Geoforum 35 (2004) 661668

www.elsevier.com/locate/geoforum

Talking hypothetically: the DuhemQuine thesis, multiple

hypotheses and the demise of hypothetico-deductivism
M. Morad
School of Earth Sciences and Geography, Kingston University, Kingston upon Thames, Surrey KT1 2EE, UK
Received 30 July 2003; received in revised form 21 June 2004

Abstract
The positivism-inspired hypothetico-deductive method has dominated research practices in geographical sciences for several decades. Notwithstanding its signicant contribution, as a widely employed protocol, there is a growing recognition that positivist
methods of analysis have failed to accommodate the countless auxiliary assumptions that underlie any geographical research
hypothesis, not only in human geography but also in physical geography and geographical information science. The DuhemQuine
thesis has received a signicant amount of attention in recent years in scientic and logical theory circles, as a progressive alternative
to the hypothetico-deductive method. The thesiss main attraction to contemporary practitioners of science is that it allows methodologically rigorous ways of resolving inconsistencies between a theoretical system and experience. Under the DuhemQuine
thesis, the use of a multiple organisation of hypotheses in geographical research will militate against an over-dependence on the
null-hypothesis which is inconsistent with the fact that conclusions in geographical research are subject to contingent factors such
as human participation, measurement error, and ecological fallacies.
2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Positivism; Hypothetico-deductive method; Multiple hypotheses; DuhemQuine thesis

1. Introduction
The current problems that beset geography and the
future of geographical research in general are the focus
of a great deal of debate among geographers, even
among those who maintain a strong belief in the viability of the diverse, complex disciplines under which geography operates (Thrift, 2002, p. 291). In a frank
statement lamenting the situation of the research methodology game which appears to split geographers into
scientists and non-scientists, Cliord (2002, p. 434) presents a starker assessment:
20 years on, the ridiculing of positivism and the deconstructionist excesses have taken their toll. The philosophical forefront of discussions in physical geography

E-mail address: m.morad@kingston.ac.uk

0016-7185/$ - see front matter 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2004.06.005

are still substantively directed towards the philosophy

of science: much contemporary human geography is
no longer in the same ball game, and shows no inclination to go back. For a physical geographer, abandoning
the rule book of positivism was a big enough step, but
to go further, and to abandon the game of general
explanation is at least two steps too far.
In a more recent assessment, Gillson et al. (2003,
p. 271) support the rewriting of the methodology rule
book as a necessary adjustment against dated ruling
hypotheses. . . demanding that analysts cross-check their
data for unquestioned assumptions regarding stability,
variability and spatial and temporal scales. Rather than
testing a ruling hypothesis, we suggest that ecologists
and social scientists work with multiple hypotheses.
This growing impetus for methodological reform has
manifestly been spurred by the gradual post-positivist
shift away from explanation towards humanistic,

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M. Morad / Geoforum 35 (2004) 661668

poststructuralist and, more broadly speaking postmodern styles of analysis and interpretation, especially in human geography. However, as Robinson (1998, p. 476)
noted, although we do live in a post-positivist era, positivism remains in the picture:
So it would seem more correct to portray geographys
transformation as a widespread rejection of positivism
as the predominant prevailing philosophy or, alternatively, as a move from an essentially technocratic subject
to one that was more people-centred. Again, it should be
stressed that positivism is not entirely absent from
human geography in the 1990s and a technocratic aspect
has grown strongly in importance for at least 15 years
through the emergence of GIS.
Robinsons depiction of geographical information
systems and science as technocratic betrays a dated
view about the nature of research in these elds. However, his assessment of the continuing inuence of positivism as an epistemological context for a great deal of
GIS and spatially integrated social science research is
borne out by recent scholarship (Goodchild and Janelle,
2003). Furthermore, the proponents of positivism continue to defend its relevance, especially in relation to
such important social, economic and political concepts
as the open society (Jarvie and Pralong, 2003).

