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2-5-2010

Gordon's Ghosts: British Major-General Charles

George Gordon and His Legacies, 1885-1960
Stephanie D. Laffer
Florida State University

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Laffer, Stephanie D., "Gordon's Ghosts: British Major-General Charles George Gordon and His Legacies, 1885-1960" (2010).
Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations. Paper 3319.

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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

GORDONS GHOSTS: BRITISH MAJOR-GENERAL CHARLES GEORGE

GORDON AND HIS LEGACIES, 1885-1960

By
STEPHANIE LAFFER

A Dissertation submitted to the

Department of History
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded:
Spring Semester, 2010

Copyright 2010
Stephanie Laffer
All Rights Reserve

The members of the committee approve the dissertation of Stephanie Laffer defended on
February 5, 2010.

__________________________________
Charles Upchurch
Professor Directing Dissertation
__________________________________
Barry Faulk
University Representative
__________________________________
Max Paul Friedman
Committee Member
__________________________________
Peter Garretson
Committee Member
__________________________________
Jonathan Grant
Committee Member

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members.
ii

For my parents, who always encouraged me

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation has been a multi-year project, with research in multiple states and
countries. It would not have been possible without the generous assistance of the libraries and
archives I visited, in both the United States and the United Kingdom. However, without the
support of the history department and Florida State University, I would not have been able to
complete the project. My advisor, Charles Upchurch encouraged me to broaden my
understanding of the British Empire, which led to my decision to study Charles Gordon. Dr.
Upchurchs constant urging for me to push my writing and theoretical understanding of
imperialism further, led to a much stronger dissertation than I could have ever produced on my
own. I would also like to thank Peter Garretson for introducing me to Gordon in the first place.
Without Dr. Garretsons enthusiasm for my seminar paper on Gordons death, it is unlikely that
this entire project would have come to be. In addition to Dr. Upchurch and Dr. Garretson, I
would also like to thank Jonathan Grant, who provided encouragement every step of the way,
Max Friedman for stepping onto my committee and challenging my analysis, and finally, Will
Hanely and Barry Faulk, for reading the entire manuscript and providing me with very helpful
feedback.
Outside of Florida State University, I must thank the staffs of the libraries and archives I
visited. Wandering into sometimes empty libraries and asking to look at all of the papers that
they had regarding Charles Gordon, often led to new insights into Gordon and the people he
encountered. In Boston, at the Boston Public Library and the Athenaeum, I was able to see how
Gordon was perceived in the publishing world. In the United Kingdom, the staffs of the British
Library, Hove Library, the Sudan Archive at Durham University and the National Archives all
helped me to find every document relating to Gordon held by the institutions.
Additionally, I must thank anyone who read any of the drafts, especially Amy Carney, who
edited the entire dissertation, and Christopher Black, who re-edited and proof-read it, and my
father, Elliott Laffer, who spent a portion of his Christmas vacation reading the entire draft, and
composing the chapter titles.
Finally, I need to thank my family. My parents have encouraged me to feel like I could
do anything, including write a dissertation. This support has meant more to me than they could
ever know, and the trip to Istanbul was a perfect way to end the project.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures ............................................................................................................................................ vi

Abstract ..................................................................................................................................................... vii
1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................1
2. THE LIFE, DEATH AND CULT OF GORDON ..............................................................................15
3. DEATH AND ITS AFTERMATH .......................................................................................................36
4. THE GREAT HERO MEMORIALIZED .........................................................................................56
5. PUTTING GORDONS MEMORY TO WORK .................................................................................76
6. BACK TO KHARTOUM .....................................................................................................................96
7. STILL A SYMBOL ............................................................................................................................116
8. FADING INTO THE BACKGROUND .............................................................................................142
APPENDICES .........................................................................................................................................167
A. THE GORDON STATUE ......................................................................................................167
B. THE GORDON STATUETHE WREATHS.......................................................................168
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................................169
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...................................................................................................................193

LIST OF FIGURES

A.1: Contemporary Photograph of the Gordon Statue, Victoria Embankment Gardens

168
A.2: Annual Wreaths on the Gordon Pedestal, January 2008 ................................
169
A.3: Wreath from the Gordon Foundation, Gordon School (left) and Old Gordonians (right)
169

vi

ABSTRACT
Gordons Ghosts: British Major-General Charles George Gordon and his Legacies,
1885-1960, examines the various ways that Gordon and his memory have been used in the
British Empire following his death in Sudan in 1885. After his death, Gordon became a symbol
of Britains imperial project, with his name and legacy featured in debates concerning multiple
aspects of the British Empire, including areas where his connection was tangential at best. My
study spans a period of about seventy-five years, beginning with the height of British
imperialism and concluding with decolonization. Over the course of these decades, Britains
imperial commitments stretched all over the globe, as did the projections of Gordons legacy.
In British domestic politics, Gordons legacy was often synonymous with the failures of
Liberal Imperialism and its strongest advocate, Prime Minister William Gladstone. As long as
the Liberal Party remained committed to the ideas of Gladstone, Gordons memory was
employed both explicitly and implicitly by the Conservative Party as a way of reminding the
British voting public of its opponents shortcomings. For the Conservatives, Gordon became a
political tool; he needed to be commemorated to serve as a reminder of the consequences for not
following a strong imperial policy, and my work traces these politics of commemoration.
Gordons legacy was present in other areas of the British Empire than Britain and Sudan.
My dissertation also traces how Gordons memory was used in these other regions. The first area
where Gordons legacy was employed was not in Africa, where it may have been expected, or
even in China, where he earned his nickname, Chinese Gordon, but instead in Ireland, where
his name was regularly invoked in the arguments against approving Irish Home Rule in 1886.
Following the successful defeat of this proposed policy, the Conservative Party continued to
invoke Gordons name throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most notably in
response to other imperial projects that would, in its opinion, weaken the British Empire.
Fittingly, my work concludes with a discussion of how Gordon slowly becomes less important to
British imperialism and how his representations changed as the needs of empire changed.

vii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

On Saturday May 14, 1960 at 12:30 in the afternoon, a statue of Major-General Charles
George Gordon was re-erected in the grounds of The Gordon Boys School in Surrey, England.
This statue had been sent back from now-independent Sudan to its home country and claimed by
the Boys School as a way to honor its namesake, General Gordon.1 This statue and one other
were the only two statues ever sent back to Britain by formerly-occupied countriesand by the
time it was mounted at the school, it had lost most of its importance. In fact, the re-positing of
the statue only received a solitary picture in The Times of that day.2 The statue and the man
whom it honored no longer had the same importance as they once did. Eighty-six years earlier,
when Gordon was sent to Khartoum, the papers were full of stories of his valor, and one year
later, full of his sacrifice; now they relegated his contributions and the statue that honored him to
the back pages of the paper. The statue, the last tangible reminder of the British time in the
Sudan, and the country where Gordon had sacrificed his life for the imperial project, had
returned home to England.3
Charles Gordons role in British history and its imperial project have been a question for
debate since his untimely death in 1885. He has been seen in various roles: as a martyr, as a
drunk, as an inspirational figure, as an imperial hero, and as an imperial folly. He is remembered
not for what he himself did, but rather for the fact that he was perceived as abandoned by his
government in an unfortunate situation. Gordon was a career military man. He distinguished
himself early, first coming to public attention as a young man during his service in the Crimean
War.4 However, the first major actions leading to military prominence would come slightly later,
after he was sent to China in 1859 to help Emperor Li-Hung Chang quash the Taiping Rebellion.
In this position, Gordon demonstrated two qualities that would come to define his military
career: his loyalty to the men under his command and his ability to command large groups,
1

Letter and press release announcing The unveiling of the Gordon Statue, sent to alumni and supporters of the
Gordon Boys School, April 1960 found in the collection of M.S. Lush at the Sudan Archive Durham University;
SAD 874/45.
2
Times (London) May 14, 1960, p. 14
3
For the purposes of this work, the terms Khartoum, Khartum, Sudan, and Soudan are used interchangeably,
according to whatever convention was used at the time discussed. Titles and place names will follow the same
pattern.
4
A. Egmont Hake, Gordon in China and the Soudan (London: John MacQueen, 1896), 7.

qualities valued by his class. His success at working for a foreign government was also
recognized by the emperor; Gordon was awarded the highest distinction ever granted to a
foreigner by the Chinese Army, the Yellow Jacket.5 Following Gordons time in China, his name
was known for decades within military and popular circles as Chinese Gordon, making him
synonymous with Britains benevolent involvement in the country.
Following his time in China and his triumphant return to Britain, Gordon had only one
wishto sink into obscurity and be left alone by the British public. He was notoriously
unwilling to meet members of the press or royalty in the fashionable drawing rooms of London,
instead preferring to remain at his familys home.6 Gordons next posting, in the British town of
Gravesand, would allow him to live somewhat anonymously. At Gravesand, another side of
Gordons personality became paramount. As the Commander of the Royal Engineers at
Gravesand, he was charged with directing the construction of new forts for the defense of the
Thames estuary. During this time, the first reports of Gordons Christian charity were published
in both local newspapers and the memoirs of some of his closest friends. People report instances
of Gordon providing food, comfort, and guidance to wayward souls in the towna practice he
would continue throughout his entire career.7
After his posting to Gravesand, Gordon traveled to Africa for the first time. In 1873, the
British government allowed him to go to Sudan under the aegis of the Khedive of Egypt, Ismail.
This period of service lasted until 1879. In Sudan, Gordon acted as Governor General; his duties
included reforming the finances of the country and at least partially eradicating the slave trade. 8
This first mission to Sudan was mostly successful; Gordon was regarded favorably in Sudan for
both his financial and his moral leadership.
Following his first time in Sudan, Gordon returned to Britain and service in the Royal
Engineers, and in 1882, he was promoted to Major-General.9 However, he was not employed in
direct service for very long; in early 1884 events in Sudan necessitated that the British send him
back to the region, originally as a government representative. Before Gordon left London, he was
5

Anthony Nutting, Gordon of Khartoum: martyr and misfit. (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc, 1966),
73.
6
Nutting, 81.
7
Eva Hope, Life of General Gordon (London: Walter Scott, 1885), 110-115. Gordons experiences at Gravesand are
told in the form of an imaginary dialogue between a stranger, which was meant to represent Gordon, although he
was not identified by name, and some ill members of the community who he had come to visit and aid.
8
John H. Waller, Gordon of Khartoum: The Saga of a Victorian Hero (New York: Atheneum, 1988), 159.
9
Richard Garret, General Gordon (London: Arthur Baker, Ltd., 1974), 173.

given the impression that his orders would come directly from the Prime Minister and his
cabinet. Once he arrived in Cairo, however, his mission had changed.
At the beginning of that year, the Egyptian puppet government collapsed and Sudan was
given over to the Mahdi, the Islamic spiritual leader. After the Mahdis rise to power, British
officials in Egypt were forced to act in more than just an advisory capacity regarding Sudan.
Although Egypt was not actually a British colony or protectorate in 1884, British interests
controlled the countrys economy and governmental decisions. In Egypt, the British consul
general, Sir Evelyn Baring, decided to change Gordons assignment and make him directly
responsible to the Egyptian government, not the British government, due to the hostile climate in
Sudan. His orders would be relayed to him not by the government in London, but instead by
Baring, their highest ranking officer in Egypt.10 Baring was now technically in charge of Gordon
and his mission to Sudan. Gordon was displeased with this development: he did not want to be
under the command of Egypt again and disputed the chain of command. His wishes as he had
explained them in meetings and letters before he left for Sudan in 1884 were fundamentally
ignored by the powers in both Britain and in Egypt.11 This dispute would later have devastating
consequences for him.12
Gordon reached Khartoum in early 1884 not as a representative of the British
government as he wanted, but instead as an Egyptian civil servant. In this capacity, Gordon
would be able to protect Egyptian interests, especially those of the business sector. He would be
loyal to Cairo and not to London, thus allowing him to face the Mahdi as a private individual and
allowing the British government a measure of deniability should he fail in his task.13
Gordon spent his final days in Sudan as a military officer charged with reporting on the
affairs of the country. He was not supposed to be militarily involved; he was only ordered to
watch and advise the government. Gordons previous experience in the region was cited as a
main factor why this oftentimes distrusted man was sent into the delicate situation there.14
10

Baron Godfrey Elton, Gordon of Khartoum; the life of General Charles George Gordon (New York: Knopf,
1955), 287.
11
The Cabinet and the Soudan, Pall Mall Gazette, February 13, 1884; clipping found in the Supplemental Papers
of William Gladstone, BL, Add Ms. 56452, 12-13. Gladstones own comment on the reporting of the scuffle in the
cabinet over what Gordons mission to Sudan should consist of is favorableand shows his disdain for both the
situation and Gordon.
12
Ibid., 291.
13
Ibid., 157.
14
Roy MacGregor-Hastie, Never to be Taken Alive: A Biography of General Gordon (London: Sidgwick
& Jackson, 1985), 152-153.

Ironically, his actions during his final year in Sudan and the actions which directly preceded his
death would cement his memory in the minds of people in Britain and Sudan for the next
century. The actual manner of his death is in dispute; however, the perceived circumstances of
his demise had profound and political implications. It will be addressed in detail in the following
chapter.15
Since his death, Charles Gordon has been the subject of countless biographies and
tributes. He has also been represented in larger works on imperialism, the British in Africa, and
even works on the decolonization process and its impact on British perceptions of masculinity.
As he was a man of acclaim at the time of his death and his death was tragic and unexpected, a
veritable trove of biographies regarding different aspects of Gordons life and death has been
published in the years since he died, many of which are in contradiction on key elements like his
Christianity, the possibility of his alcoholism, and the caliber of his military service. As historian
and Sudan Civil Service veteran Richard Hills research showed, these biographies run the gamut
from laudatory eulogies to much more critical works.16 From these disparate views, a
complicated and consistent image emerges: Gordon as a complex and conflicted figure. Even as
the authors views on Gordon changed, all seemed to agree on the trope of Gordons innate
contradictions.
The earliest biographies of Charles Gordonsome prepared at the time he left for his
second trip to Sudan and others published as soon as the news of his death reached London
reflect the feelings and perceptions of the generals contemporaries. His life and military career
have been analyzed by these contemporaries, as demonstrated by Demetrious Boulgers two
volume work.17 This work, which examines Gordons career from the view of a man who
actually met and previously wrote about him, attempts to explain what the author referred to as
Gordons two sided character. Boulger analyzed this character in relation to Gordons
achievements; he is the first of Gordons biographers to realize that to understand the man, it was

15

Gordons experiences in Khartoum, and the circumstances which directly led to his death will be discussed in the
next chapter; the purpose of this introduction is to provide sufficient background to Gordon as he was seen upon
undertaking what would become his final mission.
16
Richard Hill, Gordon: Yet Another Assessment (Durham, UK: Sudan Studies Association of the United Kingdom
Press, 1987), 3. Hill also includes an appendix with a chart showing exactly how many biographies were published
in each year since Gordons death to the time of publication.
17
Demetrious Boulger, The Life of Gordon: Major-General, R.E., C.B.,: Turkish Field-Marshal, Grand Gordon
Medijidieh, and Pasha; Chinese Titu (Field Marshal), Yellow Jacket Order (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1896)
Volumes 1 and 2, v.

also necessary to understand the mans character in relation to his achievements. 18 The
biography, although uneven at times, is also the first to give a more realistic image of Gordon;
his foibles receive an equal amount of attention. It is the end of his analysis of Gordons life,
however, that indicates the most problematic detail in using biographies as sources: The tragic
end of Khartoum was not an inappropriate conclusion for the career of Charles Gordon, whose
life had been far removed from the ordinary experiences of mankind. 19 Biographies from this
time period seem to depend on exaggeration and hyperbole to make their subjects seem almost
superhuman.20
This trend is further evidenced in two other early works on Gordons life and death, both
written by female admirers of the man whom they saw as a martyred hero. The first, by Eva
Hope, was published soon after word reached London of Gordons demise. She aimed to educate
her readers about the country Gordon died for, and more significantly, about the Christian
undertones of Gordons life.21 Hope felt that in order for her readers to understand the
circumstances of Gordons death, they must also have knowledge about the region where he
died. She addressed this deficiency in her readers knowledge with a discussion about the
natives who live in Sudan, including their customs, appearance, and dress.22 By analyzing the
habits of the natives, Hope drew a dichotomy between her Christian hero, Gordon, and the
natives he came to save. Gordons role as a Christian is the most important facet of his
personality for Hopea theme which she discussed throughout her work. In fact, her survey of
Gordon ends not with the public reaction to his death, but instead with a chapter entitled, A
Christian Hero, in which she compared him to Jesus Christ.23
The second biography also addresses the theme of religion in his life. Gordon is one of
the three Christian martyrs profiled by Elizabeth Rundle Charles in Three Martyrs of the
Nineteenth Century.24 The introduction to her entire study opens with the following quote:
18

Boulger, vol. 1., 17.

Boulger, vol. 2, 172
20
Kenneth Silverman, Biography and Pseudobiography Common-Place vol. 3 no. 2, January 2003; Silverman
references the idea of modern biographies following into the pattern of nineteenth century realistic fiction, which is
an accurate description for these early forms of Gordon biographies.
21
Eva Hope, Life of General Gordon; Hope does not actually appear as the author of this work, instead the author is
credited as by the author of Our Queen, New World Heroes, etc., a common practice in the late nineteenth
century.
22
Ibid., 137-138.
23
Ibid., 361-369.
24
Elizabeth Rundle Charles, Three Martyrs of the Nineteenth Century: Studies from the Lives of Livingston, Gordon
and Patterson. (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1889).
19

Tidings of General Gordons death fell suddenly like a stroke of personal bereavement on our
English homes, and smote contending Christendom once more into a sense of its unity of ideal
and worship in the common love and lamenting of this one man.25 Even allowing for the
hyperbolic tendencies of the early biographers, Charles believed that Gordons death was a
unifying factor for Britain and the British Empire. His subsequent martyrdom should thus serve
to unify Christians in Britain and to inspire more people to live an observant, Christian life so
Gordon did not die in vain.26 These three works taken together show the general pattern of early
Gordon biographies: each author chooses a particular aspect of his life and death to highlight,
whether it is his military sacrifice, his character, or his Christianity.27
Before the First World War, at the height of the British imperial project, the British
public embraced its imperial symbols and did not question them. As Gordon was one of the most
well known imperial figures, not to mention a martyr to the cause, it is perhaps understandable
that the first biographies that are directly critical of him do not appear until much later, with a
chapter on Gordon appearing in Lytton Stracheys larger work, Eminent Victorians. This chapter
is the first to depict Gordon in a negative light, and it is also the first biography to mention the
less favorable aspects of his character.28 Eminent Victorians, first published in 1918, challenged
the idea of imperial hero worship. Designed to be ironic, Stracheys title poked fun at the
contemporary image of Victorian Britain. In the same vein, his use of biography was also
slightly ironic.29 Gordon was one of the eminent Victorians that Strachey profiled in a
mocking tone. He did not receive the same amount of respect as he had in earlier studies; instead,
Strachey used anecdotal evidence to declare that Gordon was a drunk and not worthy of the
adulation he inspired.30 Stracheys study, although verging on satire, did help to remove some of
the luster from Gordon, and almost every subsequent biographer cites Eminent Victorians.
Truly critical biographies of Gordon were not published until much later, following the
end of British imperialism in Africa. Around the centenary of his birth in 1933, there was a brief
25

Ibid., v.
Ibid., 284.
27
Although these are the three early biographies highlighted here, many more exist, including E A. Edgemont Hake,
Gordon in China and the Soudan. (London: John MacQueen, 1896) and one by One who knew him well, A
pseudonym for a woman that he knew at Gravesend. Mrs. F, More about Gordon (London: Richard Bentley and
Son, 1894).
28
Lytton Strachey, Eminent Victorians: Cardinal Manning, Florence Nightingale, Dr. Arnold, General Gordon
(New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1969).
29
Ibid., vii.
30
Ibid., 264-265.
26

resurgence in laudatory biographies, but the biographies of Gordon did not turn critical until after
Egypt became independent in 1952 and Sudan subsequently attained independence in 1956.31
One of the early examples of this new trend in Gordon biographies is by Anthony Nutting.
Written in 1966, this biography introduces the idea of re-assessing Gordon and challenging longheld assumptions about his deathespecially regarding his actions undertaken in his final days
at Khartoum and his ultimate decision to remain in the city after British policy makers in London
decided to abandon it.32 Nutting was also the first biographer to turn the traditional narrative of
biography around. He began his work with Gordons death, indicating the main goal of his
narrative would not be to discuss Gordons lifetime, but rather his death. He was also the first
biographer to include the idea that Gordons death was his own fault, which was a significant
departure from traditional biographies of the general. Ending his work with a call for a
reassessment of Gordon and Gordon biographies, Nuttings work heralded a new focus for future
works.33
The historians who followed Nutting, including Charles Chenevix Trench, have heeded
this call to reassess Gordons life and death. Trenchs work tries to place Gordon into historyin
effect de-mythologizing himwhich follows the general trends occurring in historiography
during the 1970s.34 Taking a more socio-cultural approach to biography, Trench ignored the
conflict over whether Gordon can be considered a martyr and instead looks at the actual events
of his life and his fabled eccentricities. Following this methodology, Trench does not describe
Gordon as a perfect individual or even a hero; instead, he chooses to show Gordons flaws, and
all of the generals character quirks.35 Trenchs lack of concern for the martyr of Khartoum
aspect of his personality shows in his decision to address the death only at the very beginning of
his epilogue, a direct departure from the strategies of the historians who preceded him, and as
well as those who succeeded him.36

31

Biographies published around the centenary of his birth are almost all laudatoryone example will be provided
here, Hugh Evelyn Wortham, Gordon: An Intimate Portrait (London: George G. Harap & Co. Ltd., 1933), is among
the better researched documentsWortham was allowed access to the Gordon family files by Gordons heirs. There
are other biographical attempts to be critical of Gordon which predate independence, but since most are ultimately
regarded as more praise than criticism, they are not included here.
32
Anthony Nutting, Gordon of Khartoum, martyr and misfit.
33
Ibid., 314-323.
34
Charles Chenevix Trench, Charley Gordon: An Eminent Victorian Reassessed. (London: Allen Lane, 1978).
35
Ibid., 9.
36
Ibid., 293-294.

Trenchs successors, Roy MacGregor-Hastie and John Waller, have the benefit of writing
a century after the events in Khartoum. Each of them used a wealth of primary and secondary
sources; by the 1980s several public archives held all of Gordons letters and papers.
MacGregor-Hastie and Waller are both trying to solve the mystery of Gordon and how his
mystique pervades history.37 MacGregor-Hastie, who begins his book with a dedication to thenPrime Minister of Britain Margaret Thatcher, advocates a strong foreign policy and uses his
nineteenth-century example as a metaphor for the contemporary foreign policy issues of his
country. He thus made Gordon into a symbol rather than an actual subject of a serious biography.
Although not ultimately persuasive, MacGregor-Hasties use of Gordon as a metaphor was a new
way of addressing the quandary of Gordonusing the past to advocate for change in the present.
Finally, John H. Waller once again brought the idea of a straight biography back to the
historiography of Gordon biographies. His work, undertaken over a century after Gordon died, is
the most comprehensive biography written to date. He was also the only biographer to tackle the
subject of the Mahdi in a non-biased way, treating the religious leader as a figure of history and
not solely as the man who most other biographers claim is responsible for Gordons death.
Waller does not demonize the Mahdi. Instead, he provides his readers with a thorough
description of his life and his rise to power, describing the Mahdi in the same way he did other
major foreign figures that Gordon encountered during his life. To allow his readers to come to
their own understanding of Gordons demise, Waller does not make a definitive statement on the
exact cause of Gordons death, but merely analyzes all of the different reports of it.38 As one of
the most recent and the most definitive biographies on Gordon, Wallers work is quite important,
and it has begun to reshape the Gordon biographies canon once more.
Most of Gordons biographers understandably end their studies of Gordon with his death.
However, his importance as a figure in the imperial history of Britain is really only solidified by
his ultimate sacrifice. Since all of the biographies above only focus on Gordon the man, they can
be credited with perpetuating the fame of the general, but they are simply biographies. They fail
to develop a complex picture of Gordon because they are designed to detail the events of a mans
life. Nevertheless, as the scholarship of the last century has clearly demonstrated, Gordons
37

Roy MacGregor-Hastie, Never to be Taken Alive: A Biography of General Gordon; and John H. Waller, Gordon
of Khartoum: The Saga of a Victorian Hero; the full titles are provided here to illustrate the type of treatment each
author gave Gordon.
38
Ibid., 441-443; For the most definitive work on the exact causes of Gordons death, see Doug Johnson, The
Death of Gordon: A Victorian Myth, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 10 (1982) 285-310.

importance to empire and the British imperial project intensified after his death, almost to the
point of rendering all of the other achievements of his lifetime before his final mission to
Khartoum insignificant. Thus, any study of Gordons impact on the imperial process would
clearly have to employ a new methodology to understand the puzzle that was Charles Gordon.
This new methodology makes use of the concept of the imperial hero, an idea that has
been explained in John MacKenzies studies on imperialism and popular culture. One major
focus of MacKenzie's overall work is the link between propaganda and imperialism and their
impact on material culture. Although MacKenzie does not study Gordon, he does examine some
other contemporary figures from the British imperial project, including another British martyr,
Dr. David Livingstone.39 As Livingstone also died while serving in Africa, there are some
obvious parallels between these two men, such as their Christianity and their choice to live
among the natives rather than among their contemporaries. Livingstone has received much
attention as the first martyred imperial hero, and the myth surrounding his death has been
developed much more fully than that of Gordon.40 Although the situations leading to the two
mens martyrdom were very different, the methodology to examine the resulting myths is not. By
using MacKenzies concept of the imperial hero as a lens into perceptions of Gordons death
and the beginnings of the myth, a much more nuanced picture of British imperialism emerges.
This multifaceted approach to the British Empire is reflected in how the martyred hero
was commemorated in a myriad of different ways. Soon after news of his death reached London,
Gordon was memorialized not only in print, but also in statue and even in edifice, with the
building of the Gordon Boys Home in England and Gordon Memorial College in Khartoum. A
thorough examination of these tangible reminders provides another facet into understanding the
public perceptions of Gordons death. Many historians have done work on the role of
commemoration. Recently, Berny Sbe has undertaken a study partially quantitative in nature
that discusses the volumes of tributes and engravings of imperial heroesfurther demonstrating

39

Mackenzies publications include several edited volumes. The one where he outlines the idea of an imperial hero
the most fully in is: John MacKenzie, Heroic Myths of Empire, in his Popular Imperialism and the Military
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986).
40
In addition to the John MacKenzie work, there have been other attempts at explaining the Livingstone legacy
including the catalogue to the National Portrait Gallery exhibit on Livingstone: National Portrait Gallery, David
Livingstone and the Victorian Encounter with Africa (London: National Portrait Gallery, 1996) and Dorothy Helly,
Livingstones Legacy: Horace Waller and Victorian Mythmaking (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1987).

the effect that imperial heroes had on the metropole.41 His work demonstrates the type of hero
that the British people most admired, described by historian Andrew Thompson as the
heroismof the ordinary soldier who guarded distant colonial outposts, fought against all the
odds and was sometimes rescued but more often overpowered by the enemy ranged against
him.42 Both of these historians have contributed new dimensions to understanding the impact of
material culture, but neither has shown how these material items create a myth in the way that
Maya Jasanoffs work on a slightly earlier phase of the British Empire presents. She examines
material culture and imperialism as a type of collecting, an approach which also has merit in
examining the life and afterlife of Gordon. 43
It is this afterlife of Gordon where his true value as an imperial hero in British culture
is revealed. Without the continual emphasis of his sacrifice made by the British media, it is
unlikely that his name and mystique would have had the same level of significance. Many
studies on British imperialism and imperial heroes mention Gordon. They do not, however,
examine how a man who disobeyed orders by remaining in Khartoum after he was told to
evacuate was not vilified in the press, but instead became a popular and cultural hero. For
example, David de Cavalhos article General Charles Gordon: The Making and Meaning of a
Cultural Hero, examines the role of Gordon in British culture in the years directly following his
death, but does not examine how the myth of Gordon was perpetuated after 1885.44 The concept
of myth as it is used by de Cavalho is closer to the literary definition of the term as exhibited in
Andrea Whites work on Joseph Conrad, another European imperial figure with contemporary
service in Africa.45
Charles Gordon also makes for a compelling imperial symbol. His depiction as a hero can
be useful for discerning the way an imperial symbol was perceived both in the metropole and in
41

Berny Sbe, Celebrating British and French Imperialism: The Making of Colonial Heroes Acting in Africa,
1870-1939. D.Phil Thesis, Oxford University, 2007.
42
Andrew Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back?: The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the Mid-Nineteenth
Century (Edinburgh: Pearson Education, Ltd., 2005).
43
Maya Jassanoff, Edge of Empire: Lives, Culture, and Conquest in the East, 1750-1850 (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2005). Cynthia Behrman originally coined the terminology in her article, The After-Life of General
Gordon which focuses on how the general was portrayed in literary sources. Cynthia Behrman, The After-Life of
General Gordon in Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, volume 3, number 2 (Summer
1971).
44
David de Cavalho, General Charles Gordon: The Making and Meaning of a Cultural Hero, Melbourne
Historical Journal 20 (1980), 2-24.
45
Andrea White, Joseph Conrad and the Adventure Tradition: constructing and deconstructing the imperial subject
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

10

the colonies. However, as with all other aspects of imperialism, the connotations of these
symbols can often be mixed. These imperial figures have a dual role in British culture as they
can be perceived as heroes by their supporters and villains by their detractors. In addition to their
service to the Empire, imperial heroes can also be manipulated to suit the demands of the
government and private interests, as shown in Bernard Porters The Absent-Minded
Imperialists.46 Porter includes Gordon in his discussion of imperial sacrifices, using him as an
example of someone willing to make the ultimate sacrifice in service to his country. Porter does
not analyze the implications of his death in a larger imperial context, but relegates further
discussion of the matter to an endnote.47 Porters book aims to describe the entire imperial
project undertaken by Britain. Gordon is merely mentioned as one example of an imperial hero
who was used to encourage continued public support.
Although Gordon was used to engender further public support for imperial projects, he
was not embraced equally by all segments of the British population. As a symbol, he was used in
debates over a variety of imperial situations throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. The idea of Gordon, the imperial hero became politically charged, as discussed by
Martin Pugh in his The Tories and the People: 1880-1935.48 Thus, the general became a tool of
opposition: his memory was manipulated to ensure the continuation of the Conservative Partys
imperial goals. These goals would, as has been discussed in the edited compilation, The
Conservatives: A History from their Origins to 1965, undergo a drastic change over the course of
the twentieth century.49 Gordons role and the role of all imperial heroes would by necessity
become diminished, especially as the British Empire began to decolonize.
As decolonization progressed, the role of imperial heroes changed. Heroes became
more important for what their lives symbolized than for their actions on the ground. Although
their actions in life were quite different, parallels can be seen between Gordons myth and the
treatment of another imperial figure in Africa, Jan Smuts. Bill Schwarz examines the conflicting

46

Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004).
47
Porter, 171, n21
48
Martin Pugh, The Tories and the People: 1880-1935 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1985).
49
Norman Gash, Donald Southgate, David Dilkes and John Ramsden, The Conservatives: A History from their
Origins to1965 (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1977).

11

views of Jan Smuts in Britain at the time of Smuts death in 1950.50 In his work, Schwarz
analyzes the use of Smuts, a man who was seen as both an imperial hero and an imperial menace
during his lifetime, by the British Government. Instead of commemorating Smuts actual policies,
and what he actually achieved during his lifetime, the British Government transformed him into
an imperial symbol, and manipulated his memory to suit the needs of the current government.
The controversy discussed by Schwarz, over whether or not he deserved a lasting memorial, adds
another dimension to the impact that imperial heroes had on British culture. By the time Jan
Smuts was eventually commemorated, imperialism had ceased to be the driving force of British
politics; however, his role as a hero of the Empire was important enough for his statue to be
included in Parliament Square, and further shows the malleability of the term imperial hero.51
Schwarz is not the only historian who discussed the changing needs for heroes as the
empire ended. In the edited compilation British Culture and the End of Empire, the diminished
need for heroes is examined in detail, as the volumes contributors seek to understand the end of
empire and its impact on the culture of Britain.52 Some of the contributors to this work
including MacKenzie, Kathryn Castle and Jeffrey Richardsaim to redefine imperialism as the
British Empire transformed into a Commonwealth. Castle, who works on juvenile literature,
charts the change from imperial heroes to native heroes, thus providing children with a more
complete history of now-independent nations.53 Literature was not the only medium that faced a
change as imperial heroes lost their importance: heroes were no longer depicted in the same
manner in music and film, but they were relegated to becoming mere figures of history once
moreno longer the standard bearers for imperialism.54
These changes are only one example of the crossroads that Britain faced as the country
could no longer be linked with empire. Britons likewise needed to form a new identity, one
which was not linked to regions it no longer possessed, and the countries which had been a part
of the empire now needed to be re-embraced as independent nations with their own histories. An
examination of Charles Gordon and his impact on the colonial process must also examine how
50

Bill Schwarz, Reveries of Race: The Closing of the Imperial Movement in Becky Conekin, Frank Mort, and
Chris Waters, editors, Moments of Modernity: Reconstructing Britain, 1945-1964 (London: Rivers Oram Press,
1999).
51
Ibid., 200.
52
Stuart Ward, ed. British Culture and the End of Empire (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001).
53
Kathryn Castle, Imperial Legacies, New Frontiers: Childrens Popular Literature and the Demise of Empire in
Ward, ed., 156-157 .
54
Jeffrey Richards, Imperial Heroes for a Post-Imperial Age: Films and the End of Empire, in Ward, ed., 135.

12

he is portrayed in histories of the British in Africa and whether the hero in the metropole is also
the hero in the colony.
Many histories of the British in Africa focus more on actual British colonies, not areas
that were only tangentially British. As Sudan was only under Britain as part of a condominium
with Egypt, it does not receive the same level of attention as other British colonies. Sudan does,
however, factor into these studies due to the British involvement there in 1885 and 1898.
Histories of the British in Africa written during and directly following decolonization do mention
Gordon and his time in Sudan, but once again, Gordon is only seen as the archetype of the
imperial hero. Historians of Britain in Africa do include the tragic story of his demise, but they
do not focus on the role that Gordon may have played in influencing British perceptions of
Africa and Sudan following his death.
Instead, if historians mention Gordon in their discussions of British Africa following his
death in 1885, it is merely to mention how he was avenged by the British mission into the
country in 1898, a mission which is typically described as the Re-conquest of the Sudan. Little
mention is made of other reasons why the British would remain involved in the region. It is more
important that the heroic Gordon, whose sacrifice had become a part of the English imperial
lexicon by 1898, be remembered and honored by another expedition to the country. Traditional
studies of the British in Africa written before decolonization, such as work by Edgar Sanderson,
focus on this theme of avenging Gordon. Sandersons work on Sudan concludes with the
following quote: Gordon was at the last avenged, in a way that would be dearest to the heros
heart, by the inauguration of a new era in the Sudan.55 This concept of avenging Gordon would
continue to be a theme in the historiography of Africa as part of the British Empire.
By 1968, when Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Deny wrote about the
role of Victorians in Africa, public perception had clearly shifted away from Gordon. In this
work, he is referred to as an archetypal herobut only described as a hero of the hour,
indicating that the need for imperial heroes had come to an end.56 British colonization in Africa
varied by region, leading to a lack of specific works covering the entirety of British Africa.
Instead, most authors focus on one in particularsuch as work by Eve Troutt Powell. In her
55

Edgar Sanderson, Great Britain in Modern Africa (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1970 reprint of 1907
edition), 365-366.
56
Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher with Anne Deny, Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism (New
York: Anchor Books, 1968), 24.

13

study, A Different Shade of Colonialism, Troutt Powell only examines Egypt, Great Britain and
Sudan, paying attention to Gordons time in the area. However, like other works on Britain and
Sudan, Troutt Powell does not focus on what she terms a propaganda campaign which was
waged by the British officials to convince the public to support Britains 1898 actions in Sudan.57
A more thorough analysis of this campaign will shed a greater light on to the formative years of
the Gordon myth, since after 1898 Gordons martyrdom had become completely shrouded in
the myth created by his supporters.
The other way that historians currently tackle the problem of Britains involvement in
Africa is by focusing specifically on only one aspect of its imperial project. Zine Magubane, for
example, has worked on the colonial project in South Africa. Her work, which focuses on life in
Africa and how Africans are perceived in England, provides another lens to examine the Gordon
myth. Magubanes studies on the Anglo-Boer War show the way that a historical event in Africa,
in this case the Boer War, was used to rally support for granting suffrage to women in London.58
Gordons supporters and the creators of the Gordon myth used his sacrifice in much the same
way. They argued for the continued British presence in the region by highlighting his sacrifice.
Magubanes work can thus be used as a template for a more detailed analysis of the Gordon
myth and adds a new form of analysis for understanding the meanings placed on his death by the
British public.
Finally, studies on British masculinity are the last area of historiography where a
greater understanding of the perpetuation of the Gordon myth adds new dimension. Gordon is a
military figure whose sacrifice inspired many and whose actions were met with great praise. He
is also regarded as a prototypical figure of British masculinity within its African Empire. Charles
Gordon was perceived to have sacrificed himself for the greater good, an idea which directly
correlated with the changing perception of British masculinity described by Paul Deslandes in
Oxbridge Men. Gordon was the epitome of this new man, a man who possessed physical
strength, muscular development, the stiff upper lip, adventure, fortitude, and [a desire for]

57

Eve M. Troutt Powell, A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Brtiain, and the Mastery of the Sudan
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 149
58
Zine Magubane, Bringing the Empire Home: Race, Class and Gender in Britain and Colonial South Africa
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

14

action.59 Although he himself did not attend university, Gordon was still a member of this class
of men who felt a calling to serve the empire, even if it meant his death.
This new trend in British perceptions of masculinity is further examined by John Tosh,
whose study of manliness and masculinity mentions Gordons death. Tosh sees his death as
evidence for the public perception of the empire being in danger and singles out his demise as
the one imperial event of the time period which occasioned more soul searching by the British
public.60 Gordons death is seen as a failure of the British system, and by extension a failure of
the imperial man. Like Deslandes, Tosh also links the idea of service to the empire with the new
imperial mana man who, like Gordon, was willing to make the absolute sacrifice. This new
imperial figure would also be from the upper and middle classes; he would be an honorable man
who chose to serve his country. Gordon was the epitome of these men and a fuller examination
of the public perceptions of his death adds additional dimension to this conceptualization of
masculinity that was created at the apex of the British Empire.
One agreed-upon fact by every historian who has ever studied Major General Charles
George Gordon is that he is a complex figure, but the nature of his death made him something
more, an empty signifier. Without a body, there was never a sense of finality about the life of
Gordon which allowed different people with different political agendas to project what they
wished into the void he left behind. As such, he has been the subject of hundreds of works.
However, the questions still remain: how much of peoples perceptions of Gordon have colored
scholarly analysis of the man himself; how did Gordons own life impact how he was seen in
death; and how did his death impact how his life is remembered? Gordons biographers have
tried one tactic to answer this question, but they are lacking in an analysis of the overall impact
that Gordon had on the entire colonization process. Historians who discuss imperial figures are
able to see the overall influence of Gordon, but they are not able to see beyond the myth which
shrouds Gordons actions. Gordons death in 1885 and the 1898 re-conquest which avenged
him were events that were too important to the public not to be mentioned in contemporary
histories of Africa, but they are not necessarily the most important events in this history of
British interaction with the continent, and thus do not receive much attention in such large scale
59

Paul Deslandes, Oxbridge Men: British Masculinity and the Undergraduate Experience, 1850-1920
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 5.
60
John Tosh, Manliness and Masculinities in Nineteenth Century Britain: Essays on Gender, Family and Empire
(London: Pearson Education Ltd, 2005), 194.

15

works. Finally, Gordon can be seen as an archetype of the new masculinity embraced by the
imperial project, but he himself was not the prototypical imperial man. In short, Gordon and the
study of Gordon is a n exercise in contradictions. These contradictions were present throughout
his life, and his death, and without them, his memory would not have been so cherished,
manipulated, and abused.

16

CHAPTER 2
THE LIFE, DEATH, AND CULT OF GORDON

Spanning thirty-plus years and three continents, the military career of Major General
Charles George Gordon defined his life. Even before he was sent to Sudan on his fateful final
mission, Gordons military exploits working for other governments had brought him a measure
of fame, but he was never the most famous military figure in his own country. It would be his
death that would enshrine him in the memory of the British public, but Gordon was far more than
an ordinary soldier, or even an ordinary man, during his lifetime.
To those who lived when he did, Gordon was in some ways an enigma. His personal life
was never much discussed in the press at the time; instead, he was only known for his
professional career. By the time he died, the British public had long been aware of his military
service, especially in China, in addition his charitable works. However, to comprehend fully the
role that Gordon would occupy in British imperial politics, it is important to have the same
understanding of the major events in his life as did his contemporaries.
The Generals first real introduction to the public came because of his service in China.
As Chinese Gordon, he was a figure of interest. Before he became Chinese Gordon, Charles
Gordon was just a member of the Royal Engineers; as Chinese Gordon, he became an almost
exaggerated figure. His military duties over the next twenty years would only add to his legend.
There were times in the late 1860s and 1870s when he would fall from prominence, yet he never
quite disappeared from the British consciousness. Every time there was a military or diplomatic
matter that involved any area where Gordon had served, he would once again emerge to the
forefront of any discussion. In essence, Gordon was seen as the consummate imperial soldier
from his time in China through his service in Sudan.
As his earliest biographers, who wrote while and directly after Gordon lived, liked to
state, the Gordons were a military family.1 Gordons older brother and father also served their

This section of biography summarizes the work and research of many authors, including: Eva Hope, Life of General
Gordon, A. Egmont Hake, Gordon in China and the Soudan, Hugh Wortham, Gordon: An Intimate Portrait, Lord
Godfrey Elton, Gordon of Khartoum: The Life of General Charles George Gordon, Charles Chenevix Trench,
Charley Gordon, Roy MacGregor-Hastie, Never to be Taken Alive: A biography of General Gordon, Demetrius
Boulger, Life of Gordon, 2 volumes, C. Brad Faught, Gordon: Victorian Hero, (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books,
2008), John Waller, Gordon of Khartoum: The Saga of a Victorian Hero, and Anthony Nutting, Gordon of
Khartoum: martyr and misfit. These biographers all focus on different aspects of Gordons career, for the purposes

17

country, and each achieved a rank higher than Gordon ever earned. He first experienced military
life as a child during the 1830s living in Woolwich, a military town outside London. As a young
man Gordon attended the Royal Military Academy in his hometown, and at the age of nineteen
was commissioned into the Royal Engineers branch of the army as a second lieutenant. By this
time, Britain was involved in the Crimean War, which was the first place young Lieutenant
Gordon was sent in December 1854, and where he participated in the siege of Sebastopol. It was
here where Gordon came to the attention of his fellow officers, including men who would later
have an important role in his tenure at Khartoum, such as Lord Garnet Wolseley and General
Gerald Graham.2
The Crimean War was also where Gordon got his first experience with diplomacy. He
was involved in the peace settlement, which eventually led to the 1856 Treaty of Paris. Gordon
was not a principal member of any major decision-making delegation, but he was a part of the
Boundary Commission that set the borders of Bessarabia between Russia and the newly
independent provinces of Romania, Moldavia, and Wallachia. As a part of his duties on the
commission, Gordon remained in the region for the next year, surveying the region to prepare for
the implementation of the Treaty of Paris.3 His time in Bessarabia, which was generally
unsatisfying to him as he saw himself more as a man of action rather than as a peacemaker,
was followed by a further posting in the regionthis time to Armenia. While in Armenia,
ostensibly as a part of another border commission, Gordon found time to travel around the region
and meet the inhabitants, a practice which he would continue throughout the rest of his career.
Armenia was also the place where Gordon, only 24, was exposed to the slave trade for the first
time. Later in his career, Gordon would use this knowledge during his attempts to eradicate
slavery while stationed in Africa.4 While in Armenia, Gordon also encountered people who lived
within a tribal dynamic and he had his interest piqued in a non-traditional military career. It was
here where Gordon slept in tents, lived among men who had no allegiance to official authority,
and even developed his later taste for living outside the civilized habits and social conventions

of this discussion, only the pages which give the most relevant information are included, i.e.: Hope, 3-4 and Hake, 34.
2
For some further events from Gordons career during the Crimean War, see: Hope, 4-8, Hake, 8-15, Wortham, 3947, and Elton, 14-25.
3
Gordons participation on the Boundary Commission is discussed in Waller, 37 and MacGregor-Hastie, 41.
4
Waller, 39.

18

that he grew up following.5 From Armenia, Gordon was sent to Constantinople, where he met
Ferdinand de Lesseps, who would later be the President of the Suez Canal Company, and
renewed contact with the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire as a member of the Boundary
Commission. Both of these contacts would later prove important to Gordons military service in
Africa, where for some of the time he indirectly served the Sultan.6
Gordon completed his military service in Asia Minor in December 1858 with a greater
understanding of the life of a soldier and of working as a British soldier for foreign governments.
He came back to Woolwich with the first of many honors awarded to him by foreign
governments, including becoming a member of the French Legion of Honour and receiving a
Turkish War Medal.7 Ironically for a man who often claimed not to want recognition for his
work, Gordon would receive many more over the course of his life.
Like most young officers who had served abroad, Gordon did not take to living at home.
He was no longer content to be a peacetime soldier and disliked living in the barracks. Gordon
got his opportunity to return to the type of soldiering at which he excelled in July 1860 when a
joint Anglo-French force was sent to China to impel the imperial government to ratify the Treaty
of Tientsen.8 China was in the midst of the Taiping Rebellion, and the treaty was designed to
safeguard British and French economic interests there. It also had a specific provision, Article X,
which guaranteed British ships the right to trade on the Yangtzee River.9 In order to convince
the Chinese to sign the treaty, the force began by attacking smaller towns outside the capital, but
by September, when Gordon reached China, an attack on the capital, Peking, was imminent. As
second-in-command of a company of the Royal Engineers in China, Gordon was directly
involved in this operation. Although the original plan was to take the capital quickly with a
modicum of effort, it proved to be more difficult, with the first British emissaries being thrown in
jail. However, by October, Peking had surrendered, the summer palace of the Emperor had been
burned to the ground by the British expedition, and Britain had forced the emperor to ratify the
treaty.
The most important aspect of this treaty from the British perspective was the provisions
in Article X allowing them access to the Yangtze River. However, this access would only be
5

Nutting,12.
MacGregor-Hastie, 50 and Wortham, 51.
7
For a further discussion of Gordons medals, see Hope, 8, MacGregor-Hastie, 51, Elton, 22, and Nutting, 11.
8
Boulger, volume I, 47 and C. Brad Faught, Gordon: Victorian Hero, 24.
9
J. S. Gregory, Great Britain and the Taipings (New York: Frederick Praeger, Publishers, 1969), 79.
6

19

granted after peace had been achieved: So soon as Peace shall have been restored, British
vessels shall also be admitted to trade10 Under the terms of the treaty, the British also
believed that they would have immunity from paying the Taiping any duties for using the river, a
position which led to further friction between the Taiping, who disagreed with this claim, and the
British, who wished to take advantage of the new ports opened to them. To ensure that they
would have this access, the British Empire joined what had previously been an intra-Chinese
struggle, using the flimsy justification that the Taiping were abandoning both the treaty and the
concept of free trade in generaland thus needed to be stopped militarily.11
As a member of the Royal Engineers, Gordon was tasked with constructing new living
quarters for the troops who were left behind at Tientsen to reinforce the now-ratified treaty. He
remained in the city for the next eighteen months.12 After his time at Tientsen, during which he
suffered a brief case of smallpox, Gordon was sent to Shanghai, where he again had a chance to
join the fighting. In Shanghai, Gordon was in charge of a detachment of Engineers that in 1863
fought the Taiping, who continued to threaten the tenuous peace and economic stability achieved
in China with the signing of the treaty.13
Gordon really came to national prominence in Britain during this struggle against the
Taiping. His actions as a part of the Chinese Ever Victorious Army would also earn him more
international recognition. However, the question still remains: how did a British Royal Engineer
find himself a part of a Chinese Army? The answer to this question lies in the British attitude
towards the Chinese and their intra-Chinese conflict. The Ever Victorious Army was actually
founded in 1861 as a conglomeration of French, Indian, and Chinese troops serving the Emperor.
Originally, this army was led by an American adventurer named Frederick Ward. It was quite
small and unorganized, only consisting of two regiments of 1000 men each, but it was effective
and soon proved its competence by capturing several Chinese cities. 14 With the justification of
the Treaty of Tientsen, combined with pressure from British officials serving in China and the
10

Gregory, quoting the terms of the treaty found on p. 79 fn. 24. He quotes Treaties, Conventions, etc. between
China and Foreign States, volume i, 408.
11
Jen Yu-wen, The Taiping Revolutionary Movement (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 148-149. The
British use of the Treaty of Tientsen as a justification for intervention is also discussed in Gregory, 81-82.
12
Boulger, volume I, 49.
13
Elton, 32. The Taiping rebellion technically lasted from 1850-1864 and was a radical religious and political
upheaval that impacted all of China. The major goal of the movement was to introduce an anti-Confucianist world
view into China, which was reflected in new ideas about democracy, property, and proper behavior. Although the
rebellion would eventually fail, China would never be the same.
14
Elton, 35 and Boulger, volume I, 56.

20

knowledge in London that their trade interests needed to be safeguarded, the decision was made
to allow British military and naval officers the right to accept Chinese military commissions at
half pay.15
This decision was in keeping with the policies of the British Army following the Crimean
War. After these two encounters, Britain would not be involved in any European warfare for the
next half-century, leading to a new attitude towards the army. Over this same period, the British
Empire expanded greatly, necessitating more troops. In essence, the army transformed from
being a standing, fighting force to one of a more mercenary nature, with soldiers being deployed
solely in areas of colonial interest.16 Gordons deployment while still serving as a British officer
to China and the Ever Victorious Army is merely one example of this practice.
As it was an organization founded and commanded by foreign officers, the Ever
Victorious Army, was never popular with the Chinese population it was supposedly assisting and
in non-Western works on Taiping it receives the added title of so-called.17 In fact, Chinese
historians are dubious about the claims of the armys success, as historian William Hail argues.
In his work on the Taiping Rebellion, Hail states that it would be rash to assert or assume that
Chinese Gordon put down the Taiping Rebellion.he was always strengthened by large
Chinese armies to whom a share of praise is due for the victories which their absence might have
turned into defeats.18 Clearly, although Gordon and the Ever Victorious Army have been
granted most of the praise for their involvement in the conflict in Western sources, this is not the
Chinese perspective.
However, regardless of historical opinion on the merits of this army, it was the one that
the British joined once they entered into the conflict. Gordon was dispatched to this army when
he was sent to Shanghai. As a part of the Army, Gordon proved valuable: his insistence on
reconnaissance before striking targets, including an outlying pagoda outside of Shanghai, led to a
great victoryand his rise to prominence in the army. When Ward was wounded in September
15

Ibid., 510, ff. 53. Jen includes the citation to Papers Relating to the Affairs of China (Blue Book 1864), p. 199
which has the Council in Order, March 1, 1864 that revoked two earlier orders, one of August, 13, 1862 and the
other from Janaury 9, 1863 that had granted this permission.
16
Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army 1509-1970: A Military, Political and Social Survey (New York: William
Morrow & Co., 1970), 273. The changing attitude of the British Army is also discussed in Stephen Badseys article,
New Wars, New Press, New Country? in Victorians at War: New Perspectives. Society for Army Historical
Research, edited by Ian F.W. Beckett, number 16 (2007): 34-46, and 40-41.
17
William James Hail, Tsng Kuo-fan and the Taiping Rebellion: with a sketch of his later career, second edition
(New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1964), reprinted from the 1927 edition, 262.
18
Ibid., 268-269.

