Critical Notice on John McDowells Values

and Secondary Qualities

Yuichi Amitani

Dec. 10, 2004

1 University

reserved.

of British Columbia. mailto: yuiami-at-gmail-dot-com All rights

Introduction

The notice here is on John McDowells paper for the so-called moral realism1 . Therefore it is not compatible with error theory and moral relativism
(Mackie is an anti-realist in this sense). It is also distinct from moral cognitivism. (McDowell 1985). This seminal paper is a response from McDowell to
Mackies error theory (Mackie 1977) of moral value and moral statements2 .
His paper is divided into five sections; in the first section, McDowell briefly
explains Mackies error theory. In the next section, he points out that Mackie
assumes moral values are modeled as (something like) the primary qualities.
The third section criticizes Mackies account on the distinction between the
primary and secondary qualities, and suggests that even the secondary qualities have objectivity and reality in a sense. That is, they are true independently of any particular persons sensibility (weak objectivism), not that they
are true independently of anyones sensibility (strong objectivism) as Mackie
assumes. Then McDowell claims that, contrary to Mackies account, moral
values are indispensable for explanation of moral phenomena and thereby can
pass the explanatory test for reality (the fourth section). In the last section
he tries to show how it is to do moral explanations under the secondaryquality model of moral values and criticizes Simon Blackburns account of
moral phenomena.
1

In this notice, realism of moral values (properties) means the claim that [t]here are
moral facts and moral properties whose existence and nature are independent of peoples
belief and attitudes about what is right and wrong (Audi 1999).
2
McDowells paper first appeared in a tribute to Mackie (Honderich 1985).

This critical notice focuses on the fourth and last sections in his paper.
In the rest of this section, we very briefly outline his account for the reality
of moral values. In the next section it will be seen that McDowells analogy
between fearfulness and moral values does not work and its failure makes his
account of moral values look bleak. The last section deals with the question
of whether what is called merit talk (to be explained later) in this notice
is actually an explanation. It is important for McDowells account because
he says that considering this way of talking about moral statements is what
Mackies and Blackburns accounts of moral phenomena lack.
Merit talk as what is not explained by causal explanation According
to McDowell, one of Mackies tenets is that moral values do not pass the
explanatory test for reality.
(a) If x does not appear in any explanation of the phenomena in question,
x does not exist.
(b) Moral values do not appear in causal explanation of the phenomenology
of moral judgments.
(c) Merely causal explanation is satisfying for the explanation of the phenomenology of moral judgments.

(d) Therefore, moral values do not exist.

However, McDowell denies (c), because there is another dimension of explanation in the cases of fearfulness and moral values (McDowell takes fearfulness as an example the explanation of which by projectivists appear more
2

plausible (but in fact not) than that of McDowell). This is an explanation

like these (hereafter we call such an explanation merit talk);
A: Why is the lightening fearful?
B: Because it merits fear.

A: Why am I wrong to kick Ken?

B (As father): Because it is wrong.
They are clearly not causal explanations, but seem to consist of our ordinary
moral judgments. And this is the most important explanation for fearfulness
and moral values, McDowell thinks, because this opens the possibility of
rational discussion. For example, when A hears Bs reply, A might further
ask why. Then B might show further explanations. It is wrong to harm
a friend without reason, for example. Then B might reply to it (It was
Ken who kicked me first, etc.). This is an argument for reason. Causal
explanation does not have such a character. McDowell (1985) says,
[I]f what we engaged in is an attempt to understand ourselves,
then merely causal explanations of responses [...] will not be satisfying anyway. [...] [A] technique for giving satisfying explanations
[...] must allow for the possibility of criticism; we make sense of
fear [and moral phenomena] by seeing it as a response to objects
that merit such a response [...] (p.176)3 .
3

Pagination in this paper is from (Sayre-McCord 1985).

Therefore, McDowell replaces (b) and (c) with (b) and (c):
(b) Moral values appear in the merit talk.

(c) The merit talk is the best or most important explanation of the phenomenology of moral judgments.

We cannot infer the inexistence of moral values from (a), (b), and (c). This
is one of McDowells accounts for moral values.

