the production of quartz wristwatches
had yet to materialise due to the difficulty of miniaturising
components and the lack of dependable batteries small enough to
fit within the casing of a watch.
to the Swiss banking group Pictet & Cie, eight playersthe Swatch
Group, Rolex, Richemont, LVMH, Patek Philippe, Bulgari, Chopard
and Guccihad cornered over 90% of the luxury watch market
(defined as being those with a factory gate price of over
US$444corresponding roughly to a retail price in excess of
US$1,268.21
United States of America
American watchmakers had been a force in the international
watch market since the 19th century. In 1950 the US Time
Company introduced Timex wristwatches, a collection of
inexpensive watches with imitation-jewellery casings that were
produced with hard alloy bearings instead of jewels. The US Time
Company (later renamed Timex Group) distributed the watches in
unconventional outlets such as drug stores at extremely low prices.
In the early 1970s, Timex and Bulova introduced quartz analogue
watches using components from outside suppliers. Timexs first
analogue quartz watch retailed at US$125the lowest price of any
quartz watch then on the market. In 1972, the Hamilton Watch
Company introduced the first digital watches in production with the
Pulsar line of watches; they featured a ashing red light emitting a
diode (LED) time display.
A number of American semiconductor firms applied their
experience in microelectronics research and integrated circuit
production to the mass production of digital quartz watches. In 1976,
Texas Instruments shocked the industry by introducing a US$20
watch line featuring plastic-cased LED watches. Subsequent pricebased competition forced many watchmakers out of business and
only a few established companies were able to survive. By the late
1970s, consumer demand for low-cost digital watches was declining,
while price competition meant pressure on margins. By the early
The appreciation of the Yen in the late 1980s, coupled with the
devaluation of Asian and Latin American currencies strengthened
Hong Kongs position in the low-price watch segment. In the
1990s, Hong Kong revised its trade law to allow for watch origins
to be determined according to the source of its parts rather than
the country of assembly. This meant that Hong Kong watch
producers were able to use the label fiMade in Switzerland or
fiMade in Japan on watches using imported parts. Consequently, a
trend emerged whereby watches assembled in Mainland China
were
re-exported
from
Hong
Kong.
Manufacturers were
increasingly developing original designs and becoming more
sophisticated with branding. In 2005, the export of some 627.3
million units of watches and clocks from Hong Kong amounted to a
total value of US$ 5.9 billion.26
With low labour costs and an eficient supply chain, China had
emerged as the worlds largest exporter of watches by volume,
accounting for much of the global output of low-end watches by the
early 2000s [see Exhibit 8A]. Intense competition was
prompting Chinas watchmakers to make attempts at branding
their own products and to shift to mid-range production. However,
most Chinese producers lacked the large sums of investment
needed to develop and market their own brands internationally, and
production of watches with higher-end functionality required a level
of technology that most manufacturers did not have. In 2005,
Chinese producers exported 884.6 million watches (an amount
15% lower than a year earlier).27 Watches exported by China
were sold at an average price of US$1 (at factory gate prices) as
compared with US$6 for watches leaving Hong Kong, and US$377
for Swiss watches.28
Japan
For many years, Japans big-three watchmakers consisted of Seiko,
Citizen Watch Co. and the Orient Watch Co. (Seiko later acquired
a 54.8% controlling interest in Orient). 29 Intensifying competition
The Casio Computer Company was a major new entrant to the watch
market in the mid-1970s, with a product line that featured a range
of multifunctional digital watches. Casio watches were sold through
new channels such as consumer electronics and sporting goods
shops. By the early 1980s, the company was second to Timex in
the low-priced segment but faced increasing competition from lowercost digital watches from Hong Kong.31 In response, Casio developed
increasingly advanced digital watches for specialised uses and
added a range of functionality to its watches, such as calculators,
world time display, thermometers and altimeters. The companys
signature line of shock-resistant (G-Shock) digital watches was
introduced in 1983 and carved out a strong position in the market.
More recently, Casios strategy was to develop a market for its solarpowered, radio-controlled watches. In the fiscal year ended 31 March
2006, the companys net sales for timepieces totalled US$611 million.
Japans watch business, while accounting for more than half of the
worlds watches and parts, endured a period of stagnation during the
1990s. Competition from Swiss brands, an increase in mid-priced
fashion brands and a glut of low-end watches from Chinese suppliers
(many of which featured inexpensive Japanese parts) prompted
Japans watchmakers to reduce production.32 Meanwhile, the
domestic economy was mired in recession and a strong Yen had
driven up production costs. To stay price competitive, Japans
watch producers established plants in China, where labour costs
were 10% of those in Japan.