21

of 1862, Gordon was proposed as the next long-term commander of the makeshift army.19
Following a bit of diplomatic dithering, Gordon was confirmed as its commander in January
1863. For the first time, he was in command of an army, but his influence was tempered by
having a co-commander, a Chinese Governor named Li Hung Chang. Thus, Gordon did not have
free reign over decision making. He also had one further restriction; due to an agreement made
with Li, he was only allowed to operate in an area comprising Shanghai and a thirty-mile radius
surrounding the city. Nevertheless, upon taking command, he promised to eradicate the rebels
and free China from the Taiping within eighteen months.20 Among his first actions were to
introduce discipline, to standardize pay and uniforms in the ragtag army, and to ensure that his
soldiers would both respect and fear him, thereby creating a unified fighting force.21
These modifications led to a series of victories occurring soon after Gordon took
command. By the end of April, 1863, the Army had won several battles and retaken many cities
and towns, proving his military expertise.22 Although partially hampered by intra-army intrigue,
his success would continue until October when he began to prepare to take the rebels last
remaining stronghold, the city of Soochow. To capture Soochow, Gordon organized a twomonth siege, punctuated by several smaller battles, from which he would emerge victorious, and
on December 5, he captured the city. 23
However, the capture of Soochow led to a multitude of other problems for Gordon. He
and his co-commander, Li Hung Chang, had a difference of opinion over the treatment of the
surrendered Taiping leaders. Gordon wanted them to be treated fairly and spared, but Chang
wanted them to be executed; the leaders eventually fell to the fate that Chang wanted. This
decision appalled Gordon, and he even argued strenuously against it; ironically, the British press
blamed him for the massacre.24
19

Elton, 36-37 and Boulger, volume I, 57-59. Although Gordon was the next to serve as commander of the army for
any stretch of time, another American, Henry Burgevine, had a disastrous and short-lived term before him.
20
Elton, 39.
21
Hope, 30-31.
22
Elton, 43.
23
Elton, 54, Hope, 42-43, and Boulger, volume I, 97.
24
Elton, 65 and Hake, 72-87. The true story of Gordon and the murder of these Taiping leaders was first laid
before the British public in an earlier edition of Hakes work on Gordon in China, reprinted at length in this later
volume. The original, entitled The Story of Chinese Gordon was published in 1884 and went through 12 editions,
further proving the ubiquity of this story. Although Gordon was blamed for the action in the first reports, following
an erroneous letter that was received in London from an English Gentleman, he was quickly exonerated, and the
story reported in the press changed to that of Gordon forcibly chasing Li Hung Chang with a revolver to with the
intent of killing him as justice for his massacre. This letter was reprinted in a variety newspapers including The

22

Following the capture of Soochow, only one other area was still in the hands of the
TaipingChangchow. Changchow was the final city that had to fall to the Ever Victorious
Army in order to ensure the victory of Imperial China. It was also the first place where Gordon
was wounded in battle; he was shot in the leg.25 After allowing his wound to heal, the general led
the final push of the army into Changchow. They were met by the threat of cannon fire and large
artillery, but luckily for the Ever Victorious Army, the Taiping powder was wet, and they were
unable to fire, lending credence to a rumor in the Army that Gordon was capable of
extraordinary things.26 This imagined ability to perform magic would be a frequent theme in
British analysis of and reporting on Gordons time in China, especially when his contemporaries
referred to his magic wand, or the swagger stick that Gordon used to conduct his troops.27
Thus, following the traditional British interpretation of the eventslike those presented in Lord
Godfrey Elton and A. Edgmont Hakes biographies of Gordonusing his skills, a bit of luck,
and his perceived magic, Gordon was able to lead the army into the city and to victory.
However, from the Chinese perspective, Gordons role in these events was quite
different, as has been shown by William Hails work. Hail is not the only historian who believes
that Gordons role in the events and even his mystical qualities were, if not complete
fabrications, certainly over-exaggerated. Hails work, which has been cited by the bibliographer
of the Taiping Rebellion, Ssu-Y Teng, as an epoch-making book which marked a significant
departure from the attitude of uncritical admiration for Gordon and the view that the Ever
Victorious Army was entirely responsible for quelling the Taiping Rebellion, was the first to
introduce Chinese sources into discussions on Gordon.28 It would not be the last. More recent
scholarship has even asserted that following the end of Gordons time as commander, he left
behind an army that had clearly outlived any usefulness and was even seen as, in the words of

Caledonian Mercury and the Newcastle Courant, etc. [Wholesale Slaughter in China, Caledonian Mercury, 1
February 1864; Imperial Atrocities in China, Newcastle Courant, etc., 5 February 1864]. The Times also had a
correspondent in China; the letter which ran in the paper was reprinted in several other papers including the Derby
Mercury and the Glasgow Herald. [China, Derby Mercury, 3 February 1864; How Soochow was Captured,
Glasgow Herald, 5 February 1864].
25
Elton, 67, Hope 80-81, and Hake, 94.
26
Elton, 69 and Nutting, 67.
27
Hope, 52-53, Chenevix Trench, 37, and Waller, 108. The authors refer to the Chinese terms for the stick: wand
of victory or magic wand. Gordons swagger stick was a part of his Royal Engineers uniform.
28
Ssu-Y Teng Historiography of the Taiping Rebellion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 124.

23

historian R.J. Smith, unruly, unpredictable, ineffective and even dangerous.29 That the original
concept behind the army, of having foreign trained Chinese officers, was also not effective thus
eliminated any real need of even having the army, although its dissolution proved to be more
problematic in Western policy making.30
Even before the Ever Victorious Army disbanded at the end of May, 1864, Gordons time
as commander was complete. He had accomplished his stated task: China was under control of
the Imperial Emperor once more. This was not a campaign where Gordon grew richhe refused
most of his pay and spent the rest on his troopsbut China was the place where his international
reputation was solidified. Although Gordon detested receiving praise and honors, he did accept
the two highest awards in the Imperial Army from the Chinese Emperor: the Order of the Yellow
Jacket and the Peacocks Feather. Furthermore, he became a heroic figure back home, where his
exploits at the head of the Ever Victorious Army were featured in the daily newspapers.31 In the
contemporary British press, Gordon was portrayed as the sole figure responsible for the
restoration of China to full imperial control; as a result, Gordon would never be completely
anonymous again.
However, it was his lost anonymity that Charles Gordon sought when he traveled back to
London, leaving China with as little ceremony as possible, in late 1864. At first, he was asked to
attend many different events, offered honors and promotions, but because he declined all of
them, he eventually faded in the publics memory.32 After a brief period of leave at home with
his family, Gordon reapplied to the Royal Engineers for a new posting. He was appointed to be
the officer in command at Gravesend, where he was responsible for the erection of new forts to
defend the Thames River from a possible French attack.33
In Gravesend, where he spent the next two years, Gordon was able to regain a measure of
his anonymity. It was also the place where his spiritual side first became known to the public.
29

Richard J. Smith, Foreign-Training and Chinas Self-Strengthening: The Case of Feng-Huang-Shan, 18641873 Modern Asian Studies, Volume 10, Number 2 (1976): 198. Franz Michael also addresses misconceptions
about the Army in his comprehensive three volume work on the rebellion: Franz Michael (in collaboration with
Chung-li Chang), The Taiping Rebellion History and Documents: Volume I: History (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1966), 171-173.
30
The Ever Victorious Army was finally disbanded at the end of May 1864, following intense diplomatic
discussions between the British and the Chinese. See Smith, 199-200 for more information.
31
Elton, 71-72 and Nutting, 73.
32
Waller, 119.
33
Elton, 78, and Waller, 121-122. Waller makes the claim that these forts were basically a Parliamentary
extravagance to assure the British public that although France once again seemed to threaten an invasion, they
would be well protected.

24

Gordon had always had his own personal religious beliefs; he quoted scripture and wrote D.V.
(the Latin abbreviation for God willing) in the margins of his personal correspondence, but these
beliefs had remained private.34 Charitable deeds were another aspect of his religious fervor, and
they were an important part of Gordons activities at Gravesend. He worked almost exclusively
with very poor, young boys who lived on the streets. He provided food, clothing, and education
to these children, and by the end of his posting, he was caring for hundreds of boys out of his
own pocket.35
Out of this commitment to education, Gordon began writing and distributing his own
religious tracts and teaching in the local Ragged School, which catered to boys who had nowhere
else to go nor money of their own, and the Holy Trinity Church Night School.36 He regularly
visited invalids and the sick and was willing to risk his own personal safety if it would benefit
another. Although Gordons devotion to charitable causes is commendable, he was certainly not
the only person who was involved in philanthropic causes during this time period. In fact, it was
common for members of the upper and middle classes in mid-Victorian England to participate in
philanthropy.37 For instance, Gordon was only one of many famous supporters of the ragged
schools. However, since Gordon was already a public figure in Britain, his support became well
known.38
While involved in his charitable works at Gravesend, Gordon also became acquainted
with another religious family, the Freese family. Their beliefs and friendship would provide
solace to Gordon even after he had moved on to other stations.39 His experiences there remained
a defining influence throughout the rest of his life, though Gordon never again had a place in
England that he called home following the end of this posting.
After Gravesend, the British Government sent Gordon back to Romania in 1871 as a part
of the Danubian Commission; instead of merely being a member of the boundary commission as

34

Elton, 33 and Wortham, 120.

Elton, 85 and Wortham, 150.
36
Waller, 130 and MacGregor-Hastie, 82.
37
A.F. Young and E.T. Ashton, British Social Work: In the Nineteenth Century (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1956), 15.
38
David Owen, English Philanthropy: 1660-1960 (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1964), 151. Owen includes an extensive list of other public supporters of the schools.
39
During his lifetime, not much was published or known to the public about the Freese family and their influence on
Gordon, but Mrs. Octavia Freese published a work in 1894 discussing their relationship and adding to Gordons
mystique with more reports on his good deeds in Gravesend. Octavia Freese, More about Gordon (London: Richard
Bentley and Son, 1894).
35

25

he had been almost two decades earlier, Gordon was sent as the British Commissioner.40 He
viewed the work as stultifying; he began to agitate to be posted elsewhere. Gordon got his wish
and was sent back to Crimea to survey British cemeteries remaining from the war. During this
second time in Crimea, he was invited to a dinner hosted by the British Ambassador to Turkey
where he met Nubar Pasha.41 Pasha served as an advisor to Khedive Ismail, the ruler of Egypt
and Sudan under the Ottoman Empire. Meeting Nubar Pasha ultimately changed Gordons career
and his life. In the fall of 1873, the Khedive was looking for a new person to replace the current
Governor of Equatoria, a British adventurer named Sir Samuel Baker.42 Following the advice of
Nubar Pasha, Ismail wanted Gordon to replace Baker in Equatoria, a province in Southern
Sudan. By October of that year, Gordon was released from active service in Britain, allowing
him to work for a foreign government and officially accept the post of Governor of Equatoria.
On his forty-first birthday, January 28, 1874, the new Governor left for Egypt, en route to Sudan
and his new posting.43
Equatoria was a particularly inhospitable place when Gordon first reached it. Egypts rule
over the territory was tenuous at best and would not have been possible without the tacit support
of both the French and the British. The reason for their support was its location, on the Nile
River, which was important to each countrys economic investment in the region: the Suez
Canal. In order to safeguard their economic interests, Equatoria needed to be under firm control.
This was not the only challenge Gordon had in ruling the territory; he also had to contend with a
rival for control of Equatoria, a native leader known as Zubair Pasha who controlled the Darfur
region. In addition, Gordon was not an autonomous ruler. He had to work with his immediate
supervisor Ismail Pasha Aiyub, the Governor-General of Sudan at the time, who had his palace
in Khartoum and controlled the amount of supplies that could come up the river to Gordons own
palace at Gondokoro, the capital of Equatoria.44
Gordon was not bothered by the lack of supplies or by the primitive quarters he found in
Equatoria. Instead, he began his tenure as Governor-General by focusing on the infrastructure of
40

For more information on Gordons mission and goals as a part of the commission, see E.D. Tappe, General
Gordon in Rumania The Slavonic and East European Review, Volume 35, Number 85 (June 1957): 566-572.
41
Elton, 112 and Boulger, volume I, 139-140.
42
Elton, 117 and Faught, 42-43. For more on Baker and his role as Governor see P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, A
History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day, fifth Edition (London: Pearson Education,
2000), 67-70.
43
Elton, 119.
44
Faught, 46-47and Nutting, 101.

26

the province, including building new forts. When he arrived, the entire province only had two
forts; Gordon, with his experience in the Royal Engineers, quickly had several more built. The
primary aims of these forts were twofold. One was to show Gordons intention to have an active
role in the province, and the second was to prevent the further spread of the slave trade, a major
source of income in the province. The eradication of the slave trade in Equatoria was one of
Gordons main goals as Governor-General. Another major goal was to survey the rest of the
route of the Nile. Although he did not completely achieve both of these goals, he was somewhat
successful. Gordon was able to reduce the slave trade, though he was not able to eradicate it
completely because his rival, Zubair, continued to support and offer succor to slavers in Darfur.
Under Gordon, the major course of the Nile was mapped out, an achievement which would later
be used by Egypt (and Britain, by extension) to justify further projects in the region.
Furthermore, Gordons men charted Lake Victoria and several new falls.45 However, by the end
of 1876, he had grown disenchanted with his work in Equatoria, the conditions he was living in,
and the lack of success he had made in possibly annexing more territory for the Khedive.
Returning home to England on Christmas Eve, 1876ostensibly for a vacationGordon vowed
that he would no longer serve the Khedive as Governor of Equatoria.46
When Gordon returned to Africa in early 1877, his wishes were granted and he was
appointed Governor-General of the Sudan by the Khedive, replacing Ismail Pasha Aiyub, whom
he accused of participating in the slave trade he was trying to eradicate.47 In addition to giving
Khartoum to Gordon, the Khedive also made him a Marshal in his army, which gave him a larger
purview, including the entirety of the Red Sea. Gordon now had the opportunity to try to end the
slave trade completely. He began by going on several expeditions into the desert, where the
power base of the slave trade was located, and forcing the slavers into agreeing to give up their
trade. At the same time, he continued his efforts to denude Zubairs power base in Darfur.48
However, Gordon also had diplomatic affairs to attend to, including a power struggle in
Abyssinia, which he settled. Overall, his second tenure as Governor-General for Khedive Ismail
was successful. Nevertheless, there were some failures in his reign, especially in his finances. By
the time Gordon left Sudan, the area that had been under him was almost completely bankrupt,
45

Chenevix Trench, 91.

Faught, 53.
47
Elton, 194.
48
Ibid., 204 and Nutting, 149-150.
46

27

partially as a result of Gordons policies, as he was never known to be the most careful about
money, instead preferring to earn and spend as little money as possible and giving the rest away
to others, but most of the blame belonged to the Khedive and his poor financial management
skills.
Gordon was not the only person to fall victim to problems with finances during this time
period. Egypt was essentially bankrupt, and Khedive Ismail was deposed, with the support of the
British, in 1879 and replaced by his son, Tawfik, who governed with a strong Anglo-French
influence.49 During this upheaval, Gordon had officially resigned his commission, but his
resignation was not accepted and he was forced to remain Governor-General. Following Ismails
overthrow, Gordon once again offered his resignation, this time in an act of protest against
Ismails treatment.50 It was accepted, and by the end of the year, he was further disenchanted
with the British and Egyptian governments, but was nonetheless happy with his continued
success at eradicating the slave trade.
By 1880, Gordon had returned home to England a changed man. He wanted to resign his
commission in the Royal Engineers, but he was prevented from doing so.51 Instead, he was told
to take a years leave, but this hiatus was shortened due to a change in government in London
from the Conservative Party under Benjamin Disraeli to the Liberal Party under William Ewart
Gladstone. Soon after this transition, Gordon was recalled to be the private secretary to the new
Viceroy in India, Lord Frederick Ripon. He did not last long in the position, partly because his
appointment was purely political. By making him private secretary, Gladstone and Ripon used
Gordons personal history of philanthropy to add a veneer of respectability to the Viceroys
programs of reform. 52 Gordon regretted accepting the commission almost immediately and
resigned it as soon as possible, after which he traveled briefly to China at the behest of his old
compatriot, Li Hung Chang. Li wanted Gordon to serve again as an advisor to his old army, the
Ever Victorious Army. This time, although the War Office was inclined to allow him to work for
the Chinese, the Foreign Office was not, as there was a threat of war between China and Russia,

49

Holt and Daly, 70.

Nutting, 181.
51
Elton, 225.
52
Faught, 66 and Boulger, volume II, 43-44.
50

28

and Britain did not want to become involved in the possible conflict.53 Without government
approval of a long-term stay in China, Gordon was forced to return to England once more.
It was early 1881 by the time Gordon returned. He spent the next few years based in
England, although he did leave the country from time to time on insignificant military matters,
including an undistinguished spell at the Cape Colony in Southern Africa. During a brief tour of
duty in Mauritius, he was promoted to his highest rank, Major-General.54 Gordon also found
time during these fairly quiet years to visit Palestinea visit which lasted for almost a year.
However, by late 1883, Gordon was restless and looking for a new challenge. He thought that he
had found this challenge when he was approached by King Leopold of Belgium. Leopold
controlled the Congo and wanted Gordon to go there as his personal representative.
Unfortunately for Leopold, Gordon was not allowed to resign his commission in the British
Army to work for another sovereign government. Disappointed, Gordon returned from Brussels
in early 1884.55
At the same time Leopold had approached Gordon to work for him, problems had arisen
in Sudan, which was still controlled by Egypt. Both Egypt, a de facto British protectorate, and
Sudan had nationalist uprisings in late 1883 and the government was worried about the
possibility of a nationalist movement taking control of the countries. In Sudan, this nationalist
movement was led by a Muslim religious figure called the Mahdi, which was a name for the
Messiah. The Mahdi, whose real name was Mohammed Ahmad ibn Abdullah, believed that he
was divinely ordered to bring justice to the world and to return Islam to its original religious
beliefs. As the Mahdi, he was seen as a saint and a successor to the Prophet Muhammad. The
Mahdi became an inspiration for people who either followed his beliefs or who wished to escape
from Egyptian, i.e. British, rule.
Originally, the Mahdi built his support from people who were disenchanted with the
current government in Sudan. His early supporters included people who were associated with the
slave trade and those who lived in Darfur. Later, he would also be joined by other Sudanese
groups who did not like living under Egyptian control, but his army of followers lacked unity.
53

Boulger, volume II, 60; Immanuel C. Y. Hsus article builds off of Boulgers version of the events leading to
Gordons mission to China and adds further analysis to the discussion. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, Gordon in China,
1880, The Pacific Historical Review, volume 33, number 2 (May, 1964): 147-166. Hsus discussion on the reason
Gordon was invited to China is found on pp. 148-153.
54
For more on Gordons activities and promotion during this lull in active service, see Elton, 256, Nutting, 192-193,
and Boulger, volume II, 95.
55
Nutting, 221, Elton, 271-272, and Faught 75.

29

This unity would come later, once the Mahdi had cemented his reputation and created a new,
more fundamentalist version of Islam.56 His version of Islam, which differed greatly from the
more secular version practiced by the Khedive in Egypt, was one of the major reasons why many
more Sudanese joined his army and were willing to fight and even die for their beliefs. Thus, it
follows that one of the Mahdis main goals was to create a place where his version of Islam
could be practiced in a Sudan that was free from the corrupting foreign influences he was
rallying against.57 One of these influences that he was determined to eradicate was the British
government, which had a large stake in keeping both Sudan and Egypt under control and
defeating any nationalist movement in the two countries. In the eyes of the government, the best
solution was to evacuate Sudan and abandon it to the Mahdi. However, as Gordon was
considered to be an expert on the area, his expertise was thought to be needed, and thus the War
Office denied his request to work for Leopold. This denial would lead to a fateful decisionto
send the general back to Sudan.
The idea of returning Gordon to Sudan did not originate with the War Office or the
Gladstone Cabinet. Instead, the decision was motivated by public outcry and the pressure of the
press, particularly The Pall Mall Gazette and its editor, W.T. Stead. After knocking on Gordons
door on January 8, 1884 and being greeted by the general himself, Stead was granted an
interview. They spoke about the deepening crisis in Egypt and Sudan. This interview was
published the next day on the front page of the Gazette as Chinese Gordon for the Sudan. In
his article, Stead claimed that he was presenting Gordons opinion on evacuating Sudan to the
public for the first time. He stated that Gordon believed that abandoning the territory was
condemning the population to death by massacre at the hands of the Mahdi and his forces. Stead
continued his article by calling for a reversal of the governments policy of evacuating Sudan
and for the government to send in the one man who he felt was qualified, General Gordon.58
If the story had remained simply one article in The Pall Mall Gazette, perhaps Gordons
ultimate fate may have been different. Gordon did not give many interviews, and this interview
with Stead was the first time that he had spoken to the press about Sudan. Inevitably this
56

P.M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan: 1881-1898: A Study of its Origins Development and Overthrow
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), see 42-44 and 53.
57
Waller, 301-314. The exact details of the Mahdis rise to power and even when Mohammed Ahmad became the
Mahdi are not known to historians. For more on the Mahdis rise to power, see Holt and Daly, 75-80.
58
The headline and information in the article are reprinted in Elton, 273; the entire statement that Stead claimed was
made by Gordon is reprinted in Boulger, volume II, 111-115. The original article appeared on the front page of The
Pall Mall Gazette on 9 January 1884.

30

distinction led all of the other major newspapers in Britain to pick up the story. The next days
papers featured excerpts of the interview. By the end of the week, these papers were calling for
Gordon to be sent to Khartoum, not to evacuate it, but to save it.59
The final decision to send Gordon back to Sudan, however, was not undertaken lightly.
The general had never been a favorite of the powers at the War Office; he was regarded as too
much of a loose cannon, a man who could not be counted on to perform his duties as they were
intended. The government feared sending Gordon to Sudan for this reason, and even resisted
asking him for advice, but the situation on the ground continued to deteriorate. On January 18,
1884, following a meeting at the War Office, he was officially sent back to the country in what
was then termed to be an advisory and executive capacity, both to look into the situation on the
ground and to evacuate it. The British government had effectively decided at this point to
abandon any interests it had in Sudan, and Gordon was sent to ensure that the decision would be
enforced.
Although the decision to send Gordon to what would ultimately be his death was finally
reached in 1884, the terms of his mission when he left London remain unclear.60 Gordon was
sent to Sudan by a government that did not have full trust in him, and he was to report to the
Egyptian Government before undertaking any major decisions. These conditions, imposed by the
War Office, would lead to frustrations between Gordon and the metropole, especially when it
came to whether or not he was to evacuate the country.
On January 26, exactly one year before his death, Gordon arrived in Cairo. His departure
from London had been made in hastehe had left the meeting at the War Office and headed
directly to the rail station at Charing Cross, his first stop on the way out of England. The story of
his departure has been told many times: on his final trip out of London, the man who would be
hailed as a hero had little money in his pockets and received the loose cash, pocket change, and
pocket watch of his old friend, Lord Garnet Wolseley.61 The rest of his journey was uneventful;
the next year would not be.

59

Ibid. This is also an example of an editor influencing governmental policy a subject which will be analyzed in
Chapter Three.
60
Bernard M. Allen, Gordon and the Sudan (London: Macmillan & Co., 1931), 234, Faught, 79-80, and Elton, 283.
61
This story has been repeated many times, thus it seems to be more than apocryphal. Early authors who cite it
include Strachey, 295, Hope, 260-261, Wortham, 279, and Boulger, volume II, 122. Since these early authors
included the tale, it is not surprising that it features in many later biographies of Gordon such as Elton, 290-291,
Nutting, 228, Waller, 330, Faught, 80, and Chenevix Trench, 206.

31

Once Gordon arrived in Cairo and presented himself to Sir Evelyn Baring, the British
consul in Egypt, he was told there had been a change in plans in his mission. The Cabinet, which
had agreed in London a month previously that Gordon would serve in both an advisory and
executive position, had now decided that he was just to evacuate the country. The members of
the Cabinet had acceded to public pressure to send him to Sudan, but they were not going to
allow him to remain an advisor. The situation with the Mahdi remained dire, there was a greater
perceived need to evacuate the country, and Gordons personal beliefs about abandoning it, as
evidenced by his Pall Mall Gazette interview, no longer mattered. This change in focus and
Gordons impressions on the change were illustrated in a private memo written by Gladstone.
This memo was the first time that the difference of opinion between the two men on how to solve
the problem in Sudan was explored, and it clearly demonstrates this tension:
the irrevocable decision [to evacuate] of which he [Gordon]
speaks isthe decision to evacuate the territory and not to incur
the very onerous duty of securing to the peoples of the Soudan a
just future Government. This decision as far as possible involves
the avoidance of any fighting62
As Gladstones memo demonstrates, the British government wanted to quit the region, but it was
equally clear from other sources that Gordon was still unwilling to evacuate the country.
In fact, another dimension of the problem between Gordon and the Gladstone Cabinet
was over the transition of power within Sudan. When Gordon left Egypt for Sudan, he wanted to
bring his old rival from his time as Governor of Equatoria, Zubair, back with him and leave
Zubair as Governor of Sudan, not himself. However, this solution was not acceptable to Baring
as it would not result in the evacuation of British interests in the territory if they propped up a
new ruler. Instead, conventional thought in London was to abandon the territory to the Mahdi
and, in the words of Gladstone [put] an end to this most perplexing and distressing affair.63
The difference of opinion between Gordon in Khartoum and Gladstone in London was
not easily resolved. As the Mahdi grew stronger, Gordon became more isolated in Khartoum and
getting messages through to him became much harder, leaving him to work in a more
autonomous fashion. Before the Mahdi took the area directly surrounding Gordon, there was
communication between Khartoum and London, even if it was infrequent. Afterwards, Gordon
62
63

British Library Add Ms. 44147, ff 25.

Ibid., ff.102-103.

32

was essentially alone in Khartoum with his Egyptian troops. He had no idea what his home
government wished him to do and no idea if any help or reinforcements were coming to his aid.
Soon, Gordon and his few troops were under siege in Khartoum and his local government was
effectively out of money, but he was unwilling to leave the country to the Mahdi.64
This state of siege would last until the end of Gordons life. He would not receive much
meaningful communication from the British government, nor would he know whether an
expedition to aid him would reach him in time.65 By December 1884, he realized that the relief
expedition he had long sought, which would be led by Lord Garnet Wolsely with the assistance
of General Gerald Graham, would probably not reach him in time. At the close of the journal he
kept during his solitary occupation, he wrote his farewells to his fellow officers, acknowledging
his frustration with not knowing if he would be rescued, and finally closing with an acceptance
that there was nothing he could do about it: but this is spilt milk, he wrote, Good bye.66
Charles George Gordon would be dead a month later, still attempting to hold Khartoum.
The actual details of Gordons last days and death are the subject of much conjecture.
All of his contemporaries, biographers, and historians agree that he was killed two days before
the relief expedition reached Khartoum. The first news of his death emerged from reports which
described the failure of the relief expedition, as did the first accounts of what may or may not
have happened in Khartoum. Therefore, the details of Gordons death are still open to debate.
The stories include: Gordon being run through with a spear, either in his bed or while running
down the stairs; Gordon being stabbed; Gordon being shot while attempting to run for safety; or,
the most sensational of them all, Gordon being decapitated while still alive.67 The most prevalent
story of the time was that of Gordon being speared. It is also the description referenced in most
biographies and in the official account provided in the comprehensive history of the war.68
When the scouts from the relief expedition arrived two days before the main force, they
refused to believe that Gordon had died. Instead, they discounted the fantastic stories about his
death and set out to find him, looking for signs of Gordon and his Egyptian troops, hoping to see
64

Gordon himself invented his own paper currency to allow the government to function, but the only thing backing
his money was his own reputation. For more information on the currency, see Elton, 327.
65
The details and political decisions leading to the relief expedition will be discussed in the next chapter.
66
British Library Add Ms 34479, ff. 130.
67
In the confusion following the death, various accounts were sent to newspapers. The Manchester Guardian
reprinted an account that was published in the Morning Post which claimed of the live decapitation, although a
correction was later issued. The Soudan Campaign, Manchester Guardian (February 12, 1885), 8.
68
The Blue Book on Egypt, which was included with Gordons last journals in British Library Add Ms 34479, was
the official documentation of his death.

33

the flag that he always flew from his palace at Khartoum. The soldiers of the relief expedition
conducted an eager searchbut no sign of it [the flag] could be observed.69 It was obvious to
those who came to rescue Gordon that he was no longer in command of Khartoum, but his death
had still not been confirmed as an absolute certainty.
Gordons death would not be confirmed by the British until their steamers drew closer to
Khartoum and messengers were sent into the city. They returned and through eyewitness
testimony confirmed that his death had occurred two days prior to the scouts arrival.70 The
confusion surrounding Gordons death was reflected in the official account of the fall of
Khartoum. Written by Major Horatio Kitchener, it indicates a desire to address the
circumstances: It is difficult, from the confused accounts, to make out exactly how General
Gordon was killed. All the evidence tends to prove it happened at, or near the palace, where his
body was subsequently seen by several witnesses.71
Gordons death remains a mystery, partially because of the problems that the British had
with those who witnessed it and the fact that these witnesses were known to change their stories.
For example, Kitchener referenced one witness who claimed that the general wore light colored
clothing and then later changed his mind and stated that Gordon wore dark clothing.72 Another
problem with any discussion of Gordons death and the manner in which he died was the fact
that the accounts published in Britain, including the official history, did not take into account the
information that could be gleaned from the Mahdi. When these sources are examined, as done by
historian Douglas Johnson, a more complete account of the death is possible.73 He reached his
conclusions by examining what happened to the general according to people who claimed to
have witnessed the actual killing and death and left their records solely in Arabic. These records,
which historians had never previously examined, provide clarification. Although Gordon served
in the region for almost a decade overall, he never became familiar with Arabic, the language
predominantly spoken in Khartoum and by the Mahdi. Similarly, most of the men sent to relieve
him and the people who wrote the first accounts also lacked familiarity with the language. The
official account of Gordons death in Arabic sources mentions Gordon being speared by
69

H.E. Colville, History of the Sudan Campaign, originally published 1889, reprinted (Nashville: The Battery Press
in association with the Imperial War Museum Department of Printed Books, 1996),36.
70
Ibid., 38.
71
Ibid., Appendix 47, pg. 274.
72
Ibid.
73
Douglas H. Johnson, The Death of Gordon: A Victorian Myth, The Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, volume 10 (1982): 285-310.

34

natives while dressed in white and standing at the top of the palace stairs. This version is
supported by other Arabic sources, all of which mention the spear being thrown at the general as
he stood at the top of the stairs.74
There are no direct eyewitness accounts of Gordons actual death, leading all official
accountsregardless of languageto rest solely on supposition. The Arabic accounts cited
above adhere to the official description and are similar to Kitcheners English version of events.
There have been some challenges to the official story espoused by both sides of the conflict. In
his article, Johnson cites the example of Karl Neufeld, a fellow European, who was held in
captivity by the Mahdi, as one of these departures. In his memoir, Neufeld claimed that Gordon
was wearing a dark suit and he was shot, not stabbed or speared. This account, published at the
end of the nineteenth century, also includes the recollections of Khalil Agha Orphali, the man
who was on guard in Khartoum palace the night Gordon was killed. 75 According to Neufeld,
Orphali claimed that he saw, a bullet [strike] the Pasha [Gordon] in the right breast[and] the
Pasha was getting weak from loss of blooda native of Khatimeh speared the Pasha in the right
hip, but I shot him, and the Pasha fell down on the cavasses [servants] mat at the door, and was
dead.76 This retelling is one of the first to introduce the idea of being shot into the lore
surrounding the circumstances of Gordons death and is generally discounted, partially because it
came from a non-British source, making the information suspect at the time.
Following his discussion of how Gordon may have died, Johnson incorporated what
happened to Gordons body after his death and the fact that his head was severed postmortem.
Although the sources mention that Gordon was decapitated and his head was placed in a leather
bag following the act, they do not mention what later happened to it.77 Later it was recorded in
the official records and several contemporary biographies that Gordons head was, for many
days mounted on a tall pole in front of the Mahdis tent, [serving] as a macabre flagstaff to
remind the faithful that Islam had triumphed.78
Gordons body was never recovered from Khartoum. His head, the subject of much
consternation, was never returned to England. Unlike other fallen heroes, there was no public

74

Ibid., 286-287.
Ibid., 293.
76
Karl Neufeld, A Prisoner of the Khalifa (London, 1899), 336-337, cited in Ibid., 294-295.
77
Ibid., 296.
78
Waller, 439.
75

35

funeral held at Westminster Abbey and he never received last rites.79 Instead, the public found
other outlets to commemorate the fallen hero, a subject which will be discussed in later chapters.
However, without a body and without a ceremony, there was no closure for Gordon, his
death, and what he meant to British culture and the British Empire. This lack of closure,
combined with the fact that Gordon was already considered a hero before he left for Sudan, is
partially reflected in the way that the British public strove to comprehend his death. Without a
funeral, and without a consensus on exactly how he died, Gordons sacrifice remained open to
interpretation.80 His death could be co-opted by different groups for diverse reasons.
As will be fully discussed in later chapters, these interpretations helped shape the socalled myth of Gordon. One popular view on Gordon was to portray him as a Christian martyr, a
view aided by the lack of a body. Those who supported Gordon as a Christian martyr took their
evidence from his life, especially his time spent at Gravesend and the beliefs he held, comparing
the struggles in Gordons life to that of another martyr, Jesus Christ.81 These comparisons were
strengthened with Gordons death at the hands of a Muslim enemy. Beyond his portrayal as a
Christian martyr, he was also remembered as a second type of martyr: an imperial martyr, whose
death served his country. This concept of martyrdom was compounded by the publics belief that
his death could have been avoided. This argument places the blame and responsibility for
Gordons martyrdom on the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, making Gordon a martyr to politics,
rather than to religion.82
As these discussions on two different categories of martyrdom show, Gordons death
was able to be interpreted in many different fashions. These interpretations are just two of the
reasons why the cult of Gordon began. Gordons real significance was born out of his death
in death he could become an imperial symbol. Even in life he had been associated with Britains
various foreign involvements in Asia and Africa. His significance in these areas would only be
increased because of how he died.
79

The countryman who was most compared to Gordon, David Livingstone, another man killed in Africa, did receive
a public funeral at Westminster Abbey. For more information see John Wolffe, Great Deaths: Grieving, Religion
and Nationhood in Victorian and Edwardian Britain (London: Published for the British Academy by Oxford
University Press, 2000), 137-138.
80
This concept, the idea of an empty signifier, is examined in Page Dubois, Sappho is Burining (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1995). Dubois examines the poetry of Sappho through the lens of the unknown; people
can project into the poetry because the words have not existed, much the same way that Gordons absent body
functioned. See pp. 82-83 for Dubois treatment of the subject.
81
Hope, 361-369.
82
John Wolffes work neatly summarizes the major points in the political martyrdom question. Wolffe, 147.

36

Although the concept of martyrdom was one of the most significant tropes to emerge
from Gordons death, it was not the only one. His death was also seen as a commentary on the
situation that Britain was facing with Egypt in particular and its empire in Africa in general. By
1885, British imperialism was approaching its zenith. Anti-imperialist forces were quick to use
the death of Gordon to support their claims against extending the empire further. As such,
Gordons death can be examined as another way to see the imperial project and as a way of
understanding British public opinion on its empire.83 Within this argument, the outpouring of
grief and support for Gordon clearly demonstrates that the public was dismayed with how its
hero was killed and even sacrificed to the cause of imperialism.
The circumstances of Gordons death can never be determined with absolute certainty.
As discussed above, this uncertainty has allowed for a wealth of differing opinions about where
he died and the manner in which he died. The 1885 publication of his journals, which
demonstrate his feelings of abandonment in his final months, allowed for public speculation on
the way in which he himself would have liked to have been remembered. However, what has not
yet been addressed is the effect that Gordons death had on the people who knew him, the people
who knew of him, and the people who were sent to relieve him.
Charles George Gordon was born an ordinary, average man, but his experiences would
change the way that some Britons viewed their empire: either with a renewed sense of pride or
with the beginnings of distaste for the imperial project. His public acclaim came from his
participation in imperial projects throughout the world. The Generals service in Europe, Asia,
and Africa was emblematic of the then-character of the British Empire, giving him the necessary
background to aid in his transformation to an imperial symbol.
Without the press influence, Gordons role as an imperial figurehead would have been
diminished. It is possible that the circumstances of Gordons death would not have occurred
without the press direct agitation for his return to Khartoum. The press was primarily
responsible for the creation of this imperial figure and hero, not the generals own actions. From
November 1884, Gordon was unable to communicate with anyone outside of Khartoum; yet his
story and circumstances were still being presented to the public by the press on a daily basis.
Thus, the press was responsible for shaping public opinion in Britain regarding Gordons time at

83

Andrew Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back?: The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the Mid-Nineteenth
Century (Edinburgh: Pearson Education Ltd., 2005), 181-182.

37

Khartoum. The only way that the public knew about his struggles with the British and Egyptian
governments was because the press told them. Gordons perceived abandonment at Khartoum
led to an increase in peoples desire to learn as much as possible about the circumstances. In
turn, his death would lead to a sense of outrage felt throughout British society as exemplified by
its coverage in the press. From the Queen and her ministers, to Gordons friends, acquaintances,
and those who only knew him through the press, people felt the need to express their anger,
sadness and dismay at what was perceived to be a senseless death.
Gordons death was unexpected. He was simply expected to go into Sudan and resolve an
unfortunate situation, not to die. The level of reaction and grief which accompanied the news of
Gordons death changed the way that Britain regarded its imperial ambitions in Sudan, and partly
changed the course of imperial history in that region. It also led to a new conception of Gordon
from a much decorated (at least by foreign powers) general to an imperial martyr, the figurehead
of British imperialism and the sacrifices it required.

38

CHAPTER 3
DEATH AND ITS AFTERMATH

The failure of the Gordon relief expedition added another dimension to General Charles
Gordons death. As the relief expedition had been cobbled together solely to appease the public
and was never a popular undertaking at the War Office, its failure was generally seen as the fault
of men not only in London and but in Egypt and Sudan. The fact that the expedition almost
succeededarriving in Khartoum two days too lateonly added to that perception. Once the
events of the expedition, including the delays that befell it and the official hindrances, became
known to the public, outrage against the government and Prime Minister William Gladstone
intensified. Popular opinion at the time believed that without these obstacles, the expedition
would have succeeded and Gordon, who by this time had become an even greater figure of
national interest, would have been saved.
In order to examine the political ramifications that the expeditions failure would have, it
is necessary to understand the events of the actual expedition, beginning with the discussions
over whether it was even going to be launched. Perhaps, if the expedition had been sent to Africa
in a more expedient fashion, then its outcome might have been different. Gordons arrival and
subsequent actions at Khartoum had remained a topic in the press through 1884. As long as news
could be received from Sudan, he would continue to be featured in the newspapers. Once news
from him could no longer be received, the questions over his mission began. These questions
only intensified at the first reports of his death. After Gordons death was confirmed, people
turned to the government for answers to all of their questions. These answers were sought by all
different levels of societyfrom men who were fighting to reach the general to the Queen
herself. However, the person who would be forced to answer all of these questions, and the man
who would be held personally accountable for the failure of the relief expedition, was the Prime
Minister. Gladstone never wanted to send an expedition to Sudan to save Gordon; now he would
be the person whose political career would be forever linked to that same expeditions failure.
National politics certainly had a role in any decisions to send a relief expedition. In 1880,
the Gladstone government had come back into power following an election in which the Liberal
Party defeated the seated Conservative Party and its leader, Lord Beaconsfield. Under the
Conservatives, Britain had followed a virulently imperialist course of action, leading to its
39

involvement in a variety of small, insignificant wars. The country was also struggling with the
question of continued involvement in Ireland.1 Even a history of the Conservative Party,
compiled with its assistance, recognized that one of the primary ways that the Liberal Party
returned to office was on the basis of arguing against all of the imperial decisions made by
Beaconsfield.2 However, even with the change of party, the British Empire was too large to
ignore. Thus, as Prime Minister, Gladstone advocated a new tacticLiberal Imperialism. This
concept of limited autonomous self-rule for provinces within the British Empire was partially
implemented in the policies he chose regarding Sudan. It led to his decision not to send an
expedition to relieve Gordon, a decision he would be forced to rescind due to political and public
considerations.
Gladstone was not the only government official who did not want to send in an
expedition, but he received the largest share of the blame.3 The public reaction to the perceived
abandonment of Gordon,who was portrayed in the press as being alone at Khartoum,
completely cut off from the worlddid not help the Gladstone governments choice not to aid
him. The Prime Minister was attacked for his delay in sending any help by some members of his
cabinet and by some of his military officials, including Lord Wolseley. He was also attacked,
once again by the press, whose involvement had forced Gordons original mission.4 Gladstones
decision to delay the mission was much criticized at the time, but he was not vilified until later,
when the mission failed. Following the failure of the relief mission, the vitriol against Gladstone
turned personal: he went from being perceived as one of the most important political figures in
his country to being seen as the man who condemned Gordon to his death.
As a result of his policies, Gladstones party went from having a large victory in the 1880
election to barely winning re-election in 1885. The reasons why he barely retained control of the
government were considerably more complicated than his actions in Sudan. For example,

Gladstone and Beaconsfield as the leaders of the Liberal and Conservative Parities respectively held the position of
Prime Minister from 1865 to roughly 1895. Martin Pugh has advanced the argument that economics was more
important than imperial considerations in the election of 1880, see his The Making of Modern British Politics: 18671945 Third Edition (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 67.
2
Norman Gash, Donald Southgate, David Dilkes and John Ramsden, The Conservatives: A History from their
Origins to1965 (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1977), 193-195.
3
Gladstone was not the only member of the Cabinet who wanted to delay sending help to the general. In addition to
Gladstone, the Colonial Secretary, Lord Derby, Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, and Hugh Childers, the Secretary
of State for War.
4
See previous chapters discussion on W.T. Stead and Gordon; Steads true imperial role will be addressed in more
detail in the following chapter.

40

historian Martin Pugh references both domestic and foreign problems that resulted in the close
election.5 However, regardless of all the other reasons why Gladstones political power was
lessened, events in Sudan led to his being personally blamed by the Queen and his actions being
questioned by Parliament. Gordons death did not end Gladstones political career, but it
certainly changed the way that large segments of the British public perceived their prime
minister. The failure of the expedition and Gordons death even changed the sobriquet applied to
the formerly popular politician: he went from having a reputation as the Grand Old Man (a
reference to his long public service career) to instead being known as the Murderer of Gordon.6
The fallout from the failure of the expedition to relieve Gordon was felt in other areas
besides Parliament and 10 Downing Street. It was an arduous expedition; many members did not
return, and those who did felt guilty about failing in their mission. Men in the War Office in
London and in government in Egypt also took the failure of the mission personally, even if they
themselves had not committed any actions leading to its unfortunate end.
Originally, the War Office did not want to send an expedition into Sudan to relieve
Gordon; it believed he had chosen to ignore his orders and stay in the territory even after he had
been told to evacuate it. However, by the summer of 1884, the government was forced, following
months of barely any communication with Sudan, to act. Gladstone, who had always refused to
send troops to the territory, had tried for months to delay the sending of any expedition, but was
finally persuaded that he must by his Secretary of State for War, Lord Hartington. An agreement
was made to send an expedition in August 1884, when Parliament voted to put aside 300,000
for the expedition, if it proved to be necessary; however, it still took another month for
preparations to be complete.7
One of the most important decisions that the War Office faced in relation to its relief
effort was who was to be its commander. This question, which was settled with the appointment
of Lord Wolseley, was directly linked with the actual goal of the mission. Wolseley had long
been a supporter of sending a mission to Khartoum specifically to save Gordon, but Gladstone
5

In his analysis of the election, Pugh states the following: The election of 1885 appears more complicated. That it
was less of a victory for the Liberals than 1880 was due primarily to [Charles Stewart] Parnells decision to withhold
the Irish vote in England, to the unpopularity of Gladstones imperial policies culminating in the death of General
Gordon at Khartoum in 1885, and to renewed alarm among the urban middle classes at the radical tone of [Joseph]
Chamberlains Unauthorized Programme., 67.
6
Gladstones transformation in the public opinion will be fully discussed in the next chapter.
7
Julian Symons, Englands Pride: The Story of the Gordon Relief Expedition (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1965) 8485.

41

had been unwilling to categorize the mission as such. Instead, it was given a much more
innocuous name: The Nile Expedition. Regardless of the name, everyone in the government
knew exactly what the purpose of the expedition wasto reach Gordon at Khartoum before his
supplies ran out. Even before the expedition was formed or even approved, Wolseley believed,
based on the scant information available, that the latest date Gordon could remain in Khartoum
was the fifteenth of November, 1884. This belief, which was later recorded in the official history
of the Nile Expedition, was among the considerations which led him to push the government to
approve sending a force to Sudan.8
On September 9, 1884, Wolseley arrived in Cairo to lead the Nile Expedition. Prior to
him leaving London, there had been a great deal of discussion about what route to use to reach
Gordon, which added to the overall sense of delay. The War Office considered two routes; one
was to sail up the Nile River, and the other was to go through the desert from Suakin to Berber.
Neither route was perfect, and the Office was undecided on which to take, though Wolseley
himself supported the former. Sailing the Nile River was a particularly daunting task, which was
one of the reasons why many at the War Office felt that it was the wrong route. However,
Wolseley did not see the Nile River as insurmountable. He relied on information gained from
commanding the Red River Expedition, which had been sent to investigate a settlement in
Canada. On this expedition, he used birch-bark canoes to traverse the Winnipeg River, whose
flow coincidentally happened to resemble that of the Nile.9 Wolseley transferred this knowledge
to the Nile and reconfigured whale boats to resemble the canoes he had used on the Red River
Expedition.10 His prior experiences solved the problem of how to reach Gordon, but the problem
of who was going to crew these boats remained. Wolseley needed men who were familiar with
these boats, and the only men who were familiar with them happened to be in Canada.
Before leaving for Cairo, Wolseley solved this problem by requesting approximately
three hundred Canadian Voyageurs as a part of his expedition. These Voyageurs, who were
divided into Europeans and members of the Caughnawaga nation, were only some of the
nationalities that were included in the expedition. He also included West African crewmen, and
8

H.E. Colville, History of the Sudan Campaign: compiled in the intelligence division of the War Office (Nashville,
The Battery Press in association with The Imperial War Museum Department of Printed Books and Articles of War,
Ltd., 1996), reprinted from the 1889 edition, part I, 31. Colville served as a Colonel during the expedition, any
editorial remarks made are his.
9
Symons, 101-102.
10
British Library, Add Ms 44148 ff. 140-141.

42

by the end of the expedition, even Australia had contributed a force. The makeup of the
expedition was significant: it was the first time that any of Britains colonial dominions had
contributed troops to an overseas imperial project, further cementing the importance of the
expeditions success.11
Although the relief effort had a time limit and a great amount of press coverage, the
Gladstone government still continued its obstructionist efforts against it. Beginning in April,
1884, Gladstone worked to defeat any efforts to relieve Gordon. In a long memorandum dated
April 19, he outlined his perceptions of Gordons role and the likelihood of ever sending
additional troops to Khartoum. In it, he expressed his dislike of the fact that Gordon had
remained against orders and still dared to request assistance, writing, If he remains by choice at
Khartoum what hopes does he entertain of useful actions?...are the views he entertains well
founded on the original design of evacuation?...If he asks for 3000 Turkish troopswhat motive
would he have for such a course?12 This memorandum, which was set aside in a volume of
papers that Gladstone marked as D.W. Gordon Mission, papers to be kept apart for reference in
case of dispute, showed that Gladstone already had cause to believe that Gordon had exceeded
his mission and thus was not to be rescued or helped. By keeping these papers aside, he also
indicated that he understood that his decision was controversial and open to questioning should
his tactics be blamed for a less than favorable outcome.13
Unfortunately for Gladstone, his grudgingly given permission resulted in an expedition
that reached Khartoum too late. Part of the reason why the final expedition failed to save Gordon
was not specifically his fault. There were problems with the Nile route that resulted in slower
progress than anticipated, but had the expedition been authorized and planned earlier, then these
problems may have been easily surmounted. Wolseley even condemned Gladstones delaying
tactics in his journal of the expedition, where he wrote: I hate to think we shall have to pay

11

There have been entire books written on the contributions of dominion troops to the Nile Expedition. For more
information on Canada, see: C.P. Stacey, ed. Records of the Nile Voyageurs 1884-1885: The Canadian Voyageur
Contingent in the Gordon Relief Expedition (Toronto: The Publications of the Champlain Society 37, 1959), 5. For
more on Australia see: Ralph Sutton, Soldiers of the Queen: War in the Soudan (Sydney: New South Wales Military
History Society and The Royal New South Wales Regiment, 1985), 38-39. The unique character of the expedition is
also addressed in Symons, 106-107 and Colville, part I, 66-67.
12
British Library, Add Ms 56452 ff. 42-43.
13
Ibid., ff.2. D.W. stands for Department of War. Altogether, two full Add Ms collections (56451 and 56452) were
kept separate to refute any claims that might be made against Gladstone regarding the failure of the mission.

43

many, many, valuable lives lost from the prolonging our operations into the hot weather for the
folly and ignorance of Mr. Gladstone.14
Although the Nile approach was considered the most effective route, it was not very
passable, even in the whale boats. Traveling up the Nile, the whaleboats and their crewmen had
to contend with six major cataracts. In each of these areas, the sailors were forced into the slow
and cumbersome process of partially dissembling and carrying their boats around the rapids.15
The difficulties in moving the boats meant the expedition needed to be headquartered in a central
place. The location chosen was Wadi Halfa, located between the first and second major cataracts
of the Nile. It was also far enough north that there still was unimpeded communication with
Cairo via telegraph, but as it was further up the Nile, it was closer to Khartoum. However, even
with headquarters at Wadi Halfa nearer to Gordon, the Nile still remained an obstacle, as many
more cataracts needed to be passed before the expedition could reach Khartoum, and in addition
to these physical difficulties, the expedition also had to contend with the fact that they were
entering what was, in effect, a war zone.
The fact that they were crossing through a war zone necessitated other side missions to
ensure that the boats would be able to progress up the Nile without encountering hostility. One of
the most important of these side trips involved the Mudir, or the local leader, of Dongola, who
was allied with the Egyptian government. Wolseley sent Brigadier-General Sir Herbert Stewart
to the Mudir to negotiate his cooperation with the relief efforts. This side mission indicated that
the British were not solely counting on the troops and supplies that they brought to the region,
but instead were also relying on the people who were nominally in the territory under their
control.16
While at Dongola on his mission, in late September 1884, Stewart received two messages
that had been sent from Gordon in Khartoum. One of these missives, dated July 31, indicated
that there was only food for two more months in the city.17 However, it was the second missive,
dated about a month later, on August 24, which added a further sense of urgency to the
expedition. This second telegram stated that Gordon and some of his men, including a Lieutenant
14

NA WO 147/8, p. 145
Stacey, 17.
16
Eve M. Trout Powell expands on the relationship between the Nubians, who lived in Dongola and foreigners
(which was any European, including those working for the Egyptian government as Pashas) in her A Different Shade
of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain and the Mastery of the Sudan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003),
70.
17
Colville, part I, 92.
15

44

Colonel named D.H. Stewart, were attempting to take Berber back from the Mahdi using several
steamers that Gordon had at his disposal in Khartoum.18 Shortly after receiving this telegram, Sir
Stewart was informed that the attempt had failed, Gordon was back in Khartoum, and Colonel
Stewarts steamer had been delayed while trying to head north and reach other troops and was
caught on a rock, preventing any forward movement. Two days later, on October 4, news
reached Dongola that Colonel Stewart and all of his men had been murdered on board their
disabled steamer.19 Not only did the incident cost the British one of their steamers, but it also
caused the Mudir to rethink his support for the expedition and to claim that he did not have the
proper resources necessary.20
Wolseley eventually traveled to Dongola himself at the end of October to secure the
Mudirs cooperation with the expedition. By going to Dongola from Wadi Halfa, where he had
previously been stationed, Wolseley believed that he would have more success in
communicating with Gordon. Even though the telegraph lines between Dongola and Khartoum
had been cut, native messengers, who were in the pay of the Mudir, were still able to travel
between the cities.21 With this partially reinstated communication, more messages could reach
Gordon, and Wolseley was able to inform him of the relief expeditions progress.
By November 30, 1884, Wolseley issued a general order to his troops reminding them
that the relief of General Gordon and his garrison, so long besieged in Khartum, is the glorious
mission that the Queen has entrusted to usWe can, and with Gods help, we will, save Gordon
from such a death [as the one that befell Colonel Stewart].22 Wolseleys conviction that they
would be able to save Gordon was one of the driving forces behind his decision to move to Korti,
which was located even further up the river. Furthermore, it was the location where the final
stage of the expedition, the advance to Khartoum, would be launched at the end of December.
The advance force sent from Korti was smaller than Wolseley had hoped to send. As a
result of circumstances in the region, the British were unable to gain the number of camels that
they required, forcing some men to stay behind.23 However, a Desert Column under the
18

These steamers had already made the treacherous trip up the Nile to Khartoum, and were among the resources that
Gordon had to use for his ostensible evacuation of the city.
19
Ibid., 92-93; There is also a detailed description of the way Colonel Stewart and his crew were trapped and
murdered on pages of part I, 97-100.
20
Symonds, 135-136.
21
Colville, part I, 109.
22
NA, WO 147/8; p. 137-138.
23
Symonds, 173-177.

