20150502-Schorel-Hlavka To Buloke Shire Council Care of Mayor

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Buloke Shire Council
2-5-2015
Buloke Shire Council's Head Office is located 367 Broadway, Wycheproof, Victoria 3527.
5 C/o buloke@buloke.vic.gov.au
Cr Reid Mather (Mayor) MALLEE WARD Mobile: 0438 306 259 Email:
crmather@buloke.vic.gov.au
Cr David Pollard (Deputy Mayor) LOWER AVOCA WARD Mobile: 0458 918 638 Email: crpollard@buloke.vic.gov.au
Cr Leo Tellefson MOUNT JEFFCOTT WARD Mobile: 0427 320 166 Email: crtellefson@buloke.vic.gov.au
10 Cr Stuart McLean LOWER AVOCA WARD Mobile: 0439 327 839 Email: crmclean@buloke.vic.gov.au
Cr Graeme Milne MOUNT JEFFCOTT WARD Mobile: 0419 126 911 Email: crmilne@buloke.vic.gov.au
Cr Gail Sharp MOUNT JEFFCOTT WARD Mobile: 0437 090 172 Email:
crsharp@buloke.vic.gov.au
Cr Ellen White, MALLEE WARD, Mobile: 0417 560 706, Email: crwhite@buloke.vic.gov.au
Re: Infringement Notice -Fire danger etc

15 Sir/Madam,
further to my previous correspondences (upon which I rely upon also) as to my
property at 10 Anderson Avenue, Berriwillock, having been slashed in about October 2014,
subsequently after the issue of a notice it was slashed again in October 2014 and again in January
2015 by a neighbour who gave me the understanding that he had slashed my property in the same
20 manner as his own.
I understand that Buloke Shire Council itself no longer engage staff to slash the week along the
highways such as Calder Highway, and as I provided images showing that long after the so to say
deadline Buloke Shire Council did set for landholders it had nevertheless weed growing along
the Calder Highway of more than 1 metre high.
25 As Buloke shire Council appears to me to hold the position that regardless who slashed the
weed/grass ultimately the landowner is legally accountable then so the same apply or must apply
to Buloke Shire Council.
One then has to ask; Why is Buloke Shire Council not fined? After all the fire danger along
Calder Highway is a lot greater then a private property well away from Calder Highway.
30 Buloke Shire Council may argue that its contractors were engaged to slash the weed, but I had
my neighbour doing it and one cannot apply DOUBLE STANDARDS.
When one drives from Calcoa to Berriwillock then not only around the Berriwillock sign but also
on the other side of the road near what I refer to as being a creek there is high weed/grass.
35
Before going further into this matter one has to ask if safety and wellbeing of Buloke Shire
residents is the real issue then why is it that Buloke Shire Council and indeed councillors
themselves to my knowledge did absolutely nothing to safeguard the health and wellbeing not
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G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
INSPECTOR-RIKATI about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD
A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0
PLEASE NOTE: You may order books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series by making a reservation, See also
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just of themselves but also that of family and other residents within Buloke Shire Council? After
all for the about 25 years that I have battled GWMWater for supplying untreated water, and
so in violation to the Safe Drinking Water Act 2003, Buloke Shire Council simply seems to
ignore this, despite my past writing to it about this.
http://tex.parliament.vic.gov.au/bin/texhtmlt?form=jVicHansard.dumpall&db=hansard91&dodraft=0&house=ASSE
MBLY&speech=23716&activity=Second+Reading&title=SAFE+DRINKING+WATER+BILL&date1=7&date2=M
ay&date3=2003&query=true%0a%09and+%28+data+contains+'safe'%0a%09and+data+contains+'water'+%29
QUOTE
10
Mr ANDREWS (Mulgrave) - It is a pleasure to speak in support of the Safe Drinking Water Bill. This bill forms part of the
government's strategic approach to water management, with specific attention being paid to water quality and risk
management as matters of public health. It is worth noting that this is a debate about public health and about making sure
that each community across our state has access to the highest quality water. It is also worth noting that this bill has been
introduced by the Minister for Health as a matter of public health.
15
The bill has four specific objectives. Before going on to those I welcome the support shown by the Liberal and National
parties for this bill. Every endeavour has been made to try to provide as much information as possible.
END QUOTE
While GWMWater claims to have obtained in 2007 an exemption I understand this was under a
20 falsehood that customers would wrongly assume they were provided with Safe Drinking Water.
How can it be wrongly assumed by customers where by law they were and are entitled to Safe
Drinking Water? What we had was that despite the State Government providing a reported $465
million for water providers to upgrade the systems, so that by 1 January 2004 they would supply
safe drinking water. GWMWater as I understand it failed to comply with the Safe Drinking
25 Water Act 2003 in 2004, 2005, 2006 and it seems to me under a falsehood gaining an exemption.
Such exemption however based upon a falsehood is without legal force!
Councillors should consider that the Department of Health (as I have published in my
correspondence on my blog www.scribd.com/inspectorrikati the severe dangers that can result
from drinking untreated water! Indeed GWMWater itself has issued warnings against this.
30 How often I may ask did any councillor bother to check if a relative, friend, visitors having fallen
ill was so because of drinking untreated water? When in October 2013 I attended to my
Berriwillock property I fell severely ill that my wife was concerned I was to die. For weeks I was
very ill in bed. Consider a bus load of small children coming from a town where they ordinary
drink safe drinking water, stopping at some service station and unbeknown to them they start
35 drinking the untreated water from the water tap. If any of them were to fall serious ill and/or
die then Buloke Shire Council itself in my view could have a real issue on its hand that it failed
to deal with this issue despite I notified it about it.
Just consider how many babies are washed in untreated water where the parents are unaware
40 that the water through their taps is in fact untreated water?
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Instead of fighting GWMWater for endangering the community and others (A real health risk!)
in Buloke Shire I have that Buloke Shire Council rather takes up a fight against me regarding
alleged fire dangers. In the meantime councillors themselves and others, including family
members, are accumulating in their bodies the elements that are contained in the untreated
5 water! If councillors and staff of Buloke Shire Council are not aware of the dangers of
consuming untreated water then they better do some appropriate research before it is too late
if not for themselves then for family members. This as once they succumb to the effects of
having been provided with untreated water then it is too late! Again my blog has relevant
details on it also about the dangers.
10 And to prove I am not making it up I reproduce below a notice by GWMWater!
Just that I understand from people that they think that boiling water will make the untreated
water suitable for drinking. It is not as the dangerous elements in the water remains! Regretfully
15 it appears to me Buloke Shire Council is more obsessed to pursue me then to concern itself with
real issues governing citizens in the Shire of Buloke and so also any visitors. Ask yourself what
happened with the millions of dollars the State Government (from our taxes) provided to upgrade
the systems?
Do you know if any of your family members may have serious health problems or will suffer
20 from this in time due to the long or short term usage of untreated water? And yes I alerted
Premier Daniel Andrews and Former Water Minister Peter Ryan (the local Member of
Parliament) about it but it seems as long as I am the sole complainant they ignore it, as much as
Buloke Shire Council so far did. It basically playing Russian roulette with the lives of people and
when something disastrous eventuates then they all will blame whomever. Well if for example
25 your child were to become mentally or otherwise disabled as result of the usage of untreated
water are you then boosting about how you could possibly have avoided it but didnt care to do
so?
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Getting back to the alleged fire danger, I in late 2013 purchased a ride on mower just to slash the
10 Anderson Avenue property at Berriwillock, as I have no other use for it, and as such, it clearly
demonstrate that I then did slash the property. However, in 2014 due to the station wagon being
broken down due to (as later was found) the gearbox failure it became clear that despite having a
5 ride on mower I had no way to travel with it to Berriwillock. However, in the alternative I was
able to arrange with a neighbour for him to slash the weed/grass. As I indicated he did so 3 times.
If any alleged inspection held it was not good enough, for whatever reason, then I view there
should have been a feedback as to why this was held to be so. How on earth could my neighbour
know what may be deemed not having been done sufficient if there is no feedback in that regard.
10 As he indicated to me he did his own property also and to him both were the same. And no notice
was issue against him!
If one so to say want to find something against a person then any freak will be able to do so but
reality is that where the property had been slashed not once, not twice but 3 times then surely the
15 intend of this ought to have stopped this nonsense as to an Infringement Notice.
Regardless if I would or wouldnt have filled in anything on the Infringement Notice, I did
indicate it was misplaced and my 82 year old wife hasnt got a clue what happened with it. As
such Buloke Shire Council failure to forward a copy as I requested via email cannot be ignored.
.
20 As I understand it the Infringement Act requires matter that is if pursued (As Buloke Shire
Council can simply not proceed with it), requires it to be filed with the Infringement court.
However, as I indicated in my previous correspondences, I object to it on constitution grounds
(that is the Federal constitution - Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK))
which in s106 created the States subject to this constitution. And as the Infringement Court
25 purportedly is part of the Magistrates Court of Victoria but not one that allows a hearing as a
Chapter III court of the constitution then I view it has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the
matters. The Infringement Court is not a Court invested with federal jurisdiction.
In February 2011 the Victorian Police alleged that I had been exceeding the speed limit by 5
kilometres an hours and issue an Infringement Notice. I challenged this on constitutional grounds
30 as a CONSTITUTIONALIST I for example on 19 July 2006 comprehensively defeated the
Commonwealth of Australia on compulsory voting in the County Court of Victoria exercising
federal jurisdiction, to which all state and Territorian Attorney-Generals had been served with a
s78B NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS. I also challenged the validity of the
purported Victorian Constitution Act 1975 and raised the issue that it is a violation of separation
35 of powers to have courts using the same ABN number as the Attorney-Generals Department.
I on 6 July 2006 published a book:
40
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A book on CD on Australians political, religious & other rights
ISBN 0-9751760-2-1
CHAPTER 03 NOT VOTING IN BANANA REPUBLIC
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ADDRESS TO THE COURT

County Court of Victoria, Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630
060719gh-address-part 1-v7
Below you will find I have quoted parts of the ADDRESS TO THE COURT in which
proceedings I comprehensively defeated the Commonwealth of Australia regarding numerous
constitutional issues.
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ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2
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QUOTE ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2

I am well aware that there is an implied bias by the County Court of Victoria where it shares the same ABN
business registration number as the Justice Department and the magistrates Court of Victoria against which I
appealed its conviction, and this also is a issue of concern to me.
To me it represents to be a STAR CHAMBER COURT which is outlaws under the, so called, 1640 STAR
CHAMBER COURT Act and which is part of Victorian legislation, at least when I last checked the Act
Interpretation Act 1980 (Vic).
I refer back to the extensive set out on this matter that I placed on file in my ADDRESS TO THE COURT filed
for the 16 and 17 November 2005 proceedings held before the Magistrates Court of Victoria at Heidelberg and
now being DE NOVO before this Court. For example that the County court of Victoria, the Magistrates Court of
Victoria, the Justice the Department and among many others the Prostitution Committee are all in the same
business by sharing the same ABN number.
Also to consider;
Title
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS LEGISLATION (FURTHER AMENDMENT) BILL
House
ASSEMBLY
Activity Second Reading
Members DEAN
Date
16 August 2000
Page
64
16 August 2000 ASSEMBLY
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Page 64
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COURTS AND TRIBUNALS LEGISLATION (FURTHER AMENDMENT) BILL

