A well-known but evidently inaccurate proposal of definition
was made by Bal Gangadhar Tilak, the Father of the Indian
Freedom Struggle , who chose belief in the Vedas, variety in the means and infiniteness of the objects of worship as the criteria for being a Hindu.3 The variety in the means is a valuable contribution, because it explicitates what is often only a tacit assumption presupposed in most Hindu teachings. The acceptance of many approaches to the ultimate truth is indeed a distinctive characteristic of Hinduism, distinguishing it from the exclusivism intrinsic to Christianity and Islam. Yet, this reading may be too optimistic: perhaps disagreement about the means would be a better description than variety in the means . Thus, many of the Sants of the Bhakti movement (Kabir, Nanak, Chaitanya) extol repeating the God-name as the means to Liberation and explicitly denounce both rituals and ascetic practices as false ways. Hindus have only agreed to disagree and not to interfere with other people s practices eventhough these may be considered as deceptive paths leading nowhere. It is perhaps in this sense that Hindus could accept the presence of Christians and Muslims as much as that of rival Hindu sects, because all of them, i.e. both non-Hindus and Hindus of certain rival schools, are considered as being equally in the wrong. At any rate, Hindu tradition has an acute sense of true and false (hence a lively culture of debate), and it does not attribute equal truth to Hindu and non-Hindu, nor even to different Hindu schools of thought. The assumption that all roads lead to the same goal is typical for modern (urban and Western-oriented) Hinduism as propagated by Swami Vivekananda and numerous more recent Gurus. Thus, in his highly critical account of the specificities of Renaissance, English-speaking, eclectic, basically anti-Sanskritic, pamphletistic neo-Vedanta , including its tendency to uncritical synthesis , the late Agehananda Bharati remarks: Patanjali s yoga is for people who have accepted brahmin theology. This is a fact which is systematically overlooked ( ) by many teachers of the Hindu Renaissance. One of their perennial mottoes was that all religions are the same, that everyone can be a yogi on the basis of his own theology, or of no theology. 4 Hinduism, by contrast, has kept up a tradition of debate and scholastic argument since hoary antiquity, and has typically scorned soft options and insisted on radicalism, not in the sense of smashing the heads of people who disagree, but in the sense of settling for nothing less than the truth which liberates. Recent Hindu Revivalists merely return to the genuine Hindu tradition when they state that the comparatively newfangled notion that all religions are one, equal or equally valid ( ) to us is a pleasant falsehood and thereby the biggest stumbling block in the understanding of religion and the religions .5 They refer to the Mahabharata editor Vyasa who exercised his power of discrimination when he observed that moral principles may be shared by all religions ( )but their philosophical positions are often different .6 And who is to say that philosophical viewpoints don t matter? Even at the level of moral precepts, religions are far from equal. Leave alone the details such as dietary taboos, even the general principles may differ considerably. Thus, ecstatic
states provoked by alcohol and other psychotropic substances
are sought after in many animistic and Shamanistic traditions, but abhorred in more sober traditions like Buddhism and Islam. Violence is strongly condemned in Jainism but glorified, at least in specific conditions, in Islam and other religions. Again, these differences exist not only between Hindu and non-Hindu, but also within the Hindu commonwealth of schools and sects. Tilak is aware of this pluriformity; what he intended to add, is that this variety of means is not merely a factual situation, but that it is also valued positively by Hinduism, and that in this, Hinduism differs from its major rivals, which impose a single worldview and a single system of ethics on their adherents. But the major problem with Tilak s definition is the criterion of belief in the Veda . This reduction of Hinduism to the believers in the Veda does injustice to any accepted usage of the term Hindu (apart from contradicting Tilak s own justquoted position of a plurality of ways, arguably including non-Vedic ways as well). For centuries, Brahmins prohibited lower-caste Hindus from hearing, reciting and studying the Vedas, a prohibition still supported in principle by Tilak himself.7 Are those Hindus who are unfamiliar with the Vedas being excluded from the range of the definition? This would be greatly welcomed by anti-Hindu polemicists, who like to claim that only upper-caste Hindus are real Hindus. Moreover, the expression belief in the Vedas shows a rather crude understanding of the exact place of the Veda in the doctrine of its adepts, a place which is radically different from that of the Quran for Muslims. In the Quran it is God who speaks to man, while in the Veda it is man who sings praise to the Gods. It is not even clear what believing would mean in the case of the Vedas, collections of hymns written for a number of Gods by several dozens of male and female poets over several centuries. If someone compiles an Anthology of English Religious Verse, would it make sense to say: I believe in this anthology ? The matter becomes a bit clearer when we consider Tilak s Sanskrit original: prmnyabuddhirvedeshu sdhannmanekat upsynmaniyama etaddharmasya lakshanam. 