2. Positivism and geographical sciences

Logical empiricism or neo-positivism (better known
as logical positivism) was an important by-product of
positivism, the philosophy of the social theorist Auguste Comte (17981857). So called because of its empirical focus on what is positively given through sense
experience rather than metaphysical speculation, positivism had espoused an evolutionary approach to theory building through a scientic method that
allowed repeatable observation. Logical positivism
(which has its origin in the pre World War II Vienna
Circle that included such major logicians as Carnap
and Feigl) extended the epistemological premise of positivism. Members of the group adopted verication as a
major method for acquiring knowledge. To vericationists, a statement is meaningless or a mere belief
if the criteria for verication are not clear and testable
(Ayer, 1946).
The verication principle in logical positivism is not,
however, a mere account of the relative importance of
propositions, but a denition of meaning according to
empirical criteria. In this view, the meaning of a statement, which can be tested by empirical experience,
serves as its method of conrmation (i.e., verication)
and provides an epistemological means by which science
can be demarcated from non-scientic belief systems
(Schlick, 1999).

Logical positivisms main loyal opponent, Karl Popper (19021994), went further by stressing that conrmations should only count if they are the result of
risky predictions; that is to say. . . we should have expected an event which was incompatible with theory
(Popper, 1965, p. 36). Poppers main point was that scientic hypotheses should be subjected to the test of
empirical experience, through a hypothetico-deductive
methodology, which does not have the power to conrm, only to refute (i.e., falsify) in order to provide a
safe means for establishing a viable theory without
resorting to induction which was permitted under former versions of positivism. Most authors tend to classify
this application of positivism by Karl Popper (i.e., the
emphasis on falsication) as critical rationalism to distinguish it from other forms of positivism, including logical positivism (Johnston et al., 2000, pp. 128129).
Geographys association with developments in positivism has been attributed by Guelke (1978) to the publication of Harveys seminal book Explanation in
Geography (Harvey, 1969). However, it is unclear how
much positivism Harvey espoused in his book (Paterson,
1984), or if positivism was in eect an ex post rationalization of quantication . . . ironically, just as the movement was beginning it slow arc of decline (Johnston
et al., 2000, p. 666). Another curious contradiction
regarding the history of positivism in geographical research concerns the widespread adoption of mathematical methods by the supporters of geographys
quantitative revolution when many positivist researchers
have actually doubted the relevance of mathematics in
describing or solving real world problems. As Fotheringham et al. (2002, p. 85) put it, Although p-values
and signicance tests are of some use, their utility is
not as great as some practitioners appear to believe.
Indeed, following a strict application of verictionism
by one of its founders, Alfred Ayer (19101989) concluded that mathematics said little about reality, only
how to manipulate abstract symbols purported to represent real world entities and relations (Ayer, 1946).
Scepticism about the limitations of mathematical representation of reality had also prompted one of the most
eminent mathematical philosophers, Bertrand Russell
(18721970) to decide that, in order to uncover the
underlying structures of mathematical objects, mathematics should be reduced to a more representative form,
namely logic (Russell, 1919). To Russell, the existence of
geometric objects and the epistemology of space could
not be answered adequately by empiricists. In geometry
(as also applied in spatial science) a line can be broken
down innitely into smaller segments, and the possibility
that empiricism can enable us to verify a mathematical
line or point as material entities is questionable, since
spatial concepts (such as polygons, lines and points in
GIS) are abstract and not concrete objects that can be
veried through our senses. According to Russell, we