45

leadership of Brigadier-General Herbert Stewart was dispatched to the town of Metemmeh,

where Gordon had sent his remaining steamers. Attached to this column was another officer, Sir
Charles Wilson, who was ordered to travel directly to Khartoum from Metemmeh and meet with
Gordon.24 On December 30, the Desert Column left from Korti, heading to Metemmeh, but they
did not get there without incident; on January 16, they encountered a large group, later estimated
to be between eight and fourteen thousand, of the Mahdis men at Abu Klea. Following
procedure, Stewart had his men form a zereba, or an enclosure that was made of stones and
thorns to resist attack, and wait for the Mahdis troops to attack. The Mahdis troops did not, and
because time was of the essence, Stewart was forced to continue his progress and attack them
instead, using the defensive square he had had his troops form as an offensive tool. His attack
was successful, and a day later he and his troops were able to continue to Metemmeh.25
By January 19, Stewart and his men had reached Metemmeh. There they were greeted by
further opposition and were once again forced to fight their way to the river where Gordons
steamers were anchored. In the ensuing battle, Stewart received a wound to his groin that would
later prove fatal, and command of the column passed to Sir Charles Wilson.26 Wilson was illprepared for the command, but he decided to continue the advance and finally reached the
steamers on January 21. On them, Wilson found several pieces of correspondence, all dated from
December 14 or before. In these communiqus, which included the final volume of his journal,
Gordon described the desperate situation that he found himself in and the need for a relief
expedition to reach him as soon as possible.27
Unfortunately for Gordon, there was more delay before the expedition would leave
Metemmeh and head to Khartoum. Although the general had urged haste, Wilson believed that it
was more important that the troops be safe and rested following the eventful trip to Metemmah
and that, because Gordon had falsely predicted in his letters that the city would fall on Christmas
Day, he could wait a day or two before launching the final stage of his advance. He believed, as
he later wrote, that the crisis at Khartum which had been deferred from the 25th December to

24

Colville, part II, 8-9. He includes the full text of Wolselelys orders to Wilson, including the object of his mission:
you will confer with him [Gordon] both upon the military and upon the political position.
25
Ibid., 15-22. He even includes battle sketches and a description of the famous battle square. For more on the
individual parts of the battle, see Symonds, 190-204.
26
Symonds, 208 and Colville, part II, 25.
27
Symonds, 217, 219, Colville, part II, 30.

46

the 19th January would be hurried on, or that a delay of a couple of days would make much
difference.28 As history has proven, this delay made a significant difference.
Wilson chose to wait for three days, leaving Metemmeh by steamers on the morning of
January 24. The journey to Khartoum was treacherous. On the first day, the steamers made
significant progress up the Nile, but the second day was not as fortuitous. One of the steamers
struck a rock on the second day, completely disabling it. After trying for six hours to free the
steamer, the expedition was forced to stop for the night. They did manage to free the steamer on
the third day, but by the night of January 26, the steamers had only moved three miles farther
away from where they had been the night before. On the next day, the steamers made further
progress, but they also encountered gunfire from the Mahdis positions along the Nile. By
January 28, the steamers were within sight of Khartoum; the men on them could see that the flag
was no longer flying from the roof of Gordons palace, and they assumed that the city had been
lost.29
That night, after fending off attacks from the Mahdi all day, Wilson ordered the
steamers to anchor at an island near Khartoum and sent scouts to the city to ascertain the fate of
Gordon. When the scouts returned, they confirmed that the city had fallen and that Gordon was
presumed dead. The next day, Wilson received a message from the Mahdi stating that the city
had fallen and asking that he send an envoy to find the truth about Gordons fate. Wilson refused
to send an envoy, but Gordons death was all but confirmed by the Mahdis actions. In the letter,
the Mahdi specifically said that Khartoum had been destroyed and made reference to a killing
of Khartum, which, according to the translation could only be a reference to Gordons death.
Hence, the only task that remained for Wilson was to get word back to Korti of his expeditions
ultimate failure.30
However, reaching Wolseley at Korti would prove to be just as difficult for Wilson as the
trip up the Nile to Khartoum. His steamers were attacked on the voyage back to Metemmeh; two
of them would be wrecked on the rivers cataracts and Wilson himself would have to be rescued
by the troops he had left behind at Metemmeh. Once he reached the town on February 1, he

28

Colville, part II, 30, quotes Sir Charles R.Wilsons From Korti to Khartum,, p. 112 in his official report. Colville
also includes Wilsons official report to Wolseley on his delay as Appendix 46, part II, 267-269.
29
Symonds, 232-235; Colville, part II, 34-38.
30
Colville, part II, 39-40. He includes a full translation of the Mahdis letter to Wilson.

47

forwarded his tragic news to Wolseley, who received it on February 4. By the fifth, the news had
reached London.
The men who had valiantly struggled to reach Khartoum in time were only two days too
late to save him. Two days was less than the length of Wilsons delay at Metemmeh, so his
actions received particular scrutiny, and he himself was vilified for what was perceived to be an
error in judgment. Yet the expedition itself did not end with Gordons death. Instead, it was
transformed into an expedition to avenge him and to guarantee that his death had not been in
vain. Instead of abandoning Sudan, the Gladstone government bowed to overwhelming public
and political pressure and ordered that the Mahdi would have to be overthrown by British
forces.31 Wolseley received telegraphic orders to that effect on February 7. According to these
orders, he would continue to be in charge of the expedition, which would receive more troops
and supplies, and a contract would be awarded to build a railroad in the region, which would
make troop movement easier. For the first time since Wolseley entered Sudan, it seemed as
though a British presence in Sudan would replace that of the Mahdi. Unfortunately,
circumstances outside of the region caused an entirely different ending.
In April 1885, Sudan was superseded as the utmost area of imperial concern to the British
government. Instead, there was an incident in Afghanistan, which was under limited autonomous
rule and regarded as a buffer-zone by the British and the Russians. Gladstone feared that this
incident, in the border town of Pandjeh, would lead to a full-scale military engagement between
the two empires and recalled the troops from Wolseleys expedition back to Egypt in anticipation
of their having to be sent to Afghanistan. The situation would not lead to war, as it was quickly
diffused by the Afghan leader, but the troop recall remained in effect.32 Some historians, like
Julian Symonds, claim that Gladstone was aware that the situation in Afghanistan would
probably be settled without British involvement, but he used the excuse of war as a way to end
the Sudanese relief expedition.33 However, these claims have never been proven. There was a
war supply vote that paid for both, but Gladstones possible speculation that the war might not
break out is unrecorded. Regardless of his motives, Britain would not become involved in Sudan

31

Symonds, 248 and Colville, part II, 57-60. The efforts by the press and the influence that their machinations had
on the governments policies will be discussed more fully in the following chapter.
32
For more on this situation, see Stephanie Laffer, From Masterly Inactivity to Limited Autonomy: Afghanistan
as a Catalyst for Liberal Imperialism, (masters thesis, Florida State University, 2005), 47-48.
33
Symonds, 268-269.

48

again under Gladstone. The Mahdis death in June 1885, which led to an internal crisis in the
country, only cemented the regions lack of importance.34
Although Sudans imperial significance waned, the events that preceded the politically
expedient evacuation of the region were not as hastily forgotten by the British public. Their
government had been willing to abandon the region, but people were not willing to abandon
Gordon, or what they believed to be his sacrifice for the preservation of their empire. His
perceived abandonment combined with the still uncertain, although definitely violent,
circumstances of his death led to a new role for Gordon: that of a martyr. He was seen by some
of his contemporaries, especially those who were already critical of Gladstone and the Liberal
Party, as having been condemned to his death by his government, a government that should have
been able to save him, but that chose not to do so.35
The lack of support by the government angered both Gordons friends and those people
who had only heard of him in passing, but it also allowed those individuals who saw Gordons
sacrifice as a gateway to his martyrdom, to add to their argument. As Gordon was already seen in
England as a hero due to his years in China and as a Christian man, especially following his
posting at Gravesend, it followed that his actions were designed for the good of those who he
was trying to serve and not for himself. Using these characteristics, Gordon quickly received an
additional appellation; he was now characterized by some as a Christian martyr.36 According to
these individuals, Gordons decision to stay in Khartoum, against the direct orders of his
superiors, could be seen as divinely motivated. He chose to remain despite the real possibility of
losing his own life, following the traditional definition of Christian martyrdom, which required
courage in the face of adversity, to be declared a martyr, as Jean Porter argues.37 Following the
definition of martyrdom that T.S. Eliot used to describe Thomas Becket in his Murder in the
Cathedral, Gordons actions can be said to be those of a man acting as an instrument of god.
34

Holt, 135.
Various reactions to Gladstones decision to abandon Gordon in Sudan are detailed in the following chapter.
36
The reasons why Gordons contemporaries characterized him as a martyr are discussed later in the chapter.
37
This definition of Christian martyrdom comes from the Oxford English Dictionary, which calls a Christian martyr
a person who chooses to suffer death rather than renounce faith in Christ or obedience to his teachings, a Christian
way of life, or adherence to a law or tenet of the Church; (also) a person who chooses to suffer death rather than
renounce the beliefs or tenets of a particular Christian denomination, sect, etc. The OED also defines non-Christian
martyrdom as the following, a person who undergoes death or great suffering for a faith, belief, or cause, or (usu.
with to; also with of, for) through devotion to some object. These definitions were common in the nineteenth
century. Accessed 19 April 2009. The traditional definition of martyrdom is expanded in Jean Porter, Mere
History: The Place of Historical Studies in Theological Ethics in The Journal of Religious Ethics volume 25,
number 3 (25th anniversary supplement), 1997: 103-126.
35

49

Eliots play built on the example of Alfred, Lord Tennysons play Becket, which was published
in November 1884, only two months before Gordon died.38 As Tennyson was the Poet Laureate
of Britain, his play was well read and the idea of Beckets sacrifice was present in the public
consciousness when Gordon was killed. While the situations that led to each mans martyrdom
were quite different, what they had in common was their respective decisions to follow what they
believed to be Gods will rather than that of their corporeal masters: Gladstone and his
government in the case of Gordon, and Henry II in the case of Becket.39 Both men were also the
subject of long-running cults that resulted from their martyrdoms. These cults were different in
nature; nevertheless, each served to illustrate national feelings regarding the circumstances of its
heros death and the governments direct involvement in it.40
One of the places where Gordons death was widely felt was in Egypts large AngloEgyptian community. As he had served in Africa for many years, including under the auspices of
the Khedive, he was personally acquainted with many prominent and average Egyptian citizens.
The man whom he knew bestand the one who in some ways sealed his fatewas Sir Evelyn
Baring, who at the time was the highest ranking British official in Egypt. As discussed
previously, Baring disagreed with the government about the character of Gordons mission to
evacuate Sudan and over whether or not Gordon was to report directly to him. He was also
involved in the discussions about the relief expedition and in its failures. Baring himself, writing
about the time period in his later years, acknowledged the role he played in both events. His
defense of his actions began with a discussion of whether Gordon should have been sent to
Sudan in the first place and concluded with an indictment against Gladstone and his cabinet for
acceding to the will of the press and the public and making the mistake of sending Gordon to the
region.41 Barings reaction to Gordons return was not necessarily a personal slight; he rather felt
that sending in Gordon, one who had attracted to himself a greater degree of public sympathy
38

Gerald B. Kauver and Gerald C. Sorenson, eds., Nineteenth Century English Verse Drama (Rutherford: Farleigh
Dickinson University Press, 1973), 256. The full connection between Tennyson and Gordon will be explored in the
next chapter.
39
Ruth M. Roths article contains a discussion comparing the martyrdom of Beckett, as portrayed in Eliots play.
However, her more modern comparative is with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Ruth M. Roth, Martyrdom The
English Journal volume 57, number 8, November 1968.
40
Beckets cult, and his resulting elevation to sainthood are discussed in detail in Frank Barlow, Thomas Becket
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 267-268. The idea of cults is also addressed in Anne J. Duggans
collection of articles, Thomas Becket: Friends, Networks, Texts and Cults (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007). The third
section is devoted entirely to reprinted articles concerning the formation of Beckets cult all throughout Europe.
41
The Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt: Two Volumes in One (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1908); the pages are
from the 1916 reprint: vol. I, 427-429.

50

than almost any Englishman of modern times, would only complicate a delicate situation.42 This
complication, which proved to be rather prophetic on the part of Baring, was intensified by the
failure of the relief expedition.
Professionally, Baring did not agree with the decision to send the general back to Africa.
Gordon, who was already considered a hero and called a national treasure in the House of
Lords speeches which lauded the decision to send him to Khartoum, was, according to Baring,
not the best person to send there; he did not want to send any British officials at all to Sudan.43
Personally, Barings reaction to Gordons death was one of shock, echoing a common trope
found throughout most personal correspondence during the period. Even writing nearly twenty
years after the event, in the unpublished drafts of his memoirs, Baring clearly demonstrated the
impact that Gordons death had on him and his country. As he wrote in his draft, well do I
remember the blank feeling of grief and disappointment with which I received the news of his
death, and then now at this distance of time I cannot pen the record of those last few sad days at
Khartoum without emotion.44 Baring had fought to prevent Gordons appointment;
nevertheless, he was still very affected by his actual death.
He was not the only person who personally knew Gordon to express the same level of
shock and dismay upon hearing about his death. Another man who knew both Baring and
Gordon well and even considered Gordon to be one of his close friends was the leader of the
failed relief effort, Lord Wolseley. Wolseley, who had been instrumental in first sending Gordon
to Khartoum in 1884it was his pocket watch and loose change that Gordon received on the
railroad platformwas also devastated by the death of his friend, especially because it was his
expedition that arrived too late.
As the leader of the expedition, Wolseley did receive a share of the blame that was placed
on the government following the confirmation of Gordons death. Through no direct fault of his
own, his expedition did fail, finalizing Gordons abandonment. Wolseley himself acknowledged
this failure in the letters that he wrote home to his wife. In these letters, he was willing to express
his feelings on Gordon and on Gladstone, and his strong sense of personal guilt is also quite
clear. Like Baring, Wolseley blamed Gladstone for the expeditions failure and his friends
death. However, unlike Baring, he did not choose to accuse Gladstone in print. Instead, he had
42

Ibid., 428.
Ibid., 428. Cromer quotes the words from a speech by Lord Cairns on February 14, 1884.
44
National Archives, Cromer Papers, FO 633/86 ff 632-633.
43

51

some sympathy for Gladstones position, which he showed when he wrote to his wife before
Gordons death had been confirmed as an absolute certainty: I should think this blow will kill
poor old Gladstone. He alone is to blame. Had he been a statesman, this misfortune could never
have fallen upon us: but he is neither. In the same letter, Wolseley also included his belief that
Gordon was willing to die for his mission to Sudan and would be happy with the circumstances
of his death, as he always looked forward to it.45
However, although Wolseley acknowledged that he was unable to change the
circumstances that led to Gordons death, he did worry over the reception that would greet him
when he returned to London and whether the public blamed him for Gordons death. In a later
letter, he expressed this fear, although his wife had already told him that, you have them [i.e. the
publics support] with you, in regards to the fate of the expedition.46 He was not specifically to
blame. Wolseley only joined the expedition because of Gordon, and the personal relationship
that the two men had: as you know I have never liked this desert venture and only embarked on
it because I thought I might by my rashness save Gordon, a hero for whom I had the deepest
reverence.47 He did not save Gordon, but it was not for a lack of trying.
Although Wolseley was the leader of the relief expedition, he was not the only member
who felt a distinct sense of loss at the news of Gordons death. Horatio Kitchener, then a major
on the expedition and the writer tasked with the official report of Gordons death, indicated his
personal feelings of grief. In the Blue Book on the situation in Khartoum, Kitchener wrote, The
memorable siege of Khartoum lasted 317 days, and it is not too much to say that such a noble
resistance was due to the indomitable resolution and resource of one Englishman. Never was a
garrison so nearly rescued, never was a commander so sincerely lamented.48 Kitchener was the
only person whose grief became a part of the official record of the incident, but he was not the
only man who served on the relief expedition to express his sorrow. Other expressions mostly
followed in the same pattern, with all members first expressing disbelief that the man they had
45

Letter from Lord Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, February 4, 1885. Hove Library, Wolseley Papers, W/P 14/3, i.
Regarding Gordons feelings on death, Wolseley wrote the following: . Poor Gordon! For his sake I sincerely hope
he is dead. Death was always looked forward to by him in the beginning of lifeone of my familys mottoes
MORS MIHI VITA EST! [death is life to me]
46
Letter from Lord Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, February 22, 1885, Hove Library, Wolseley Papers, W/P 14/5, i-ii.
Letter from Lady Wolseley to Lord Wolseley, February 20, 1885, Hove Library, Lady Wolseley Papers, LW/P 11/8,
iv.
47
Lord Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, February 22, 1885, iv.
48
British Library, Add. Ms. 34479, ff 133. Kitcheners report can be found at the back of the sixth volume of the
journals.

52

come to rescue was dead, and then continuing by mourning his passing. As one letter from an
anonymous writer stated, if the news is true [of Gordons death] it is sad, sad, news.49 A
further example shows just how important Gordon was to the average soldier. In his weekly
letter home sent from Korti, John Jack Dalison made specific mention of the fact that Gordon
was presumed dead: if anything happens to poor Gordon, the heart will go out of the
Expedition, but we will revenge ourselves for his life before we leave the country.50 The idea of
revenge was certainly not confined to this one letter; in later discussions of the expeditions
future, avenging Gordon by defeating the Mahdi emerged as the new goal once the death was
confirmed. Obviously, many other letters were written home from soldiers of all ranks who
served on the expedition; highlighting the thoughts of the man in charge (Wolseley), a high
ranking officer (Kitchener), and an ordinary soldier (Dalison), shows the overall impact of
Gordons death.
Reactions to the news from Sudan did not just take the form of correspondence. The
generals death was felt all throughout the British Empire, from London to her colonies,
including Canada and Australia. Both of these dominions sent more troops to join the expedition
once they heard about it. In some ways, the death of Gordon and the failure of the expeditions
original goal motivated participation in the expeditions new goal: to continue, as the late general
had put it, to smash the Mahdi.
The contributions of the Canadian Voyageurs were particularly important to the
expeditions new goals. As an article in the Ottawa Free Press explains, Wolseley addressed the
Voyageurs at the end of their contribution to the mission and extolled the great skill and
courage [they] manifested in making the ascent and descent of the treacherous current and felt
that but for the experience and assistance of [them] the expedition would not have reached
[Berber].51 Even if the Voyageurs assistance in Sudan was unable to save Gordon, their
contributions were clearly important to continued British involvement in the region. However,
they were not the only imperial force who played a vital role in the expedition.
Joining the Canadian Voyageurs in Sudan was a regiment from Australia. Many
prominent Australians, including retired military officials, advocated sending an Australian
49

Sudan Archives Durham, Durham University Library, Sir William Goodenough collection, Letter from February
1, 1885, 73/2/35.
50
SAD, Rotach Collection, Letter from 8 February 1885, 866/6/1.
51
Soldier Suffering in Sudan: How Stewart Was Betrayed, Ottawa Free Press, April 25, 1885, reprinted in
Stacey 202-203.

53

presence to Sudan, following the Canadian example. One official, Sir Edward Strickland, wrote
an editorial in the Sunday Morning Herald of February 12 calling for the new force both for the
glory of Australia and in memory of the gallant Christian hero, Gordon. He believed that
every Christian-born subjecthas lost a friend in Gordon; therefore all Christendom [would]
ring with praises of the gallantry of Australia in not losing a moment in tendering aid.52
Stricklands suggestion was quickly followed, and by the end of February, an Australian force
was headed to Sudan as described in Ralph Suttons work on the subject.
In Sudan, the expedition continued until the already-discussed international developments
forced the end of it in May 1885. This end, which was marked by one final transmission from
Wolseley, had a mixed result at best. The Mahdi had not been smashed. The British withdrew to
save face, and Wolseleys previous reputation for military excellence was diminished. His final
dispatch also highlighted the hard work of the men who participated in his expedition and the
fact that the failure was not their fault. As the concluding lines of his telegram state, No one can
regret more than I do the fall of that place, but in common with all my countrymen I look back
with pride to the gallant struggle made by our troops to save Khartum and its heroic defender.53
Like Kitchener, Wolseley was also able to express his personal feelings in the official report of
the expeditionand thus, was able to salute his troops as well as express his own discomfort
with the way his mission was ended.
If Gordon had not been a well-known citizen of the British Empire, discussions about the
expedition would have probably ended with the Wolseley dispatch quoted above, but he was not
an average man. In London, his death was greeted with an outpouring of grief in all levels of
society. Furthermore, it was a contentious issue in Parliament and even in Gladstones own
cabinet. Although Gordons death did not directly bring down the government, it can be credited
with turning the public opinion away from the Liberal Party in general and Gladstone in
particular. The long shadow of Gordons death would still be present in imperial decisions until
the end of Britains involvement in Sudan, which did not occur until almost a century later. He
would be invoked by those who supported continued imperial expansion; however, his death
would also be used by those who wished to curtail the empire. In discussions of the final

52
53

The editorial is excerpted in Ralph Sutton, 39.

Colville, part II, 231.

54

withdrawal, Gordons sacrifice is referenced, nearly sixty years after the original events
occurred.54
Regardless of the reasons why Gordon was not rescued in time, disbelief followed by
grief was the dominant emotion among members of the British government. Even Gladstone,
whose actions had directly led to delays in the expedition reaching Gordon, was dismayed to
hear that he had died. Some members of the government were more vocal about the death than
others; some took more accountability for their actions than others; but all felt the need to
acknowledge Gordons passing.
Like her ministers, the Queen was very distraught over Gordons passing. Her attitude
towards Gordon, a man whom she would later commemorate by having his bible occupy a place
of honor in her home, comes through in the letter that she wrote to various members of the
government about his all-too-preventable death.55 To show this anger publicly, the Queen took
the extraordinary step of telegraphing both her Prime Minister and Secretary of War en clair. By
sending her feelings on the matter in a non-ciphered telegram, the Queen basically announced to
anyone who was reading the telegrams, including members of the press, that she blamed the
government and was displeased with how her ministers had handled the crisis.56 This displeasure
is also seen in the Queens other correspondence. Her letter to Spencer Cavendish, the Marquess
of Hartington and the Secretary of State for War, is only one example of her feelings about the
conditions that led to the fall of Khartoum: to think that all this might have been prevented &
many precious lives saved by earlier action is too fearful.57 This letter to Hartington is only one
example of Victorias grief, anger, and dismay, but she did not excoriate Gladstone for his role in
the crisis. Her more vitriolic comments were reserved for the eyes of her Private Secretary, Sir
Henry Ponsonby, with whom she had reams of daily correspondence. In these notes, Victoria did
not temper her anger against the Prime Minister whom she only grudgingly accepted, nor did she
shy away from placing all of the blame for the situation on Gladstone and his government. To
Ponsonby she wrote, Mr. Gladstone and the Government havethe Queen feels it dreadfully
54

Gordons role in these discussions will be discussed in the concluding chapters.

Gordons sister Augusta sent the Queen her brothers bible as an acknowledgement of the Queens condolence
note and kind words about Gordon. See Giles St. Aubyn, Queen Victoria: A Portrait (New York: Atheneum, 1992),
456. The queens letter to the Gordons is reprinted in Barbara Harlow and Mia Carter, editors Archives of Empire,
Volume II: The Scramble for Africa (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 579.
56
Gladstones reply to the Queen following the telegram can be found in Philip Guedalla, The Queen and Mr.
Gladstone (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1934), 638-639.
57
National Archives, War Office 32/6121, Letter from Victoria to Hartington, February 5, 1885.
55

55

Gordons innocent, noble, heroic blood on their consciences. No one who reflects on how he was
sent out, how he was refused, can deny it! It is awful!58
Like most of her subjects, their Queen blamed the government for Gordons
abandonment; unlike most of her subjects, however, she was able to reach out directly to the
government and demand accountability regarding its actions. She did so in a direct note to
Gladstone the day after the news of Khartoums fall reached London. In this note, Victoria
outlined the two courses of action that the government must take. Logically, the first was to
ascertain if Gordon was alive or dead. The second contained a barely-veiled reference to
Gladstones indecision regarding the relief expedition: the Cabinet will promptly agree to a bold
and decided course. Hesitation and half measures would be disastrous.59 From these selections,
it is evident that the Queen was personally affected by Gordons death. It is also clear that she
was not willing to believe that his death was merely a result of a bad policy action. As her letter
of condolence to the Gordon family stated, the Queen keenly felt Gordons death, a death that
she felt left a permanent stain upon England.60
The Queens feelings on Gordon are reflected in her desire to memorialize Gordon in her
personal journals, where she was able to express her unedited anger about the situation. In her
personal journal she wrote about the government and Gladstone, using much stronger language
than she did in the letters discussed above. Instead, in her own private musings, the Queen
reflected, The Government alone is to blame, by refusing to send the expedition till it was too
late.61 This note is the only occurrence in her journals where she specifically blamed and
vilified the government for its inaction. The Queen also wrote about wanting to have a bust of
Gordon made and even directed one of her secretaries to send a letter to Gordons sister,
requesting a photograph to give to a sculptor to make a marble representation of the departed
general for her personal collection.62
The man at whom most of Victorias anger was directed, Gladstone, also had his own
feelings of grief relating to the failure of the relief expedition. Although his actions have been
blamed for its eventual failure, Gladstone himself was less willing to take the direct blame for
58

Letter from Victoria to Ponsonby, February 17, 1885 in Christopher Hibbert, ed. Queen Victoria in Her Letters
and Journals (New York: Viking, 1985), 290.
59
Letter from Victoria to Gladstone, February 6, 1885 in Ibid., 289-290.
60
Aubyn, 456.
61
Victorias Journal entry from February 5, 1885 in Hibbert, 289.
62
British Library Additional Ms. 51299, ff. 155-157.

56

Gordons abandonment. In his letter of condolence to the Gordon family, Gladstone attempted to
acquit himself while still apologizing for the situation. Instead of acknowledging the
circumstances, the Prime Minster, after spending several lines praising Gordons qualitiessuch
as his enthusiasm, military skill, and even his inexhaustible strength of willthen concludes
by almost blaming Gordon, the man he had called a hero earlier in the same letter. As
Gladstone wrote to the bereaved family, yet I reflect with pain now that the catastrophe has
come, how ill his generous confidence was requited by some of those for whose welfare, though
they were of a foreign race, it was his desire to live or die.63
This frequent desire to die for the Sudanese people was one of the points that Gladstone
in particular, and the government in general, was quick to use to justify their decision. The War
Office and Cabinets opinion of Gordon, already discussed, indicated that the official feeling on
Gordons choice to remain in Khartoum was that as it was his decision not to leave with the last
steamers, the final result was at least partially his fault. The fact that the relief expedition did not
reach him in time was really just a failure of planning and hence not a direct decision to abandon
him to his fate. Following this line of argument, it is understandable that Gladstone, when the
news about the fall of Khartoum reached London, still chose to attend a play that night. His
journal entry for that night, February 10, does not mention Gordon. Instead, he merely
commented on the play, The Candidate, which Gladstone noted was capitally acted.64 At the
time, he was vilified in the press for continuing to enjoy himself when the fate of Gordon was
not yet known to the public. However, following the logic that the government was employing,
Gladstone did not consider his actions to be inappropriate, especially as he was already aware
that Gordons death was almost a certainty because he had already stated as much in a letter to
Hartington three days previously.65
Many other members of the government were dismayed about the death of Gordon. In the
official memorandum of the government and in their personal papers, members of Gladstones
Cabinet, including Hartington and Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary, expressed their sadness
at the expeditions failure. Gordons death was not anticipated. There were no contingency plans
63

British Library Add Ms 52400 ff. 155-156 [Henry William Gordons copy] and Add Ms 51300 ff. 82-83 [Augusta
Gordons copy] Letter from Gladstone to the Gordon family, February 22,1885.
64
Gladstones journal entry for 10 February 1885 in H.C.G Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries with Cabinet
Minutes and Prime Ministerial Correspondence volume xi July 1883-December 1886 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1990), 293. Matthew also has a footnote recognizing the press coverage of Gladstones decision to attend the play.
65
7 February 1885 Letter from Gladstone to Hartington, Matthew, ed., 292.

57

for what the government was going to do if he was killed in Sudan, nor was there a plan for how
to replace Gordon at Khartoum. When the government was faced with having to solve these
problems, the utter failure to take any of these details into account became known, leading many
members of the government to turn further against Gladstone and his administration.
Perhaps the most telling sign that not all members of the government agreed with
Gladstone and his policies can be seen in the vote of no confidence that was proposed by Sir
Henry Northcote, a Member of Parliament. The vote, Motion: Want of Confidence in the
Government with relation to the policy in Egypt and the Soudan, failed, but it was only defeated
by fourteen votes.66 Gladstones government did not fall over Gordon, but it came close.
What Parliament was able to pass in acknowledgment of Gordons sacrifice was the
granting of an annuity to the Gordon family. As his earlier experiences in Egypt and Sudan
proved, General Gordon was not the most skilled financial administrator. Unsurprisingly, given
his hasty departure from London in January 1884, he did not leave his financial affairs in good
order; in fact, some of his last letters to his brother, in his role as executor of Gordons will,
included instructions to pay people on his behalf.67 Members of Parliament who were aware of
Gordons habits wished to grant his family an annuity as a way of expressing their gratitude for
his service and for his ultimate sacrifice. The first time an annuity was mentioned was at the end
of February when the House of Commons voted in favor of it. By March, a grant of 20,000 had
already been factored into the budget. The Gordon family received the money by royal warrant
in August.68
The grant to the Gordon family was extremely large and unconventional. He was not the
only general to die while serving the British in Sudan. Two years before Gordon died, another
general, William Hicks, was also killed by the Mahdis forces. Hicks did not receive any
parliamentary recognition, nor was his family granted any special monetary recognition. The
treatment of Hicks family was in keeping with the customs of the British army at the time.
Following the Cardwell reforms of 1869, the army did not make sufficient provisions for the
66

British Library Add Ms 56452, ff. 131. A February 27, 1885 note about the motion is found in Gladstones
supplemental papers
67
British Library Add Ms 52401 Henry Gordon Correspondence on Charles Gordons death, ff. 119. Henry Gordon
included the text of the will in a letter regarding the publishing of Gordons diaries, Richard Garret, General Gordon
(London: Arthur Barker, Ltd., 1974), 181.
68
British Library Add Ms. 52402 Henry Gordon Correspondence on Charles Gordons death, ff. 129-131; 108.
(1884-1885) House of Commons, Civil Services and Revenue Department. Further Supplementary Estimate : Grant
to the Family of General Gordon, estimate of the amount required in the year ending 31 st March 1885 for a grant to
the family of the late General Charles George Gordon 10 March 1885.

58

widows and orphans of its soldiers, nor did it grant an adequate amount of money to its former
soldiers.69 Thus, Gordons grant was unique. The circumstances of his death, combined with his
notoriety, provided an opportunity to acknowledge all of his contributions, at the same time, it
was also a perfect opportunity for the Queen and her government to express their sympathy with
his dependents publicly. In the text of the supplemental budgetary assessment necessary to pay
this large sum, the fact that the Queen had direct input into the bill was acknowledged: this sum
will be paid to trusteesin such a manner as Her Majesty may direct.70 The grant was not the
only way that the government recognized Gordons service, but it was the first official response
to his death.
The Gladstone government never really recovered from the loss of Gordon in Sudan. Its
failure to send an expedition to rescue him in a timely manner led to the common cry of too
late! and to Gladstones new appellation as the man who murdered Gordon.71 However, the
failure of the government to rescue Gordon cannot be placed solely on one man. The relief
expedition faced many difficulties and delays; even if it had been launched earlier, it is still not
certain that it would have reached Gordon in time. Wolseley, who escaped most of the blame for
the failure, was also partly responsible, but Wolseley was not the leader of the Liberal Party and
therefore escaped mostly unscathed.72 The fact that Gladstone was personally blamed for the
death of Gordon not only indicates the politicization of it, but also showed the profound rift
existing between the two political parties over matters of Imperial policy. Many men die heroic
deaths; however, to create a martyr, it takes an organized movement invested in bringing about a
particular agenda. Thus, Gordons death transcended his activities during his life and he became
a symbol. He stopped being seen as one man who was a bit of a mavericka loose cannon in
the words of the War Officeand instead became the personification of the ills of the Liberal
government.

69

Alan Ramsey Skelley, The Victorian Army at Home: The Recruitment and Terms and Conditions of the British
Regular, 1859-1899 (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 216.
70
Supplementary Estimate
71
Although this will later be discussed in detail, Bernard Porter examines the transformation of Gordon in The
Absent Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society and Culture in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 166167.
72
Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 97.

59

CHAPTER 4
THE GREAT HERO MEMORIALIZED

Even though General Charles Gordon died in Khartoum, the place where his death had
its largest significance was not Sudan, but London. The loss of an imperial figure and a man to
whom leading members of government referred as a national treasure was more than a political
loss. People from all levels of society, from the nobility to the working class, were united in their
grief and their wish to find a proper way to express it. Newspapers throughout the United
Kingdom presented the public with the details of Gordons final days, preserving his last hours
for posterity. They also carried letters written by those who wanted to commemorate the general.
A thorough examination of contemporary media helps to further an understanding of the
full impact of Gordons final mission and subsequent death. Some of their reporting veered
towards using the event as a none-too-subtle way of undermining the Gladstone government and
its policies. Regardless of the ulterior motives of the editors of these publications, Gordons final
year was clearly an event that received a significant amount of press coverage. Thus, with the
level of press coverage, it is hardly surprising that the general public would become personally
invested in the news from Sudan.
One of the ways the people of Britain demonstrated their personal involvement was
through the reams of correspondence sent to the Gordon family. The writers all felt a distinct
urge to reach out to the Gordon family and mourn the generals passing. These letters were sent
to the nominal head of the family, Charles brother, Sir Henry Gordon, from all across the British
Empire. They ranged from personal recollections by people who considered themselves friends
of the general to simple sympathy notes from ones who did not know him but were inspired by
the coverage in the press and the general knowledge of what transpired in Sudan. This public
outcry helped to preserve the popularity of Gordon and his abandonment for a significant period
of time; the death of Gordon was still a popular story in November 1885, nearly a year after the
events had occurred.1

Both the Daily News and the Western Mail featured articles entitled Mr. Gladstone and the Death of General
Gordon in early November 1885. Mr. Gladstone and the Death of General Gordon, Daily News 10 November
1885 and Mr. Gladstone and the Death of General Gordon, Western Mail 11 November 1885. Although both
articles had the same title, these were two distinct news items.

60

The most influential members of the public to acknowledge the loss of Gordon were the
members of the aristocracy. Like the Queen, they too had at least a passing acquaintance with the
general and thus had a personal drive to memorialize him. However, it is important to note that
several members of the aristocracy and the royal family itself were noted supporters of the
Conservative Party and its goals. Gladstone and the Liberal Party were, during this time period,
advocating policies that threatened the upper classes, from the idea of Irish Home Rule to the
Franchise Bill which extended the vote.2 As discussed in the previous chapter, Gordons death
and Gladstone were intertwined. Thus, by memorializing Gordon, these people were also able to
demonize Gladstone. Hence, it was the interest of these groupsthe people in the Empire with
the most cloutthat further spurred the continuing newspaper coverage of Gordon. Perhaps the
most important was the poet laureate of Britain, Alfred, Lord Tennyson. Tennyson would be
responsible for some of the best-known verses honoring Gordon, and due to a brief conversation
he and Gordon had in 1883 would provide the lasting idea for the national memorial to him.
Although Tennyson was not the only member of the aristocracy to honor Gordon, his
contribution was probably the most vital. Certain individuals at all levels of British society
wanted to honor the fallen general, not just the upper-most one. Their tributes may have received
the most coverage because of who they were, but similar sentiments can be found in many
tributes written by members of the British public who lacked their social standing. It is these
letters, written by ordinary people, church vicars, and school children that reveal the
importance of Gordon. Furthermore, these letters reveal the depth of the press coverage of all
events, as all of the correspondents referenced the same details in their tributes.
As has already been shown, the press played a large role in sending Gordon to Sudan.
Hence, it should not be surprising that the major drive to acknowledge Gordons sacrifice came
not from the government, but the press. It stands to follow that if the general had not sat for the
interview with W.T. Stead at the beginning of January 1884, and thus had not allowed his
feelings on the situation to become public knowledge, he may have had a much more anonymous
death.3 Certainly, he would not have been sent back to Sudan, as that decision by the War Office
was greatly influenced by the ensuing press fervor caused by the interview. Thus, in addition to
Gladstone, Wolseley, and other members of the government, the contemporary media must also
2

Martin Pugh, The Tories and the People, 1880-1935 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 74-75.
W.T. Stead, Chinese Gordon on the Soudan, Pall Mall Gazette 9 January 1884, accessed through the W.T. Stead
Resource Site http://www.attackingthedevil.co.uk/pmg/time.php, 25 June 2009.
3

61

share some of the blame for Gordons fate. The case of Gordon was not the only time that the
popular press has been accused, by historian John Mackenzie, of exploiting the publics
spectatorial fascination with colonial warfare to its own benefit.4 After the initial coverage
that accompanied Gordon back to Sudan, the press treatment of his time in the country was
occasional at best. His time at Khartoum did not become an important story again until the
details of his abandonment and the governments continued indecision to send him any
assistance became known.
Gordons fate became a newsworthy topic once more when Wolseleys relief mission
was in its planning stages. The march to save Gordon took on, in the words of historian John O.
Springfield, an almost crusade-like appearance to the British press.5 This crusading attitude
only served to enhance the generals struggle further in the eyes of the British public. His
survival thus took on another dimensionit became a national fascination. As Rudyard Kipling
described in his novel, The Light that Failed, which was published six years later, it was above
all things necessary that England at breakfast should be amused and thrilled and interested,
whether Gordon lived or died.6 Writing after the events at Khartoum had unfolded, Kiplings
somewhat satirical sentiment showed the level of interest that the public had in Gordon. His
struggle was constantly on their minds, and checking to see if any news of the stranded man had
arrived was a priority.
The source that everyone would check was the morning newspapers. By the time
Gordons final saga began, the press was undergoing a transformation and embracing a new
audience: the lower-middle and working classes. In his book, The Absent-Minded Imperialists,
historian Bernard Porter claims that Gordons mission, abandonment, and eventual death were
the type of story that newer newspapers thrived upon. The Gordon affair was exactly the form
of sensation that this medium needed to increase its market share. By the end of the nineteenth
century, as explained in Mackenzies Propaganda and Empire, newspapers as varied as the
Conservative-Party-supporting Daily Mail and the Liberal-leaning Reynolds News were
covering imperial events, including Queen Victorias jubilee and several smaller imperial wars in
4

John Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1984), 6.
5
John O. Springfield, Up Guards and At Them!: British imperialism and popular art, 1880-1914, in Imperialism
and Popular Culture, ed. John Mackenzie, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), 56.
6
Rudyard Kipling, The Light that Failed (New York: R.F. Fenno & Co., 1899), 28. The novel was originally
published in 1891.

62

Africa. However, this coverage would reach its peak with the ultimate sensational event of the
time period: the Boer War.7 Gordons death was only one sensationalistic imperial event during
this time, but it was among the earliest to appeal to this new type of yellow journalism.8
If the press in general and W.T. Stead in particular, share the blame for the decision to
send Gordon to his death, neither can be held culpable for a lack of commemoration once it
occurred. Instead, the press was among the first to memorialize the fallen general. He was
featured in large sections of the pages set aside for foreign news. For example, in the edition of
the Times published the day after confirmed reports of Gordons death reached London, an entire
page was devoted to re-telling the story of his life and reminding the public of the figure that
they had just lost.9 Instead of placing blame, the newspaper chose to commemorate Gordons
remarkable life. His exploits in Crimea, China, and his other foreign postings all served to
illustrate his long record of service to the empire, thus reinforcing the idea that the general died
while fulfilling his imperial duty.
The idea that the press was at least partially responsible for Gordons death is not one that
was popular at the time. Although there was plenty of vitriol directed at the government, the
same could not be said for the press. Even W.T. Stead, who was directly responsible for
providing Gordon the opportunity to express his displeasure with the tactics used in Sudan before
his re-involvement, was able to deflect any possible public ill-will with the pages of his
newspaper. However, Steads first telegrams sent to Gordons family after his newspapers
correspondents had reported on the fall of Khartoum demonstrate a level of personal
bereavement and grief. They also display that he himself felt guilty for Gordons fate.
Steads original telegram, sent at 10:53 in the morning of February 5, was the first news
that the Gordon family received about the fall of the city; he indicated that Khartoum had fallen,
but that there was no news about Gordon.10 Approximately twenty minutes later, the Gordon
family received a second telegram from Stead. This telegram did not contain any new
informationbut what it did contain was a warning to regard the first telegram as unofficial.11
Thirty minutes after the second telegram came a third one which introduced the idea of Gordon
7

Mackenzie, 6-7.
Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 170-171.
9
General Gordon, Times (London) 12 January 1885.
10
British Library Add Ms 51300 Correspondence to Augusta Gordon regarding Gordons death. 5 February 1885
telegram from W.T. Stead, ff. 64-65.
11
Ibid., 66.
8

63

being held as a prisoner.12 When taken together, these first three telegrams show the amount of
confusion that was present in London as news was slowly received from Egypt and Sudan.
Steads fourth telegram of the day, sent in the late afternoon, only contributed to the sense of
uncertainty. In his final telegram of that day, Stead cited what he claimed to be authentic news
from the Mahdi; unfortunately, his authentic news was that Gordon was still alive and wearing
the uniform of the Mahdis supporters.13 The news was false. By the next day, when Stead was
able to pen an actual letter to the Gordon family, his tone had turned from one of hope to one of
despair.
In Steads letter to Gordons sister Augusta, he references a letter that he received from
her regarding his 1884 articles and interview with Gordon. He then refers to them as perhaps
the best [work he] shall ever be permitted to do.14 With this phrase, Stead accepts the
responsibility for bringing Gordon into discussions on Sudan, and he accepts it with pride. He
also introduces another element into discussions of Gordons death, which at the time was still
only a possibility, allowing Stead to use terminology such as if your brother is dead and the
thought of her loss rather than definite terms. He was able to continue to hope that Gordon was
not dead because of the lack of fast communication from Khartoum. Communication had been
cut off completely from the city in November 1884. Wolseleys men needed to restore it before
they could send the conflicting reports received at Khartoum regarding the general back to
London. When the British troops took Khartoum, they did not know that Gordon was dead
there was only supposition until it was confirmed by the Mahdi two days later. Thus, when Stead
was writing his letter, Gordons fate still remained unknown. The hopeful tone contrasts with
the editorial and articles that Stead would be forced to write in the days ahead as his hopes were
unfortunately dashed.
Although the first news from Sudan was received, as the above telegrams demonstrate, in
London on February 5, Gordons death was not confirmed until days later. On February 10,
Stead was no longer able to believe the authentic news from his earlier telegramGordons
death had been confirmed. The next days Pall Mall Gazette featured several articles about
Gordon. Some were laudatory while others indicted the government or outlined the actual events

12

Ibid., 67.
Ibid., 68.
14
Ibid., 6 February letter from Stead, 69.
13

64

as they were known.15 Steads In Memoriam served as a eulogy; in this laudatory article, Stead
was not above using his piece to justify sending Gordon to Sudan and even to use his death as an
example of patriotic faith.
The section of his In Memoriam that is devoted to this aim begins with the idea that
Khartoum was evacuated by massacrea subtle way of reminding his readers that Gordon was
originally sent to the region to evacuate the cityand then continues with the idea that the
general was now confirmed to be dead. Only after laying out the exact circumstances of
Gordons death and calling him a martyr does Stead continue with the following statements:
Even with that terrible telegram of massacre and treachery before their eyes there
is not one of his friends who for a moment regrets that General GORDON was
sent to the Soudan [sic] to suffer and die in the defence of Khartoum. Looking
back over the whole of the dark, confused welter of bloodshed and blunder that
filled last year, the mission of General GORDON stands out distinct and clear as
the one great achievement of England for which everyone has indeed good cause
to thank GOD and take courage. 16
These comments indicate the depth of feeling present in London about Gordons death. They
also show that Stead believed Gordons death was to be in service of a higher cause, hence his
discussion of Gordon as a martyr. Interestingly, once he finished his discussion of Gordon and
the circumstances leading to that stainless life now crowned with the aureole of martyrdom,
Stead focused more on the ideas of the second sentence quoted above, or Gordons similarities to
other people who achieved greatness for England: Kings Arthur and Alfred and Oliver
Cromwell.17 The In Memoriam piece also served to set the tone for the rest of the days
coverage of Gordon.
Two other articles from the same edition were not presented as editorials; instead, they
were news items. The first, Let Us Cut and Run was an indictment against the government
consisting of reprinted speeches given by members of Parliament who opposed the governments
decision not to smash the Mahdi. Stead chose to publish these speeches in full to indicate his
agreement with the speakers and to show his disagreement with the government. The other
article, The Death of General Gordon is similarly factual. These articles were solely to inform
15

These three articles are only a sampling of the Pall Mall Gazettes focus on the death of Gordon in the February
11, 1885 issue. W.T. Stead, In Memoriam, Let Us Cut and Run, and The Death of General Gordon, Pall Mall
Gazette 11 February 1885.
16
W.T. Stead, In Memoriam, Pall Mall Gazette 11 February 1885.
17
Ibid. The figures mentioned above are discussed in the article as examples of Englands greatness.

65

the public about the events and the speeches, or in other words, to show the less emotional side
of the debate.
Professor Laurel Brake discusses this aspect of press coverage in her article Government
by Journalism and the Silence of the Star: Victorian Encounters, 1885-90.18 In it, she analyzes
W.T. Steads use of his newspaper as a way of influencing public perceptions, such as his
decision to feature Gordons 1884 interview on Sudan on the front page. By doing so, Brake
argues, Stead was contradicting the role that journalism played at the time and instead was
creating a more active form of higher journalism. This form of journalism would become
predominant, partially as a result of the way in which government decisions were covered.
Imperial issues were not the only ones that Stead advocated in the pages of his newspaper. Brake
focuses more of her attention on domestic ones, such as Steads series of articles The Maiden
Tribute of Modern Babylon which exposed child prostitution in London. As a result of his
articles, the government passed a law that, among other provisions, raised the age of consent for
girls from 13 to 16, which indicates the impact that Steads series had on the public. The
predominance of this form of journalism was further proven by the Cleveland Street scandal
which was created to test the law referenced above.19 Thus, it followed that a government
decision, like that of the Gladstone government concerning Gordon at Khartoum, which did not
have a positive outcome, was a clear instance where this new and more investigative journalism
would be vital to the publics understanding of a situation.
The death of Gordon was a major press event. It received multiple pages of coverage in
all the daily newspapers. Some focused on his remarkable life, others on the known
circumstances of his death, and some even chose to include what policy towards Sudan would be
like given how he died. Much attention has been paid to the news stories directly following the
report of his death and on his obituaries. In fact, most early biographies and all the later
biographies of Gordon include the details of these papers in their final pages.20 However, the

18

Laurel Brake, Government by Journalism and the Silence of the Star: Victorian Encounters, 1885-1890 in
Encounters in the Victorian Press: Editors, Authors, Readers eds. Laurel Brake and Julie F. Codell, (New York:
Palgrave, 2005).
19
Ibid., 213-218 Brakes argument centers around domestic events which occurred in 1885 (i.e. The Maiden
Tribute of Modern Babylon, but there are striking similarities to Steads actions over sending Gordon to Sudan.
The Maiden Tribute and Cleveland Street scandal were both related to different provisions of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act. Cleveland street focused on another aspect than the girls, instead it regarded male homosexuals
and proved the extent of this journalistic advocacy.
20
For a complete discussion on the merits of Gordons biographies and biographers, see the introduction.

66

Gordon story did not die in the press with the final report of his death. For the next ten months,
Gordons final days remained a significant news story.
Although the Pall Mall Gazette was an important newspaper to the story of Gordon
because of Steads original interview, it was not the only one to keep his story alive. Newspapers
all over the United Kingdom, from the major city papers in London, Manchester, Cardiff, Leeds,
and Glasgow to more regional papers like those in Ipswitch, Bristol, and Derby all focused on
Gordon. He was mentioned in multiple contexts over this time period, too. Only days after his
death was confirmed, the political ramifications of it were already being discussed. One of the
first publications to do so was the liberal-leaning Reynolds Newspaper. The article which ran in
the newspaper included a comparison between Gladstone and Lord Palmerston. Almost thirty
years before, Palmerston had been forced to call for new elections following a situation in China
that had some parallels to the one that resulted in Gordons death. In 1857, the Chinese had
seized a ship flying the British flag and the British government resorted to force to end the
conflict.21 Like Gladstones indecision regarding a relief expedition, Palmerstons decision to use
force was unpopular. However, in China, the situation only involved the loss of prestige and not
lifeespecially not the life of a man regarded as a national hero. The difficulties faced by
Palmerston that led to his decision were included in the article, which set out its objectives in its
title: The political side of Khartoum.
Unlike the Pall Mall Gazette, Reynolds Newspaper advocated for no further involvement
in Khartoum. Its editors were more focused on how the problems in Sudan could be used by
those who disagreed with Gladstone to move for another election, even noting that the movement
which led Palmerston to call for early elections had been begun by a member of his own party.
They also believed that the British government should be more focused on problems existing
within its borders, such as the Franchise Bill and Irish Home Rule, and should not have gotten
involved in Egypt, and by extension in Sudan, in the first place.22
As the article indicated, there was clearly a distinct possibility that Gordons death would
be used to force an election and possible change of government. By the end of February, it
seemed that their prediction would come true. Gordons death was featured in the discussions
21

Palmerston was forced to call a new general election in 1857 after he lost a vote of censure in Parliament over his
handling of a crisis in China. In the resulting election, Palmerston had a large victory and his status as Prime
Minister was reaffirmed. For further details on the 1857 election including its causes and impacts, see E.D. Steele,
Palmerston and Liberalism, 1855-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 57-58.
22
The Political Side of Khartoum, Reynolds Newspaper 15 February 1885.