In terms of value, Japan accounted for half of the worlds total
export of watches and parts (US$15 billion) in 2004, followed by
Switzerland (US$9 billion), Hong Kong (US$3.5 billion) and China
(US$1 billion) [see Exhibit 8B].33 Many of the Japanese watches
507-1101
management decisions rather than making them from the
standpoint of managing a branded watch business. A clearer
division of labour between the two manufacturing arms of Seiko
Group was established to avoid overlapping development costs. In a
break from the historical policy of encouraging internal rivalry
between the two arms, each would now concentrate on their
manufacturing strengths in a close working relationship with
SWC: Seiko Epson focusing primarily on quartz watch production
and Seiko Instruments on the production of mechanical watches at
various price points.
To remain price competitive, much of Seikos labour-intensive
watch manufacturing operations (eg, assembly and case, hands,
and dial production) were relocated to less expensive Asian
countries, primarily China.37
Branding and Market Repositioning
Because of our intention to offer watches to
everyone, we ended up not having a specific target
clientele Seiko, in the desire of pleasing everyone, has
been too fexible Up to now, it was our product offer
that made our identity. Now, it is our brand identity that
must determine our product offer. This is a major
reversal.
- Tsutomu Mitome, first president of Seiko Watch
Corporation38
In the 1980s and 1990s, Seiko approached the watch business with
a market-share oriented culture, exploiting opportunities to achieve
mass sales by introducing watches at various price points, even at
the risk of altering its image. In addition to its core brand, Seiko
managed a portfolio of sub-brands: Pulsara line of mid-priced
quartz wristwatches sold in the US and Europe (the Pulsar brand was
acquired from the Hamilton Watch Company in 1979), Alba an
afordable collection of youth-oriented watches sold in Asia and the
Middle East, Lorus a line of afordable watches introduced in
1982, and Credora collection of luxury dress watches sold at
select outlets in Japan. Beginning in the 1990s, Seiko produced a
range of fashion watches, such as Agnes B and Mandarina Duck
under license from the brand owners.
In the international market, the value of Seiko watches was typically
perceived as lying in the US$150500 range, with the brand
characteristically associated with reliability and value for money
[see Exhibit 9]. However, in the domestic market, Seiko was
known as a fully integrated watch company and sold more
expensive watches for the top-end of the market in addition to midrange watches. The Credor collection, for example, included gold
and platinum watches set with gemstones, that could carry prices of
more than US$10,000.
Seiko launched the Grand Seiko line in 1960 to cater to the high
end of the domestic watch market. Reecting the companys
desire to counter Swiss competition in the high-end segment, the
Grand Seiko collection was re-launched in 1988, initially featuring
quartz movements. In 1998, the focus of the Grand Seiko
collection began to shift to high-grade mechanical movements.
Although early models in the re-launched collection were made with
refinements to the companys existing movements, Seiko
management soon approved the development of an entirely new
high-grade movement for the second generation of Grand Seiko
watches. Mechanical Grand Seiko and Credor watches were
manufactured by Seiko Instruments at its Morioka Seiko factory, the
site of possibly the largest watch production line in the world.
Tsutomu Mitome, the first president of SWC, had worked in the US
market and believed that Seiko was in need of a more focused
brand image. While in some markets, the Seiko brand was
associated with inexpensive watches, in Japan and other parts of
Asia it was known for high quality timepieces. And while some
customers associated Seiko with leading technology, others
connected the brand with specific watch designs. Mitome
described Seikos pricing position as such:
It is a double-edge sword. If it is a definite advantage
that consumers see Seiko as having an excellent price
to quality ratio, it is also a disadvantage that they
expect, at the same time, to pay less for a Seiko
than another watch.39
SWCs management undertook the task of identifying a new
direction for Seikos watch business. A focus for the brand was
expressed through the following vision, identity and core values
statements:
Vision:
Seiko, in its longstanding tradition of trustworthiness,
will bring to people who are in the mainstream of
society, products and services representing innovation
and perfection. These products and services will
encourage, impress, and instil expectations of innovation
and advancement.
Identity:
Seikos identity shall be that of fiinnovationf and firefinementf.
Core Values:
Seikos core values are fireliability based on qualityf
and fiworldwide brand recognitionf. Seikos additional
strength is as a manufacturer, with its power to combine,
seamlessly and at a high level,
a. technological development capabilities that
continue to achieve world firsts and
b. design development capabilities that can create original designs.