Second reading
Debate resumed from 15 August; motion of Mr HULLS (Attorney-General).
Dr DEAN (Berwick) -- Last night I made mention of a certain portion of the bill that is perhaps
gaining more interest than other sections. I noted that the Attorney-General has spent most of his
contribution to debate on the bill on that particular point rather than the substance of the bill. That
particular point is the removal of the oath to the Queen from the two oaths of office given by lawyers
prior to being admitted to the Supreme Court.
Recapping, it was suggested that because England had done away with it, therefore we should.
I noted that that was an interesting approach by the government. I also noted that those states that do
not have the oath to the Queen -- of course, South Australia, Tasmania, Northern Territory and
Queensland do have it -- have not seen fit to introduce legislation to remove that oath of office. That
is the nub of the point I wish to make in the few minutes that I will talk on the bill.
There is absolutely no mention in the second-reading speech of any agreement by the judiciary to the
removal of the oath to the Queen.
Mr Hulls -- Don t disclose confidences!
Dr DEAN -- I know from the Attorney-General s past conduct that, while he would not refer to any
particular conversations, if he had the support of the judiciary he would let everybody know that.
The question then arises of whether he has the support of the judiciary. My information is that he
does not. Therefore, although the opposition does not oppose the bill it is of the view that it is
inappropriate to go ahead with legislation to change the procedures which have been set up and
which are accepted by the courts, particularly when those courts have not consented to the changes
and may not wish the introduction of legislation to make them. It is a total interference by the
legislature in the procedures of the courts.
It is astounding to take the step of introducing legislation and interfering with the judicial process on
such a small issue, presumably because of a political belief. To not have the agreement of the
judiciary is totally inappropriate. I could understand if there were a major conflict between the
legislature and the judiciary and we could have it out; however, it is an issue not of major conflict but
of political whim.
The fact is that many people still recognise that until Australia becomes a republic the courts are the
Queen s courts, and that therefore the Queen has a role to play; and it may be traditional. I am happy
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to state my view that if the courts come to the conclusion that some people they are admitting to
practice may not wish to
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make a particular oath, I am very happy for the courts to abolish that oath. If they as courts believe
they wish to retain an oath I am not happy that the legislature should step in and force them to change
the situation.
On an issue as trivial as this it is a misunderstanding of the separation of powers to allow the
legislature to instruct the courts on how to go about their internal procedures -- and this is an internal
procedure. When one is admitted to practise as a barrister and solicitor of the Supreme Court one
goes before the Supreme Court and the justices of the court arrive at the bench to listen to one take
the oath of admission. The bill means that the legislature has stepped into their court and said,
Because I, the Attorney-General, have a political view, I will step into your court and tell you what
you must do about this matter .
I was going to say it is incredibly naive -- I do not want to cast aspersions on anyone -- but it is
beyond belief that someone who has on many occasions espoused separation of powers and the
difference between the legislature and judiciary would make such a slip. We have been told that the
next step will be legislation to tell courts how people who appear before them may dress. Whether
the profession or the judiciary decide they do or do not want people to wear wigs when they appear
before them, we are told that will be the Attorney-General s next step. One has to ask, Where will it
stop? .
Mr Hulls interjected.
Dr DEAN -- That is a cheap shot but it misses the principle.
I am in favour of the abolition of wigs, particularly in civil matters, but the difference between me
and the Attorney-General is that I will not and would not introduce legislation, firstly, on such a
trivial matter, and secondly, on a matter that tramples on the jurisdiction of the court. If the AttorneyGeneral does not understand that principle at all, what will be the next step? Perhaps the AttorneyGeneral will come to the view that there are other things about the courts he does not like and he will
introduce legislation on them? Perhaps a couple of the decisions they make will not suit him and he
will legislate on those. Once you open the door to legislation on the internal workings of the courts,
you are opening a door to a breach of the separation of powers.
In my view, a Court of law must at all times remain a Court of the people (Queens Court) and
cannot have a business registration as then it no longer is a Court of the people. Neither do I
accept that the Commonwealth of Australia has any constitutional powers to force upon a
State Court to become a registered business entity being it for taxation or other purposes, as
this interferes with the sovereign rights of the States to have their own independent courts.
Therefore I view the judgement of the Magistrates Court of Victoria at Heidelberg to issue
orders of convictions is ULTRA VIRES, as it is done by a some kind of STAR CHAMBER
COURT type of Court that has a business interest and is no longer a Court independent of
any business interest.
END QUOTE ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2
ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2
I refer back to the extensive set out on this matter that I placed on file in my ADDRESS TO THE COURT filed
for the 16 and 17 November 2005 proceedings held before the Magistrates Court of Victoria at Heidelberg and
now being DE NOVO before this Court. For example that the County court of Victoria, the Magistrates Court of
Victoria, the Justice the Department and among many others the Prostitution Committee are all in the same
business by sharing the same ABN number.
The following was also part of the appeal before the county Court of Victoria on 19-6-2006.
60
ADDRESS TO THE COURT Part 1

INCLUDING SUBMISSIONS
For 16 November 2005 special hearing
Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630
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Prepared by the Defendant, Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka
The problem is also, that the Commonwealth of Australia has provided legislation as to ABN numbers for
corporations, and it appears to me that the State Courts have also fallen for the trap to follow suit in this
unconstitutional conduct.
No one who is employed or otherwise engaged to work for a private enterprise, being it a corporation or
otherwise can be deemed to be a suitable adjudicator in matters governing enforcement of legislations.
Corporations are to make profits. A Court never can be set up to operate as some private corporation to make
profits. Albeit, time and again the issue of cost is argued, and so in particular with the so called Family Court of
Australia, as to the cost of dealing with cases, this is what rather causes to sidetrack from what a Court is really
about. To dispense JUSTICE.
I understand that "government" mean "public", and "corporation" mean "non -government" or "private"? Isn't
"government corporation" an oxymoron?
15
For example, the Federal Court of Australia places a "typed-in" ABN No (49 110 847 399) on their letterhead --- a tad astonishing!
The HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA (which is its "Trading Name") has an ABN of 69 445 188 989.
20
Search results
This extract is based on information supplied by businesses to the Registrar of the Australian Business Register.
Neither the Registrar nor the Federal Government guarantee that this information is accurate, up to date or
complete. You should consider verifying this information from other sources.
25
Your search for MAGISTRATES COURT OF VICTORIA found 2 names (sorted by relevance)
Indicates exact match
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Indicates close match
ABN
Name
Name Type
Location
32 790 228 959

Active
MAGISTRATES COURT VICTORIA
Other Name
3000 VIC
60 265 617 271

Active
Federal Magistrates Court of Australia
Other Name
3000 VIC
Page 1 of 1
Retrieved on: 03 Sep 2005
Last updated on: 02 Sep 2005
30
business.gov.au
ABN Lookup
Advanced search
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Current Details for 32 790 228 959
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Last modified on:
09 Aug 2005
ABN:
32 790 228 959
ABN Status:
Entity Name:
Entity Type:
Main Business Location
State:
Postcode:
Trading Name(s)
Active from 01 Nov 1999

STATE OF VICTORIA - DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
State Government Entity
view history
VIC
3000
Victim Support Agency
Corrections Victoria
Sentencing Advisory Council
JUDICIAL COLLEGE OF VICTORIA
BOOKMAKER & BOOKMAKERS CLERK'S REGISTRATION COMMITTEE
GAMBLING RESEARCH PANEL
LIQUOR LICENSING VICTORIA
RACING APPEALS TRIBUNAL
TRADE MEASUREMENT VICTORIA
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
PRIVACY VICTORIA
OFFICE OF THE VICTORIAN PRIVACY COMMISSIONER
VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION
ADULT PAROLE BOARD VICTORIA
ASSET CONFISCATION OFFICE
BUSINESS LICENSING AUTHORITY
CONSUMER CREDIT FUND
COUNCIL AGAINST VIOLENCE
COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA
DEFENCE RESERVES RE-EMPLOYMENT BOARD
DONOR TISSUE BANK OF VICTORIA
ESTATE AGENTS COUNCIL
MOTOR CAR TRADERS GUARANTEE FUND CLAIMS COMMITTEE
OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE
PATRIOTIC FUNDS COUNCIL OF VICTORIA
PROSTITUTION CONTROL ACT MINISTERIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
VICTORIA STATE EMERGENCY SERVICE
VICTORIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
VICTORIAN COMMUNITY COUNCIL AGAINST VIOLENCE
VICTORIAN GOVERNMENT SOLICITOR
VICTORIAN INSTITUTE OF FORENSIC MEDICINE
Other Registrations
GST Status:
Deductible Gift Recipient:
Effective from 01 Jul 2000

STATE OF VICTORIA - DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE operates the
following Funds, Authorities or Institutions. Gifts to these Funds, Authorities or
Institutions may be deductible:
Name
From
01 Jul 2000
Important: Please read Deductible gift recipient (DGR) information before making
a gift.
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Historical Details for 32 790 228 959
Last modified on:
ABN:
09 Aug 2005
32 790 228 959
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Active
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(current)
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STATE OF VICTORIA - DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
From
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(current)
Main Business Locations

VIC 3000
From
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(current)
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Victim Support Agency
Corrections Victoria
Sentencing Advisory Council
JUDICIAL COLLEGE OF VICTORIA
BOOKMAKER & BOOKMAKERS CLERK'S REGISTRATION
COMMITTEE
GAMBLING RESEARCH PANEL
LIQUOR LICENSING VICTORIA
RACING APPEALS TRIBUNAL
TRADE MEASUREMENT VICTORIA
THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
PRIVACY VICTORIA
OFFICE OF THE VICTORIAN PRIVACY COMMISSIONER
VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION
ADULT PAROLE BOARD VICTORIA
ASSET CONFISCATION OFFICE
BUSINESS LICENSING AUTHORITY
CONSUMER CREDIT FUND
COUNCIL AGAINST VIOLENCE
DEFENCE RESERVES RE-EMPLOYMENT BOARD
DONOR TISSUE BANK OF VICTORIA
ESTATE AGENTS COUNCIL
MOTOR CAR TRADERS GUARANTEE FUND CLAIMS COMMITTEE
OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE
PATRIOTIC FUNDS COUNCIL OF VICTORIA
PROSTITUTION CONTROL ACT MINISTERIAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
From
09 Aug 2005
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To
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(current)
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VICTORIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
VICTORIAN COMMUNITY COUNCIL AGAINST VIOLENCE
VICTORIAN GOVERNMENT SOLICITOR
VICTORIAN INSTITUTE OF FORENSIC MEDICINE
VICTIMS REFERRAL & ASSISTANCE SERVICE
CORE THE PUBLIC CORRECTIONAL ENTERPRISE
REGISTRAR OF BIRTHS DEATHS & MARRIAGES VICTORIA
REGISTRY OF BIRTHS DEATHS & MARRIAGES
GST Status
Active
Deductible Gift Recipient Status (DGR)
DGR Fund, Authority or Institution Name
STATE OF VICTORIA - DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - DONOR TISSUE
BANK OF VICTORIA
(current)
(current)
(current)
(current)
(current)
(current)
05 Jun 2001
09 Aug 2005
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28 Jul 2003
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Your search for COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA found 21 names (sorted by relevance)
ABN
32 790 228 959
Active
10
24 Mar 2000
24 Mar 2000
24 Mar 2000
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24 Mar 2000
24 Mar 2000
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24 Mar 2000
Name
Name Type
Other Name
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3000 VIC
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Your search for SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA found 12 names (sorted by relevance)
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ABN
Name
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Location
32 790 228 959