M. Morad / Geoforum 35 (2004) 661668

can understand geometric structures only by applying

logic to the study of relationships among spatial objects.
As he put it, what matters in mathematics, and to a
very great extent in physical science, is not the intrinsic
nature of our terms, but the logical nature of their interrelations. (Russell, 1919, p. 59).
However, even the logical approach of Russell could
not resolve many unanswered questions about the epistemology of spatial objects that are of primary concern
to geographical information scientists. Following a detailed inquiry into Russells works, one of the 20th Centurys greatest logicians, Kurt Godel (19061978),
leaned towards an intuitionist (Platonic) position on
the nature of geometry. Unlike Russell, who had advocated that geometrical structures existed in terms of relationships, Godel argued that it was not a question of
whether these existed or not. Rather, despite their elusive mathematical qualities, we are able to perceive geometrical objects irrespective of the incompleteness of
any formalised system deigned to explain them (Dawson, 1997). Writing a chapter on the methodological
roles of theory in science in the Scientic Nature of Geomorphology, Brown (1996, p. 8) observes, with specic
footnote reference to Quines logic:
Rules of arithmetic provide routines that allow us to
nd answers to an enormous number of calculation
problems. . . And in deductive logic, once we reach a
particular degree of complexity, there are no longer
any rules that will allow us to apply an automatic procedure to assess whether a given argument is valid.
By the middle 1980s, many geographers, encouraged
by mounting doubts over the perceived rigour of positivist thought, began to question the usefulness of positivism as a methodological framework for analysing and
explaining geographical phenomena. A number of research articles by geographers from as wide a eld as
physical, cultural and medical geographies criticised
the limitations of positivist geographical methodologies,
and made tentative attempts at proposing alternative
theoretical agendas. Curry (1985, p. 109110) called
for a shake up of geographical research methods, arguing that those who believe in a universal form of
rationality more fundamentally are expressing a desire
for the creation of a foolproof method in geography,
one based in part on a deep-seated but unquestioned belief in progress.
In an article on explanation in medical geography,
Bennett (1991, p. 339) advocated a pragmatic epistemological agenda, and raised basic questions about evidence, proof, argument, and explanation. He argued
that the constraints imposed by inductive and deductive reasoning prevent the formulation of causal explanations of a kind likely to satisfy those potential
external consumers of medical geographys output who
unreectively apply a criterion of certainty. It is sug-

663

gested that all forms of empirically relevant explanation

will fall short of this standard. This view was echoed by
a similar call from another medical geographer, Mayer
(1992), who pleaded for a creative synthesis between
logical positivism and realism or structuration and
used case studies to illustrate how disease distribution,
as a surface phenomenon, can be explained using deeper
analysis. Rhoads and Thorn (1996, p. 116) level similar
criticisms at the shortcomings of logical positivism, this
time for its failure to deliver knowledge-producing research practices:
The nonempirical foundation of logical empiricism
clearly conicts with the empirical modus operandi of
scientists. Contemporary philosophers of science fully
recognize the need to grapple with this problem, and
over the past 30 years (i.e. since the demise of logical
empiricism) have focused their eorts on developing
naturalized philosophical perspectives that attempt to
capture the knowledge-producing potential of science
as it is actually practiced.
Critical evaluations of the limitations of positivist
methodologies equally gathered momentum within the
systems-dependent elds of geographical sciences,
including geographical information science (Lake,
1993, p. 410; Pickles, 1995, p. 410). Drawing on a
GIS-based research project in India, Sahay (1998, p.
149) makes similarly critical observations about the
domination of positivist methodology in geographical
information systems and science, arguing that research
approaches incorporating time and space analysis will
help to develop more holistic understandings of the
implementation problem, and take us away from narrower approaches anchored within the positivist
tradition. . .
In addition to the fundamental premise of space in
geographical epistemology, time (as a historical lter)
is equally elemental in distinguishing between immanent
(subjective) and congurational (objective) understanding of the relation of substance and quality. Although
the process of scientic inquirywith or without using
experimental methodsremains basically the same in
most science-based disciplines, the nature of observations may dier since observations can be either ahistorical (time independent) or historical (time-dependent).
For example, by accumulating multiple historical observations, physical geographers can reconstruct a reliable
model of the formation of a landscape. Historical science may therefore have potentially greater margin of
error than experimental science, because it is not always
possible to repeat each observed event. That margin of
error should not, however, be mistaken for lack of
knowledge, as without taking into account the auxiliary
research factor of space-time interdependence it would
be impossible to produce any knowledge or explanation
of real world systems (Mackin, 1963; Simpson, 1963).

