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DUE PROCESS:
(1) Judicial Proceedings, (2) Administrative and Quasi-Judicial Proceedings, (3)Academic Discipline,
(4)Deportation Proceedings, (5)Fixing Rates and Regulation of Profession, (6)Closure Proceedings,
(7) Termination Proceedings
BANCO ESPANOL VS PALANCA...............................................................................................
JUAN CARVAJAL VS. CA, ET AL................................................................................................
STATE PROSECUTORS V MUROS.............................................................................................
WEBB V DE LEON..................................................................................................................
PEOPLE VS. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR.....................................................................................
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ,
GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZIOLO AMA, BALDWIN BRION, LUIS CORCOLON, ROGELIO CORCOLON,
AND PEPITO KAWIT, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS............................................................................
PEREZ V. ESTRADA..............................................................................................................
PEREZ V. ESTRADA..............................................................................................................
ANG TIBAY, REPRESENTED BY TORIBIO TEODORO, MANAGER AND PROPIETOR, AND
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD VS. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC..............................................................................................
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. PASCUAL.............................................................
ATTY. NAPOLEON S. VALENZUELA V. JUDGE REYNALDO BELLOSILLO.......................................
LUMIQUED VS. EXEVEA........................................................................................................
FABELLA V. COURT OF APPEALS...........................................................................................
SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD V. TORCITA.............................................................................
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V CORONEL.............................................................................
JUSTICE SECRETARY V. LANTION...........................................................................................
GOV'T. OF THE USA VS. PURGANAN......................................................................................
GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG V. OLALIA...............................................................................
GUZMAN VS. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY....................................................................................
ALCUAZ V. PSBA..................................................................................................................
NON V. DAMES....................................................................................................................
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG 222 SCRA 644; G.R.
99327; 27 MAY 1993............................................................................................................
UP VS. LIGOT-TELAN............................................................................................................
LAO GI V CA (1989).............................................................................................................
PHILCOMSAT VS ALCUAZ.....................................................................................................
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS V NTC..........................................................................................
GLOBE TELECOM VS NTC......................................................................................................
CORONA VS. UHPAP............................................................................................................
CENTRAL BANK VS. CA........................................................................................................
RURAL BANK VS. CA............................................................................................................
PHILIPPINE MERCHANT VS. CA.............................................................................................
AGABON VS. NLRC...............................................................................................................
JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION, VS. DARWIN PACOT, ROBERT PAROHINOG, DAVID
BISNAR, MARLON DOMINGO, RHOEL LESCANO AND JONATHAN CAGABCAB.............................
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WEBB V DE LEON
247 SCRA 652
Facts: On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging
petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with the crime of Rape and
Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their
home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to
conduct the preliminary investigation.
The DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. The credibility of Jessica Alfaro was assailed as inherently
weak and uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sown statements.
They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged
inconsistencies.
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued
warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination.
Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an
impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge accused with crime
of rape and homicide?
(2) Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion when they failed to conduct a
preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against the accused?
(3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation?
(4) Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the
information as an accused?
HELD:
(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the
person arrested committed it.
Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that upon filing of an information, the RTC may issue a warrant for the accused.
Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent judges should have conducted searching examination
of witnesses before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard.
The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the
evidence submitted more fully.
(4) NO.
Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial
function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference.
In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department whose principal power and responsibility is
to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this right is to prosecute their violators.
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Dasmarinas Village. He has not used this car since then. Accused conceded that although the car was not in
good running condition, it could still be used.
Ruling : The accused was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of 3 eyewitnesses who positively
identified him as the gunman. However, he vigorously assails his out-of-court identification by these
eyewitnesses.
He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Leino, the lone surviving victim of the crimes at bar.
Appellant urges: First, that Leinos identification of him outside an unoccupied house in Forbes Park was
highly irregular; Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the newspapers before he identified
him; Third, that Leinos interview at the hospital was never put in writing; Fourth, that the sketch of appellant
based on the description given by Leino to the CIS agents was suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised that the
sketch must have been among the evidence turned over to the NBI when the latter assumed jurisdiction over
the investigation; and, lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the face of the accused. The shooting
lasted for only five (5) minutes. During that period, his gaze could not have been fixed only on the gunmans
face. His senses were also dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer he imbibed that night.
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the
suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where
photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court
identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have
fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due
process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at that time; (3)
the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Using the totality of circumstances test, the alleged irregularities cited by the accused did not result in his
misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in Leinos identification of the
accused in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that this mode was resorted to by the
authorities for security reasons.
The SC was also not impressed with the contention that it was incredible for Leino to have remembered the
accuseds face when the incident happened within a span of 5 minutes. Five minutes is not a short time for
Leino to etch in his mind the picture of the accused. Experience shows that precisely because of the unusual
acts of bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can remember
with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals. The natural reaction of victims of criminal violence
is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. Most
often, the face end body movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased from
their memory. In this case, there is absolutely no improper motive for Leino to impute a serious crime to the
accused. The victims and the accused were unknown to each other before their chance encounter. If Leino
identified the accused, it must be because the accused was the real culprit.
(1) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the shooting of Roland John Chapman. He
was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor
as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of
the said deceased the following amounts: P50,000 as indemnity for the victims death; and, P1,000,000 as
moral damages.