Active
Other Name
3000 VIC
77 057 165 500

Active
SUPREME COURT
Trading
Name
2000 NSW
42 426 227 089

Active
SENIOR MASTER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF

VICTORIA
Entity Name
3000 VIC
15
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Many questions now start to come up.

eg: "Are Courts businesses?"
and: "Is the Law to be traded?"
and: "Can Right or Justice be sold, denied or delayed - setting Magna Carta at nought?"
Are Courts dealing with cases as a business entity in a way to make a profit, and as such charging for transcripts,
tape recording, etc as to make a profit and by this deny parties who suffer hardship of obtaining transcripts/tapes
for further proceedings?
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Commonwealth Government Entity

A government entity is:
a. a department of State of the Commonwealth, or
b. a department of the Parliament, or
c. an executive agency, or statutory agency, within the meaning of the Public Service Act 1999, or
d. a department of State of a State or Territory, or
e. an organisation that:
i. is not an entity, and
ii. is either established by the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory (whether under a law or not) to carry on an
enterpise or established for a public purpose by an Australian law, and
iii. can be separately identified by reference to the nature of the activities carried on through the organisation or
the location of the organisation
whether or not the organisation is part of a department or branch described in paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d) or of
another o
See also the ATO's Glossary of Terms. "
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From Site:
http://www.abr.business.gov.au/(o31xlg55yl2kx5ydqri0kcvo)/WebProcessEngine.aspx?pid=0&sid=0&outcome=
0
To quote the Reserve Bank Act 1957 Section 7:
"The Reserve Bank of Australia
(1) Notwithstanding the repeal effected by subsection 4(1), the body corporate established under the
Commonwealth Bank Act 1911 and continued in existence under the Commonwealth Bank Act 1945, under the
name Commonwealth Bank of Australia: (a) is preserved and continues in existence as a body corporate under
and subject to the provisions of this Act, under the name Reserve bank of Australia, but so that the corporate
indentity of the body corporate shall not be affected; (b) shall have a seal; and (c) is capable of acquiring, holding
and disposing of real and personal property and of suing and being sued.".
In the Oxford Reference Dictionary of Law, it says: "body corporate See corporation".
35 It must be clear that the ABN issue was before the courts and as I succeeded comprehensively in
the appeals then that should be the end of it, because the Infringement Court and neither a
Magistrate can overrule this decision.
I may add that I also relied upon numerous other issues, including the issue of citizenship being a
40 political rights (franchise, etc) and nothing to do with nationality.
As I challenged since February 2011 (regarding the Infringement Notice) the validity of the
Infringement Court, the failure to apply Magistrates court of Victoria rules, etc, and failing to be
an open court, and challenged the validity of the Infringement Act itself then from then on the
45 Act is and remains to be ULTRA VIRES unless and until if ever at all the High Court of
Australia declares it to be INTRA VIRES.
International Finance Trust Company Limited v New South Wales Crime Commission [2009] HCA 49 (12 November 2009)
50
55
60
QUOTE
In 1864 the Supreme Court of the United States said: "Parties whose rights are to be affected are
entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified."[193]
Under Pt 2 of the Act, there is notification only after the defendant's rights are affected, and no provision for
any opportunity for defendants to argue that orders affecting them should be dissolved. In 1965 the Supreme
Court of the United States said that the opportunity to be heard "must be granted at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner."[194]
END QUOTE
Article 11 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
"Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law in a public trial at which she/he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence."
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END QUOTE
R v. Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia [1956] HCA 10; (1956) 94 CLR 254 (2
March 1956) was a case in which the High Court of Australia held that the judicial power of the
5 Commonwealth could not be vested in a tribunal that also exercised non-judicial functions.
Although the court's reasons did not examine the fundamental justifications for the separation of
judicial and executive powers, this case is one of the foundations for that doctrine in Australian
law.
The significance of the case was that it restricted the use of judicial power to Chapter III courts
10 (under the Australian Constitution), also established that these courts could exercise no other
power. In this way, it set a high standard for the separation of judicial power.
process
presumption of innocence
mistrial
15
20
Definition Save to Favorites See Examples

Conduct of legal proceedings strictly according to established principles and procedures, laid down to ensure fair
trial for every accused. Because the infallibility of court judgments cannot be guaranteed, the legal system aims to
secure this second-best but possible option. The guaranty of due process means no accused is punished without an
orderly and adequate procedure that is applicable uniformly in all cases. Under a due process, every accused gets an
advance notice of trial, and an opportunity to be present, to be heard, and to defend himself or herself. It also
includes the rights to (1) legal counsel, (2) confront and cross examine the witnesses, (3) refuse self-incriminating
Read more: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/due-process.html#ixzz2mjxpd0CQ

From The Age
25 http://www.theage.com.au/news/Opinion/The-corporatising-of-our-courts/2005/03/23/1111525218521.html
30
The corporatising of our courts

Retirement speech of John K. Phillips, Supreme Court of Victoria
March 24, 2005
QUOTE
As we all know, the independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of our constitutional system,
particularly the independence of this court, which must, from time to time, tell the political arms what they
can and cannot do according to law. As a court we will rarely, if ever, be popular with politicians, but while I
have been sitting here, I have seen what appears to me to be some erosion of this court's independence.
END QUOTE
QUOTE John K. Phillips statement
March 24, 2005
40
In his parting words from the Supreme Court bench, John D. Phillips warns of a dangerous erosion of the
court's independence.
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For more than 14 years I have been sitting here, and it has been hard and unremitting, but exciting and
rewarding - emotionally, I hasten to add, before I am misunderstood. But for much of that time I have had to
bite my tongue.
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15
I refer to policy matters rather than the debate within a particular case. For, during my time on the bench, and
especially as I grew more senior, I have watched with some concern a change emerge in the perception of this
court by others and some blurring of essential distinctions. I want to speak briefly of that now because I have
been unable to say much about it until now and when my resignation becomes effective, I fear that nobody
will listen.
One of the most public examples recently was the refusal of the executive to accept the decision on
remuneration handed down by the tribunal established by the Parliament for the very purpose of freeing both
Parliament and the executive from the invidiousness of the decision-making process over judicial salaries and
so ensuring the independence of which I am speaking.
Less well known was the refusal of earlier governments to allow that the court's own chief executive officer
be appointed by the Governor-in-Council and its insistence that that officer be appointed by and be ultimately
answerable to the Department of Justice, which is what happened.
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30
That appears now, if I may say so, to have been but part of a movement towards this court's becoming
absorbed into that department, and it is that to which I want to draw attention in particular; for such a
movement must be reversed if this court is to have, and to keep, its proper role under the constitution.
This court is not some part of the public service and it must never be seen as such. Established as a court of
plenary jurisdiction and with supervisory jurisdiction over all other courts and tribunals, this court is the third
arm of government, co-equal in concept with Parliament and the executive. Its role, inter alia, is to control
and to limit those other arms according to law and to that end to stand between those other arms and the
citizen. Hence the emphasis on the court's independence, especially from the executive.
Yet within the Department of Justice this court is now identified and dealt with - would you believe - as
"Business Unit 19" within a section labelled "courts and tribunals", a section which indiscriminately
includes all three tiers of the court structure and VCAT.
This court is subject to direction on the raising of taxes in the form of court fees - in that these are prescribed
by departmental regulation, even if a part of those fees is redirected to the court by the department at its
discretion. The other day the department used a regulation to prescribe a procedure in this court, apparently in
disregard, if not in defiance, of the convention that such matters are for rules of court.
35
And perhaps most troubling of all: the judges' computers, which were provided by and through the
department, are but part of the departmental network. I do not say that departmental officers ordinarily avail
themselves of the access that that affords; one hopes the department has some controls in place. But access is
possible, and that seems to me altogether inappropriate when the state, in one form or another, is the major
litigant in this court, and sometimes on matters of critical import to the wider community.
40
Nobody is suggesting that the executive would ever seek to influence a judge's decision directly, otherwise
than by argument in open court, but what has been happening is more insidious. What is evolving is a
perception of the court as some sort of unit or functionary within the Department of Justice, a perception
which is inconsistent with this court's fundamental role and underlying independence.
45
Indeed I think it is fair to say that the Supreme Court, despite its dominant role within the court structure and
its constitutional role vis-a-vis the other arms of government, is now seen by some in authority as no different
from a tribunal, nowadays the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal in particular. That is simply not
the case; yet the distinction between a court and a tribunal has been steadily undermined over the years, and it
must be restored if the proper constitutional position is not 2to be subverted.
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The basic distinction is easy enough. A court exercises judicial power and must be, and be seen to be,
impartial and so must be independent of all else. Accordingly, its judges are appointed once and for all, and
ideally, without hope of additional gain or reward from anyone, including any other arm of government.
Hence Parliament's creation of the specialist remuneration tribunal. In contrast to a court, a tribunal, properly
so called, exercises administrative functions but not judicial power, and many things flow from that. Such a
tribunal may be an arm of the executive; its members may be appointed for fixed terms, with the possibility
of renewal at the discretion of the executive; and the need is not so great, to see that their remuneration is
fixed independently of the executive.
You will see, now, how far the distinction between court and tribunal has become blurred. While the
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal is staffed by a few judges, it consists mainly of members
appointed for fixed terms, capable of renewal at the discretion of the executive - and hence my alarm when,
in addition to its administrative work, that tribunal was given some judicial power to exercise, for the latter is
altogether inconsistent with such a form of tenure.
10
There is talk now of acting judges for this court, and again, because this is a court which is exercising judicial
power, such would be anathema. It is one thing to tolerate the occasional acting appointment to this court for
a limited time or purpose; it is altogether different to institutionalise such temporary appointments at the
discretion of the executive. Judges of a court properly so called must have security of tenure or, in a relatively
small community like this in Victoria, the whole system is put at risk. Our courts have been remarkably free
from any taint of bias or corruption; let it remain that way. A judge must be, and be seen to be, impartial and
so must eschew all other interests which might one day give rise to conflict or the appearance of bias.
15
20
In my book, the judge must forgo the current cult of the individual: to adapt Edmund Burke, "individuals pass
like shadows, but the (institution) is fixed and stable". The judge is sometimes accused of remoteness but in
one sense that is no more than the reverse side of the commitment, the total commitment, which is demanded
of the appointee.
25
John D. Phillips is retiring as a judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria. This is part of his farewell address to
the court.
END QUOTE John K. Phillips statement
Constitutionally there is a division between the Judiciary and the legislators and executives. As
30 indicated the States are created subject to this constitution within s106 of the constitution and
bound by the legal principles embedded in this constitution. As such the States have only
constitutional Parliaments, which has no power to interfere with the judiciary. The High court
of Australia made this also clear in the Kable (NSW) case No Attorney-General has the
constitutional powers to interfere with the judiciary but nevertheless the former Attorney35 General Robert Hulls and the Police Minister at the time signed a charge with TENIX
SOLUTIONS MIE Pty Ltd that it now can actually access court computers and use them to issue
Magistrate Court of Victoria court orders as well as warrants, all without any open court hearing.
As such the corruption into the judicial system is rife, because the government bodies allow a
private corporation to not just access court files but to even issue (albeit unconstitutionally) court
40 orders and warrants.
His Honour refers to being the third arm of Government, rather than the 3rd arm of the
sovereign State. No judiciary can be part of the Government because this infringes upon the
independence of the judiciary. However, it should be understood that the State of Victoria is in a
45 limited manner a sovereign state (subject to the constitution it has no sovereign Parliament
as it is a constitutional Parliament.
50
HANSARD 9-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

