Science,Metaphysics,Philosophy:Insearchofa

distinction

JUANJOSSANGUINETI1

Sommario:1.Classicaldistinctionsandtheirproblems.1.1.Philosophyasasearchof
wisdomwithinscience.1.2.Sciencesasabstract.1.3.Mathematicsaslessphilosophical.
1.4.Sciencesashypothetical.1.5.Scienceweakerthanphilosophy?2.Moderndistinctions.
2.1.Sciencesasempirical.2.2.Sciencesasempiricalinapositivistsense.Newproblemsfor
realists.2.3.Naturalsciencesasverifiableorfalsifiable.2.4.Scienceasconstructive.
2.5.Someconclusions.

Thedistinctionbetweenphilosophyandtheempiricalsciencesisrelatively
recent in the history of human culture. It goes back to the development of
experimentalanddescriptivesciencesinthelateseventeenthcentury.Thebirth
of these sciences (geography, history, geology, paleontology, chemistry,
biology)showedanunexpecteddistancebetweenthemandtheoldphilosophical
methods.Ofcourse,sciencessuchasmathematics,astronomyormedicinewere
wellknown in classical culture, but philosophy was not seen as something
radically different from those studies. The distinction between science and
philosophywasveryfluidandnotsystematicbeforetheseventeenthcentury.
Thisproblemiscomplex,sincetheconfigurationofthetaskofphilosophers
underwent many variations in ancient and modern times. Wisdom (and
philosophyistheloveofwisdom)seemedtobeinAntiquitymoreconcerned
withreligious andethical questions, butalso with physical, mathematical or
logical researches, or with political and social issues. The practical way of

1PontificiaUniversitdellaSantaCroce,PiazzadiSantApollinare49,00186Roma.Email:
sanguineti@usc.urbe.it

identifying philosophy, in Antiquity, was simply to point at Peripatetics,

Academicians,Stoicsandthelike,whosearchedforwisdominmanydifferent
ways.
The distinction betweenscienceandphilosophy(nowincludingastrong
separation)wasstressedintheearlypositivism(duringthenineteenthcentury),
whenphilosophicalspeculationswerefrequentlyidentifiedwithgnoseologyand
idealism. The existence of 'two cultures' in modern times (scientific and
humanistculture)isanotheraspectofthesamefact(thisismoreacuteinLatin
countries,wherethedivisionwasimposedbytheeducationalsystem).
Recently,thedifferencebetweenscienceandphilosophyisbecomingmore
flexible, but it remains always controversial. There is a great deal of
philosophical ideas among scientists, in literature, in the mass media, or in
academiccourses.Andthereisalwaysalackofunanimityamongauthorsabout
the proper notion of philosophy and its specific methods. The increasing
ramificationofdisciplinesisduetospecialization,butphilosophy,leavingaside
historical studies, is hardly identifiable as a specialized area. A nontrivial
distinction between sciences and philosophy (or between science and
metaphysics, which is similar), then, is a very serious speculative problem,
linked with their mutual interaction and with the problem of the identity of
philosophy.
Herethereareseveraloppositionssketchingtheproblemofthedistinction
betweenphilosophy(thefirstmemberoftheduality)andscience(thesecond
member):
total/partial;
universal/particular;
ultimatecauses/secondarycausesfirstprinciples/derivativeprinciples;
being/particularkindofbeings;
substantialissues,essence/detailsandaccidents;
qualitative/quantitative;
problemsofsense/technicalproblems;
questioningeverypresupposition/assumedpresuppositionsorhypotheses;
intellect/reason;
ontological/empirical,experimental;
intuition/demonstration;
eideticintuition/practicalreasoning;

deepexplanation(why)/description(how);
comprehension(verstehen)/lawlikeexplanation(erklren);
dialecticalreason(Vernunft)/abstractintellect(Verstand);
separatio/abstractio;
ineffable/whatcanbesaid.

Anumberofthesedistinctionshaveaclearphilosophicalcorrespondence
(e.g.thelastonebelongstoWittgenstein).InthesepagesIwilltrytointroduce
abriefhistoricalorderinseveralofthesedualities.Someofthemconcernthe
object,othersthemethod,andareductiontomorefundamentalpairscanbe
attempted.Myapproachinthispaperishistorical.Itisnotmyintentionhereto
settletheprobleminasystematicway,butonlytoprovokesomereflectionin
ordertoprepareamoreprecisedifferencebetweenthetwoareas.Thiswillhelp
togetanewinsightintheirmutualrelations.
1.Classicaldistinctionsandtheirproblems
1.1.Philosophyasasearchofwisdomwithinscience
AmongtheancientGreeks,philosophywasanattitude,anactivityofmen
engagedinthesearchofwisdom,morethananobjectivedisciplinetobetaught
orlearned.Thesocalleddisciplineswerethesciences,ortheorganizedcontent
ofsciencessuchasmathematicsorphysics(mathematicsetymologicallymeans
disciplineorteaching:mavqhma).
AccordingtoAristotle,empiricalstudieslikebiologyormineralogywere
concernedwithalowlevelofinquiry,deservingthenameof quia sciences2.
Thesesciencespointedtothehowandnottothewhy.Thispreliminaryresearch
was meant to record the facts, in order to ascertain 'what there is' (it was
concludedquiaest:thatsomethingis).Descriptiveor'phenomenological'studies
were not yet properly sciences for Aristotle, but just a first step (e. g. the
Historiaanimalium: iJstoriva or history meanspreciselyrecordorresearch).
JEpisthvmh, instead, is the knowledge of the principles governing the

2Seemybook Scienzaaristotelicaescienzamoderna,Armando,Roma1992,pp.3573and101138,
concerningtheAristotelianconceptionofscienceanditsrealuseinhisscientificwork.

phenomena.Thedeepscienceisthe propterquid science,whichtellsus why

somethingisinthiswayandnototherwise 3.ButAristotleacknowledgedthe
quia sciences,whichawaitedforafullerunderstandinginthehigher propter
quidscience.Adescriptivesciencewastobe'explained'byanetiologicscience.
Subordination, as an interdisciplinary relation between the sciences,
involvesinAristotleandAquinasthatahigheretiologiclevelaffordsinsightand
deeperreasonsofaphenomenologicallevelofresearch4.Thebeautifulsounds
ofmusicareduetomathematicalproportions,sinceorderismorebeautifulthan
disorder5.Thethunderasa'soundintheclouds'isscientificallyunderstoodasa
'soundcausedbytheextinctionoffireintheclouds' 6.Scientificdemonstration
operatesthetransitionfromtheimmediatephenomenatotheirinitiallyunknown
causes.Onlyatthelastleveldoweproperly'understand'thethingortheevents
(scire):i.e.whenweknowwhytheyareproduced 7,thoughthis why entails
variousmeanings(materialcause,formalcause,etc.).
AristotlewasopentothePythagoreanvisionofscience.LikePlato,inthe
PosteriorAnalyticsheplacedmathematicalreasoninginphysicalmattersonthe
propterquid level,sincemathematicswasintendedtoexplainwhatwasfirst
knowninamerelydescriptivephysics8.Thecauseofthephysicalstructureof
therainbow,forinstance,istobefoundinthelawsofgeometricaloptics 9.From

3Cfr.ARISTOTLE,PosteriorAnalytics,79a115.
4Cfr.THOMASAQUINAS,InIAnal.Post.,lect.15.
5Cfr.ARISTOTLE,PosteriorAnalytics,90a2431.
6Cfr.ARISTOTLE,PosteriorAnalytics,93b814.
7Cfr.ARISTOTLE,PosteriorAnalytics,71b1013.
8Id onotassume that according to Aristotle mathematics provides the absolute
propter quid of phenomena. But mathematics applied to physics produces a new scientific level of
understanding,calledscientiamediabyAQUINAS:seeInBoethiumdeTrinitate,q.V,a.3,ad6.Aquinasw as
awarethatthescientiaemediaewereespeciallyusefulintechnology:seeInIAnal.Post.,lect.17and25.
9Cfr.ARISTOTLE,Meteorologicorum,375b16377a28.

this point of view, as Wallace has shown10, the Aristotelian epistemological

causalparadigmisnotdiscordantwithmodernscience,particularlywithGalileo
andNewtonsscience.
In this epistemological framework there is no place for a distinction
betweenscienceandphilosophysuchasweunderstandittoday.Therelevant
distinction here is rather between sciences concerned with different areas of
being,likecelestialbodies,earthlysubstances,mathematicalentities,andthe
'scienceweareseeking'(metaphysics),whichwouldprovideforAristotle,aswe
know,theultimateexplanationofeverything.Inotherwords,theAristotelian
division concerns the subset of particular sciences dealing with particular
explanationsoftheseveralpartsoftheuniverse,ontheonehand,andthe'meta
science'offirstphilosophy,ontheotherhand.Thelatterfacesthemostuniversal
andintelligibleaspectsof theworld(entityassuch)andthereforeitcanbe
directly referred to the ultimate explanation of everything: God as the first
Cause,thepureselfunderstanding,separateinesse.
InAquinas,theologybringsmetaphysicstoahigherviewpoint,according
totheselfrevelationofGodintheSon.Theology,thescienceoffaith,maintains
a continuity with the natural inquiry of human mind, especially with its
aspiration to the vision of God. Both metaphysics and theology can be
consideredawisdom,thoughmetaphysics,inaSocraticfashion,couldberather
viewedasasearchforwisdom,whichispreciselythephilosophicalenterprise.
Metaphysics in this framework was the core of philosophy, but the other
particularsciencesremainedlikewisephilosophical,inasmuchastheywerenot
closedinthemselves,butincludedthedynamicsearchfortheultimatetruthand
thefirstabsoluteprincipleoftheuniverse.

