Rule 76

Atillano Mercado vs. Santos (1938 Case)

Important points:
1. WILLS; CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE DUE EXECUTION OF A PROBATED WILL. Section 625 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is explicit as to the conclusiveness of the due execution of a probated will. It provides: "No will shall pass either the
real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the
allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID. The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is considered as conclusive as to its due
execution and validity, and is also conclusive that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the
will, and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and not a forgery.
3. ID.; ID.; PROCEEDING "IN REM." The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice
by publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted,
the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State.
4. ID.; ID.; CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that
it will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong. The will in question having been probated by a
competent court, the law will not admit any proof to overthrow the legal presumption that it is genuine and not a forgery.
5. ID.; ID.; CRIMINAL ACTION AGAINST FORGER OF A DULY PROBATED WILL. Upon the facts stated in the opinion of
the court, it was held: That in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333 and 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure, criminal action
will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent
jurisdiction.

FACTS:
On May 28, 1931, the petitioner herein filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a petition for the
probate of the will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa. Without any opposition, and upon the testimony of Benigno
F. Gabino, one of the attesting witnesses, the probate court, on June 27, 1931, admitted the will to probate.
Almost three years later, on April 11, 1934, the five intervenors herein moved ex parte to reopen the
proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction of the court to probate the will and to close the proceedings. Because
filed ex parte, the motion was denied. The same motion was filed a second time, but with notice to the adverse
party. The motion was nevertheless denied by the probate court on May 24, 1934. On appeal to this court, the
order of denial was affirmed on July 26, 1935. (Basa v. Mercado, 33 off. Gaz., 2521.)
It appears that on October 27, 1932, i. e., sixteen months after the probate of the will of Ines Basa, intervenor
Rosario Basa de Leon filed with the justice of the peace court of San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint against
the petitioner herein, for falsification or forgery of the will probated as above indicated. The petitioner was
arrested. He put up a bond in the sum of P4,000 and engaged the services of an attorney to undertake his
defense. Preliminary investigation of the case was continued twice upon petition of the complainant. The
complaint was finally dismissed, at the instance of the complainant herself, in an order dated December 8,
1932.
Three months later, or on March 2, 1933, the same intervenor charged the petition for the second time with the
same offense, presenting the complaint this time in the justice of the peace court of Mexico, Pampanga. The
petitioner was again arrested, again put up a bond in the sum of P4,000, and engaged the services of counsel to
defend him. This second complaint, after investigation, was also dismissed, again at the instance of the
complainant herself who alleged that the petitioner was in poor health. That was on April 27, 1933.

Some nine months later, on February 2, 1934, to be exact, the same intervenor accused the same petitioner for
the third time of the same offense. The information was filed by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga in the
justice of the peace court of Mexico. The petitioner was again arrested, again put up a bond of P4,000, and
engaged the services of defense counsel. The case was dismissed on April 24, 1934, after due investigation, on
the ground that the will alleged to have been falsified had already been probated and there was no evidence
that the petitioner had forged the signature of the testatrix appearing thereon, but that, on the contrary, the
evidence satisfactorily established the authenticity of the signature aforesaid.
Dissatisfied with the result, the provincial fiscal, on May 9, 1934, moved in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga for reinvestigation of the case. The motion was granted on May 23, 1934, and, for the fourth time,
the petitioner was arrested, filed a bond and engaged the services of counsel to handle his defense. The
reinvestigation dragged on for almost a year until February 18, 1934, when the Court of First Instance ordered
that the case be tried on the merits.
The petitioner interposed a demurrer on November 25, 1935, on the ground that the will alleged to have been
forged had already been probated. This demurrer was overruled on December 24, 1935, whereupon an
exception was taken and a motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal were filed. The motion for
reconsideration and the proposed appeal were denied on January 14, 1936.
The case proceeded to trial, and forthwith petitioner moved to dismiss the case claiming again that the will
alleged to have been forged had already been probated and, further, that the order probating the will is
conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution thereof.
The motion was overruled and the petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction to enjoin the trial court from further proceedings in the matter. The injunction was
issued and thereafter, on June 19, 1937, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari, and dissolved
the writ of preliminary injunction. Three justices dissented in a separate opinion. The case is now before this
court for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the probate of the will of Petitioners deceased wife is a bar to his criminal prosecution
for the alleged forgery of the said will.
Ruling:
Section 625 of the same Code is more explicit as to the conclusiveness of the due execution of a probated will.
It says: "SEC. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. No will shall pass either the
real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the
Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive
as to its due execution." (Emphasis ours.)
In Manahan v. Manahan (58 Phil., 448, 451), we held: ". . . The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to
the due execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of
fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceeding
In 28 R. C. L., p. 377, section 378, it is said:j"The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction
thereof is usually considered as conclusive as to its due execution and validity, and is also conclusive that the
testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will, and was not acting under
duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and not a forgery." (Emphasis ours.)
As our law on wills, particularly section 625 of our Code of Civil Procedure aforequoted, was taken almost
bodily from the Statutes of Vermont, the decisions of the Supreme Court of that State relative to the effect of

the probate of a will are of persuasive authority in this jurisdiction.