Challenges Ahead
By 2006, Seikos watch business reported an increase in both sales
and profits for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2006, with net sales
of US$915.3 million, a 5.2% increase from the previous year, and
an operating income of US$68 million, a 2.7% increase from the
previous year [see Exhibit 11].48
The US was Seikos largest
market by value, followed by Japan, South East Asia and Europe.
17
507-110-1
CSVS/107C
Company
Annual Sales
Employees
Seiko
Corporation52
US$1.82
billion
6,699
Information-Related Equipment
(printers, scanners and projectors,
computers and peripherals), Electronic
Devices (semiconductors, displays and
quartz devices), Precision Products
(watches, plastic corrective lenses and
factory automation equipment).
Electronic Components (eg, CMOS ICs,
LCD modules, quartz crystals, micro
batteries), Scientific Instruments (eg,
thermal analysis equipment, scanning
probe microscope), Communication
Products (eg, communications servers,
high-speed data transmission cards),
Machine Tools, Printer Modules,
Information Systems.
US$13.19
billion
Seiko Epson
Corporation53
Seiko
Instruments
Inc.54
30 April 2007).
(Consolidated;
Year Ended 31
March 2006)
90,701
(Year Ended 31
March 2006)
US$2.4
billion
(Consolidated;
Fiscal 2005)
14,841
507-110-1
CSVS/107C
Net Sales
2006
Watch Business
Precision Products Business
Optical Products Business
Clock Business
Other Business
Total for all Business Segments
Consolidated Total
Operating Income
2005
2006
2005
108.0
107.6 42.0
38.5 30.0
28.2 13.0
12.9 29.0
32.7 222.0
220.2 215.0
213.7
8.0
1.0
0.6
0.4
0.3
10.3
11.0
8.0
(1.2)
0.4
0.3
(0.5)
7.0
9.3
Note: Consolidated total represents figures after consolidation adjustments such as the elimination of inter-segment sales.
Millions of Yen
Year ended 31 March
Information-Related Equipment:
Customers
Inter-segment
Electronic Devices:
Customers
Inter-segment
Precision Products:
Customers
Inter-segment
Other:
Customers
Inter-segment
Eliminations and Corporate
Consolidated
2004
2005
2006
917,116
3,264
942,401
3,628
973,690
2,753
413,540
27,613
454,616
27,995
489,460
37,507
77,736
3,366
76,827
4,316
81,463
4,315
4,851
24,606
(58,849)
1,413,243
5,906
28,604
(64,543)
1,479,750
4,955
28,022
(72,597)
1,549,568
19
507-110-1
CSVS/107C
Others
23%
Solutions
8%
Network
Components
51%
Network Components: CMOS ICs, LCD modules, Micro batteries, Quartz crystals, etc.
20
507-110-1
CSVS/107C
Oceania
1%
Africa
1%
Europe
28%
Asia
50%
Source: Montagnani, M. and Amoroso, J.R. (2003) The Watch Industry: What
Makes it Tick? Pictet Company Research.
55
21
507-110-1
CSVS/107C
>US$2370/
Mechanical
(Swiss)
22%
<US$395/
Quartz (Swiss)
11%
US$395US$2370/
Quartz (Swiss)
15%
US$395US$2370/
Mechanical
(Swiss)
11%
22
507-110-1
CSVS/107C
North
America
20%
Asia
33%
Latin
America
2%
Other
1%
Europe
37%
Source: Montagnani, M. and Amoroso, J.R. (2003) The Watch Industry: What
Makes it Tick? Pictet Company Research.
23
507-110-1
CSVS/107C
1,200.0
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800.0
U
nit
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in
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on
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600.0
400.0
200.0
1,001.5
713.6
25.0
China
11.0
6.2
5.8
USA
5.6
Thailand
France
Japan
Country
Note: Data from Japan excludes watches made by overseas plants and exports from overseas ports.
Source: Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry (2005) The Swiss and World Watchmaking
Industry in 2004, http://www.fhs.ch/statistics/watchmaking_2004.pdf (accessed 30 April 2007).