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(2) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of
Maureen Navarro Hultman. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay
the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: P50,000 as indemnity for her death; P2,350,461.83
as actual damages; P564,042.57 for loss of earning capacity of said deceased; P1,000,000 as moral
damages; and P2,000,000 as exemplary damages.
(3) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting
of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 8 years of prision mayor as
minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the said offended
party the following amounts: P30,000 as indemnity for his injuries; P118,369.84 and equivalent in
Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; P1,000,000 as moral damages; and,
P2,000,000 as exemplary damages.
(4) In all three cases, to pay each of the 3 offended parties the sum of P1,000,000, or a total of P3,000,000, for
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in all 3 cases.
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Perez v. Estrada
AM No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001
FACTS: On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly
franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting the Supreme
Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former
President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the
proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of
5 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17
April 2001, the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not media coverage be allowed to air Estradas trial to the public.
HELD: No. In Estes v. Texas, US SC held that television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial
of due process rights of the criminal defendant: "Witnesses might be frightened, play to the cameras, become nervous.
They are then subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences that might affect their testimony. Telecasting increases
the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of
mental harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from an effective presentation of
his defense. Finally, the television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an
accused and his case in the eyes of the public."
The right of people to information does not prescribe that TV cameras be installed in the courtroom. This right might
be fulfilled by less distracting, degrading and more judicial means. In a criminal case, a life is at stake, and the due
process rights of the accused shall take precedence over the people's right to information. The accused has the right to
a public trial, and the exercise of such a right is his to make, because it is his life and liberty that is in the balance. A
public trial is not the same as a publicized trial.
IBP: "TV coverage can negate the rule on the exclusion of the witness intended to ensure a fair trial...could allow the
'hooting throng' to arrogate upon themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused...will not subserve the ends of
justice, but will only pander to the desire of publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers."
Court is not unmindful of the recent technological advances but to chance forthwith the life and liberty of any person
in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore
expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.
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Perez v. Estrada
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001
FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners request for permission to televise
and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the
Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the right of the
people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused
to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the
press because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a
safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his
trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his experience with the
impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger
massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada
contends that the right of the people to information may be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and
prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage.
ISSUE: Whether or not television and radio coverage of plunder case be allowed.
HELD: No. The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after due deliberation,
finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio or television
of the trial of the former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its member, the Court denies the motion for
reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, has resolved to order the
audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes. Seven (7) Justices vote against the audio-visual
recording of the trial. Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada
and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording
of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only
later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every
case to which the recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records
Management and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.
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recommendation that he be charged and prosecuted for Bribery as defined and penalized under Article 210
of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the evidences presented against Judge Filomeno Pascual were strong enough to
convict him.
Held: We find that the evidence on record does not warrant conviction. We note that the only bases for the
Report and Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon consist of: The Complaint,
the Answer, the Memorandum of the respondent, and the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of
the bribery case of respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. The respondent was, therefore, not afforded the
right to open trial wherein respondent can confront the witnesses against him and present evidence in his
defense.
This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an administrative cases, demand that, if the
respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him
should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. The Judiciary to which respondent
belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it should be only after due
investigation and after presentation of competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character.
[7] The above-quoted Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge had fallen short of the
requirements of due process.
The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies in the testimonies of principal witness,
Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI Reynaldo Olazo on several material points.
It will be remembered that the charge was intimated by someone who must have had an ax to grind against
the respondent judge but who, by reason of cowardice or lack of evidence to put up a righteous case, did not
come out in the open and instead wrote an anonymous letter. The letter-writer, naming himself as Ceferino
Tigas, did not specify crimes committed or illegal acts perpetrated but charged respondent with anomalies in
general terms. Respondent judge could not have been expected to make a valid answer or to otherwise
defend himself from such vague accusations.
While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of the Tigas letter, ordered the NBI
investigating team to make a discreet investigation of respondent, the NBI team had instead caused an
instigation or the entrapment of respondent judge. Not having found letter-writer Tigas and concluding that
no such person exists, they sought out an accused before respondents court who could possibly be
respondent judges virtual victim. Approached by the NBI team was Candido Cruz, a person who had been
brought before the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, for preliminary investigation on the charge of
Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge gave judgment to the effect that the crime committed by Candido
Cruz was that of physical injuries merely. He declared then that he had original jurisdiction to try the case.
But, respondents action in this regard was perpetrated some time before Candido Cruz was persuaded to
participate in what they (the NBI agents) called entrapment operation. The opportune time to bribe the
respondent should have been before he acted in reducing Cruz criminal liability from Frustrated Murder to
Physical Injuries. No bribe was asked then. It was unlikely that respondent would ask for it on the date of
the entrapment on March 26, 1993, the favorable verdict having been rendered already.
It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admitted[8] that, despite the fact that he scoured the table of
the respondent in search of the envelope, with marked money in it, no envelope was found and so he had to
call Candido Cruz who was already outside so that Cruz can locate the envelope.