10Cfr.W.WALLACE,CausalityandScientificExplanation,TheUniversityofMichiganPress,Ann
Arbor1974;FromaRealistPointofView,UniversityPressofAmerica,Boston1983;TheModelling
ofNature,TheCatholicUniversityofAmericaPress,Washington1996,pp.322376."Tothedegree
that it is able to demonstrate conclusions, modern science is just as philosophical as Greek, medieval, or
Renaissancescience"(TheModellingofNature,p.237).

1.2.Sciencesas'abstract'
The array of sciences is not monolithic in Aristotle. In the Posterior
Analyticshehighlightstheautonomyofparticularsciences,governedbyproper
principlesconcerningtheirownobject,principlesnottobededucedfromthe
universal(or'common')axioms.HeopposesthepresumedPlatonicconception
ofasingleuniversalscience11.WhetherornottheAcademyhistoricallydreamt
ofdeducingthewholeofknowledgefromalittlenucleusofprinciples,Aristotle
infactstressedtheautonomyofsciencesandconsequentlytheimpossibilityof
reducingonekindofsciencetoanother,thoughtheconceptofsubordinationto
alienprinciplesallowedhimtocombineheterogeneoussciences,suchasphysics
andmathematics12.
Scientific heterogeneity arises from the modalities of abstraction. The
conceptofabstractionopensAristotletoafruitfulconfrontationwithmodernity,
inasmuchasitintroducesanoeticperspective,correctingthePlatonichyper
realismwhichignoredthedifferencebetweenthemodusessendiandthemodus
cognoscendi13.Abstractionentailsaspecialconceptualelaboration,maintaining
verydifferentrelationshipswithexperienceandsensorialknowledge.Abstract
thoughtcapturesitsintelligibleobjectseparatedfromexperience,butatthesame
timerelatedtoit,sincetheexistentialandsingularentityisgraspedbyourmind
onlyintherealmofexperience.
The methodological differences between sciences such as mathematics,
physicsormetaphysicscanbethoughtofwithinthisgeneralframework.The
Platonic conception rather followed the pure concept, confusing the mental
separation (abstraction) with a real separation in esse. Platonism equated
scientific objects, grasped in the abstraction of an eidetic content, with
transcendentimmaterialbeings.Thefewuniversalgenera,tobediscussedin
Dialectics, are for Plato (see The Sophist) still more immaterial than the

11Cfr.ARISTOTLE,PosteriorAnalytics,I,chapters28,29and32.
12Cfr.ARISTOTLE,PosteriorAnalytics,75a25;75a3875b20;78b3579a15.See
algo THOMAS AQUINAS, In I Anal. Post., lect. 17. Physics cannot be reduced to mathematics:
ARISTOTLE,OntheHeavens,299a1217;299b23300a19;300a1519.
13Cfr.THOMASAQUINAS,S.Th.,I,q.84,a.1.

mathematicalideas.Belongingtotherealmofseparatethought,thePlatonic
ideaissustained,asitwere,byametamathematicalmethod.
Aristotle stressed instead the difference between metaphysics and the
particularsciences.HetriedtoavoidthePlatonicperspective,sincehestrived
forametaphysicsdrawnfromnatureandnotfromtheessencesastheyappeared
intheintentionalthought.Histheoryofthemodalitiesofabstraction(three,but
notproperlydegrees:physical,mathematicalandmetaphysicalimmateriality),
thoughinspiredinPlato,shouldnotbeinterpretedwithinaPlatonicpattern.The
threelevelsofthoughtareprogressivelyimmaterial,moreformal,butnotinthe
lineofahomogeneousascension.MetaphysicswasforAristotlemoreakinto
physics than to mathematics, rightly deserving the name received in the
Peripatetictradition.
According to Aquinas' commentary, In Boethium de Trinitate, the
particular sciences should follow the method of abstraction in trying to
circumscribetheessence.Metaphysics,dealingwithbeingassuch(ens),which
is not a genus or a supergenus, should undertake the way of separatio14.
Sciences stand to metaphysics as abstraction to 'separation' (or as particular
sensesstandtothewholeperception).ThemeaningofseparatioinAquinascan
beunderstoodasanintellectualoperationof'separating'whatreallysubsists,i.
e.thesubstanceasaunity,asawhole,asanindividualandanexistent(ensper
se,suppositum).Metaphysicsshouldnotseparateinratione,butinesse.Itstask
istoturntothetotalthinganditsacts,operationsandrelations(e.g.thehuman
person), being able precisely for this reason to attain the existent 'separate
substances'ortherealmoftheexistentialtranscendenceoversensiblematter
(spiritual beings, persons, God), not in the line of essence as it appears in
thought(objectivity),butinthelineof actemergingoverpotency.Asound
translationofseparatiocouldbeexistentialtranscendence.Metaphysicsstrives
for the most actual transcendence in terms of being: Ipsum esse subsistens.
Withoutthistranscendence,metaphysicswouldbereducedtoamereontology
ofphysicsandbiology,ortologic.
The path by which Aristotle overcame sensible matter and attained
transcendenceconcernedtheintellect asanact andnot,aswehavesaid,the
immanentobjectofitsoperations(abstractthought).Theintellectcansubsistin
itselfbecauseitisnotimmersedinmatter.Ateleologicalnatureisintelligible

14Cfr.THOMASAQUINAS,InBoethiumdeTrinitate,q.V,a.3and4.

(theuniverse)andthereforeitisintrinsicallyrelatedtotheintellect.Uponthis
basis,AristotlepointstotheIntellectasthegoverningprincipleoftheuniverse,
completedbyAquinaswiththeprincipleofthethinkingandlovingfirstAct
(God). Therefore, the association between natural sciences, psychology and
metaphysics in Aristotle and Aquinas was quite different from the binomial
mathematics/dialectic in Plato. Accordingly, even if metaphysics is sharply
distinguished from natural science (which is particular and abstract, in the
context of the antireductionist trend of the Aristotelian research), the latter
neverthelessremainstiedtometaphysicsinaverynaturalway.
1.3.Mathematicsas'lessphilosophical'
Excessivelyforcingthedistancebetween separatio and abstractio would
beunfairtoAristotelianism.InHeidegger'sview,modernsciencebroughtthe
forgetfulnessofbeing,acriticismwhichheextendedtoPlatonicessentialismas
wellastotheAristotelianphilosophy.Thiscriticismisinconsistentwiththe
deep reasons underlying Aristotle's restless antiplatonism. It would be more
justified if applied only to the Platonic inclination favorable to see in
mathematicalobjectsafirstapproachtowardstranscendence.
Aristotle is basically a philosophy of nature. He does not reduce it to
numbers or to the atoms of Democritus, rejecting both Platonism and
materialistic naturalism. He was mistaken, of course, when he identified the
heavenswithareignofquasigeometricalmaterialperfection.Nevertheless,his
physical, biological and psychological researches were natural steps in the
speculativepathwaytowardsthescienceofbeingasanact.Naturalsciences,if
pursuedasaphilosophicalendeavor,accordingtoAristotle,shouldnaturallyend
upinmetaphysics.
Strangeasmayappear,asimilarstructurecanbefoundinKant.Thereisa
parallelism in Kant and Aristotle's distrust of the ontological weight of
mathematics15.Forthelatter,mathematics,whenappliedtophysics,mustbe
severelycontrolledbyexperience,preventingitfrombuildingtheoreticalobjects
never to be found in the sensible world. In this respect, Aristotle seems an
empiricist,andthisexplainswhytheAristotelianapproachtonaturehadnopart
inthebirthofmodernscience.Theconceptof impetus,thenotionofanideal

15SeemybookScienzaaristotelicaescienzamoderna,o.c.,pp.3844,5663,149163.