24
507-110-1
CSVS/107C
Country
Japan (including
overseas plants)
Switzerland
China
Hong Kong
Units
Total Value
(US$)
712 million
Estimated
Average Unit
Value (US$)
21
25 million
1,001.5 million
713.6 million
360
1
5
9 billion
1 billion
3.5 billion
15 billion
Source: Japan Clock and Watch Association The Japanese Watch and Clock Industry in
2004: An Outlook on its Global Operation, www.jcwa.or.jp/eng/statistics/industry_04.html
(accessed 30 April 2007) ; and Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry (2005) The Swiss and
World Watchmaking Industry in 2004, http://www.fhs.ch/statistics/watchmaking_2004.pdf
(accessed 30 April 2007).
25
507-110-1
CSVS/107C
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27
507-110-1
CSVS/107C
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1,071
1,01
6
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1,024
1,000
800
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7.8
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400
200
2004
2002
2005
2003
Fiscal
Year
EXHIBIT 12: TOP SELLING FINE WATCH BRANDS (US WATCH SALES, 2005)
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Unit Sales
Citizen
Seiko
Bulova
Pulsar
Carvelle
Movado
Swiss Army
Esq*
Rolex*
Tag Heuer*
Dollar Sales
Rolex
Citizen
Seiko
Movado**
Tag Heuer**
Bulova
Cartier
Breitling
Omega
Patek Philippe
Source: Kuczynski, T. (2006) U.S. Fine Watch Market Tilts Toward High End in 2005,
National Jeweler; and LGI Network (2005) Annual Report.
29
5
EXHIBIT 13: US WATCH MARKET: UNIT SALESGROWTH BY PRICE POINT (US$)
4500000
4140000
4000000
U
ni
ts
so
ld
(2
00
5
vs
20
04
)
3500000
3000000
2500000
1562000
2000000
1500000
1000000
157000
645000
400000
500000
0
$5,000+
$1,500 - 5,000
$500 - 1,500
Price point
30%
D
oll
ar
sa
le
s
gr
o
wt
h
(2
00
5
vs
20
04
)
$50 - 150
$150 - 500
25%
25%
20%
15%
5%
10%
2%
5%
0%
$5,000+
$1,500 - 5,000
$500 - 1,500
$50 - 150
$150 - 500
-5%
-10%
4%
-6%
Price point
Source: Kuczynski, T. (2006) U.S. Fine Watch Market Tilts Toward High End in 2005,
National Jeweler; and LGI Network (2005) Annual Report.
30
507-110-1
CSVS/107C
EXHIBIT 14: US WATCH SALES: FINE WATCH BRAND OVERVIEW (2005 SALES)
Accutron
Audemars Piguet
Baume
&
Mercier
Bedat & Co.
Breitling
Bulova
Caravelle
Cartier
Chopard
Citizen
Coach
Concord
Corum
David Yurman
Ebel
ESQ
Girard Perregaux
Gucci
IWC
Jaeger-LeCoultre
Maurice Lacroix
Michele
Movado
Officine Panerai
Omega
Patek Philippe
Piaget
Pulsar
Rado
Raymond Weil
Rolex
Seiko
Swiss Army
TAG Heuer
Vacheron
Constantin
Wittnauer
Zenith
Average
Median
Overall
Average MSRP
per Watch Sold
(US$)
690
18,550
2,680
Number of
Retail
Storefronts
1,950
45
680
4,810
4,320
275
92
5,610
9,510
235
305
3,520
4,630
2,690
3,530
245
9,910
1,010
6,990
8,490
1,900
1,040
880
5,380
2,530
20,320
24,630
115
1,910
1,100
7,360
270
270
1,645
16,500
Sales by Gender
% Male
% Female
78%
89%
43%
22%
11%
57%
105
365
11,500
3,700
275
160
15,700
730
430
200
430
320
3,400
80
990
115
130
400
430
4,600
83
990
160
86
7,350
720
1,040
830
15,500
2,700
1,500
64
12%
89%
44%
35%
47%
20%
52%
16%
34%
80%
15%
12%
49%
65%
24%
100%
78%
76%
4%
49%
98%
62%
74%
49%
44%
48%
39%
67%
60%
78%
69%
93%
88%
11%
56%
65%
53%
80%
48%
84%
66%
20%
85%
88%
51%
35%
76%
0%
22%
24%
96%
51%
2%
38%
26%
51%
56%
52%
61%
33%
40%
22%
31%
7%
640
7,900
2,900
93
58%
97%
42%
3%
4,932
2,680
-
2,182
430
31,480
49%
51%
Source: Kuczynski, T. (2006) U.S. Fine Watch Market Tilts Toward High End in 2005,
National Jeweler; and LGI Network (2005) Annual Report.
31