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STA RT I NG
A nato my o f A D isast er
Five years after the tragic events at the Macondo Prospect in the Gulf of Mexico, Oil & Gas IQ and Derek Park present this detailed infographic guide to the perfect storm of events that lead to this fateful incident. Based on facts
presented throughout the BP trial, below is a clear and comprehensive blow-by-blow dissection of the web of contributing factors that led to the biggest offshore disaster in the last quarter of a century.
TOTA L LOSS
CO ND IT IO NS A ND
ASSU M PT IO NS
Modern conventional subsea wellheads use integral lock rings to lock down each casing string,
together with the annular seal as each hanger is landed. The rings often prove difficult to set,
are unreliable in service and even harder to unlatch should the casing need to be pulled.
Prior to Macondo casing lock rings were often removed because of this poor reliability.
Post Macodo the US Authorities issued the 'Drilling Safety Rule' which said
'The operator must ensure that the latching mechanisms or lock down mechanisms are
engaged upon installation of each casing string or liner.
The decision to leave off the Casing Lock Rings and subsequently install a Lock Down Sleeve generated a huge amount of additional work at the crucial phase of
temporary abandonment.
See Whats All This Talk About Lockdown Sleeves? for more information
http://www.oilandgasiq.com/integrity-hse-maintenance/columns/what-s-all-this-talk-about-lockdown-sleeves/
BP decided to use an old batch of cement that was on the rig from a previous job. This cement
contained a defoaming agent, despite the fact that foam cement was to be used on this well.
Foam cement is lighter, hence easier to pump and less likely to damage the wellbore.
The inclusion of the defoamer meant that the cement was designed to do the opposite of what
was intended.
The defoaming problem was 'designed around' by increasing the amount of foaming agent in
the final mix.
There was also concern that the well was unloaded less than 10 hours after completion of the
cement job, despite tests which showed that this was insufficient time to develop full strength.
& CO N FUS IO N
ST R ESS
LCM stands for Loss Control Material, specifically designed to plug 'leaks' into the
formation (losses).
Left over LCM was circulated through the well because that allowed it to be legally dumped
overboard as returning well fluid. The alternative was to ship it ashore and pay for proper
disposal.
It is likely that that the LCM caused blockages in the choke, kill or instrumentation lines, leading
to anomalous readings during the negative pressure tests.
There are theories that say the flow was via the annulus at
the time of the blowout. This would be possible because the
casing was not locked down and could have lifted the
hanger off the annular seals.
The official view however is that the well flowed via the
production casing bore.
However what is not in doubt is that because the casing was
not locked down, there was a lack of confidence in the
annulus, particularly the wellhead seal and this contributed
to the delay in killing the well in the days after the blowout.
The Diverter was lined up to the mud/gas separator rather than overboard.
This was to comply with BP's environmental policy.
Once the well started to flow the small mud gas separator was simply overwhelmed
Having the diverter lined up to overboard might have bought time for the drill crew to control
the well.
O NGO I NG
Environmental
Concerns
O F CO NT RO L
I NIT IA L D ECIS IO NS
SPILL
Both BP (on and offshore) and TO accepted that the test was
good despite 1400psi on drill pipe
Misread FIRST
Negative Pressure Test
Unable to properly monitor
returns from well
The gold standard for kick detection involves the monitoring of flow in, flow out and
pit volume - a closed system.
But .....
Seawater was being drawn straight from the sea-chest and not via a mudpit.
Returning mud was being discharged to boat, by passing mud logger's flow sensor
Sand traps were being cleaned and pumped out
Crane operations for boat loading were affecting pit level measurement.
Hydrocarbons
In Riser
B L O WO UT