In view of these antecedents, we find reason to favorably consider the allegations of respondent judge in his
defense that, at around 9:30 oclock in the morning of March 26, 1993, Candido Cruz, along with the NBI
agents, went to the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan. Candido Cruz, alone, went inside respondent
judges chambers, located thereat, and placed before respondent judge an envelope containing marked
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money. Respondent judge thought that what was placed before him was a pleading for filing and so, he told
Candido Cruz to file it with the Office of the Clerk of Court, that is, in a room adjacent to his chambers.
Candido Cruz replied that it was the money the judge was asking for. Upon hearing this reply, respondent
judge suddenly erupted in anger. He grabbed the envelope on the desk and hurled it at Candido Cruz. The
envelope fell on the floor. Respondent judge then picked it up and inserted it inside the pocket of Cruz polo
shirt and drove him out of his chambers. NBI Agents Villarta and Olazo immediately entered the door of the
judges chambers, introduced themselves, and told respondent judge that the money that Cruz gave him was
marked. Respondent judge told them that he did not receive or accept money from Candido Cruz. After
respondent judge said this, the NBI Agents nevertheless proceeded to search the room, examined tables,
drawers, and every nook and cranny of respondents chambers, and the pockets of the pants of respondent
judge. Even after rigid search of the chambers of respondent, the NBI Agents failed to find the envelope
containing marked money allegedly given by Candido Cruz to respondent judge.
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ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?
HELD: The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing
and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an
absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an
administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have
competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the
proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the
purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?
HELD:
YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual
or constructive notice of the institution ofproceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor,
and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person
charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal
which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in
the records or made known to the parties affected. The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public
schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public
schoolteachersadministrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a
representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers organization and a supervisor of the division.
In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrativecharges against private
respondents did not include a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national
teachers organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no
competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any
basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers
organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would
have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due
process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. Other minor issues:
Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied with because the respondents are members of Quezon City
Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers organizations does
not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670.
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Under this section, the teachers organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be included
by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of
education or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the
teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a
teachers organization as its representative in said committee. Sec 9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon
principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a previous specific law, unless there is an express stipulation.
Always interpret laws so as to harmonize them.
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execution and authenticity, the alleged photocopy of the original duplicate of OR No. 0736 does not
convince us that it is an accurate reflection of the actual bill incurred.
While this Court adheres to a liberal view of the conduct of proceedings before administrative
agencies, it also consistently requires some proof of authenticity or reliability as a condition for the
admission of documents.
Absent any such proof of authenticity, the photocopy of the original duplicate should be considered
inadmissible and, hence, without probative value.
Given the flimsy charge and the paucity of the evidence against respondent, there is no need for her
to present additional evidence to vindicate herself. The Office of the Ombudsman should have dismissed the
Administrative Complaint against her in the first place. Clearly, her guilt was not proven by substantial
evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Respondent Carmencita D. Coronel is hereby
EXONERATED of the charge against her for lack of substantial evidence. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition
proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of theaccused are at fore;
in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not. An extradition proceeding is sui generis.
It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights.To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of
an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in thecourt of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as
a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannotbe
invoked by an extradite. There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal
proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminalproceedings involve a full-blown trial.
In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission
of evidenceunder less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while afugitive may be ordered extradited upon
showing of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes
executory uponbeing rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. TheUnited States adheres to a similar
practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the
demands of thenations foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite.Given the foregoing,
it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person
sought to be extradited. Suchdetermination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless
duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistancethrough which a person
charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not
part of the function of theassisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction.
The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determinewhether the extradition request
complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the
Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries thepresumption that its
implementation will serve the national interest.Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes
comity with the requesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paintsa bad image
of our country before the world community. Such failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties
with us, particularly an extraditiontreaty that hinges on reciprocity.Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to
comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty. This principle requires that we deliver the accused to
therequesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other
words, the demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to
the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is underobligation to
make the surrender. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should
it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima
facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch: nothingshort of confinement can
ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to
the requesting state.The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited
have a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would noteven begin, if only the accused were willing to
submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right
beforethe conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite
learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and thatthe crimes he is charged with are bailable -eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid
them at allcost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated
that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once,what is there to stop him, given sufficient
opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
Due Process
Is an extraditee entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest?It is significant to note that
Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word immediate to qualify the arrest of the accused. This
qualification would berendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails
sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and argumentsfrom them, and giving them time to prepare and
present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered immediate. Thelaw
could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency
and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.By using the phrase if it
appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not
expected to make anexhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of
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the petition. From the knowledge and the material then availableto it, the court is expected merely to get a good first
impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest
anddetention of the accused.
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for anypurpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge afterexamination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons orthings to be seized.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination -under oath or affirmation -- of complainantsand the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and
hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine complainants and their
witnesses. In the present case, validating the actof respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused
and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entiresystem. If the accused were
allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest,what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedurecould convert the determination of a prima facie case
into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. Thisscenario is
also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of
a set of procedures more protective of theaccused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one
-- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondent s demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Right to Bail
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on bail
quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of theRules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,because extradition
courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as hereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply toa case like extradition,
where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended does notdetract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only
in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds
application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion. Hence, the secondsentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in
criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken tomean that the right is available even in
extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to
grant him one in the present case. To stress,extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the
offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminalcases against him, not
before the extradition court.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
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The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the
constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion andtyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect
and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enoughto include the
grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the life, liberty or property of
every person. It is dynamic andresilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application.