67

over Conservative Member of Parliament Sir Stafford Northcotes vote of censure against the
government. This vote, which has already been discussed, occurred less than a month after
Gordons death was confirmed, and thus it was only natural for the press at least to mention him
in their coverage of the events leading to the vote.23
Following the vote of censure (which Gladstone survived) and with the exception of one
days worth of press coverage that his funeral services and national day of mourning received in
early March, the news coverage devoted to Gordon slowed but did not disappear. The next time
he was used as a political instrument was in the coverage of Gladstones decision to call new
elections in June; following those elections, which led to a change in government, he would be
used again in political discussions in the general elections in October of that same year.24
Newspapers were not the only type of medium that covered Gordons death. The
publication of pamphlets, especially political tracts, also flourished in the months following his
death. One of the most vitriolic of these pamphlets was entitled The Egyptian Red Book.25
Designed by its authors, anti-Gladstonians George Stronach and George R. Hackett, to serve as
an indictment of his government, the pamphlet was a satirical take on the governments
traditional Blue Books. This Red Book even included extracts from the official Blue Books on
one page and on the facing page, famous quotations and purpose-drawn cartoons that directly
contradicted the official language. For example, on the page entitled The Salvation (?) Army,
the illustration is of Gladstone and other cabinet members dressed as members of a marching
band. Each man has a badge on his chest which reads Too late. At the top of the page, the
authors have included a quote from the first act of Shakespeares Henry VI: What noise is this?
What traitors have we here?26 By placing this quote over the cartoon just described, the authors
of the Egyptian Red Book were able to accuse the government of its betrayal without actually
making a direct accusation.

23

The Vote of Censure, Daily News 24 February 1885.

Examples of the type of coverage and usage of Gordon can be found in: The Parliamentary Election, Ipswich
Journal 2 June 1885 and Reported Settlement of the Political Crisis, 23 June 1885; and for the general election:
General Gordon and the Liberal Defeat, 8 October 1885.
25
The Egyptian Red Book illustrated and published by William Blackwood & sons, Edinburgh and London, 1885.
Found in British Library Add Ms. 51302 Correspondence to M.A. Gordon on Gordons death. The pamphlet is
included in full and runs ff. 76-92. Stronach was a noted Shakespearean scholar, so perhaps that explains why there
are several Shakespearean quotes. The two men would also collaborate on the The Irish Green Book which
satirizes Gladstone and his policies as well.
26
Ibid., 80.
24

68

Pamphlets such as the Red Book transcended the realm of just delivering news and
opinions. With their clever satirical writings, these pamphlets almost crossed over into a form of
entertainment. Although they did serve as an indictment against the sitting government, they
were also quite funny; their readers would be able to have a laugh while still being able to
condemn governmental policies. Nonetheless, pamphlets such as these are not quite traditional
satire, as had been seen in the novels of authors like Jonathan Swift. Instead, they are more
similar to the work of William Hogarth, where the illustration provides the main argument. As
Frank Palmeri argues, these pamphlets are a more modern invention, a type of hybrid satire
that combines the written word with illustrations.27
As the editorials, newspapers, and pamphlets show, Gordons death was easily
manipulated by the media to support a variety of political agendas. In the examples cited above,
both liberal and conservative publications capitalized on the events. However, Gordons death
was also a cultural phenomenon. Gordons name can be found not only in the news pages, but
also in the advertisements, where full color portraits of him were on sale, and in the arts and
entertainment pages.28 His death had such a large reach that it was even mentioned in Glasgow
Heralds Music and the Drama section. Writing just days after it occurred, the reviewer of the
Valentine concert at the Royal Albert Hall in London makes special mention of a tribute to
Gordon that was played, writing that the only notable feature of the concert was the reception
by the audience of the Dead March in Saul, which, with questionable taste, was played in
memory of General Gordon. There were cries from the gallery of Too soon.29 This particular
decision to honor the general may have been a bit too soon in the feelings of the reviewer, but
nonetheless, his death was being treated as a national event by the British people.
Another indication of the esteem in which Gordon was held can be found by the amount
of attention a simple letter to the poet laureate, Alfred, Lord Tennyson, received. The letter was
from another poet, the American Quaker John Greenleaf Whittier who had been asked to write a
commemorative poem about Gordon. Whittier chose not to pen the lines himself, but instead sent

27

Frank Palmeri, Cruikshank, Thackery, and the Victorian eclipse of satire, Studies in English Literature, 15001900, volume 44 number 4 (Autumn 2004): 772.
28
There are hundreds of advertisements selling ephemera connected to Gordon. For illustrative purposes, see the
advertising pages of The Penny Illustrated Paper and Illustrated Times 7 March 1885, p. 154.
29
Music and the Drama, Glasgow Herald 16 February 1885.

69

a letter to Tennyson recommending that he write the commemoration instead.30 Tennyson

responded by writing the famous lines that can be found on Gordons cenotaph at Westminster
Abbey:
Warrior of God, mans friend, not here below,
But somewhere dead far in the waste Soudan;
Thou livest in all hearts, for all men know
This earth hath borne no simpler, nobler man.31
The fact that Tennyson penned these lines is not much of a surprise. Gordon was a long-time fan
of the poet, even asking Lady Cardwell, who knew both men, to send him a small volume of
Tennysons work during his first stint as Governor-General of Sudan. In the letter he wrote
thanking her for finding a small enough volume, the general makes special mention of the fact
that, reading Tennyson was [his] great relief.32 Following Gordons return from his first time
in Africa, Tennyson and Gordon became personally acquainted; the general even attended a
luncheon at the poets home in 1883. At this luncheon, a conversation between the two men,
later recorded by Tennysons son, Hallam, took place. In his two-volume memoir of his father,
Hallam included what he claimed was the exact wording of a request by the general. He wrote
that Gordon approached his father and said in a solemn voice: Mr. Tennyson, I want you to do
something for our young soldiers. You alone are the man who can do it. We want training homes
for them all over England.33 Although it is likely that Hallam, who served as his fathers
factotum, may have embellished the actual words, the sentiment behind them is accurate.
Once word of Gordons death reached Tennyson, he not only penned the verse above but
also remembered the conversation that he had with Gordon about the possibility of army camps.
While Tennysons words which adorn the cenotaph that honors Gordon are still present, it is the
second impulse that the poet had once he was informed of Gordons demise that has had longerlasting repercussions. When the Queen and other prominent Britons were trying to decide the
shape of the national memorial to Gordon, Tennyson suggested, according to his biographers,
30

A full discussion on the reasons why Whittier chose not to write his own lines at the time can be found in John C.
Helper, GordonA New Whittier Poem, The New England Quarterly volume 34, number 1 (March 1961): 9395.
31
The poem has been widely published. It can be found in Tennysons collected works among other places, but for
the purposes of this discussion, the version occurred in the letter Tennyson sent in reply to Whittier which was
published in several newspapers including The Graphic. Scraps, The Graphic (London) 9 May 1885.
32
9 April 1878 Letter from Lady Cardwell to Alfred Tennyson published in Hallam Tennyson, Alfred Lord
Tennyson: A Memoir by his son, Volume II (London: Macmillan & Co., 1897), 225.
33
Ibid., 224.

70

that it should be a boys home, in the same vein as the homes that the general had suggested he
create two years earlier.34 The actual process of creating the homes will be discussed in the
following chapter, but Tennysons inputwhen combined with the lines he wrotehelped to
keep Gordon in the public consciousness.
Tennyson believed that this memorial to the man he called our great simple soldier
hero would be a fitting way to remember all of the facets of Gordons character.35 Gordons
character, and the circumstances surrounding his death which led to many of his contemporaries
characterizing him as a martyr, also had a particular resonance with Tennyson. In 1879 he had
written a play that was devoted to Englands most well-known martyr, Thomas Becket. In his
play, which was discussed in the preceding chapter, Tennyson depicted Becket as a really great
and impulsive man, with a firm sense of duty; this description can certainly also be applied to
Gordon, whose impulsiveness and sense of duty were a matter of public record.36 In proposing
the Gordon Boys Home to be the national memorial, Tennyson especially wanted to honor that
sense of duty present in both men, but especially within his late acquaintance.
As Tennyson was both the poet laureate and a peer of the realm by the time of Gordons
death, his interest in a national memorial to the general was a matter of public record.
Newspapers quickly discovered the story of Gordon lunching at the Tennyson home and
discussion of the boys home idea and reports mentioned Hallam telling the story he printed in
his memoir of his father.37 Although the Gordon Boys Home was to be the national memorial to
Gordon, its construction was not the only way that members of the aristocracy, who felt a kinship
with Gordon, were able to memorialize their fallen comrade.
Even before the first stones were laid for the new building, another type of memorial was
being put together. This memorial was in the form of a beautifully bound and illuminated book
of condolences given to General Gordons sisters by the wives of several of the most powerful
men in Britain. As they wrote at the beginning of their book, these women saw themselves as
representatives of all women in the United Kingdom, and they themselves were the Princesses
of Great Britain and Ireland, the Peeresses of the Realm, and the Wives of Bishops and Members
34

Hallam Tennysons two volume memoir of his father was followed by Charles Tennyson, the poets grandsons ,
treatment on the same subject. Charles Tennyson, Alfred Tennyson (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949).
35
Princess Louises copy of a 10 July 1885 letter from Tennyson to Queen Victoria, printed in Hope Dyson and
Charles Tennyson, ed. Dear and Honoured Lady: The Correspondence between Queen Victoria and Alfred
Tennyson (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1969), 119.
36
Hallam Tennyson, 193.
37
The Gordon Boys Camp in This Evenings News, Pall Mall Gazette 15 May 1885.

71

of the House of Commons.38 The book itself was about forty-five pages long, and forty of those
pages were filled with signature cards from some of the most well-known women in Britain,
ranging from the Princess of Wales, who was the first signature, to Florence Nightingale, the
last.
The aim of the book was simple. The women wanted to express their sympathy with
Gordons family and honor the sacrifice of the general. At the time, the idea of womens suffrage
was little more than a discussion point, and a memorial book was one of the ways that prominent
women, such as those who signed it, could influence politics. Womens use of their own sphere
to influence politics is examined in Historian Jonathan Schneers Imperial London.39 As in the
cases Scheer examines in his work, these women were extending out of their own sphere in a
way which was acceptable to their class; at the same time, their contributions could not be
overlooked, unlike those of less-fortunate women. Hence, as they were speaking for all of
England, these wives also chose to put Gordons importance into a more nation-wide context.
They referenced the idea that all mothers would tell their children about General Gordon in the
coming decades and that he would be held as an example to inspire them to great and noble
deeds. The commemoration then calls Gordon one of the heroes of whom [England] is most
proud. These sentiments are followed by what is probably the most telling portion of the
inscription, England will evermore hold in honour the name of Charles Gordon, the Brave
Soldier, the Loyal Subject, the Faithful Christian, the Loving friend of the poor, the desolate, and
the oppressed.40 This one quote sums up the feeling present in Britain, especially at the highest
levels of society, about Gordon. By November, when the book was presented, the personal
foibles of Gordon had been forgotten and he was beginning his transformation into a symbol of
everything good and heroic.
Some of the women who presented this book to Gordon, like Viscountess Wolseley, were
personally acquainted with him and felt a particular need to acknowledge what was not only a
national loss, but a personal one. However, not everyone who knew Gordon was included in this
prestigious memorial. One of the citizens who could claim to know Gordon as intimately as he
38

British Library Add Ms 34482 (restricted collection) Condolence Book presented to M.A. Gordon, 4 November
1885, ff. 1-43.
39
Schneers analysis is more focused on the way that this class of women served as hostesses, however the idea that
women were able to extend out of the domestic sphere has parallels with the presentation of the memorial book.
Jonathan Schneer, London 1900: The Imperial Metropolis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 122-123.
40
Ibid., 3.

72

allowed was Mrs. Octavia Freese. Following their initial meeting when the general was posted to
Gravesend, Freese became one of Gordons confidantes. She participated in his charitable
endeavors there, including his visits to the sick and teaching in the Ragged School. Even after
Gordon left England, her family continued to correspond regularly with the general when he was
sent to Sudan for his first term as Governor-General, and her husband even joined him on some
of his travels after he resigned the post. After the generals sister Augusta, she was his closest
confidante. Thus, in the years after his death, when almost anyone who ever knew the general
was preparing reminiscences, the fact that she too published a book on Gordon was hardly
surprising.
Freesess book, which was not published under her name originally, tried to reveal a
different side to General Gordon than the one which was presented to the public in the first
biographies and tributes following his death. Her work, which was simply called More About
Gordon, was published almost a decade following his death. In her introductory note that
explains why she chose to publish her work when she did, Freese specifically mentions that she
will not apologize for bringing before the public a few reminiscences of a man so remarkable in
every way as the late General Gordon. 41 Her memories were carefully chosen to serve two
purposes. One was to humanize Gordon and the other was to emphasize his Christian character.
By 1894, when Freeses book was published, Gordons memory was no longer paramount in the
minds of the public. For this reason, she chose to remind her readers that his memory [was] still
green; he is by no means forgotten; therefore I have thought that many might be interested to
read a few personal reminiscences of Gordon as I knew him.42 The introductory note makes
clear that, when the book was published, sections, such as her impressions of the circumstances
leading to Gordons death, were written much earlier, when the news was still fresh.
Of Gordons closest friends and family, Freese was the only one to publish this type of
book. Not quite a biography, but also not a memoir, it did achieve her stated goal of showing a
different side of Gordon to the public. The appendix, which is mostly concerned with her second
purposeemphasizing Gordons Christian natureis also the most telling of her own feelings.
Within the appendix, she adds to the martyrdom debate that had begun around Gordon, citing a
personal conversation that the two had at Gravesend in which he told her that one of his daily

41
42

One who knew him well [Mrs. Octavia Freese], More About Gordon (London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1894), 1.
Ibid., 2.

73

prayers was that he might have fellowship with Christs sufferings.43 Her inclusion of this
sentiment, combined with the emphasis that she and all of his contemporaries placed on his sense
of duty, shows that Freese was clearly one who believed that Gordon had been martyred.
Freese was not the only person who knew Gordon who chose to express his or her grief.
Other ordinary people reached out to members of his familyhis sister Augusta and brother
Henry received letters from many of them. The people sending these letters were from all over
the world; they were from people Gordon had met and influenced in varied postings, from China
to Equatoria and Egypt, from Gravesend to London. Some of them were from people in
influential positions, but others were from those who had met the general as they went about
their daily lives. All of this correspondence had some attributes in common. Each person
expressed his sympathy with Gordons family and his outrage with the circumstances of his
death. The letters often contained mentions of Gordon as an inspiration to all other Englishmen
and some even specifically referenced his sacrifice to his country. These personal snapshots
reveal much more about how his death and life were perceived by his contemporaries.44
By early March, enough time had passed since the news of Gordons death reached the
other countries where he had served, and his family began to receive correspondence from
farther-flung locations. One of the earliest examples of this correspondence came from China,
the place where Gordons nickname was earned. Sir Harry Parkes, the British Minister to China,
and several members of his staff sent telegrams as soon as they heard the news. These telegrams
were filled with personal remembrances of Gordons time in China and of course included their
sympathies with the family. This early correspondence was followed by a letter sent to his
brother Henry from Tseng, the Chinese Minister to Britain. In his letter, Tseng refers to Gordons
sacrifice, but it is not in the terms that most of the other correspondents used. Instead, Tseng said
that he was sending this tribute of sympathy, sorrow, and admiration, as the minister of a
country for which your brother fought and bled and in which his name will be forever
honoured.45 The terminology of fighting and bleeding is not any different from that which was
43

Ibid., 236.
These letters can also be seen as evidence of what James Stevens Curl has termed the Victorian Celebration of
Death, or the particular need of these individuals to have a public form of mourning. Although the letters were
privately sent to the Gordon family, they are still evidence of the desire felt by Gordons friends and acquaintances
to participate in the spectacle of mourning. James Stevens Curl, The Victorian Celebration of Death (Stroud,
Gloustershire: Sutton Publishing, Ltd., 2001), 194-195.
45
British Library Add Ms 52400, ff. 214-233 26 February 1885 telegrams from Sir Harry Parkes, et al, to Sir Henry
Gordon and 5 March 1885 letter from Tseng to Sir Henry Gordon, British Library Add Ms. 52401 Correspondence
44

74

used in letters from Gordons countrymen; however, it is interesting to see this particular
terminology used not to describe his sacrifice in British terms, but instead as a reference to
earlier events. Most of the correspondence received by his family members in the time following
his death only mentioned one place if any: Khartoum.
Letters from people who knew Gordon in all of his major military postings also poured in
to the Gordon family as news of his death spread. Those who knew him when they had served
together in Crimea, in China, in Equatoria and in Egypt are all well represented in the volumes of
letters that have been preserved by the family.46 These letters ranged from simple statements of
sympathy to longer letters that reminisced about the times that the writer spent with Gordon and
even to long screeds filled with vitriol against the government that allowed the general to die.
A letter to Gordons sister from Earnest A. Floyer, who was the inspector-general of
Egyptian telegraphs, is illustrative of this final type of correspondence. There had been several
letters between Miss Gordon and Floyer, but this one letter is noteworthy. Floyer was not a
soldier, yet he was in consultation with members of the army, including Kitchener. As a result,
he felt a personal responsibility for abandoning Gordon. His guilt is evident, especially in lines
such as, I was not proud of myself. I was one of the Englishmen that had abandoned him and I
could not but feel it. Yes, Floyer was writing to the sister of the man whom he had encouraged
abandoning; nevertheless, his personal frustration at the policy is still clear. His chastisement of
Gladstone in the paragraph before the one where he expressed his personal grief is also telling.
In direct contrast to the measured tones Floyer used while taking responsibility for his own
actions, his criticism of the former Prime Minister could not be considered neutral: Surely if
that old man Gladstone could read but a glimpse of the thoughts of our hearts he would sicken
and die from the intensity of unexpressed contempt.47 Floyers letter, written nearly nine
months following Gordons death, showed that time had not diminished his personal anger at the
British government, thus indicating the continued influence that Gordons abandonment retained
among those who knew him.

to Sir Henry Gordon on the death of Gordon, ff. 22-23. Both Henry and his sister Mary kept enough of these letters
(approximately 1000) to fill ten volumes (consisting of at least 150 folios each) at the British Library.
46
For the purpose of clarity, one telegram from each engagement has been selected. For Crimea: Letter of 18
February 1885 from a fellow cadet, Add Ms. 52400, ff. 39; China: Letter of 18 February 1885 from Lt. Col.. W. Hill
James, Ibid., ff.61-63; Equatoria: Letter of 8 July 1885 from Emir Bey, Add. Ms. 51300, ff. 140; and Egypt: Letter
of 22 February 1885 from C.M. Watson at the War Office in Cairo, Ibid., ff. 149-150.
47
8 October 1885 Letter from Earnest A. Floyer to Augusta Gordon, Add Ms. 51300, ff. 147-152.

75

The letters that were received from Gordons friendsand even, in one case, a distant
relativewithin Britain also follow the patterns laid out above. These ones were sent earlier
often written as soon as their authors heard the newsand each writers grief is still fresh and
evident. Almost all of the letters specifically reference the patriotic aspect of Gordons death;
interestingly, most do not specifically mention the idea of Gordon as a martyr. It seems that the
people who were most apt to refer to him as such during the time directly following his death
were those who did not know him, or even those who wanted to use his death purely for political
purposes. His friends were not looking to make a political point when they sent their letters; they
wanted only to comfort the Gordons and to express their support for his final endeavor.
One of the earliest letters of this sort received by Henry Gordon came even before the
final news from Khartoum was confirmed. The letter, from a man named Thom Ower Jones, was
sent on the seventh, which was after Khartoums fall was confirmed, but three days before
Gordon was officially declared dead. Jones refers to Gordon as Charley throughout his letter,
and emphasizes how those who loved Charley could not possibly be saddened by the manner in
which he died, concluding that if they had to select the time and manner of the closing of his
life of sacrifice and great deeds when & how could he have left behind him a more glorious
memory?48 In Jones opinion, Gordon and his sacrifice should be feted, not mourned. This
sentiment was shared by a distant relative of the Gordons. The connection was tenuous at best
the writer, J. Stanley Oldham, claimed to be the cousin of the generals sister-in-law. His letter
included ideas like those quoted above, but also took the argument further and cited the patriotic
aspect of his death or the idea that it would seem to be a national loss in which all Englishmen
have a common share.49 Even though the author is trying to ingratiate himself with a family that
he clearly does not belong to, his contribution to the reams of letters is significant, as it is one of
the first to include the idea of a national loss in addition to a personal one, marking one of the
earlier moments that the Gordon familys loss transformed from a private sorrow to a public one.
Gordons death certainly can be called a nation-wide event. The correspondence that the
Gordon family received from the general public following the generals death can be divided into
three distinct groups: from people who drew creative inspiration from the events and their
personal need to memorialize the fallen general, from those who wished to express their

48
49

7 February 1885 Letter from Thom Ower Jones to Henry Gordon, Add Ms. 52399, ff. 44-45.
17 February 1885 Letter from J. Stanley Oldham to Henry Gordon, Add Ms. 52400, f. 10.

76

sympathy with the family about the loss of their patriotic inspiration and hero, and from those
who wished to market items associated with Gordon.50
As Gordon was already perceived as a national hero due to his actions in China two
decades earlier, a market existed for products relating to him. His first biographiesor at least
the first editionshad been published before Gordon ever went to Sudan.51 The Chinese
Gordon story had been told, but with his re-appointment to Sudan, new biographies went into
print. These newer biographies were joined, in the months following his death, by countless
other volumes. As can be expected considering the public interest in Gordons death, his family
was besieged by correspondents asking to write new biographies, or seeking to advise the family
on how to publish any of Gordons writing, including his journals.52 These letters were not
limited to English-speaking audiences; the Gordon family received requests from abroad asking
their cooperation in telling the story of their deceased brother.53
In addition to the letters asking the Gordon family for permission and cooperation
regarding biographies, the family was beset with another type of letter from those seeking to
profit from his death: those asking for color portraits of the general. The people who were
sending this type of letter wanted to create various forms of ephemera, such as medals, to honor
him. The seller of one these medals, Raphael Tuck & Sons, wrote a letter to Henry explaining
that they wanted to make the medal available to all of Britain, so they offered it at a price that
will bring it within the reach of all classes, & amongst whom the name of Gordon has become a
household word.54 This letter, which was sent only seven days after Gordons death had been
confirmed and six days after the news had reached the general public in London, demonstrates
the impulse that existed to profit from events in the Sudan as quickly as possible. The publics
appetite for Gordon-related goods would continue to grow. Eventually it would even include
50

For reasons why people chose to write letters of personal bereavement to the family of a man they never met see
John Wolffes discussion on the death of Gladstone and the letter-writing that accompanied it in his: Great Deaths:
Grieving, Religion, and Nationhood in Victorian and Edwardian Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the
British Academy, 2000), 170-171.
51
For example, Samuel Mossmans General Gordon in China was published in 1875, nearly a decade before the
events in Sudan. Samuel Mossman, General Gordon in China: the story of the every victorious army (London:
Griffith, 1875).
52
The question of who had the right to publish the Gordon journals and who actually controlled them is quite
complicated and thus will be addressed in the next chapter.
53
Among these requests was a letter from Copenhagen and one from a German magazine publisher. Both letters can
be found in the same volume of Henry Gordons correspondence: Add Ms. 52399. Copenhagen: f. 194, German
magazine: ff. 136-137.
54
17 February 1885 letter from Raphael Tuck & Sons to Henry Gordon, Add Ms 52400, f. 30.

77

commemorative mugs and plates and in the years after the generals death, his likeness would be
used to sell a variety of items to people who were seeking to keep his memory and deeds alive.55
Fortunately for the Gordon family, most people who chose to intrude on their time of
grief did not do so with the intention of making money from their loss. Instead, a great number of
people only wished to include their personal tributes to Gordona man whom they had never
met. This fact did not stop people from writing to the Gordon family, as evidenced by a letter
sent by Mr. W. Youngman. His letter is brief but succinct; in it Youngman references the fact
that he, and thousands like him, who did not have the privilege of meeting Gordon, still did love
him and were unwilling to forget him. Instead, he claims that he and the many thousands he
believes to represent will continue to revere his name, and hold in tender regard those deeds of
heroism and Christian love which so unspeakably adorned his character.56 This Christian aspect
of Gordons character was an idea which featured prominently in the letters which were sent to
the family from people who did not know him. By referencing his Christianity, these
correspondents were able to feel a spiritual kinship with Gordon that was able to supersede the
fact that they never knew him.
The majority of letters like the one discussed above followed the same pattern. It was also
the established methodreferencing Gordons final days, his patriotic sacrifice, and his
Christian characteremployed by the letter writers who fell into the last group of the Gordon
familys correspondents: those who took creative inspiration from the saga. These
correspondents were also from all over; Gordons story was well-covered throughout Europe and
the rest of the English-speaking world. By late 1885, with a significant uptick around
Christmastime, the Gordon family had received dozens of verses, poems, musical compositions,
and even acrostics honoring their dead brother.57 Some of these works had been published;
others had been composedin one case while the correspondent was lying in bedespecially
for the family, but what they all had in common was the desire to memorialize Gordon.58
Although these works lacked the lyrical intensity of Tennysons lines, they are still
significant as the events in Khartoum inspired average, everyday men, women, and children to
55

In addition to the items mentioned above, Gordon was also featured prominently in popular music, especially
ballads, and in prints that could be easily bought from magazines and newspapers. Bernard Porters Absent Minded
Imperialists further explores the uses of these types of memorabilia. Porter, 178.
56
2 March 1885 letter from W. Youngman to Henry Gordon, Add Ms 52401, ff. 5-6.
57
British Library Add Ms. 52404 and 52405 solely consist of letters filled with this type of tribute. The musical
verses referenced above can be found in Add Ms 52404, ff. 181-183.
58
Add Ms 52404 ff. 18-19, undated later from G.R. Blackbee.

78

pick up a pen and write what they were feeling about the generals death. The simplest of these
lines were the acrostics. Henry Gordon received several of these poems, but the most striking
was one by S.C. Clarke. Clarke sent the acrostic in both English and French, with different
wording for both to make the poems work, but it is the English version that best captures the
spirit that the lines were written in:
Grief for her son the nation feels, for worth so peerless
Oer him a grateful Senate mourns its Chieftan fearless
Rare-noble souls like his of lofty moral beauty
Dead to all love of self, forsaking all for duty!
On names so great there rests a halo bright with glory.
Neer may Posterity forget his wondrous story.59
These six lines epitomize the public reaction to Gordons death. The major elements of the
storyhis patriotism, his morality and his sense of dutyare all covered. What is not mentioned
in these particular lines is the other side of the debate over Gordons death: the role played by the
Gladstone government. A poem by J.H. Hodges, What will they say in England under a Liberal
Government which was based on an 1832 poem What will they say in England under a
Conservative Government, was designed to address the governments culpability in the matter.
It is quite a long poem, with the author making the case for Gladstones personal guilt in its last
lines, theyll say of Gordons glory that it liveth evermore, theyll say of Gordons murder that
it lies at Gladstones door!60
The idea of Gladstone as the murderer of Gordon was not the invention of Hodges. The
sobriquet was liberally applied in the press of the time period, and it was also referenced in other
correspondence sent to the Gordon family. As discussed previously, prior to Gordons death,
Gladstone was seen as the Grand Old Man or G.O.M. of the Liberal Party.61 His nickname,
which was earned after decades of service to the party he helped to bring to prominence,
conveniently flipped aroundthe G.O.M. became the M.O.G., or Murderer of Gordon.62

59

In the original, the first letters are in red to further symbolize the acrostic. Undated letter from S.C. Clarke, Add
Ms. 52404, f. 36.
60
Undated letter from J.H. Hodges, Ibid., ff. 69-70.
61
For a discussion on the Gladstone myth, including the cult of the Grand Old Man see D.A. Hamer, Gladstone:
The Making of a Political Myth Victorian Studies volume 22, number 1 (Autumn 1978): 47-50.
62
Some of the earliest instances of the use of the term can be found in the previously discussed Pall Mall Gazette
articles of 11 February 1885. The idea of Gladstones treachery towards Gordon is also evident in the Egyptian Red
Book [Add Ms. 51302, ff. 76-92]. The terminology exists to the present day. Even Gladstones official biography on
the Number 10 Downing Street website, the official site of the Prime Ministers office, includes both nicknames for

79

William Ewart Gladstones personal reputation and prestige would remain sullied for the rest of
his political career.
Even if the events in Sudan were not enough to topple the government, they were enough
to spur the public to action. In the months after Gordons death, people were already writing to
the family to tell them of their renaming organizations after the general. For example, the
Oddfellows Scottish Order No. IV of Glasgow wrote to Henry Gordon in November to tell him
of their name change to the General Gordon Lodge. They justified their name change as
expressive of our hearty admiration for his personal character, and as a neutral ground on which
we can all meet, irrespective of political bias or religious creed.63 The idea of Gordon was one
that came without biaseveryone could acknowledge his actions and thus they could honor him
and his memory. The Oddfellows were not the only organization that informed the Gordon
family about a name change honoring the general, but it was the only one to provide such a
specific reason why it chose to adopt his name.
As the varied examples of different ways that people chose to memorialize Charles
Gordon show, people of all classes in Britain strove to process and understand the death of a
national hero. Their expressions of grief ranged from newspaper editorials, like W.T. Steads In
Memoriam to bound condolence books, like that presented to Augusta Gordon, from simple
poetry inspired by his death, including Tennysons cenotaph inscription, to more vitriolic
condemnations of the Gladstone government. They questioned their government and proposed
votes of censure, they praised Gordons actions and denounced those of Gladstone and his
cabinet, but the most important thing that these individuals did was air their shared grief.
Without this outpouring of grief and support, it is unlikely that Gordon would have retained the
same level of prominence in the months following his deathand his death would not have had
the same impact on his country.
However, even after expressing their grief, sorrow, and at times, outrage, the people of
Britain still did not have the complete story of Gordons death at Khartoum. The complete story
would only be provided to them once the journals he kept there were published, an endeavor that
did not occur without serious political dithering. Another goal of those who wanted to
memorialize Gordon was to have some sort of a national memorial to him. This national
the Prime Minister. http://www.number10.gov.uk/history-and-tour/prime-ministers-in-history/william-ewartgladstone, accessed 30 July 2009.
63
12 November 1885 Letter from the Oddfellows to Henry Gordon, Add Ms. 52403, ff. 44-45.

80

memorial, the shape of which would be derived from the idea that Tennyson and Gordon
discussed in 1883, would come to fruition in the year after the generals death. Finally, there
would be a drive for an even more prominent monument to Gordons memory: a statue. All of
these future memorials and monuments would contribute to the lasting memory of Gordon, a
memory that would be preserved for decades to come.

81

CHAPTER 5
PUTTING GORDONS MEMORY TO WORK

For the first months after Gordon died in Sudan, his achievements were celebrated and he
was mourned. When the shocking news first reached London, the immediate reaction to his death
was not to discuss its political ramifications; instead, it was much more visceral. The larger
political repercussions of Gordons abandonment and death would come later. As has been
previously discussed, in death, Gordon became a symbol: in essence, an imperial figurehead. He
was transformedfirst by those who knew him, then by those who wished to benefit from his
experiencesinto a political figure as well. Gordon was never a politician, yet his death had a
large impact in the political sphere.1
William Gladstone faced and defeated a no-confidence vote over his perceived
abandonment of Gordon. However, several months later, his government fell, partially as a result
of the outcry that accompanied the generals death. Clearly, the Liberal party lost support over
the fiasco in Africa. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the real reason why the
Liberal Party lost its government was much more complicated, involving a variety of domestic
causes, such as the Franchise Bill. By the time the Gladstone government fell and was replaced
by a Conservative one led by the new Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, Gordons transformation
had begun.
After the fall of Gladstones government in 1886, Britain was dominated politically for
the next twenty years by Conservative governments. As Gladstone had been the longtime face of
the Liberal Party, even out of government, he and his shortcomings remained a popular subject
for Conservative politicians. The Liberal Party was Gladstones party. As such, most political
attacks on the party were also perceived to be personal attacks on him. For example, one of the
areas where this vitriol was the most apparent was in electoral speeches. The election of 1885
represented a further expansion of the vote; thus politicians had to alter their strategies to appeal
to a wider spectrum, as for the first time all working-class men were enfranchised. The Liberal
Party used domestic issues to lure more voters, but the Conservative Party had a different
1

John Greer was one person who has argued that the reaction to Gordons death was simply one of a mood
reaction and his significance was rendered moot by the end of the relief expedition. John Nelson Greer, The
Great Oracle: British Public Opinion on the Fall of Khartoum and the death of Gordon (masters thesis, Cornell
University, 1979).

82

approach; it used imperialism and national pride. One of the most significant figures who was
referenced in an attempt to reach as broad a base as possible was the hero of Khartoum.
The Conservative Party more effectively mobilized Gordons death politically. This
mobilization was aided by the foundation of a new organization within the Conservative Party,
the Primrose League. Named after former Prime Minister Benjamin Disraelis favorite flower (at
least according to myth), the League was originally founded to bring the working class to the
Conservative Party. Technically, the League, which was founded in 1883, was not officially
affiliated with the Conservative Party until the twentieth century, but for all intents and purposes
it functioned as the mass organization of the Party from its inception. It was not a policy making
(or even determining) body; it was more social and designed to bridge barriers between sexes,
ages, and classes. As the first Prime Minister who made use of the League, Lord Salisbury
remarked about its composition: it brings more classes together, and I think its greatest
achievement of all is that it has brought the influence of women to bear on politics in a way that
has never before been the case.2 The Primrose League served its purpose of bringing people
together to further Conservative goals. However, regarding policy, the League had only broad
goals, including the defense of Empire, monarchy, and religion. In terms of its goals, the
connection to Disraeli becomes more apparent; he was widely acknowledged to be Queen
Victorias favorite Prime Minister. Like Gordon, Disraeli, who was often ridiculed in life,
became sanctified in death, and he and the general both served the same type of political purpose
to this new organization. 3
The most important function for the Primrose League as it concerned Gordon is the first
of the three goals mentioned above: Empire. Acknowledged as an imperial symbol by both
parties, Gordon became co-opted to a great extent by the League. As historian Martin Pugh
explained, while the League was a very large imperial organization it remained vague,
amorphous and sentimental in its imperialism, hardly ever venturing an opinion on a specific
colonial question.4 Instead, the League looked to imperial figures to further its goals
specifically men like Gordon, and Colonel Fred Burnaby, a League member, who had been a part
2

Constance Rover, Womens Suffrage and Party Politics in Britain: 1866-1914 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1967), 105. Rover includes this excerpt from Salisburys November 29, 1886 speech in her discussion on the role
that women played in the Primrose League and the Conservative Party.
3
Martin Pugh, The Tories and the People: 1880-1935 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1985), 16-17. The name of the
League and its relation to Disraeli are discussed on page 20.
4
Ibid., 88.

83

of his rescue mission. Choosing to use these men, Gordon as the acknowledged national hero,
and Burnaby as the ideal of a Primrose League member, the League was able to reinforce
another one of its tenets: the idea of equating the nation with the Empire. Since 1880 the
Conservatives had attempted to co-opt the idea of patriotism as solely theirs. This hero-worship
was merely another way to continue to assure their prestige in the publics eyes.5
The Primrose League was not the only new organization affiliated with the Conservative
Party founded during this time period. Another solidly anti-Gladstonian organization was the
National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations, commonly known as the
National Union. The National Union was founded in 1868 at the same time as the previous
Franchise Bill. As such, it was the first mass organization of the Conservative Party. However, it
did not rise to the same level of popular prominence as the Primrose League. Instead, it
functioned more to spread the message of the Conservative Party to the rank-and-file of the
party.6 Like the League, it was also a mass-politics arm of the Conservative Party. Yet, the two
differed as the National Union was always under the auspices of the party without even a veneer
of independence. Together, these two organizations served to help the Conservative Party
achieve its goals, especially the goal of a continued, strong imperial Britain.7
The Conservative theme of pride in the Empire was not a new one. It had been adopted
by Disraeli after the Franchise vote of 1868 as a way of embracing newly enabled voters. Pride
in the Empire was a quality that people of all strata of society could understand. As a part of a
history of the Conservatives, historian Donald Southgate analyzed the impact of these new ideas,
first presented to the public in Disraelis 1872 Crystal Palace speech. Southgate wrote that
Disraeli explained that the great body of the people were Conservative, by which he meant
that the people of England and especially the working-classes are proud of belonging to a great
country and wish to maintain its greatness 8 Southgate continued after discussing the first
part of Disraelis speech to analyze the second, which focused on the negative impact that the
Liberal Party had on the Empire and its wish to disband the Empire completelya constant
theme throughout the nineteenth century.

Ibid., 91-92.
Andrew Gamble, The Conservative Nation (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 12.
7
Disraeli first introduced these ideas in the 1870s, but they still had prominence in the 1880s.
8
Norman Gash, Donald Southgate, David Dilkes, and John Ramsden, The Conservatives: A History from their
Origins to 1965 (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1977), 180-181.
6

84

The ideas outlined in the Crystal Palace speech in 1872 continued to be the guiding
principles of the Conservative Party through the end of Lord Salisburys terms in office over
twenty years later.9 The biggest challenge to Empire that Salisbury was forced to contend with
during his tenure was the question of Ireland. Although geographically close to England, Ireland
was seen, by the late nineteenth century, as within the same frame of empire. This sentiment was
best expressed in a letter to Salisbury from a Conservative Peer which referred to events in
Ireland being seen in England as if they happened in China or another planet.10 To Salisbury,
the issue of Ireland came to be emblematic of the Empire as a whole; to give it any sort of
autonomy would weaken the entire imperial state.
The question of Ireland was also the first time that the Conservative Party used General
Gordon as a political symbol. In the speeches and discussions over Home Rule in Ireland,
Gordons abandonment was frequently referenced and even juxtaposed with a supposed
abandonment of Ireland. In the months leading toward the elections of 1886, these speeches
featured phrases such as the anniversary of the death of GENERAL GORDON has given the
enemies of England to exult, and the deep-rooted differences in the Liberal Party are once more
made manifest, and others that are even more political, with speakers mentioning Gladstone as
the decimator of the struggling Soudan [sic] tribes, the betrayer of Khartoum, [and] the person
guilty of the death of Gordon.11 In addition to these strictly political views, many articles
included Gordons own views on the subject, General Gordon, a Home Ruler by the light of
those days [1880].12 By including Gordon in the discussion, the politicians further enhanced the
connection between Africa and Ireland discussed above.
The connection between events in Africa and Ireland was one that Salisbury exploited
quite often, most famously in his Hottentots speech of 1886. As the letter expressed, Ireland
was perceived to be exotic, hence his decision to equate its desire for independence with events
occurring on the dark continent is hardly surprising. These feelings directly influenced
9

The question of Home Rule, which was not begun in the electoral cycle of 1886, was one which would have longlasting repercussions for Britain. It was already an issue when Disraeli made his Crystal Palace speech, and would
continue to be an area of discontent until well into the twentieth century. Home Rule for Ireland would not be
approved until 1914. The fight over Home Rule would come to define domestic politics until it was decided.
10
Michael Bentley, Lord Salisburys World: Conservative Environments in Late-Victorian Britain (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 56, Fn 63 contains a quote from a June 14, 1882 letter from Lord Cranbrook, a
Conservative Peer, to Salisbury.
11
The first quote is from Three Acres and a Cow, North Wales Chronicle, 6 February 1886; the second is from
The General Election: Lord R. Churchills Address, Lloyds Weekly Newspaper, 27 June 1886.
12
General Gordons Plan of Home Rule, Pall Mall Gazette, 1 January 1886.

85

Salisburys speech, which is unique for the high level of disdain toward the Irish. It featured
passages describing them as a separate race and comparing them to the Hottentots, a native
people in South Africa. By linking the two, Salisbury attempted to exoticize the Irish further and
marginalize their demands for Home Rule. By equating them with an African tribe which was
perceived to be barbaric, Salisbury was attempting to convince the public that a situation similar
to the one which resulted in Gordons death could occur in their closest neighbor. He then
continued by making it clear that the Irish could not be considered as the same Teutonic race
as the English and that they were therefore incapable of self government.13 Although the speech
did not specifically reference Gordon, it still can be useful to historians by providing views on
the people who would be linked with him in future speeches. Furthermore, this speech and those
similar to it added another dimension to the Conservative Partys mobilization of Gordon as an
imperial figure.
The partys decision to fight against Gladstones plans for Home Rule was more than just
one of political expediency. Home Rule went directly against the tenets of the party laid out by
Disraeli and it threatened the imperial functions of the government. It had to be defeated, and the
best way that the party saw to defeat it was to remind the public of other imperialist blunders by
the Liberals. Party members used two different techniques in their anti-Home Rule speeches to
achieve their goals. First, they specifically referenced Gordon by name. Second, they employed
terms like the Soudan, as synonyms. For example, a speech by Salisbury cited Gladstone and
his governments failures which led to the death of the heroic General Gordon as proof that
they would fail in their attempt to implement a system as complicated as Home Rule. He
reflected that the same baneful system which has been tried and has been found to fall was
now to be applied to Ireland.14 This speech is one of the earliest ones to juxtapose the two
situations.
A fellow member of the party, Lord Randolph Churchill, also used the idea of
Gladstones policies in other parts of the Empire as a way to indict him about his Irish goals,
citing the governments decision to scuttle, or abandon, territories such as Afghanistan, South
Africa, and Sudan as the precursor to what he wished to do in Ireland.15 Churchills use of the

13

Lord Salisburys Alternative to Home Rule, Pall Mall Gazette May 17, 1886.
Lord Salisbury on the Irish Question, Pall Mall Gazette, February 18, 1886.
15
Monday, June 28th 1886, The Leeds Mercury, June 28, 1886.
14

86

word scuttle was particularly damning to Gladstone and his goals, because the connotation was
that Gladstone intentionally decided to abdicate responsibility in these areas.
Gladstones lack of responsibility was a theme that other members of the Conservative
Party also sought to use against him. In a speech given at Old Sneed Park, the Hon. John
Plunkett, campaigning for the House of Commons, mocked Gladstones claim that he never
spoke against Home Rulewhich was considered baseless as Gladstone himself did not come to
agree with the concept until 1885.16 In his speech, Plunkett accused Gladstone of deserting the
loyalists (people who wanted Ireland to remain in the Empire) in a similar way to how he had
deserted General Gordon: He was guilty of a baseless desertion of the loyalists of Ireland as he
had desertedGeneral Gordon.17 Plunketts assertions against Gladstone on the basis of his
coming to the cause of Home Rule late showed another way that Gordon could be used against
Gladstone, invoking the deceased general was Plunketts way of reminding his audience of
Gladstones other missteps concerning imperial policy, including the current debate. Whether the
speeches actually included the words General Gordon or just used terms like the Soudan to
represent his death, clearly Ireland and Gordon became linked in the publics mind.
The evidence of this linkage can also be seen in editorials written by newspapers during
the same time. These editorials and other articles referenced the death of Gordon in their
discussions of the Home Rule question. In a January, 1886, editorial in the North Wales
Chronicle, the paper questioned whether the outcome of the 1885 general election was really
based on peoples anger regarding the fate of Gordon rather than other issues. The editors go as
far as to call the people who thought that Gordons death would have a large impact on working
class men, some enthusiastic dreamers.18 The idea that Gordon had been useful in the electoral
cycle for the last time was refuted at a Primrose League meeting in the same month. At this
meeting, a great deal of time was devoted to honoring the memory of Gordon and his sacrifice.
In his closing remarks, Mr. A. H. Poyser tied the generals death into the idea of voting for the
Conservative Party. He believed that a lesson must be learnt from his [Gordons] life, and
whether [a person] voted Radical or Conservative they would recognize their responsibility and
16

Gladstone has also been accused of deciding to support Home Rule for purely selfish reasons such as retaining
control of the Liberal Party. However, in David Steeles chapter in Recovering Power, these ideas are disproven.
Steele claims that there is no proof for the spurious supposition. David Steele, A New Style and Content: 18801885 and 1886 in Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon, editors, Recovering Power: The Conservatives in Opposition
since 1867 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 67.
17
Mr. Plunkett at Old Sneed Park, Bristol Mercury and Daily Post, July 8, 1886.
18
The Political Situation, North Wales Chronicle, January 23, 1886.

87

would do before everything else that which God and their country demanded. The article then
continued by referencing the ongoing situation over Home Rule in Ireland, further emphasizing
the link between the two groups.19
As all of the newspaper coverage of speeches, editorials, and articles show, Gordon could
not be ignored by the parties as they discussed Home Rule. In 1886, the Conservative Party
swept into office for the next six years as a result of their defeat of Home Rule. It was a victory
for anyone who opposed the Liberal Party and its concepts of imperialism, including the Queen,
who strongly supported Salisbury and his opposition to Home Rule.20 Home Rule was defeated
by a large margin, with several members of Gladstones own party voting against his bill. It was
a huge loss for Gladstone and the party he helped to found. Home Rule was defeated not just
because the Conservative Party crafted more creative speeches and convinced more members of
Parliament to support them. The Conservatives owed their victory more to dissent within the
Liberal Party as the members who chose to vote against it demonstrated. Following this vote, it
took two full decades for the Liberal Party to recover; some of its members permanently left by
1895 to join the Unionist coalition, a group of members who were in favor of continued British
rule in Ireland.21 Whether the presence of General Gordon in the arguments helped to defeat
Home Rule cannot be known, but as the side which prevailed used him often, the conclusion that
his abandonment at least helped color the debate can be logically drawn.
Part of the reason why Gordon was used as an illustrative example in the Home Rule
fight was because he remained in the public eye. As discussed in the last chapter, by the end of
1885, Gordons death ceased to be a frequent news story, but that did not mean the general had
been removed from the public consciousness. Instead, his memory was transferred to a more
cultural sphere as people began to purchase books, pictures, and other mementos and to attend
music shows about him. Those who wished to understand his last mission further also had
another resource: by summer, 1885, Gordons six journals left from the siege of Khartoum were
published.

19

The Primrose League, Ipswich Journal, January 28, 1886.

Pugh, 75.
21
Mitzi Auchterlonie, Conservative Suffragists: The Womens Vote and the Tory Party (London: Tauris Academic
Studies, 2007), 14-15. The Conservative Partys ability to take advantage of the Liberal dissent is also discussed in
Stuart Balls chapter in his edited work. Stuart Ball, Factors in Opposition Performance: The Conservative
Experience since 1867, in Ball and Seldon, eds. Recovering Power, 13.
20

88

The road to publishing his journals was anything but smooth. Controversy ranged from
who actually had the right to the journals to what content could be made public. The first five
volumes of Gordons journals had reached the outside world, sent from Khartoum before the
Mahdis forces managed to seal the city off, but the last was not recovered until after Gordon had
died. Thus, the first major question surrounding the journals was one of ownership. Sir Henry
Gordon, the late generals brother, argued that the journals should be considered his property, as
executor of the estate. His view was not popular with the embattled Gladstone government. The
government in general and the War Office in particular believed that the journals were,
according to a minute paper on the situation by Lord Hartington, the Secretary of State for War,
a public documentaddressed to the Commander of the Expedition for the information of the
Govt.22 As such, the content of the journals would need to be vetted in order for them to be
published. Sir Henry, agreed in principle with the idea of vetting the journal; the major
disagreement was over who would own the originals.
It is that controversy which provides a valuable insight into both the transformation of
Gordon and into attempts by the sitting government to avoid as much recrimination and blame as
possible for its handling of the situation. When the journals were returned to London, they were
sent to the War Office. The Gordon family was only sent facsimiles of them and was asked to
remove any information from them that they did not want made public. The fact that some of
their brothers final thoughts were withheld from them led to a heated exchange of words which
eventually reached the Prime Ministers office. Over a series of letters sent between March and
April 1885, the two sides eventually came to an agreement on publishing the journals. The
Gordon family was sent the originals; in turn, they edited them and then sent them back to the
War Office.
At the beginning of the controversy, Sir Henry wrote to Lard Hartington about why he
wished to publish the journals (which are also referred to as diaries). He stated that he had
already received offers to publish the journals, including one for the not-inconsequential sum of
5,000. He was also careful to stress the fact that he was not intending to profit from the
journals, instead planning on donating the profits to form a fund to rescue children. At the
conclusion of this early letter, Sir Henry further emphasized that publishing the journals would

22

National Archives War Office WO 32/6132, April 9, 1885 minute paper.

89

honor his late brothers wishes.23 The importance of this letter to understanding the situation is
twofold. First, the fact that needy children would profit from the publishing of the journals
indicates a desire on the part of the Gordon family to continue the good works for which their
brother was renowned; and second, it demonstrates that there was a significant market for
Gordons journals.
Unfortunately, the publication of the journals would be a bit more complicated than this
letter indicated. In his letter, Sir Henry indicated a willingness to work with officials to make
sure that the published journals did not contain any information that the government did not wish
to make public. He was assisted in this task by Sir Ralph Thompson, who was assigned to help
excise the undesired information, transforming the journals from their original statewhich
included negative criticisms about the government and its policiesto a bland, apolitical listing
of what Gordon was doing during his final months.
Sir Henry found the number of revisions, which were clearly done to benefit the
government, unacceptable, triggering the next phase in the controversy. Thompson removed,
according to Hartingtons summary of their correspondence, all criticisms & suggestions about
the policy of the Govt (irrespectively of their horrible character), and also all allusions to
Government officials. 24 In life, Gordon had known members of both political parties, but he
himself had not been affiliated with either. His personal journals reflected his feelings of
frustration with party politics. In them, he illustrated some of his observations with derogatory
sketches of the policy-makers in London.25 Hartington feared that these omissions may have
gone too far, and as he wrote to Gladstones private secretary, Lord Hamilton, he feared that he
might have overstepped his authority as dictated by the Cabinet regarding the journals in
23

WO 32/6132 copy of a March 20, 1885 letter from Sir Henry Gordon to Lord Hartington.
British Library Add Ms 44148 William Ewart Gladstone Papers, volume 63, April 23, 1885 letter with enclosures
from Hartington to Gladstone, ff. 30-35. The cited portion comes from the prcis section on April 17, ff.34-35.
25
Gordons Journal volume VI, British Library Add Ms. 34479. There are several cartoons throughout the journals,
but the one referred to appears in his entry for November 6, 1884, ff. 17. In the cartoon, Gordon has drawn
caricatures of three Lords: Granville, Northbrooke and Lord ____ in consultation about what strategy to use next in
Sudan. Above their caricatures he wrote: They remained in consultation for nearly a couple of hours, indicating
his perceptions of the amount of attention paid to his situation in London. Although this cartoon is not included in
the published copy, the authors do make a reference to its possible existence, At this point General Gordon refers to
the newspaper cuttings he has made and pasted in on the opposite page... In an account in a London paper of the
departure of Lords Northbrook and Wolseley, General Gordon has marked certain penny-a-line passages, and in all
cases where Gordon Relief Expedition occurs, he has drawn his pen through this and all expressions indicating
that the Expeditionary Force comes to his reliefED., A. Egmont Hake, ed., The Journals of Major-Gen C. G.
Gordon, C.B. At Khartoum, printed from the original mss (London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Co., 1885), 293-294, fn
13.
24

90

authorizing Thompson. In this correspondence, he also sought to remind Sir Henry that if he did
not accept the governments edits, then he could still publish the journals without government
approval.
The government sought to control the message that would be presented to the public
through the journals. By publishing Gordons final thoughts, his family would be adding to the
already-substantial supply of Gordon-related works available to the public. The publishers
willingness to pay a substantial sum to his family shows that a great deal of attention would be
paid to what would be a more accurate account of Gordons final year. When Sir Henry received
the revisions, according to Hartingtons summary once again, he felt in a regular fix & did not
know what to do. Instead, he thought it was much better to tell him to publish it & trust him
not to reflect on the Govt. Finally, Sir Henry felt that the eliminations made by Sir R.
Thompson would deprive the publication of all interest.26 The eliminations would also deprive
it of any harsh criticism. The solution to the problem was finally found with a third party
suggesting revisions that were acceptable to both the family and the government.27 As their
editor, A. Egmont Hake, suggested, the journals were Gordons last words to the world as much
as they are instruction and information to his Government, and Englishmen who value Englands
honour may well read them with a heavy heartwith eyes dimmed by tears.28
The controversy over whether the government should allow this criticism to be published
is illuminating. In the end, there was a compromise and the information presented to the public
was not as critical as Gordon had intended or as bland as the government wanted. However, the
journals themselves cannot be overlooked as a form of imperial propaganda. The mere act of
publishing the journals, regardless of what was contained within them, was enough to remind the
British about his abandonment once more. Even if people did not buy the journals, they still saw
advertisements for them and observed their brightly colored covers.29 In June, 1885, the journals,

26

Ibid., section from April 18, ff. 34-35.