Danger, Fear, and Moral Values

McDowell deals with danger and fearfulness in an equal way (p.175). But
there is a difference between danger and fear. Fear deals with feeling in
an essential way in which danger does not. For example, some feel fear of
something non-dangerous. Think about phobias (animal or insect phobia,
agoraphobia, etc.). Some might say that these things are dangerous in some
situations. Spiders are dangerous when they carry poison. But since almost
everything is dangerous in one or another way (a mug is dangerous if one
hits my head with it), almost everything would be dangerous and it is trivial
to say that we fear of a dangerous thing. Its counterintuitive.
Merit talk in fearfulness is actually prediction How about fear?
Take this example. Suppose that all people in one country do not feel fear of
4

radioactive material. But something radioactive seems to merit fear . What

does this merit fear mean? An analysis;
(i) The people in one country dont fear of radioactive material.
(ii) Radioactive material is dangerous in that it could have negative effects
on ones health.
(iii) All (or most, or the majority of) people should feel fear of a dangerous
thing.

(iv) Therefore, it merits fearfulness, although they do not feel fear of radioactive material.
What does the should in (iii) mean? One analysis would be like this.
(v) They want to preserve themselves.
(vi) They should avoid serious danger in order to preserve themselves.
(vii) They should feel fear of dangerous things in order to avoid serious
danger.

(iii) Therefore, all (or most, or the majority of) people should feel fear of a
dangerous thing.
This analysis interprets should as obligation. In other words they ought to
feel fear of a dangerous thing. But this analysis has defects, because what
seems to merit fear is not always dangerous. Again, think of various kinds
of phobias. For instance, for those having claustrophobia, confined space
5

merits fearfulness. But we do not say that they ought to or have obligation
to feel fear of confined space. In addition, contrary to (vii), feeling fear is
not a necessary condition of avoiding danger. It is conceivable to recognize
things completely intellectually and to avoid the danger with the help of
ones reason (at least in principle. See Damasio (1994)). Then how about
changing the phrase avoid danger and looking for sufficient conditions of
eeling fear ? As the space is limited, we cannot examine possible alternatives
one by one. However, we have a reason to think those alternatives would not
work successfully. It is that whether a given thing is fearful or not essentially
depends on empirical fact that people actually feel fear of that thing on such
and such situations. One reason we think the case of radioactive material is
plausible is that the people in the country (or most of them) would feel fear
of radioactive material when we know the nature and negative health effects
of it. Accordingly, whatever condition we posit as necessary for feeling fear,
it is always conceivable that some feel fear of things which is not under that
condition. And it is not appropriate to say that they have an obligation not
to feel fear of them. Therefore, there is no reason to assume that all instances
of feeling fear have or would have the same function like avoiding danger.
Then, again, what meaning does should in (iii) have? I believe this is
prediction. From the past cases of feeling fear (or our neurological mechanisms), it is reasonable to predict that they would feel fear of the dangerous
thing. So (iii) will be:

(iii ) All (or most, or the majority of) people would feel fear of a dangerous
thing.
This analysis is applicable to other instances of fearfulness, especially
phobia cases. It would sound weird if you say he (with phobia of confined
space) has obligation to feel fear of a confined room, but it would not if
you say he would feel fear of a confined room. It might be objected that
this still involves justification, because this seems to open rational discussion
about his fearfulness which is shared by the cases of moral value. However,
even though this involves justification, the type of justification is that for
prediction, therefore it is within the framework of scientific explanation. It
is not the same as the one in moral philosophy (i.e., justification for obligation). If feeling fear is subordinate to some objective of human being (e.g.,
surviving) and it is a necessary condition to the goal, we can say that one
has obligation to feel fear, but as is seen before, this is not the case.
How about what seems erroneous fear ? Is it a proof that fearfulness
statement has truth value and fearfulness exists in this world? Suppose that
you enter your room and find something black on the floor. You thought of
it as a roach and you feel fear of it. But after a while, you find it is your
black sock and think to yourself, It [your sock] does not merit my fear. Is
the fearfulness of your sock erroneous? No. True, after you recognize the
something as your black sock, your sock does not merit your fear. From
the past experiences of human beings it is not reasonable to predict that you
would feel fear of your sock given that you know it is your sock, not a roach.
7