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been
arrested or placed under the custody of the law,bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear
and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or adanger to the community;
and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those
cited by the highestcourt in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general
principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears theburden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with
clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive,not a judicial,
responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the
nature of police assistanceamongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the
courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, sothat the vital international and bilateral
interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective
of the sporting idea of fair play, it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill
international obligations.
Bail is a Matter of Discretion on the part of Appellate Court.
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Facts
Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a
final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a
petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private
respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and
that the respondent was a high flight risk. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by
the respondent judge subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear
and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes
of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in
favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold
departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the
nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all
the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees
from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be
noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail
Ruling
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Ratio Decidendi
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Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential
extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.
Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No.
153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being
available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations;
and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law
on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and the
sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed
to post bail.
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Alcuaz v. PSBA
[GR 76353, 2 May 1988]
Facts: Sophia Alcuaz, Ma. Cecilia Alindayu, Bernadette Ang, Irna Anonas, Ma. Remedios Baltazar, Corazon Bundoc,
John Carmona, Anna Shiela Dinoso, Rafael Encarnacion, et. al., are all bonafide students of the Philippine School of
Business Administration (PSBA) Quezon City. As early as 22 March 1986, the students and the PSBA, Q.C. had
already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities within the school. In spite of the agreement, the
students felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others they demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which
demand was turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances.
Subsequently dialogues proved futile. Finally, on 8 October 1996, the students received uniform letters from PSBA
giving them 3 days to explain why the school should not take/mete out any administrative sanction on their direct
participation and/or conspiring with others in the commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on October 2, 3, and 7.
On 22 October 1982, the letter was answered by the counsel for the students in a reply letter. During the regular
enrollment period, the students were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of SY 19861987. On 28 October 1986 the President of the Student Council filed a complaint with the Director of the Ministry of
Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) against the PSBA for barring the enrollment of the Student Council Officers
and student leaders. Simultaneously on the same date, the student council wrote the President, Board of Trustees,
requesting for a written statement of the schools final decision regarding their enrollment. Another demand letter was
made by Counsel for the students Atty. Alan Romullo Yap, also to the President, Board of Trustees, to enroll his clients
within 48 hours. All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be forthcoming. The students filed a petition for
review on certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction.
Issue: Whether the students were deprived of due process in the refusal of PSBA to readmit them.
Held: After the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students
or with the intervening teachers. The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The
school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers. The right of the school to
refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has always been
recognized by the Court, as it is sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment
of students. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to
those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings may be summary and crossexamination is not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet
the demands of procedural due process are:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case. Herein, conditions 3, 4 and 5 had not been complied with.
The Court, however, ordered an investigation to be conducted by the school authorities in the interest of
justice. Further, it is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the
handling of specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the Court ordinarily accords respect if not
finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless the factual findings are not supported by
evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the
factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness is manifest. Herein, a careful scrutiny of the Report and Recommendation of the Special Investigating
Committee shows it does not fall under any of the above exceptions. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition,
but in the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of the absence of academic deficiencies,
scheduled to graduate during the school year when the petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to
graduate in due time.
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Non v. Dames
[GR 89317, 20 May 1990]
Facts: Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura, Normandy Occiano, Jorge Dayaon, Lourdes Banares, Bartolome Ibasco,
Emmanuel Barba, Sonny Moreno. Giovani Palma, Joselito Villalon, Luis Santos and Daniel Torres, students in Mabini
Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989
for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. They thus filed a
petition in the Regional Trial Court of Daet (Branch 38) seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but
the trial court dismissed the petition in an order dated 8 August 1988. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this
was denied by the trial court on 24 February 1989; stating that they waived-their privilege to be admitted for reenrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of
school year 1988-89. In addition, for the same semester, they duly signed pledges "to abide and comply with all the
rules and regulations laid down by competent authorities in the College Department or School in which I am
enrolled." Hence, the affected students filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the school exclude students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them
relates to possible breaches of discipline.
Held: The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest,
considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and
regulatory powers over all educational institutions. The authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on the
ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has already expired, cannot be justified. Still, institutions'
discretion on the admission and enrollment of students as a major component of the academic freedom guaranteed to
institutions of higher learning. The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards, however, cannot
be utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for
otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection. Thus, an institution of learning has a contractual
obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue. However, when a
student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his
contractual right; and the court should not review the discretion of university authorities. Excluding students because
of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline
not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play. Further, the failures in
one or two subjects by some cannot be considered marked academic deficiency. Neither can the academic deficiency
be gauged from the academic standards of the school due to insufficiency of information. Herein, the students could
have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with the mass actions, but
the penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the offense committed and it must be imposed
only after the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with (Paragraph 145, Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools). But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative
sanctions have become moot and academic; as the students have been refused readmission or re-enrollment and have
been effectively excluded from for 4 semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of
discipline they might have committed when they led and participated in the mass actions that resulted in the disruption
of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only further
aggravate the strained relations between the students and the officials of the school which necessarily resulted from
the heated legal battle.