QUOTE
Mr. HIGGINS.-No, because the Constitution is not passed by the Parliament.
END QUOTE
.
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Page 15
HANSARD18-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention)
QUOTE Mr. ISAACS.The right of a citizen of this great country, protected by the implied guarantees of its Constitution,
END QUOTE
Hansard 2-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates
QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN (Victoria).The record of these debates may fairly be expected to be widely read, and the observations to which I
allude might otherwise lead to a certain amount of misconception.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Dr. COCKBURN: All our experience hitherto has been under the condition of parliamentary
sovereignty. Parliament has been the supreme body. But when we embark on federation we throw
parliamentary sovereignty overboard. Parliament is no longer supreme. Our parliaments at present are
not only legislative, but constituent bodies. They have not only the power of legislation, but the power
of amending their constitutions. That must disappear at once on the abolition of parliamentary
sovereignty. No parliament under a federation can be a constituent body; it will cease to have the
power of changing its constitution at its own will. Again, instead of parliament being supreme, the
parliaments of a federation are coordinate bodies-the main power is split up, instead of being vested in
one body. More than all that, there is this difference: When parliamentary sovereignty is dispensed
with, instead of there being a high court of parliament, you bring into existence a powerful judiciary
which towers above all powers, legislative and executive, and which is the sole arbiter and interpreter
of the constitution.
END QUOTE
.
You may perhaps get the picture why I comprehensively defeated the Commonwealth of
30 Australia and the then Attorney-General Robb for the State of Victoria indicated to accept the
decision of the court. As such, I am entitled to the benefit of the courts decision to then
uphold both my appeals and I view Buloke Shire Council purportedly seeking to enforce
laws of the State of Victoria is bound by it also.
35 As I indicated in previous correspondence there is also an issue that Buloke Shire Council
appears to require payments to be made to Buloke Shire Council and as such it is I view
unconstitutionally obtaining payments.
First of all monies collected for or by the State government must be placed in the consolidate
revenue funds. As such, any fines should be paid into the consolidated Revenue funds.
40 Further, as I have also set out extensively in Sydney Municipal council v the commonwealth
(1904) the High Court of Australia held that rates are an exercise of delegated land taxation
powers of the state. As such I view that all monies collected as Rates should be paid into the
Consolidated Revenue funds and can only be drawn by Appropriation Bills. However, the
commonwealth commenced on 11 November 1910 the Land Tax Office (the forerunner of the
45 ATO) and from that moment the states no longer had land taxation legislative powers and that
means that constitutionally the municipal/shire councils neither could raise rates. They only
could charge for actual cost incurred to a citizen such as for rubbish collection, but no more.
While in 1953 the land Tax Abolition Act was enacted it did however in section 3 prohibit
further land taxation. While the 1952 Act was then followed with the 1952 act this later act
50 however was itself later abolished and so Section 3 of the Land Tax Abolition Act 1952 came
back in force. It may have been a technical oversight but nevertheless that is what laws are about
and why lawyers are earning big bucks in representing parties.
55
QUOTE Melbourne CBD landlords reeling from council land tax rises
Melbourne CBD landlords reeling from council land tax rises
From Jim
I wonder how much more extortion and "screwing" Melbourne's CBD retail property owners will endure
before they revolt against the greedy corrupt Melbourne city council's unconstitutional land tax scam? The
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30
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Page 16
landlords will naturally pass this added tax burden onto their tenants who in turn will pass it onto their
customers through higher prices, fees and charges for their products and services.
Jim
CBD landlords reeling from tax rises
March 13, 2013
Chris Vedelago
CBD retail landlords are being hit with land tax increases of up to 1400 per cent, with critics alleging that the
city council has ''grossly'' over-estimated commercial land values in the city's core.
A Swanston Street retail building owner has had a tax bill rise from $4600 to $68,900 after a council
assessment found his property had more than tripled in value in just two years, according to a survey by
agency Kliger Wood.
''The valuations are just outrageous. You can't get a doubling or tripling of values in such a short time,''
an owner of several CBD buildings told BusinessDay. ''Paying those kinds of rates are going to affect the
ability of people to run their buildings.''
City councils have valuations every two years, with the State Revenue Office using the assessment to
calculate what investors will pay in land tax over the following two years. The 2013 bills based on valuations
conducted in 2012 were sent out earlier this year.
''For some owners the increase will be unbelievably high - or even seem crazy,'' said Kliger Wooddirector
Barry Novy, whose firm controls one of the largest commercial rental portfolios in the metropolitan area.
Kliger Wood found site-value assessments generally rose between 30 per cent and 100 per cent in the
prime retail precincts of the CBD and Southbank. As a result, land tax bills rose 80 per cent to 250 per
cent.
''The system is out of order. It will become too expensive for people to hold properties and it will force
people to sell or redevelop,'' Mr Novy said.
Industry operators argue that the sharp rise in land values is difficult to reconcile with CBD retailing's
recent ''difficult'' conditions.
Grant Jackson of valuation firm m3property said there had been no significant change in planning or
use in these retail areas that could account for the rise in land values since the 2010 assessment period.
''There could be some serious flow-on effects to the value of an overall asset. The land tax is coming
straight off the net return of the property and these properties are bought on their net return,'' Mr
Jackson said. ''They can't just slug the tenant with a large rental increase if the tenant can't afford it.''
The tax rise is expected to cause a surge in objections to the SRO, which have been rising since the
2008 financial crisis. Objections spiked 65 per cent in financial year 2011-12, which was before the
latest assessments were issued.
''From 2008 to 2010 was a very tough time and a lot of property owners were shocked not to see their
underlying land value drop, given the difficulties of the market. To see those increases in a relatively
difficult market environment since 2010 is very surprising,'' Mr Jackson said.
Melbourne City Council said valuations were based on current rents and sale prices.
http://www.theage.com.au/business/cbd-landlords-reeling-from-tax-rises-20130312-2fyev.html
END QUOTE Melbourne CBD landlords reeling from council land tax rises
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON: That will absorb nine delegates in each delegation, three for each of these, and the Prime
Minister of each colony represented be an ex officio member of each Committee.
END QUOTE
And
50
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60

QUOTE Mr. BARTON:
The third contains conditions without which Federation would be impossible. The Federal Parliament should
have the exclusive power to impose and collect Customs duties. Clearly we could not have border duties. We
should have free intercourse by sea, as well as by land, between one colony and another. We have had it
argued outside this place that other forms of revenue than Customs should be given up to the Federation.
Some persons have argued that the land should be the basis of taxation. I should protest seriously
against such a surrender as that. The idea of locality as an inherent essential of the individualism of each
province altogether precludes such an idea. The land itself must be left sacred to each colony just in the
same way as its external boundaries are. Other means of revenue have been suggested, such as direct
taxation. Perhaps the idea of locality is least to be discerned in the method of the collection of Customs
duties. But it is inherent in duties to be imposed by way of land taxation. This matter, some of us think,
should be left for the purposes of local government, and others have never gone further than to suppose that it
should be left to the purposes of provincial government. Still, that form of taxation, as a primary source of
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revenue, ought to be [start page 21] chosen which is least imbued with the idea of localism, and that is to be
found in federal Customs duties and the abolition of duties between the States.
END QUOTE
5 QUOTE 23-6-2014 Email re land tax
10
LAND TAX Acts

Alan Riley What is really going on here below?
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/ltaa1951281951241/ LAND TAX ASSESSMENT. No. 28 of
1951. An Act to amend the Land Tax Assessment Act 1910-1950. [Assen
To Me
Today at 4:16 PM 23-6-2014
What is really going on here below?
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/ltaa1951281951241/
LAND TAX ASSESSMENT.
15
No. 28 of 1951.
An Act to amend the Land Tax Assessment
Act 1910-1950.
[Assented to 16th November, 1951.]
20
2. This Act shall be deemed to have come into operation on the first day of July, One thousand nine hundred
and fifty-one. [was there a Royal Assent or even a Proclamation?]
LAND TAX ASSESSMENT. No. 23 of 1952.
An Act to amend the Land Tax Assessment Act 1910-1951.
[Assented to 12th June, 1952.]
25
1.-(1.) This Act may be cited as the Land Tax Assessment Act 1952.
(2.) The Land Tax Assessment Act 1910-1951* is in this Act referred to as the Principal Act.
(3.) The Principal Act, as amended by this Act, may be cited as the Land Tax Assessment Act 1910-1952.
2. This Act shall come into operation on the day on which it receives the Royal Assent.
30
LAND TAX ABOLITION. No. 2 of 1953.

An Act to repeal the Acts of the Parliament relating to Land Tax, and for purposes connected therewith.
[Assented to 4th March, 1953.]
[Date of commencement, 1st April, 1953.]
1. This Act may be cited as the Land Tax Abolition Act 1953.
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2.-(1.) The Acts specified in the First Schedule to this Act are repealed.
(2.) The Acts specified in the first column of the Second Schedule to this Act are amended as respectively
specified in the second column of that Schedule.
(3.) For all purposes in relation to land tax for any financial year before the financial year that commenced on
the first day of July, One thousand nine hundred and fifty-two, the Acts referred to in the last two preceding
sub-sections, and any regulations under any of those Acts, continue to have effect as if this Act had not been
passed.
(4.) In any Act or regulations having effect by virtue of the last preceding sub-section-
10
(a) references to the Commissioner of Land Tax shall be read as references to the Commissioner of Taxation
holding office under the Taxation Administration Act 1953;
(5.) A person is not entitled to payment of any salary, fee or allowance by reason of the operation of this
section.
THE SCHEDULES.
FIRST SCHEDULE.
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30
35
40
ACTS REPEALED.
Land Tax Act 1910
Land Tax Act 1914
Land Tax Act 1922
Land Tax Act 1927
Land Tax Act 1938
Land Tax Act 1940
Land Tax Act 1941
Land Tax Act 1952
Land Tax Assessment Act 1910
Land Tax Assessment Act (No. 2) 1930
Land Tax Abolition Act 1952 [?]
END QUOTE 23-6-2014 Email re land tax
From the above it shows

45 QUOTE
(3.) For all purposes in relation to land tax for any financial year before the financial year that commenced on
the first day of July, One thousand nine hundred and fifty-two, the Acts referred to in the last two preceding
sub-sections, and any regulations under any of those Acts, continue to have effect as if this Act had not been
passed.
50 END QUOTE
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So let us look at Commonwealth legislation.
10
15
QUOTE LAND TAX ABOLITION C1952A00081