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M. Morad / Geoforum 35 (2004) 661668

3. The DuhemQuine thesis

Unlike geographical sciences, other related disciplinesespecially economicshave given a signicant
amount of attention in recent years to the role of the
DuhemQuine thesis as a logical context for the appraisal of theories (Cross, 1982; Sawyer et al., 1997). The
main attraction of the DuhemQuine thesis (which is
also known as the underdetermination or causal holism thesis) to contemporary epistemologists is that it allows methodologically responsible ways of resolving a
conict between a theoretical system and experience
(Balashov, 1994, p. 608). According to the Duhem
Quine thesis, individual statements have no unique
methods of verication on their own. Put more formally,
there is no distinction between synthetic and analytic
statements: i.e., between synthetic claims which could
be conrmed by some experiences but disconrmed by
other criteria; and analytic claims (such as geometrical
rules) which are true whether directly experienced or
not.
In the DuhemQuine thesis, claims are testable, but
only within an entire network of propositions; and when
a hypothesis is tested, a researcher is simultaneously
assuming that a number of other auxiliary hypotheses
are holding. Therefore, unlike the principle of falsication that is enshrined in the hypothetico-deductive research methodology, supporters of the DuhemQuine
thesis contend that when a theorys prediction is refuted
it may be simply due to the fact that one of its auxiliary
hypotheses is false (Orenstein, 2002; Putnam, 1983;
Quine, 1992). According to researchers using the
DuhemQuine thesis, how to revise ones belief set in
the face of unexpected experiences (such as anomalous
experimental or survey results) is underdetermined by
those experiences; there is always more than one way
to respond so as to maintain consistency (Belousek,
1998).
From an epistemological point of view, the important
consequences of the DuhemQuine thesis are:
1. Propositions have meaning only within a complete
knowledge set;
2. Propositions have dierent meanings, given dierent
knowledge sets;
3. Any statement can be given up if experience gives us
a reason to drop it;
4. Any statement could be maintained against any evidence, if other changes to the belief set are made.
Willard Quine (19082000) was opposed to the analyticsynthetic distinction and promoted a holistic view
of scientic inquiry, amounting to radical holism at least
in Quines earlier works (Decock, 2002; Orenstein,
2002). In Quines view, it is the totality of our beliefs
which meets experience or not at all. The French scien-

tist and philosopher Pierre Duhem (18611916) was

cited in defence of this holism, although it can be said
that Duhems argument may not have been as radical,
accepting the possibility of independent truths, as
deduction, however impeccable, cannot establish truths
unless it begins with truths (Needham, 1998, p. 33).
In the DuhemQuine thesis, scientists do not test a
single theory; instead, the test involves a web of
hypotheses such as auxiliary assumptions associated
with the main hypothesis. However, the more radical
holism espoused by Quine states that in theory testing,
the matter is concerned with whether the totality of
our beliefs meets the experience (Needham, 2000).
Quines development of Duhems original work, therefore, rested on asserting through logical analysis that
our web of belief cannot justify a distinction between
analytic statements (e.g. axiomatic or mathematical definitions) and synthetic statements (empirical claims).
The signicant consequences of Quines addition to
the Duhemian thesis was that it would apply equally
to the so-called a priori disciplines, such as geometry
or, in the case of geographical sciences, spatial analysis.
As Quine put it in his seminal paper Two dogmas of
empiricism: The totality of our so-called knowledge
or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography
and law to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or
even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric (Quine, 1951, p. 42).
Methodological holism expresses the concept that the
whole is more than the sum of the composing parts
which is also a commonly stated depiction of the nature
of geographical research. Holistic also means that each
researched element receives its signicance only because
of its position and relationship with the surrounding elements. Therefore, changing one element always means
changing the whole in some way. In a complex environment, it is quite impossible to take into consideration all
reciprocal inuencing elements in the space-time nexus
that both human and physical geographers grapple with
(Massey, 2000), especially in a discipline such as geography where practitioners operate through multiple
spaces of knowledge (Livingstone, 1995); and since
knowledge is situated and does not come from above
(Haraway, 1991, p. 195). The problem resides in the
determination of the range or scale of inuence, or, as
Thomas Kuhn (19221979) had concluded, the factual
elements in any statement cannot be conclusively validated because they are not independent of the scientic
methodology used to test them with (Kuhn, 1962).
Applying this holistic emphasis to his research in
landscape classication, under a Gestalt banner, Antrop (2000, p. 18) concludes that perception works in
a holistic manner. What we perceive can be described
as a Gestalt, a whole that is more than the sum of its
composing parts. . . A more operational denition is that
each element only gets its meaning, signicance or value

M. Morad / Geoforum 35 (2004) 661668

according to the context or the surrounding elements.