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hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the March 2,
1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the investigation as being summary in nature and that respondent
students have no righ t to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in
Alcuaz . Respondent students' contention that the investigating committee failed to consider their evidence is far from
the truth because the February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it was reached only after receiving the written
statements and hearing the testimonies of several witnesses. Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March
10, 1991 was preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent students were summoned to answer
clarificatory questions.
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UP vs. Ligot-Telan
227 SCRA 342 G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993
Facts: In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly the University of the People, U.P.
administration conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through
the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program.
After broad consultations with the various university constituencies, U.P. President Jose V.
Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued on April 28, 1988 a Resolution establishing the STFAP. A year later,
it was granted official recognition when the Congress of the Philippines allocated a portion of
the National Budget for the implementation of the program. In the interest of democratizing admission to the State
University, all students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which include reduction in
fees, living and book subsidies and student assistantships which give undergraduate students the opportunity to earn
P12.00 per hour by working for the University. Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among
others, they state the amount and source of the annual income of the
family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which the University may evaluate their
financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. To further insure the integrity of the
program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data indicated in a student's application form is
undertaken. Among those who applied for STFAP benefits for School
Year 1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law. A team composed of Arsenio L. Dona
and Jose Carlo Manalo conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal. Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadal's
aunt, was interviewed and the team submitted a home visit report. Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer
II, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal's application form. Forthwith, she and Bella M. Villanueva,
head of the Office of Scholarships and Student Services, presented the matter to the Diliman Committee on
Scholarships and Financial Assistance. In compliance with the said Committee's directive, Bella Villanueva wrote
Nadal informing him that the investigation showed that he had failed to declare, not only the fact that he had been
maintaining a 1977 Corolla car which was owned by his brother but also the income of his mother who was
supporting his brothers Antonio and Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that the Diliman Committee had
reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989, unless he could
submit "proofs to the contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees" with
"interest based on current commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the
suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also
warned that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further
investigation. commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges
and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be referred to the
Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation. Nadal issued a certification stating, among other things, that
his mother migrated to the United States in 1981 but because her residency status had not yet been legalized, she had
not been able to find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment." U.P. charged Nadal before the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) that he committed acts which find him guilty of willfully and deliberately withholding
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information about the income of his mother, who is living abroad and that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car.
As such, the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and required him to reimburse
all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make reimbursement, it shall be "effected by the
University thru outside legal action. The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the Executive
Committee of U.P. Diliman for review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on Student Conduct and Discipline. Board
of regents modified the penalty from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension, effective immediately, plus
reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP, with legal interest. However the BOR also decided against
giving Nadal, a certification of good moral character. Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR
decision, in the next BOR meeting Regent Antonio T. Carpio raised the "material importance" of the truth of Nadal's
claim that earlier, he was a beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila University
(AdeMU). Learning that the "certification issued by the AdeMU that it had not given Nadal financial aid while he was
a student there was made through a telephone call," Regent Carpio declared that there was
as yet "no direct evidence in the records to substantiate the charge." According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed that
Nadal falsely stated that he received such financial aid, it would be a clear case of gross and material
misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, he cast a conditional vote that would
depend on the verification of Nadal's claim on the matter. U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V.
Abueva countered by stating that "a decision should not be anchored solely on one piece of information which he
considered irrelevant, and which would ignore the whole pattern of the respondent's dishonesty and deception from
1989 which had been established in the investigation and the reviews."In the morning of March 29, 1993, the
AdeMU issued a certification to the effect that Nadal was indeed a recipient of a scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983.
That evening, the BOR met again at a special meeting, according to Regent Carpio, in executive session, the
BOR found Nadal "guilty." However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against President
Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili.
Issue: Whether or not the Board of Regent violated Nadal's right to due process when it rendered a decision
finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting.
Held: With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent considers the same as "unquestionably void for
lack of due process" inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said meeting, that imposition of sanctions on students
requires "observance of procedural due process," the phrase obviously referring to the sending of notice of the
meeting. However BOR ruled that in any event it is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the
sending of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to respondent. University rules do not require the attendance in
BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of
students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no
time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings
where his case was up for deliberation. Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that Nadal was not given due
process in the March 29 meeting because the ground upon which he was again convicted was not the same as the
original charge. Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the conditional votes on March 28. Whether or not Nadal
was telling the truth when he claimed
that he received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU. However, Regent Carpio himself testified that the
charge considered was "exactly the same charge" of withholding information on the income of
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Nadal's mother. It should be stressed that the reason why Regent Carpio requested a verification of Nadal's claim that
he was a scholar at the AdeMU was that Regent Carpio was not "morally convinced" yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In
other words, he sought additional insights into the character of Nadal through the information that would be
obtained from the AdeMU. The Court in this regard find such information to be irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In
his July, 12, 1991 certification aforementioned,
Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was a "TNT" who could not find a "stable, regular, wellpaying employment" but that she was supporting the education of his brothers with the help of another son. The
court constitutes this as a sufficient admission that Nadal withheld information on the income, however measly
and irregular, of his mother. The court also sighted that respondent aspires to join the ranks of the professionals who
would uphold truth at all costs so that justice may prevail. In those who exhibit duplicity in their student days, one
spots the shady character who is bound to sow the seeds of chicanery in the practice of his profession. With this the
court ruled that it sufficiently shown that respondent has committed an act of dishonesty in withholding vital
information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the Rules and
Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner University, the latter's inherent power and authority to
impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked and rightfully exercised. Therefore deciding that the BOR did not violate
Nadals right of due process. The lower court is hereby ordered to DISMISS the petition for mandamus.