LAND TAX ABOLITION.
No. 81 of 1952.
[Assented to 6th November, 1952.]
B E it enacted by the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, the Senate, and the House of Representatives of the
Commonwealth of Australia, as follows :1. This Act may be cited as the Land Tax Abolition Act 1952.
2. This Act snall be deemed to have come into operation on the first day of July, One thousand nine hundred
and fifty-two.
3. Land tax shall not be levied and paid for the financial year which commenced on the first day of
July, One thousand nine hundred and fifty-two, or for any subsequent financial year.
4. Section fifteen of the Land Tax Assessment Act 1910-1952 does not apply in respect of the financial year
which commenced on the first day of July, One thousand nine hundred and fifty-two, or in respect of any
subsequent financial year.
END QUOTE LAND TAX ABOLITION C1952A00081
While the Commonwealth abolished the payment of land taxation it did however also show:
20 QUOTE LAND TAX ABOLITION C1952A00081
3. Land tax shall not be levied and paid for the financial year which commenced on the first day of
July, One thousand nine hundred and fifty-two, or for any subsequent financial year.
END QUOTE LAND TAX ABOLITION C1952A00081
25 This part of the law remains in force and so also the right of uniform taxation (land tax)
throughout the Commonwealth, and no land taxation can be applied and any State
(delegated municipal/shire council rates are therefore in violation of this part of the act!
It can therefore not be stated that the Land Tax Act and regulations in its entirety was abolished
30 as clearly that was never the intention of the Federal Parliament.
35
40
45
50
55
I am not aware any court ever considered matters as I have exposed, and the fact that the High
Court in Australia in University of Wollongong v Mohamed Naguib Fawzi Ahmed Metwally &
others [1984] HCA 74; (1984) 158 CLR 447 (22 November 1984) claimed that the
Commonwealth could allow the States to legislate while it also legislated is not constitutionally
viable. Constitutionally the Commonwealth cannot allow for states to legislated while it legislate
itself on a subject matter. Consider that the Commonwealth were to legislate as to land taxes and
then somehow permitted the States to do so likewise and the States then delegate legislative
powers to the municipal/shire councils to also raise land taxes by way of rates. The
Commonwealth by permitting (hypothetically) states to legislate on land taxes while it does so
itself would mean it violated uniform taxation. Even if it didnt apply land taxation it still
cannot permit a state to raise land taxes by the Commonwealth authority as it still would be in
conflict with :uniform taxation. It would otherwise an easy way out for the Commonwealth to
undermine constitutional prohibitions. Also makes an utter mesh as to what taxation is defrauded
without ending up in the State/Commonwealth Consolidated Revenue Funds.
Neither can the Commonwealth accept any reference of legislative powers within s51(xxxvii), as
this subsection merely provides for the States to refer legislative powers but cannot include nor
does it that the Commonwealth can then accept such reference of legislative powers. To give a
clear example, S116 prohibits the Commonwealth to legislate as to religion. The States however
are permitted to legislate as to religion. If the states were to refer legislative powers about
religion to the Commonwealth within s51(xxxvii) then the Commonwealth by s116 is clearly
prohibited from accepting this. Therefore, any reference of legislative powers referred to in
ss51(xxxvii) is limited to what the constitution itself would allow for. And there is a lot more to
this all but in this writing I shall not delve into it any further. Sav e to say we I view need a
VELVET REVOLUTION as to get back to the true meaning and application of the
constitution.
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10

QUOTE
Mr. CARRUTHERS:
This is a Constitution which the unlettered people of the community ought to be able to understand.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Mr. ISAACS.We want a people's Constitution, not a lawyers' Constitution.
END QUOTE
Judges therefore should interpret the constitution through the eyes of unlettered people
and not what they may fancy to introduce of other jurisdictions not only totally foreign to
15 our kind of constitution but in blatant violation to the intentions of the Framers of the
Constitution!
Clearly, the wording As we all know, the independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of our
constitutional system indicates that this justice held there was a separation of powers within
20 state level.
25
Currently, Buloke Shire Council is pursuing an about $1,476 Infringement Notice against me as I
recall it for failing to comply with a notice. I do not know of any legislation that makes it a
crime to fail to comply with a notice.
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-We are going to suggest that it should read as follows:-
30
35
40
the people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to make any laws not applicable to the general
community; but so that this power shall not extend to authorize legislation with respect to the affairs of
the aboriginal race in any state.
Mr. ISAACS.-My observations were extended much further than that. The term general community" I
understand to mean the general community of the whole Commonwealth. If it means the general
community of the whole Commonwealth, I do not see the meaning of saying that the Parliament of the
Commonwealth shall have the exclusive authority to do that, because any single state would have the right to
do it under any circumstances. If it means less than that-if it means the general community of a state-I do not
see why it should not be left to the state. We should be placed in a very awkward position indeed if any
particular state is forbidden to pass any distinctive legislation in certain well-known instances. For instance, if
Victoria should choose to enact that Afghans shall only get hawkers' licences under certain conditions which
are not [start page 228] applicable to Europeans she may be debarred by this sub-section from doing so. I do
not know how it will affect our factory law in regard to the Chinese which does not operate beyond the
confines of Victoria at all.
Sir EDWARD BRADDON.-Why single out the Afghans?
45
50
Mr. ISAACS.-If any other race possess the same characteristic as the Afghans I will put them in the same
class. At all events, the expression general community" means the whole community of the Commonwealth. I
do not think that this has any application. If it is to have any application at all, it seems to me to be intended to
debar the state from passing legislation-necessary legislation, but purely confined to that state. I do not think
that that sub-section ought to be there at all if that is the meaning of it.
Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-I think the original intention of this sub-section was to deal with
the affairs of such persons of other races-what are generally called inferior races, though I do not know
with how much warrant sometimes-who may be in the Commonwealth at the time it is brought into
existence, or who may under the laws of the Commonwealth regulating aliens come into it. We have
made the dealing with aliens, which includes a certain degree of coloured immigration, a power of the
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Commonwealth, and we have made the dealing with immigration a power of the Commonwealth, so
that all those of the races who come into the community after the establishment of the Commonwealth
will not only enter subject to laws made in respect to their immigration, but will remain subject to any
laws which the Commonwealth may specially devise for them. There is no reason why the Commonwealth
should not have power to devise such laws.
Sir GEORGE TURNER.-An exclusive power?

Mr. BARTON.-It ought to have an exclusive power to devise such laws.
Sir GEORGE TURNER.-If it does not exercise it can the state exercise it?
Mr. BARTON.-Once the Commonwealth legislates with reference to the question of aliens and
immigration, its legislation displaces the state law.
10
END QUOTE
15

QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-I was going to explain when I was interrupted that the moment the Commonwealth
legislates on this subject the power will become exclusive.
END QUOTE
20 QUOTE
Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-If this is left as an exclusive power the laws of the states will
nevertheless remain in force under clause 100.
Mr. TRENWITH.-Would the states still proceed to make laws?
25
Mr. BARTON.-Not after this power of legislation comes into force. Their existing laws will, however,
remain. If this is exclusive they can make no new laws, but the necessity of making these new laws will be
all the more forced on the Commonwealth.
END QUOTE
While lawyers lacking proper constitutional education may claim that s51 is a concurrent power
30 section, it should be clear that each subject matter was providing for concurrent legislative
powers of the Stater and the commonwealth until the commonwealth commences to legislate as
then it became an exclusive legislative powers for the Commonwealth. This is why I opposed
the usage of radar speed cameras not certified by the Commonwealth, this is because Victoria has
no legislative powers as to weight and measurements. Hence its legislation regarding speed
35 detection cameras is and remains to be ULTRA VIRES.
.
40
45
Hansard 9-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention)
QUOTE
Mr. DEAKIN (Victoria).-The position of my honorable and learned friend (Mr. [start page 2092] Higgins)
may be perfectly correct. It may be that without any special provision the practice of the High Court, when
declaring an Act ultra vires, would be that such a declaration applied only to the part which trespassed
beyond the limits of the Constitution. If that were so, it would be a general principle applicable to the
interpretation of the whole of the Constitution.
END QUOTE
.
p21
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Page 22
QUOTE
Mr. GLYNN.-I think they would, because it is fixed in the Constitution. There is no special court, but
the general courts would undoubtedly protect the states. What Mr. Isaacs seeks to do is to prevent the
question of ultra vires arising after a law has been passed.
[start page 2004]
Mr. ISAACS.-No. If it is ultra vires of the Constitution it would, of course, be invalid.
END QUOTE
10 As I challenged the validity of the legislation of speed detection cameras legislation of the State
of Victoria then unless and until if ever at all it remains to be ULTRA VIRES.
Likewise so with the Infringement Act. As such Buloke Shire Council has a problem with this as
no court can enforce the Infringement Act against me where already since 2011 I challenged its
validity unless and until if ever at all it can obtain a judgement of the High Court of Australia to
15 declare the Infringement Act to be INTRA VIRES!
For the record, as a Professional Advocate (now retired) I successfully represented on 19 March
2009 Mr Francis James Colosimo before Her Honour Harbison J against a CONTEMPT OF
COURT charge (against Mr Colosimo). I then also submitted to Her Honour Harbison J that the
Infringement Act was unconstitutional.
20
As such Buloke Shire Council cannot for example argue that I merely seek to unduly complicate
matters on legal technicalities, which in any event would be legal rights, after all that is what
lawyers generally are about when arguing a case for a client, but that clearly I have already raised
those issues in the past and so very successfully.
25 As such I object to the jurisdiction of any court to hear and determine the alleged Infringement
issue, if Buloke Shire Council were to persist in prosecution, and by this it would have no choice
but to get first a High Court of Australias decision to declare legislation I have opposed as
ULTRA VIRES to be declared INTRA VIRES. That is if the High Court of Australia were not
to refuse to accept such a case because not only failed the Commonwealth and the States to take
30 the matter up before the High Court of Australia when so ordered by a Magistrate in 2002, but
they conceded defeat on 19 July 2006 and neither the Commonwealth or any State/Territorian
Attorney-General pursued any appeal on those constitutional issues despite having been served
with a s78B NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS.
.
35 The last party I (4 times) represented in litigation (prior to retirement) was solicitor and barrister
(for 22 years) Mr James Johnson. The term constitutional lawyer is an oxymoron because a
lawyer seeks to find loopholes in the law to try to get his/her client of whereas I as a
CONSTITUTIONALIST pursue the true meaning and application of the constitution.
40 My wife is 82 and due for 2 more operations, after having had on 28 April 2015 her most recent
operation, which as a private insured patient as to be able to obtain the services when needed,
means considerable additional financial cost, and I certainly am not so to say looking for a fight
in the courts, but neither so to say will be on the run.
If Buloke Shire Council desires to litigate against me it may just discover as other lawyers did to
45 face comprehensive defeat.
.
50

QUOTE
Mr. SOLOMON.- We shall not only look to the Federal Judiciary for the protection of our interests,
but also for the just interpretation of the Constitution:
END QUOTE
.
55

Australasian Convention),
QUOTE Mr. OCONNER (New South Wales).-
(Official Record of the Debates of the National
p22
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Page 23
Because, as has been said before, it is [start page 357] necessary not only that the administration of
justice should be pure and above suspicion, but that it should be beyond the possibility of suspicion;
END QUOTE
5 Hansard 8-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

