Educ. Phil.

& Theory

Is Relativism Self-Refuting ?
JOHN WECKERT

Melbourne College of Advanced Education

I: Introduction
In recent issues of this journal, a number of articles have been addressed, in whole or
in part, to the question of whether or not relativism is self-refuting.l This paper is a
further contribution to the same debate.
I do not distinguish between conceptual relativism and cognitive or epistemological
relativism. By epistemological relativism, I do not mean what Field does. He writes:
I understand [epistemological relativism] as the doctrine that the basic
epistemological properties are not such properties as that of belief B being
justified, but rather such properties as that of belief B being justified relative to
evidential system E2
This is certainly a legitimate variety of relativism, but it is not the one which concerns me
here. Epistemological relativism is being taken as the doctrine that knowledge is relative
to something or other, and it is assumed that what is known is true. The arguments to be
examined which attack epistemological relativism interpreted thus, are also arguments
against conceptual relativism.
Only a thoroughgoing relativism of course is normally charged with being self-refuting.
A relativist then, can always avoid the charge by opting for a more moderate position.
Instead of asserting that all truth is relative, he might just claim that most is. Even a
thoroughgoing relativism, however, is not self-refuting, or so I will argue. Just as a sceptic
so a relativist can accept
can embrace scepticism with respect to his belief in s~epticism,~
that the statement of relativism itself is relative. Whatever other problems a conceptual
relativist may encounter, self-refutation is not one of them.
Arguments to the effect that relativism is self-refuting take a variety of forms, a
number of which are discussed by Husserl and Trigg. Some of these have been adequately
answered by Meiland, and so will not concern us here? What will be of concern are
several other versions of the argument, and an argument which Meiland considered but
does not develop enough.
11: Mandelbaum

According to Mandelbaum
an acceptance of relativism in the theory of knowledge frequently - and perhaps
always - involves a prior commitment to non-relativistic interpretations of at
least some judgments concerning matters of fact.5

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JOHN WECKERT

He is saying, that is, that if relativism is true, then there are some things which are not
relative, and he has two arguments designed to show this. (Two that is, with respect to
conceptual relativism: there are others concerning other forms of relativism.) The first
deals with Whorf. Whorfian conceptual relativism, he contends
holds that the influence of language on thought is so pervasive and so compelling
that, insofar as it is a question of truth or falsity, one cannot legitimately compare
statements made in one language with those made in another: the truth of each
must be assessed within the framework provided by the conceptual system
implicit in the structure of the language used.6
The argument is that if this Whorfian relativism were true, neither Whorf nor anyone else,
could describe, in English, the languages which they do. They can do this because there
are some non-relativistic facts, and so this all-embracing relativism must be false. Acceptance of it depends on acceptance of something being objectively or absolutely true.
Mandelbaum continues :
[Whorfl initially had to assume that the same objects and activities were being
referred to in both languages. Therefore, it cannot be the case that how the world
appears to those who speak a particular language is in all respects determined by
the language they speak. . . languages presuppose a world of extra-linguistic
objects to which the speakers of a language refer. Since, however, it is possible to
refer to the same aspects of this world when using radically different languages . . .
it cannot be maintained that those whose thought is expressed in different
languages do not share a common world.7
There are two points here which suggest that relativism involves a reductio. One is
that there is a world of extra-linguistic objects, and this, presumably, is an objective fact,
and the other is that speakers of different languages share a common world. With respect
to the second, it does not follow that if languages L1 and L2 share a common world,
what they share is aany way objective or absolute. What they share might not be what L 1
shares with L3, or what L2 shares with L3. Any two languages may share something, but
no two need share the same. Whorf could say his account of the Apache or Nootka, or
whatever, is relative to his language, that is, English, and its conceptual scheme. A linguist
from a different background would give a different account.
The other point is more worrying for the relativist, but he can meet it. He might say
that relative to our scheme, languages presuppose something extra-linguistic, but that this
is not necessarily the case relative to all schemes. Perhaps we cannot understand what a
language which did not would be like, but it does not follow that no-one can.
These replies to Mandelbaum may raise problems of their own, but they show that
Whorf is not committed to any non-relativist facts, not at this level anyway. These
criticisms then, as they are, fail.
Mandelbaums second argument is an attack on what he sees as relativism in Kuhnsview
of science. This requires little comment here, partly because it is an attempt to show inconsistencies in Kuhns account in particular, and a conceptual relativist could always deny that
Kuhn gives an adequate one, but more importantly because, as Mandelbaumacknowledges:
. . .his [Kuhns] thesis is less all-embracing than was Whorf s, for he confined his
attention to what occurs within science, thus excluding any discussion of the
more general world-pictures.8

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Is Relativism Self-Refuting?