In his preface, the final editors of the journal, A. Egmont Hake and Godfrey Thrupp, indicate how quickly the
journals were edited: The work of editing these Journals is at an end; it only remains now for me to thank one of
my oldest and most valued friends, whose assistance in every way I wish most thoroughly to acknowledge: this is
Mr. Godfrey Thrupp. When it became obvious that the public demand for the work made its completion in so short a
time impossibleas the conscientious achievement of one manhe generously came forward. A. Egmont Hake,
ed., The Journals of Major-Gen C. G. Gordon, preface.
28
Ibid., x.
29
John Mackenzie discusses these trends in publishing, including the origination of eye-catching covers and dust
jackets in his work on imperial propaganda. John M. Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of
British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 18.
27

91

edited by Alfred Egmont Hake, were released.30 In addition to the first biographies of Gordon,
the journals kept his name and appearance in the public consciousness. At the same time as the
journals were released, the Gladstone government also fell. The minority government that
replaced it was the first to be led by Salisbury, who was willing to use Gordon to further
Conservative imperial goals.
The Primrose League was also interested in the publication of these journals. Like
Salisbury, the League sought to preserve Gordons memory as an imperial hero. The journals
only served to reinforce this perception. They also, when combined with other pro-Gordon and
anti-Gladstone propaganda like the Egyptian Red Book, served to remind the public about
Gordon and the circumstances under which he died. Following the fall of the Gladstone
government, they additionally served as a model of policies that the new government should try
to avoid, as could be seen in letters received by the Gordon family following the publication of
the journals.31
As can be shown by the number of copies of the journals still in existence today, the
public was quite interested in Gordons experiences in Khartoum.32 Three years later, the
Primrose League, in a bid to cement its adoption of Gordon as one of its imperial heroes, chose
to publish a selection of his letters to his sister, Mary Augusta Gordon. In publishing these
letters, the Primrose League wanted to ensure that the public was unable to forget the generals
death and his royal connections. The published letters included the one that was written to Mary
Augusta by the Queen, who showed her dismay at hearing the news that the general had been
killed. Hence, the publication achieved two of the major goals of the Primrose League: it
reminded people of the price of being ambivalent about imperialism and of the strong connection
between the Queen and its goals.33
30

Hakes note at the front of the journals has the date of June 11, 1885. A. Egmont Hake, ed., The Journals of
Major-Gen C. G. Gordon, C.B, iii. By mid-June, Sir Henry Gordon was receiving notes from people who read the
journals. These letters occupied several pages in his correspondence: Add Ms 52402, ff. 93-100.
31
For one example, see the letter from Floyer discussed in the last chapter. In it, Floyer specifically references a
letter he wrote to Gordon that appeared in the diary and criticizes Gladstone. Add Ms. 51300 Correspondence to
Mary Gordon, October 8, 1885 letter from Ernest Floyer, ff. 147.
32
There are over 500 copies of Gordons journals available at libraries today, over 100 years after it was first
published. This indicates that there was a significant amount of interest in the journals. They were also reprinted
multiple times in the twentieth century. Worldcat search for The Journals of Major-Gen. C.G. Gordon at
Khartoum accessed on September 4, 2009:
http://newfirstsearch.oclc.org.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/WebZ/FSQUERY?format=BI:next=html/records.html:bad=html/rec
ords.html:numrecs=10:sessionid=fsapp1-48952-fz7fu1pd-msv6b9:entitypagenum=24:0:searchtype=advanced
33
Pugh, 78-79. He also included a portion of the text of the letter referenced above.

92

In fact, due to projects like those of the Primrose League, it was almost impossible to
forget the general in the years directly following his death. Besides the publication of his written
words, Gordons legacy was kept alive with several building projects, including his national
memorial, the Gordon Boys Home, and the statue at Trafalgar Square. These monuments helped
to cement the late generals role at home in England and raise his prestige even further.
The first memorial to Gordon was the Gordon Boys Home. Founded in 1885 and based
on the idea proposed by Gordon to Tennyson during their 1883 lunch, this home, which today
remains in existence as the Gordon School, was seen by many of his contemporaries, both in
government and out, as the most fitting way of remembering the general.34 The attention paid to
his work at Gravesend, combined with Gordons reputation for charity, certainly contributed to
this sentiment. However, it is unlikely that the memorial would have been perceived as a national
one without the support of the Queen and her family. Queen Victorias feelings regarding
Gordon and the manner in which he died were instrumental in raising public support for his
memorial. It was also illustrative of the Queens role in imperial politics in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century. Instead of being perceived as holding political power, the Queen, like
Gordon, was transformed into more of a symbol. She, too, became more than just her own
person; with her crowning as Empress of India in 1877, Victoria became an imperial figurehead.
Therefore, supporting the Gordon Boys Home was another expression of this change of the role
of the monarchy. The Prince of Wales continued to support the Home, thus further embracing
this new form of royal tradition.35
The product of this royal support, The Gordon Boys Home, was founded in 1885 with
in the words of Field-Marshal J.M.A. Simmons, a Chairman of the schools Executive
Committeethe purpose of carrying on a charitable work which was dear to his [Gordons]
heart, and in which he had laboured with such marked success. The statement continued by
praising the Queen, the Prince of Wales, and the Lord Mayor of London for their support in
founding the Home, which provided a place for needy boys admitted at the age of 14. The goal
of the home was to see that they were clothed, educated, and instructed in trades or occupations,

34

The connection between Tennyson and the Gordon Boys Home is discussed in the previous chapter.
David Cannadine explores the changing role of the monarchy, in his article The British Monarchy, c. 1820-1977
in Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, editors, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005). An assessment of the changes in England as compared with other European monarchies is on page
133.
35

93

which [gave] them a fair prospect of earning honest livelihoods in after-life.36 The idea of
providing boys with an opportunity to better themselves and not fall into the life of being a
criminal was another important aim of the Boys Home. This aim was probably the one that was
best suited to Gordons own wishes, as demonstrated by his participation in Gravesends Ragged
School. The home itself was quite small, with only 20 boys housed there in the first year, but by
1887, the number had grown to 100.37
The fact that the Home, which was financed entirely through public subscriptions, was
opened the same year as Gordon died indicated the high level of public support for the scheme.
However, the Gordon Boys Home was not the only organization devoted to his memory.
Ministry of Education files show several other schools that chose to change their names to
include General Gordons. These schools were co-educational, showing a broader level of
support for the general. In addition to these Gordon Memorial Schools, as they became known,
the Ministry of Education also has a file on the foundation of other Gordon Memorial Homes
for Destitute Boys that were founded throughout the country.38 Neither the homes nor the
schools were directly involved with the Gordon Boys Home, the official memorial, but they still
served the same purposeto keep the generals memory alive and to honor him.
This goal is best elucidated in the yearly sermons which were preached in
commemoration of the anniversary of Gordons death. These sermons, which until the death of
Queen Victoria were always given in front of the Gordon Boys Homes royal patrons, the Prince
and Princess of Wales, emphasized the Christian nature of the general, his willingness to help
others less fortunate, and, most importantly for the continued nature of his work, the need for
people to continue to support the Home through donations.39 This support was forthcoming at

36

The statement appeared as the frontispiece, National Memorial to General Gordon, to a published sermon
preached in commemoration of the anniversary of Gordons death in 1897. The sermon is seventh in a series of
bound published sermons at the British Library. Alexander T. Llyod, Enthusiasm, Confidence, DeterminationA
sermon preached before their royal highnesses the prince and princess of Wales, in Sandringham Church on Sunday
Morning, January 24th, 1897 in commemoration of the death of General Gordon, (London: Skeffington & Son,
1897).
37
Ibid., 14.
38
For a full enumeration of these schools, see the National Archives, Ministry of Education Files, ED 21/12611
(Gordon Memorial Schools) and ED 49/6061 (Gordon Memorial Homes for Destitute Boys).
39
The bound collection mentioned above contains the annual sermons preached in honor of the Gordon Boys
Home. Sermons include those by Llyod and William Boyd Carpenter (1898 and 1899). In addition to the bound
collection referenced above, several other years speeches, including 1890 and 91, in honor of the anniversary can
be found in the bound political tracts BL 1578/3 483.

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least through the end of the nineteenth century, and the Home grew to hold over 200 boys by
1900.40
The role of the Gordon Boys Home as one of the primary national memorials to Gordon
is a bit surprising. The only mention of his imperial endeavors at the Home is in the inscription
in the Recreation Hall. The inscription references his efforts in China and Sudan, but those
passages come after the opening lines. The entire opening stanza focuses on Gordon the man,
with lines like a man simple and heroic, loving righteousness and hating iniquity, not on
Gordon the imperial figure. His final sacrifice at Khartoum is a part of the inscription, which
ends as follows: in Khartoum, called at a memorial crisis, to a task of mercy beyond human
strength, for eleven months he held out alone, drawing to himself in the beleaguered city, the
wonder and reverence of the world, and then fell at his post, faithful unto death.41 Thus, the
inscription ended with the same sort of focus as the beginning, a focus on the man himself.
Perhaps the reason why the Gordon Boys Home did not focus on Gordons imperial
duties was because another memorial to him was proposed at the same time. This memorial took
the form of a statue placed in Londons Trafalgar Square. The placement of Gordons statue was
not without controversy; the family of one of the other imperial figures honored in the square,
Lord Napier, wrote to the Works department about the possibility of moving his statue to make
room for the new one in late 1885. The statue was not moved; a large gas light was removed to
accommodate the new statue to General Gordon.42

40

Llyod, 14.
The full inscription appears in Lt.-Col. Graham Seton Hutchinson, Gordon and the Gordon BoysCharles
George GordonThe Man, The Gordon Boys School1885-1945 (Woking, Surrey: The Gordon Boys School,
1944, reprinted 1950), 54-55. The entire text of the inscription is as follows: This home was founded/in memory
of/Charles George Gordon, C.B./A man simple and heroic,/loving righteousness and hating iniquity,/born to be a
soldier and a ruler/he gave his heart/to the young, the poor and the outcast./Accepting the hardest duties/but refusing
wealth and honours/and counting his life as nothing/if by any means he might lesson the miseries of mankind,/in all
loneliness, danger and perplexity/he endured as seeing him who is invisible.
In China/by inspiring a disheartened army/with his own dauntless resolution/he delivered the most populous of
empires/from the horrors of civil war.
In the Soudan/he strove to suppress slavery/and by his just and fatherly rule/won the love of hapless multitudes.
In Khartoum/called at a memorial crisis/to a task of mercy beyond human strength/for eleven months he held out
alone/drawing to himself in the beleaguered city/the wonder and reverence of the world/and then fell at his
post/faithful unto death.
Born at Woolwich, January 28, 1833/died at Khartoum, January 26, 1885.
41

42

Correspondence between the Napier family and the Works office is in the National Archives WORK 20/50 A6481
and A 6549 Letters from December 7 and 5 1885 (respectively); the final decision to move the light is found in B
3116, May 19, 1888.

95

The statue itself did not differ greatly from the statues of other, lesser military heroes of
the time.43 Cast in bronze and standing about ten and half feet tall, it represented Gordon as a
staff-officer, with his head inclined forward and his chin resting on his right hand, while he is
holding a bible in his left. His wand of victory from the China campaign is tucked under his
arm, while his left foot stands on a broken cannon. This action was, in the words of The
Graphics article from the day it was unveiled in 1888, intended to symbolize his moral attitude
as a soldier. Although he hated war and bloodshed, he seemed bound by fate to be ever
fighting.44 Gordons experiences as a soldier are represented further on the pedestal. In addition
to a simple side that bears his name, rank, and date of death, the pedestal features two large
bronze allegories which once again made reference to his character. The first of these allegories
is titled Fortitude and Faith and the second is Charity and Justice. Above the allegories at the
top of the pedestal is a series of locations important to Gordons life and career. The names
ranged from Crimea to Khartoum.45 Together, the pedestal and statue represent a particular view
of Gordon: the imperial hero.
The design was approved by Parliament under a Conservative government. The statue
itself was quite expensive; the final cost was over 4000 and was not paid for by private funds.46
As a government project, the successful completion of the statue and its unveiling can be seen as
imperial propaganda. However, it is important to note that the Gordon statue, like so many of the
other military imperial monuments that had preceded it for centuries, was meant to inspire future
actions as well as commemorate past ones. Matt Matsuda examined this phenomenon through a
discussion on Trajans column in Rome in The Memory of the Modern. Trajans column was not
meant to glorify Romes brutal conquest over the Dacians, but instead to illustrate grand lessons
in politics and morality deserving of respect and emulation. Matsuda continued his analysis by
referencing the source of Trajans success: success was inextricable from worthiness and the
exercise of the virtues of courage, clemency, justice, piety.47 As the names on the friezes

43

The statue can still be viewed in London today in its new location at the gardens on the Victoria Embankment.
The reason why the statue is now located there will be discussed in the concluding chapters. See Appendix A for a
contemporary photograph of the Gordon Statue.
44
Statue of General Gordon, The Graphic, October 13, 1888.
45
The names on the pedestal are as follows: Crimea 1855, China 1864; Quinsan, Soochow [above Fortitude and
Faith]; Gravesend, Equator [above Charity and Justice] and finally Soudan and Khartoum.
46
WORK 20/50 contains a final tallying of the expenses, including the budget years that they were broken down
into.
47
Matt K. Matsuda, The Memory of the Modern (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 30.

96

above the allegories on the pedestal to his statue demonstrate, over a millennium later, a hero of
another empire, Charles Gordon, would be similarly hailed by his contemporaries.
The statue at Trafalgar Square was not the only statue of Gordon commissioned during
this time; and by 1888, when the statue was completed, it was joined by several other ones
throughout the British Empire, in places as disparate as Canada and Australia.48 There was one
other Gordon statue of note erected in 1890. This statue, which served as the model for the later
one which would be at Khartoum following its re-conquest, featured an equestrian Gordon, with
the general seated astride a camel. It sits at the entrance to the Royal Engineers Barracks at
Chatham as a tribute to their famous fallen colleague.49 Gordons transformation from man to
symbol was thus effectively cemented.
In the years following his death, organizations like the Primrose League, his friends and
associates, and the royal family itself ensured that Gordon was not going to be forgotten. As a
symbol and figurehead, the general was an invaluable asset to either side of the imperial
question. Those who supported further imperial involvement could use the Gladstone
administrations lack of decisive action regarding Sudan as a cautionary episode that must not be
repeated. The political connection between Gladstone and Gordon as already discussed was not
one that was broken with the fall of the Liberal Party from government in 1885 and 1886.
Instead, it remained a viable political strategy which linked the two until Gladstones death in
1898, the same year that Britain found itself re-engaged in Sudan.
Even without the immediate threat of re-involvement in Sudan, Gordons name was still
invoked in other imperial situations following his death. Between 1885 and the re-conquest in
1898, there were several other imperial squabbles involving the British government. While none
of these problems had a significant impact on the Empire as a whole, the fact that Gordons name
and abandonment were cited in discussions of them indicates his continued importance to the
British public. The most common place where Gordons name was employed to serve as a
reminder was in political speeches, similar to the ones made over Home Rule. This usage of
Gordons legacy is best exemplified by two imperial crises which occurred in the 1890s.
The less important of these situations involved the actions of the Great Powers
concerning Crete. In 1897, the Great Powers agreed to grant autonomy to Crete under a Greek

48
49

WORK 20/50 A5293.

WORK 20/182. The statue at Khartoum will be discussed at length in the concluding chapters.

97

prince following a brief rebellion. Although seemingly insignificant, this rebellion spelled the
end of Britains Eastern Question, dating back to the mid-1870s. With the British agreement to
the Great Powers plan for Crete, the government signaled an acceptance of a loss of this sphere
of influence as the Greek prince was firmly under German influence.50
The event may have gone without much notice except for the fact that the Eastern
Question had first grown to prominence under William Gladstone and his outspokenness against
the Bulgarian atrocities beginning in 1876.51 Now, twenty years later, it seemed as if Britain was
finally coming to end of its deliberations on the question. In speeches regarding the situation,
both Gladstone and Gordon were invoked. In one speech from 1896, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach,
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, urged that the government should not heed Gladstones advice,
who argued for further British involvement in the region on the grounds of human rights. This
advice could be disregarded because Gladstone was, according to Hicks-Beach, responsible for
abandon[ing] the peaceful population of the Sudan to the rule of the Mahdi. [He] deserted
General Gordon, and therefore by the direct action of the Governmentwe have incurred no
small responsibility for the condition of the population of the Soudan.52 Hicks-Beach felt that
the human rights basis that Gladstone cited was not very important given his previous decisions.
In this case, Gordon was not used to further the empire; his death was used as an argument
against continued involvement.
At the same time as Hicks-Beach made his argument, one of his colleagues, UnderSecretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Nathaniel Curzon, was still invoking Gordons
death as a reason for a continued imperial presence in Sudan. In a long speech given to the
Glasgow Conservative Association, Curzon detailed some of the governments foreign policy
goals. In the space of one sentence, he switched from stating that the government would not be
satisfied until we have avenged, on the very spot where he fell, the memory of General Gordon
to the major foreign affairs topic of the day, Eastern Europe or the topic that occupies the
50

Richard Shannon, The Crisis of Imperialism: 1865-1915 (London: Hart-Davis Macgibbon, 1974), 317. Margaret
Jefferson explains the reasons why Britain chose to accept this decision in her article Lord Salisbury and the
Eastern Question, 1890-1898 in The Slavonic and East European Review volume 39, number 92 (Dec., 1960), 57.
Gladstone himself also argued firmly against this solution as can be seen in a letter he sent to the Aberdeen Weekly
Journal on April 3, 1897.
51
Gladstone wrote a famous series of articles against the atrocities in The Nineteenth Century in 1878. William
Gladstone, Englands Mission in volume 3, number 16; The Paths of Honour and Shame, in volume 3, number
18, and Liberty in the East and West in volume 4, number 19.
52
Sir Michael Hicks-Beach at Darlington, Leeds Mercury, October 14, 1896. The human rights basis was on the
treatment of the Armenians by the Turks in the Ottoman Empire.

98

universal attention.53 Gordon was still important enough to occupy at least a portion of a long
speech that was otherwise focused on the events in the East. These two contrasting speeches
delivered on October 14 and 15, 1896 respectively, highlighted the ways that Gordon could still
be used by the Conservative Party. In the first, he and Gladstone are used as an anti-imperial
argument, while conversely, Curzon employed his death as a reason to re-enter Sudan. What the
two speeches do have in common was a desire to discredit Gladstone, the Liberal Party, and their
views on imperialism.
Like the Conservative party, other people were also unwilling to overlook Gladstones
actions from 1885 in discussions about policy in the late 1890s. Gladstone was not in favor of the
Great Powers proposal to give Crete its autonomy under a Greek Prince. In an editorial against
the former Prime Minister, the Glasgow Herald chose to remind its readers that Gladstones
attempt to use the mere authority of his name as a way to argue against something was ironic as
he was the man who acted at the wrong in the Transvaalhe did not act soon enough in the
case of General Gordon.54 His perceived authority was, if not completely discredited, at least
tempered by his previous actions.
The case of Crete was not the only one in which the memory of Gordon was invoked.
The second crisis where Gordon was employed in an imperial context concerned the building of
a railroad in Uganda. Uganda had first become an imperial issue in 1890 with the signing of the
Mackinnon Agreement. Under this agreement, the Imperial British East Africa Company
received the rights to a strip of territory that stretched from Uganda to Lake Tanganyika. By
holding this territory, the company was able to unite the northern and southern spheres of British
influence as a part of the Cape to Cairo scheme of Sir William Mackinnon, the director of the
company.55 By 1894, the British presence in Uganda had grown in the way of several other
British imperial schemes to be more than just a commercial issue. The government in London
became involved in the area when Mackinnon, knowing Ugandas significance to Salisburys
imperial plans, threatened to withdraw from the area if the government did not help to fund the
companys efforts to build a railroad. As Uganda had significant strategic importance, these
guarantees were made, leading to its becoming a British protectorate in part to safeguard the
53

Political Situation, Glasgow Herald, October 15, 1896.

Friday, March, 19th, Glasgow Herald, March 19, 1897.
55
The full details of the scheme and the way that the area eventually wound up a defacto British protectorate are
discussed in Wm. Roger Louis, Sir Percy Andersons Grand African Strategy, 1883-1896, The English Historical
Review volume 81, number 319 (Apr. 1966) : 302-304.
54

99

sources of the Nile, which was considered integral to ensuring Egypts protection.56 The idea of
Uganda becoming a protectorate of Britain was well received. For example, an article in The
North American Review from June 1894 explained the public take on the news that Uganda had
become a part of the British imperial sphere. From this decision, the author, Conservative MP Sir
Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, wrote, British influence will stretch from end to end of the dark
continent, from Alexandria to Cape Town. That will be a splendid day for England. The fruition
of the work of men like Livingstone and Baker, Gordon and Stanleywill then be finally
concluded [through commercial means]. 57
These commercial means certainly included the question of the railroad, which was first
brought to the governments attention in 1891, but was not settled before the Salisbury
government fell in the elections of 1892. However, Salisburys replacement, the Liberal
Roseberry, kept the scheme alive; when Salisbury returned to office in 1895, the Uganda railway
project was still viable.58 As its completion was directly linked to British goals in Africa, the
presence of Gordon in discussions about it is hardly surprising. In this particular fight, Gordon
was used as an expert on Africawhich was one of the reasons why he had been sent back to
Sudan originally. Interestingly, his expertise was used by people seeking to defeat the bill, who
in some cases, were members of the government that had abandoned him to his fate eleven years
earlier.
The question of funding the Uganda Railway came up for a vote in the House of
Commons in June 1895. This vote, which resulted in the granting of 80,000 for the
administration of East Africa (including the railway), received overwhelming support from both
the Liberals and the Conservatives. Yet, it was hardly a unanimous vote, with 249 in favor and
51 opposed.59 One of the most prominent of those who opposed the vote was Sir Charles Dilke.
Dilke was a member of the Gladstone Cabinet that had sent Gordon to Khartoum in 1884. He
was part of the group within the Cabinet that was instrumental in convincing Gladstone that he
56

Further analysis on the political motivations behind the British decision to become involved in Uganda, including
foreign policy decisions, see M.P. Hornik, The Anglo-Belgian agreement of 12 May 1894 The English Historical
Review volume 57 number 226 (Apr., 1942) : 227-243. For the actual decisions that led to Uganda becoming a
protectorate see P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000, second edition (Longman: London,
2001), 334-335.
57
Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, The Political Outlook in England, The North American Review volume 158, number
451 (Jun., 1890): 670.
58
Gash et al, 228.
59
The Time of the House, Leeds Mercury, June 14, 1895. Of the 80,000, 50,000 was set aside specifically for
the railway.

100

needed to act proactively in terms of Sudan, and he strongly supported sending the general back
to Africa.60 Thus, Dilkes citation of Gordons views on another African-related issue, especially
one that was linked to the fate of Egypt and Sudan, is understandable. His views, which were
expressed during the debates, received press coverage from multiple newspapers including the
Glasgow Herald and the Leeds Mercury. Both of these papers covered the entirety of the railway
fight. However, the tones that two papers took differed.
The Glasgow Herald article provided a straightforward analysis of the debate. The
reporting was not colored by political bias, and both sides of the question were fully explained.
In the article, Dilke was presented as vigorously oppos[ing] the policy of constructing a
railway for two reasons. The first was on the basis of the idea that General Gordon had said
there could be no trade, as the natives had nothing to exchange for goods. The second was a
more practical concern; Dilke believed that the proposed line was not the natural route to
Uganda at all. 61 To support his claims against the wishes of the seated government and Lord
Salisbury, Dilke used the figure of Gordon he knew, not the one that was created after his death.
The Leeds Mercury also carried news of the debate. It was included in a section that was
written in a fairly satirical manner, with another issue referred not as the expected battle between
the two sides, but instead as a polite conversation between a very stout gentleman [Sir William
Harcourt, the Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer]and a very thin gentleman [Arthur Balfour,
the leading Conservative voice in the House of Commons]. The topic of the polite conversation
is wholly unnecessary. The example was merely to demonstrate the tone of the article. Dilkes
comments on the bill were not considered to be very important; they came at the very end of the
article, right before the final vote was taken. However, the way in which the writer described his
comments shows the continued interest that people had in Gordon: Sir Charles Dilke subjected
the Government scheme to serious criticism, declaring that the best route had not been selected
for the railway, and that he had it on the authority of the late General Gordon that it would not be
possible to develop markets in that part of the world. The author felt that the statement was
sufficient. There was not one word of analysis provided after it; the article moved to its next

60

Add Ms 56452 Supplemental Papers of William Gladstone. In Gladstones papers on the crisis, a clipping from
the Pall Mall Gazette, The Cabinet and the Soudan, February 13, 1884, with the names of people who supported
and opposed sending Gordon to Sudan is saved. With the clipping is a note from Gladstone to his Colonial Secretary
Derby asking if he saw it, ff. 12-13.
61
Our London Correspondence, Glasgow Herald, June 14 1895.

101

featured point, The closure, which reported the final tallies.62 Clearly, Gordons status as an
authority on Uganda, which he visited during his time in Equatoria, was unchallenged more than
a decade after his death.63
The question of a railway in Uganda became paramount following a change in the
Empires goals in East Africa. This change was not based on the needs of Africa, or even the
British people, but instead on European events. The Great Powers which had been referenced in
the Crete debate were slowly giving way to more formalized alliances, like the Triple Alliance
between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy.64 At the time, Italy was involved in imperial
projects in Abyssinia. Following an Italian defeat in the spring of 1896, the British government
decided to launch a counter-offensive in Sudan to try to draw attention away from the Italians.65
The original goal of this military endeavor was not to avenge the death of Gordon. Therefore, the
plans did not make any mention of Khartoum, but only of sending an Anglo-Egyptian force as
far into Sudan as Dongola. Khartoum would not be taken and until two years later.
Before the decision was made to support Italy, Salisbury wished to postpone any
intervention back into Sudan until the Uganda railway, which he strongly supported, had been
built. Diplomatic need surpassed any commercial benefits that might have been derived from the
railway and the incursion was launched before the railway had come even close to completion.66
Instead of launching any sort of incursion from the south, as would have been the case with a
Uganda based assault, the expedition was sent from Egypt under the command of the Sirdar of
the Egyptian armyHoratio Herbert Kitchener.
During Kitcheners command, the purpose of the operation changed to include the
avenging of Gordon and the re-taking of Khartoum. This change was partially to court public
opinion. As this chapter has shown, General Gordon remained a popular subject in Britain. His
death in 1885 did not completely derail the Liberal partys agenda, but it was a factor in it. As
debates over Ireland and Crete later demonstrated, Gladstones credibility in foreign affairs was
62

The Time of the House.

John H. Waller, Gordon of Khartoum: The Saga of a Victorian Hero (New York: Atheneum, 1988), 154-155.
64
This alliance was formalized in 1882, while the idea of the Great Powers did not completely fall apart until the
twentieth century.
65
The actual events that led to the re-conquest of the Sudan and the creation of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium,
including the reasons why Britain wanted support the Italian efforts in Abyssinia (modern-day Ethiopia) will be
discussed in the next chapter. For information on the relationship between Italy, Abyssinia, and Sudan, see Bahru
Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia: 1855-1991 second edition (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press and
Research Publication Office, 2001), 81-83.
66
The railway was finally completed, following some domestic issues in Uganda, in 1901.
63

102

irreparably damaged by Gordons abandonment. His political foes were able to use it almost as a
tangible reminder of what was perceived at the time to be one of his biggest failures. Thus, the
fallen general was transformed into a national hero. Memorials to Gordon demonstrated this
British pride, a sentiment that the Conservative Party was quick to exploit. His new role as an
imperial symbol, especially as embraced by that party and the Primrose League, almost
demanded that the government officially avenge him, which a Conservative government finally
did in 1898.

103

CHAPTER 6
BACK TO KHARTOUM

It international considerations led the British to launch a military offensive into Sudan
beginning in 1896 with the campaign at Dongola and effectively concluding in 1898 with the retaking of Khartoum. The British did not become re-involved in Sudan to avenge General
Gordons death, and the reasons why they recommitted to the region had nothing to do with the
general. Instead, it was the balance of power in Europe that motivated the British government to
reexamine its position in the region. By the mid-1890s, the balance was shifting towards
Germany. Traditionally, Italy had served as a link between Britain and Germany. To help
preserve this link, British assistance to Italy in Africa was crucial. If Britain had not wanted to
aid Italy, then the original advance to Dongola would not have occurred in 1896, and
furthermore, if Britain had not feared Frances intentions towards controlling the Nile Valley,
then there may not have been an extension of the British goals to include the re-conquest of
Khartoum. General Gordons name was not included in any of the military preparations for the
operation. In fact, the offensive itself would not be considered a British operation. It was led by
the Egyptian army, although the officers were British, so in truth, the army itself was more of an
Anglo-Egyptian force. The Sirdar, or commander of the army, General Herbert Kitchener, had
also participated in the effort to relieve Gordon. Thus, Kitchener provided the link between
Gordons death and the new offensive, a link which would be strengthened following the retaking of Khartoum and Kitcheners memorial to Gordon in front of his former palace.
Despite the real international imperatives initiating the British involvement in Sudan, the
fact that Gordons memory remained so strong in the popular imagination meant that public
opinion would act on and shape the events once they were set in motion. According to Lord
Cromer, the British public had evidently made up its mind that, sooner or later, Khartoum had
to be recaptured.1 This sentiment was echoed in the press and in discussions of the offensive by
the men who had served in it. It was also exploited by the Conservative government to ensure
that there was significant public support for the undertaking. This public support was important
to its success, as Britain acknowledged its presence in the area following the end of the offensive
with the creation of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium.
1

The Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt volume II (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1916), 109.

104

Anglo-Egyptian troops first returned to Sudan to begin their progress to Dongola in

March 1896. In the beginning, the government only approved an abbreviated advance up the
Nile; however, to intimidate the Khalifa, or leader, of Sudan, it was extended out to the city.2 The
reason why these troops were sent to Dongola had little to do with events actually occurring in
Sudan. Instead, they were sent to buttress British foreign policy goals in the region and, more
importantly, in Europe. In 1896, the fragile alliance that had existed between Italy and Britain
was crumbling as a result of Germanys growing power. Originally, the British and Italians had
allied as a way of aiding Anglo-German relations. As these relations became more strained, Italy
lost most of its importance to British foreign policy by March 1896.
Nevertheless, according to historian Arthur Marsden, there were two main reasons why
Salisbury decided to assist the Italians in Abyssinia. First, he was unwilling to ignore the Italian
request for help; as Marsden commented, it is clear that a second refusal of help would have
dealt a possibly fatal blow to what was left of Anglo-Italian cordiality. 3 In 1896, the British still
wanted to preserve this tenuous relationship. Regardless, the British decision to become reinvolved in Sudan was already in the planning stages; to assist the Italians, Salisbury really only
needed to speed up the preparations. The second reason was simple: the continued protection of
Egypt, the Suez Canal, and the Nile River. Marsden cited the inevitability of relations with
France being strained someday to near breaking point over the whole Egyptian question, in his
discussion of this goal.4 This fear of a French presence in the region was paramount to any
foreign policy debates during the time period, and an Italian presence would help forestall any
French encroachment.5
When, for the reasons discussed above, the decision was made to support the Italians,
specific goals were sent to Kitchener and Cromer. At first, their orders were only to intimidate
the Khalifa and provide a diversion for the Italian troops currently enmeshed in battle in

The Mahdi died in June 1885. He was succeeded by the Khalifa, which in Arabic means the successor. As the
Mahdis successor, he was also a religious and political leader. For more on the Khalifa and his duties see the final
four chapters of P.M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-1898: a study of its origins development and
overthrow (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).
3
Arthur Marsden, Salisbury and the Italians in 1896 in The Journal of Modern History volume 40, number 1,
(Mar., 1968): 111.
4
Ibid.
5
In addition to these foreign policy goals, two major works on the Mahdi had become bestsellers in England by
1896. These two books helped to remind the public about the events of 1885. Their significance is examined in John
M. Mackenzies Heroic Myths of Empire in his edited Popular Imperialism and the military: 1850-1950
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 128.

105

Abyssinia. These aims were met in September, 1896, when the Anglo-Egyptian force reached
Dongola. There were two reasons why the force took nearly six months to reach the city. One
was the fact that it was dependent on the Nile rising high enough to allow the gunboats to be
used. The other was the extension of the old railway that had been created for the relief
expedition in 1885. This extension was connected to Kitcheners personal goal for the region:
the re-conquest of Khartoum.6
As Winston Churchill, one of the most famous correspondents of this offensiveor the
River War as he termed itexplained about re-taking Dongola: the first step had been
takenAfter ten years of defensive war the Dervishes [the Mahdi/Khalifas supporters] had been
attackeda general desire was manifested in the country that the operations should continue.7
Operations did continue following the taking of Dongola. However, the preparations that were
involved in continuing the offensive were extensive and occupied most of the armys time from
the end of 1896 through 1897. Almost a year after Dongola fell, the Khalifas troops decided to
abandon Berber to the Anglo-Egyptian troops, which allowed the Sirdar to move to the next and
final phase of his operations: defeating the Khalifa and re-conquering Khartoum.
At the same time as Kitcheners troops were operating in Sudan, the government in
London was debating what the final scope of his operation was going to entail. By February
1897, it was decided that Khartoum needed to be re-taken. As Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, stated, Egypt could never be held to be permanently secure so
long as a hostile Power was in occupation of the Nile valley up to Khartoum.8 In his speech, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer was not just referring to the Khalifa. There was another hostile
power in the region for the British to worry about: France. In 1896, the French had launched an
expedition whose goal was to take control of the Nile valley area. By 1898 the expedition had
entered into the region and there were fears in Britain that British dominance over the Nile was
going to be challenged.9 As a result, the Sirdars goal would become a reality.
6

John O. Udal, The Nile in Darkness: A Flawed Unity 1863-1899 (Wilby, Norwich: Michael Russell, 2005), 513516. The reasons for the railroad are discussed in chapter two.
7
Winston S. Churchill, The River War: an account of the Reconquest of the Sudan (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode,
1899 (1933 reprint)), 160. There have been many accounts of these continued operations, or the battles which led to
these significant ones: however, as they are outside the scope of this project, their details have been omitted. For a
full summation of these battles see Henry Keown-Boyd, A Good Dusting: a Centenary Review of the Sudan
Campaigns 1883-1899 (London: Leo Cooper in association with Secker & Warburg, 1986).
8
Saturday February 6, Glasgow Herald February 6, 1897.
9
This expedition was the Marchand Expedition. Jean-Baptiste Marchand did reach the area and took control of a
fort at Fashoda. Although Marchand reached it first, the Nile valley would remain under British control following a

106

Kitchener had personal aims for achieving these goals. He had served in Egypt during
Gordons final mission and was one of the last Europeans to have any contact with him because
he had been in charge of the telegraph wires to Khartoum.10 After the city had fallen and Gordon
killed, Kitchener had been tasked with writing the official account of the events. His feelings
about Gordon, whom he regarded as a personal hero and an example to be followed, are evident
in his final summation to the report, in which he noted that the only reason why Khartoum had
not fallen earlier was due to the indomitable resolution and resource of one Englishman
[Gordon].11 Although he did not advocate the return of Anglo-Egyptian forces to Sudan simply
to avenge the general, Kitchener was very conscious of the symbolic significance of the renewed
British presence in the region.
This sentiment was evident in the orders that he issued before the battle over the Atbara
River in April, 1898. This battle occurred on Good Friday and determined who controlled the
river, which was essential to the re-taking of Khartoum. In fact, although Kitchener would gain
glory and nobility from his subsequent defeat of the Khalifa at Omdurman, he himself
considered this battle to be the turning point of his entire military career.12 The significance of
the battle is reinforced by the orders he issued for it. They ended with the following: The Sirdar
is absolutely confident that every officer and man will do his duty, he only wishes to impress
upon them two words: Remember Gordon. The enemy before them are Gordons murderers.13
Kitchener personally delivered these orders, adding to their importance.
The idea of using a previous tragedy to motivate troops was a popular one in 1898.
Kitcheners utterance of Remember Gordon came only two months after the famous entreaty
period of diplomatic tension between the two countries. The settling of the Fashoda Crisis in November 1898 would
be one of the factors in the creation of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium which will be discussed later in this
chapter. For a full account of the Marchand expedition see Darrell Bates, The Fashoda Incident of 1898: Encounter
on the Nile (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
10
Gordon even regarded Kitchener as the man whom [he] had always placed [his] hopes upon in his diary of the
siege. Volume VI of Gordons Journals, British Library Add Ms 34479, ff. 75.
11
Kitcheners Blue Book is included in Add Ms 34479, the quote appears on f. 133. His relationship with Gordon
including various aspects of his hero worship is explained in John Pollock, Kitchener: The Road to Omdurman
(London: Constable, 1998), 66-67.
12
Udal, 520.
13
Kitcheners habit of giving his orders personally has led to them not being preserved in the official accounts of
battles. These words were instead preserved by his staff officer, Baron Henry Rawlinson and are recorded in a
biography of him by his close friend, General Sir Frederick Maurice based on his journals, letters and private papers
(for details on the writing process see page x-xi in his preface). Frederick Maurice, Soldier, Artist, Sportsman: The
Life of General Lord Rawlinson of Trent from his journals and letters edited by Major General Sir Frederick
Maurice (London: Cassell, 1928) , 33. However, over the last fifteen years the recollection of Kitcheners quote has
been wrongly attributed in several books to a fellow officer, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Court Repingtons
memoirs. Charles Repington, Vestigia (London: Constable and Co., Ltd., 1919).

107

to Remember the Maine which helped spark the Spanish-American War. Like Gordons death
a decade earlier, this war was also caused by the growth of yellow journalism. The U.S.S. Maine
was also lost in suspicious circumstances and in a way that was an issue for national pride. Thus,
the people who advocated a war were not above using it as a reason to raise popular support for
an unpopular undertaking. The re-conquest of Sudan was more popular than the SpanishAmerican War, but it too was problematic. Using Gordon was a way to convince any potential
detractors and to remind the forces why (at least in the perception of the public) they had entered
the war. As Richard Fulton discussed in his article, The Sudan Sensation of 1898, Kitchener
used the memory of Gordon to rally support in a similar manner, with the same level of
success.14
With Kitcheners personal entreaty motivating the troops, the Anglo-Egyptian forces won
a decisive battle at Atbara and by the end of the day controlled the river and its banks. The next
step was to re-take Khartoum. However, it would still be several more months before the AngloEgyptian forces (which had, by this time, been supplemented by several other British battalions)
would be able to achieve their objective. The main reason for this delay was that the Nile had to
rise to a level that would allow the gunboats to progress further south. By September 1898, the
water had risen a sufficient amount and Kitcheners troops were preparing for their final
offensive against the Khalifa. This offensive would not take place at Khartoum, but instead at his
capital, Omdurman.15
When Gordon was alive, Omdurman was an old Egyptian fort that was built a short
distance away from Khartoum. After his death, the Mahdi abandoned Gordons capital, leaving
his palace in ruins, and moved the seat of government to Omdurman where he built a new city.
When he died, he was buried there in a magnificent tomb.16 Hence, Omdurman had symbolic
importance to the Khalifa in addition to having strategic value.
14

Richard Fulton, The Sudan Sensation 1898, Victorian Periodicals Review, volume 42, number 1 (Spring 2009):
44.
15
The Khalifa chose Omdurman as the location for his final stand for a variety of reasons, including the facts that
most of his army was located there, it was his capital, and he controlled both communication and supply lines. For
more on Omdurman, see Udal, 522-524.
16
The best descriptions of this tomb can be found in Bennet Burleigh, Khartoum Campaign of 1898 or the Reconquest of the Sudan (London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1899, 1989 reprint), 130 and 237. Burleigh described the
tomb before it was destroyed as a white, cone-shaped tomb, its dome girt with rings, and ornamented with brazen
finials, globe and crescent, shone not six miles awayfour arabesque finials rose, one from each corner of the
supporting wall. Later, when discussing the damage done to the tomb, he went into specifics about the interior,
mentioning brass and iron grilles, black and red cloth covering a catafalque, ornate woodwork, yellow lettered
panels with text from the Quran, and blue and yellow scroll work.

108

The largest military encounter of the British campaign to re-conquer Sudan happened at
Omdurman on September 2, 1898. It lasted a single day and proved the effectiveness of a new
British weapon: the machine gun. As historian Daniel Headrick has discussed, the British feared
a repeat of the Gordon relief expedition and its failure to defeat the Mahdi. This time, as
Headrick wrote, Kitcheners expedition was therefore well supplied with the latest weapons:
breechloading and repeating rifles, Maxim guns, field artillery, and six river gunboats firing
high-explosive shells.17 With their overwhelming firepower advantage, the British won a
decisive victory against the Khalifas troops and much more antiquated weapons. Historian
Henry Keown-Boyd described the Khalifas troops, with a bit of poetic license, as a medieval
host in full battle array with beating drums, blaring horns, armoured knights on prancing horses,
a multitude of foot-soldiersbrandishing the traditional weapons with which men had done
battle for centuries. The differences between the two sides could not have been more stark.18
Omdurman was not only a battle for control of the Nile River and its valley, it was also a
battle between old and new technologies. This fact was best explained by Churchill who was
present at Omdurman and served as both a member of the 21st Lancers and a war correspondent
for the Morning Post. He famously summed up the battle as the most signal triumph ever
gained by the arms of science over barbarians. Churchill then continued his analysis by
referencing the fact that only it took five hours to destroy the strongest and best-armed savage
army yet arrayed against a modern European Power with comparatively little difficulty, risk or
loss by the Anglo-Egyptian troops.19
Even if the battle of Omdurman was not a significant military struggle for the AngloEgyptian forces, it still was important in terms of British involvement in the region. Successful
re-conquest had been a British imperial goal; it became a point of British pride. By 1898,
advances in cheaper printing meant that an ever-widening British public was able to receive their
news daily, in some cases more than once a day.20 With all of these new papers, there was also a
growth in the numbers of reporters in the field covering events like those in Sudan. In addition to
the Reuters correspondent, H. A. Gwynne, whom Kitchener would have preferred to be the only
17

Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 118.
18
Keown-Boyd, 220.
19
Churchill, 300; Headrick gives the numbers killed in the battle as follows: 20 Britons, 20 of their Egyptian allies
and 11000 Dervishes lay dead on page 118.
20
Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society and Culture in Britain (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 170-171.

109

war correspondent allowed with his troops, the Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, and Morning Post
all had their own reporters in Sudan.21 Most of these correspondents were attached to the
military; in the case of Churchill, he served in the action at Omdurman.
The British publics curiosity about these events was not satisfied with the publication of
dispatches back from Sudan. Instead, over the next year, each of these correspondents also
published accounts of the events. Written only months after the battles concluded, these books
provide a view into how Gordons avenging was viewed in London while at the same time
allowing their readers to gain more insight into events as they unfolded in the desert. Each author
had a unique perspective about the events. Bennet Burleigh, the Daily Telegraph correspondent,
had also been present for the Gordon Relief Expedition. In his coverage of the re-taking of
Metemmeh on the way to Omdurman, he referenced his feelings of pain felt on the receipt of
the evil news of Gordons deathand of the slaughter at Khartoum, even as he explained the
victorious battle movements.22 He later worked Gordon into his coverage of the Battle of
Omdurmans aftermath, using language such as At last! After fifteen vexatious years spent in
trying to get here, an Anglo-Egyptian army has recovered Khartoum and occupied Omdurman.
Gordon has been avenged and justified.23 To Burleigh, one of the major goals of this campaign
was to avenge Gordon and he used the generals name liberally throughout his recollections.
Like Burleigh, George Washington Steevens, the correspondent for the Daily Mail, was
also a full-time war correspondent. However, unlike his counter-part, Steevens was at the
beginning of his career and closer in age to the men who were fighting against the Khalifa.
Instead of being in Sudan for the Gordon Relief Expedition, Steevens merely read about ita
fact mentioned in the beginning of his bestselling book on the re-conquest. He even referred to
accounts of the people and events which took place as stories, so gallant, so futile, indicating
his youthful fascination with the topic.24 He began his work with an assumption of familiarity
with the events of 1884-5, and in this way and many others, Steevens account differs from that
of Burleigh. There is a lack of personal remembrances and a focus on the events as they occurred
21

Kitcheners desire to only have a Reuters presence is examined in Joseph J. Matthews, Heralds of the
Imperialistic Wars, Military Affairs, volume 19, number 3 (Autumn, 1955):149. For a full account of the
correspondents present in 1898, see Hugh Cecils British Correspondents and the Sudan Campaign of 1896-1898,
in Edward M. Spiers, editor, Sudan: the reconquest reappraised (London: Frank Cass, 1998).
22
Burleigh, 89. Control over Metemmeh had also been essential during the Gordon relief efforts of 1885, so it was
familiar to him.
23
Ibid., 136.
24
G[eorge] W[arrinton] Steevens, With Kitchener to Khartuom (London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1898); this
reprinted edition (London: Greenhill Books, 1990), 4.

110

on the ground in Sudan. He too mentioned the idea of avenging Gordon, but his analysis of the
avenging differs. To Steevens, Gordon is a symbol, interchangeable with other imperial figures,
which allowed him to express the following sentiment: Gordon may dieother Gordons may
die in the futurebut the same clean-limbed brood will grow up and avenge them.25 For
Steevens, the more important idea was not the avenging of one imperial hero, but rather the
imperial spirit present in Britain.
The Morning Posts Winston Churchill shared some of these sentiments. He was also a
young man in 1885 and was just beginning his career when he went to Sudan in 1898. However,
unlike Steevens, Churchill was personally invested in the outcome of the offensive because he
was temporarily posted to the Lancers for the duration of his time in the region. His writing,
especially regarding the battle movements, is quite vivid and at times slips into the first person
demonstrating the personal attachment that he had to the battles outcome. In his description of
the aftermath of the Lancers charge, Churchill employed terminology like we and our in
passages such as, With the experience of the past hour on our minds and we had not gone far
when individual Dervishes began to walk towards us.26 In a departure from the conventions
employed by his fellow correspondents, Churchill did not use the idea of avenging Gordon as a
major point in his analysis of Omdurman; he was more focused on why the Anglo-Egyptian
forces succeeded in 1898 rather than failed in 1885.
This analysis and the distinct lack of Gordons name in any coverage of the battles show
the difference in priorities between some of the men fighting on the ground and those who were
responsible for an Anglo-Egyptian presence in the region. Most members of the governments in
Cairo and London shared the idea that, at least to appease public opinion, Gordon needed to be
avenged. These sentiments are best reflected in the correspondence that Sir Francis Reginald
Wingate, the Director of Military Intelligence for the Anglo-Egyptian Army, received in the days
following the battle. In these letters, Wingate was praised for his role in the Khalifas downfall.
His correspondents included fellow members of the Egyptian government, military officers in
London and Sudan, and prominent citizens in London. All of the letters were effusive with

25
26

Ibid., 311.
Churchill, 301.

111

praise, with most referencing the idea that Khartoum was once again in British hands and thus,
the object of the mission was achieved and Gordon had finally been avenged.27
The Sirdars own report sent to Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Grenfell, who was in
command of the British garrison in Egypt, fully explained the goals of his advance: the
resultis the practical annihilation of the Khalifas army, the consequent extinction of Mahdism
in the Sudan, and the submission of the whole country formerly ruled under Egyptian Authority.
These achievements had therefore, reopened vast territories to the benefit of peace, civilisation
and good Government.28 Cromer, who was involved in the both the 1885 and 1898 military
endeavors in Sudan and was the boss of Grenfell and Kitchener, echoed these sentiments in his
Modern Egypt. He focused not on the battle movements, but instead on the political importance
of the fall of Omdurman and subsequent re-capturing of Khartoum. In his magnum opus, he
demonstrated the manner in which news was received in London, writing that it was in direct
proportion to the despondency which chilled the heart of the British nation when, thirteen years
previously, it was known that Mahdism had triumphed and that General Gordon had been
killed.29 To Cromer, the re-conquest of Sudan was about more than just avenging Gordon, a
man with whom he had had personal and professional differences; it was about eliminating any
vestiges of Mahdism still present and introducing the light of Western civilisation amongst the
sorely tried people of the Soudan.30 However, none of Cromers goals would have been
achieved without the success of the Battle of Omdurman.
The fall of Omdurman essentially ended any resistance to the re-conquest. It paved the
way for the Anglo-Egyptian troops to re-take the ruined city of Khartoum and to finish Gordons
mission.31Furthermore, the conquest of Omdurman, the Mahdis capital, represented the end of
his influence in Sudan, a point that was demonstrated by Kitcheners decision to destroy his
tomb. This decision, which Kitchener admitted in a letter to Cromer was taken after due

27

Sudan Archive, Durham University Library (SAD) 266/9 F.R. Wingates September 1898 Correspondence,
contains examples of the people above in 4,7, 20-21, 22 respectively.
28
5 September 1898 report in the National Archives, Reports and Dispatches on the Nile Operation 1898-1899, WO
32/6143.
29
Cromer, volume II, 109.
30
Ibid., 110.
31
When Queen Victoria, who was so upset about the failures of the previous decade, was notified about the fall of
Omdurman and re-taking of Khartoum, she was able to write in her journal with satisfaction that surely, he
[Gordon] is avenged! Pollock, 142.

112

deliberation and prompted solely by political considerations, was extremely controversial. 32

Kitcheners feelings on the situation are best reflected not in the letter quoted above, which was
sent from Cromer to Salisbury following a negative article that appeared several months later in
the Contemporary Review, but instead in a private telegram to Cromer. In the telegram, which
Cromer later quoted to Salisbury, Kitchener elaborated on his decision: it was politically
advisable that the Mahdis tomb, which was the centre of pilgrimage and fanatical feeling,
should be destroyed; the tomb was also in a dangerous condition owing to the damage done to it
by shell-fire, and might have caused loss of life if left as it was.33 In addition to destroying the
tomb, the Mahdis bones were removed and thrown into the Nile River, with only his skull left
untouched.
The reasons for the desecration of the tomb were complicated. As Kitchener pointed out,
the tomb itself was damaged; however, the political ramifications were clearly more important.
The man assigned to destroy the tomb (probably because he was the only one capable of laying
the explosives) happened to be General Gordons nephew, Lieutenant-Colonel William Staveley
Gordon, known as Monkey. Monkey Gordon was also partially responsible for the decision,
made in conjunction with other Anglo-Egyptian officers, to throw the bones into the Nile and
keep the head, perhaps in retaliation for one of the popular Gordon myths at the time which
stated that the generals head had been transformed into a drinking vessel by the Mahdi.34
The decision to blow up the Mahdis tomb was thought to be necessary for the reasons
that Kitchener gave Cromer. However, desecrating his grave and destroying his bones was not
perceived as a necessity by the British government. Kitchener was not present in Omdurman, or
even Khartoum, when the bones were cast into the Nile, yet he was the person who took the
brunt of the blame for the offense.35 Ironically, only months earlier, Kitchener had been
compared favorably to the Mahdi, which in Arabic means the expected one. Steevens wrote,
32

National Archives Public Records Office Kitchener Papers, 30/57/14, 1 February 1899 letter from Kitchener to
Cromer.
33
NA 30/57/14 12 March 1899 letter from Cromer to Salisbury.
34
Pollock, 149-151. Janice Boddy presented a different, more unsympathetic view of the controversy in Civilizing
Women: British Crusades in Colonial Sudan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 21. She asserts that
Like his adversary, the Mahdi was denied the religious burial required to ensure his resurrection at the end of
human time. This statement leads to the argument that Gordon had failed to recognize the amount of passion that
his followers had for the Mahdi and that the British were not going to underestimate this passion again. The various
myths about Gordons death (and his remains) are discussed in chapter one.
35
At the time, Kitchener was involved in solving the Fashoda Crisis caused by the French under Marchand. The
crisis, which brought the two sides to the brink of war, was successfully defused by November 1898. For more
information see Bates The Fashoda Incident.