8 Savarkar translates it as: Belief in the Vedas, many means, no strict rule for worship: these are the features of the Hindu religion. 9 More literally, it would read: Acknowledging the authority of the Vedas, pluralism ( not-one-ness ) of spiritual paths, no fixity about the objects of worship: that is the characteristic of the Dharma. The point is that the Vedas are to be considered as a pramna, a means of valid knowledge , on a par with direct perception and inference. Veda may be understood in a very broad sense (common enough in actual usage, e.g. Vedic medicine , Vedic cooking ): knowledge , as encompassing the entire Vedic corpus including the Upanishads, the Upavedas and the Vedangas, thus meaning the accumulated ancestral knowledge , or more or less the tradition . This then becomes a reasonable proposition: the accumulated knowledge passed on by the ancestors is an important though not exclusive means of knowledge, due to the human reality that we cannot start discovering everything anew through personal experience within a lifetime. It is also distinctive
for Hinduism along with all Pagan cultures, contrasting
them with Christianity and Islam, and to an extent even with Buddhism. The latter category, most radically Islam, rejects ancestral culture, and takes a revolution against the tradition as its starting-point, a total rejection of the preceding age as age of ignorance (jhilya). However, in Tilak s case, there is every reason to assume that he used Veda in the restricted sense: Brahmanic scriptures to the exclusion of all others, notably the four Samhitas ( collections : Rik, Sama, Yajus, Atharva), chanted by Brahmins since time immemorial and supposed to have an auspicious effect. In that case, the problem with Tilak s definition is that for a majority of practising Hindus, the Vedas are only a very distant presence, much less important than the stories from the Itihasa-Purana literature, the rules of conduct laid down in the Dharma-Shastras, and (often counterbalancing the latter) the teachings of the Bhakti poets. This is not because of some revolution rejecting the Vedic heritage, but simply because of the time-lapse, and also because of the jealousy with which the Brahmin caste increasingly distanced the Vedic knowledge from the masses. In the post-Vedic millennia, there was ample room for new writings, and gradually the Veda proper was eclipsed by new Great Narratives, or new formulations of old narratives, springing from the same inspiration as the Vedas but better placed to catch the popular imagination. But at least these younger texts pay homage to the Vedas and fix them as a distant and little-known object of veneration in the collective consciousness. The most influential post-Vedic text, the Mahabharata, is explicitly rooted in the Vedic tradition, but it is younger and not guarded for the exclusive hearing of the Brahmins. Through this indirect lip-service to the Vedas, even illiterate little traditions in Hindu civilization can be covered by Tilak s definition. However, even in its most inclusive reading, Tilak s definition excludes important groups which many Hindu Revivalists insist on including in the Hindu fold: Buddhists, Jains, Brahmo Samajists, etc. Savarkar, before developing his own alternative, rejects Tilak s definition precisely because it is not sufficiently inclusive. Finally, there is a decisive scriptural argument against Tilak s inclusion of belief in the Vedas as a criterion for Hinduism. The Puranas describe (and the Epics occasionally refer to) several dozens of generations of ancestors of the Puru-Bharata lineage which patronized the composition of the Vedas.10 Regardless of whether we accept the historicity of those genealogies and family histories, they prove that Hindus have at least conceived of a pre-Vedic period in Arya/ Hindu civilization. Thus, though the Manu-Smriti in its present version does not pre-date the Christian era, tradition ascribes it (or at least its original version) to Manu Vaivasvata, putative ancestor of all the Puranic dynasties and pre-Vedic founder of Hindu civilization, thought to have lived several generations before the first Vedic poets and a great many before the compilation of the Vedic Samhitas.11 If the central concept of dharma is ascribed to pre-Vedic sages, if the Vedas themselves (like all ancient religious traditions) have an awareness of venerable ancestry, it follows that Hinduism conceives of itself as ultimately predating the Vedas. What else could you expect of a religion