Our concem is with the more all-embracing. It might be that all scientific theories
share something, but wh.at they share may still be relative to some conceptual scheme,
or to several closely related ones. So again, even if Mandelbaums criticism, of Kuhn are
successful, more than this is required to show that conceptual relativism presupposes
some non-relativistic truths.
111: All truth is relative
We turn now to the more specific claim that
T: All truth is relative,
or some variation like No truth is absolute, is self-refuting. It is self-refuting, it is claimed,
because T itself is absolutely or objectively true if T is true at all. Mackie states the
argument this way:
Since anything that simply is the case is an absolute and not merely relative
truth . . . There are no absolute truths is absolutely self-ref~ting.~
According to this, if it is simply the case that there are no absolute truths, then it is an
absolute truth that there are no absolute truths.
This argument, as it stands, does nothing to show that T is indeed self-refuting. All it
shows is that if whatever is the case is absolutely true, then T is self-refuting, and this is
of course question begging, because it relies on the very notion, that of absolute truth,
which the defender of T will reject.

A slightly different version of the argument comes from Trigg:

If someone declares that truth is not objective, but only relative to societies,
he may very well claim there is no such thing as objective truth or truth is
relative to societies. Both assertions, however, clearly purport to be objectively
true, and are intended as truths about all societies. . . . He [the relativist] thus has
to accept that sentences which state his thesisare apparently inconsistent with it.lo
The idea here, is that if T is about all truth in all societies, T must be absolutely true (or
false). If it is true absolutely, it is false, because one truth is not relative, viz. T itself.

This argument is spelt out in more detail by Siegel. R is his version of T, (R is an

epistemological, rather than a logical or metaphysical claim, but the issue is the same. The
differences are, for our purposes, irrelevant.)
(R) For any knowledge-claim p, p can be evaluated (assessed,established, etc.) oniy
according to. . , a set of background principles and standards of evaluation S1. . .
S,; and, given a different set (or sets) of background principles and standards S1
. . S,. there is no neutral. . . way of choosing between the two. . . alternative sets
in evaluating p.11
I am assuming here that truth relative to a set of background principles and standards
of evaluation is just truth relative to a conceptual scheme. This is reasonable given that
conceptual schemes contain these principles and standards.
The problem arises now, so Siegel believes, if R itself is substituted for p:
( R ) . . .Rcan be evaluated. . .only according to. . . a set of background principles
and standards of evaluation S1 . . S,;and, given a different set. . . of background
principles and standards of evaluation S1. . .S.,
there is no neutral. . .way of
choosing between the two. . . alternative sets in evaluating R.