QUOTE
Sir JOHN DOWNER.-Now it is coming out. The Constitution is made for the people and the states on
terms that are just to both.
END QUOTE
10 As such, any court that were to pursue to hear and determine matters would have to be
INPARTIAL (not using the same ABN number as the prosecutor or those acting on its behalf)
and accept that where the Parliament is a constitutional Parliament then it has no legislative
powers to amend the State constitution without a State referendum approving it to do so. It
means that the colonial constitution subject to this constitution became a state constitution
15 where the State Parliament no longer was a sovereign Parliament, and so any purported
amendments not being those as result of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900
(UK) including the purported Victorian Constitution Act 1975 is and remains to be ULTRA
VIRES. Considering also that Buloke Shire Council is charging unconstitutional rates (a land
taxation) and also charges me about $360 for garbage collection, this even so for example not a
20 single time this or the previous financial year any such garbage collection eventuated then it may
find that it is defrauding monies big time. Do keep in mind I have never participated in any of the
enactments I am objection to nor those I rely upon.
As author of books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI on certain constitutional and other legal
issues I pursue to expose the truth about the true meaning and application of the constitution.
25 Again, I am not seeking to litigate, far from it, but if Buloke Shire Council desires to do so then it
better be aware it had an obstacle course to overcome. After all, I am entitled to rely on past
successes in the courts, and no court can ignore this. Again, no one can claim I am raising issues
just to so to say give Buloke Shire Council a hard time to prosecute, as I challenged the validity
of the Infringement Act since 2011 at the very least, on my own account and as such I am
30 entitled to rely upon this.
I draw your attention to the decision in Hobsons Bay Council v Viking in Supreme Court of
Victoria re an infringement notice, where the Supreme Court upheld the Magistrates decision that
cost should not be awarded where cost isnt applied if the Police prosecuted for the same. (I have
reproduced the decision below)
35 QUOTE
SYDNEY_CITY_COUNCIL_V_REID (1994) 34 NSWLR 506 (21 Sept 1994) councils employees not
Crown employees.
.pdf
Download View
40
Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Company - 55 U.S. 80 (1852) A Corporation cannot sue a human
.doc
Download View
p23
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Page 24
Bropho v W. A [1990] HCA 24; 171 CLR 1 (20-6-1990) Bropho won. Abl land case. Govt or corporation
employees under Crown authority has no immunity if exceed duty.
.pdf
Download View
Shaddock Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) 1981 HCA 59; 150 CLR 225 (28-10-1981)
Council liable for misinformation negligence
END QUOTE
The following is some of the email communication with as neighbour who looked after my
10 property at 10 Anderson Avenue, Berriwillock. Making it very clear that for all intent and
purposes I was well entitled to accept that the weed/grass was slashed as much as Buloke Shire
Council does when it has contractors doing the slashing for it, and rely upon it having been done.
15
QUOTE
On Sunday, October 12, 2014 2:07 AM, (identity concealed) wrote:
thank you mate.headding back 2morow.we will take it easy going back.
regards (identity concealed)
20
25
On Saturday, October 11, 2014 6:22 PM, Mr Gerrit H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

<inspector_rikati@yahoo.com.au> wrote:
(identity concealed),
congratulations to your wife and you regarding your sons wedding.
I am glad you are at least up and about.
Gerrit
Constitutionalist & Consultant
30
35
MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

Mr. G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B., GUARDIAN
(OFFICE-OF-THE-GUARDIAN)
107 Graham Road, Viewbank, 3084, Victoria, Australia
Ph (International) 61394577209
.
Email; inspector_rikati@yahoo.com.au
40
The content of this email and any attachments are provided WITHOUT PREJUDICE, unless specifically
otherwise stated.
If you find any typing/grammatical errors then I know you read it, all you now need to do is to consider the
content appropriately!
45
50
55
A FOOL IS A PERSON WHO DOESN'T ASK THE QUESTION BECAUSE OF BEING CONCERNED
TO BE LABELLED A FOOL.
END QUOTE
END QUOTE
On Monday, October 20, 2014 1:55 PM, Mr Gerrit H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
<inspector_rikati@yahoo.com.au> wrote:
I received a fire notice dated 16 October 2014.from Buloke Shire Council allegedly that the weed/grass was
not cut, or something to that effect. I do not know if you because of your illness was unable to do something
about my property. Could you let me know what the position is because if I have to drive up I need to get my
station wagon urgently repaired (change of gearbox) as it has been standing in the driveway waiting to get
repaired.
p24
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Page 25
Gerrit

10
otherwise stated.
15
20
25
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Re: From Gerrit to (identity concealed)
People
(identity concealed)
21 Oct
To
30
35
40
45
me
Ok we cut it before we went away to the west.

just had a look around there and its the same as my. could do with another
cut. so as soon as we gat some parts for the ride on mower.it needs a new starter.
will arrive here on Friday.will cut it on the weekend again. for you no problem mate.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
On Saturday, 25 October 2014, 2:08, (identity concealed) > wrote:
Halo gerrit
we have just cut your grass on Friday.
it's all ok mate.
QUOTE
QUOTE
To
(identity concealed) CC
50
55
me
much appreciated.
I have booked in my station wagon for an inspection, that is they have no spot un til end next week and I was
advised that pending what repairs need to be done they will tell me how long it will take before they can do
p25
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Page 26
the repairs. It seems that if certain parts are required it can take some time. At least I might finally be able to
travel again. Useless to have a stationwagon that isn't working.
.
Anyhow, how is it with your health? Is it settling?

.
Gerrit
10
15

.
20
otherwise stated.
25
END QUOTE
It must be clear from the email correspondences that from my part the property was
slashed twice in 2014. As indicated above also it was again so in January 2015.
30
p26
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http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2010/386.html
QUOTE
Hobsons Bay City Council v Viking Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 386 (27 August 2010)
Last Updated: 27 August 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
Not Restricted
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
VALUATION, COMPENSATION & PLANNING LIST
No. 689 of 2010
and No. 690 of 2010
HOBSONS BAY CITY COUNCIL
Appellant
v
VIKING GROUP HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN
133 909 145)
10
Respondent
and
HOBSONS BAY CITY COUNCIL
Appellant
v
VIKING ASSET MANAGEMENT PTY LTD
(ACN 112 893 884)
Respondent
--JUDGE:
WHERE HELD:
DATE OF HEARING:
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:
MEDIUM NEUTRAL
CITATION:
OSBORN J
Melbourne
13 August 2010
27 August 2010
Hobsons Bay City Council v Viking
[2010] VSC 386
---
15
COMMON LAW Appeal from Magistrates Court cost award in criminal proceeding Costs awarded
covered disbursements fees only - Review of discretionary judgments - Presumption in favour of the
correctness of the decision - Appellant must demonstrate a vitiating error of law - It was open to the
Magistrate to exercise his discretion in award of costs Consistency of cost awards - Proportionality of cost
awards - Magistrates Court Act 1989 s 131(1)
--APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant
Counsel
Mr A Marshall
Solicitors
Brand Partners Commercial
p27
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Lawyers
For the Respondent
Mr J Searle
Viking Group
TABLE OF CONTENTS
HIS HONOUR:
1 These appeals relate to orders made in the Magistrates Court at Sunshine in January 2010.
2 In the first proceeding, the presiding Magistrate, following conviction of the respondent in respect of six
charges under the Victorian Road Rules relating to parking offences, ordered that the respondent pay an
aggregate fine of $600 and costs in the amount of $180.80.
3 In the second proceeding the presiding Magistrate convicted the respondent of two further such offences
and fined it an aggregate fine of $250 and ordered it to pay costs in the sum of $65.20.
10
4 In each proceeding the matters were initially listed for hearing on a mention day and following no
appearance by the respondent were listed for ex parte hearing.
5 At the conclusion of the first case the solicitor for the appellant applied for costs comprising legal fees of
$1,470.26, service fees of $91.10, filing fees of $66.60 and a courtesy letter of $23.10. The solicitor deposes
that these were a true calculation of the amounts properly incurred by the Council in the prosecution of the
case.
15
20
25
30
6 After the Magistrate awarded costs in the sum of $180.80[1] he was asked to give reasons for his order. He
then stated:
The application for legal costs is refused on the basis that I think that theyre disproportionate to the
criminality of the defendants conduct. I believe weve had this discussion in the past Mr Prosecutor, but the
same reasons apply. It seems to me to be unfair to award costs based on the defendants bad luck in being
prosecuted by a council rather than by the police as a matter of principle, it cannot be or should not be the
defendant that incurs the additional liability of substantial costs based on who prosecutes. It strikes me as
unfair that an award of costs against the defendant when thieves, drug traffickers and other wrongdoers who
do far more harm than the defendant has, are not asked to pay costs. Additionally, citizens pay rates and taxes
for services, including the cost of prosecuting, supervising and imprisoning wrongdoers. It seems to me that
principle ought to apply to this prosecution as well and as I also say that the costs are disproportionate to the
criminality of the defendants conduct (sic). In the exercise of my discretion, the application for costs is
refused.[2]
7 At the conclusion of the second case the Magistrate again received an application for costs consisting of
legal fees of $170.50, filing fees of $42.10 and a courtesy letter of $23.10. The solicitor for the appellant
again deposes that the costs for which application was made comprised a true and correct calculation of
amounts properly incurred by the appellant in the prosecution of the case.
8 The Magistrate refused the greater portion of the application for costs on the same basis as he had refused
the greater portion of the application for costs in the first matter.[3]
9 It can be seen that the Magistrates reasons invoke notions of proportionality and consistency.
35
10 The appellant acknowledges:

(a) the power of the Court to award costs is contained in s 131(1) of the Magistrates Court Act 1989 which
states:
The costs of, and incidental to, all proceedings in the Court are in the discretion of the Court and the Court
has full power to determine by whom, to whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid.
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(b) such discretion is effectively unfettered.
11 As counsel for the respondent emphasised, the latter part of s 131(1) emphasises the full power of the
Court to determine the question of costs.
12 The grounds of appeal allege that the Magistrate failed to exercise his discretion properly or at all, and in
the alternative that he purported to act for improper reasons and/or took into account irrelevant matters. In the
further alternative it is alleged that the Magistrate failed to take relevant considerations into account.
13 The fundamental question raised by the appeal is whether it was open to the Court to exercise its
discretion as it did. The general principles governing appeals from the exercise of discretion as to costs were
expressed by Kitto J in Australian Coal and Shale Employees Federation v The Commonwealth:[4]
10
15
20
25
30
35
..the true principle limiting the manner in which appellate jurisdiction is exercised in respect of decisions
involving discretionary judgment is that there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the
decision appealed from, and that that decision should therefore be affirmed unless the court of appeal is
satisfied that it is clearly wrong. A degree of satisfaction sufficient to overcome the strength of the
presumption may exist where there has been an error which consists in acting upon a wrong principle, or
giving weight to extraneous or irrelevant matters, or failing to give weight or sufficient weight to relevant
considerations, or making a mistake as to the facts. Again, the nature of the error may not be discoverable,
but even so it is sufficient that the result is so unreasonable or plainly unjust that the appellate court may infer
that there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first
instance: House v. The King[5]....
14 His Honour went on to endorse the following statement by Jordan CJ in Schweppes Limited v Archer:[6]
In appeals as to costs, the principles to be applied are these. The Court will always review a decision of a
Taxing Officer where it is contended that he has proceeded upon a wrong principle, for the purpose of
determining the principle which should be applied; and an error in principle may occur both in determining
whether an item should be allowed and in determining how much should be allowed. Where no principle is
involved, and the question is, whether the Taxing Officer has correctly exercised a discretion which he
possesses and is purporting to exercise, the Court is reluctant to interfere. It has undoubted jurisdiction to
review the Taxing Officer's decision even where an exercise of discretion only is involved, and will do so
freely on a proper case, using its own knowledge of the circumstances, but it will in general interfere only
where the discretion appears not to have been exercised at all, or to have been exercised in a manner which is
manifestly wrong; and where the question is one of amount only, will do so only in an extreme case.
(Citations omitted)
15 In Urban No 1 Co-operative Society v Kilavus & Anor,[7] Hedigan J observed that in cases involving the
review of discretionary judgments there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the decision
appealed from and the general rule is that the decision should be affirmed unless the appellate court of review
is satisfied that it is clearly wrong.
16 In Kenyon v Drissen,[8] Ashley J (as he then was) observed:
40
45
It is true that an exercise of discretion is not to be tested by an appeal court asking itself whether it would
have exercised the discretion in the same or a different way to the way in which it was exercised in fact. On
the other hand, the appeal court, before it interferes with an exercise of discretion, must be satisfied that the
decision was clearly wrong. In my opinion the correct approach is that in considering that question an appeal
court is not constrained to hold that an exercise of discretion was wrong only by reason that weight was given
to some irrelevant consideration, or by reason only of complaint that insufficient weight was given to some
relevant consideration. It may be, despite such matters, that the decision was very evidently supportable by
pertinent grounds relied upon by the decision-maker.
17 These observations and the observations of Hedigan J were made in the context of appeals from the
Magistrates Court to this Court. These reflect the need for an appellant in an appeal on questions of law to
demonstrate not only that an error of law occurred but that it was a vitiating error.[9]
18 In Kymar Nominees Pty Ltd v Sinclair,[10] Cavanough J stated:
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There is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of a discretionary judgment of a court, and all the
more so in relation to the taxation of costs. Although, strictly speaking, the present question is not one of
taxation of costs but of the extent of the parties respective liability, a reviewing court will rarely interfere on
such a question, especially in an appeal limited to questions of law.
10
19 The right of appeal to this Court from final orders within criminal proceedings of the Magistrates Court is
one on questions of law only.[11] Accordingly, just as it is not open to challenge the weight given to relevant
factors in reaching a conclusion of fact, it is not open to challenge the weight given to relevant factors bearing
on the exercise of a discretion.[12] The critical question is whether it was open to the Magistrate to conclude
as he did having regard to relevant factors.[13]
Preliminary questions
20 The appellant relied on the decision in Latoudis v Casey.[14] It must be recognised however that the
present case is not one such as Latoudis, where a successful defendant, having been brought to Court by the
informant, is ordinarily entitled to his or her costs.
21 In Oshlack v Richmond River Council[15] Kirby J observed:[16]
15
The decision in that case [Latoudis] does not, and could not, lay down a general rule that the only
consideration to be taken into account in the exercise of a statutory costs discretion is the compensation of the
successful party for the recoverable expense to which it has been put by the litigation. With respect to the
learned judges of the Court of Appeal, this reads too much into Latoudis. Such a rule was required neither by
the matter which was before this Court for decision in that case nor by the majority's reasons.
20
22 Likewise, cases such as Ohn v Walton,[17] which was concerned with a power in the Medical Tribunal of
New South Wales to order the complainant ... to pay such costs to such person as the Tribunal may
determine, are of no real assistance in the present case.
25
23 It was next submitted that if costs were not ordinarily recoverable by the Council then the Council would
be deterred from bringing further prosecutions of the type in issue. I do not accept this inference should be
drawn. Such prosecutions enforce a system of parking regulation from which municipal councils derive
significant revenue and the evidence simply does not establish the conclusion contended for.
24 The appellant also placed substantial emphasis on the following observations by McHugh J in
Oshlack:[18]
30
35
Nor is the status of the respondent as a public authority presently relevant. The law judges persons by their
conduct not their identity. In the exercise of the costs discretion, all persons are entitled to be treated equally
and in accordance with traditional principle. The fact that a successful respondent is a public authority should
not make a court less inclined to award costs in its favour. Gone are the days when one could sensibly speak
of a public authority as having available to them almost unlimited public funds.[19] Moreover, if costs
awards are not made in favour of successful respondents such as the Council, the public services which those
authorities provide must be adversely affected. Every irrecoverable dollar spent on litigation is one dollar less
to spend on the services that public authorities do and ought to provide. Often enough the services that will be
reduced will be those that favour the politically weak children, the unemployed, the disabled and the aged.
Such results cannot be in the public interest.
25 These observations do not assist the appellant because:
40
45
I do not accept that the learned Magistrate refused the appellant costs simply because it is a municipal
council. Rather as I have said, he considered the issue of costs by reference to broader notions of consistency
and proportionality.
Oshlack was concerned with fundamentally different proceedings. It was concerned with the costs of a
successful council responding to an unsuccessful claim for injunctive relief, brought by a member of the
public seeking to ventilate issues of the public interest.
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McHugh Js observations were made in dissent and the majority of the High Court affirmed the breadth of
the discretion available to the Court of first instance.
Consistency
10
26 I turn then to the underlying bases of the Magistrates reasons. In my view it cannot be said that it was not
open to the learned Magistrate to take into account questions of consistency. Counsel for both parties referred
to the observations of Mason and Deane JJ in Norbis v Norbis[20] (a case concerning the exercise of
discretion as to costs under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)):
The point of preserving the width of the discretion which Parliament has created is that it maximizes the
possibility of doing justice in every case. But the need for consistency in judicial adjudication, which is the
antithesis of arbitrary and capricious decision-making, provides an important countervailing consideration
supporting the giving of guidance by appellant courts, whether in the form of principles or guidelines.
27 Brennan J, who agreed generally with the reasons of Mason and Deane JJ stated at 536:
15
The orderly administration of justice requires that decisions should be consistent one with another and
decision-making should not be open to the reproach that it is adventitious ... An unfettered discretion is a
versatile means of doing justice in particular cases, but unevenness in its exercise diminishes confidence in
the legal process.
28 In the present case it should be noted that breaches of the Victorian Road Rules with respect to parking
infringements may be prosecuted either by a police officer, an authorised council officer or certain other
authorised persons.[21]
20
29 It was open to the Magistrate to form the view that the discrepancy in costs outcomes between police
prosecutions and council prosecutions in respect of the same offence and more generally raised a relevant
issue of consistency. Inconsistent outcomes do not support a system in which the public may be expected to
have confidence. They give rise to a system which may appear adventitious and arbitrary in its outcomes.
Proportionality
25
30
30 Likewise the related issue of proportionality was a relevant factor. In some jurisdictions, achieving
proportionality of procedural costs to the dispute in issue is an explicit obligation of civil case
management.[22]
31 The same underlying concept is relevant here, but in the criminal jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court the
notion of proportionality has a further dimension. Proportionality is a touchstone of just outcomes of the
criminal justice system. In Hoare v The Queen[23] the High Court stated:
Secondly, a basic principle of sentencing law is that a sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court should
never exceed that which can be justified as appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime considered
in the light of its objective circumstances (see Veen v The Queen [No 2]).[24]
35
32 In R v Young[25] the Victorian Court of Appeal addressed a sentence in which Veen [No 2] and
associated cases had been misinterpreted. The Court said at 953:
... there is nothing whatever new in what the learned judge called the principle of proportionality. We shall
have to return to the question later but for the moment it is sufficient to say that for as long as any member of
the court can remember it has been the law in Victoria that an offender must not be sentenced to a more
severe punishment than is appropriate or proportionate to the offence which he has committed...
40
33 Proportionality in sentencing is necessarily a matter of judgment on which individual views may differ. In
The Queen v S[26] the Court of Appeal adopted with approval the following further statement in Young:[27]
What is a sentence proportionate to an offence is a matter of discretion and there must in most cases be a
range of sentences open to a sentencing judge which are proportionate to the offence.
p31
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34 I accept that the purpose of an award of costs is not to punish the unsuccessful party but to indemnify the
successful party. Nevertheless, in the present case the Magistrate was in my view entitled to compare total
outcomes in terms of fines plus costs, with other outcomes of the summary prosecution system not only as
informing a view as to consistency, but also as informing a conclusion as to the proportionality of the costs
sought to the criminality of the conduct in issue.
35 It was in turn open to him to conclude that the costs sought were disproportionate to the criminality of the
respondents conduct. The conclusion he reached was one by a member of the court which is confronted with
a large number of summary offences on a daily basis and accordingly, the issue is one on which the
Magistrate was well placed to form an opinion.
10
15
20
36 I am not persuaded that it was not open to him to conclude that the costs sought were disproportionate to
the criminality of the respondents conduct.
37 It is submitted for the appellant that the notion of proportionality might have justified the award of a lesser
award of costs, but it could not justify the award of effectively no professional costs. This submission enters
into questions of the weight of relevant factors. It is not for this Court however to weigh up the relevant
factors. It is simply for this Court to ensure that the Magistrates Court did not have regard to irrelevant
factors and reached a conclusion open to it. I accept that the view put forward on behalf of the Council might
be accepted, but not that it was the only view open to the Magistrate.
38 It is clear from the terms of his reasons that the Magistrate regarded his conclusions as to proportionality
as fundamental to the proper exercise of his discretion. In turn his discretionary decision must stand if, as I
have said, the view he reached is regarded as open to him.
Irrelevant considerations
25
39 Insofar as the appeal is put on the basis that the Magistrate failed to take into account relevant
considerations, there is no evidence that, save in one respect, the matters relied on were expressly urged upon
him and I am not able to infer that a failure to refer to them in his reasons means that he did not take account
of them. The matters allegedly overlooked are stated in the amended notice of appeal as follows:
... relevant material considerations including:
(a) the cost to municipal councils in properly prosecuting council by-laws and other laws;
(b) prevention of breaches of council by-laws;
(c) failure of the respondent to pay on-the-spot fines;
30
(d) deterrence to wrongdoers.

40 Factor (a) was of course squarely put before the Magistrate and factors (b), (c) and (d) were implicitly
caught up in the question of proportionality.
35
41 The relevant principle is that in some circumstances a failure to advert to particular matters in reasons will
enable an inference to be drawn that regard was not had to those matters in reaching the decision in issue. In
others it will not.[28] This is not a case in which an inference adverse to the Magistrate can be drawn.
Conclusion
42 In order to succeed in an appeal of this type the appellant must satisfy the Court that the Magistrates
decision was vitiated by reason of the matters to which he or she had regard, or that the decision was simply
not open to him or her.
40
43 In my view the factors upon which the Magistrate based his decision in the present case were capable of
being regarded as relevant to the exercise of his discretion and the consequent exercise of that discretion was
open to him.
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44 Accordingly the appeal must be dismissed.
[1] The summation of the disbursement charges plus the courtesy letter.
[2] Affidavit of Lloyd Dewar sworn 15 February 2010, [7].
[3] The cost award was the summation of the disbursement charge and courtesy letter.
[4] [1953] HCA 25; (1953) 94 CLR 621, 627.
[5] [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-505.
[6] (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 178, cited in Australian Coal and Shale Employees Federation v The
Commonwealth [1953] HCA 25; (1953) 94 CLR 621, 628-9.
10
[7] [1993] VicRp 69; [1993] 2 VR 201.

[8] Unreported decision, 6 October 1994.
[9] Portland Properties Pty Ltd v Melbourne & Metropolitan Board of Works (1971) 38 LGRA 6, 18 and 22.
[10] [2006] VSC 488, [61].
[11] Criminal Procedure Act 2009, s 272(1).
15
[12] Secombs (a firm) v Sadler Design Pty Ltd [1999] VSC 79, [58]-[59]; Transport Accident Commission v
Hoffman [1989] VicRp 18; [1989] VR 197, 199.
[13] S v Crimes Compensation Tribunal [1998] 1 VR 83, 89 per Phillips JA.
[14] [1990] HCA 59; (1990) 170 CLR 534.
[15] [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72 (Oshlack).
20
[16] Ibid, 118.

[17] (1995) 36 NSWLR 77.
[18] [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72, 107.
[19] Kent v Cavanagh (1973) 1 ACTR 43, 55, cited in Oshlack.
[20] [1986] HCA 17; (1986) 161 CLR 513, 518.
25
[21] Road Safety Act 1986, s 87(1) read with s 77(2).