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regarding the beginning of Kitcheners campaign: For Anglo-Egypt he is the Mahdi, the
expected; the man who has sifted experience and corrected error; who has worked at small things
and waited for great; marble to sit still and fire to smite; steadfast, cold, and inflexible36 Now,
only months later, he was accused of allowing the remains of a man of certain importance as
the queen referred to the Mahdi, to be desecrated. 37 Regardless of his personal intentions
towards the Mahdi, Kitcheners troops were responsible for this blatant desecration and
destruction. His personal reputation would be maligned, leading John Pollock, who authored
biographies of both Kitchener and Gordon, to compare the two men. He wrote that Kitchener is
remembered by Sudanese chiefly for the slaughter at Omdurman, the destruction of the tomb
(since rebuilt) and the indignity done to the bones, whereas Gordon continued to be venerated as
a saint.38 Kitcheners non-participation in the decision became known to his contemporaries the
following March, but the damage to his reputation had already occurred.
Perhaps part of the reason that the destruction of the Mahdis tomb received the level of
attention that it did was because of Kitcheners actions at the re-taking of Khartoum. Only two
days after Omdurman was shelled and essentially destroyed, Kitchener and the Anglo-Egyptian
troops held a ceremony at Khartoum in front of Gordons former palace. Full of pomp and
circumstance, the ceremony served both as an acknowledgment of the formal Anglo-Egyptian
regaining of the city, but more importantly to the Sirdar, it was also a memorial service for the
general who had famously died there.
Gordons memorial service took place on Sunday, September 4, 1898. For a ceremony
that would officially represent the beginning of a new type of rule in Sudan, it was remarkably
brief, lasting from 10am until approximately noon. The event was well attended, with, in the
words of G.W. Steevens: detachment[s] of every corps, white, black or yellow[and] every
white officer that could be spared from duty in addition to fifty men selected from each British
battalion that participated in the re-conquest and one or two representatives from each Egyptian
battalion.39 The participants ranged from the generals friends and colleagues to those who had
barely been born in 1885, further highlighting Gordons continued impact in the region.

36

Steevens, 51-52.
NA 30/57/16, 24 March 1899 letter from Queen Victoria to Kitchener.
38
Pollock, 151.
39
Steevens, 311. There are numerous descriptions of the events of this ceremony; however, most historians feel that
the most complete description is found in Steevens work.
37

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As Khartoum was still in ruins, the preparations for the ceremony began when a fleet of
steamers brought the soldiers up the Nile to the city. Once there, they disembarked and were
placed into formation facing the ruins of Gordons palace. On one side of the rectangle were the
Egyptian troops, on the other were the British; in the middle, between the troops and facing the
palace, were the Sirdar, his generals, and his staff.40 In a ceremony laden with symbolism, the
placement of each of these groups was important. The center of all attention was not the Sirdar
who had just won a significant battle, but instead the roof of the ruined palacethe place where
Gordon himself was believed to have been killed.
The reason for this placement soon became evident: atop the ruins stood two flags poles
with staff officers standing beside them. At a signal from Kitchener, the Union Flag was run up
the first; while that flag was unfurling, the Khedives flag was also hoisted.41 The hoisting of
both flags was accompanied by God Save the Queen and the Khedival Hymn, respectively,
in addition to salutes from the cannon aboard the steamers. Finally, when both flags had been
hoisted, three cheers tributes were given for the Queen, Khedive, and Sirdar, followed by a
twenty-one gun salute.42 The actual hoisting of the flags was a simple and symbolic act. By
having the Union Flag raised first (even if it was only a second earlier), Kitchener asserted the
prominence of Britain in Sudan. Nevertheless, by allowing the same level of pomp to the
Khedives flag, he also indicated that the two would be partners in Sudan, even if Britain was the
senior one.43 This portion of the ceremony was joyous, a celebration of a completed task with
patriotic music and blaring guns. It was also a moment to look towards the future, to the
rebuilding of Khartoum, and to a new start for Sudan.
However, the ceremony did not end with the hoisting of the flags. As soon as the guns
had stopped firing, the second object of the ceremony began. Described as either a memorial or
funeral for Gordon, this section began with the military band playing the Dead March from
Saul, followed by the march from Scipio. In his account of the ceremony, Steevens went into
detail about the choice of Scipio for the memorial, as in England [it] generally goes with Toll
for the Brave; this was in memory of those loyal men among the Khedives subjects who could
40

Burleigh, 254 discusses the exact composition of each side of the rectangle.
Egypt was technically ruled by the Khedive under a firman from the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Egypt
and Khedival state are used interchangeably, as are their adjectives.
42
Steevens, 313 and Burleigh, 257. This edition of Burleigh includes a grainy photograph of the flags being lifted on
259.
43
This idea would be officially enshrined with the creation of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium in the January 19,
1899 agreement, which will be discussed in full later in this chapter.
41

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have saved themselves by treachery, but preferred to die with Gordon, referring to the Egyptian
garrison that was stranded in Khartoum with Gordon.44 Robert Giddings analyzed this choice of
language by Steevens, accusing the war correspondent of go[ing] to great lengths to work up as
much emotional charge as he can to convey the moving solemnity of the ceremonyin which
military music plays an important part.45 Even if Steevens was taking license with his language,
he did manage to convey the depth of feeling present as the men were standing and listening to
the music honoring the men who had died at Khartoum.
These musical selections were followed by a brief memorial service designed to be as
ecumenical as possible, with chaplains from each of the Christian denominations represented,
perhaps as a nod to Gordons well-known and fairly non-denominational Christianity. Each
chaplain read a prayer and the service concluded with bagpipers playing a funeral dirge and the
Khedives band played the final hymn, either Abide with Me as Steevens claimed, or Thy
Will Be Done as Burleigh remembered it.46 This difference is notable for the simple reason that
Steevens analysis of the ceremony made specific reference to the choice of Abide with Me,
writing that perhaps lips did twitch just a little to see the ebony heathens fervently blowing out
Gordons favorite hymn; but the most irresistible incongruity would hardly have made us laugh
at that moment.47 Regardless of which hymn was played, the ceremony concluded with another
blast of guns from the steamers.
Every description of the ceremony ended with a note about the normally stoic, cold
Kitchener and his unexpected reaction to finally being able to memorialize and honor his hero.
Kitchener was described as overcome with emotion and unable to speak or see as people walked
up to him to congratulate him on re-taking Sudan.48 An officer serving with him at the time,
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Court Repington, remembered speaking to him about Gordon that
day while they walked in the garden planted by the late general at his palace and recollected that
Kitchener spoke in affecting words about Gordon, and of the long years which had been spent

44

Steevens, 313-314.
Robert Giddings, Delusive Seduction: pride, pomp, circumstance and military music in John M. Mackenzie,
editor, Popular Imperialism and the Military, 44.
46
No one is sure what hymn was actually played. Repington remembers it as Lead, Kindly Light, and refers to it
as Gordons favourite hymn in his Vestigia, 170.
47
Steevens, 314.
48
Ibid., Burleigh, 261. Rawlinsons reminiscences are the only specific mention of the idea that Kitchener was
actually crying during the ceremony. He wrote that the Sirdar, who is, as a rule, absolutely unmoved, had great
round tears on his cheeks. Maurice, 42.
45

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in recovering the lost Sudan and all he owed to those who had assisted him.49 Repington and
Kitchener were joined by many other troops who had participated in the ceremony; the gardens
were perceived to be a connection to Gordon the man, rather than the legend they had just
honored.
Kitcheners staff officer, Sir Henry Rawlinson, recorded his feelings on the ceremony in
his journal, writing that what it meant to me, and I think to most of us, was not that we had
added so many thousand square miles to the British Empire, but that we had pledged ourselves to
complete the work for which Gordon died thirteen years ago, and to free this land from brutality
and tyranny.50 Bennet Burleigh, as an observer and not a participant, contributed a different
perspective to the time spent in Khartoum by describing the level of emotion present among the
men as they scrambled over the ruins and walked in the gardens, I was surprised to find that
even the youngest, most callow soldiers knew their Khartoum and the story of Gordons fight
and death. So deep and far had the tale travelled.51 Some of the soldiers had a particular reason
to be moved by their time spent in Gordons garden. Special permission had been granted to any
Gordon Boy or graduate of the Gordon Boys Home, who was involved in the re-conquest to
participate in the ceremony.52 All of the men were given about an hour to walk through the
remains and then the entire contingent traveled back to Omdurman. The ceremony was
concluded. Gordon had been laid to rest in Khartoum.
However, even though the idea of Gordon now being avenged was prevalent throughout
all of the Empire, not all of its citizens agreed with the level of celebration afforded to the late
general by Kitchener. Irish newspapers, in particular, sought to minimize the importance of the
ceremony. Their coverage falls into three categories: strict reports on the events as they occurred,
factual descriptions with some editorial commentary, and editorials. The coverage in the
Southern Star is an example of the first method; it only briefly mentioned the ceremony and did
not go into detail about its aspects, merely reporting that a memorial service to General Gordon
was held yesterday, both British and Egyptian armies taking part in it.53 Other Irish papers
mentioned the Battle of Omdurman, and the idea that the death of Gordon has at last been
49

Reptington, 170-171.
Maurice, 42.
51
Burleigh, 262.
52
Gordon Boys at the Battle of Omdurman, The New Penny Magazine illustrated, November 26, 1898, p. 247.
Also included is the story of one boy who missed the ceremony, but was given a leaf from Gordons garden further
illustrating its significance.
53
Flight of the Khalifa, Southern Star, 10 September 1898.
50

117

avenged but not the ceremony itself, thus falling into the second type.54 It is the final method of
coverage, the editorial, where the Irish papers were the most critical about events in Sudan. In an
editorial which ran in the Anglo-Celt, the author reacts to statements which had been made to the
Times in London. The paper reprinted some of the most explosive statements from that Times
letter to the editor, such as when the writer refers to Kitchener step[ping] to fame and glory
over the corpses of 20,000 murdered African warriors. The writer believes that the ceremony
was more of a self-aggrandizing move for Kitchener than a fitting memorial for Gordon, who, he
believes, would have been angered by the idea that thousands of Sudanese had been killed to
avenge him, in the words of the writer, these warriors were butchered to ease the conscience
of the English nation and make an English holiday55 Clearly, the author of the letter did not
believe that Kitcheners ceremony was appropriate, or that Gordon himself would have wanted
to be commemorated in such a manner.
In spite of these sentiments expressed in the Irish newspapers of the time, Kitchener was
unwilling to let Gordons memory fade from Sudan following this ceremony. Instead, he
proposed a memorial similar in idea to that of the Gordon Boys Home. Designed originally to
propagate Gordons distinctive combination of morality, technical skills, official loyalty and
military virtue, this memorial would be in the shape of a college (although, originally it was no
more than an elementary school).56 According to Burleigh, who claimed to have had several
conversations with him on the subject, Kitchener conceived of the scheme while still in Sudan
and believed that his new college at Khartoum would become a centre of light and guidance for
the new nation being born to rule Central Africa.57 In order to make this vision a reality, the
Sirdar, who would soon become the new territorys first Governor-General, needed to raise a
substantial amount of money. To achieve his goal, he looked to the British people.
By November 1898, Kitcheners peerage had been officially conferred, but more
importantly, he had become Kitchener of Khartoum.58 As K of K, as he became known, he
54

For example, see Notes and Comments, Westmeath Examiner, 10 September 1898, the Southern Star also ran
other articles on September 10 concerning events in Sudan.
55
Spex, Idle Moments Pars: Indicted by an Englishman, Anglo-Celt, (Cavan) 17 September 1898.
56
Mackenzie, Heroic myths of Empire, 130. In a speech given at the inauguration of the new Gordon Memorial
College in 1945, the then-governor-general of the Sudan referred to its humble beginnings as an elementary school.
SAD 673/7/45.
57
Burleigh, 270.
58
Kitchener wanted to call the September 2, 1898 battle the Battle of Khartoum; he was overruled by the War Office
who insisted on naming it the Battle of Omdurman, but he was allowed to use the name of the city in his new title
when he became a peer.

118

wrote a letter to the press in England asking for public support for the college. His reason for
building it was simple: the college would be a pledge that the memory of Gordon is still alive
among us. Appearing in a variety of newspapers throughout the United Kingdom, the appeal
asked for the specific sum of 100,000 to found the college, with 10,000 to build it and the
remaining 90,000 for its maintenance. It continued by asking for the money on behalf of a race
dependent upon our mercy, in the name of Gordon, and in the cause of that civilisation which is
the life of the Empire of Britain. 59 In the letter that Kitchener sent to the press asking them to
run the appeal, he also listed the prominent supporters of the college, including the Queen, Lord
Salisbury, the Lord Mayor of Liverpool and the Lords Provost of Glasgow and Edinburgh. 60 As
he expected, the college received overwhelming support. By January, 1899, the full sum had
been raised and construction on the building began. On January 5, 1899, Cromer laid the
foundation stone, making Kitcheners dream a reality.61 The college opened to students in
November, 1902.
By then, Khartoum had been rebuilt into a completely modern city, much in the way
Burleigh reported that Kitchener had desired. In her analysis of the perpetuation of the Gordon
cult in Khartoum, historian Janice Boddy focused on Kitcheners attempts to create this new
Khartoum as quickly as possible, even including his private instructions to Wingate which
ordered him to loot the city of any marble stairs, marble pavings, iron railings, looking glasses
and fittings; doors, windows, furniture of all sorts, in order to fill the new buildings. Kitchener
was so devoted to the project that by February, 1899, he had five thousand men working on
building new government buildings and infrastructure.62 Thus, this Khartoum was a creation of
the British, complete with a storywhich may have been spuriousthat the entire city was laid
out in the shape of the Union Flag, with Gordons statue in the center.63 Regardless of whether
there was an intentional decision to lay a new city out in the shape of the British flag, the
placement of Gordons statue at the point where the most roadswhich were of course named
after the imperial figures of the day including the late general himselfintersected was a fact.
59

Kitcheners letter to the press was printed on November 30, 1898 in the Pall Mall Gazette, the Daily Telegraph,
the Daily Mail, and the Times, and in the Belfast News Letter. It also appeared in many other publications, but these
were among the most significant.
60
The full text of Kitcheners letter appears in Burleigh, 272-274, including the sections that were not published for
general reading.
61
WO 32/6143 Report on the Nile Expedition from the General Officer Commanding the Force in Egypt.
62
Boddy, 21 quoting Kitchener to Wingate, January 26, 1899. The quote is taken from Philip Magnus 1958
biography of Kitchener, Kitchener, Portrait of an Imperialist (London: Murray, 1958), 148.
63
Boddy, 22.

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The statue standing on Gordon Avenue, an exact copy of the equestrian statue that stands
at the front of the Royal Engineers Barracks at Chatham, was erected in 1903 and remained in
Khartoum as long as there was a British presence.64 In contrast to the statue in Trafalgar Square,
the Khartoum and Chatham statues depicted Gordon riding a camel, dressed not in a traditional
British uniform, but in the uniform and tarboosh (hat) of an Egyptian general. This depiction,
which was much more imposing than the one in London, stood over two feet higher on a taller
plinth. Gordon was not holding a bible; all he held was his traditional wand of victory and the
reigns of the camel. Unlike the national statue, the Khartoum statue was not one designed to
celebrate all of the generals characteristics; instead, the equestrian statue celebrated only his
final posting.
The statue and college were not the only memorials to Gordon in Khartoum. A third
memorial was perhaps the most fitting to the Christian side of his character. In 1904, under the
supervision of the late Queen Victorias daughter, Princess Henry of Battenburg, the foundation
stone for the Cathedral Church of All Saints Khartoum was laid. The dedication was led by
members of the newly formed Gordon Memorial Mission, whose goal was to continue the work
of Gordons anti-slavery activities in the late 1870s as a sort of living memorial to the general.65
Fittingly for the Mission, the cathedral included a separate memorial chapel in memory of the
servants of Great Britain who have laid down their lives in the discharge of their duty in the
Sudan. According to a newspaper article about and seeking contributions for the chapel, will
be fittingly identified with the hero of Khartoum and called the Gordon Memorial Chapel.it
is thought that there may be many in the Sudan who hold Gordons name in reverence and would
like to help in some way.66
There were many people in Sudan who held Gordons name in reverence. However, most
of them were not Sudanese or even Egyptianthey were British. To the people of Sudan (and
Egypt) Gordon was a more controversial figure. Although Gordon was the only European who
was killed at Khartoum in 1885, he was accompanied by an Egyptian garrison and they, too,
64

The Khartoum statue is an exact replica of the one at Chatham. The Chatham statue was fully described in a 1937
pamphlet The Royal Engineers in Egypt and the Sudan by Lt. Col E.W.C. Sands, on page 144. The pamphlet is
found in the D.M.H. Evans collection, SAD 714/24. The full details about the removal of the statue from Khartoum
will be discussed in the final chapter.
65
A handwritten account of the history of the Gordon Memorial Sudan Mission can be found in the papers of O.
Allison at Durham, SAD 804/11/31.
66
Twenty-Five Years Ago: Khartoum Fallen: Gordon Dead, The Sudan Times January 26, 1910. The clipping
was saved in the collection of R.O. Collins at Durham. SAD 946/7.

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were killed by the Mahdis forces. Eve M. Troutt Powell examined Egyptian responses to the
commemoration of Gordon, quoting from a speech made by the founder of Egyptian nationalism,
Mustafa Kamil. In the speech, Kamil was annoyed at the British for their subjugation of any
Egyptian efforts in the region, but he was also annoyed at his fellow Egyptians for allowing it to
happen. He was not satisfied by what Steevens believed to be an acknowledgment of the
Egyptian garrison and felt that they needed much more. Thus, Kamil referenced the British
ceremony at the palace for Gordon, and then continued by asking a question of his Egyptian
listeners: Did not our heroic soldiers die before the recovery of the Sudan, for its recovery, and
no one mentions a thing about them? Instead, there are those among us who congratulate the
British for reclaiming Gordons remains He concluded his accusation with a question: Is
the blood of one Englishman of higher price, while the blood of thousands of Egyptians has no
price and gets nothing but oblivion?67 For Kamil, the answer to the question was obviously no.
Gordons death was not the only death that mattered in Sudan. To Kamil, then, Gordon was a
symbol of the continued British effort to reform both Sudan and Egypt into its own image. For
the British, however, the answer was quite different: by using Gordon as their symbol, they were
able to [wipe] away the names and memory of the Egyptian dead in the Sudan while at the
same time they could [engrave] their own mark on the region with the letters of Gordons
name, which would make the Egyptian role anonymous.68
Mustafa Kamil was not the only detractor of British efforts in Sudan, but his objections
and the opinions of those who agreed with him were overlooked while Britain remained in
control of both territories.69 When the British government decided in 1896 that it needed to
become involved in the region again, it became almost inevitable that Sudan was going to
become part of the Empire. How Sudan would be classified under it was still in question.

67

A selection of Kamils speech from December 23, 1898 is reprinted from his Al-khutub edited by Abd alAzim
Ramadan (Cairo: Matbaa al-misriya al-amma l-il-kitab, 1986) and translated in Eve M. Troutt Powell, A Different
Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain and the mastery of the Sudan (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2003), 161.
68
Ibid.
69
For other objections to the British conception of events in Sudan, see Mekki Abbas, The Sudan Question: The
Dispute over the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 1884-1951 (London: Faber and Faber, 1952) and L.A. Fabunmi,
The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations: A Case Study in Power Politics 1800-1956 (London: Longmans, 1960).
Both authors focus on the economic benefits that the British Empire gained from the re-conquest, with particular
attention on the Nile river and its uses, especially in irrigation. Fabunmis work is more detailed, and builds upon the
ideas laid out by Abbas.

121

This question would not be answered until the conclusion of any military obstacles
present in the Nile Valley. With their loss at the Battle of Omdurman, the Khalifas forces no
longer obstructed Anglo-Egyptian interests, but a foreign threat still remained in the form of
France, represented by the Marchand expedition. At the same time as Kitcheners forces were
moving towards their confrontation at Omdurman, Marchand and his troops arrived at Fashoda,
where they took over an abandoned Egyptian fort. The fact that the French arrived there first was
worrisome to the Britishbut Marchands force was quite small, and it was considered a lesser
threat than the Khalifa. Hence, as soon as the Battle of Omdurman, re-taking of Khartoum, and
memorialization of Gordon were concluded, the next major priority for the British was to handle
the situation in Fashoda. Kitchener went up the Nile to the fort just days after the memorial; by
the end of September, he had reported back to the British government on conditions there and the
size of the French force.
To add to the tension between the two empires, at the same time as Kitchener was
meeting with Marchand at Fashoda, in London, Salisbury had proclaimed that the territories that
had been captured during the re-conquest were officially Anglo-Egyptian owing to the right of
conquest, and thus the British would not negotiate with the French over Fashoda.70 For
approximately one month, the situation in Sudan, instead of being almost resolved, appeared as if
it were on the brink of causing warfare between Britain and France. For a variety of reasons,
both domestic and foreign, the French backed down from the confrontation in late October.71 By
December, the Marchand expedition had abandoned Fashoda and returned home. Sudan was now
left solely in British (or technically Anglo-Egyptian) control.
The Fashoda incident demonstrated to the British government that it needed to create a
form of government to eliminate any questions of who controlled Sudan. At the time, it was
considered to be a primitive country whose inhabitants were incapable of complicated
international laws, courts, and customs, and thus needed a European overseer. The idea of
making Sudan at least semi-autonomous was not considered, nor was the idea of handing the
70

Udal, 569-570.
France depended on a legal justification of res nullius, or the idea that the land belonged to no one, to explain its
presence in the region; however, to press this claim, it would have needed international support. Without
international support, especially from the Russians, this reason for invasion was discounted in France. While the
lack of support for its international goals was partially responsible for the end of the expedition, a domestic problem,
the Dreyfus affair, resulted in a lack of public attention to the expedition in Fashoda and provided a convenient
excuse for the French government to decide that it could not possibly go to war against Britain. For more on these
problems, see Bates, 151-154.
71

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territory over to Egypt completely. 72 Its re-conquest was not under the British flag, but that of
the Khedive, so to justify a continued presence in the region, Britain needed to maintain the idea
of an Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Remarkably, Britain had never before claimed control of Sudan;
even General Gordon had worked for the Khedive, who was technically under the Ottoman
Empire. Although realistically, Britain controlled all of the territorys policies and interests by
1900, Egypt was not a British colony; Sudan therefore could also not be one.73 The solution to
the problem was to create a new, sometimes awkward governmental scheme: the AngloEgyptian condominium.
Winston Churchill described the resulting state as free from the curse of
internationalism and said that it was neither British nor Ottoman, nor anything else so far
known to the law of Europe. Instead, he termed it a diplomatic Fourth Dimension.74 This
unique form of government was officially enshrined into law with the signing of the Sudan
Agreement on January 19, 1899, which declared that Sudan was officially under both the
Queens and the Khedives authority. For the purposes of government, it was to be ruled by a
governor-general, who would be appointed by Khedival Decree on the recommendation of Her
Britannic Majestys Government, and shall be removed only by Khedival Decree with the
consent of Her Britannic Majestys Government.75 This statement, the entirety of Act III of the
agreement, is only one of many asserting that Britain was actually the controlling power,
regardless of the legal niceties which established both as equals.
With the January 19 agreement, the question of Sudan was ended. From 1899 onwards, it
was enshrined as a part of the British sphere of influence, and in essence, the British Empire. But
what of the man whose death there in 1885 gave the region greater significance for foreign
policy? Charles Gordon was not erased from the British memory as soon as he was avenged in
September 1898. Instead, his role of imperial symbol was increased. His continued presence in
the public eye was helped by the actions of the first two governor-generals of Sudan. Both
Kitchener and his successor, Wingate, held Gordon in high esteem as was evident by the

72

John Marlowe, A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1956 second edition (Hamden,
CT: Archon Books, 1965), 156-157.
73
Cromer also discussed the reasons why he advocated the condominium, including the policy reasons for Egypts
continued involvement in his Modern Egypt, volume II, 112-119.
74
Churchill, 325-326.
75
Churchill included the entire text of the agreement as his Appendix B, 371-373. Act III is on page 372.

123

rebuilding of Khartoum discussed in this chapter.76 Kitchener remained governor-general for

only a short time; by late 1899 he had been pressed into another African imperial conflict, the
Boer War. He left Sudans government in the hands of Wingate, who is credited with creating
the new Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Wingate served as governor-general until after the end of World
War I, and his policies truly enshrined Gordon into Sudanese history. Perhaps his actions are
unsurprising, as the final words of his Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan indicated his hopeful
opinion that a new and better Sudan will be raised over the ashes of Gordon, and all those brave
officers and men who have perished in the loyal performance of their duty.77 As Wingate would
be responsible for its foundation, a new and better Sudan that still held Gordon in high esteem
did, in fact, result.
By 1900, Gordon had been avenged. The lack of a response to his death was no longer a
blight on British pride to be used to rally support for a continued presence in Africa or Sudan
this presence was now guaranteed by the condominium. If the real object of the offensive was
not Gordon but instead British foreign policy goals, these too had been met. Khartoum was under
British control, rebuilt in a more European image, to serve as a counterpoint to the nearby ruins
of Omdurman.78 Plans for Gordon memorials were underway, and it seemed as though, finally,
the generals memory had been assured. He had received a type of funeral, young boys were
learning about him as a figure of history, and, for the time being, he was no longer perceived as
important at the turn of the century. However, this perception would change as the demands of
British imperialism warranted in the early twentieth century. As a symbol, Gordons work for the
British Empire was not finished. Politics over the next decades would see him used in new
debates, but it was not the same Gordon who had been used in the earlier debates. The Charles
Gordon who was cited in debates on Ireland, on Uganda, on Crete, was no more. What replaced
him was an idealized figure, not a real person.

76

With the publication of his famous Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan in 1891, Wingate had already become well
known as a supporter of Gordon. He is even credited by his son and biographer, Ronald, with helping to advocate
the re-conquest in his writings. Sir Ronald Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan: The Life and Times of General Sir
Reginald Wingate, Maker of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (London: John Murray, 1955), 88.
77
F.R. Wingate, Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan: being an account of the rise and progress of Mahdiism and of
subsequent events in the Sudan to the present time (London: Macmillan and Co., 1891), 491.
78
In her section on the Gordon cult, Boddy examines this use of modern Khartoum juxtaposed with the exotic,
Oriental Omdurman, Boddy, 22.

124

CHAPTER 7
STILL A SYMBOL
With the ceremony at the palace in Khartoum, Charles Gordons transformation into a
symbol was complete. What he had actually achieved during his lifetime became less important,
as the focus shifted to how people perceived his accomplishments. This shift resulted in a
metamorphosis of the use of Gordon, his name, and his memory. As the Empire reacted to
world-wide events in the first four decades of the twentieth century, Gordon would be an
imperial figure, a religious hero, a figure of controversy, and, finally, a beacon of British pride.
At the turn of the century, Britain was faced with imperial crises in two areas of its influence:
China and South Africa. Two events in these regions, the Boxer Rebellion and the Boer War,
provided the first opportunity for this symbolic Gordon to be invoked by his supporters and his
detractors. His memory was also important to Edwardian Britain. His death was commemorated
yearly, with newspaper coverage of ceremonies held at his statue in Trafalgar Square and
memorial sermons. In addition to the annual commemorations, Gordon was the subject of a
variety of entertainment forms, as he had been since 1885.
However, when the country became engaged in World War I, these ceremonies lessened.
With Britain enmeshed in a global conflict, the memory of one mans death in Sudan no longer
seemed significant. This assumption was confirmed with the publication of the first critical
biography of Gordon in 1918.1 The imperial symbol was being questioned; the existence of the
Empire was no longer seen as inevitable. Although the importance of Gordons imperial
experience had been reduced by the 1920s, he became a vital figure in Britain again as
celebrations of the centenary of his birth demonstrated. These celebrations ushered in a
resurgence of popularity, culminating in what amounted to a renaissance for the general. During
the Great Depression, Charles Gordon was used as once more as a symbol, but this time he was a
symbol of patriotic strength, rather than of the Empire itself.
The first opportunities for Gordon to be invoked symbolically occurred almost
simultaneously. In 1899, the British were forced to contend with two major imperial threats: the

Lytton Strachey, Eminent Victorians: Cardinal Manning, Florence Nightingale, Dr. Arnold, General Gordon
(New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1969 reprint).

125

Boers in South Africa and the Boxers in China. 2 Military concerns in the two circumstances
were radically different, as were the forces sent to the areas and encountered by the British. In
South Africa, the situation was between the Boers or the Afrikaners, who were primarily
descendants of early Dutch settlers, and the British. The Boxer Rebellion eventually became
perceived as a Western versus Eastern conflict, with the killing of Westerners in China. Both
imperial conflicts occurred at the end of Queen Victorias long reign and had economic
repercussions for the Empire. The Boer War lasted from 1899 until 1902. Never a very popular
war, it was ostensibly begun, to guarantee the rights of British citizens in South Africa, but it was
really over who would control the massive gold deposits discovered in the territory over a decade
earlier.3 Like the Boer War, the Boxer Rebellion also concerned who would control economic
resources. However, unlike the situation in South Africa, this conflict was over who would
control the Chinese concessions for more than just mineral rights: railway concessions were also
hotly contested by a variety of foreign enterprises, including British companies. Thus, responses
to the rebellion were international, involving several foreign countries. This rebellion reached its
peak in the summer of 1900, but was not completely concluded until 1901.4 Regardless of
duration, each event had a lasting effect on the Empire.
The Boer War began only months after the successful re-conquest of Khartoum. Not
surprisingly, the same major military figures who had prominent roles in the re-conquest were
also deployed in South Africa. Salisbury remained the Prime Minister, Wolseley was still in
command of the Army, and Kitchener played a vital role in the offensive, this time serving as
second-in-command. The situation in South Africa was different from the one they had
encountered in Sudan. Unlike the Battle of Omdurman, which in the course of several hours had
proven British superiority over the Khalifas forces, the offensives of this war were much more
complicated due to the Boers use of guerilla warfare tactics. Used particularly effectively in the
opening battles of the war in October 1899, these tactics were not new to the Boers, who had
employed it against the British before. The first time the British encountered this guerilla war

Historians have referred to both incidents in a variety of ways. The Boxer Rebellion is also known as the Boxer
War and the Boxer Movement, and the Boer War is known as the Anglo-Boer War or the Second South African
War. I have chosen to use the terminology that has been employed the most frequently.
3
For more on the origins of the conflict, see Bernard Porter, The Lions Share: A Short History of British
Imperialism: 1850-2004 (London: Pearson Longman, 2004), 171-176.
4
For more on the origins, including the foreign concessions and the Boxer response to them (including the taking
over of embassies) see L.K. Young, British Policy in China: 1895-1902 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 75-130.

126

was in 1881, at the Battle of Majuba Hill.5 They were unprepared for it and were quickly
defeated. Majuba Hill motivated Gordon to comment on the use of irregular warfare and the
armys need to find a strategy to combat it.
Gordons provisions were reprinted with editorial asides by the Times in November 1899.
Their unnamed correspondent focused on Gordons ideas and claimed that in this hour of trial
for the courage and still more for the capacity of the British nation the military officials needed
to listen to the wise words written by General Gordon in 1881.6 In Gordons old piece,
originally published in the Army and Navy Gazette, he argued that instead of hastily defeating the
Boers, the military needed to take its time and learn from its mistakes, believing that, the
inordinate haste which exists to finish off these wars throws away many valuable aids which
would inevitably accrue to the regular army if time was taken to do the work; and far greater
expense is caused by the hurry than otherwise would be necessary. The correspondent
continued to praise Gordons words, quoting liberally from his paper. Perhaps the most pointed
comment by the Times correspondent came after a long segment of Gordons thoughts on
irregular warfare that concludes with a warning, the regular forces are at a very great
disadvantage until by bitter experience in the field they are taught to fight in the same irregular
way as their foes, and this lesson may be learnt at a great cost.7 The correspondent then repeated
the wording of bitter experience and great cost to pressure the government into finding a
solution for fighting the Boers.
Gordons advice, coming from his years of experience in Africa, was considered, at least
by the press, to be worthy of further comment. A month after the article appeared in the Times, a
similar story appeared in the Leeds Mercury. In the time between the first instance and the
second, the British forces had to contend with what became known at the time as Black Week.
During this week, the British forces lost three important battles all due to their inability to

The Battle of Majuba Hill occurred in February 1881. For more information on the actual events of the battle see
Byron Farwel, Queen Victorias Little Wars (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1972), 247-251.
6
General Gordon on Irregular Warfare, The Times (London), November 6, 1899. The article was also reprinted
the next day in several papers including the Western Mail, indicating that the article spread beyond the Times
circulation. Over a month later, the Army and Navy Gazette would be quoted in a Derby Mercury piece with the
same title, but the Times was not credited in this article. General Gordon on Irregular Warfare, Derby Mercury, 27
December 1899.
7
Ibid.

127

confront the Boers guerilla tactics.8 Reflecting this frustration with the army and its attempts to
come up with a spectacular victory against the Boers, the editors of the Leeds Mercury concluded
their article on Gordon and irregular warfare with a somber passage: We have had to pay dearly
for pursuing [spectacular victory] against an enemy whose numbers, equipment and skill in the
field have been woefully underrated. 9 They advised their readers that Gordons ideas would
have to be followed in order to achieve a victory.
These articles, which invoked Gordon as an authority, date from the very beginning of
what was to become a long and costly war. Historian Donal Lowry, in his introduction to a
modern reassessment of the war, recounted how many journalists in Londons Fleet Street had
assumed that the conflict would just be a teatime war, and over quickly. Instead, the war lasted
for three years, cost over 200 million, and used between 250,000 and 450,000 British and
colonial troops. Instead of being a minor war, this struggle became the largest and costliest war
waged by Britain between the Napoleonic Wars and the Great War of 1914-1918.10
Unsurprisingly, articles like the ones discussed above, which were openly critical of the
wars direction, were common as early as the second month of the fighting. To these critics, the
war should have been completed with a quick British victory, not continuing into what seemed
certain to be a complete British defeat. Also common were efforts by politicians to place blame
for the war. In a speech given to the Primrose League, the speaker, Mr. Chaplin, sought to blame
the Liberal Party in general and former Prime Minister William Gladstone in particular for the
current state of events in South Africa. He achieved this goal by tying the happenings in South
Africa into another of Gladstones perceived failures: Gordons death in Khartoum. Speaking to
an admittedly favorable audience, Chaplin suggested that the two wars were legacies of
Gladstones mistaken and disastrous policy. He claimed that the need for a re-conquest in
Sudan was the natural and inevitable outcome of the wickedness of the abandonment of Gordon
and Khartum, a statement that was met with cheers. This argument was then followed by
Chaplins claim that the Boer War was no less the inevitable outcome of the dishonourable and

These three battles, Stromberg, Magersfontien, and Colenso, all occurred between December 9-12, 1899. A
summary of Black Week tactics can be found in Denis Judd and Keith Surridge, The Boer War (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 122-129.
9
How War Should be Waged in the Transvaal: The Advice of General Gordon, Leeds Mercury, 28 December
1899.
10
Donal Lowry, Introduction: not just a teatime war, in his edited The South African War reappraised
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 2.

128

cowardly surrender after Majuba.11 Gladstone was Prime Minister during both of these events,
but he would not be the one blamed for the British failures in South Africa.
Instead, that blame would fall squarely on the sitting Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury.
Like Gladstone, Salisbury also wanted to avoid a possibly unpopular war in Africa. However,
war seemed inevitable; the conditions in South Africa were too unstable, and the only variable
left for the government to be concerned about was the publics opinion about a potentially
unpopular war. This situation was solved when the Boers declared war with an ultimatum
demanding their independence, facilitating Salisburys contention that the Boers action had
liberated us [the British government] from the necessity of explaining to the people of England
why we are at war. Yes, the British were the instigators of the war, but the Boers actions
allowed Salisburys government to claim they had a casus belli (or justifiable claim for war). 12
Of course, this statement was made at the very beginning of the war; had Salisbury known how
the war would have concluded, perhaps he would not have been so happy that he had not begun
it. In fact, as historian David Steele argued, the end of Lord Salisburys brilliant career was
marred by the blows which the Boers dealt to British self-esteemhe could not escape his share
of responsibility for the military failures and all that they implied.13
The beginning of the war was definitely one of those military failures. The Boers laid
siege to the British outpost of Mafeking beginning in October 1899. Although the British citizens
were never in any immediate danger, inept attempts by the army to relieve the city were telling.
When the city was finally relieved 217 days later, the response in Britain was tremendous.14 As
opposed to the outpouring of grief and anger that had resulted from the British failure to relieve
Khartoum in 1885, the successful relief of Mafeking was greeted with huge celebrations
throughout the Empire. The success of the British at Mafeking was transformed into a
celebration of British imperial strength and pride, as Cynthia Behrman described in her article,
The Creation of Social Myth; Journalism and the Empire. In this piece, she outlined the four
heroic qualities that created the personal-heroic imperial myth. These four characteristics,
11

Mr. Chaplin in Lincolnshire, Times (London), 16 July 1900.

Salisburys parliamentary remarks from 16 October 1899, quoted in John Benyon, Intermediate imperialism
and the test of Empire: Milners excentric High Commission in South Africa in Lowry, 88. The idea of Britain
having a casus belli is discussed in Bernard Porters section on South Africa in Lions Share, 177. Porter also
includes the Salisbury quote, n.65.
13
David Steele, Salisbury and the Soldiers, in John Gooch, editor, The Boer War: Direction, Experience and
Image (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 3.
14
Farwell, 350-351.
12

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courage or pluck, honor, modesty, and resourcefulness, were all present in the hero of the
siege, General Robert Baden-Powell. Following her discussion on Baden-Powells
characteristics, she cited another example of an imperial hero: General Gordon. To emphasize
her point, Behrman continued by comparing the news coverage of Baden-Powell and Gordon,
even citing a contemporary newspapers depiction of the victory at Mafeking, which stated that
the victory was due solely to the dominant factor of pluck as every other advantage was on
the Boers side.15 News articles and stories about Mafeking served to boost British morale and
patriotic pride, both of which had been severely diminished with the disastrous stories from
South Africa.
The relief of Mafeking was the turning point in a badly mismanaged war, yet the British
press was still dissatisfied with the war effort. In the summer of 1900, the editors at Reynolds
Newspaper effectively summed up this feeling by listing humiliation after humiliation for
England, owing to the loss of prestige through the gross incompetence of her commanding
officers in South Africa.16 Even though the British would eventually win the war, these
humiliations continued for the Salisbury government as it struggled and later as it tried to
reincorporate the two formerly autonomous free regions of the Transvaal and the Orange Free
State into the British Empire. They were also highlighted in political speeches given by the
Conservative Party as a part of the electoral season of 1900. The Conservatives were not in
power when the war began. Thus, in the build-up to the Khaki Election of 1901, they were able
to use the failures of the war to attack the Liberal Party, which was fractured due to differences
in opinion over the war. This weakness provided a convenient target for the Conservatives who
would win a sweeping victory in the election. Therefore, in direct contrast to speeches made
about the war by the Liberal Party where the speakers were careful to avoid the appearance of
exploiting the war to their partys benefit, the Conservatives did not hesitate.17 The leader of the
15

Cynthia F. Behrman and Michael Wolff, The Creation of Social Myth; Journalism and the Empire [with
comments], Victorian Periodicals Newsletter, number 11, volume 4, number 1, (February 1971): 12. Following her
discussion of these characteristics, Behrman continues, in her next sentence, by adding Gordon to her argument:
Probably a large share of the motivation for heroic behavior came again from the games ethos, which, of course,
stressed fair play and honorable dealing, qualities which the imperial heroes had in large measure, people like
General Gordon, for example, whose death in 1885 sent a spasm of remorse and idolatry through Britain.
16
Up to date, Reynolds Newspaper, 19 August 1900.
17
The changing dynamics in England which allowed for a Conservative victory in the khaki election are discussed
in Andrew Porters article in Writing a Wider War: Rethinking Gender, Race, and Identity in the South African War,
1899-1902. Andrew Porter, The South African War and Imperial Britain: A Question of Significance? in Greg
Cutherberson, Albert Grundlingh, and Mary-Lynn Suttie, editors, Writing a Wider War: Rethinking Gender, Race,
and Identity in the South African War (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2002), 290-293.

130

Liberals, Joseph Chamberlain, believed at the beginning of the war in November, 1899, that
nothing could be more unfortunate for this country than that at any time we should be forced
into a war in which the two great parties took absolutely opposite sides and in which one party
had to use its party majority in order to prosecute the war.18 Six months later, with the tide
turning towards a probable British victory, his opposition did not agree. Their speeches followed
the pattern discussed above in that of Mr. Chaplain, with a concerted effort to place all of the
blame for a British army presence in South Africa on the Liberal Party.
However, as the war was reaching its conclusion, the focus in these speeches shifted, as is
demonstrated best by a speech given by the Duke of Marlborough. Speaking at Bournemouth,
the Duke once again reverted to the traditional tactics employed by the party. Thus, he claimed
that if the Liberal Party, composed of many members who opposed the war at the beginning,
and whoopposed the Soudan campaign and the avenging of General Gordon was returned to
power, their perceived military weakness would impel them [the Boers] to continue fighting, a
result that could only be avoided by the electorate returning the Conservative Party to power.19
These speeches served two goals. The first was to ensure that the Conservatives remained in
control of the peace process, and the second was to serve as a morale boost for the imperialist
segment of the British public. By invoking Gordon, the Duke was reminding the audience of
their old patriotic hero, and, by extension, the continued greatness of the British people even as
they were limping to the end of a hard-fought war.
The Boer War ended in May 1902. It was an expensive war for Britain in a variety of
ways. It cost men and material, but most importantly, it cost the British pride. The Boers were
not defeated militarily; the peace was negotiated, and if the Empire won the war, it certainly
did not win the peace. Yes, the republics were incorporated back into the Empire, but the
Boers won significant financial assistance and the British acceded to all of their demands,
including agreeing not to enfranchise non-Europeans.20 In addition, Britain faced international
condemnation for its actions during the course of the war. As a part of its war strategy, Britain
employed a scorched earth policy against civilians as a means of forcing the Boer commandos

18

Speeches on the War, The Manchester Guardian, 30 November 1899.

The Settlement After the War: A Speech by the Duke of Marlborough, Birmingham Daily Post, 20 September
1900.
20
Judd and Surridge, 298. This point was especially important to the Boers and one which the British strongly
advocated.
19

131

to lay down their arms.21 This resulted in thousands of Boer elderly, women, and children
having no place to live other than the concentration camps hastily erected for them. These camps
were ill-suited for the number of people forced to live there; the situation quickly deteriorated to
the point that the government was criticized at home and abroad. Thus, Britain lost more than its
pride as a result of the war; it lost some of its international prestige.22 Furthermore, peace was
only temporary. By 1907, the two former states had regained their autonomy.
At the same time as the Boer War was occurring in South Africa, the British were forced
to contend with another imperial problem on a different continent, Asia. Coverage of this crisis,
the Boxer Rebellion, also featured Gordons name prominently. As in the Boer War, the
generals name and expertise were employed in discussions of this incident; however, there was
one other factor present in news coverage of the Boxer Rebellion that was not present in the Boer
War: Gordons personal connection. Newspapers often referenced Gordons service in China and
his co-commandership of the Ever Victorious Army with Li Hung Chang.
The Boxer Rebellion occurred for a variety of reasons which are still debated by
historians. These range from longer historic causes, such as the Opium War, to financial and
religious concerns. However, the one fact that is not in dispute is the distinct anti-foreigneror
more specifically, anti-Europeancharacter of the rebellion.23 What the Boxers wanted, in
essence, was to reduce, if not completely eliminate, any European presence in China.24 In order
to achieve their goal, they needed to eliminate anyone who had close personal ties with the West.
Gordons co-commander and friend, Li Hung Chang, fit into this category. The two men had
continued to be close after Gordon left China; the general returned to China at Li Hung Changs
21

Elizabeth van Heyningen, Women and Disease: The Clash of Medical Cultures in the Concentration Camps of
the South African War in Cutherberson et al, Writing a Wider War, 187.
22
Hew Strachan discusses the international repercussions of Britains decision in his Essay and Reflection: On
Total War and Modern War, in The International History Review, volume 22, number 2, (Jun., 2000): 353-354.
23
The preface to one of the standard background studies of the rebellion gives these reasons in more detail. Victor
Purcell, The Boxer Uprising: A Background Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), vii-ix. For more
on current scholarship from the Chinese perspective of the rebellion see the special edition of Chinese Studies in
History also published as an edited volume. David D. Buck, ed. Recent Chinese Studies of the Boxer Movement
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1987).
24
There are a variety of reasons why people became Boxers. However, their goals are best stated by the AustroHungarian legions Charg dAffairs, Dr. Arthur von Rosthorn. He believed that there were two major reasons why
people were inspired to become Boxers: their dissatisfaction at the European attempts at partitioning China [and]
their efforts to force upon China through treaties or through the use of gunboats, if necessary, the missionary
activities. This statement, translated from the German work [Gerd Kaminiski and E. Unterrieder, Wre ich Chinese,
So Wre ich Boxer. Das Lebens an der K. und K. Gesandtschaft in Peking in Tagebchern, Briefen und Dokumenten
Wien-Zurich: Europa, 1989, 45] is quoted in Lanxin Xiang, The Origins of the Boxer War: A Multinational Study
(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 104.

132

request in 1880. Chang even sent his condolences to the Gordon family after he learned of the
generals death, further indicating their closeness.25 Therefore, as Li Hung Chang was one of the
major figures involved in the rebellion, Gordons name was frequently invoked in all of the press
coverage.
The earliest stories mentioning Gordon in connection with events unfolding in China
appeared in May, 1899. These stories were concerned with the growth of a reform movement
advocating the overthrow of the Manchu government. In a commentary in the Pall Mall Gazette,
the editors mentioned the idea that Gordon had proposed the overthrow of the Manchus and the
establishment of a native dynasty. His proposal (one who reads it now regrets) was not well
supported. The Gazette, which had long been supportive of Gordon and his memory, concluded
their editorial with the following wistful remark: O! That Gordon were alive!26 By reminding
its readers of Gordons past deeds, the Gazette re-established Gordon as an authority on China
and his experiences would be cited until the resolution of the crisis.
It was not just newspaper editors who remembered that Gordon had been against the
current Chinese government. His opinions were also expressed on the floor of the House of
Commons. In a speech by a Member of Parliament, Mr. Pritchard Morgan, Gordons belief that
the Chinese would have been better served by having a different emperor on the throne was
employed in support of a motion in favor of having the British government suggest to the
Chinese that they appoint a regent. The regent that Morgan favored was Gordons old comrade,
Li Hung Chang. To stress his point, Morgan used the idea that Chang was the man whom
General Gordon himself picked out for the Throne forty years earlier. Thus, he believed that the
British government should trust Gordon as an authority and appoint Li to the position.27
Morgan was not alone in wanting to understand the situation in China by viewing it
through the ideas of Gordon. A month after his speech, the Times printed what it claimed (with a
bit of controversy) to be diary entries written by Gordon during his time in China. The article
containing the entry is titled: General Gordons Diary in 1860.28 The diary entry itself was
fairly basic, merely consisting of a list of events occurring between August 9 and November 12,
25

For the full story of Gordons second time in China and his inability to serve as a military advisor, see chapter
one. A variety of telegrams from China to the Gordon family can be found in the British Library Add. Ms 52400
correspondence to Sir Henry Gordon, ff. 214-233. Several mention the generals career in China.
26
The Reform Party in China, Pall Mall Gazette, 5 May 1899. The comment was in reference to another article
which ran in the Gazette. The unnamed article was a discussion on reform in China by Mrs. Archibald Little.
27
The Crisis in China, Western Mail, 4 July 1900.
28
General Gordons Diary in 1860, Times (London) 30 August 1900.

133

1860, with editorial comments by then-Captain Gordon. There was no germane information
about the new crisis, just a re-stating of facts relating to the last time British forces had been
involved in a Chinese military action. It was printed without any explanation of who Gordon was
or what his role in China had beenthese facts were still considered to be common knowledge.
In reality, the entry would not have been important enough for inclusion in the paper except for
the fact that it mentioned the terms Gordon, China, and Li Hung Chang. However, the
provenance of the entry itself was in doubt: the week after the entry was featured, the Times ran a
response to criticisms raised in a letter, A Spurious Gordon Diary, written to the Daily
Chronicle and signed Accuracy. In that letter, it was claimed that Gordon did not write the
entry and two facts are clear: It is not a diary and it is valueless. In the response, the Times
defended running the diary and ended the argument by saying that its editors had the original
manuscript in Gordons own distinctive handwriting.29 Following this statement, the matter was
considered closed. The fact that the mere publication of a new work attributed to Gordon in the
climate of the Boxer Rebellion was afforded this level of attention indicates that there was still a
good deal of public fascination about the general and his views.
This public curiosity would be exploited as the crisis continued. Even an anti-Manchu
organization, the Triad, understood that using Gordons name would help give its cause more
attention in the West. Thus, it invoked Gordons personal feelings in a letter sent to major Hong
Kong newspapers in support of the Boxers. The letter was reprinted as a part of an article that
restated part of a report filed by the Reuters correspondent in China when the negotiations which
would end the conflict began. In it, the correspondent quoted liberally from the Triads letter.
After relating a very brief history of Anglo-Chinese relations, this document stated the following:
In 1862 Great Britain frustrated our aims by lending the services of General Gordon to the
Manchu Government. The great and chivalrous General Gordon bitterly regretted his connection
with the barbarous and ungrateful Manchus Following this passage, the letter continued by
stating that Gordons sentiments had support amongst the great politicians of his country; his
views on the matter should still be followed. However, the most controversial idea in this letter
penned by the leader of the Triads, a group who did not claim to be Boxers but who also
supported the anti-foreigner movement, is a simple statement: General Gordon even longed to
shoot that base traitor Li Hung Chang. By concluding the argument with this information, the
29

Response to the above article, also titled General Gordons Diary in 1860, Times (London) 6 September 1900.