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JOHN WECKERT

He continues:
If R is true, then, as R states, R is itself relative to alternative, and equally
legitimate, sets of background principles and standards of evaluation. Since these
alternative sets will suggest differing evaluations of R, and since there is no way
to neutrally pick one evaluation over and against any others, it follows that, if R
is true, then R s truth unll vary according to the principles and criteria by which R
is evaluated. In particular, it follows that, if according to some set of standards
S1 . .Sn R is judged false. . , , then, if R is true (at least according to that set of
standards S1. .Sn), R is false.13
The details of this argument are not altogether clear, and there seem to be two possible
interpretations. One is that if R is true, it is true only relative to one set of standards, and
therefore not true. The other interpretation is that if R is relatively true, it is not true
relative to all standards, and so in an absolute sense, is false. Again if R is true it is false.
Doppelt replies to this argument, which is a criticism of an earlier paper of his own.
He writes:
. . Siege1 claims that Kuhnian relativism as I present it is vulnerable to a reductio
argument. The essence of the reductio is that Kuhn's relativism concerning
standards of theoretical adequacy in science undermines the very methodological
standards its own plausibility as a theory presupposes. But this argument misconstrues Kuhnian relativism as applying a prion and across the board to all
standards and forms of evaluation whatsoever . . . Based, as it is, on a study of the
standards implicit in scientific debate, it is illicit to abstract the form of Kuhn's
argument and apply it willy nilly to-philosophical standards and arguments as
well.14
The defence is that Kuhnian relativism is limited to scientific truths, not to all truths.
If T is replaced by:
T'. All scientific truth is relative,
and if T' itself is not a scientific truth, then Doppelt is right, there is no reducfio. T' is
not self-refuting. But self-refutation is avoided at some cost. Relativism on this account is
much weakened. The problem also arises of why it does not apply to all truth. I will not
pursue this line of argument further, because, as was mentioned earlier, my argument is
that the stronger version of relativism is not self-refuting.
Doppelt does appear to be reluctant to take this way out, and continues:
On the other hand, if Siegel thinks that there are some plausible standards of
philosophical argument implicit in its historical or contemporary practice which
makes relativism less plausible than its alternative(s), let him produce these
standards.. .15
But produce these standards is something that Siegel does not have to do to show that
relativism has a problem. Pointing out the incoherence is enough.
Doppelt concludes:
Relativism may well turn out to be inferior to some alternative hilosophical
system, but it cannot be dismissed by the facile route of a reductio.I t
A reductio hardly constitutes a facile route. If conceptual relativism is self-refuting, it
ought to be rejected. But the relativist need not concede defeat just yet.

Is Relativism Self-Refuting?

33

It has been argued that T must be true absolutely if true at all, and if so, T is selfrefuting. But why, if true, must it be absolutely true? If the relativist denies that there is
any absolute truth, he must maintain that T itself is relatively true, and as Meiland points
out, saying that relativism is only relatively true does not produce inconsistency.17
To see this more clearly, we will make use of an undeveloped idea of Meilands - that
absolute truth is a two-term relation between a statement and a state of affairs, and a
relative truth is a three-term relation between a statement, a state of affairs, and a conceptual scheme.18 (This is slightly different from his formulation, but the difference is
insignificant.) Call relative truth, truth3, absolute truth, truthz, and truth in general,
where the matter is undecided, truthl. If T, All truthl is relative, is true2, then T is
false2, in which case it is self-refuting. But if we accept Meilands suggestion that T
should be taken as relatively true, then no inconsistency is generated. We can say either
that if T is true3, it is not true3, or if it is true3, it is not true2. In the latter case two
different concepts of truth are at work so there is no contradiction. In the former, there
is no contradiction in saying that T is true relative to one scheme and false relative to a
different one. On this view it cannot be said, as Mackie says, that if something is the case
it is absolutely true. It is rather only the case relative to some scheme. And objectivity
need not be presupposed by any statement which purports to make a cognitive claim. All
that is presupposed is a relationship between the statement, some state of affairs, and
some conceptual scheme.

IV: T as a relative truth

So relativism is saved for a moment longer from self-refutation, but I want to examine
more carefully now what is involved in the claim that relativism, that is T, is itself
relatively true.
IV: 1: Can T be relatively true?
Suppose that T is true relative to some conceptual scheme S1. Then T must be true
relative to every possible scheme, or there is some possible S relative to which T is not
true. Assume that the former is correct. But if T is true relative to every scheme, it
becomes unclear in what sense T is only relatively true. The three term relation, true3, has
one free-wheeling member, which can be dropped with no loss, and so becomes true2 . A
truth which is true relative to every scheme is surely just an absolute truth. The velocity
of light is constant relative to every frame of reference, so we are commonly told, so we
say that it is one thing the velocity of which is not relative. It is certainly not relative in
the sense that the speed of a person walking down the aisle of an aeroplane is relative, say
four kilometers per hour relative to the plane and 804 kilometers per hour relative to the
ground. So truth gS relative to every framework or scheme is nothing other than truth
which is not relative, but which is absolute. (More will be said about this shortly.)
How does the relativist fare if the other disjunct is accepted? Now it is the case that T
is true relative to S1, but not true relative to some other scheme, S2. There are again two
alternatives. Either T is false relative to S2, or T is neither true nor false relative to S2. If
T is false relative to S2, then relative to S2 some truths are absolute. Put another way,
some truths are absolute relative to S2. That is, if T is false relative to S2, then some
sentence p is absolutely true is true relative to S2. But what is the force of absolute
here? It seems that it has little, if any. We might say of the person walking down the aisle

