Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
44)
SupportforSame
SexMarriagein
LatinAmerica
1
GermnLodola,UniversidadTorcuatoDiTella,
UniversityofPittsburgh
glodola@utdt.Edu
MargaritaCorral,VanderbiltUniversity
margarita.corral@vanderbilt.edu
aymarriagerecentlyhasbeenasubjectof
intense discussion in many countries in
theAmericas.Disputesovertheissueare
marked by sharply conflicting opinions among
citizens, social organizations, religious groups,
the highly influential Catholic Church, and
policy makers. In Latin America, these debates
have engendered outcomes that vary sharply
fromcountrytocountry.Samesexmarriagehas
been constitutionally banned in Honduras
(2005), El Salvador (2009), and the Dominican
Republic(2009).InBolivia,thenewConstitution
(2009) limits legally recognized marriage to
oppositesexunions.InCostaRica,theSupreme
Court ruled against samesex couples seeking
the right to be legally married (2006), while a
Page 1 of 9
Figure 1.
Average Support for Same-Sex Marriage in the
Americas, 2010
Canada
Argentina
Uruguay
United States
Brazil
Chile
Mexico
Colombia
Peru
Bolivia
Panama
Honduras
Venezuela
Costa Rica
Suriname
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Belize
Guatemala
Paraguay
Nicaragua
Trinidad & Tobago
El Salvador
Guyana
Jamaica
63.9
57.7
50.5
47.4
39.8
39.7
37.8
34.4
26.3
24.7
22.8
22.6
22.5
20.7
20.3
18.6
18.4
17.5
16.5
16.1
15.6
15.4
10.3
7.2
3.5
0
20
40
60
80
Thefinalversionofthe2010wavewillinclude26countries;
atthetimeofthisreport,thesurveyisbeingimplementedto
asampleof6,000individualsinHaiti.
6 Around 1,500 respondents were interviewed face-to-face in
each country, except in Bolivia and Ecuador, where the
samples were approximately 3,000. The Canada and the U.S.
are web-based surveys. Non-response to this question was
3.23% for the sample as a whole.
Page 2 of 9
Alsoincludedintheregressionisavariablethat
captures the respondents political ideology.
This variable is based ona110 scale,where 1
means left or liberal and 10 means right or
conservative. For obvious reasons, we expect
more conservative respondents to be less prone
tosupportsamesexmarriagethanliberalones.
Finally,theregressionmodelincludesanumber
ofvariablesmeasuringbasicsocioeconomicand
demographic characteristics that are thought to
play a role in shaping public opinion towards
homosexuality.Wethusincludeeducation,age,
gender, wealth, and city/town size.10 We expect
moreeducatedindividualstohavemoreliberal
sexual attitudes and therefore express higher
levelsofsupportforsamesexmarriagethanless
educated persons (Ellison and Musick 1993;
Gibson and Tedin 1988; Herek and Capitanio
1996; Treas 2002). Similarly, we expect older
people to be less tolerant toward gays/lesbians
than younger people, due more to the eras in
which the former were socialized than to the
aging process itself (Davis 1992; Herek and
Glunt1993).Asfoundinpriorresearch,wealso
expectmentobemoreinclinedtodisapproveof
homosexuality than women (Herek 2002; Kite
1984; Kite and Whitley 1996), and people with
higherincomestobemoretolerantthanpeople
with lower incomes (Hodgess Persell, Green,
and Gurevitch 2001). Following research by
Stephan and McMullin (1982), we expect
urbanism (in our model, individuals living in
larger cities) to be positively associated with
tolerance toward homosexuals and, thus,
supportforsamesexmarriage.
Theresultsofthisregressionanalysisareshown
inFigure2.Eachvariableincludedinthemodel
is listed on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of
eachofthosevariablesonsupportforsamesex
marriageisshowngraphicallybyadot,whichif
fallingtotherightofthevertical0lineimplies
a positive contribution and if to the left of the
0lineindicatesanegativeimpact.Onlywhen
theconfidenceintervals(thehorizontallines)do
not overlap the vertical 0 line is the variable
statistically significant (at .05 or better). The
relativestrengthofeachvariableisindicatedby
standardizedcoefficients(i.e.,betaweights).
10
Citizens in Canada and the United States hold sharply
higher levels on many socio-economic characteristics; for
this and because we select to focus this report on Latin
America and the Caribbean, we excluded these cases from
the analysis.
Page 3 of 9
Figure 2.
Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Latin America and
the Caribbean, 2010
R-Squared =0.201
F=136.711
N =28217
Size of City/Town
Quintiles of wealth
Age
Female
Education Level
Atheist
Evangelical
Importance of Religion
Religious Group
Ideology
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0.0
0.05
0.1
Page 4 of 9
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
95% C.I.
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP
Figure 4.
A Multilevel Analysis of the Determinants of Support
for Same-Sex Marriage in Latin America and the
Caribbean, 2010: The Impact of Education.