inertia,orthepossibilityofunobservedatomswereruledoutbyPeripatetics,as
being too theoretical. This rejection was philosophically prudent, though
scientificallyunproductive.
Aristotle allowed the use of mathematics in science, acknowledged the
existence of a physicomathematical level of abstraction, and conceived
mathematicalreasonsasa propterquid levelregardingthephenomenological
research,aswehaveseen,butatthesametimeherefusedtobuildmathematical
modelstryingtoadaptnaturetothem,asthePythagoreansdid(accordingto
Aristotle's criticism16). He preferred a more inductive procedure wherein
mathematicsshouldlimititselftotheroleofanaccidentalmeasureofphysical
andsensibleproportions.Thisinsufficientapproachisquiteoppositetothespirit
ofmodernscience,whichstartswiththeabandonmentofthecommonsensible
features of the world. Aristotle's option for these features was indeed
methodologicallymisleading.Hewantedtherebytopreservewhathesupposed
tobetherealcontentofphysics,tooclosetotheexternalappearancesofthings.
ItisgenerallyignoredthatKantaswellconsideredmathematicsasapure
instrumentofphysics,deprivedofanyphilosophicalimportance,evenifuseful
in the area of technical or practical rationality 17. Mathematics is not a
knowledge,accordingtoKant,butapuremethodofcalculating,thoughwithits
fictionalclarityitperfectlyprovidesthemodelofadeductiveandverywell
definedscience18.ThescientificstatusofphysicsinKantismoreproblematic
thanusuallyacknowledged(problematicaswellistheexistenceofsynthetica
priorijudgementsinphysics,notinmathematics,insidetheKantiansystem).
LongaftertheCritiqueofPureReason,beingunsatisfiedwithNewtonian
physics,whichheconsideredtoophenomenological,Kanttried(unsuccessfully)
to elaborate a physics based on metaphysics, within the context of the
transcendentalturn.Hetried,inotherwords,toaccomplishtheoldprojectof

16Cfr.ARISTOTLE,OntheHeavens,293a2527.
17SeeforexampleKANT,OpusPostumum,inGesammelteSchriften(GS),vol.22,
pp.544546.

18SeeKANT'sworksonLogic,asVorlesungen,LogikBusolt,inGS,vol.24,2,p.639;LogikPlitz,in
GS,vol.24,2,p.560;KritikderreinenVernunft,inGS,vol.3,B754760,757758,760761.Onlymathematics
enjoysthepropertyofhavingperfectdemonstrations:ibid.,B762766.

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Leibniz,i.e.tobuildadynamicphysics,aftertheepistemologicalintroduction
oftheCritique(seehispostcriticalwork MetaphysicalPrinciplesofNatural
Sciences,1786),nottospeakoftherestoration,intheCritiqueofJudgement,of
theorganicview,togetherwithfinalismandanimism,whichismoreorlessthe
traditionalAristotelianorPlotinianphilosophyofnature.The OpusPostumum
was further projected as a transition (bergang) from the metaphysical
principlestothespecificcontentsofthephysicalsciences.
Therefore,thereisaconvergencebetweenKantandAristotleintheproject
ofbuildingascienceofnaturewithanontologicalrange,providedwecontrol
theuseofmathematicsinscience.Mathematicalobjectssometimescouldbe
purelyimaginative(Kantinfactruledoutatomismsinceitentailedthefictional
ideaofavoid19).NeitherKantnorAristotlewerewillingtoleavegreatspaceto
imaginationinscience20.Bothshowedasortofpositivismregardingtheuseand
interpretation of mathematics in science, though at the same time Kant (in
physics)wasfarfromthepositivistmoldusuallyattributedtohim.Kantwas
ratheraconstructivisttranscendentalmetaphysician,oracausalenergetist,very
concernedwiththephilosophyofmechanics.
Theunitybetweenmetaphysicsandphysics,accordingly,isincontestable
inAristotleandKant.Butintheformertheunionisrealist,whileinthelatterit
istranscendental,preparingthesoilforanidealistmetaphysics.Moreover,the
KantianunitywasanattempttoconsecratethecontingentNewtonianstructure
of the physical world with a necessary a priori. This was a failure. The
mechanicalworldshouldhavebeenseenastheobjectofaparticularscience,not
asanecessarystructureofnatureasreadbyourmind.Kantinthissensewas
absolutist, lacking anadequate distinction between philosophy and particular
science.
Kant's projected metaphysics of nature was intended to be the last
improvement of Newtonian physics, at the level of Intellect (Verstand). Of
course,thisisquitedifferentfromthemetaphysicsofnatureonthedialectical

19 Cfr. KANT, Metaphysical Principles of Natural Sciences,inGS,vol.4,p.524.Fora

parallelismwithARISTOTLE,seenote12(OntheHeavens)andOntheHeavens299b23300a19 ,against
Platosdeductionofthephysicalconstitutionofnaturalbodiesstartingfromtheirgeometricalstructure.
20Cfr.KANT,MonadologiaPhysica,inGS,vol.1,p.475.

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levelofReason(Vernunft),wheretherewouldbenotheoreticalobjectstodeal
with, since there is no sensible basis for them. This is a real step towards
positivism,ortofunctionalneokantianism.SoinAristotle'smind,thenatural
sciencesmakeupapathwaytoatranscendentmetaphysics.InKantianscenario,
onthecontrary,thismetaphysicsisveryweak,thoughinsomewayitissavedas
ausefulguide.ButthereremainsinKantadogmatism,sotospeak,regardinga
transcendental metaphysics used to the philosophical comprehension of
Newtonian mechanics. Of course, these are contradictory aspects in Kants
philosophy.Thiscontradictionhastodowiththeproblemof the distinction
betweenscience,philosophy,andmetaphysics.
Looking to the development of contemporary science, the alleged little
ontological range of the quantitative approach to nature should be revised.
Measures are not merely conventional: they tell us something essential of
materialbodiesandoftheirpowersandrelationswitheachother.Thediscovery
ofwonderfulmathematicalstructuresinmatterisabridgetoamoreaccurate
ontologicalcomprehensionofnaturalsubstances.Itistimeforphilosophersto
put an end to the quarantine of mathematics in the philosophical insight of
nature. No reconciliation between philosophy and modern science can be
expectedwithoutthisstep.Reductionismmustbeavoided,butquantityremains
animportantpropertyofthematerialworld,andithastobeseenintegratedwith
qualitiesandnaturalessences. Substances,propertiesandrelations,furtherly,
shouldbeconsideredintheirmutualrespect,notseparated.
1.4.Sciencesas'hypothetical'
InseveralAristoteliantexts,mostlyinthePosteriorAnalytics,wereadthat
sciences like geometry begin from hypotheses or presuppositions. They are
neitherdemonstratednorjustifiedinsidethosedisciplines,whosetaskismerely
to make deductions from the principles. These presuppositions are not so
stronglyselfevidentasthesocalled axioms,againstwhichitisimpossibleto
think21.
Thecontext ofthisdistinctionistheaxiomaticframeworkof deductive
sciences(particularlyinthelineofgeometry),nottheinductiveatmosphereof

21Cfr.ARISTOTLE,PosteriorAnalytics,72a125;76b2334.

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natural sciences. The Aristotelian axiomatism goes back to the Platonic

distinctionstatedin TheRepublic22 between noetic science(thescienceofthe
Ideas) and dianoetic science (mathematics). Platonic dialectic, Aristotelian
metaphysicsandthescientiadivinaofDeTrinitatebyBoethius23makeuseofan
intellectual method, i. e. they employ primarily nou'" and only secondarily
lovgo".Theyuse,inotherwords,anintellectualunderstandingor'intuition'of
thenondemonstrableprinciples,andonlysecondarilydotheyemployreasoning
(diavnoia, ratio). But ratio is founded (not by mere deduction!) on the
absolutenonhypotheticalprinciples.
Inthissense,asAquinassuggests,particularsciencesaremoreconcerned
withdemonstrations,whilephilosophydealswiththeirultimateprinciples,i.e.
with the insight of immediate axioms24. Obviously, metaphysics employs
demonstration as well, as in the proofs of the existence of God, but the
philosopher,notbeingalogician,triestoilluminatethetruth,andeveninhis
rationalargumentsheattemptstointroducemore intellectus withinthelogical
procedures.FollowingBoethius,Aquinasconceivestheintellectasacenterof
powerfullight,asastartingpointofthemanyrationalmovementsandlikewise
astheirfinalpointofarrival25.
Therefore, the Platonic distinction between noetic and dianoetic science
marks a difference in the strength of the principles. Dianoetic or rational
sciences,likegeometryandastronomy,arguefromhypotheses,whosetruthis
assumedbutnotregardedasanabsolutenecessity(Greekastronomyemployed
the method of 'saving the appearances', which corresponds to the modern
hypotheticodeductivemethod).Geometricians,inthisview,arenotconcerned
withtheontologyofprinciples.Theysimplyassumethemanddrawthelogical

22Cfr.PLATO,TheRepublic,VI,509d511e.
23Cfr.THOMASAQUINAS,InBoethiumdeTrinitate,q.VI,a.4.
24Cfr.THOMASAQUINAS,InBoethiumdeTrinitate,q.VI:ondealingwithmetaphysics,weshould
operateintellectualiter,inphysicsnaturaliter,inmathematicsdisciplinabiliter.