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of the aeroplane that it is absolutely true that he or she is moving at the speed of four
kilometers per hour relative to the plane and 804 kilometers per hour relative to the
ground. But absolute seems to do little work here, except perhaps as emphasis, and that
is of no help. It appears then that truth which is absolute relative to some scheme, is
just truth relative to that scheme. If this is so, then there is no sense in saying that if T is
true only relative to S, it is false relative to S. If it is true relative to S, it is true relative
to any scheme, and so is true absolutely. And if it is absolutely true, it is of course selfrefuting.
However this argument against the relativist fails. It fails because it depends on the
identification of truth which is absolute relative to some scheme, with truth which is
relative to that scheme, that is, the following is assumed to hold:
p is absolutely true relative to S = p is true relative to S.
The relativist can deny this identification. If p is absolutely true relative to S2, then
relative to s2 p is true relative to every S. This is different from saying that p is true
relative to S2, which claims only that p is true relative to S2. Put another way, saying that
consistent with the other truths of S2, p is true relative to every S, is different from
saying that p is true is consistent with those truths. They might both be consistent with
the other truths of S2, but they certainly need not be. So despite appearances, absolute
does have a job to do in p is absolutely true relative to S2) and so cannot be dropped.
The other case is that where T is neither true nor false relative to S2. Here truth is
neither relative nor non-relative. This must be so, because if truth were relative in S2 then
in S2, T would be true, and if all truths were not relative, T would be false. Therefore, if
all truth is either relative or not relative, and if S2 truth is neither relative nor non-relative,
there is no truth relative to S2. That is, in S2 either All truth is relative is meaningless, or
it has a different meaning from what it has in S1. This does not necessarily pose any
problem for relativism. If T is true relative to some scheme, false relative to another, and
neither true nor false relative to a third, T is not incoherent if interpreted as being
relatively true. However, if in all schemes T is either true or neither true nor false, then
there is at least the appearance of a difficulty. It is not clear in what sense the T which is
true in S1 is the same T as that which is neither true nor false in S2. If T1 is the T in S1,
and T2 the one in S2 then T1 is true relative to S1 and T2 is neither true nor false relative
to S2. But now T1 is true relative to all schemes in which it occurs, and so could be
argued to be true absolutely. However it can also be argued that since T is not true
relative to all schemes it is reasonable to call it only relatively true. We will return to this
issue later, and for the moment give T the benefit of the doubt.

IV: 2: Triss objection

So far we have been able to save T from the self-refutation charge, but perhaps this
has been done at some considerable cost. Consider this objection to relativism raised by
Trigg, part of which was quoted earlier:
If someone declares that truth is not objective but only relative to societies, he
may very well claim there is no such thing as objective truth , or truth is relative to societies. Both assertions, however, clearly purport to be objectively true,
and are intended as truths about all societies. There would not be much point in
the relativist uttering them if he did not wish to convince someone else of them.
He thus has to accept that sentences which state his thesis are apparently inconsistent with it. He can always claim that the truth of his words is only relative to

Is Relativism Self-Refuting?

35

his own society, but as their whole point is to describe other societies as well, this
just serves to emphasise the incoherence in the position.l9
Triggs basic argument here seems to be that unless there are absolute or objective truths,
it is not possible to convince anyone of anything, and it is not possible to make any
general claims. The second of these need not concern the relativist too much. He can still
describe other societies from his own point of view, and make general claims which are
true relative to his own scheme. No careful relativist would of course want to do more
than that. The former claim of Triggs, that it is not possible to convince anyone of anything if relativism is true, is discussed by Meiland. Meiland distinguishes three strands in
this Trigg-type objection:
(1)
There is no possibility of a non-relativist accepting relativism.
(2)
The non-relativist can have no reason - can have no rational basis - for accepting
relativism.
(3)
The relativist can have no motive in uttering the doctrine of relativism, particularly in uttering it to the non-relativist.20
(1) is clearly false. One may change ones mind simply as a result of conversion. There is
nothing to stop the relativist from trying to convert the non-relativist. Against (2) it can
be argued that relativism does not necessarily rule out all rational discussion and
argument. Two people who share, or for the sake of the argument assume, the same presuppositions, may argue rationally, while admitting that their arguments are relative to
those presuppositions, which in turn are acknowledged to be true relative to some scheme
or schemes. The relativist may be able to show a non-relativist that on the basis of the
non-relativists own presuppositions he is logically committed to relativism. So relativism
does not rule out all rational arguments, and there may be rational grounds for a nonrelativist to become a relativist.
The third strand discussed by Meiland can easily be refuted. The relativist can surely
have motives for expressing relativist views. He may just feel like it, in the same way that
someone may feel like expressing something in poetry or on the piano.