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Lao Gi v CA (1989)
180 SCRA 756
Facts: Filomeno Chia Jr. was made a Filipino citizen by virtue of Opinion 191 by the Secretary of justice. However,
this was revoked when his fathers citizenship was cast aside due to fraud and misrepresentation. Charges of
deportation were filed against the Chias. Charges also alleged that they refused to register as aliens and that they
committed acts of undesirability. The Chias said that the CID has no authority to deport them which was denied by the
CID. They filed a petition with the Supreme Court for a writ of preliminary injunction which was dismissed for lack of
merit. Their MFR was also denied.
Earlier, Manuel Chias case of falsification of public documents in alleging he was a Filipino citizen. He was alleged
to have done this for the sale of real property. The trial court acquitted him by saying that Opinion 191 was res
judicata and cant be contravened by Opinion 147. The CID set the hearing for the deportation case against the Chias
and told them to register as aliens. The Chias tooks further action. Their petition for injunctive relief was denied by the
CFI of Manila. They also lost the appeal in the CA. The Chias was denied.
In their SC petition, they seek to set aside the CA decision. They argued that they werent subject to immediate
deportation, the presence of fraud in the citizenship, the CAs overstepping of appellate jurisdiction, and the resolution
of the SC didnt make a ruling that the petitioner entered the Philippines by false pretenses.
Issue: Does the CID have the jurisdiction to determine the deportation?
Held: Yes. Petition granted Hearing must be continued to determine if they are really aliens
Ratio:
Section 37 of the Immigration act states:
SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any
other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration
after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against
the alien:
(1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading
statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at any
place other than at a designated port of entry. (As amended by Sec. 13, Rep. Act No. 503.) ...
There must be a determination of the existence of the ground charged, particularly illegal entry into the country. Only
after the hearing can the alien be deported. Also, there must be appositive finding from the CID that they are aliens
before compelling them to register as such. This power is the police power to protect the state from undesirable aliens
injurious to the public good.
Since the deportation is a harsh process, due process must be observed. In the same law, it is provided that:
No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for
deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be
prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.
The acts or omissions that they are charged of must be in ordinary language for the
person to be informed and for the CID to make a proper judgment. Also, the
warrants of arrewst must be in accordance with the rules on criminal procedure.
On the information of a private prosecutor in the case: Deportation is the sole concern of the state. There is no
justification for a private party to intervene.
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Philcomsat vs Alcuaz
180 SCRA 218
Facts: By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT)
was granted the authority to construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications
services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals in the Philippines.
PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to companies like Globe Mackay (now Globe) and PLDT.
Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the
Public Service Commission later known as the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However,
Executive Order No. 196 was later promulgated and the same has placed PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of the
NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire permit to operate from the NTC in order to continue operating its
existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates
by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546.
PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and holds that the
enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for public service communications, does not provide the
necessary standards which were constitutionally required, hence, there is an undue delegation of legislative power,
particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546,
providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under
the jurisdiction of NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and
adjudicatory powers. PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a
reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to NTC, the exercise of
which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to fix rates is limited by the requirements of
public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the
requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power
may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in
making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power.
Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be nonconfiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a
fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the
only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the
rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to
reasonableness, this standard may be implied.
However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was done without due process since no hearing
was made in ascertaining the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.
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Executive Order No. 546, being an implementing measure of P.D. No. I insofar as it amends thePublic Service Law
(CA No. 146, as amended) is applicable to the petitioner who must be bound by its provisions.
The position of the petitioner that by the mere grant of its franchise under RA No. 2036 it can operate a radio
communications system anywhere within the Philippines is erroneous.
Sec. 4(a). This franchise shall not take effect nor shall any powers thereunder be exercised by the grantee until
the Secretary of Public works and Communications shall have allotted to the grantee the frequencies and wave lengths
to be used, and issued to the grantee a license for such case.
Thus, in the words of R.A. No. 2036 itself, approval of the then Secretary of Public Works and Communications was a
precondition before the petitioner could put up radio stations in areas where it desires to operate.
The records of the case do not show any grant of authority from the then Secretary of Public Works and
Communications before the petitioner installed the questioned radio telephone services in San Jose, Mindoro in 1971.
The same is true as regards the radio telephone services opened in Sorsogon, Sorsogon and Catarman, Samar in 1983.
No certificate of public convenience and necessity appears to have been secured by the petitioner from the public
respondent when such certificate,was required by the applicable public utility regulations.
The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive in nature nor can a franchise be granted except that it
must be subject to amendment, alteration, or even repeal by the legislaturewhen the common good so requires.
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FACTS: The Philippine Ports Authority [PPA] was created through PD 505, as amended by PD857 to control,
regulate, supervise pilots and the pilot age profession.
After hearing from relevant government agencies, pursuant to said charter, PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan
issued Administrative Order 04-92 [PPA-AO 04-92] and corresponding Memorandum Order in 1992, stating that all
existing regular appointments which have been previously issued shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only and
that all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilot age districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one year
from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of
performance to regulate and improve pilot services by instilling discipline and give better protection to port users.