Religious Group
Atheist
Evangelical
35
Predicted Probability
Support for Same-Sex Marriage
Importance of Religion
Ideology
Size of City/Town
Education Level
Quintiles of wealth
Age
Female
Education Index
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Argentina
Chile
Mexico
Venezuela
Costa
Rica
Panama
Brazil
Colombia
Peru Suriname
Ecuador
Belize
Dominican Republic
Jamaica
30
Uruguay
25
Guatemala
20
El Salvador
Paraguay
Bolivia
Honduras
95% C.I.
15
Guyana
Nicaragua
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
GDP Index
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP and
UNDP (Human Development Report 2009)
onethirdweighting).Formoredetailsonhowtheseindexes
are constructed, see UNDPs 2009 Human Development
Report.
Page 5 of 9
Figure 6.
The Impact of Education on Support for Same-Sex
Marriage in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2010
Predicted Probability
Support for Same-Sex Marriage
35
Plot derived from a linear multilevel model
holding constant at their mean value
all individual level variables
30
Uruguay
Argentina
Guyana
Chile
Venezuela
Bolivia
Panama
Mexico
Brazil
Costa Rica
Colombia
Peru
Paraguay
Ecuador Trinidad
& Tobago
Suriname
Dominican Republic
Jamaica
25
20
Honduras
El Salvador
15
Nicaragua
Belize
Guatemala
10
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
Education Index
0.9
0.95
Conclusion
References
Webeganthisshortreportbypointingoutthat
citizens in the Latin American and Caribbean
region,onaverage,expressrelativelylowlevels
ofsupportforsamesexmarriage.However,we
have underscored that there is also significant
crossnational variation. At the individuallevel
ofanalysis,ourstatisticalanalysisindicatesthat
strong religious values and more conservative
ideologieshaveasignificantnegativeimpacton
individual support for homosexuals having the
righttomarry.Inaddition,wefoundthatlevels
of support are higher among wealthier people,
individualslivinginlargercities,andwomen.In
our analyses of nationallevel factors, we found
strongempiricalevidencesupportingtheclassic
claim that both economic development and
education increase tolerance for homosexual
rights.
Davis,JamesAllan.1992.ChangeableWeather
in a Cooling Climate atop the Liberal
Plateau:ConversionandReplacementin
FortyTwoGeneralSocialSurveyItems,
19721989. Public Opinion Quarterly
56(3):261306.
Page 6 of 9
________________.2002.GenderGapsinPublic
OpinionaboutLesbiansandGayMen.
PublicOpinionQuarterly66(1):4066.
_________________,andJohnP.Capitanio.1996.
Some of My Best Friends: Intergroup
Contact, Concealable Stigma, and
Heterosexuals Attitudes toward Gay
Men and Lesbians. Personality and
SocialPsychologyBulletin22(4):41224.
Kite,MaryE.1984.SexDifferencesinAttitudes
toward Homosexuals: A MetaAnalytic
Review. Journal of Homosexuality
10(1/2):6982.
Raudenbush,StephenW.,andAnthonyS.Bryk.
2002. Hierarchical Linear Models:
Applications and Data Analysis
Methods.NewburyPark,CA:Sage.
Page 7 of 9
____________andTedJelen.1990.Evangelicals
and Political Tolerance. American
Politics
Research
18(1):
2546.
Page 8 of 9
Appendix
DeterminantsofSupportforSameSexMarriage
Ideology
ReligiousGroup
ImportanceofReligion
Evangelical
Atheist
EducationLevel
Female
Age
Quintilesofwealth
SizeofCity/Town
Mexico
Guatemala
ElSalvador
Honduras
Nicaragua
CostaRica
Panama
Colombia
Ecuador
Bolivia
Peru
Paraguay
Chile
Uruguay
Brazil
Venezuela
DominicanRepublic
Jamaica
Guyana
Trinidad&Tobago
Belize
Suriname
Constant
RSquared
NumberofObs.
*p<0.05
CountryofReference:Argentina
Coefficient.
0.030*
0.061*
0.087*
0.058*
0.020*
0.038*
0.087*
0.114*
0.046*
0.052*
0.088*
0.166*
0.213*
0.148*
0.189*
0.161*
0.146*
0.106*
0.253*
0.217*
0.148*
0.192*
0.104*
0.044*
0.104*
0.172*
0.164*
0.238*
0.220*
0.196*
0.175*
0.172*
0.025*
0.201
28,217
t
(4.86)
(9.28)
(9.90)
(9.91)
(2.50)
(5.46)
(15.02)
(18.85)
(6.80)
(6.61)
(7.92)
(16.27)
(22.19)
(13.75)
(16.24)
(13.31)
(10.49)
(9.38)
(18.01)
(13.18)
(13.52)
(16.57)
(8.21)
(4.08)
(5.50)
(12.87)
(15.67)
(24.71)
(20.31)
(19.15)
(14.36)
(12.53)
(2.69)
Page 9 of 9