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So we can discover whether Chinese leaders truly are the disciples of Machiavelli by probing into these three tenets, while
roughly evaluating Chinas domestic politics and foreign affairs.
Tenet one: History is a sequence of cause and effect and cannot be directed by imagination. This is a view that has some
roughly historical-materialist elements and particularly targets the weakness of utopian beliefs. Interestingly, historical
materialism has an essentially important role in the CCPs political ideology and philosophy, although the CCP also
acknowledges that subjective consciousness may have certain impacts on the objective development process see, for
example, the role of historical figures and heroes. Nevertheless, in view of historical materialism, Chinese thinkers may find
Machiavellis viewpoint on history agreeable to a certain degree.
Tenet two: Practice creates theory. This view is even more familiar to the CCP and even to the Chinese public, especially after
Deng Xiaoping made his famous claim that practice is the only standard to test truth in the late 1970s. The Chinese
leadership does not indiscriminately copy existing theories from its ancient philosophies or the Western ideologies. Instead,
the CCP consistently insists that all theories, institutions, and patterns should be weighed with regard to the real situation in
China in other words, combined with Chinese characteristics. Of course, the Chinese leadership also emphasizes the role of
theories as guidance for practice. In Chinas political practices, theory and practice are actually in a dialectical unity.
Tenet three: Ethics is a function of politics, or ethics is the product of politics. This actually is the key issue with regard to my
query. At least on this point, Machiavelli, E. H. Carr, and Han Feizi shared some common ground. For example, like
Machiavelli, both Han Feizi and Carr described ethics (or political ethics) using a very realistic approach; they generally agreed
that ethics were subordinate to states or politics. But what kind of role does ethics, including rules and institutions, have in the
Chinese leaderships political philosophy? In contemporary China, does ethics rule over politics or is it the other way around?
First, the leadership of the CCP seems to have a very unique and strong characteristic: to recommend and select the wise and
able that are ethically qualified (). So far, an obvious difference between Chinese politics and Western politics lies in a
single letter of the alphabet: S selection vs. election. The CCP emphasizes the inner qualities of candidates, including
their ethical accomplishments, through years of observation, cultivation, and examination. The Chinese do not seem to trust a
single election when they try to choose their national leaders, since that could be too risky for such a geographically huge and
ethnically, economically, and culturally diverse country (though in-party elections have been tested at the local, provincial,
and national levels, especially in the past decade).
Meanwhile, generations of Chinese leaders have been very enthusiastic about educating party cadres and the public with
ethical rhetorical practices. Jiang Zemin urged cadres to rule the country by virtue (); Hu Jintao had the campaign
to maintain the advanced nature of Communist Party members (); and and now Xi seeks to establish the
people with virtue (). Hence, we may confer that at least in the CCPs political value system, ethics is still higher than
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politics.
Likewise, regarding foreign diplomacy, the Chinese leadership has been trying to overcome the somewhat illusory nature of
ethics in politics described by many classical realists. For example, China summarizes its policies toward neighboring countries
with four Chinese characters: , , , , meaning amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness. Meanwhile, China
acknowledges but does not over-emphasize the importance of hard power when it comes to conflicts and disputes, and
especially works very hard to avoid the natural and inevitable conflicts between states that classical realists see when it
comes to great power relations. Could we thus conclude that contemporary Chinese leadership are not really disciples of
Machiavelli?
It is natural and understandable that we may find some common points between the political thoughts of either Han Feizi or
Machiavelli and the political philosophy of contemporary Chinese leadership. For example, rule of law pledged by Xi Jinping
could remind us some of Han Feizis classical writings. That is indeed a very interesting research topic. But coming back to my
own question, the whole political philosophy and ideology of the CCP can hardly be tied to classical philosophers, whether Han
Feizi or Machiavelli. In his piece on the subject, Ryan Mitchell described Xi as a pragmatic legalist. In fact, pragmatism (rather
than Machiavellian realism) is a better way to describe on-going changes in both Chinas political and diplomatic practices.
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