PPA-AO 04-92 replaces PPA-AO 03-85 which succinctly provides that, aspiring pilots must have a license and train as
probationary pilots, and only upon satisfactory performance, are given permanent and regular appointments by the
PPA itself and to exercise harbor pilot age until they reach the age of 70.Upon learning of PPA-AO 04-92 only after
publication in the newspaper, the United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines: (a) questioned said PPA-AO
twice before the DOTC, which Secretary Garcia said twice that only the PPA Board of Directors [as governing body]
has exclusive jurisdiction to review, recall or annul PPA-AOs, (b) appealed to the Office of the President, which first
issued a restraining order to the PPA on the implementation of the PPA-AO, and after PPAs answer, then dismissed
the appeal/petition and lifted said order, stating, through Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C.
Corona, that the PPA-AO (i) merely implements PPA Charter, (ii) issuance is an act of PPA, not of its General
Manager, (iii) merely regulates, not forbids practice of the profession, recognizing that such exercise is property right,
and (iv) sufficiently complied with the requirement in the PD to consult only with relevant Government Agencies and
(d) finally finding affirmative relief with Manila RTC Br. 6. Court, which ruled that (i) said PPA-AO is null and void (ii)
PPA acted in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion and (iii) imposed a permanent restraining order on
PPA on its implementation.Assistant Executive Secretary Corona thus filed petition for review [of the Manila RTC
Decision] to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have acted in excess of jurisdiction.
Whether or not the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents right to exercise their profession and t
heir right to due process of law.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that:
Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and in a
capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-92 including all its
implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders;
PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders are declared null and void;
The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing
Memoranda, Circulars and Orders.
No costs. SO ORDERED
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FACTS: Central Bank discovered that certain questionable loans extended by Producers Bank of the Philippines
(PBP), totaling approximately P300 million (the paid-in capital of PBP amounting only to P 140.544 million, were
fictitious as they were extended, without collateral, to certain interests related to PBP owners themselves.
Subsequently and during the same year, several blind items about a family-owned bank in Binondo which granted
fictitious loans to its stockholders appeared in major newspapers which triggered a bank-run in PBP and resulted in
continuous over-drawings on the banks demand deposit account with the Central Bank; reaching to P 143.955 million.
Hence, on the basis of the report submitted by the Supervision and Examination Sector, the Monetary Board (MB),
placed PBP under conservatorship.
PBP submitted a rehabilitation plan to the CB which proposed the transfer to PBP of 3 buildings owned by Producers
Properties, Inc. (PPI), its principal stockholder and the subsequent mortgage of said properties to the CB as collateral
for the banks overdraft obligation but which was not approved due to disagreements between the parties. Since no
other rehabilitation program was submitted by PBP for almost 3 years its overdrafts with the CB continued to
accumulate and swelled to a staggering P1.023 billion. Consequently, the CB Monetary Board decided to approve in
principle what it considered a viable rehabilitation program for PBP. There being no response from both PBP and PPI
on the proposed rehabilitation plan, the MB issued a resolution instructing Central Bank management to advise the
bank that the conservatorship may be lifted if PBP complies with certain conditions.
Without responding to the communications of the CB, PBP filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
against the CB, the MB and CB Governor alleging that the resolutions issued were arbitraty and made in bad faith.
Respondent Judge issued a temporary restraining order and subsequently a writ of preliminary injunction. CB filed a
motion to dismiss but was denied and ruled that the MB resolutions were arbitrarily issued. CB filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders of the trial court but CA affirmed the said orders.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not dismissing the case for lack of cause of action and declaring the MB
resolutions as arbitrary.
HELD: The following requisites must be present before the order of conservatorship may be set aside by a court: (1)
The appropriate pleading must be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock of
the bank in the proper court; (2) Said pleading must be filed within ten (10) days from receipt of notice by said majority
stockholders of the order placing the bank under conservatorship; and (3) There must be convincing proof, after
hearing, that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith.
In the instant case, the original complaint was filed more than 3 years after PBP was placed under conservator, long
after the expiration of the 10-day period deferred to above. It is also beyond question that the complaint and the
amended complaint were not initiated by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock.
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FACTS: Petitioner Rural Bank of Buhi is a juridical entity existing under the laws of the
Philippines. Buhi started its operations on Dec. 26, 1975. Under the law, Central Bank has
charge of the supervision and examination of Rural Banks. However, Rural Bank of Buhi
refused to be examined and as a result thereof, financial assistance was suspended.
Upon general examination of Buhis affair and operations conducted by DRBSLA and
represented by Consolacion Odra, director of DRBSLA, there was a massive irregularities in its
operations (consisting of loans and fictitious borrowers). Thereby, Odra submitted a report
recommending the Monetary Board of the Central Bank the placing of Buhi under receivership
in accordance with Sec. 29 of the RA 285 as amended, the designation of the Director
DRBSLA, as receiver thereof.
Rural Bank of Buhi filed a motion to dismiss averring that the petition alleged a valid
cause of action and that the respondents have violated the due process clause of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Monetary Board of Central Bank is correct in placing the Rural
Bank of Buhi under receivership in accordance with Sec. 29 of the RA 285.