25 Cfr. THOMAS AQUINAS, In Boethium de Trinitate, q. VI, a. 1, ad tertiam

quaestionem:"intellectualisconsideratioestprincipiumrationalis(...)intellectualisconsideratioestterminus
rationalis".

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consequences for the sake of coherence. Dialectic, on the other hand, like
Aristotle's metaphysics, deals with archv ajnupovqeto" or with non
hypotheticalprinciples,whosetruthisabsolute.
This feature does not correspond to the naturalistic character of the
effectiveAristotle'sscience(nottotheidealizedscience,asitisinthePosterior
Analytics). The indications concerning hypotheses in the Posterior Analytics
remainlaconicandperhapstheybelongtoaspectsoftheyoungAristotelian
thought,morerelatedtotheAcademicapproaches.Nevertheless,thepointis
very important for this paper, because in Aristotle the relationship between
hypothesesandaxiomsisparalleltotherelationshipbetweenproperprinciples
and commonprinciples,orbetween particularsciences and metaphysics26.In
otherwords:sciencesarehypothetical,whilemetaphysicsisaxiomatic.
Ishalladdthreepointstothissection:
1. Abouthypotheses:IhavenotfoundanexplicitreferenceinAristotle's
writings concerning the origin of the hypothetical principles, which are the
typical principles of every particular science. The hypotheses according to
Aristotle,itseems,couldbejustassumedinamathematicalway,ortakenfrom
empirical suggestions27. Thomas Aquinas recalls that a science can assume

26Properprinciples,belongingtoparticularsciences,arehypothetical( cfr.ARISTOTLE,
PosteriorAnalytics,76a3132;76b2330;77b5),whichdoesnotmeandoubtful.Bytheway,wedisagree

tress the hypothetical character of scientific principles to simply discard them as

meaninglessforphilosophy. Therearemanydegreesofhypotheses.Someofthemmaybepractically
certain(forexample,theexistenceofatoms), thoughtheyarealwaysopento
with those who s

discussionanddonotpossessametaphysicalnecessity.Conversely,otherhypothesesmaybemereconjectures

,andthiscorrespondstothepopularviewofhypothesis.Thedifferent
meaningsofepistemologicalnotionsamongscientistsandordinarypeople(forinstance ,inpopular
withaverylittleempiricalbasis

writings or in journalistic declarations) should be noticed in order to avoid misunderstandings.

Evolution,theBigBang,superstrings,etc.arenothypothetical
inthesamedegree.Today,theexistenceofatomsisascertain
astheexistenceofelephants.
27 Cfr. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, 1025 b 1020, and AQUINAS' comments in In VI
Metaphysicorum,lect.1.

14

principlesborrowedfromanothersourceofknowledge,sothatthetaskoftheir
justification would shift to a farther instance28. However, interdisciplinary
subordinationdoesnothelpusverymuchforthejustificationofphysicalor
mathematical principles, whereas, according to an Aristotelian tenet already
mentioned29, mathematical principles are not reducible to physics (against
PlatonistsandPythagoreans).Wemightsuspectthatthescienceofbeingshould
becompetenttoclarifythem.ButpreciselythispointisexcludedinAristotle.
The impossibility of demonstrating the proper principles from common
metaphysical principles is tied to the autonomy of the different sciences.
Otherwisetheywouldbeabsorbedbyasinglesuperscience30.
2.Aboutaxioms:accordingtotheproceduresofAristotle,themetaphysical
nondemonstrableprinciples(=axioms)canbediscussedinadialecticalway
(notproperlyscientificordemonstrative).Thiswouldbenotamerediscussion,
butastrategyinwhichsomenoeticunderstandingcouldbeinduced 31.Dialectic
canbethemeansofcarryingonan induction soastobringourmindtothe
intuitive grasp of a truth32. Dialectic reasoning, though generally weak, is
strongerwithinmetaphysics,sincethefirstprinciplesarefullynoeticandthey
canbedefendedbyindirectarguments,perabsurdum,especiallywiththehelp
oftheprincipleofnoncontradiction.Inthefieldofsciences,instead,dialecticis
weaker,inasmuchastheproperprinciples,aswehaveseen,arehypotheticaland
notaxiomatic.InAquinas'mind,hypothesesmaybe persenotasapientibus,
verywellknowntotheexperts33,whereasforAristotletheyare endxa,i.e.

28Cfr.THOMASAQUINAS,InIPosteriorumAnalyticorum,lectiones5,19and21.
29Seenote12.
30Cfr.ARISTOTLE,PosteriorAnalytics,76a1720.
31 Cfr.W.WIELAND, DieAristotelischePhysik,VandenhoeckundRuprecht,Gttingen1970; E.
BERTI,Leviedellaragione,IlMulino,Bologna1987;LeragionidiAristotele,Laterza,Bari1989.
32 Cfr.V.KAL, OnintuitionanddiscursivereasoninginAristotle,Brill, LeidenandNewYork
1988,pp.5960.

33 Cfr.THOMASAQUINAS,InIPosteriorumAnalyticorum,lect.1;InBoethiumdeHebdomadibus,
lect.1.

15

well establishedor reasonabletruths,heldbymanypeople or byauthorized

experts.
3.Thefieldofaphilosophicaldiscussionconcerningscientificprinciples
seemstobedialectic,whichmustbeunderstoodinadeepsenseandnotasa
merelogicalmatch.Dialectic,inthissense,canbeconceivedasadialogueora
kindofcontrolledreasoningintheareaofnoeticprinciples.Thisshouldbethe
placeforanencounterbetweenmetaphysicsandthesciences,ifwearetofollow
theAristoteliansuggestions34.
Buttheautonomyofsciencesshouldnotbedisregarded.Thehumanmind
cannotattainatotalunificationofsciences.Weshouldn'taimforaphilosophical
justification of scientific principles, since they cannot obtain an axiomatic
dignity.Thesciencesmustruntheriskofproposingtheirprinciplesontheir
own.AlthoughnotexplicitinAristotle,Ithinkthispointcorrespondswelltohis
epistemologyandtothefewindicationshegaveinhisworks.
1.5.Scienceweakerthanphilosophy?
The distinction between hypotheses and axioms makes the particular
sciencesweakerthanmetaphysics,incontrastwiththecurrentviewaccordingto
which philosophy plays the weaker part in human knowledge. However,
philosophyfortheancientsdidnotpossesstheomnimodacertitudoassignedto
itbyrationalistauthors.
The 'strength' of a science, i. e. its degree of certainty, is correlated in
Aristotelian philosophy to the object of study and to the dispositions of the
knower.Contingentandvariableentitiesdonotprovidethebasisforastrong
science.Theseentitiescharacterizetheobjectofsocialandpoliticaltopics.But
alsoinmanyphysicalquestionsthereisuncertaintyduetothecontingenceof
matter, according to Aristotle (conversely, the absolute certainty of the old
Newtonianphysicswaslinkedtoitsdeterminism).

34Closetothisdistinction, R.SPAEMANNholdsthatthepositivesciencesassumemodelsandobjects
withsomedecisionistelements(andabstractionhasadegreeoffreedom),whilephilosophydiscussesevery
presuppositionandeverykindofobjectivity,criticallyinvestigatingtherelationshipbetweenscientificmodels
andthewholereality

:seePhilosophischeEssays,Reclam,Stuttgart1983,pp.113118.

16

ThetposofplaincertitudeinAristotleandAquinasisdeduction,andthis
iswhyrigorousscience(ejpisthvmh)means demonstrativescience,whose
eminent paradigm is mathematics. It is not surprising to read Aquinas'
statements that "mathematics refers to matters wherein we find an absolute
certainty(omnimodacertitudo)"35 andthat"mathematicalthoughtiseasierand
morecertainthanphysicalandtheologicalthought" 36.However,mathematical
demonstrations start from hypotheses and Aristotle is reluctant to reduce all
sciencetomathematicalnecessity.Wecouldsaythatmathematicsispseudo
certain.
AnotherfieldofabsolutecertaintyinAristotleandAquinasisthelimited
but very strong region of the first principles, such as the axiom of non
contradiction.Theintellectuallightofnou'"hereispowerful:contradictionis
unthinkable.Butapartfromnoncontradictionandsomeotherfewmathematical
principles,Aristotledidnotappliedexplicitlythepropertyofunthinkabletoany
other principle.Contradictionis irrationalandbelongstopurenonbeing,of
course, but our mind sometimes needs a hard reflection to single out an
authenticcontradiction(andthisisnotamatterofformallogic)inphilosophical
matters.
Necessary matters outside mathematics, with all the restrictions stated
above,aremetaphysicalmatters(forexample,aboutGod).IntheAristotelian
view,theyhave quoadse (inthemselves)aproperrighttoinduceanecessary
knowledge,concerningwhatisunconditionallyandcannotbeotherwise.But
AristotleandAquinasemphasisgoestoman'sintelligencewhich,liketheeyes
oftheowlregardingthebrightnessofnormallight,isinitiallyblindtothose
highsubjects37.Theyarequoadnos(forus)attheendoftheresearch,notatthe
beginning.Thestrengthofthefirstnoeticprinciplesdoesnotallowaquickand
easymetaphysics.
Thequestionastowhetherscienceisweakerthanphilosophycannotbe
answeredwithaneatyesorno.Deductionisclear(lovgo"iseasy),andsothe
problemgoesbacktotheintellectualcomprehensionofprinciples:to nou'".