Similarly, in a research article examining methodological issues in GIS, Sahay (1998, p. 163) signals the need
for a more domain-related knowledge, arguing that
the view of GIS as a unifying force in geography has
met with a fair amount of criticism, primarily on the
grounds of the positivist assumptions it embodies. . .
naive empiricism wherein isolated facts become more
important than geographical knowledge.
Although the DuhemQuine thesis has not yet been
explicitly adopted by geographers as a research methodology, a pragmatic (working) version of its framework
has been in practice for over a century. Writing in the
Journal of Geology, the earth scientist Chamberlain
(1897, p. 395) observed three phases of intellectual
development, which he characterised, in an ascending
order of sophistication, as the method of the ruling theory, the method of the working hypothesis, and the
method of multiple working hypotheses. Citing Chamberlains method of multiple working hypotheses in a
case study on geological mapping, Brodaric et al.
(2000) observe that:
The geologist interprets the eld evidence to constrain
possible geologic histories, and constructs hypotheses
by combining the eld constraints with extant geologic
theory. Such reasoning often leads to multiple valid
hypotheses since the evidence from eld and theory regularly underdetermines the history. . . Because multiple
hypotheses can t the facts, and because the facts themselves are contentious, being somewhat subjective due to
the variability of observation and interpretation, geological mappers often regard their skill as an art as well as a
science.
By investigating a multiple hierarchy of hypotheses, a
researcher may not become too inclined to favour the
hypothesis being examined. In this way no single hypothesis should become favoured or the focus of the research
to the extent that evidence against it might be ignored (or
exaggerated). This risk could be amplied if the hypothetico-deductive method were employed, since it prompts
a total rejection at the hint of counter-evidence which the
researcher may choose to ignore to protect investment in
time and expense. Other advantages of the adoption of
multiple hypotheses include a broadening of the scope
of inquiry and a systematic examination of alternative
explanations.

4. The logical framework of the DuhemQuine thesis

Similarly to positivism, the DuhemQuine thesis
agrees that statements can be determined as true or false
on the basis of observation or experiment. However,
according to the work of Duhem (and Quines subsequent contribution), all research contexts imply a theo-

665

retical interpretation of observations. For example, a

eld-based experiment in geographical sciences is not
simply an observation but the interpretation of an
observation, and a scientic experiment can never adequately condemn an isolated hypothesis without undermining the whole web of belief. Therefore, any study of
observed spatial distribution patterns would be linked to
both the context and mechanisms which explain them in
realist terms (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). Also, as Rhoads and Thorn observed, the issue of background information has to receive more careful handling. As they
put it (1996, p. 130):
The extent to which a particular item of background
information constrains possible new hypotheses is usually in direct proportion to the extent to which that item
is held to be true. Through detailed examination of
investigations that have led to discoveries in geomorphology, the discipline may develop a better understanding of the reasoning processes that underlie
geomorphologic inquiry and the relationship of these
processes to those in other areas of science.
According to Darling (2002, p. 511), Duhemian
underdetermination is. . . grounded in the practice of science, specically in the scientists use of instruments and
measurement techniques. . . this reliance on auxiliary
assumptionswhich makes possible the use of instrumentsis the foundation of his thesis and that recognizing this completes the familiar account of his
underdetermination argument.
Stated more formally by using symbolic logic, the
main terms of the DuhemQuine thesis are that:

A theory T is supported by several other theories and
laws (i.e., TM{T1, T2 , . . . , Tn}), and is rarely underpinned by one set of observations (where {o:To}),
since a theory will always incorporate various auxiliary hypotheses (i.e., {A1, A2, . . . , An});