But this does not mean that even if you did not know it, your sock does not
merit fearfulness. It is reasonable to predict that you would feel fear of your
sock if you mistook it for a roach. In other words, your fear was mistaken if
you understand the situation thoroughly, but it is not if you do not. Your
erroneous fear comes form your erroneous cognition, and, given that your
response itself is not an error.
Therefore, there is no reason to presuppose the reality of fearfulness. As
is seen before, whether a prediction works partly depends on conditions of
our mind and body. For instance, a confined room is fearful for those who
are claustrophobia, but it is not for most people. The same thing in the
world is fearful for one person, but not for the other. Whether a given thing
is fearful or not depends on the situation. It might be objected that this is
compatible with the dispositional nature of fearfulness. As color like yellow
looks green under a green light, the same thing looks fearful or not according
to a situation. But according to McDowells account, being a disposition
is not sufficient for existing. It is here that the merit talk matters. But
as is already seen, the merit talk does not have power which McDowell
expects it to have and it can be accounted within the framework of scientific
explanation.
Argument from queerness remains If the merit talk in the case of
fearfulness is actually about prediction, how does it affect McDowells account? What if McDowell says like this? Oh sorry, fearfulness is a bad

example. But that fearfulness and moral values have a particular dimension
which causal explanations cannot account for is explained by this example
(even if it is not true in fearfulness), and this argument is applicable to the
case of moral values. That is what I wanted to do, and the argument in
the previous sections does not affect it, does it? To answer this question,
it is good to see what role the example of fearfulness plays in McDowells
account. In his paper, McDowell mentions four kinds of properties; shape,
color, fearfulness, and moral values. Shape is primary quality, and color is
secondary quality. Fearfulness and moral values are not secondary qualities
but much more similar to secondary qualities than primary qualities4 . They
also share merit talk which is the major difference between the last two and
secondary qualities. In this sense, fearfulness places itself between color and
moral values. Given that one of McDowells motivations is to make a counterargument to Mackies argument from queerness (that is, moral values are
so different from other qualities, say in its priscriptiveness, that it is weird to
posit its objective reality), fearfulness constitutes a chain starting from color
apprehension to moral values and it plays a role to make moral values look
less queer or not very different from other qualities.
The disanalogy between fearfulness and moral values disconnects this
chain and thereby sheds light again on the queerness of moral values. It is true
that if one admits the analogy of secondary qualities and moral values (this

McDowell refers to a disanalogy between color and moral values (p.175). He also notes
Fearfulness is not a secondary quality (p.178).

is admitted here for the sake of argument) in McDowells account then moral
values look less queer. But as long as they still have unique characteristics
such as the merit talk (which fearfulness does not share in spite of McDowells
intention) and its prescriptive power, moral values are still quite unique from
other qualities.
And some disanalogies between secondary qualities and moral values pull
away further the two and make the peculiarity of moral values stand out
more. As Simon Blackburn (1985) points out, there are disanalogies between
secondary qualities and moral values5 . For example, evaluative predicates
attribute to a subject (p.15)6 . When we use evaluative predicates, we say,
As doing B is good qua a father. But we would not say that this apple
is white qua an apple7 . If it is white, it is white with no qualification 8 .
Another difference is the extent to which qualities vary according to the
situation. The same act (for example, sacrificing ones life to the king in
ones country) is seen to be act of the brave or the barbarian, whereas the
same object rarely looks pink in one situation and blue in another situation.
Color can change, but not as much as moral evaluation of an act. Given
those disanalogies, the distance between moral values and other qualities is
even larger (p.14).
5

This does not mean that McDowell does not notice that there are disanalogies between
the two.
6
Citations in this paragraph are all from Blackburn (1985).
7
This sentence could read that this apple is white despite the general fact about apples,
i.e., that they are not white. This is not the usage which I want to pay attention to here.
8
Of course, under which light we see an object (or whether one is color-blind) could be
qualification when attributing a color to it, but this is not the subject here.

10

Therefore despite McDowells intention, moral qualities are quite different

from other kinds of qualities. Only moral qualities can approve the special
usage of the word merit and prescriptivity. Things are better than Mackie
thinks, because the secondary quality model of moral properties seems closer
to the case (if McDowell is right). But most of the queerness which Mackie
mentions remains even in McDowells model.

Is the merit talk a genuine explanation?