35THOMASAQUINAS,InIEthicorum,lect.3.
36THOMASAQUINAS,InBoethiumdeTrinitate,q.VI,a.1,adsecundamquaestionem.
37Cfr.THOMASAQUINAS,InliberdeCausis,prooemium.

17

The problem is to be related, furtherly, to human dispositions and habits.

Aristotleacknowledgedthatsomepersonsfindmorepersuasivemathematical
arguments,orperhapsrhetoricreasoning,orpoeticpresentationsandthelike.
Peopletodayaremoreeducatedtodealwitheasemoreinscientificmattersthan
inphilosophicalinsights.
Non immediate metaphysical matters, like the knowledge of God,
accordingtoSaintThomasaresubtleanddeep38.Philosophers,followingthe
pathofreasoninthesematters,werevictimofvariousandawkwardmistakes
(erroresmultiplicesetturpissimos),uptothepointthathardlytwoorthreedid
agree in a common opinion39. Though not legitimating fideism, this point
manifests the weakness of human reason alone, lessening the strength of
rationalisminphilosophyandinscienceaswell.

38Cfr.THOMASAQUINAS,InBoethiumdeTrinitate,q.III,a.1.Thecontexthere
arethemany difficulties toknow God, stated by Rabbi Moses, which Aquinas invariably brings
forwardwhendealingwiththe moral necessitytoreceiveChristianfaith inordertoknow
Godwithouterror.
39Ibid.,ad3.

18

2.Moderndistinctions
2.1.Sciencesasempirical
As we have seen, the distinction between metaphysics and the other
theoretical sciences (conceived altogether as 'philosophical': physics and
mathematics)wascurrentamongancientandmedievalauthors,althoughsome
disciplines were more empirical and others more mathematical (physico
mathematical).Thisdivisionremainedunchangeduntiltheseventeenthcentury
(see e. g. the title of Newton's work, Philosophiae naturalis principia
mathematica: Mathematical principles of natural philosophy). However,
Newtonianphysicshadreplacedthetraditionalphilosophyofnatureand,more
specificallyinclassicalrationalism,metaphysicsandmechanicswereinterpreted
togetherundertheaprioriofpurereason.TheoldnameofRationalmechanics,
still in use in some places (another denomination was Analytic mechanics),
alludes to a science of motion dealing with pure rational principles, to be
discoveredatthelevelofanalyticreasonandnotempirically.
Thoughrationalismisnotunivocalinthedifferentauthors,itscommon
feature is to work out metaphysics and any rigorous science within the
mathematical approach of conceptual analysis. Human thought (now
preferentiallycalledreason,asopposedtothesenses)wassupposedtobeable
toattainaclearnecessarytruthintheanalysisofapurifiedconcept.Thisshould
bethemethodofa propterquid science,inmechanicsaswellasinrational
theology.Aweakeruseofourreasonwouldbesimplytoreceivetruth(butnot
yetitsdeepreason)fromoutside,onthebasisoffactualexperience.Thiswas

19

intendedtobethefieldof'empiricalsciences'(theoldquiasciences)40.InKant's
conservative view (inspired inWolff's philosophy), the hypothetical sciences
still remained on an empirical level, deprived of the a priori that would
transformthemintoanecessaryandseriousscience41.Histenacioussearchfor
anaprioriphysicsindicatestheidentificationbetweenthelatterandphilosophy.
Atthesametime,asImentionedatthebeginningofmyexposition,the
empirical sciences had been developing with extreme rapidity. The
'experimental' sciences created a definitive gap between philosophers and
scientists. The distinction between philosophy and the positive sciences (or
simplysciences)becameclearaftertheEnlightenment,forthefirsttimein
history.Thatdistinction,asweknow,wasnotfavorablefortheformer.Hard
positivismmeanttheintroductionofempiricismintheinterpretationofthenew
positivesciences.Inthepositivistphilosophyofscience,thesearchforinner
necessitywasdeclaredvane,andallthesciencesconcerningrealitywerelocated
onthelevelof quia,sotosay,whiletheirrationality,devoidfromontological
principles,becamepurelylogicalorsyntactical.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the scientific revolutions in
mathematics and physics, i. e. in the headquarters of old rationalism, broke
downmoreeffectively,atleastinmanypeople,theideaofscienceasreferredto
theinnervisionofanalytictruth,withthepredicateflowingoutfromthesubject

40 Wolffisanillustrativeexampleinthisrespect,thoughnottoorationalistasusuallyrepresented,
since he was aware of the importance of the experimental studies. His two great volumes of Psychologia
empirica and Psychologia rationalis (the former is conceived as a preparation for the latter) announces
somewhattheincomingseparationbetweenexperimentalsciencesandpurephilosophy.Hetriedabalanced

approach whichhecalleda connubiumrationisetexperientiae (GesammelteWerke, PsychologiaEmpirica,

Olms, Hildesheim 1968, 497). In rational psychology, all the properties of the human being observed a
posterioriaretobededucedapriorifromtheconceptofthesoul:"inpsychologiarationalisexunicoanimae

humanaeconceptuderivamusaprioriomnia,quaeeidemcompetereaposterioriobservanture exquibusdam

observatisdeducuntur,quemadmodumdecetphilosophum" (GesammelteWerke, PhilosophiaRationalissive

Logica,ParsI,Olms,Hildesheim1983,112).Philosophystrivestogetaperfectcertainty:"inphilosophia
studendum est omnimodaecertitudini" (ibid.,33),theveryqualificationusedbyAquinas onlyregarding

mathematics(seenote3 ).

41Cfr.KANT,MetaphysicalPrinciplesofNaturalSciences,inGS,vol.4,pp.467469.

20

oftheproposition.Intheempiricistframework,essentialoranalyticpredications
(per se) were considered as implicit definitions or tautologies. This point
belongstotheconventionalistorneopositivistviewofscience,whichbecame
widespreadintheearlyyearsofthetwentiethcentury.
Thenaturalempiricalsciences,coveringnowsolelythewholeenterpriseof
scientific knowledge, were considered the paradigm of the use of reason:
rationalitywasequatedwithempiricalrationality.Mathematicslostitsflavorof
eternaltruthintheformalistconception(Hilbert).Tobeempiricalwasnolonger
acontemptuousqualification,butalabeloftruthfulnessinscience,bothwithin
inductive and deductive procedures. Accordingly, in the following historical
considerations I shall restrict myself preferentially to the area of natural
sciences.
2.2.Sciencesas'empirical'inapositivistsense.Newproblemsforrealists
The turn of physical sciences towards experience might have seemed
reasonablefrom anAristotelianperspective.Butpositivismenvisagemodern
scienceasnonontological,i.e.experimentalsciencesaresupposedtotellus
nothingabouttheessentialandcausalstructureoftheworld.Theywouldbe
madeupofanetoffunctionalrelationsworkedouttocalculate,topredictandto
control phenomena for practical purposes. These pragmatic relations were
thought of as excluding an essential insight in nature. The methodological
predominanceofamathematicalscrutinyofnaturewastheoccasion(andthe
excuse as well) for this formalist view which is the nucleus of positivist
epistemology.
Accepting this new version of science had new consequences for the
distinctionbetweenscienceandphilosophy.Obviouslythiswasnotaproblem
forneopositivism.Thedistinctionproposedinlogicalpositivismwassimply
destructive for philosophy. As it is well known, only natural science was
supposedtohaveasense,accordingtotheViennaCircle.Metaphysicsshould
be senseless and philosophy was transformed in a logical reflection on our
linguisticprocedures,becomingasatelliteofscience.
The positivist version of modern science was partially shared by some
philosophersinthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury,evenbythoseauthorswho
regarded it as an inferior level of knowledge, while accepting the value of
philosophy.IshallmentiontheopinionsofsomeThomistsinthisfield,since