Thus, the discovery of anomalous observations during experimental or eld research can potentially
refute the entire complex of {T and A}, because only
the whole theoretical complex {T and A} can be compared to experience not just an isolated hypothesis
taken in itself.
Using the contrasting position of the hypothetic
deductive methodology to illustrate these points, suppose that we are replicating an experiment where the
theory T is known to entail an observation o, but we
observe o (i.e., NOT o), so we conclude that theory
T must be false. However, this rarely happens, as more
usually our observations relate to a network of theories
and hypotheses {T1, T2, . . . , Tn and A1, A2, . . . , An}
and not a single self-contained hypothesis. To take a
widely understood example, Newtons three laws of
motion, plus the auxiliary hypotheses (that no forces

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M. Morad / Geoforum 35 (2004) 661668

but gravitational ones act on the planets, all the theories of optics are correct, and so on) entails that Mercury will have orbit o. But Mercury was not observed
to have orbit o. So {T1, T2, . . . , Tn and A1, A2, . . . , An}
must be false according to a positivist-style methodology, because at least one of the laws would not t.
But since the hypothetico-deductive method would
not permit the testing of multiple hypotheses and
assumptions, how could we establish which theory or
hypothesis was at fault?
In evaluating the sort of problem posed by the above
example, Quine (1951, p. 4243) pointed out, Having
reevaluated one statement we must reevaluate some
others, which may be statements logically connected
with the rst or may be the statements of logical connections themselves. But the total eld is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that
there is much latitude of choice as to what statements
to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience. Quines critique of the limitations of research
informed by the hypothetico-deductive method is reected in the conclusion of a number of geographers
who have noted the inherent contradiction in having
to reject ones core propositions about causal mechanisms and processes only because of apparently disconrming empirical evidence (Chouinard et al., 1984,
p. 375).
Recently, some of the supporters of Popperian positivism have attempted to refute the DuhemQuine thesis
by proposing an interpretation of falsication which can
survive the idea that a theory can be rejected if one of its
hypotheses clashed with an observation (Cross, 1982).
According to this view, a theory T will not normally
be falsied unless there is another theory T 0 that can explain, along with the actual falsifying instance, everything that was contained in the old theory T. To use
the Newtonian example again, Einsteins theory would
be T 0 and Newtons theory would be T, and sophisticated falsicationism can now be moved forward to test
instead the Eddington experiment (which conrmed
Einsteins theory of relativity as a successor to Newtonian physics). However, the use of such immunising
strategies and progressive adjustments (Creath, 1991),
to avert the collapse of the dogma of falsicationism,
contradicts the very anti-conventionalist logic on which
falsicationists operated and accused Duhem of perpetrating (Popper, 1972, p. 78).
To summarise, the use of the DuhemQuine thesis as
an alternative to the hypothetico-deductive methods
which are still used in geographical sciences, especially
by some physical geographers, would entail relegating
the primacy of the null hypothesis (H0) and testing,
for their relative robustness, multiple alternative
hypotheses (i.e., H1, H2, H3, etc.) based on a host of
underlying research assumptions (eld measurement
methods, error propagation, scale, zoning and data

aggregation criteria, and so forth). Further consideration of these issues is discussed in the next section.

5. The application of the DuhemQuine thesis in geographical research

The use of a multiple taxonomy of hypotheses in geographical sciences will anticipate the conclusion of many
geographers who have long identied the main weakness
of positivist hypothesis testing as primarily that of
restricting assumptions about human patterns of interaction which are invariably at odds with true experience
(Cloke et al., 1991, p. 18). Also, as Openshaw (1983) had
conrmed in a study of the modiable area unit problem, even where purely spatial contexts are concerned,
conclusions and explanations in geographical research
are subject to complex assumptions about ecological fallacies exacerbated by data aggregation, zoning and
scale.
In a case study highly relevant to quantitative research in geographical sciences, Bovens and Hartmann
(2002) illustrate in a clear fashion how the adoption of
the DuhemQuine thesis could work, especially in eld
research where instruments and other research tools
are employed. The authors explain what they did as follows (Bovens and Hartmann, 2002, p. 29):
We . . . model dierent strategies for obtaining conrmation for a hypothesis from experimental test results
provided by less than fully reliable instruments. In
particular, we consider (i) repeated measurements of a
single test consequence of the hypothesis, (ii) measurements of multiple test consequences of the hypothesis,
(iii) theoretical support for the reliability of the instrument, and (iv) calibration procedures. We evaluate
these strategies on their relative merits under idealized
conditions and show some surprising repercussions on
the variety-of-evidence thesis and the DuhemQuine
thesis.
More recently, a geographical case study has been
published that clearly ts into DuhemQuine logical
framework, although the attempt has been couched in
the broader pragmatic agenda of Chamberlins 19th century method of multiple working hypotheses that was
mentioned earlier. According to Gillson et al. (2003,
pp. 385386):
Researchers can and should explore multiple paradigms
when analysing environmental aairs. Rather than
accepting and testing a ruling theory, researchers can
try to develop a range of hypotheses, thus avoiding
the dangers of parental aection for a favourite theory. . . Instead of comparing the merits of dierent
hypotheses and their associated methodologies, and asking what is the best method, we can ask what are the