134

Triad indicated that it also supported this aim.30 Clearly, the groups view of Gordon and Li
Hung Chang was in direct contrast to that espoused by most Western sources, but it is interesting
to note that this anti-Manchu organization was willing to employ Gordon in support of its goals.
This willingness was even more remarkable when Gordons own actions in China are
discussed in this context. According to Demetrius Boulger, one of Gordons contemporaries and
early biographers, the general is credited with two specific changes to China. The first was his
suggestion that the capital be moved to Nanjing. The second is more aligned with the problems
seen by the Boxers. After discussing the background of the crisis in an article published in The
North American Review, Boulger continued by stating that the only reason why China survived
the Taiping Rebellion was because of the active intervention of the Europeans and the military
genius of General Gordon.31 While Boulger simplified the problem, he was correct in that the
military support provided by the British and co-commanded by Gordon and Li Hung Chang did
stave off the problems faced in the Boxer Rebellion for another forty years.
Gordon was not the only Englishman whose name was dragged into this inter-Chinese
conflict. Another prominent Englishman often mentioned in the same context was Sir Robert
Hart, the Inspector General of the Chinese Maritime Customs. Hart and Gordon were in China
concurrently, and they both contributed to the perceived westernization of China that the
Boxers wanted to expunge. This sentiment was seen in a report issued by the Associated
Chambers of Commerces Special Commissioner to China, Lord Charles Beresford. In his
report, according to a pithily titled review, Broken China, Beresford quoted sources on both
men. As he said about the importance of Harts opinion to financial matters, during the
interviews and many other conversations which I had with Viceroys and other high Mandarins
they invariably asked me if I knew Sir Robert Harts opinion on the question which we were
discussing.32 Modern historian Lianxin Xiang described the impact that Hart had on China by
saying that he was able to use his effective control of Chinas external economic relations to

30

The Chinese Crisis, The Belfast News Letter, 12 November 1900. The Reuters letter was also reprinted in the
next days Daily News. The Revolt in South China, Daily News, 13 November 1900. In the Daily News letter,
more attention is devoted to the Triads self-description: We are not Boxers. We are members of that great
Political Society of Masons, commonly known as Triads, whose senior and junior leaders at home and abroad have
sworn to oust the barbarous Manchu usurpers from the Throne of our Fatherland and reinstate a Chinese ruler.
31
Demetrius C. Boulger, The Dissolution of the Chinese Empire, The North American Review, volume 168,
number 508 (Mar., 1899): 265.
32
Broken China, Bristol Mercury and Daily Post, 15 May 1899.

135

exercise enormous influence on Chinas ambitious modernization process.33 If Gordon was the
acknowledged military expert in terms of China, then Hart was his financial counterpart.
Both mens names were invoked in the months preceding the rebellion. When the antiEuropean sentiment grew violent and reprisals against the Western missionaries in China
occurred, one of the bigger fears in Britain was that it would be forced to intervene militarily.
There were other international actors in China with eleven countries represented, including the
French, the Russians, the Japanese, the Americans, and the Germans. As all of these countries
had missionaries who were affected by the Boxers, a consensus amongst them had to be reached
before any action could be taken.34 None of these great powers wanted to see a partitioned
China, so they agreed to support the Manchus and put the rebellion down, creating an exercise
in imperialism by co-operation in which the British paid a relatively minor role.35 Therefore, the
rebellion was crushed by a combined force of these Western empires. The end result for Britain
was that it could continue to have its influence and its financial concessions in China.36 With this
international support, the Manchu government survived, but it was left in a weakened state and
collapsed only a decade later. Thus, with the close of the rebellion and the death of Li Hung
Chang in 1901, Gordons relevance to Britains Chinese policies was significantly diminished.
While these events were occurring in the farthest reaches of the Empire, life in Britain
was changing, too. With the death of Queen Victoria on January 22, 1901, one of Gordons most
fervent supporters was silenced. Although her family continued memorializing Gordon and
supporting his memorial, the Gordon Boys Home, the personal connection was now lost. Even
before Queen Victoria died, her place at the annual sermons commemorating the general had
been filled by her son, the Prince of Wales, who also became the Homes official patron. These
sermons, which were preached on the Sunday closest to January 26, strove to combine the
memory of Gordon with current events. Once given, the sermons were often, printed by special
desire of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, K.G., President of the Council of the Gordon
Boys Home and sold for its benefit at six pence each.37
33

Xiang, 39.
Young, 236-240. The other countries represented were: Austria-Hungary, Italy, Belgium, Spain, and the
Netherlands.
35
Porter, Lions Share, 160.
36
For a discussion of British financial concerns in China see P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism
(London: Pearson Education, 2000), 371-379.
37
Several years worth of these sermons are found in a bound volume held at the British library [BL 4476 ee17]. The
pamphlet quoted above is the twenty-second in the volume. It is a sermon by William Boyd Carpenter, D.D., The
34

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The topics of the sermons ranged over the years, but all featured the idea of Gordon, the
Christian hero. For example, the 1902 sermonpreached to the King, as the Prince of Wales
continued his patronage once he had assumed the thronefeatured references to the events in
South Africa. In his sermon, the Right Reverend George Wyndham Kennion compared events in
that country with those that occurred in Khartoum: Not in Ladysmith or Mafeking could the
trial of faith have been so severe as of the Christian herowho stood alone among all his
Mahomedan troops waiting unflinchingly for the expected relief that never came.38 The sermon
concluded in the usual manner, with a call for donations to the home, that consideration for
othersI ask you for the sake of Gordon, for the nations sake, and for the sake of the lads who
do or may belong to itto show to-day for the Gordon Boys Home.39 Even though the Home
was the national memorial to Gordon, it was clearly underfunded, as every year the chairman of
the council of the Home ran an appeal in the Times on the anniversary of the generals death. As
with the sermons, the appeals content varied, with particular emphasis on political events
occurring throughout the Empire. For example, the 1900 appeal made reference to the events
unfolding in South Africa and the part played by the graduates of the Home, or the Gordon
Boys. At that years sermon, the preacher even read portions of letters which had been written
by Boys currently serving in South Africa.40 The idea of the appeal was to remind the public of
the good work being done by the Home, but more importantly, the annual appeal, the sermons,
and the stories about the ways that Gordons death was commemorated, including the laying of
wreaths on his statue in Trafalgar Square, kept the generals memory alive in the public
consciousness.
The laying of the wreath deserves special attention. It is a yearly tradition, continued to
the present, by former Gordon Boys (or as they later termed themselves, old Gordonians). The
ceremony itself is simple, and it still receives an annual mention in the Times.41 The location of

Hidden LifeA Sermon preached before their royal highnesses the Prince and Princess of Wales, in Sandringham
Church on Sunday Morning January 29th, 1899, in commemoration of the death of General Gordon (London:
Skeffington and Sons, 1899).
38
There is a second collection of these sermons at the British Library [BL 4475 i. 20. 1-11]. The sermon above is the
seventh. The Right Reverend George Wyndham Kennion, D.D., Courage. Sincerity. Faith: A sermon preached at
Christ Church, Mayfair on Septuagesima Sunday, 1902, in commemoration of the death of General Gordon
(London: Skeffington and Sons, 1902), 10-11.
39
Ibid., 13.
40
Gordon Boys Home, The Times (London), 22 January, 1900.
41
This mention would sometimes be as few as three lines in the paper, but it guaranteed that the generals name
would be mentioned at least once a year. The article is normally entitled wreaths placed on Gordon statue and

137

Gordons statue was also important to this ceremony. Every year the Boys would visit Trafalgar
Square and be reminded of more than just Gordons sacrifice. The square, as it appeared in 1900,
has been described by historian Jonathan Schneer as the very center of the imperial metropolis
with nationalist and imperialist preoccupations visible in the architecture.42 Commemorating
Gordon in the square also reminded people of his sacrifice for their Empire.
In the early twentieth century, Gordon was also memorialized outside of London,
particularly in Khartoum. By the time the First World War began, Khartoum had both a Gordon
Memorial College and a Gordon Memorial Chapel inside the Khartoum Cathedral. The opening
of these buildings became news stories in London, partially because of the dignitaries present at
both ceremonies. In 1902, soon after the conclusion of the Boer War, the Gordon Memorial
College, for which Lord Kitchener had so passionately appealed, was opened, although at the
time it was only a primary school.43 Both the Times and the Manchester Guardian covered the
opening. However, although the Times published the entirety of Kitcheners speech, the
Guardian only devoted space to the Reuters telegram concerning the events and chose not to
editorialize on the significance of it.44 Only two years later, newspapers were referring to the
school as the Eton of the Sudan, and praising it as the most fitting memorial of that
ungrudged sacrifice.45 By 1909, Kitcheners full vision for the college was realized when the
lower branches of the school were jettisoned. At the same time, the Wellcome Research
Laboratories were opened at the college, further elevating its status as a place where Europeanstyle research and education were taking place.46
Gordons Sudanese memorials were not confined solely to Kitcheners vision. Instead,
as befitted the man described as a Christian hero, he was also the subject of the awkwardly
occurs somewhere in the back pages of the paper, as it did in 1913, wreaths placed, 27 January, 1913, pg. 9, col. a.
See Appendix B for a photograph of contemporary wreaths on the statue.
42
Jonathan Schneer, London 1900: The Imperial Metropolis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 17 and 28.
43
The Times has the full text of Kitcheners speech, where he references the fact that the school is not yet a college,
but though great steps have been made, we must still look forward for the actual realization of the original scheme.
This memorial to General Gordon has not been called a college without due consideration. Lord Kitchener at
Khartum: Opening of Gordon College, Times (London), 10 November 1902.
44
Lord Kitchener at Khartoum, Manchester Guardian, 10 November 1902.
45
Andrew Balfour, the first director of the Wellcome Research Laboratories at Gordon Memorial College, collected
a scrapbook full of press clippings from the colleges early years. This scrapbook is a part of his collection at the
Sudan Archives, Durham University. SAD 724/14/3, The Eton of the Sudan: Gordon College at Khartoum, The
Sphere, 12 November 1904, and 724/14/7, Khartoum College, The Graphic, 12 November 1904.
46
The annual reports from the Wellcome Laboratories are discussed yearly in The British Medical Journal. The
1909 report, which was the third report, was the one that first gained the most attention and is discussed in The
Wellcome Research Libraries, Khartoum. Third Report in The British Medical Journal, volume 1, number 2523
(May 8, 1909): 1130.

138

titled Gordon Memorial Sudan Mission of the Church Missionary Society, as well as the
Gordon Memorial Chapel. Both of these commemorations were discussed in London, even
though they actually occurred in Sudan. In 1905, the Church Missionary Society wrote an appeal
to establish a mission on the Upper Nile for the benefit of the Pagan tribes there. In it, the
Society mentioned that both Cromer and Sir Wingate supported its appeal from the heart of
Africa. In the text of the memorandum, the Society specifically referenced Gordons heroic
attempt to restore order [which] ended in his deeply lamented overthrow and death at
Khartoum, and continued its appeal to have able-bodied, Christian men come and serve the
cause for which Gordon died.47
It is the second Christian memorial to Gordonhis chapelthat received much more
press coverage in London. As discussed in the previous chapter, the effort to raise funds for the
new cathedral relied heavily on the idea of memorializing Gordon. The cathedral was
consecrated on January 26, 1912, the twenty-seventh anniversary of his death. Its consecration
was reported in the Times and the Manchester Guardian, with the former giving the event much
more attention. Each newspaper featured depictions of the new cathedral; the Guardian had a
photograph while the Times had an artistic rendering, but that is where the similarities between
the two papers coverage ended. For the Times, the event was a chance to remind its readers
about Gordons experiences in Sudan and of the general himself. Its goal was achieved by the
printing of a letter to the editor concerning Gordons family and background directly under the
rendering of the new cathedral. The Guardian used a different approach; the sole mention of the
general was in a dismissive comment with the pictures caption: Khartoum Cathedralwas
originally conceived as a memorial to Gordon, and stands close to the gardens of the Palace, a
stones-throw from the spot where he was killed.48 Both newspapers indicated that the

47

A selection of the Church Missionary Society papers are held at SAD, SAD 930/13; these papers include the
instructions given to those men who were going on the mission, which states that the Committee believed that the
hand of God is manifest in the ordering of this new venture of faith. The appeal itself was published in the Times.
A New Call from the Heart of Africa, Times (London), 21 January 1905. For a discussion on the content and the
political ramifications of the missions themselves, see Richard Hill, Government and the Christian Missions in the
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1914 Middle Eastern Studies volume 1, number 2 (Jan., 1965).
48
Both the Times and the Guardian featured the events for two days, with the illustration on the first day and a short
description of the consecration on the second day. The Times featured two articles, The New Cathedral at
Khartum and Khartum Cathedral When Finished and a letter to the editor The Founder of Khartum: General
Gordons Ancestry on the first day, 26 January 1912; the Guardian only had the illustration and its caption,
Khartoum Cathedral. On 27 January, each had articles entitled Consecration of Khartum/Khartoum Cathedral.

139

foundation of a new cathedral, especially one which also honored Gordon, was clearly
newsworthy.
By the time the cathedral was consecrated, it seemed that Gordons relevance to British
politics was beginning to abate. With the exception of commemorative efforts, Gordons name
was no longer present in routine political discourse. A rare exception to this trend occurred in
discussions that did not specifically involve the general, but rather the expedition that was sent to
relieve him. In a parliamentary debate over the War Offices failure to reprimand a British
citizen who chose to criticize the soldiers who took part in the expedition as mere murderers,
the mongrel scum of thieves from Whitechapel and Seven Dials, the level of feeling which still
remained regarding both Gordon and the expedition itself was revealed.49 In passionate tones, a
Member of Parliament, Mr. Rowland Hunt, implored the War Office to condemn the writer
Wilfrid S. Blunt. Not coincidentally, Blunt had just published a new book on General Gordon, so
perhaps some of his motivation was to incite controversy.50 Regardless of why Blunt chose to
condemn the soldiers, the controversy was diffused with a representative from the War Office,
Under-Secretary of State for War Colonel Seeley, agreeing that a form of censure was necessary,
although he believed that the severer condemnation will be to leave this gentlemanor, at any
rate, the writer of this slanderto the condemnation of all honourable men.51 With this
statement, the brief debate in the House of Commons was ended. Yet the episode demonstrated
that, even with the re-conquest and formation of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, there was
still unresolved sentiment about the expedition and Gordons part in the debate.
By 1915, when the thirtieth anniversary of Gordons death occurred, Britain was much
more concerned with the First World War than with commemorating Gordon. Unlike earlier
significant anniversaries, this one was marked by the Times with a simple six-line article, mostly
concerned with the laying of wreaths on his statue.52 The generals insignificance in the face of a
world-wide war was never more apparent. In the years following, his death did not even receive

49

Mr. W.S. Blunt and the Gordon Relief Expedition, Manchester Guardian, 15 November 1911.
Wilfrid S. Blunt, Gordon at Khartoum: being a personal narrative of events (London: S. Swift, 1911). In the
preface, he references that the book was completed on the Twenty-ninth anniversary of Tel-el-Kabir or September
13, 1911, indicating that the work was completed a little over a month before the controversy.
51
Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Charges Against British Troops [Hansard], 5th ser., vol. 31, cols 332-335,
14 November 1911. The response from Colonel Seeley is in col. 335.
52
The article was too minor to receive a title, instead it can be found at the very bottom of the Wills and Bequests
column, Times, 26 January 1915. The Gordon anniversary sermon was only preached in Khartoum following the
consecration of the cathedral, which lessened its newsworthiness.
50

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a mention, save for a line in the days happenings. For the first time since Gordons death, there
was no way to make him relevant to the political discussions or to the British public at large.
There were three motivating factors contributing to Gordons irrelevance. First, his
memory had been employed most effectively by the Conservative Party. In May 1915, the often
fractious Conservative Party officially joined the war-time coalition government. Although there
continued to be tensions between the Liberals and Conservatives, these tensions were expressed
in much more modern terms, focusing on the war currently being waged rather than a thirty-yearold conflict.53 The second was the death in 1916 of one of Gordons remaining colleagues and
supporters: Lord Kitchener. Kitcheners death, which coincidentally also occurred as a result of
suspicious circumstances, resulted in the loss of a person who had been involved in establishing
all of Sudans memorials to Gordon. Without Kitchener, it is highly likely that there would not
have been a Gordon Memorial College or an equestrian statue in Khartoum.54
The third reason, however, was the most compelling. Although Britain had been involved
in a variety of smaller skirmishes and wars since Gordon died, including the Boer War and
Boxer Rebellion, none of these wars produced anyone who filled the archetypal role of a national
hero.55 This was not the case with the war which would come to be known as the Great War. As
Paul Fussell has discussed in his landmark work The Great War and Modern Memory, this war
was different. It was the last war to be waged with a sense of innocence and the idea that Britain
would quickly defeat its adversaries. It was also a war in which heroes were made and myths
were created. The Great War was the subject of reams of literature; it was where hundreds of
thousands of young men went but did not return home. The heroic acts of these men,
immortalized in their comrades letters and poetry, supplanted the ideas of the hero present in
Britain before the war.56 In essence, Gordons usefulness as a hero lessened with the growth of
this new type of heroic figure.
The way that Gordon was perceived at the conclusion of the war only helped to add to
this assessment. In May, 1918, shortly before the war ended, Lytton Strachey published Eminent
Victorians. This work aimed to present some Victorian visions to the modern eye through
53

David Dutton, Conservatism in Crisis, in Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon, editors, Recovering Power: The
Conservatives in Opposition since 1867 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 128-131.
54
Kitchener was killed in June 1916 when a ship he was sailing on supposedly struck a German landmine and sank.
55
Although an argument regarding General Baden-Powell and the siege of Mafeking could be made in the years
directly following 1899, by World War I, that too had faded from prominence.
56
Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory, twenty-fifth anniversary edition (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 135-144.

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biographies of four well-known Victorians: Cardinal Manning, Florence Nightingale, Dr.

Arnold, and, most importantly to Strachey, General Gordon.57 His biographies of each subject
were comprehensive and did result in the shattering of assumptions regarding these previously
legendary figures. The merits of Stracheys actual contributions to literature and the field of
biography have been discussed at length by academics, but the way he challenged and changed
peoples perceptions is uncontested.58 Stracheys treatment of Gordon is noteworthy. Although
he claimed in his preface to give a complete biography of each of his subjects, his chapter on
Gordon is actually called The End of Gordon and focuses almost completely on the final year
of the generals life. While his tone is quite witty and the work is well-written, the main reason
why Stracheys work was important to changing views on Gordon was that it presented several
new pieces of evidence regarding the general. Strachey claimed that he had been a drunk, seated
at a table, upon which were an open bible and an open bottle of brandy, believed that Gordon
was interested in becoming a heroic figure and intended his own martyrdom, and highlighted the
continuing question of Gordons sexuality.59 The most damning of Stracheys assertions were
attributed to people who had personal grudges against the general, and, as Anthony Nutting
proved in the final chapter of his biography, Gordon of Khartoum: martyr and misfit, cannot be
taken as strictly factual.60
Nevertheless, Eminent Victorians was a very popular and well-respected book. The
review it received in the Times Literary Supplement was very positive; the only negative
thoughts that the author had were in reference to Stracheys writing style, mentioning in an
almost rueful tone, here we touch the only fault which one can really find with this booka
fault which in almost any other author would be a virtue: it is too amusing.61 If the literary
supplement of a paper which had, over the past three decades, printed several articles and letters
praising Gordon, did not find fault with the works content, then it stands to reason that most
contemporary readers took the information as correct.
57

Strachey, vii.
The most virulent challenges to Strachey occurred in the early twentieth century. Charles Richard Sanders
synthesized these arguments and added to them in his piece Lytton Stracheys Conception of Biography in PMLA,
volume 66, number 4 (Jun., 1951): 295-315 .
59
Strachey, 264. Cynthia Behrman addressed the changes to the Gordon biography historiography in The AfterLife of General Gordon, Albion: A Quarterly Journal concerned with British Studies, volume 3, number 2
(Summer, 1971): 54-55.
60
Anthony Nutting, Gordon of Khartoum: martyr and misfit (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, publisher, 1966), 316321.
61
Megatheria, Times Literary Supplement, 16 May 1918, p. 230.
58

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Regardless of whether the arguments made by Strachey were strictly factual, they
certainly had an impact. From 1918 until almost a decade later, Gordon faded further from public
discourse. Although there were infrequent mentions of his memorials, most notably in the yearly
appeal published by the Gordon Boys Home in 1920 which mentioned the Boys who had died in
World War I, there were almost no references to Gordon himself. In the text of the 1920 appeal,
published on the thirty-fifth anniversary of his death, the stark truth that Gordon was becoming
irrelevant is revealed. There are two men who signed it, both of whom served with Gordon, but
their roll of subscription is annually decreasing as members of this new generation began
asking Who was Gordon? Ten years earlier, the name of Gordon had needed no explanation;
now it was required.62
The trend of Gordons lessening importance continued throughout the 1920s. Part of why
this occurred is linked to the reason why he was an unimportant figure during the First World
War: the Conservative Partys omission of his memory as an electoral tactic against the Liberal
Party. The Liberal government, replaced by a wartime coalition in 1915, was the last true Liberal
government; following the war the party was in a steady decline. With the rise of Labour and the
fall of the Liberals, the Conservatives no longer had the need, or the opportunity, to use Gordon
as a figure for political maneuvering.63 Instead, his name and experiences were sometimes
invoked, but in a more limited way than in the past. Ironically, the best example of this new
usage came in political speeches given by a Labour MP, Leslie Haden-Guest. In his speech,
given as a partial justification for his Spring 1927 resignation, he railed against Ramsay
MacDonald, the Labour Prime Minister, for his foreign policy decisions regarding the British
military position in China. MacDonald had advocated recalling the British naval and military
forces from Shanghai, which would have left British citizens living there in danger of being
caught in the middle of inter-Chinese fighting between the nationalists and the communists.64 His
plan failed. In his speech, Haden-Guest argued that had MacDonald succeeded, we might even
now be witnessing a tragedy more awful than that of the massacre at Khartum when General

62

The Gordon Boys, Times (London) 23 January 1920.

While the Liberal Party did not disintegrate until later in the twentieth century, the split in the party dated back to
1916, effectively ending its role as a major opposition party. For more on the split, see Martin Pugh, The Making of
Modern British Politics, 1867-1945 third edition (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 153-156.
64
The circumstances in China which led to this state of affairs, including the takeover by Chiang Kai Shek, are
discussed in Robert E. Bedeski,The Evolution of the Modern State in China: Nationalist and Communist
Continuities, World Politics, volume 27, number 4 (Jul., 1975): 547-550.
63

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Gordon was killed.65 Even if the actual circumstances of Gordons life no longer had the same
resonance to the British public that they formerly had, his abandonment and death still were a
powerful image.
This power was reaffirmed in an appeal launched by the governor-general of Sudan, Sir
John Maffey, on the forty-fourth anniversary of the generals death. The appeal asked for
contributions to help support the Christian work or work of the Church, in Sudan. In addition
to printing the appeal, the Times ran a letter in support for it from several men who had served
during the re-conquest of Sudan. The names included Churchill, who had since risen to political
prominence; Wingate, the now-retired governor-general of the Sudan; Lord David Beatty, the
First Sea Lord and member of the Privy Council, two field marshals, and twelve generals of
various ranks. In their letter, the men referenced their hope that before the generation passes
away to which the tragedy of January, 1885, remains a vivid memory and the name of Gordon is
half-forgotten with other far off things and battles long ago his memory would be honored
through contributions to the governor-generals appeal.66
The presence of one or two of these names on the appeal would have been enough to
garner significant attention. The fact that all of these well-known and respected men signed the
letter, however, led the Times to publish an editorial on Gordon the same day. In the editorial, the
Times recapped the events of Gordons life, mentioned the controversies which led to his death,
and gave a general indication of the feeling in Britain present at that time, including the idea of
who was ultimately to blame for his death. Following the basic information, the editorial focused
not on Gordon in the past, but instead on his memory as a Christian hero:
But, on looking back over the forty-four years that have passed, it
is not to thoughts of blame that the generous mind will betake
itself. The storm has died away; and all may see, risen out of the
turmoil, a shining figure. It is by no means the figure of a
conventional hero. There is more than a little that is strange about
it, willful, simple, impulsive, impatient. But, as it has the shifting
lights and shades of genius, so it has the steady greatness of
65

North Southwark: Labour and China, Times (London), 25 March 1927.

In Memory of Gordon: His Supreme Ideal, Times (London) 26 January 1929. The full signatory list is as
follows: Plumer, F.M.; Winston S. Churchill; Beatty; Reginald Wingate; Archibald Hunter, General; J.G. Maxwell,
General; G.F. Milne, F.M.; H.S. Smith-Dorrien, General; Leslie Rundle, General; T.D. OSnow, Lieut.-General;
Josceline Wodehouse, General; Edward Gleichen, Major-General; Fred W. Stoppard, Lieut.-General; W.E. Payton,
General; E.P. Strickland, Lieut.-General; J.J. Asser, General; and R. Whigham, General. The Guardian published a
short article that contained most of the points of the letter and the appeal, but did not publish either in full:
Anniversary of Gordons Death: Memorial Appeal, Manchester Guardian, 26 January 1929.
66

144

genius: the utter unworldliness, the entire faith, the carelessness of

all except the will of GOD.67
The editorial continued by imploring people to remember that Gordon gave his life that the
Sudan might be freed from oppression and rapine: yet more so that it might be made
Christian.68 These two sentiments, taken together, show a new manner in which Gordon was
being employed. Instead of being seen more as an imperial symbol, as he had been regarded for
the first forty years following his death, Gordon was now being portrayed as a Christian symbol
and used as a fundraiser for purely Christian projects that were not related to British imperial
goals. This tactic was not necessarily a new one. As has already been discussed, at the turn of the
twentieth century, Gordons name was used in conjunction with appeals by the Church
Missionary Society and in support of the fundraising to build Khartoum Cathedral, but it was the
first time that any sort of imperial-bettering mission was lacking from an appeal in his name.
The editorial, letter, and appeal from January 26, 1929, marked a change in the way
Gordon was presented. It was almost as if people were attempting to recast the memory of
Gordon for a more contemporary purposeso, in a way, the eminent names achieved their goal
and Gordon was not forgotten. His name and his exploits became newsworthy again with the
Times in particular printing several letters to the editor filled with remembrances of people who
claimed to have known or were related to the general. Most of these letters were quite short, with
correspondents just re-telling old stories about Gordon, but one of them is particularly significant
as it inspired many others. In November of 1929, Gordons nephew, Lieutenant-Colonel Moffitt,
wrote a short article about his fallen uncle. In it, he recollected when he had first been told about
his uncle and his reaction to meeting the general for the first time when he was about seven years
old. Instead of discussing Gordon as symbol, his nephew recalled that the general had a bright
side of his nature and was willing to laugh and joke about his escapades.69 These comments
were unique; no other printed remembrances of the general were quite so personal. Moffitt was
not focused on the empire, politics, or religion; he was simply fondly recalling his famous uncle.
By printing the appeal and editorial in addition to Lieutenant-Colonel Moffitts decision
to share his recollections in its pages, the Times became the newspaper which was most invested
67

In Memory of Gordon, Times (London), 26 January 1929.

Ibid.
69
General Gordon: A Nephews Recollections, Times (London) 12 November 1929. Over the next two days,
several letters to the editor told other Gordon stories, especially on November 14.
68

145

in preserving the Gordon myth. This status was confirmed in 1932 when the paper ran an article
that featured the offense taken by the most senior officer in the Royal Engineers, General Sir
Bindon Blood, to a British Broadcasting Company (BBC) radio program about Gordon that
featured incorrect information from the Strachey biography. In the piece, which basically
amounted to a formal demand for a retraction, the general strove to rehabilitate Gordons
reputation further, especially concerning the now disproven claims against his sobriety.70
Interestingly, although the piece discussed a BBC program that was available throughout
the country, the Times was the only paper to mention the events or print an article based on
Bindon Bloods comments. From 1932 onwards, it appeared as if the editors of the Times had
decided that Gordon was again newsworthy. The most apparent indication of his change in status
occurred with the celebrations of the centennial of Gordons birth in January 1933. As Behrman
discussed in the After-Life of General Gordon, the Times Literary Supplement devoted its
front page leader of January 26, 1933, to General Gordon (1833-1885) and reviewed four
works. These were biographies written by historians, not propagandists; Gordon was now
treated as a remote figure from the past, and any claims of immediacy were no longer valid.71
However, even as the editors of the Literary Supplement were striving to praise these new,
historic biographies, varying opinions about their validity were still present.
These opinions are best exemplified in a book review written about one of the four works
covered in the supplement, Bernard Allens new study of Gordon and Sudan. The review, which
ran in the Egyptian Gazette, specifically referenced the fact that the centennial would result in a
spate of new biographies. As this article ran in the Egyptian Gazette, which was a paper for the
English-speaking population in Egypt, the details of Gordons life, career, and death were still
considered common knowledge. Thus, this reviewer felt that the authors of the new books would
not need to educate their readers on Gordons basic information. By 1933, there were plenty of
other biographies of the general available which told the story of his life in its typical tropes. 72
However, the author of the review believed that these new biographies would only focus on one
or another facet of Gordon, mentioning the ideas of Gordon the religious fanatic, Gordon the
bellicose militarist, Gordon the mystic, and even Gordon the unconscious homosexualist with a
70

General Gordon: A Vindication by General Sir Bindon Blood, Times (London), 7 January 1932.
Behrman, After-Life, 55-56. The four reviewed books were: Bernard Allens Gordon and the Sudan, H.E.
(although she incorrectly attributes it to W.E.) Worthams Gordon: An Intimate Portrait, Pierre Crabitss Gordon,
the Sudan and Slavery, and a reissue of Winston Churchills The River War.
72
For example, the works by Boulger, Hake, or even the Blunt work discussed earlier in this chapter.
71

146

sister complex but none of them would portray the gleaming, shifting opal that Gordon really
was.73
In the celebrations of the centennial, all of the sides of Gordon were celebrated. Even the
Manchester Guardian, whose editors were significantly more critical of Gordon than their
counterparts at the Times, celebrated the centennial with a series of articles, photographs, and an
editorial. These articles were published on January 28 (the actual centennial) and 30 (the date on
which the memorial service in London had been held). In the editorial, published on the
centennial, the editors encapsulated the problem with Gordon succinctly:
National hero and very queer fishthe great man the centenary of
whose birth we celebrate to-day was undeniably both, but ever
since his death there has been some uncertainty where the
emphasis should be placed. His immediate contemporaries were
content to salute Gordon as a hero; his death made him thatLater
the interest was not so much in his deeds as in his personalityin
the queer fish rather than in the hero. The military genius who
found even a casual discipline irksome, the Engineer officer much
occupied with the Biblical speculations on the site of Garden of
Eden and the rate of drift of the Ark, the saint who smoked too
many cigarettesall this was meat and drink to a number of
writers who found in Gordon what they were looking for: a very
queer fish indeed, a Victorian neurotic, a character.74
The rest of the editorial continued in the same irreverent vein. The author did not have a final
opinion on Gordon himself; he was really just repeating the same sort of speculation that had
been present in the public consciousness since the publication of Eminent Victorians. Regardless
of its final sentiments, the Guardian recognized the centennial as newsworthy. In addition to
these sometimes scathing words, a simply captioned image of the Trafalgar Square statue also
ran in that days paper. Two days later, a photo of Gordons defender, Sir Bindon Blood,
receiving the Duke and Duchess of York at the Gordon memorial service held at St. Pauls
Cathedral ran in the pages of the Guardian. This photo was accompanied by a short news article
that focused not on the actual sermon, but rather on the prominent individuals who attended it.75
73

Like several other clippings, this review A Study in Contrasts: Viewpoints about Gordon, which appeared in the
Egyptian Gazette of 20 February 1933, is found in a collection held at SAD. E.G. Sarsfield-Hall collection, SAD
683/7/7.
74
Gordon, Manchester Guardian, 28 January 1933. The un-titled photo appeared on the same day with the
caption, The statue in Trafalgar Square of General Gordon who was born a hundred years ago.
75
In Memory of Gordon, Manchester Guardian, 30 January 1933. The photo The Gordon Centenary ran the
same day.

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With these articles, the Guardian honored Gordon while still managing to marginalize him.
These pieces also represented the last time that he was mentioned in that paper in any significant
capacity through the beginning of the Second World War.
If the Guardians editorial staff was satisfied with one editorial, two photographs, and an
article that amounted to little more than a social listing to honor Gordon, the Times staff was
not. Like the Guardian, the Times featured an editorial on January 28, but it also included a
multi-page familiar portrait of Gordon by Major-General Sir Louis Jackson, who was related
to the general by marriage. In addition to this material, the Times featured a notice about an
exhibition of Gordon-related documents at the Public Record Office. Furthermore, it
complimented this coverage with an entire column in the 30 January paper on the celebrations
held in St. Pauls, in Trafalgar Square, and at Southampton. The Times also published a
photograph of the ceremonies on the same day.76
All of these items had a much more respectful tone than those published in the Guardian.
The Times editorial referenced the same ideas but was much more favorable towards the general.
In it, the author mentioned the controversy, but said that it had helped Gordon and his memory.
For the general was in some risk of being embalmed in the general acceptance. The article
continued by saying that there is little danger now that any of them [Gordon, the Queen, other
eminent Victorians] will be taken for granted, but still less of their being explained or dissected
away.77 According to the Times, by 1933 the furor created by the Strachey accusations had been
quieted. Gordon was transformed back into a popular hero and his centennial sparked a Gordon
Renaissance.
One of the most important aspects of this renaissance was to complete the rehabilitation
of Gordons character that had begun with the 1929 appeal. The Times contribution to this effort
was the publication of Major-General Sir Louis Jacksons long portrait, in which he claimed
Gordon to be similar to one of Plutarchs famous heroes.78 In it, the author sought to re-educate
the public about Gordons deeds before his time in Sudan and to remind them about his heroic
actions and self-sacrifice. It reads in a manner similar to the earliest biographies of Gordon, with
76

Gordon of Khartoum, General Gordon: One of Plutarchs Men: A Familiar Portrait and Documents of
Gordon, Times (London) 28 January 1933. In Memory of Gordon and photo of St. Pauls Cathedral service
Times (London) 30 January 1933.
77
Gordon of Khartoum.
78
General Gordon: One of Plutarchs Men. The title refers to Plutarchs Lives which featured almost mystical
heroic figures. For more on Plutarchs heroes see D.A. Russell, Plutarch and the Ancient Hero, The Yearbook of
English Studies, volume 12, Heroes and the Heroic Special Number, (1982).

148

little to no criticism for any of his actions. These two articles set the tone for all of the Times
future coverage of the general.
Two days later, when the Times covered the centenary service at St. Pauls instead of
merely including a social listing, the article quoted several passages from the sermon and
featured a description of the service, in which the memory of Gordon was described as evoking
sorrow as well as pride. The other memorial events received similar, although shorter,
mentions.79 All of the press coverage described above inspired a spate of letters to the editor
discussing little known facts about Gordon. Like the letters that had accompanied the Nephews
Recollections years earlier, these mostly repeated older stories about the general, although one
in particular was on Gordon as a botanist.80 None of the letters shed much light on any new
facets of the generals character, but, taken together, they represent the continued interest his
name engendered.
There were other reasons why Gordon became more popular in 1933 in addition to the
centennial of his birth. A celebration of the general was also a celebration of the Empire.
Following the First World War, traditional British imperialism underwent a transformation; even
those who advocated imperialism understood that the goals of the imperial project needed to be
transformed in order to assure the Empires continued vitality. The moral reasons for empire
were no longer considered valid; now the empire needed to continue for other reasons, most
notably its economic benefits. One of the ways that it was transformed was the introduction of a
new term into discussions: the Commonwealth. In its new role, the Empire was portrayed as a
great exercise in friendly, familial cooperation, and even internationalism.81 Charles Gordon
fit this new definition. His memory also fit with efforts to continue promoting the empire,
referred to by Bernard Porter as consisting of Empire Days, Empire Songs, Empire Essay
Competitions, Empire Meals on Empire Day, and all the other ingenious ploys of the
imperialists.82 Charles Gordon was still the perfect symbol for these imperialists to employ.
However, there were outside factors contributing to Gordons popularity in the year of his
centennial. Nineteen thirty-three also marked the solidification of a new ideology in Europe,
fascism. With the growth of fascism, especially in Germany, Italy, and Spain, Britain faced a
79

In Memory of Gordon.
Gordon as Botanist, Times (London) 7 February 1933. Other letters appeared on February 3, 4, and 18.
81
Porter, Lions Share, 288.
82
Ibid., 273.
80

149

new threat. Gordonthe archetype of the Victorian hero and a supreme example of imperial
masculinityprovided an excellent counter to this new ideal.83 By celebrating him and all that
he represented, the British were reaffirming their imperial culture and rejecting the ideas of
fascism present throughout the continent. Fascism was present in Britain throughout the 1930s,
but the country never became fascist. Celebrations of Gordon and other figures reminded the
British people of their history and their national pride, factors which have been described by
historian Keith Robbins as part of the reason why Britain did not succumb to fascism.84
Thus, while honoring Gordon was important, the timing of the centennial was beneficial
to the imperial project. Gordon himself was not as significant for the rest of the 1930s.
Throughout the rest of the decade, with a bit of an upswing around the fiftieth anniversary of his
death, Gordon remained a figure of minor note. In January 1935, he was the subject of memorial
stamps issued by the Sudanese Government (which at the time was still a part of the AngloEgyptian condominium) commemorating the anniversary.85 More biographies were released;
Gordon was also the subject of several editions of popular boys journals in the 1930s. These
journals sought to increase the boys patriotic feeling by featuring stories such as Gordons final
year.86 Literature was not the only area where interest in the general increased following his
centenary. Interest was also piqued by the advent of a new form of media: cinema. Although
there had been earlier films about Gordon, in 1938 a notice appeared about a new film to be
made about the generals life.87 This film, the third cinematic version of A.E.W. Masons The
Four Feathers, was released in 1939. According to historian Jeffrey Richards, it was designed by
its director, Alexander Korda, to stress the virtues of the British imperial system, the doctrines
of fair play and moral authority at a time when the rise of fascism was threatening those ideals
and offering a different sort of world government.88

83

For the connection between British fascists and the ideas of imperial masculinity, see Ina ZweinigerBargielowska, Building a British Superman: Physical Culture in Interwar Britain Journal of Contemporary
History, volume 41, number 4, (Oct., 2006): 597-598.
84
Keith Robbins, Britain and Europe: 1785-2005 (London: Hodder Education, 2005), 205-206.
85
Silver Jubilee Stamps, Times (London) 13 December 1934.
86
John M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 219-220.
87
Gordon, gen, film based on life to be made, Times (London) 25 October 1938. The earliest film featuring the
general was a 1915 silent film adaptation of Four Feathers it was remade in 1921 and 1929.
88
Jeffrey Richards, Boys Own Empire: feature films and imperialism in the 1930s in John MacKenzie, editor
Imperialism and Popular Culture (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), 149.

150

By 1937, people in Britain were beginning to worry about Japans actions in China,
particularly its actions around the city of Nanjing. Paralleling the press coverage of the Boxer
Rebellion, the British public sought an authority on China, and once again, Chinese Gordon
was the authority found. This time, however, Gordon was only mentioned in letters to the editor.
The editorial boards of papers in the late 1930s did not consider him to be a worthy authority on
a country which had completely changed in the eighty years since he had been there. Although
the Times did not quote Gordon directly, it did run parts of two separate letters to the editor that
referenced Gordons views on China.
The first of these letters appeared in August, 1937. In the letter, the author liberally
quoted from Gordons views on the Chinese army, drawing particular attention to his contention
that China cannot have an army when generals keep 2,000 men and draw pay for 5,000. These
generals ought to have their heads cut off. Gordons comments were about the army in 1880.
The author, Mr. J.P. Donovan, extrapolated this idea out to the Chinese army in 1937 without
any proof that the same situation existed. Regardless of the authors perhaps misguided attention,
the letter is still notable for the attempt to keep Gordons name in the discussion.89
The second appeared in July, 1939. By this time, war between Japan and China had
begun in earnest. This letter, from Mr. George Lancing, is a brief discussion on Gordons tactical
views. His points have more merit than those of Mr. Donovan because the Chinese were using
the guerilla tactics he had recommended in 1880. The letter included a passage from Gordons
discussion on the tactics. Some of the points, such as his idea that China should never engage
in pitched battles. Her strength lies in quiet movements, were quite familiar.90 In fact, the
same type of advice was used in a paper Gordon wrote the same year about the Boers. China was
using the military tactics he had advocated, although the likelihood that these tactics were
employed as a result of the generals recommendation is slim at best.
With Gordon being used as an authority again (even in a limited capacity), and films,
books, and journals featuring him being sold, his renaissance was complete. Although his name
was no longer employed in a political capacity, Gordon was still important to Britain and its
Empire. He may not have had the same level of relevance as he did in the first years of the
twentieth century, and his reputation may have suffered in the years directly after the First World

89
90

Points from Letters: Chinese Armed Forces, Times (London) 18 August 1937.
Points from Letters: Gordon on Chinese Tactics, Times (London), 10 July 1939.

151

War, but he himself was still a figure of interest. Perhaps the fascination that the British public
had with the general was re-ignited as a result of Stracheys accusations or the stories printed
about the general in the form of articles and letters to the editor in the early 1930s. Regardless,
by 1939, the problems that had so worried his supporters in the 1920s, had been eliminated. In
1939, it was highly unlikely that the question of Who was Gordon? needed to be asked. His
name and reputation were well-known once more. However, with the onset of the Second World
War, Gordon, as an imperial hero from the last century, was relegated to a minor figure, in much
the same manner as accompanied his first time of irrelevance. This new status continued into
post-war Britain as it was beginning to divest itself of its former territories. Thus, Gordon would
be transformed yet againthis time into an imperial relic.

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CHAPTER 8
FADING INTO THE BACKGROUND
In 1939, Charles Gordons name was again prominent in the public consciousness; he
was honored yearly at Trafalgar Square and was even being referenced as an authority in
imperial matters. However, this renaissance was to be short-lived. Similar to the effect of the
First World War, the Second World War led to a permanent lessening of Gordons importance to
Britain and its Empire. By the time it had concluded, Gordon was no longer as present in the
public consciousness; his statue had been removed from Trafalgar Square and the traits he had
most strongly exemplified were no longer shaping the British self-image as they once had.
Furthermore, following the wars conclusion, decolonization became a central concern, which
led to the question of what kind of imperial figure was still needed, and whether it might be one
that represented reconciliation rather than conquest. The great hero of the nineteenth century had
become a problem in the twentieth, especially as discussions about decolonization began.
As Gordons place in British culture changed during the war, so too did his assorted
memorials. In England, these memorials had, like the man they honored, undergone a
transformation. In 1943, Gordons annual recognition at Trafalgar Square ended. The Gordon
Boys Home became the Gordon Boys School, a change in status which indicated a lessening of
the original goals of the Home. As a school, other boys besides the less fortunate were eligible to
attend it. At the same time, the London statue went into storage, where it would remain through
the end of the war. In Sudan, his memorials also went through a metamorphosis following the
Second World War. However, change in Khartoum would occur a bit later, once the imminent
danger had subsided.
In both capital cities, Gordons statues were moved because of constraints on their
locations. In Khartoum, anti-British sentiment led to the eventual move; in London, it was quite
the opposite. Gordons statue was moved to make way for a wartime pro-British demonstration.
By 1943, the British people had been subjected to war for over four years. In London, the public
was suffering through the blitz and its aftermath. The country and its troops needed a morale
booster and a way to help the war effort. The solution was the establishment of a series of weeks
between March and June 1943, known as the Wings for Victory weeks. They served as a
fundraiser and an extension of the larger War Savings Campaigns. As the advertisement for the
153

weeks read, The vital war work youre doing is backing up the men who flywonderfully. But
back em up still moreby seeing that your town gets its Victory Wings1 This campaign was
nationwide; the first of these weeks was held in London, March 6-13, 1943 and was inaugurated
in a large ceremony held in Trafalgar Square. At this ceremony, the head of the campaign, Lord
Robert Kindersley, the president of the National Savings Committee, spoke on a purpose-built
marquee erected underneath an Avro Lancaster bomber. The choice of the bomber was
intentional. It was British built and the most successful four-engined aircraft built during the
war. The plane was also an essential part of British war strategy, participating in bombing raids
over Germany.2 In essence, it was a symbol of the British war effort. However, the Lancaster
bomber was quite large; it was described in contemporary news reports as perched between the
fountains located on either side of the square, hence a considerable amount of area needed to be
cleared to accommodate it.3 Essentially, in order to have the bomber in the square, one of the
statues had to be moved or placed in storage.
The statue chosen was of General Gordon; perhaps this decision is unsurprising.
Gordons statue was never felt to be a good fit for the square; even before the 1943 decision to
remove it, there had been other instances where, in discussing the squares long-term appearance,
the statues positioning was questioned. Even in 1936, at the height of the resurgence of
popularity of Gordon, there was a growing consensus in the Works Department that his statue
was out of place in the square. In the departments private documents, the idea of moving the
statue in conjunction with a scheme for transforming Trafalgar Square intoa naval piazza,
was discussed.4 However, there was no final decision about where Gordon would be moved, or if
1

Advertisement for Victory Weeks in Flight and the Aircraft Engineer, 11 February 1943, pg. 9. Although the
weeks were successful as a morale booster, historian Angus Calder has argued that they actually cost the
government more than they raised. Angus Calder, The Peoples War: Britain1939-1945 (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1969), 356.
2
There is a compelling photograph of the ceremony in the 18, March, 1943 issue. England Expects Flight and
the Aircraft Engineer, 18 March, 1943, pg. 272. The symbolism of the bomber is discussed in The Times article on
the ceremony. Savings For Victory: London makes a good start, Times (London), 8 March, 1943. The Lancaster
bomber had a wingspan of 102ft and was almost 70ft in length. For more on the bombers uses see Anthony Verrier,
The Bomber Offensive (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), 119 and 162-169.
3
Our London Correspondence: Wings over Trafalgar Square, Manchester Guardian, 8 March 1943.
4
This scheme was eventually realized after the war, with the remodeling of the fountains and the installation of
solely naval busts. For more on the changing character of the square and its statues, see Sue Malvern, The Fourth
Plinth or the Vicissitudes of Public Sculpture in Alexandra Gerstein, editor, Display and Displacement: Sculpture
and the Pedestal from Renaissance to Post-Modern (London: The Courtauld Institute of Art Research Forum in
association with Paul Hoberton publishing, 2007), 132-137. The naval piazza is described in an undated wartime
memo on the Gordon statue with handwritten corrections from 17 December 1947 in National Archives WORK
20/215.

154

the statue was ultimately deemed inappropriate for the square in the years preceding the Second
World War.
The naval question was not the only time the idea of moving Gordon was raised in the
1930s. In the same undated memorandum, the idea of erecting a new statue in the square, to
another imperial figure, Cecil Rhodes, was referenced. At the time, there was a vacant plinth at
the northwest corner of the square. According to the memo, the Rhodes statue was to be placed
on that plinth; however, the Department had decided that including a statue to Rhodes would
have impeded the squares design aesthetic. By this point in Britains history, imperial heroes
were no longer considered to be as important as they had been under the Victorians, yet at the
time, the board did not recommend the removal of Gordon.5
Therefore, when the decision was made in March, 1943, to have a wartime propaganda
event at Trafalgar Square, the first step that the Works Department needed to take was to find a
new home for the Gordon statue. The debates over where the statue was to be relocated
demonstrated the lessening importance of Gordon as a figure and of his statue. In these debates,
preserved in the files of the Works Department, a consensus was reached that the statue should
not be placed on display, at least for the duration of the war. Instead, it was first to be kept in the
Works storeyard at St. James and later moved to Lord Roseberrys country house, Mentmore, in
Hertfordshire. By April, 1943, the statue was at Mentmore; it remained there until a more
permanent solution was found.6
It was clear, at least in the view of the Works Department, that Gordons statue would not
be returned to Trafalgar Square after the war. In the undated memo written after the Wings for
Victory week concluded, the department enumerated a variety of concerns for the fate of the
statue. These concerns included the possibility of wartime damage, the need for the space in the
square to remain available for other war-related uses, and lastly, the possibility of who might
register a complaint if the statue were to be moved permanently. The first concern was the
easiest one addressed; the author of the memo believed that replacing the statue in the square
would be, in view of the risk of its being damaged, unwise. The need for available space in the
5

WORK 20/215 17 December 1947 memo. A vacant plinth without a permanent statue remains in the square to the
present day.
6
WORK A.S. 23; 7472; 31 March 1943, with handwritten notes at the bottom from 19 and 20 April 1943. The
Gordon statue was not the only one moved to the countryside as a result of the Blitz. This file contains the new
locations of several other statues including William III from St. James Square, George III from Cockspur St., the
Burghers of Calais from Victoria Tower Gardens, Lord Wolseleys statue from the Horse Guards Parade, and
Charles I.

155

square was a bigger concern for the Works Department, and the author believed that the statue
might be in the way of further propaganda campaigns in the Square. Yet, the people behind
these campaigns have not pressed this suggestion to the extent of objecting to the reinstatement
of the statue. These two concerns were valid arguments in wartime Britain.7
However, the final concern, over who might have complained if the statue were
permanently removed, received the least attention in this memo, further indicating the apathy felt
by the Works Department towards Gordon and his statue.8 Although the board of works felt that
the statue was not well located, there was a fear, expressed in this memo, that to move Gordon
would potentially cause a large amount of backlash. In the memo, the thoughts of Sir Patrick
Duff, the permanent secretary to the Ministry of Works, were cited: Sir Patrick Duffs view was
that we should bring a hornets nest around our ears if we showed signs of ousting him.9
Clearly, there was resentment in the Works Department over the need for Gordon to remain in
the square. The final lines of this lengthy memorandum reflected this apathy. On the possibility
of reinstatement in the square, the author concluded, that if there was no request made, then it
will leave our hands all the freer to re-erect the statue elsewhere after the war and thus contribute
another installment to the naval piazza scheme. We can only hope that the hornets nest
envisaged by Sir Patrick Duff will not materialize.10
Unfortunately for the Ministry of Works, that hornets nest did, in fact, materialize
following the conclusion of the Second World War. It was not a question of whether there had
been a significant wartime need to move the statue; no one could argue with concerns for the
statues, and Gordons was not the only one that the Department moved. Rather, it was a question
of what Gordon now represented. During the Second World War, the Gordon statue did not serve
a purpose. Britain did not need to honor its long-dead imperial symbol, but instead needed to
look forward, as the propaganda associated with the Wings of Victory week asserted.11
Gordons role as an imperial symbol and even as a patriotic one was not as important as other
symbols, like the Lancaster Bomber, to people surviving the blitz.

WORK 20/215 undated memo with corrections from 17 December 1947.

By this point, the two were basically perceived as synonymous.
9
WORK 20/215 undated memo with corrections from 17 December 1947; emphasis is the memo authors.
10
Ibid.
11
The advertisement in Flight was only one example of this propaganda. There were several other posters and
newspaper advertisements for the program.
8

156

There was still another aspect to the problems faced by the Ministry over the Gordon
statue: a change in the British publics attitude towards their statues following the First World
War. Charles Gordons statue memorialized just one man, not a war or even a military endeavor.
This type of statue as a national monument was increasingly uncommon in the twentieth century,
especially with the advent of total war. Stephen Heathorn discussed this changing attitude in his
article on another controversial London statue, the memorial to World War I Field-Marshal Earl
Douglass Haig. He argued that Haigs memorial is a valid national memorial, because Haig
epitomizes all of the men, those who lived and those who died, who fought for him. The same
cannot be said for Gordons memorial. As a product of the nineteenth century, his statue seemed,
like others of the same ilk, to be atavistic and out of touch with the postwar [First World War]
reality.12 Thus, while Britain was concerned with its survival, the survival of one statue, or one
mans legacy, was unimportant. However, Gordon and the Gordon statue still had prominent
supporters, as the debates over its future would soon demonstrate.
The question of where the Gordon statue was to be relocated regained attention in April,
1947. At the Ministry of Works, it had long been decided that Gordon would not return to
Trafalgar Square. This sentiment was reinforced by a letter sent from the First Commissioner of
Works, Charles W. Key, to F.J. Bellenger, the Secretary of State for War. In his letter, Key
informed the War Office of the permanent decision regarding Gordon.13 He referenced the naval
scheme and the original plan by the Works department to remove all non-naval military figures,
including Generals Sir Charles James Napier and Sir Henry Havelock, in addition to Gordon.
However, the other generals remained in place and only Gordon, who has never really looked at
home in Trafalgar Square in a surrounding of an alien period and character, was moved.14
The public at large was unaware that the Ministry of Works reached this decision. The
first indication that Gordon would not be returned to the square came with statements issued by
the ministry. These statements were fairly vague at first, leading to reports that a decision on the
statues fate had not yet been reached, but will be reached shortly.15 The problem with
Gordons statue was not its removal, but its relocation. The Ministry believed that a suitable spot
12

Stephen Heathorn, A matter for artists, and not for soldiers? The Cultural Politics of the Earl Haig National
Memorial, 1928-1937, Journal of British Studies, volume 44, number 3 (Jul., 2005): 358.
13
As Gordon had originally served under the War Offices auspices, their input was sought in all of the decisions
regarding his statue.
14
18 April 1947 letter from Key to Bellenger, NA WORK 20/215. Napier and Havelock remain in the square to the
present day.
15
Our London Correspondence: Londons Statues, Manchester Guardian, 22 April 1947.