IV: 3 : Passmores objection

Triggs objection, stated baldly as it is, does not show that a relativist can have no
motives for expressing T and saying that it is only relatively true. However, the germs of a
problem lie in Meilands reply to (2). This will be approached via Passmores discussion of
one of Socrates attempts to show that Protagoras Man is the measure of all things, is
self-refuting. The crux of the problem, Passmore says, is this:
Protagoras is . . . asserting that p is true for x and p is not true for y; these
propositions he is taking to be true. It has to be true not only for x but for everybody that p is true for x since this is exactly what is involved in asserting that
man is the measure of all things.21
If p is true for x is true for everybody, then p is true for x is one truth which is
absolute, so Protagoras doctrine implies that man is not the measure of all things. Some
things must be true for all men. But it is not clear why this is so. If man is the measure of
all things, then it would seem to follow that while it is true for x that p is true for x it
might be true for y that p is not true for x. No contradiction appears to be involved
here. p is true for x is not both true and not true relative to the same person.
We can set out this criticism of Passmores more fully by reverting to our previous

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terminology. Suppose that T is true relative to Slyand that some proposition, p, is true
relative to S1. Now relative to S1 there must be some scheme S2, relative to which it
is not true that p is true relative to S1. If this were not so, p is true relative to S, would
be true in all schemes, and so would be true absolutely. So it must be the case that
Telative to S1, p is true relative to S1, and relative to S2, p is not true relative to S1. This
certainly generates no contradiction. So Protagoras and the defender of T do not
succumb to Passmores criticism.
IV: 4 : a is decidable
However, the non-relativist can push the argument a little further. Suppose again, that
relative to S1 , p is true relative to S1 ,and that relative to S 2 , p is not true relative to S1 ,
Let a stand for p is true relative to Sl. Now, is it decidable whether a is true or false?
Assume that it is. If it is, then either the S1 adherent is correct, or the S2 adherent is.
That is, it must be possible to show either that p follows from, or is consistent with, the
other truths or presuppositions of S1, or that it does not follow from, or is inconsistent
with, those truths and presuppositions. So a must be either absolutely true or absolutely
false, in which case the relativist would be committed to an absolute truth.
An immediate objection might be raised by a relativist. It is that the question Is it
decidable whether a is true or false? is illegitimate as it stands. a is only true or false
relative to some scheme. The non-relativist might then ask whether this is decidable, that
is, if OT is true or false relative to that scheme, to which the relativist will again say that
this is an illegitimate question. In order to make things as difficult as possible for the
relativist, we will assume that the question, as it stands, is legitimate. So we return to the
original problem, the supposition that a is decidable.

Meilands way out will not do for the relativist now. He claims that it is not incompatible with relativism to say that a relativist can argue, even with a non-relativist,
provided that, at least for the sake of the argument, they assume the same presuppositions.
Here it must be remembered, they are both arguing about the truth value of p relative to
the presuppositions of S1. So for the sake of the argument, the S2 adherent must work
within the confines of S1. His argument is simply that given the presuppositions of S1,
p is not true. The problem here clearly seems to be whether a: is reall,, true or whether it
is reall,, not true, and really carries the force of absolutely. So if the S1 adherent can
show that a is really true, as truth might be an absolute truth, and if the S2 adherent can
show that it is really not true, that must be not true absolutely.
IV: 5: a is not decidable
What is the situation if a is not decidable? We immediately want to know why it is
not. If the adherents of S1 and S2 are both rational it might be because S1 and S2 are
incommensurable. Exactly what incommensurability involves is not clear, but for now I
will assume that if two schemes are incommensurable, none of the terms of one can be
translated or explained in any way, in terms of the other. It would follow from this that
incommensurable schemes have different criteria of rationality. This must be so because
none of the logical connectives of one scheme could be translated into the other, nor
could terms like is true, is rational, and so on. Whether the incommensurability thesis
needs to be interpreted as strongly as this can be debated, but it commonly is, or at least
appears to be.