21

they were very sensible to the epistemological problem created by modern

naturalscience.
Maritain,forexample,sharedinpartDuhem'sideathatmodernphysics
was not directly ontological. Within the traditional physical degree of
abstraction,Maritainproposedakindofsubdegreecorrespondingtothespecial
cognitive approach of modern empirical inquiry. Now physics would be
concernedwithmeasuredphenomena,andeverythingnotincludedinthisformal
objectshouldbeexcludedfromitsreach42. Maritain'sinterpretationofmodern
physics as non ontological is based upon two principles: 1) some highly
theoreticalphysicalabstractionsdonotattainreality,oratleastitisproblematic
whethertheydo;2)humanknowledgeofspecificessencesisveryimperfect.
Maritaintreatmentofthedegreesofabstractionwasuseful.PersonallyI
thinkthattherearemanywaysofabstraction,notonlythreeorfour(classical
mechanicalabstraction,quantummechanicalabstraction,etc.).Theyshouldbe
conceived as dynamic, flexible and somewhat optional, and they are also
historicalhabits,relatedtosomescientifictraditions.Scientificabstractionsare
in movement in researchers. They are always connected with their personal
metaphysicalinsight,andalsowithideastakenfromtheculturalenvironment.
Thisconnectionbetweenscientificconceptsandpersonalphilosophicalviewsis
thebasisofasilent,personalandhabitualinterpretationofthe metaphysical
sense ofpositivesciencesorsomeoftheirparts,aninterpretationthatmaybe
correct or misleading (e. g. to see some aspects of science as indicators of
theism,atheism,materialism,etc.)43.
According to other authors, as Simard, theoretical concepts in physics
wouldbe entiarationis,usefulcreationsofthehumanmind,notrealphysical
entities44.Icanagree,buttherearemanykindsof entiarationis,moreorless
foundedonreality.Someofthemmaybefictitiousatall(likeether,orthe

42 Cfr. J. MARITAIN, La philosophie de la nature, in Oeuvres compltes, volV., Ed.

Universitaires, Paris1982,pp.819968(publishedoriginallyin1935); Lesdegrsdusavoir,in Oeuvres
compltes,vol.IV,1983,o.c.(orig.1932),pp.309390,509626.
43Cfr.mypaperIdeasmetafsicasyverificabilidadenlas
ciencias,VISimposioInternacionaldeTeologa,Universidad
deNavarra,Pamplona1984,pp.85102.

22

epicyclesoftheoldastronomy),whileothersmayhavesomecorrespondence
with reality, allowing true of false propositions. Some physicomathematical
conceptsandlawsinvolveapartialidealizationofphysicalentities(e.g.the
notionofaperfectgas),butthroughthemwedoattainapartialandimperfect
insightofreality,andthiscanbesaidinsomewayofeveryconcept,including
thoseusedinordinarylife.
On the opposite side, Hoenen tried to read chemical and physical
discoveriesinthelightofAristotelianphilosophicalnotions45,andSelvaggiheld
that modern physics, even if not concerned with a thematic metaphysical
interpretation of nature, nevertheless included some ontological grasping of
substances, properties and causes46. Selvaggi's thesis was that phenomena
manifest anaspectof reality,againsttheKantiandualismbetweenphenomena
and substances. But philosophy of nature goes deeper than the experimental
sciences, studying natural beings as beings, i. e. approaching metaphysics
(philosophyofnaturebecomesametaphysicsofnature).Inthesameontological
line,WallacesustainedthatmodernsciencefitswelltheAristotelianparadigm
of cognitio per causas. Physics, chemistry and biology do produce a real
knowledgeofessences47.

44 Cfr.E.SIMARD,Lanatureetlaportedelamthodescientifique,LesPressesdel'Universit
Laval,Qubec,1958,pp.361372(inparticularp.366).
45 Cfr. P. HOENEN, Cosmologia, Pontificia Universit Gregoriana,
Roma 1956.SeeMaritain'spolemicwithHoenenin MARITAIN, Laphilosophiedelanature,
Oeuvrescompltes,vol.V,o.c.,pp.346348.
46 Cfr. F. SELVAGGI, Filosofia del mondo fisico, Pontificia Universit
Gregoriana,Roma1985,pp.159163,203209.Thetriumphofatomismagainstphenomenalistic
energetism,intheearlytwentiethcentury,openedtheroadtoamorerealistphilosophy
ofscience(cfr.ibid.,p.168):atomsbecomerealentities,notmeresymbolsofhiddenentities.Scientific
phenomenalismwassometimesadisappointedreactionmotivatedbythebreakdownofclassicaldeterminism

cfr.ibid.,p.162).

47Cfr.W.WALLACE,TheModellingofNature,o.c.

23

Inamoremiddleposition,Agazzidefendedtheideaofnaturalsciencesas
dealing with severely defined objects (objectivity should be determined in
relation to instruments of observation and measurement), while philosophy
wouldbetransobjectual,tryingtoknowthefoundationsofthewholereality48.
Inaparallelway, Artigasreferredpositivesciencestoapartialandcontextual
truthor,inotherwords,toapartialconceptualizationofthephysicalworld,
fairlycompatiblewitharealistviewofscientificknowledge49.
Thedifferencebetweentheserealistepistemologicalviewsperhapsismore
inemphasisthaninsubstance.Pierre Duhem,forexample,normallyseenasa
conventionalist in philosophy of science, had acknowledged that physics
presupposedsomemetaphysicalnotions,takenfromourordinaryknowledge 50.
He thought that scientific theories aimed to be a natural classification of
experimentallaws,andthattheirinherentlogicalorderreflectedanontological
order51. Maritain,again,wasalwaysattentivetotherelationsbetweenscience
and philosophy of nature. He conceived both fields as complementary 52.
Scientistsandphilosophersshoulddialogueandworktogether53.

48 Cfr.E.AGAZZI,Temieproblemidellafilosofiadellafisica, Abete,Roma1974,pp.364
378;Philosophie.Science.Mtaphysique,Ed.UniversitairesFribourgSuisse,Fribourg(Switzerland )1987.
49Cfr.M.ARTIGAS,Filosofadelacienciaexperimental,EunsaPamplona1989,pp.269
275,284294;383393.

50Cfr.P.DUHEM,Physiqueetmtaphysique,Revuedes
questionsscientifiques,34(1893),pp.5583.
51 Cfr. P.DUHEM, Lathoriephysique,sonobjectetsa
structure, Chevalier et Rivire, Paris 1906. See also F. J.
LPEZRUIZ,FindelateorasegnPierreDuhem.Naturaleza
yalcancedelafsica,PontificiaUniversitdellaSantaCroce,
Roma1998.
52 Cfr. J. MARITAIN, La philosophie de la nature, in
Oeuvrescompltes,vol.V,o.c.,pp.910915.

24

The birth of modern natural sciences, no doubt, created a new field of

research,notsystematicallyknownintheclassicaltradition,thoughforeseenin
some way under the concept of scientiae mediae. Mathematics must be
distinguished from philosophy of mathematics, physics from philosophy of
nature,biologyfromphilosophyoflife,andsoon.Theeffortofthementioned
authorsinthisdirectionisunderstandable.
Now,therationalist oppositionbetweenphilosophyconceivedaspurely
rational,namelyasatasktobeperformedwiththepowerofthoughtalone,and
naturalsciencesashavingtodowith experience,iscompletelyuntenable.In
postrationalist philosophies, experience does play an essential role in the
philosophicalresearch(thereisaninductivemetaphysics),andscienceincludes
a rational interpretation as well. Experience is never bare: rather it is an
intellectualreading('insight')ofsensibledata.Theproperdistinctionshouldbe
herebetweentwodifferentkindsofexperience:moreessentialinphilosophy,
andmoreparticularinthesciences.
Thedistinctionwearediscussingherehastodowiththeproblemofthe
ontological value of scientific objects and propositions, such as atoms,
elementary particles, energetic principles and the like: must they be taken
seriouslyasrealobjects,describedorreferredtobyscience?Doscientificlaws
refertosomethingessentialinnature?
a)Iftheanswerisno,andwecontinuetoberealistsfortheotherfieldsof
knowledge, it follows that science is irrelevant for philosophy. Accordingly,
science will be seen as a mere practice, accomplished for technological
purposes.Troublesomeproblemsconcerningtherelationbetweenphilosophy
andthescienceswillbetooeasilydismissed.Perhapstheknowledgeofthe
materialworldwillbelefttoscientists(withoutphilosophy),whilephilosophy
willbeconfinedtoanthropologyandethics.Iobservethisattitudeinpeople
inclinedtothinkthatcosmologicaltheories,evolutionarybiology,thestandard
modelofelementaryparticlesandthelikearemeresymbols,images,myths,or
to see modern science as purely practical, technological, but not at all
speculative. The temptation, then, is to consider science as a wrong attitude

53 Cfr. J. MARITAIN, Le Paysan de la Garonne, in

Oeuvrescompltes,vol.XII,1992,o.c.,pp.853855.