The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by publication as a
prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted,
the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State. This court held in the case of
Manalo v. Paredes and Philippine Food Co. (47 Phil., 938):
"The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265), and the court acquires jurisdiction over
all the persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them.
"Through the publication of the petition for the probate of the will, the court acquires jurisdiction over all such
persons as are interested in said will; and any judgment that may be rendered after said proceeding is binding
against the world."virtua1aw library
Section 333, paragraph 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes an incontrovertible presumption in favor
of judgments declared by it to be conclusive. library
The will in question having been probated by a competent court, the law will not admit any proof to
overthrow the legal presumption that it is genuine and not a forgery.
The majority decision of the Court of Appeals cites English decisions to bolster up its conclusion that "the
judgment admitting the will to probate is binding upon the whole world as to the due execution and
genuineness of the will insofar as civil rights and liabilities are concerned, but not for the purpose of
punishment of a crime."
"A judgment admitting a will to probate cannot be attacked collaterally although the will was forged; and a
payment to the executor names therein of a debt due the decedent will discharge the same, notwithstanding the
spurious character of the instrument probated. It has also been held that, upon an indictment for forging a will,
the probate of the paper in question is conclusive evidence in the defendants favor of its genuine character.
But this particular point has lately been ruled otherwise."cralaw virtua1aw library
The dissenting opinion of the Court of Appeals in the instant case under review makes a cursory study of
the statutes obtaining in England, Massachusetts and Florida, and comes to the conclusion that the
decisions cited in the majority opinion do not appear to "have been promulgated in the face of statutes
similar to ours." The dissenting opinion cites Whartons Criminal Evidence (11th ed., sec. 831), to show
that the probate of a will in England is only prima facie proof of the validity of the will (Op. Cit. quoting
Marriot v. Marriot, 93 English Reprint, 770); and 21 L. R. A. (pp. 686-689 and note), to show that in
Massachusetts there is no statute making the probate of a will conclusive, and that in Florida the statute
(sec. 1810, Revised Statutes) makes the probate conclusive evidence as to the validity of the will with
regard to personal, and prima facie as to real estate. The cases decided by the Supreme Court of Florida
cited by the majority opinion, supra, refer to wills of both personal and real estate.
Although in the foregoing case (State v. McGlynn) the information filed by the State was to set aside the
decree of probate on the ground that the will was forged, we see no difference in principle between that case
and the case at bar. A subtle distinction could perhaps be drawn between setting aside a decree of probate, and
declaring a probated will to be a forgery. it is clear, however, that a duly probated will cannot be declared to be
a forgery without disturbing in a way the decree allowing said will to probate. It is at least anomalous that a
will should be regarded as genuine for one purpose and spurious for another.
The American and English cases show a conflict of authorities on the question as to whether or not the probate

of a will bars criminal prosecution of the alleged forger of the probated will. We have examined some
important cases and have come to the conclusion that no fixed standard may be adopted or drawn therefrom, in
view of the conflict no less than of diversity of statutory provisions obtaining in different jurisdictions. It
behooves us, therefore, as the court of last resort, to choose that rule most consistent with our statutory law,
having in view the needed stability of property rights and the public interest in general.
To be sure, we have seriously reflected upon the dangers of evasion from punishment of culprits deserving of
the severity of the law in cases where, as here, forgery is discovered after the probate of the will and the
prosecution is had before the prescription of the offense. By and large, however, the balance seems inclined in
favor of the view that we have taken. Not only does the law surround the execution of the will with the
necessary formalities and require probate to be made after an elaborate judicial proceeding, but section 113,
not to speak of section 513, of our Code of Civil Procedure provides for an adequate remedy to any party who
might have been adversely affected by the probate of a forged will, much in the same way as other parties
against whom a judgment is rendered under the same or similar circumstances. (Pecson v. Coronel, 43 Phil.,
358.)
The aggrieved party may file an application for relief with the proper court within a reasonable time, but in no
case exceeding six months after said court has rendered the judgment of probate, on the ground of mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. An appeal lies to review the action of a court of first instance when
that court refuses to grant relief.
After a judgment allowing a will to be probated has become final and unappelable, and after the period fixed
by section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure has expired, the law as an expression of the legislative wisdom
goes no further and the case ends there.
We hold, therefore, that in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333 and 625 of our Code of Civil Code
Procedure, criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a will which had been
duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.
The resolution of the foregoing legal question is sufficient to dispose of the case.
From the view we take of the instant case, the petitioner is entitled to have the criminal proceedings against
him quashed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed, without pronouncement regarding
costs. So ordered.