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31

There are problems with the imcommensurability thesis, but I will ignore these and
concentrate on the self-refutation objection. If S1 and S2 are incommensurable it could
make no sense relative to S 2 to talk about truth relative to S1, and vice versa. If the terms
true, absolute and relative, are terms in S1, they are completely foreign to any other
scheme. In so far as other schemes may use these terms, they must have different meanings from what they have in S1. Now from this, if it makes sense, it follows that all truth
is truth relative to S1. T then, if true, is true relative to S1 only, not because it is false in
all other schemes, but simply because the relevant concepts do not occur in any other.
What work then does relative to S1 do in T is true relative to S1? It seems that there is
nothing for it to do. Relative to S1 only does something if it makes sense to say that
relative to some other scheme T may not be true. But this cannot make sense if the
incommensurability thesis holds, because now we cannot ascribe truth in any sense to any
scheme other than S1, And if all other schemes lack the concepts of truth, absoluteness
and relativity, nothing about T can be asserted from within them either.
What follows from this for the self-refutation argument? It might be argued that if
there is incommensurability, T must be true absolutely. This conclusion might be reached
on the grounds that there is no scheme relative to which T is false. If this is correct,
relativism, that is, T, is self-refuting. The chief difficulty in arguing in this way, however,
is that, while it is true that T is false in no scheme, it is also the case that T is not true
relative to all schemes. It is only true relative to S1. This may be enough to show that T is
only relatively true. Against this it might be objected that T is true in all of the schemes
in which it is possible for it to occur, so if true, it is true absolutely.
The indecision evident in the preceding paragraph about which conclusion to draw,
stems, I think, from doubts about whether to place more weight on the claim that T is
not true relative to all schemes, or on the claim that it is true in all of the schemes in
which it can occur. The relativist might be able to avoid self-refutation here, but another
problem cannot be avoided. That is, that relative to, whether in T is relative to S1 or p
is true relative to S1 , has a very different meaning from relative to as it occurs in statements like I am travelling at four kilometers per hour relative to the plane and 804 kilometers per hour relative to the earth. In this case it is meaningful but wrong to say that I
am moving at four kilometers per hour relative to the earth, but with T is true relative to
S1 the situation is quite different. T has no relationship whatsoever with any scheme
apart from S1, so it is unclear what relative to in this context means.
IV: 6 : Adilemma

To recapitulate briefly, the dilemma posed for the relativist is this: if a,that is, p is
true relative to S1 is decidable, then the relativist is committed to an absolute truth, viz.
that a is either absolutely true or absolutely false. On the other hand, if a is not decidable
there is incommensurability between schemes and the very meaning of the relativist thesis
becomes unclear. There are a number of ways in which the relativist can attempt to avoid
impalement on the horns of this dilemma, and it is to these which we now turn.
First, it might be argued that all the argument for the first horn of the dilemma shows
is that statements like a are absolutely true relative to some scheme, but not just
absolutely true. And it has already been shown that absolute truth relative to a scheme
does not reduce to absolute truth. If this is right, then if a is decidable it is either

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absolutely true or absolutely false relative to S1,but not just absolutely true or false. This
however misses the point of the argument, which was, if the truth or falsity of a is
decidable, then a is either true or false relative to all schemes, and this is absolute truth or
falsity.

A second way of avoiding the dilemma is to argue that while S1 may be incommensurable with some schemes, it is not with all. Suppose that S1 and S2 are not
incommensurable but that S1 and S3 are. It might make sense now to talk of a being
true relative to S1, because that is not the only scheme relative to which it is both
meaningful and true. This, however, does not really advance the relativist cause, because a
is still true relative to all schemes in which it can occur. A new problem is raised too,
which concerns the identity of conceptual schemes. If S1 and S 2 are not incommensurable what reasons have we for saying that they are two schemes rather than one? Perhaps
incommensurability is what individuates schemes. This is a problem which I will not
attempt to answer now.
A third possibility is that we may be able to weaken the incommensurability claim and
so slip between the horns. Of course it cannot be weakened too much, or we will be back
with decidability. The main question now is whether or not it is possible to have a
position where S1 and S2 are not totally incommensurable, but where a is still not
decidable. There is such a position, and that is where a is discussable. S1 and S2 may not
be totally incommensurable, but a may still not be decidable, even though it might be
discussable. This possibility avoids entirely the problems raised by the dilemma. On the
one hand, a might be both true relative to S1 and not true relative to S 2 , without the
matter being decidable, and on the other the problems of incommensurability do not
arise. S1 and S 2 may share many statements, one of which may be T. This does not imply
that T must be true relative to S 2 , merely that it is meaningful in that scheme, and that
the meaning is the same as in S1. If they both share T, 01 should at least be discussable.