M. Morad / Geoforum 35 (2004) 661668

distinctive values of dierent methods, and how might

various hypotheses be combined to capture the complexity of a situation/phenomenon. By ensuring that both
materialist and ideological paradigms are used as bases
for hypotheses, this approach could capture both perspectives, in order to describe phenomena which have
both ecological and social dimensions.
Put in procedural terms, the adoption of the Duhem
Quine thesis in geographical research should normally
follow the sequence of steps outlined below:

Identify a range of research hypotheses relevant to
the research question, as well as the auxiliary hypotheses which, though not directly under examination,
could aect the outcome or reliability of the inquiry.

Single tests are devised for each hypothesis (or combination of hypotheses), and those that fail can be
eliminated fairly rapidly, thus increasing the eciency
of the inquirys progress and the reliability of its
ndings.

Identify which, if any, of the research hypotheses
yielded results that were most distinct from other outcomes. These ndings, which could include one or a
combination of hypotheses, should then be agged
and put forward for further investigation by the
incumbent researchers or, subsequent to publication,
other fellow-researchers.

Where several hypotheses survive all reasonable tests,
these can be put in some order of more probable to
less probable based on the degree of support they
received from the examined data, their congruousness
with other reported research, or their predictive
value.

The outcome of this sequence of steps might then prepare the ground for further research plans in the
future that would be informed by the newly formulated hypotheses and techniques.

6. Conclusion
This paper examined the limitations of the hypothetico-deductive method which has dominated research
practices in geographical sciences for several decades.
Notwithstanding the signicant contribution made by
positivism (in its various evolved forms) to the advancement of scientic thinking in geography and other disciplines, there is a growing recognition that positivist
methods of analysis have failed to accommodate the
many auxiliary assumptions that underlie any research
hypothesis put forward for testing. These failures range
from unquestioning reliance on auxiliary hypotheses
(for instance, about data aggregation, zoning and scale)
to more fundamental expediencies relating to the com-

667

plexities of meaning and convention which elude both

empirical tests as well as logical inference.
As Fotheringham et al. (2002, pp. 67) observed in a
major study of weighted regressions in geography, local
statistics are multi-valued: dierent values of the statistic can occur in dierent locations within the study region. . . This places them in the realm of exploratory
spatial data analysis where the emphasis is on developing hypotheses from the data. . . It also suggests that
the techniques are not rooted fully in the positivist
school of thought where the search for global models
and laws is important.
In contrast to the positivist hypothetico-deductive
method, the DuhemQuine thesis which is receiving
growing recognition in scientic research elds does
not share positivisms preoccupation with theory building, and espouses a holistic view of testing, based on presenting for analysis multiple hypothesis formations to be
assessed (statistically or otherwise) for their relative
robustness. As economics methodologists have already
established in their own eld (Sawyer et al., 1997), this
would enable researchers to gain greater insight from
their inquiries by using a string model of scientic tests
and the comparing of hypotheses for their relative utility
(Balashov, 1994).
The use of a multiple organisation of hypotheses in
geographical research will militate against one of the
main weaknesses of positivist hypothesis testing which
has no room for assumptions about human interactions
or the fact that, as geographers have long recognised,
conclusions and explanations in geographical research
are subject to complex assumptions about data aggregation, zoning and scale.

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