25

towardstheworld,moreorlesscontaminatedbyNietzscheanwillofpower(this
isHeideggersappraisalofoccidentalscience).
b)Iftheanswerisno,anotherpossibilityistoembraceapurelyidealistor
pragmatistphilosophy,accordingtowhichknowledgeisacreativeenterprisein
theworld,andsciencewouldbesimplyahighlysophisticatedknowledge,more
successfulthanordinaryorpopularknowledge.
c)Iftheanswerisyes,thenitwillbepossibletolookforafruitfuldialogue
between philosophy and the sciences, since they will have something in
common, though the problem subsists of distinguishing between the
philosophicalapproachtonatureandtheconceptualandlinguisticframeworkof
science.
For this third possibility, which I obviously prefer, I think it is very
important toabandon philosophicalrationalism.Indeed, rationalism (even in
Thomism) posed aserious obstacle for therelationship between science and
philosophy. This means that natural essences are not to be thought of as
somethingtobecapturedinanessentialdefinition.Ifwefollowthiswrong
opinion,thenwewillnotbeabletounderstandhowcanthesciencesknowa
nature. In this sense, some distinctions proposed in other times between
'philosophicalessences'and'empiricalessences',orbetween'ontologicalcauses'
and'empiricalcauses'aremisleadinganduseless.Naturalessencesarepartially
caughtinordinaryknowledge,aswellasinscientificdescriptions.Normally,a
quantitativeaccountofnaturehelpstodiscoverunknownontologicalstructures,
providedweacceptthatanimperfect,openandrevisableknowledgeofnatural
kindsisareal knowledgeoftheessence (thislastassumption,obviously, is
incompatiblewitharationalistepistemology,whichwasthetarget,bytheway,
of Popper's criticism to Platonic essentialism). The ontological condition of
materialentitiesmustnotbeconceivedwithconceptualrigidity.
Another important point in the same line is to abandon the classical
(rationalist)oppositionbetweenphenomenaorthethingsforusandthethings
inthemselves.Weknowrealthingsasfarastheypresentthemselvestoour
personalsourcesofknowledge.Thismeansthatweknowthingsimperfectly,
fromsomesides,troughouroperations,sometimesbuildinganimagethatis
able to be referred to them, with the possibility of making true (or false)
statements. There is a continuity, in this sense, between our perception of
sensible things (relative, with some elaboration, subject to corrections), and
scientificknowledge.Andthisisthehumanknowledgeoftheessentialaspects

26

of the world. Human action on things is not necessarily separated from

contemplation.Practicaloperationsonthingscanprovideabetterknowledgeof
whattheyreallyare.
2.3.Naturalsciencesasverifiableorfalsifiable
Neopositivists,asitiswellknown,viewednaturalsciencesasempirically
verifiable, and metaphysics as unverifiable and therefore senseless. The
languageoftruthinthisaccount(toverifyistoascertainwhetheraproposition
istrueorfalse)introducesadifficultnotioninlogicalpositivism.Truthisa
metaphysical concept. The first Wittgenstein, under the influence of modern
logic(Frege,Russell),couldnotavoidthelatentcontradictioninthepositivist
thesis:onlyphysicalpropositionscanbetrueorfalse,whereastheirsemantical
truthmanifestsitself54.Apositivistaccountoftruthisunstable:itsnaturaloutlet
shouldbepragmatism(orinstrumentalism),i.e.theeliminationofspeculative
truth(truthasadaequatiointellectusadrem,anaccordancebetweenmindand
being).
PopperrejectedtheViennaCircle'sthesisclaiming,asweknow,thatthe
problemwasnotofsensebutofdemarcation,whichshouldbeproperlylocated
in falsification. In the debates concerning verification and falsification, the
empirical traits were always seen as the distinctive character of the natural
sciences. Popper's focusing on falsification was a sign of the ambiguity of
sensibleexperienceassumedasanabsolutemeansofpartingtheterritoriesof
metaphysics and science. But falsification may be problematic as well,
especiallywhenisolated.Evenadmittingfalsificationasmorepowerfulthan
verification,theasymmetrybetweenthemislessabsolutethanPopperthought55.

54Cfr.L.WITTGENSTEIN,Tractatuslogicophilosophicus,
4.461.
55 A more mature POPPER acknowledged that both
philosophyandnaturalsciencesaresearchingforspeculative
truth.Accordingtohim,metaphysicstriestojointhedifferent
trueaspectsoftheworld(whicharenotonlyscientific)ina
unifyingimageofreality,animagewhichinthelongfuture

27

Now, how can we decide the degree of a supposed verification or

falsification?Wecannotverifythatsomehypothesisisactuallybeingverifiedto
a greater or lesser extent. We have to be previously in agreement with the
potentialverifyingroleofcertaineventsinrelationtogivenpropositions.And
by no means do there exist any algorithmic procedures, separated from a
framework of interpretation, capable of performing an experimental control
whichwoulddeterminethetruthorfalsenessofascientificstatement.
Sincenoautomaticempiricalevidenceisavailable,ultimatelyweshould
relyonsomeglobalestimationofmanyconvergentproofs,atdifferentlevels,
and in this sense we approach the weak DuhemQuine thesis and Polanyis
epistemology56.Butherewehaveaqualitativeestimation,sustainedbypersonal
insightsnormallysharedbymostresearchersof'goodsense'.Thisis,indeed,the
wayofscience,anditworksverywell.Butifhumanreasonhasalwaystojudge
whenandtowhatextentsomephysicalexperienceisagoodtestoftruth,thenit
is not sufficient to place in experiments the borderline between physics and
metaphysics,orphysicsandphilosophy.
Dealingwithaspecificscientificareacreatesafieldofconceptsandways
ofseeingthings,reflectedinlanguage,butalsointheunexpressedagreementto
interpretwhatissaidoriswritteninacertainway.Modernscienceisabletofill
inthegapsofsubjectiveinterpretationbymeansofatightunivocallanguage,
notopentoambiguities,andthisisanotherreasonwhichledWittgensteinto
assign natural science to the domain of what can be said (in the scientific
language), and metaphysics to what is ineffable. The problem reappears
wheneverweadmitthateveninsciencewhatissaidisgenerallypermeatedby
sometacitintelligence.

should be an even wider and more truthful image: cfr.

PostscripttotheLogicofDiscovery,vol.III:QuantumTheory
and the Schism in Physics, W. W. BARTLEY III (ed.),
Hutchinson,London1982,pp.199200,211.
56Cfr.M.POLANYI,PersonalKnowledge,Routledgeand
Kegan,London1983;TheTacitDimension,Smith,Gloucester
1983.

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I am not underestimating the importance of empirical verifications and

falsificationsinthenaturalsciences.ForAquinas,physicalabstractionentails
thatthestartingandthefinallevelofphysicalpropositionsshouldbeplacedon
sensiblematter57.Inphysicswemustrelyonpropositionsconcerningsensible
objects,inordertoknowthephysicaltruth.Withoutverificationstherecouldbe
noascertainedtruthinnaturalsciences,butonlymathematicalimaginationor
merehypothesis.
Nevertheless,verificationsarenotsufficienttosolveourproblem.First,
becausethedistinctionassuch(verifiable,unverifiable)doesnothelptoknow
whatisproperlyphilosophyormetaphysics(differentfrompseudophilosophy,
myth,etc.).Secondly,becausethereareaposterioriwaysinphilosophytoknow
thetruth,inarealistconceptionofintelligence.Thirdly,because,aswehave
seen,experimentalconfirmationsarealwaysincludedinatheoreticalcontext.
Therefore,themembersofascientificcommunityarepreparedtoacceptsome
kindsofevidencesandcounterevidencesintheirownareaofresearch,andeven
so,confirmationsareneverautomatic(theknowledgeofanontrivialtruthisnot
automatic).Sotheproblemofdistinguishingbetweenphilosophyandscience
remains.
2.4.Scienceas'constructive'
Fromwhatwehaveseensofar,itisclearthatmostempiricalsciences
includeintelligibleelements(theoretical,notproperlyobservable),muchmore
when science enlarges itself and tries to give a global account of a wide
spectrum of phenomena, as is expected from it. Any attempt to reduce the

57THOMASAQUINAS,InBoethiumdeTrinitate,q.VI,a.
2:inscientianaturalisterminaridebetcognitioadsensum,ut
scilicethocmodoiudicemusderebusnaturalibus,secundum
quodsensuseademonstrat,utpatetinIIICaelietMundi,et
quisensumnegligitinnaturalibus,inciditinerrorem.Itcould
not have been expressed in a simpler way this empiricist
criterion,sotospeak,typicaloftheAristotelianscience,which
isfullycompatiblewitharealistviewofnature.