V:Discussability and decidability

So the relativist is out of trouble again, if only temporarily. But now two more
questions arise. Can a statement be discussable but not decidable, and does discussability
appeal to some absolute criterion of rationality?
The second question can be answered quickly. What discussability does imply is some
appeal to a shared criterion of rationality. This is necessary, at least if truth and validity
are to be discussed, and it is difficult to see how they can be avoided. But an appeal to
shared criteria is very different from an appeal to absolute criteria. If a is to be discussable between S1 and S 2 , those two schemes must share some criteria of rationality, but
the criteria they share need not be absolute, and it need not be what S1 and S3 share. 22
The answer to the first question appears obvious. Arguments are conducted at great
length over politics, for example, with no agreement being reached, except perhaps an
agreement to differ. But this is hardly good enough. It can be attacked from two
directions. One is to say that no real discussion is taking place in arguments of this sort,
because the antagonists talk past each other, and for this reason never reach agreement.
The alternative objection is that agreement could be reached, but only if people were
more rational and more inclined to listen to rational argument, rather than adhering

Is Relativism Self-Refuting?

39

stubbornly to their prejudices. In order to avoid these objections some accounts of

discussability and decidability are required.
V: 1 : Discussability

We will say that some sentence p is discussable by two disputants, D1 and D2, only if
D1 can understand the meaning or usage of p as employed by D2, and vice versa. Most
discussions of p, and certainly the ones which are of concern here, involve an attempt to
assess the truth of p, or perhaps its probability, or, as some sociologists of knowledge
prefer to say, its credibility. For the sake of simplicity, we will only talk about truth. If
D1 and D2 are to discuss p, not only must they understand what the other means by p,
but they must also understand the others meaning or usage of truth, or variants like is
the case, is the fact, and so on. If they operate only at the object language level, they
may not need to understand each others usage of truth and the like, but I am assuming
that any thorough discussion does involve some use of these terms.
Discussion may involve considerably more mutual understanding than has been
indicated here, but it involves at least this much. On the account given, if D1 and D2 both
have the same conceptual scheme, it is easy to see why they can discuss p. Each understands the other because they use the terms involved in the same way, and they share the
same criteria of rationality. If they have different conceptual schemes, they can discuss
p only if each can understand what the other says. This, however, does not involve them
sharing the meaning or usage of p, merely that for the sake of the discussion they assume
certain common presuppositions. The same is the case with truth. They need not share
the concept of truth in the sense of accepting the same one, but if the discussion is to
proceed, they must at least understand and use the same one for the purposes of the
discussion. Suppose for example, that D1 holds a correspondence theory of truth and D2
a preference theory, that is, that p is true if preferred by the majority of the community.
If D1 understands D2s use of p and his preference theory, of if D2 understands D1 in the
equivalent way, they can discuss p.
V: 2 : Decidability

This account of discussability sets some limits as to what can be discussed between
schemes, but we will leave that for the moment, and briefly consider decidability. In
general a statement or argument is decidable if there is a decision procedure which can
tell in a finite number of steps whether or not the statement or argument is true or valid.
If a problem has an algorithmic solution, that is, if it can be solved by a computer, it is
decidable.
Suppose that D1 and D2 can discuss p but that they cannot agree on its truth value,
despite both being creatures of good-will. Why are they unable to reach agreement? One
obvious answer is that the knowledge each possesses with respect to p differs. Each might
be justified in what he believes, given the state of his knowledge. However, p.might
eventually be decidable here if each acquired the same knowledge relevant to p. The situation will be different if what divides them is a difference in relevant presuppositions.
Perhaps they can examine these presuppositions and reach a reement on them. (I am
assuming that presuppositions can be discussed and examined).k But that may not be so.
In cases where alternative presuppositions are equally reasonable and equally useful,