As is seen before, merit talk in moral values shows one character of moral values; opening a series of rational explanations/discussions. McDowell thinks
this is what causal explanations do not capture. But a question arises here.
Is the merit talk itself an explanation? Take this dialogue again.
A: Why am I wrong to kick Ken?
B (As father): Because it is wrong.
A question here is this; Is Bs reply really an explanation? It is true that Bs
reply opens the possibility of rational discussion, because A can keep asking
why is it wrong? and then B cannot make the same answer (or repeat
the same answer forever). It is rational explanation of why As conduct is
wrong that B needs here. In this sense Bs reply has a distinct characteristic
different from causal explanations. And it is only McDowells realism that
can explain this moral phenomenon. That is why McDowell thinks moral

11

value can pass the explanatory test for reality (p.174) despite of Mackies
argument.
But there are reasons to doubt that this constitutes a genuine explanation.
First, B adds hardly any information to As utterance. It is hard to make
sense of an information which can explain itself. Secondly, it is because the
first dialogue looks like this conversation;
A: Why am I wrong to kick Ken?
(B hits As head without saying anything)
Is Bs hitting an explanation? At least it is doubtful, because it does not
have any propositional content. It is true that A can infer (or conjecture)
some propositions from Bs hitting (e.g., you should not kick a friend), but
it is not the same as that it has some propositional content. And the point
is that, Bs first response seems to function in the same way as Bs hitting.
In both cases, one can expect similar responses. The fact that in the first
case one tends to say with hitting (kicking, striking a table, etc.) that it is
wrong supports this. And if Bs hitting is not an explanation, is there any
reason to think Bs first utterance as an explanation?
One might object, as Blackburn implies (see p.17), that this is an explanation corresponding to As interest (say) in how much confidence B has on
his moral position about As conduct. Suppose that A is at the age sufficient
to understand kicking a friend is wrong. But A might not understand how
wrong it is. For example, not saying hi to a friend when we meet is wrong,
but it is not as wrong as kicking a friend without reason. As question can be
12

understood in this perspective. A might ask the question in order to know

how wrong B think it is to kick a friend. And Bs utterance is an explanation
along with As interest. But this account is the one of why Bs utterance
is an interest-relative (if any) explanation, but not the one of why it is an
explanation in the first place (and Blackburn does not seem to explain why
this is an explanation).
It might also be objected that Bs utterance is an abbreviation (in the
first case, it might be a statement that you should not kick a friend). Again,
Bs hitting gets in the way of this objection, because Bs hitting seems to
(be able to) play the same (or very similar) function. A, hit by his father,
might feel as if his father says you should not kick a friend (Of course, this
interpretation might be wrong, but this is also true of Bs utterance, because
Bs utterance does not necessarily remind A of that statement). Then what
is the reason not to think Bs hitting of abbreviation of that statement?
Implication for McDowells account The fact that Bs utterance (the
moral-value version of merit talk) is not actually an explanation could
have serious implications for McDowells account, because this merit talk
is what causal explanation lacks. It is a sign of the phenomenology of moral
judgments (remember the citation from McDowell in the first section).
It is true that even just because Bs utterance is not an explanation does
not mean that McDowells account as a whole collapses. As is seen in the
previous citation, he sees the peculiarity of moral statements as allowing for

13

rational criticism, and the merit talk seems to open this space of rational
criticism. Although Humeans would argue that those discussions are ultimately based on emotion (therefore they are not rational discussions), we
cannot presuppose this here to criticize McDowell. However, a sentence like
Bs utterance is a very pure form of such discussions and it is hard to understand as a genuine explanation without making committment to realism
of moral properties. After all, this is the only type of explanation which
McDowell mentions in his paper needs the existence of moral values. If this
is not actually a genuine explanation, then (c) in his counterargument to
Mackies criticism (a-d) (see section 2) is not true, therefore his attempt
against Mackies anti-realism does not work well.

14

References
Audi, R., ed. (1999), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (2nd Edition),
Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.
Blackburn, S. (1985), Errors and the phenomenology of value, in T. Honderich, ed., Morality and Objectivity, London: Routeledge and kegan
Paul.
Damasio, A. (1994), Descartes Error: Emotion, Reason, and Human Brain,
New York: Grosett/Putnam.
Honderich, T., ed. (1985), Morality and Objectivity, London: Routeledge and
kegan Paul.
Mackie, J. (1977), Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth.
McDowell, J. (1985), Values and secondary qualities, in T. Honderich,
ed., Morality and Objectivity, London: Routeledge and kegan Paul,
p. Routeledge and keg.
Sayre-McCord, G., ed. (1985), Essays on Moral Realism, Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.

15