29

empiricalgroundofsciencetosensationsendsupwiththeeliminationofthe
meaningof its propositions.Evenasingle factualpropositionpresupposes a
meaning,whichisnotequivalenttoanetworkofsensations.Noscienceissheer
description,furthermore,sincedescriptionhastobeorganizedinsequencesof
propositions, tied to each other by different kinds of relationships, wherein
causallinksareespeciallyrelevant.
Atthispoint,amoreorlessneokantianmovecouldbeintroduced,by
claimingthatsciencesuperimposesamongsensationsanetworkoffunctional
relationships, intelligible but not ontological. Theoretical constructions here
wouldamounttorationallinksbetweenthoughts,ascreatedindependentlyand
not under constraint from the object. Then, science would be a rational
constructionaddressedtopracticalsuccess:ratiowithoutintellectus.
Modernscienceispracticalortechnical,sinceitisorientedtomodifythe
materialworld.Buthardpragmatismviewsscienceasreducedtopurepractice.
Theorybecomesafunctionoftechnology.Knowledgeassuch(toknowwhatit
is) fades away, and becomes undistinguished from a practical fitness in the
environment,orfromphysicaloperations.Toknow,then,isnotan immanent
activity,butpurelytransitive.Atmost,knowledgemightbepreservedasapure
selfawareness of practice. In a coherent radical pragmatism (functionalism,
instrumentalism),eventhenotionofselfisproblematic,andweshallnotbeable
todistinguishmanfromaperfectidealintelligent robot(everyactionof a
robot ismaterial,efficient,external,sinceithasnointernalactions,suchas
feeling,thinking,knowingorloving).
Radical constructionism is selfrefuting, because we can understand
constructionism.To understand theconstructionistaccountofknowledgeisa
refutationofconstructionism.Theawarenessofaccomplishingevenarational
construction,likebuildingaproposition,isnotaconstruction.Toknowisnotto
build.Inconsciousness,somethingisgrasped:notbuilt,butgiven,andthis is
knowing.Evenaconstructivistaccountofsciencemustgobacktophilosophyas
anonconstructivistwayofknowing.
Now,fromthisviewpointitispossibletoexplainthedifferencebetween
philosophy and science in terms of opposition between contemplation and
action.ThiskindofdistinctionwasproposedbyauthorslikeBergson,orby
phenomenologyandexistentialism.Atthebeginningofthetwentiethcentury,
whenpragmatismwasstronglywidespreadinepistemologyandphilosophyof
science(e.g.Mach),manyphilosopherstriedtodefendanonpragmatistkindof

30

knowledge, while accepting the pragmatist conception of science. This

knowledge is intuition (e. g. Bergson). Animals perceive objects of their
environmentonlyinrelationtotheirinstincts,towhatismeaningfulfortheir
vitalneedsandactions.Thesamepragmatistaccountofnatureisaccomplished
bymodernscience,accordingtoScheler(scienceis willofworkandpotency
over nature: this view influenced Heideggers negative and pragmatist
conception of science). For example, physics selects in nature only the
mechanical forces: experimental sciences represent a practical project of
dominatingnature.Theystartfromapracticalmechanic apriori.Buthuman
spirit(andphilosophy)isabletoparticipateintimatelyintheessenceofthings58.
Sointhetwentiethcentury,postrationalistphilosophers,belongingtonon
scientific areas, tried to overcome the dominating scientific view by the
acknowledgment of a superior way of thinking, more penetrating,
comprehensive and sympathetic to the heart of reality. Existentialists,
personalists and vitalists criticized modern science as instrumental,
technological,dealingwithconstructedobjects,whichconcealedrealbeingand
produced,accordingtoHeidegger,itsoblivion.Philosophyunderstands,itmight
besaid,andscience,likeablindman,justoperates.
This drastic opposition leads to an overly pessimistic view of science,
which becomes easily condemned for its interventionism in nature. There is
morethanconstruction,arbitrarymodelmakingandpuretechnologicalinterest
inmodernscience.Itsconstructiveelementscanbeassumedasapropertyof
abstraction, but through abstraction, and even through action and practical
interests,wemayknowmanyintelligibleandtrueaspectsofreality.Actionand
contemplation are not to be separated. Contemplation without action can be
fruitless,andactionwithoutcontemplationisblind.Therecent realist trendin
philosophiesofscienceandnaturetestifiestotheinadequacyofconventionalist
andinstrumentalistversionsofscience.
Anotherpossibility,ofcourse,istoproposeaconstructivistphilosophy,
likeidealismandradicalpragmatism(e.g.Kant,Quine),whichwouldbeinthe

58 Cfr. M. SCHELER, Erkenntnis und Arbeit, in

GesammelteWerke,vol.8,Franck,Bern1980,thirded.,pp.
191378. SeealsoF.BOSIO,Filosofiaescienzadellanatura
nelpensierodiMaxScheler,IlPoligrafo,Padova2000.

31

lineofscientificinstrumentalism.Then,thedifferencebetweenphilosophyand
sciencewouldbelessdrastic.Philosophycouldbejustatheoryofaction.But,
asIhavesaidabove,radicalconstructionisminepistemologyisselfrefuting.
Essentially,toknowistocontemplate,andactionorcreationisaconsequence
(Godiscreator,becauseHecontemplatesandlovesHimself).
2.5.Someconclusions
Asfarasparticularsciencesareconcernedwitharealaccountofnature,
thoughlimitedandpartial,theyapproachphilosophicalrealism.Asfarasthis
accountis,furthermore,globalandunified,theyaremuchclosertophilosophy.
These variables warrant a fruitful communication between philosophical and
scientificknowledge.
The distinction between philosophy andscience is flexible and changes
withtime,becausetheyarebothdynamicandinmutualinteraction.Ingeneral
terms, philosophy tries to grasp the essential of everything, while science
investigatesparticularareas,withautonomy.The apriori versus aposteriori
opposition generated the most deviant distinction between philosophy and
science.Therecoursetothefeatureoftheempiricalknowledge,whichinvolved
verificationandfalsification,wasrestrictedtothenaturalsciences(forexample,
itisuselesstodistinguishmathematicsfromphilosophyofmathematics),and
could not avoid some of the ambiguities born in the positivist matrix. Both
philosophyandtheparticularsciencesaretheoreticalandempirical,accordingto
theirownobjectandmethod.
Itseemslikewiseinadequatetomaketoodrasticanoppositionbetweena
constructivistscienceandan'eidetic'philosophy.Althoughscienceworksinthe
areaofratio,operatingwithdifferentkindsofabstractions('buildinganobject')
and often starting from hypothetical premises, while philosophy is more
concerned with a comprehensive understanding (intellectus), the binomial
convergestowardsafullerknowledgeofreality.
Two conditions warrant a more fruitful agreement between science and
philosophy:
1)Themathematicalknowledgeofnaturemaybealsoqualitative,andin
principleitcanbeaguidetograspsomethingabouttheontologicallayersof
reality.Hardpositivismdecidestostopournaturalunderstanding,separatingit
from data and numbers. But this is a non necessary voluntary decision. Of

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course, some mathematical constructions can be fictitious, and mathematical

devices(e.g.spaces)arenotsimplynaturalfacts.Ascientificimageofrealityis
notreality toutcourt:itisverypartial,andinsomewayitisanintellectual
construction,indifferentdegrees.
2)Animperfectaccountofnaturalessencesisarealknowledgeofessence.
Therefore, a scientific description of a part of the world normally is
indispensableforthecorrespondingphilosophyofthatarea,andconsequentlyit
isrelevantformetaphysics.
Anonrationalistunitybetweenscienceandphilosophyishighlydesirable.
A unique science with merely provincial departments is inconceivable. It is
possibletoestablisha relationalandanalogicalunification betweenpositive
scienceandphilosophy.Theycanconstituteaunitasordinis(unityoforder),not
anorganism.Thisunification(notintegration)istobereconstructedagainand
again,throughconstantrelationships,especiallyonthelevelofprinciples.Itis
moreaproblemofopennessofmind,ofhumanhabits,ofdialogue,thanapurely
objectiveaffair.Ithinkthatthesciencestodayaremovinginthisdirection.

***
Abstract:Larticoloesaminalaproblematicadistinzionetralafilosofia(ola
metafisica) e le scienze particolari in una prospettiva storica, cercando di
avviare a certe riflessioni che possano aiutare a chiarire il problema,
fondamentale per la comprensione dei rapporti dinamici tra le due aree di
pensiero.Unaprimapartestudialediversedistinzionipropostedallatradizione
platonica, aristotelica e tomistica, quando ancora non si conosceva
propriamenteunadistinzionetrafilosofiaescienza,masolotrametafisicae
altrescienze,piparticolari.Lasecondapartedellavoroaffrontaledistinzioni
proposte nella filosofia moderna, quando le scienze naturali si distinguono
nettamentedalpensierofilosofico.Alcunedistinzioni(peresempio,inbasealla
verificabilit,razionalitcostruttiva,ecc.)sonoconsiderateinsufficienti.Nelle
conclusioni, si cerca di favorire la continuit tra pensiero filosofico e
scientifico,grazieaunaversionerealisticadellaconoscenzascientifica.