157

for the statue could not be found in central London and recommended in Keys letter to
Bellenger that it should be moved to Woolwich, where Gordon was born and had attended
school. The final location was not yet determined when Key wrote this letter. In August, the War
Office recommended another location for Gordon: Sandhurst, the location of the Royal Military
Academy. By September, it appeared as if the Works Office had a solution to its Gordon statue
quandary, and by the end of November, the public had been informed of the plan to relocate the
statue to Sandhurst.16
It was at this point that the plans of War Office and Ministry of Works hit a snag. When
the news about the Gordon statue leaked, the hornets nest that Sir Patrick Duff had predicted
became a reality. The first reactions to the plan began to appear in editorials and letters to the
editor in late November and December, 1947. The first letter to the editor appeared in the
Spectator in which the author, who used the pseudonym Janus, expressed his dismay at the
removal of the Gordon statue, a situation that he termed most unsatisfactorily settled. Janus
continued, The expulsion of Thornycrofts Governor General from London is a much more
serious matter [than the removal of James IIs statue], and to send him to Sandhurst because he
was once at Woolwhich seems a little inept. Gordon, with all his faults, was a great historic
figure. That was why his statue was placed in Trafalgar Square.17 The letter demonstrated that
Gordons name and the reasons why he was memorialized were still important to at least some
Britons after the Second World War.
Shortly after this first letter appeared, a variety of letters on the subject were received at
the Ministry of Works. All of these letters referenced the ideas set out in Janus letter; not one
received was in favor of the decision to remove Gordon from London. A handwritten letter from
Wilson Harris, a Member of Parliament, referenced the other generals located in the square after
first commenting on Gordons banishment from the Square. In this letter, Harris questioned why
Gordon was being moved as opposed to Napier, because he did not even know which Napier &
[he] cant believe that anyone is much interested in him or would miss him if he were moved.18
The only conclusion which can be drawn from Harris letter is that, in his opinion, Gordon was a
16

There are several letters regarding the possibility of the statues move to Sandhurst. All are located in WORK
20/215. The first was sent on 27 August, 1947, another on 2 September, 1947 [Ext 1414] and finally a memo from
the press office about announcing it to the public [P.I. 232-C].
17
Janus 28 November, 1947, editorial to the Spectator was retyped and included in the Works files, WORK 20/215.
At the time, both the Gordon statue and a statue of James II had not been relocated in London; most editorials and
letters on one statue mentioned the other one.
18
WORK 20/215 326/0247 6 December, 1947 letter from Wilson Harris.

158

much more important general than the ones who were to be left in the square. As Harris was an
MP, Key responded directly to him in a long letter, explaining the decisions made by Works to
solve the problem of Gordon and concluding with his reasons for the proposed move to
Sandhurst.19
This letter effectively silenced Harris complaints, but he was not the only government
official to question Works decisions regarding the statue. Another was Mr. J.H.S. Burgess at the
Ministry of Education, which had received comments regarding the situation. The Ministry sent
a letter, written on behalf of Sir John Maud, the permanent secretary of Education, which did not
detail his concerns, but rather those he had received in relation to the placement of the Christmas
tree then standing in Gordons former location. In the letter, the enquirer made the case for why
Gordon should remain in London, feeling that there is every need in the present state of world
affairs that we should hold to every reminder and Memorial of men of integrity, courage and
leadershipGeneral Gordon being an exemplification of that which alone has made our country
great.20
While the idea of Gordon as an exemplification of Britains greatness was an older idea,
in postwar Britain, exemplifying the past was becoming less important as the country strove to
recover from the two world wars. Changing attitudes in Britain were best reflected in the
sweeping electoral victory of the Labour Party over the Conservatives in the election of 1945.
However, as Martin Pugh has argued, this sweeping transformation was linked to more than just
new attitudes about the past; it was also intertwined with the coming of age of a new electorate
which demanded a new social agenda. Portions of this agenda were present in the policies of the
wartime coalition government, but it was not fully achieved until Labour came to power. The
1945 election was not a defeat of Churchill per se, but rather of the ghost of Chamberlain and
the older policies of the Conservative Party as they had existed before the Second World War.
Churchill would remain personally popular (and even become Prime Minister again in a few

19

This letter appears in the same file as above. Other letters were received from newspapers [St. 1/7472] suggesting
different locations for the statue, including outside the Gordon Hospital (a site which was deemed invalid by the
Works Department) [29 December, 1947]. The Gordon Boys School also supported the move to Sandhurst in a
letter sent by Field Marshal Lord Chetwode the Chairman [A.S 23, 7 January 1948].
20
29 December, 1947, letter from Mr. J.H.S. Burgess at the Ministry of Education to Key. Key replied on 5 January,
1948, in a similar manner to the reply to Harris. WORK 20/215

159

years), but his party was not the choice of a new Britain which had to contend with several
problems including crises in health, housing, and unemployment.21
Thus, the voters chose the Labour Party. The policies enacted by this new government,
led by Clement Atlee, would be, like their electoral victory, sweeping. This new attitude was best
exemplified with the foundation of the National Health Service (NHS) in 1948. Providing health
care free of charge, the NHS has, according to historian Arthur Marwick, been widely seen,
both at the time and since, as the most significant and successful social innovation of the
period.22 As such, it represented Britains new priorities. With a government focused on the less
elite and working class populations, honoring older imperial figures, such as Gordon, no longer
seemed as vital.
Newer memorials were turning towards remembering more than just the elite officers and
white males who were the subject of nineteenth century (and earlier) memorials. As John Gillis
explained in the introduction to his edited study on national identity, nineteenth century
commemorations were largely for, but not of, the people. Now, in the aftermath of the Second
World War, ordinary people and their contributions were beginning to be honoredespecially in
mass commemorations.23 Gordons statue was not one to which this label could be applied. Yet,
his supporters tried to make his statue as important to the masses as possible. This point was
emphasized in a letter sent to the Times in December, 1947. Its author, Charles Evans, expressed
the need to have the statue remain in London; he felt that just relying on Gordons memorial at
St. Pauls Cathedral would not adequately preserve to London the memory of Gordons services
and heroic character. The letter concluded with the suggestion that the Ministry of Works
should remove the statue of some person with smaller claims upon the veneration of his
country to allow Gordon to stay in London.24
Days after the Evans letter appeared, another was published. This one referenced the
same issues raised by Evans and Janus, but also brought an additional idea to the discussion: the
artistic merit of Gordons statue. The statue and its plinth were extremely well received and

21

Martin Pugh, The Making of Modern British Politics: 1867-1945 third edition (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
2002), 251-255.
22
Arthur Marwick, British Society since 1945 fourth edition (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 33.
23
John R. Gillis, Introduction, in his edited Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994), 9-13.
24
Letters to the Editor: General Gordon, Times (London), 6 December 1947.

160

hailed as a new type of British monumental sculpture when first produced.25 However, even
while making a plea for Gordons statue to remain in London based on its artistic merits, the
author, W. Reid Dick, felt the need at least to mention the main reason why he believed
Gordons statue should remain, quite apart from the outstanding character and national
importance of the hero whom it represents it is certainly one of the really fine portrait statues in
our capital city.26 In all these letters, Gordons name and his achievements have been
transferred onto the statue: to marginalize the statue is to marginalize Gordon himself.
Unfortunately for Gordons supporters, it did not appear that these letters and sentiments
were successful; by April, 1948, the Times ran an article on the forthcoming re-erection of
Gordons statue at Sandhurst. It did not contain a plea for the statue to remain in London, nor did
the article reference any of Gordons past history or deeds. Instead, it merely stated the reason of
the Ministry of Works for moving the statue and the determination that Sandhurst would be the
best location.27 Thus, it seemed like a foregone conclusion that the statue would go to Sandhurst.
However, a great deal of public sentiment was stirred with the formal announcement of the
statues new home. This furor resulted in over a dozen letters to the editor printed in the Times
between April 30 and May 11, 1948. In these letters, the decision to move the statue and the
fitness of the new location were once again questioned. Many letters expressed shock,
amazement, and regret that the statue was going to leave London permanently. Unlike the news
article announcing the move, these letter writers also sought to remind the public of the reasons
why Gordons statue deserved to stay in London, and if the authors accepted that he could not
remain in Trafalgar Square, they also tried to propose what they felt were other suitable locations
in the city.
The correspondents ranged from a person describing himself as a mere member of the
public to members of Parliament, to a Cambridge Don, public figures, and even the only
surviving nephew of General Gordon.28 While the content of all the letters reads in a fairly
similar vein, two stand out. These letters best exemplify the goals of the correspondents, goals
25

Malvern, 137. The statue and its plinth are discussed in detail in chapter four.
Letters to the Editor: The Gordon Statue, Times (London), 11 December 1947.
27
Gordons Statue: Forthcoming Erection at Sandhurst, Times (London), 24 April 1948. The Times ran the entire
content of the press release issued by the Ministry of Works [WORK 20/215, MOW/46/48, D.I. 232C]
28
All of these letters to the editor appeared in the Times, under the heading of Gordons Statue. Letters ran on 30
April, 1948, 3 May [the mere member and Cambridge Don, G.M. Trevelyan], 7 May, 8 May [the chairman of
Gordon Hospital and the man responsible for moving the statue to fit the Lancaster bomber], 10 May [the MP, Mr.
Legge-Brooke] and 11 May [the letter from F. Moffit, Gordons newphew]. Although this subject received a great
deal of attention in the Times, the Manchester Guardian did not publish any letters to the editor on the subject.
26

161

which are quite similar to the earlier letters of November and December, 1947. The letters from
historian G.M. Trevelyan and Gordons nephew illustrate the continued need felt for a Gordon
statue to remain in London. Trevelyans appeared in the Times first, on May 3, 1948. In it, the
famed historian wrote of his regret when he heard of the decision to move the statue and his hope
that it could still be reversed. After these sentiments, he explained his belief as to why the statue
should not be located at Sandhurst. Instead of focusing on the need for the statue to remain in
London, Trevelyan took a different approach, including citing reasons why Gordons character
was not a good fit for the new location: his memory is not specially suited to inspire young
officers with zeal for discipline and obedience to orders. This statement is the only time that any
of these correspondents ventured to criticize any part of Gordon; as a historian, Trevelyan
wanted to remind people of Gordon the mannot just his statue. However, the next paragraph of
his letter returned to the similar trope employed in these letters. He is a true national hero; his
strange and tragic story is deeply written across our political and imperial annals; his personality
and genius were unique and will always remain a source of pride to Englishmen.29 At the time
he penned the letter, Trevelyan was probably the most well-known historian of Britain,
appointed to the highest positions within Cambridge University. His thoughts on the statue thus
held more weight than an ordinary correspondent. If Trevelyan was speaking as a conservativeleaning Whig historian, he was also speaking as an admirer of Gordon and as a contemporary,
being born in 1876 and with a memory of Gordon and the uproar following his death.30
The letter writer who had the most definitive memory of Gordon the man was his
nephew, Francis Moffitt. Ever since he had published his 1929 letter in the Times, Moffitt
seemed to have become the family authority on Gordon. This status was confirmed by the
publication of this second letter. Moffitt believed that as the only surviving nephew of General
Gordon it was his duty to protest against the proposal. He then provided an impassioned plea
for keeping the statue in London, citing not the specifics of Gordons deeds but rather, his total
abnegation of self and his sympathy for all who were in trouble or distress. Hence, Moffitt felt
that the story of his life has been an inspiration to many and his statue in Trafalgar Square has
served to keep his memory warm. For this reason he believed that, the place for the statue is
29

G.M. Trevelyan, Letters to the Editor: Gordons Statue, Times (London), 3 May, 1948.
For more on Trevelyan, including his personal history, connection with Winston Churchill, and political leanings,
see Joseph M. Hernon, Jr., The Last Whig Historian and Consensus History: George Macaulay Trevelyan, 18761962, The American Historical Review volume 81, number 1, (Feb., 1976): 66-97.
30

162

London, where it can be seen by thousands of the inhabitants of these islands and by many
visitors from overseas.31 As the letters excerpted above show, a large number of Britons agreed
with Moffitts sentiments.
Despite this support, the Ministry of Works still intended to banish Gordons statue to
Sandhurst. However, only days before Moffitts impassioned letter was printed in the Times, the
statue earned a reprieve, in the form of a debate held in the House of Commons. The man
responsible for the reprieve was one of Gordons most vocal supporters, Winston Churchill. Like
his friend Trevelyan, Churchill too was not pleased with the decision to move the statue to
Sandhurst. He expressed this displeasure by sending a Private Notice Question to the House of
Commons which was To ask the Prime Minister whether he has any statement to make about
the removal of the statue of General Gordon from its place in Trafalgar Square.32 This was the
question that appeared in the Works archives, but by the time that the question was actually
asked (not read), it was to the Minister of Works, Charles Key, not to Clement Atlee, the Labour
Prime Minister. However, Atlee did ask to be kept informed of the situation, writing a curt Prime
Ministers Minute to Key, which simply contained the following: I have been informed that the
statue of General Gordon which used to stand in Trafalgar Square has been sent to Sandhurst. I
should like to know by whose orders and on what grounds this has been done.33 Regardless of
why Key was sent to field questions, debate on Churchills private notice question occurred on
May 5, 1948.
The debate itself was illuminating. Although Atlee expressed concern about the
movement of the statue, it was only after the furor described above. No Labour Party members,
with the exception of Key, participated in the brief debate, which merely consisted of Churchill
laying out his point of view to Key and three other Conservative-leaning members who
supported his claims. The only person to discuss any part of Gordons character was Churchill.
Following Keys opening answer to the question, which merely discussed the practical reasons
for moving the statue and concluded by indicating that he and the Ministry still welcomed any
other suggestions which would allow the statue to remain in London, Churchill began his
argument for keeping the statue. The former Prime Minister started by asking Key if he could
ask him a question of sentimental importance. He continued by inquiring whether the Minister
31

F. Moffitt, Letters to the Editor: Gordons Statue, Times (London), 11 May, 1948.
WORK 20/215, 4 May 1948 note.
33
WORK 20/215, Serial M79/48 Prime Minister Minute from Clement Atlee.
32

163

was aware [that] the General Gordon was not only a military commander, who gave his life for
his country, but, in addition, was considered very widely throughout this country as a model of a
Christian hero, and that very many cherished ideals are associated with his name? Thus,
following in his logic, he wished to know if the statue might not receive special
consideration...[as] General Gordon was a figure outside the military and naval commanders.34
In Churchills mind, Gordon was more important for what he represented than what he achieved;
therefore, he could still be included in a square which was being repurposed to honor naval
achievements only. However, this opinion seemed to be his alone.
The debate over Gordons statue further revealed the differences between the
Conservative Party and the Labour Party. Churchill, the great Conservative statesman, was
arguing for what was, in some ways, a vestige of a bygone time. Following their defeat in the
election of 1945, the Conservatives were forced to re-evaluate what they represented. This reevaluation or re-thinking of the Conservative Party would lead to a new Conservatism, with
a focus on a genuine process of modernisation and democratisation.35 As a part of this new
commitment, the Conservative Party did embrace the idea of a mixed economy and a welfare
state, but it retained some reservations. Churchill too was in favor of this new ethic, but as his
support for keeping the Gordon statue in its original place of honor revealed, he was unwilling to
distance himself and his party completely from their past agendas.
While the Conservative Party was transforming itself to appear more similar to the
Labour Party, the members of the Labour Party were forced to contend with the social issues of
the day discussed earlier in this chapter. For the Labour Party, the answer was inclusive policies
that have been described by Marwick as being hitched to the star of universality.36 To
continue to memorialize a single individual, regardless of his historical contributions, was a
direct affront to the overarching goals of the Labour Party. As a party which was created to
defend and celebrate the interests and values of male manual labour, Labour had a difficult time

34

Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Oral Answers [Hansard], 5th ser., vol. 450, cols 1267-1269. In keeping with
their practices concerning the Gordon statue, the Times ran a summary of the debate. House of Commons: The
Gordon Statue, Times (London), 6 May, 1948. In addition to Churchill,other conservative members participating
were Sir Thomas Cecil Moore and Major Legge-Bourke. There was also an independent member, Mr. Wilson
Harris.
35
Harold Macmillan quoted in Harriet Jones, New Conservatism? The Industrial Charter, Modernity and the
Reconstruction of British Conservatism after the War in Becky Conekin, Frank Mort, Chris Waters, editors
Moments of Modernity: Reconstructing Britain 1945-1964 (London: Rivers Oram Press, 1999), 172.
36
Marwick, 28.

164

incorporating middle-class mores into its policies.37 Preserving the Gordon statues location was
an example of the tension between the two groups.
All in all, even with its political implications, the debate was quite short. In the end, Key
agreed to continue looking for a better solution to the question of where Gordons statue would
reside. He also remarked that he could put off the decision in regard to the new site for the
statue for some time yet.38 For Key, the matter was not settled. He still had to appease other
government agencies concerning the statue including the Royal Fine Arts Commission (RFAC),
which had also expressed interest in the statue. As it did not want to see the statue leave London,
the RFAC suggested the nineteenth-century Victoria Embankment garden as a solution, but the
location had been previously ruled out by the London City Council (LCC) due to the fact that the
garden was small and already equipped with a generous allotment of statues. 39 RFACs idea
was valid; Gordons statue would have been a good match to the character of the Embankment,
which has been characterized by geographer Stuart Oliver as an important step in making
London an imperial city. Gordons service was certainly of an imperial nature.40
Nevertheless, with the denial by the LCC, debate over the Gordon statue remained at a
standstill, without a satisfactory option for its relocation until later in 1948. In October, a solution
was finally achieved, when the decision was made to construct a garden between the new
Whitehall building and the Embankment proper. This new garden was in keeping with the LCCs
stated post-war goals for the Thames riverside area: to make the entire area more in keeping with
the national and imperial character of the city, thus removing the remnants of older economic
functions of the area, and to provide more green space for the city.41 It would also provide the
perfect space to re-erect Gordons statue. As a letter sent to the Under-Secretary for Works, Mr.

37

Martin Frances, The Labour Party: Modernisation and the Politics of Restraint in Conekin, Mort, and Waters,
eds. Moments of Modernity, 154.
38
Hansard, 1268-9.
39
WORK 20/215 Ref. No. 604, 20 May, 1948. Although the RFAC controlled the design and placement of statues,
and could suggest the location, it would have to be approved by the London City Council (LCC) which controlled
the garden. The LCC indicated in March, 1948, that they were unwilling to consider the gardens as a possible
solution [St. 1/7472, letters of 22 January, 1948 and 12 March, 1948].
40
Stuart Oliver, The Thames Embankment and Disciplining of Nature in Modernity, The Geographical Journal,
volume 166, number 3, (Sep., 2000): 229.
41
Patricia L. Garside, Politics, ideology and the issue of open space in London, 1939-2000 in Peter Clark, editor,
The European City and Green Space: London, Stockholm, Helsinki and St. Petersburg: 1850-2000 (Aldershot,
England: Ashgate, 2006), 75-77.

165

Root, stated, Mr. Key agreed that this [new garden] would be very suitable for Gordon and
seemed quite prepared to keep Gordon in store until we are in a position to erect him there.42
After this decision was made, controversy over the statue seemed to abate, although the
Ministry did receive one other letter from another Gordon relative inquiring when the statue was
to be re-erected at its finally agreed upon new site. This letter, sent in December, 1951, after the
Attlee government fell and was replaced by one headed by Winston Churchill, was quite political
in nature. H.S. Blunt, Gordons great-nephew, wrote to the new Minister, David Eccles, about
the removal. The statue of my great uncle General Gordon of Khartoum was removed from
Trafalgar Square by the Late Labour Govt & has not in spite of many letters been put up again.
He continued by lambasting Key: it is possible that your predecessor had no knowledge of
history and did not know anything about General Gordon.43 Obviously, as the Key-Churchill
debate showed, this was not the case, nor was the decision specifically politically motivated.
Fittingly, when the statue was finally re-erected in October, 1953 (although it was not
unveiled until further work was completed in November), Churchill was still Prime Minister.44
Following the Second World War, and the collapse of the Churchill-led wartime coalition
government, Britain elected its first Labour Prime Minister, Clement Atlee. The postwar policies
of the Atlee government were radically different from those advocated by the pre-war
Conservatives; by the end of the 1940s, though, they were the standard template for postwar
Britain. To remain a viable political option, the Conservative Party needed to change its
perspective and embrace other political parties and their goals. Churchill spearheaded this
transformation, as was evidenced in the work done by his second government, which was elected
in 1951.45
Part of the reason why the Conservatives needed to change was because the process of
decolonization had begun. The Empire, which had been so important to the party in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was in the process of collapsing. Although the
Conservatives tried to stem the loss of territories, by the mid-1950s, following the Suez Crisis, its
demise was regarded as fait accompli. This is not to say that the Empire was dismantled quickly;
42

WORK 20/215, 7 October, 1948, letter to Root.

NA WORK 20/280 5 December, 1951 letter from H.S. Blunt.
44
WORK 20/280 AS 23 October 23, 1953, Draft press statement.
45
John Ramsden discusses the variety of ways that Churchill helped the party in the post war years in his section of
the Norman Gash, et al, edited The Conservatives. Norman Gash, et al, editors, The Conservatives: A History from
their Origins to 1965 (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1977), 432-433.
43

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the process of decolonization took decades, but after 1947, the Empire was never to be as strong
again. After the Second World War, Britains worldwide role was diminished; it no longer
retained the type of resources which were needed to maintain a large empire similar to the one it
had had in the nineteenth century.46
However, the strains on Britains empire were apparent even before the Second World
War. In 1936, Egypt and Britain signed a treaty with three major points: it officially ended the
British military occupation of Egypt; a British military presence in the Suez Canal zone was
approved for a twenty-year period; and, most importantly, Sudans status as a condominium of
the two countries was approved.47 A dual government would only function as long as Egypt and
Britain remained in concert regarding their goals for the region, a precondition which was
increasingly difficult to maintain in the years immediately following the war. The 1936 Treaty,
although challenged by Egypt, remained in effect until 1951.48
That year, the Egyptian government voted unilaterally to abrogate the 1936 AngloEgyptian Treaty. A year later, in July, 1952, a new faction took power in Egypt, and, following a
brief power struggle, Gamal Abd al-Nasser emerged as the new leader. Under Nasser, the
Egyptians and British worked out a new treaty which finally settled the question of Sudan. On
February 12, 1953, the two governments signed an agreement on the fate of the territory. The
agreements main provision covered how Sudan would reach its freedom. This would be
achieved through a three-stage process, as described by L.A. Fabunmi, consisting of countrywide elections for a Sudanese Parliament, the formation of a Sudanese Government, and a
Sudanese decision within three years, whether to join Egypt or remain independent.49 With this
new agreement, it was clear that the almost sixty years of joint rule over Sudan were coming to
an end, which was quickened by the approaching Suez Crisis that would effectively provide the

46

Bernard Porter, The Lions Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-2004, fourth edition (London:
Pearson Longman, 2004), 310-312. Porter specifically argues that although in hindsight the demise of the Empire
may be traced to the events of 1947 contemporary opinion was that the empire would continue, and survive the loss
of India. This belief was not challenged until the aftermath of the Suez Crisis in 1956.
47
For the full text of the 1936 treaty, see Appendix III in John Marlowe, A History of Modern Egypt and AngloEgyptian Relations 1800-1956 second edition (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1965), 444-447.
48
Marlowe, 335-343. There were discussions to change the terms of the treaty in 1946, but these talks were
ultimately unsuccessful.
49
L.A. Fabunmi, The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations: A Case Study in Power Politics (London: Longmans,
1960), 297. The text of the full agreement, Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Egyptian Government concerning Self-Government and Self-Determination for
the Sudan is included in appendix 7, pages 437-440.

167

death knell to Britains imperialist policies.50 The resolution of the crisis resulted in a diplomatic
victory for Egypt and a military failure for Britain. For the first time since the nineteenth century,
Britains imperialist gunboat diplomacy had failed.51
For Sudan, this failure meant an even faster journey towards independence. By the time
the crisis devolved into a state of almost open warfare, the territory had completed its three steps
towards its independence. The third of these steps, the vote to decide whether to rejoin Egypt or
to remain independent, occurred in August 1955. The Sudanese chose to remain independent and
so an independent Sudan was officially recognized, following a period of chaos which included a
brief rebellion in the South, on January 1, 1956. On this day, a new flag was flown over
Gordons old palace at Khartouma Sudanese flag.52 For the first time since 1898, the Union
Flag was nowhere to be seen.
The removal of the British flag from the palace at Khartoum was only one action in a
series undertaken by the Sudanese to remove the remnants of their occupiers. Some of these
steps had begun before the country officially gained its independence. In 1951, the University
College of Khartoum was formally established by combining the Gordon Memorial College with
the Kitchener School of Medicine.53 What this new entity was to be called occasioned much
debate. In 1950, the Principal of the college, L.C. Wilcher, wrote to the Inter-University Council
for Higher Education in the Colonies. In his letter, Wilcher explained the problems of finding a
suitable name for the new institution, explaining that the committee favored the more radical
50

In July, 1956, Nasser decided to nationalize the Suez Canal. Britain, which had long viewed free passage through
the canal as a privilege of its imperial Empire, was outraged by this action. The British (and French, as the project
was originally conceived as an Anglo-French exercise), threatened military intervention to ensure their continued
un-restricted, free use of the canal. In fact, the Anglo-French forces did prepare to go to war in the Suez, but United
Nations intervention and the threat of military action against the two countries prevented this from actually
occurring. The end result of the crisis was that Nasser was able to keep the canal nationalized and all British and
French property in the zone also became Egyptian. At the same time, all of this was occurring, an Israeli invasion
into the area was launched. Britain and France were aware that Israel intended to invade in the fall of 1956; their
actions were timed to the incursion. At the same time, the United Nations Security Council was working to keep
from having a large scale war in the region. For more information see Marlowe, 424-432.
51
Rami Ginat and Meir Noema, The Egyptian Jewel in the British Imperialist Crown: An Overview, in Zach
Levey and Elie Podeh, editors., Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to Junior Partner (Brighton,
England: Sussex Academic Press, 2008), 193-194.
52
Fabunmi, 352-378. For more details on the rebellion, including why it was begun and the question of British
participation in it, see Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudans Civil Wars second edition (Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 25-29.
53
NA British Council Records, BW 90/675 9 February, 1946, memo on Gordon Memorial College, Khartoum. Prior
to 1945, there were two separate technical schools that were both a part of the Gordon Memorial College. They were
joined in a new institution, the Gordon Memorial College discussed above in 1945. The actual process of combining
the institutions and their accreditation with the University of London is described in P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, A
History of the Sudan: From the coming of Islam to the present day fifth edition (London: Longman, 2000), 124.

168

University of Khartoum if the merger with the Kitchener School of Medicine takes place. If the
merger had not occurred, then the name that seemed to be favored was Gordon University
College (Khartoum), which would retain Gordons name. He closed his note with a brief remark
that all concerned are eager, although not perhaps to the same degree, to keep the name of
Gordon well in the picture, and much thought and discussion will be necessary before a final
decision can be reached.54 This sentiment is not surprising, given the opinions expressed in the
speeches that greeted the 1945 reorganization of the college. In these speeches, particularly the
one given by then-Governor-General of Sudan Major-General Sir Hubert Huddleston, the
connection of Gordon and Kitchener to the college was the main focus. Huddleston gave brief
descriptions of both men and their connection to Sudan. At the end of his section on Gordon, the
highest-ranking British official in Sudan summed up the reason why the college should continue
to bear Gordons name: By the irony of fate he died fighting the people whom he loved and
longed to save; and it is fitting that the College through which they may if God wills, achieve the
ends, which he desired for them, should be named in memory of him.55
In 1945, the sentiment expressed by Huddleston was still the norm regarding British
involvement in Sudan. Egypt had not yet achieved its independence, or even begun to renegotiate
the 1936 treaty, and Sudan appeared to be under its condominium government for the
foreseeable future. Six years later, the situation had changed, reflecting the undercurrent of
tension present in the territory. In 1951, Egypts official independence was only a year away, and
Sudans status as a condominium of two openly hostile governments was clearly coming to an
end. The change in Britains status in the region may have been reflected in the changed name of
the institution; yet, the new University did retain the name of Gordon for the rest of the
condominium, if in a lesser capacity.
Furthermore, an analysis of the stationery of the new institution demonstrates the
lessening importance of Gordons name. In 1951, the stationery still mentioned the name Gordon
Memorial College, although in a smaller font than the larger University College of Khartoum.
Over the next few years, as Egypt and Sudan each went through periods of chaos related to the
eventual separation from Britain, the name of Gordon was mentioned less frequently,

54

BW 90/696 16 February, 1950, Note from L.C. Wilcher, the quotation is from the third page.
SAD 673/7/45, Address by Huddleston in his role as Governor General and as the President of the Gordon
Memorial College Council. Found in the collections of Sir Christopher Cox.
55

169

permanently disappearing from the stationary in 1957.56 Yet the University College that grew
out of the one originally founded to honor Gordon was important to the Sudanese. Ironically,
several people instrumental in the discussions leading to Sudanese acceptance of the 1954
agreement between Britain and Egypt over its future were educated at the college, as were many
of the people who voted to remain independent in 1955. Those who advocated a union would
later be criticized by their countrymen as unionists who were subservient to the whims of the
Egyptian bourgeoisie, but at the time, their participation was necessary.57 Sudan did not want to
retain a British presence, but the country was willing to continue to use the infrastructure gained
from its seventy-year association with the British Empire.
As a condominium, Sudan was unique. It had never been considered a British colony; the
closest that it could be termed would be a protectorate. Its decisions upon reaching independence
would therefore, also be unique, as would its process toward that goal. The suppressed rebellion
in the south of the country sped up the timetable, creating a government that had to govern
before it was prepared to do so. As historian Douglas Johnson explained about the process, or
lack thereof, for Sudanese independence, The final paradox of Sudanese independence was that
it was thrust upon the Sudan by a colonial power eager to extricate itself from its residual
responsibilities. It was not achieved by national consensus expressed through constitutional
means, as the process proceeded in all of Britains other former territories.58 Thus, Sudan was,
in some ways, unprepared for the challenges of self-governance. Yet one of the first steps that a
new Sudanese government decided to take was to continue the process of removing references to
the old imperial regime begun with the change from the Gordon Memorial College to the
University College of Khartoum. The next major step would be the removal of the most tangible
reminder of Gordon: his statue.
Gordon was not the only prominent figure to have his statue removed from Sudan. The
statue of Lord Kitchener also suffered the same fate. By removing these statues, the newly
independent Sudanese wanted to assert their own heroes and history, not that of the British. The
56

The observed stationery can be found in multiple years worth of letters sent to the British Council and its ancillary
organizations. BW 90/691, the files of the Inter-University Council for Higher Education in the Colonies, 19491959; 90/692, also files for the council, spanning the same years.
57
Eve M. Troutt Powell discusses the nationalists who were educated at the college in A Different Shade of
Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and the mastery of the Sudan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003),
207. The role of these unionists as perceived by their countrymen is discussed in the final part of Mohammed Nuri
El-Almins three part study on the Sudanese communist movement. Mohammed Nuri El-Almin, The Sudanese
Communist Movement, the First Five Years-III, Middle Eastern Studies, volume 33, number 1 (Jan., 1997), 133.
58
Johnson, 29.

170

statues represented the men who together brought a long-lasting British occupation to the region
and ensured its longevity. However, the reasons why the statues were removed were much more
complex than just eliminating anything which invoked the British, or even with Sudanese
perceptions of Gordon.
The reason why the statues were removed was first and foremost political. The
government formed after independence was a nationalist one; removing the statues was an idea
that appealed to its sensibilities and constituents. However, before the statues were actually
veiled and pulled down from their plinths, Sudan went through a coup detat which eliminated
the parliamentary government and created a military one. This new military government
proclaimed a democratic republic with popular sovereignty, meaning that the government
would be closer to the Marxist view espoused in China.59 Under this new government, the idea of
honoring two foreign men who represented capitalist imperialism was even more of an anathema
than it had been to the previous one.
There was a great deal of consternation in London over the possibility of the statues
being shipped back to Britain; Sudan was not the only former territory to have imperial statues,
and there were fears, expressed in a letter to Mr. Cunliffe at the Ministry of Works, that if the
government accepted the statues from one former possession it would have to prepare to accept
a number, probably a large number, of statues of various historical, British personages, mainly
generals, governors, and monarchs (Queen Victoria is a favourite), [from] countries now selfgoverning but formerly part of the Empire. The letter continued by admitting, in a relieved tone,
that only two statues have ever been returned to Britain, and both of these statues were returned
by the Sudanese. 60
Therefore, Sudan was unique in this decision to try to eliminate the physical remains of
seventy years of British influence and involvement in its country. Most other former members of
the Empire chose to incorporate this history into their own, creating a situation similar to the one
that has been described by Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities. In his chapter,
Census, Map, Museum, Anderson discussed the tendency of what he termed, postindependence states, to exhibit marked continuities with their colonial predecessors to
embrace the colonial relics left behind. These relics would, in turn, become a part of their new

59
60

For more on the two governments and the bloodless coup, see Holt and Daly, 145-150.
NA WORK 20/259, A.S. 23, 12 November 1959 Letter to Mr. Cunliffe.

171

national consciousness which was in the process of being created.61 It could be argued that the
statues themselves may have been re-imagined as well. As Kirk Savages assessment of civil war
monuments demonstrates, the aims of monuments and memorials were fluid; they could be
manipulated to suit a particular time period, or even the needs of a government. For example, in
Savages discussion, the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C. was transformed from a
nineteenth-century idea of a memorial honoring a founder of a new era in American history
dedicated to the specific principle of racial equality to a twentieth-century reality that sidestep[ped] the question of what he stood for and was designed as a civic beautification project.62
If Lincolns memory could be adjusted to suit the time frame, then it followed, so could that of
Gordon.
Eliminating the statues also had ramifications for the future. It deprived future
generations of Sudanese of the ability, as historian John Crowley argued regarding formerly
overlooked memorials, to look at aspects of the past which have literally been buried or indeed
obfuscated by time.63 Gordons role in Sudanese history is not one which can simply be omitted
from any official history, nor can the memory of Gordon be forgotten, even without a statue to
remind people about his achievements. Instead, the decision to remove the statues caused the
opposite to happen, and a great deal of attention was paid to Gordon, who had been relegated to a
lesser status.
This lessened importance is also reflected in Sudanese historian Ibrahim Muhammad Ali
Abbas history of the slave trade in Sudan. In his work, he asserted that no British official,
Gordon included, really had any impact on the slave trade. Instead, he argued, their role has been
exaggerated and the [goal of his] study is an essential corrective of this exaggeration. Although
Abbas believed that Gordon did deserve some credit for his actions regarding slavery in Sudan,
it is to the credit of Gordon that he showed a fair understanding of the varied aspects of the
slave question; his main conclusion regarding Gordon was that his attituderemained
essentially negative towards Sudan and the possibility of solving its slave trade problem.64
61

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised edition
(London: Verso, 1991), 183.
62
Savage, The Politics of Memory: Black Emancipation and the Civil War Monument in Gillis, ed., 138-140.
63
John Crowley, Constructing Famine Memory: The Role of Monuments in Naimh Moore and Yvonne Whelan,
editors, Heritage, Memory and the Politics of Identity: New Perspectives on the Cultural Landscape (Aldershot,
England: Ashgate, 2007), 57.
64
Ibrahim Muhammad Ali Abbas, The British, the Slave Trade and Slavery in the Sudan, 1820-1881 (Khartoum:
Khartoum University Press, 1972). The first quote is from the preface, the others are from page 88.

172

This Sudanese ambivalence towards Gordon was confirmed in a letter sent by the British
Ambassador in Khartoum, Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews, to J.H.A. Watson at the African
Department in the Foreign Office. This letter laid out the entire situation concerning the statues
as it appeared at the beginning of January, 1957. Chapman-Andrews specifically referenced that
outside the newspapers, there has been no agitation whatever for the removal of these two
statues, and that the statues had been ignored during the nationalist demonstrations which had
occurred the previous November. Thus, he explained in the confidential letter, there did not
appear to be a large amount of public support for sending the statues back to London, and he
believed, as he had been informed by the Sudanese Minister of Finance in January, 1957, that the
entire solution would be solved by moving the statues to a soon to be built historical museum.65
In early 1957, it appeared that Sudan would follow the pattern laid out by Anderson as discussed
above. Yet the success of coup and the resulting change of government reinforced the pressure
for the statues to be returned.
The new situation in Sudan was enumerated in a letter sent by Sir Chapman-Andrews to
J.S. Okey at Barclays Bank in Khartoum at the end of 1958. In the letter, Chapman-Andrews
referenced a plan which had been raised in Sudan by the remaining British population to move
Gordons statue to the grounds of the cathedral at Khartoum as opposed to the now-defunct idea
of building a museum.66 His response to the idea elucidates one of the problems that the statues
posed regarding Sudanese attitudes towards the British. After defending colonialism (as he
referred to the time under the condominium) as the best, most benevolent and most just system
of Government these territories have ever seen or perhaps one ever likely to see, ChapmanAndrews continued by explaining how this new generation regarded these statues as the
symbols of colonialism, of government by foreigners, of government imposed originally by
force of arms, of an inferior status from which their country has now emerged.67 Clearly, as the
letter sent to Okey demonstrates, there had been a radical change in attitude towards the British
over this two year time span. Yet despite this more negative view of the British in 1957,

65

NA Foreign Office (FO) 371/126017 Confidential 1851/ST, 15 January 1957 letter from Sir Edwin ChapmanAndrews to J.H.A. Watson.
66
With the new Marxist government, this project lost official support.
67
NA FO 371/131754 JS 1851/3 4 December 1958 Letter from Chapman-Andrews to J.S. Okey.

173

correspondents did not fear for the statues; in Sudan statues were left alone and not blown up like
the one of Ferdinand de Lesseps, the chief promoter of the Suez Canal, in Egypt.68
Even in 1957, under the more moderate parliamentary government, there were concerns
in Britain as to how the removal of the statues would be perceived both at home and in the
remains of its empire. The uproar over the removal of Gordons statue from Trafalgar Square a
decade earlier gave some hint of the controversy that might ensue in the metropole. In addition to
this sentiment, there were also fears that a returned statue would be perceived in Egypt and the
Middle East as another sign of Britains weaknesses as had been exposed in the Suez crisis two
years previously. In an unsent, canceled draft of a letter, Colonial Secretary H.F. T. Smith
worried about the statues return, writing there is a danger that the removal of these statues to
London would be exploited by Egyptian propaganda as symbolizing a further loss of British
influence in the area.69 His sentiments were echoed in a letter sent at the same time by Watson,
at the Foreign Office to Chapman-Andrews. In the letter, Watson expanded the Colonial
Secretarys ideas from the canceled draft: it seems to me that the story that the British were
being obliged to evacuate their statues from the Sudan would almost certainly be seized upon by
our enemies in the Middle East and elsewhere.70 The solution to this problem was for the
statues to remain in Sudan. In a subsequent letter to Chapman-Andrews from one of Watsons
colleagues, I.W. Bell, the African Department indicated as much: although it would be
distressing if anything happened to them and would lead to hot feelings here [in London].71
These hot feelings would not be confined to London. When the British population in
Sudan found out in January, 1957, of the decision to remove the statues, Bells anticipated
outrage was apparent. In early January, The Morning News ran two passionate letters to the

68

Confidential 1851/ST 15 January 1957. Chapman-Andrews devotes a great deal of attention to the news article on
the de Lesseps statue that was published in The Sphere on 5 January, 1957. The article A sacrifice to Nasser
consisted of a page of photographs showing the dynamiting of the statue, and concludes with what ChapmanAndrews has deemed a pearl of political writing. The editors wrote, in 1957, the following: The downfall of de
Lesseps was paralleled by somewhat smaller manifestations of nationalism in the Sudan, where the statues of
Kitchener and General Gordon have been removed. The symbolism of the de Lesseps statue in Egypt before its
dynamiting has some parallels with the Gordon case. For more on the statue and its role in how Egyptians perceived
themselves see Wali S. Hassan, Arab-American Autobiography and the Reinvention of Identity: Two Egyptian
Negotiations Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics, number 22, The Language of the Self: Autobiographies and
Testimonies (2002): 13-14.
69
FO 371/126017 Confidential draft of 9 January 1957, canceled 28 January, 1957.
70
FO 371/12601 JS 1851/1 5 January, 1957, letter from J.H.A. Watson to Chapman-Andrews.
71
Ibid., 29 January 1957 Confidential letter from I.W. Bell to Chapman Andrews.

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editor on the subject.72 The first, from B. Callard, allowed that it is not the writers decision as to
whether the statues should be removed from Sudan, a decision which should be made by the
Sudanese alone. Yet, he continued, the statues themselves were irreplaceable historical
monuments and therefore should not be destroyed. Instead, the author suggested that the
solution may be to keep the statues but include them in a larger monument allowing them to be
placed in their own historical context.73 The next letter, which came from J. Surer, agreed with
the idea of keeping the statues for their historical merit, but also included an argument drawn
from Britains own past. Mr. Surer referenced the fact that there were still Roman statues in the
United Kingdom dating from its occupation of the country; if Britain could accept its former
occupiers, why was it impossible for the Sudanese to do the same? His argument was quite basic,
Why is it that the Britons have not removed them after their Independence? Because they want
to remember the history of the past not only in books but in statues. The letter concluded with
the simple statement: Sudan can progress, I am sure, without removing the two statues.74
These two correspondents demonstrate the importance of the statues to preserving the
memory of a particular time in Sudanese history. As Matt Matsuda demonstrated in The Memory
of the Modern, these statues could be used to help in understanding the past and in creating a
lasting memory of it. As he argued, no history can be a pure event, pure evolution; each is
rather a repetition, a return to a story which must be retold, distinguished from its previous
tellings. The past is not a truth upon which to build, but a truth sought, a re-memorializing over
which to struggle.75 Without the statues, there would be little in Sudan to trigger the memory to
tell the storythus leading to its eventually being forgotten.
Unfortunately for Callard and Surer, their 1957 letters did not change any government
policy. The statues were to be sent back to Britain. When the news that Gordon and Kitchener
were to be returned first reached London, it was reported in a brief note in the Times. The note
simply stated that the two statues were to be returned and that there are no detailed plans yet for
the future disposal of the statues.76 The day before the article about the statues fate appeared in

72

The Morning News was a daily newspaper printed in Khartoum for the English-speaking population. This copy of
the paper is from the large collection of newspaper clippings amassed by Geoffrey Barter at SAD 425/4/83.
73
B. Callard, Letters to the Editor: Gordon and Kitchener, Morning News (Sudan) 12 January, 1957.
74
J. Surer, Letters to the Editor: Gordon and Kitchener, Morning News (Sudan) 12 January 1957.
75
Matt K. Matsuda, The Memory of the Modern (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 15.
76
Gordon and Kitchener to Return Home, Times (London), 15 December 1958. Only a week earlier, another
article appeared in the paper concerning the re-naming of streets formerly honoring the two men. Gordon Street

175

the newspaper, a longer article about the removal of the statues from their plinths in Khartoum
ran. The article was from a correspondent in Khartoum who was present when the statues were
veiled. In the article, the ceremony that accompanied the veiling was described: The guard of
honour presented arms, a military band played God Save the Queen; and then, as Retreat was
sounded, engineers slowly lowered a tent-like covering over the statuethe reverse of the
unveiling performed by Sir Reginald Wingate 54 years ago. Once the statue was veiled, the
Reveille was sounded, followed by the Sudanese national anthem, ending the ceremony.77 The
ceremony described above is quite interesting. It not only acknowledges that Gordon still
occupied an important role in Sudan, but also that this new Sudanese Marxist government
understood that the removal of the statue was, in some ways, more symbolic than the lowering of
the Union Flag two years earlier.
Published in Khartoum on the same day, the Morning News featured the veiling of the
statues, running two articles on the ceremony. The first article was a factual one, containing
details similar to the one referenced above. The second article was an opinion piece. At the very
end, after relating a brief summary of the reasons why the statues had been erected in Khartoum,
the editors concluded with what the best case scenario of the removal could possibly entail: the
removal of the statues should be an expression of the Sudans genuine desire to start a new leaf
in its history, and of its will to treat others on equal footing. Let us hope for the best.78 The first
step in achieving this new history envisioned by the editors of the Morning Post was the return
of the statues. Unfortunately, this return would not happen for another year.
Part of the reason why the statues return was delayed was because when they were first
pulled down, it was unclear where in Britain they were eventually going to be re-erected. The
solution to the Kitchener statue was easily found. His statue was eventually re-erected at the
Royal Engineers Barracks at Chatham. Gordons statue was more of a challenge; there already

became University Street and Kitchener Street was re-named Nile Street. The earlier article also mentioned the fact
that the statues would be removed. Marxists Detained in Sudan, Times (London), 29 November 1958.
77
Kitchener and Gordon Statues Shrouded: Plans for Removal in Darkness, Times (London) 12 December, 1958.
The parallel between the two ceremonies was intentional; the new government was in effect manipulating a very
British (or even European) custom of raising a statue to a fallen hero and transforming it into a new, Sudanese (or
African) idea of removing it. As such, it fit the description of manipulating of invented customs described in
Terrence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa in Ranger and Eric Hobsbawm, editors, The
Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 252-254.
78
Statues of General Gordon and Lord Kitchener Removed: A big crowd to see them veiled before removal, and
Morning View: Good-will, Morning News (Sudan), 12 December 1958. These articles are also found in the Barter
collection, SAD 425/4/99.

176

was a Gordon statue at Chatham, so it could not be sent there. Thus, determining where it would
be sent involved a variety of governmental offices and private institutions. Just as with the earlier
conflicts over where to move the Gordon statue formerly in Trafalgar Square, there was a lack of
consensus over where the statue should be sent, especially because no branch of government
wanted to pay for the statues to return home.79 Happily, a solution for the problem was quickly
reached when the Gordon Boys School offered to pay for all costs of transportation once the
statue was back in the country and for its re-erection on the schools grounds. This suggestion
was approved in a joint meeting between the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Works in
January, 1959, two years after it was decided in Sudan to remove the statues.80 The statue arrived
at the Gordon Boys School in April 1959. A little more than a year later, the School welcomed
people to a ceremony celebrating the unveiling of the statue on its new plinth on the schools
grounds.81 The ceremony was well attended, with over 1500 people present. A speech was given
by Lord Rugby, the senior surviving governor-general of Sudan, and the statue was unveiled by
Lady Huddleston, who also presented the plinth in memory of her late husband, Major-General
Sir Hubert J. Huddleston, Governor-General of Sudan from 1940 to 1947.82 For the school, this
was a momentous event. For Britain at large, it was not considered to be very important; even in
the Times, the unveiling of the statue did not rate an article; the paper only ran a photograph of it
on its back pages.83
With the removal of his statue and the re-naming of his school, all physical traces of
Gordon were removed from Sudan.84 In Sudan, Gordons statue and college needed to be
removed and renamed, respectively, to help facilitate the countrys continued move towards
asserting its own, newly granted, independence. Therefore, in Sudan, the story of Gordon ended
79

The War Office, Ministry of Works and the Foreign Office all disagreed about who was to be responsible for the
statue. The correspondence between various officials can be found in the National Archives. NA FO 371/131754 JS
1851/5 and 6. Eventually, the treasury agreed to incur the costs of transporting the statues, NA WORK 20/259 AS
23 Note for Under-Secretary Mr. Root.
80
NA FO 371/138710 JS 1851/9 Record of a Meeting at the Ministry of Works, 13 January, 1959, where it was
decided that the statue will go to the GBS. Representatives from Works, the Foreign Office, Treasury and the War
Office were all present.
81
Letter and press release announcing The unveiling of the Gordon Statue, sent to alumni and supporters of the
Gordon Boys School, April, 1960 found in the collection of M.S. Lush in SAD 874/45
82
From a story told by the Gordon Schools librarian to Tim Dodds, a councilor on the Surrey Heath Borough
Council, related on his blog, Lightwater. The story, Friday Fact No.4: Statue of General Gordon can be accessed
at http://lightwater.wordpress.com/2009/04/24/friday-fact-no4/, accessed on December 16, 2009.
83
Times (London) May 14, 1960, p. 14
84
The one exception was the Gordon chapel inside Khartoum Cathedral. The Cathedral was the property of the
Church of England, and, as private property, the new Sudanese government did not have any authority over it.

177

in 1960 with the return of his statue. Without the continued British governmental presence in
Sudan, as had existed under the condominium, he was relegated to a much more insignificant
role in the country, as one among many rulers who strove to improve the country, including the
man cast by the British into the role of his foe, the Mahdi.
In Britain, the situation was different. Gordons death and memory in his home country
were still celebrated, but his significance directly correlated with the needs of the country. The
Britain which existed in 1960 resulted from the radical changes of the late 1940s. As such, the
ceremony which honored Gordon as the Khartoum statue was re-erected was almost
anachronistic. The Gordon School, the modern descendant of the Gordon Boys Home, no longer
had charitable connotations. In 1944, the Education Act introduced free and universal secondary
education to Britain for all children until the age of 15.85 In essence, the act invalidated the
original purpose of the School. In 1960s Britain, with the Education Act and the NHS, charitable
organizations like the Home were no longer needednor was Gordon, the imperial hero.
What mattered, though, was Gordons memory. In Britain, his name was still important.
Unlike in Sudan, where his college had been renamed, at home, the generals name remained on
the school. Even if it no longer had the same purpose, the school still remained a tangible
reminder of Gordon as the 1960 ceremony reiterated. Yet, this ceremony honoring Gordon as a
national hero, in front of an audience composed of members of the aristocracy and the elite,
would have been anathema to the Sudanese who strove to eliminate Gordon from their country.
Nevertheless, both countries were changed by the presence of General Gordon, but by 1960 the
time for imperial heroes had passed. In a sense, General Charles Gordons life had come full
circle. He had been a figure of controversy in life and in death; his memorials also suffered the
same fate. Britains once proud imperial symbol had completed its metamorphosis into
something much less: a relic of a lost empire.

85

For more on the act, including the political maneuvering that led to its passing, see Michael Barber, Power and
Control in Education 1944-2004 British Journal of Educational Studies, volume 42, number 4 (Dec., 1994): 352353.

178

APPENDIX A
THE GORDON STATUE

Figure A.1: Contemporary Photograph of the Gordon Statue,

Victoria Embankment Gardens

179

APPENDIX B
THE GORDON STATUEWREATHS

Figure A.2: Annual wreaths on the Gordon pedestal, January 2008

Figure A.3: Wreath from the Gordon Foundation, Gordon School (left) and Old
Gordonians (right)

180

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Stephanie Laffer received her undergraduate degree from The George Washington University in
Political Science and History in August 2002. In 2005, she wrote her Masters Thesis on the
British in Afghanistan and the growth of Liberal Imperialism at Florida State University as a part
of her MA degree, which she received in May 2005. This project grew out of an attempt to better
understand the concept. She will receive her PhD in May 2010, ending her graduate career at
FSU.

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