HELD: The decision of the CA is hereby modified. There is lacking that convincing proof
prerequisite to justify the temporary restraining order issued by the court.
We hereby order the remand of this case to the RTC for further proceedings but we lift the
temporary restraining order issued by the trial court in this order.
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FACTS: On May 22, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61, rendered a decision adverse to petitioner in
Civil Cases Nos. 90-3490 and 91-685, upholding the validity of an auction sale over a piece of land and ordering the
issuance of a new Certificate of Title in favor of herein respondent.
On August 15, 1996, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from the adverse decision of the RTC.
On March 26, 1998, petitioner received a Notice to File Appellants Brief from the Court of Appeals. Petitioner had 45
days or until May 10, 1998 to file its brief. Since May 10 was a Sunday and May 11 was a holiday, petitioner had until
May 12, 1998 to file it.
On May 7, 1998, or five days before its deadline, petitioner allegedly filed by mail an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Extension of Time to File Appellants Brief, praying for an additional period of 60 days or from May 13, 1998 to July
13, 1998 within which to file the brief.
On July 13, 1998, the last day of the extension prayed for, petitioner filed its appellants brief.
On July 23, 1998, the Court of Appeals (Special Sixth Division) dismissed the appeal in a resolution, for failure to file
the appellants brief within the required period of 45 days from receipt of notice to file the same. It was further noted by
the CA that the appellants brief, received only on July 13, 1998, was without any accompanying motion for leave to
admit the same.
The CA found that: Record shows that a notice to file brief dated March 17, 1998 was received by appellant on March
26, 1998. Consequently, the 45-day period within which to file appellants brief expired on May 10, 1998.
On July 2, 1998, the Judicial Records Division (Civil Cases Section) submitted a report stating that no appellants brief
has been filed in this case.
However, the appellants brief was received by this court on July 13, 1998, without any accompanying motion for leave
to admit the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolutions made by the CA are: filed out of time and and filed without a motion for leave
for its admission.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolutions dated July 23, 1998 and
February 26, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. The denial of the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 56325
due to the late filing of the Appellants Brief pursuant to Rule 50 (e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is hereby
declared FINAL.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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Facts: Virgilio and Jenny Agabon were cornice installers of Riviera Home Improvements, a company engaged in the
business of selling ornamental construction materials.
They were employed from January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999, when they were dismissed for abandonment of
work.
The Agabons filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA, who ruled in their favor. The NLRC reversed on
appeal. The CA sustained the NLRCs decision
The Agabons further appealed to the SC, disputing the finding of abandonment, and claiming that the company did not
comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing.
Issue: WON the Agabons were illegally dismissed
Held: NO. Substantive due process (EEs must be dismissed for just or authorized cause): SC upheld the finding of
abandonment, because the act of the Agabons in seeking employment elsewhere clearly showed a deliberate intent to
sever the ER-EE relationship.
Procedural due process (for just cause, there must be a written notice informing him of grounds for termination, a
hearing or opportunity to be heard, and a final notice of termination stating the grounds therefor): There was no due
process because ER did not send the requisite notices to the last known address of the EEs. ER only gave a flimsy
excuse that the notice would be useless because the EEs no longer lived there. This is not a valid excuse, they should
have still sent a notice as mandated by law.
For not sending the requisite notices, the ER should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements of due process.
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Facts: Respondents were earlier hired by petitioner JAKA Foods Processing Corporation until the latter terminated
their employment because the corporation was in dire financial straits. It is not disputed, however, that the
termination was effected without JAKA complying with the requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code
regarding the service of a written notice upon the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least
one (1) month before the intended date of termination. Respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of wages and nonpayment of service incentive leave and 13th month pay against JAKA. The Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the termination illegal and ordering JAKA to reinstate respondents with full
backwages, and separation pay if reinstatement is not possible. The Court of Appeals reversed said decision and
ordered respondent JAKA to pay petitioners separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary, the proportionate 13th
month pay and, in addition, full backwages from the time their employment was terminated.
Issue: What are the legal implications of a situation where an employee is dismissed for cause but such dismissal was
effected without the employers compliance with the notice requirement under the Labor Code?
Held: It was established that there was ground for respondents dismissal, i.e., retrenchment, which is one of the
authorized causes enumerated under Article 283 of the Labor Code. Likewise, it is established that JAKA failed to
comply with the notice requirement under the same Article. Considering the factual circumstances in the instant case,
the Court deem it proper to fix the indemnity at P50, 000.00. The Court of Appeals have been in error when it ordered
JAKA to pay respondents separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. In all cases of
business closure or cessation of operation or undertaking of the employer, the affected employee is entitled to
separation pay. This is consistent with the state policy of treating labor as a primary social economic force, affording
full protection to its rights as well as its welfare. The exception is when the closure of business or cessation of
operations is due to serious business losses or financial reverses; duly proved, in which case, the right of affected
employees to separation pay is lost for obvious reasons.
Accordingly it is wise to hold that:
1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the
sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal was initiate by an act imputable to
the employee.
2) if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause but the employer fails to comply with the notice requirement,
the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employers exercise of his
management prerogative. Thus, dismissal was upheld but ordered JAKA to pay each of the respondents the
amount of PhP 50,000.00 representing nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.
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