40

JOHN WECKERT

which one we hold may be purely a matter of preference. Although these presuppositions
may be discussable, there is no guarantee that any agreement will be reached, even if D1
and D2 are equally rational and knowledgeable, just as it may be undecidable whether
cabbage really is nice tasting or not.
It might be argued that p is only discussable but not decidable because we are fallible,
preference-dominated creatures. Could a preference-free, infallible machine do better? In
many cases undoubtedly it could, but not in all.
We know from the work of Church and others that certain parts of number theory and
quantification theory are undecidable in the sense that there are no decision procedures
to tell whether any arbitrary formula or its negation is provable.24 We also know of many
other problems for which there exist no algorithms. A consequence of this in quantification theory is that there is no general, step by step way of showing that some sentence
follows from, or is entailed by, some other sentence or set of sentences, or that it is not.
So some undecidability must be admitted, and that in areas where discussion in the sense
outlined above is clearly possible. The general conclusion then must be that discussability
does not imply decidability, which is what the relativist needed. Moreover, undecidability
has emerged in just those areas where it was needed most. The issue under consideration
was whether or not it could be decided if a is true or false. a can be interpreted as S1
entails p, and if p is a sentence and S1 a set of sentences, the question is whether a
certain sentence is entailed by some particular set of sentences, or in a more formal way,
is S-+ p valid? And it is just in such cases that there is no general decision procedure.
It might be objected that I have misinterpreted the significance of Churchs theorem.
What Church showed was that there is no general decision procedure in quantification
theory, not that it can never be shown that some sentence is entailed by some other, or
others. If it can be shown that some p is entailed by some S, then that is absolutely true
and the relativist is still in trouble, even if this kind of entailment cannot in general be
established.

To answer this it must be kept in mind what the original problem was. The problem
was: can it be decided whether a is true, as claimed in S1, or not true, as claimed in S2?
If there is a decision procedure it must be relative to S1 and S2. Suppose that a can be
decided relative to these two schemes, what follows? Nothing, except that a is decidable
relative to S1 and S 2 . It does not follow that it is also decidable relative to S 1 and some
third scheme S3, even though a may be discussable between these two schemes. What S1
and S2 share which makes a discussable in them, is not necessarily the same as what S1
and S3 share which allows them to discuss it. This argument does not go through simply
because the decidability of a has been relativised. To see this, suppose that decidability is
relativised but that discussability entails decidability. Now, if a is decidable, it is decidable relative to every scheme in which it is discussable, so it will be true relative to all
schemes in which ,it can be discussed, or not true relative to all of them, and we are back
with an absolute truth, or with incommensurability. However, once the discussabledecidable nexus has been cut in general, this condition is avoided.
Another point is worthy of comment here. If a, that is, p is true relative to S1 is
interpreted as S1 entails p, then contrary to what was argued earlier, Q could occur in
schemes in which there were no concepts of truth or relative to, provided only that there

Is Relativism Self-Refuting?

41

was a concept of entailment. But this just shifts the issue. If ct is in S1,and if entails in
S1 is the same as entails in S2, then ct could occur in S2. But if they are not the same
concept, then it could not. So our previous claim about the schemes in which a could
occur needs only slight modification.

V : 3 : Conclusion
Finally, to illustrate what has been argued, let us briefly consider an example discussed
by Evans-Pritchard in Nuer Religion.25 The Nuer, according to Evans-Pritchard, believe
that human twins are birds. Let Sn be the Neur conceptual scheme, and Sw the Western,
scientific one. The sentence ct then will be Human twins are birds relative to Sn. Relative
to S, this appears not only false but absurd. The Nuer do not really believe that twins
are birds, we might be tempted to say from within Sw. In order to discover whether or
not it is true that Human twins are birds relative to Sn, we can attempt to see exactly
what they mean by human twin, bird, and by the verb to be. We can also examine
their principles of rationality. Once this has been done we might find that ct is really true,
and that we in Sw were wrong to deny it. But even if the matter can be decided relative
to S, and Sw, it does not follow that it could be relative to some other scheme in which ct
is discussable. The fact that we in Sw may not be able to comprehend how this would be
possible shows very little, except perhaps our limitations.
Conceptual and epistemological relativism may have their problems. But they do not
fall in the face of the self-refutation objection.

JOHN WECKERT

42

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