[22] See, eg Calabro v Zappia [2010] NSWDC 127.
[23] [1989] HCA 33; (1989) 167 CLR 348, 354.
[24] [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465, 472, 485-486, 490-491, 496, cited ibid, 354.
[25] [1990] VicRp 84; [1990] VR 951 (Young).
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[26] [2006] VSCA 134.
[27] At 960 as cited ibid, [20].
[28] The accepted test is stated by Sholl J in Yendall v Smith Mitchell & Co Ltd[1953] VicLawRp 53; [1953]
VLR 369, 379 as set out by his Honour in Harrison v Mansfield [1953] VicLawRp 60; [1953] VLR 399, 404.
5 END QUOTE
10
The above Supreme Court of Victoria decision ought to be considered where Buloke Shire
Council were to pursue litigation that I will oppose any orders for cost where there to be any
litigation by Buloke Shire Council against me.
Below I quote other authorities which I may rely upon besides others if it came to Buloke Shire
Council seeking to litigate against me. Before quoting them I view it Appropriate to quote about
Queensland municipal/shire councils which are acknowledge to fund for items that used to be
funded by federal/state governments. What it indicates is that municipal/shire councils are in fact
15 discriminating against their own citizens within its municipality/shire by charging citizens for
services that should be paid for by the State Government. What councils clearly are failing to do
is to represent their citizens appropriately to ensure appropriate funding is provided.
Perhaps, something not known to me at this moment, Buloke Shire Council may in fact also be
funding items it shouldnt do and by this seeks to employ alleged fire issues so as to extract
20 additional monies from citizens within its shire. Instead of representing its citizens it so to say
becomes the terrorist by extorting monies. In my view no court could associate itself to support
such a conduct as to enforce any Infringement Notice that serves no other purpose then to
financial prop up some council!
If anything the financial expense associated with the 2013 doomed proposed referendum to
25 recognise municipal/shire councils in the federal constitution may underline how municipal/shire
councils were fecklessly wasting the monies extracted from its citizens as rates.
QUOTE
QLD ratepayers fork out millions of dollars for teachers, doctors and TV broadcasts.
30
Jim
Apr 22 at 4:36 PM
To
Photos
35
190094-8b7188d8-e80a-11e4-a30f-c66423242607.jpg
Download All
QLD property owners are possibly the country's worst exploited and robbed group by their corrupt, criminal
"local government" corporations fraudulently masquerading as constitutional local councils.
40
The big question is how much longer will the people of QLD and other states continue allowing their de facto
criminal "local government" councils and state governments to get away with fraud, extortion and robbery?
45
The scummy councils in Australia are like a mangy homeless dog begging in the streets. As long as you keep
feeding it and giving it attention, it will come back for more. If enough people stop feeding the greedy
bloated councils their hard earned money and energy, it will force the councils to reform if they want to
survive. Why can't the dopey sheeple understand that simple truth?
Jim
p34
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Queensland ratepayers fork out millions of dollars for teachers, doctors and TV broadcasts
5
The Courier-Mail
Matthew Killoran
April 22, 2015
10
(IMAGE NOT INCLUDED)

LGAQ president Margaret de Wit says local councils are stretched to the limit providing services that state
and federal budgets will no longer cover. PIC: Liam Kidston.
15
QUEENSLAND ratepayers fork out millions of dollars for teachers, doctors, hospital services and even
television broadcasts on the back of State and Federal government cuts, a paper to be released today
reveals.
The Local Government Association Queensland document shows more than $25 million each year is spent by
mostly rural and regional councils on programs well and truly outside rates, roads and rubbish.
According to the report, councils in remote areas were being forced to fund teaching and medical positions,
community housing and television broadcasting to pick up the slack from shrinking government budgets.
20
Examples include Bulloo Shire funding a teacher and secondary learning centre for $91,000 a year, McKinlay
Shire paying for a community nurse and distance education teacher aide and Diamantina spending $1 million
a year to provide its residents with TV, radio and wi-fi access.
South Burnett council is out of pocket $250,000 a year to operate a small private hospital after a private
operator pulled the pin.
25
Townsville council was listed as providing two school therapists, Etheridge council sponsors a psychologist
to visit rural properties while several councils contribute towards child care and aged care facilities.
McKinlay Mayor Belinda Murphy said it was a difficult balancing act for councils but it was necessary to
keep communities alive.
You have to be able to afford it and sustain it, she said.
30
It can be difficult to attract people to the town. The first thing people ask is do you have a doctor, do you
have a school.
LGAQ president Margaret de Wit said the council funding was being used as a last resort to maintain services
in the small communities.
35
Ive been amazed at what councils are providing in country areas to keep their rural communities going,
she said.
She said it was cost shifting on a massive scale from the higher levels of government.
The State Government doesnt fund it, the Federal Government doesnt fund it, she said. Councils are
stretched to the limit and cant afford to keep propping up services that should be provided by other levels of
government.
40
She said the LGAQs Federation and Taxation reform discussion paper, to be launched this morning, warned
services such as these would suffer unless governments provided councils with a funding source.
p35
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http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/queensland-ratepayers-fork-out-millions-of-dollars-forteachers-doctors-and-tv-broadcasts/story-fnihsrf2-1227314190147?sv=ecf7f725270f326d3a7ce4b61177b6b9
END QUOTE
5 Without seeking to justify any kind of fining I do desire however to point out the difference
between Buloke Shire Council money value of a fine it imposes versus that of another council.
The question then is if this is about state law enforcement then why not the same kind of fine
being imposed? Again, it seems to indicate that this is more about revenue raising then ab out
proper enforcement of any State law!
10
QUOTE
Elderly woman fined $1100 by council for unmowed lawn on her vacant block of land.
15
Jim
Today at 9:17 PM (25-2-2015)
To
Photos
918450-aca963e8-b733-11e4-8f92-3a791af29df0.jpg
Download All
20
Another case of corporate council extortion and thuggery against private property owners. The grass in the
photo does not appear nowhere near long enough to constitute a fire risk, and anyway her property is none of
the damn council's affair.
25
Jim
Black Rock landowner fined for tall grass, takes council to court
30
news.com.au
Jon Andrews
February 24, 2015
(IMAGE NOT INCLUDED)
35
The owner of this Black Rock block is taking Bayside Council to court after it fined her $1100 for not
mowing it. Picture: Chris Eastman Source: News Limited
AN 85-year-old woman has been fined $1100 for not mowing her lawn.
Ruth Rosenbaum owns a vacant block in Black Rock and is taking Bayside Council to court over the fines.
40
Ms Rosenbaum is refusing to pay two fines of $550 imposed last month for not clearing her Beach Rd land,
which she has owned and left vacant for more than 20 years.
But the council said the infringement was the last straw, as Ms Rosenbaum, who lives outside Bayside, had
been warned repeatedly to cut her long grass.
Should she have to pay? Tell us below.
The council has a policy requesting owners keep their land clear due to the fire risk.
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Ms Rosenbaum said she was fined $550 in January, despite asking for an extension of time to allow her
contractor to do the work.
She said after the first fine she spoke to council officers to lodge an appeal, but then was fined another $550.
I let them know the mowing was delayed. Its really wrong. I dont mind taking this further as I dont think
its fair, Ms Rosenbaum said.
Bayside infrastructure services director Steven White said Ms Rosenbaum had been warned many times over
the years.
Council issued a letter on November 21 (last year) to all owners of vacant land in Bayside reminding them
that grass should be trimmed, Mr White said.
10
He said a notice to comply was issued to Ms Rosenbaum on December 8 and at her request an extension was
granted, but because the grass was not cut within the agreed five-week period, fines were issued.
Originally published as Elderly woman fined $1100 for uncut lawn
15
http://www.news.com.au/national/victoria/black-rock-landowner-fined-for-tall-grass-takes-council-tocourt/story-fnii5sms-1227233918828
END QUOTE
As I indicated in past correspondences (for example 20150112-G. H. Schorel-Hlavka to

Buloke Shire Council care of J Groves Re NO CASE TO ANSWER & 20150113-G. H.
20 Schorel-Hlavka to Buloke Shire Council care of J Groves Regarding incorporation of the
courts, etc, failing to have an impartial/independent courts system) the Infringement Notice is
without legal basis.
25
30
35
40
45
What it really comes down to is a council which seems to be obsessed to act like a government
rather than that it is to represent its citizens and by this it has lost principle obligation for which
councils were originally created. It not just became a menace but a terrorist towards those it is
supposed to serve.
If a council is unable to obtain appropriate funding for what is required then it clearly failed in its
duty. It is no excuse to then slug citizens within the council municipal/shire area in all kinds of
ways to try to enrich itself, rather if it fails to obtain sufficient funding it must question its own
competence or the lack thereof in failing to have done so. As well as it should not engage in an
extortion racked as to slug citizens within the municipality/shire as to pay more to provide
certain services which are in principle the responsibility of a state government.
The problem we really have is that councillors are so to say willing to sell the grave of their late
grandmother as to gain in their perception additional powers to terrorise citizens within its
municipality/shire. That must stop! If the state government (consider the Queensland example) of
Victoria fails to provide additional or sufficient funding then the relevant council should throw
back to the government its responsibilities. As the High Court of Australia in Sydney Municipal
Council v Commonwealth (1904) made clear councils are acting under delegated powers of the
State Government, and as such I view that if a council cannot obtain sufficient funding from the
State Government for a particular matter then it simply should decline the delegated powers.
Senior citizens such as myself are limited, even in income of a pension and yet contrary to the
2009 Federal government provisions to limit pension increases to the CPI, municipal/shire
councils violated this despite s109 of the constitution nullifying any such blatant violation. Any
council acting by delegated State Government power is bound by s106 of the (federal)
constitution subject to this constitution and cannot then disregard the Commonwealth legal
provisions or act in violation to it.
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In my view councils should re-engage with its respective citizens and not extort monies in all
kinds of ways such as charging for services not rendered, but should be again a council that first
and foremost acts itself in a lawful manner and to assist rather than to terrorised its citizens.
.
5 Let the following also be considered (which shows also others having their concerns as to how
councils operate):
QUOTE
Sydney City Council v Reid 1994 NSW Full Court councils do not represent the crown.
10
Mal
Mar 26 at 10:57 PM
To
15
me
Hide
Attachments
20
25
SYDNEY_CITY_COUNCIL_V_REID (1994) 34 NSWLR 506 (21 Sept 1994) councils employees

not Crown employees..pdf
Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Company - 55 U.S. 80 (1852) A Corporation cannot sue a
human.doc
Bropho v W. A [1990] HCA 24; 171 CLR 1 (20-6-1990) Bropho won. Abl land case. Govt or
corporation employees under Crown authority has no immunity if exceed duty..pdf
Shaddock Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) 1981 HCA 59; 150 CLR 225 (28-101981) Council liable for misinformation negligence.pdf
Download All
From: David [mailto:Davidkilife@gmx.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2015 4:35 PM
To: Davidkilife@gmx.com
Subject: FW: Sydney City Council v Reid 1994 NSW Full Court councils do not represent the crown.
30
35
FYI. Sorry for sharing any case that you may have, but just in case please find the Sydney City Council v
Reid NSW Full Court case. I have included the Rundle v Delaware US Supreme Court case to which is very
relevant as a Corporation is a creature of Statute and thus cannot sue a human etc if you do not have
this. Also I have included Bropho v WA 1990 HCA case also concerning any employee acting under the
authority of the Crown has not immunity to criminal or civil action if they exceed their duty and the
Shaddock case on councils regarding negligence for stating false or misleading information.
Just to back up Bropho v WA HCA has been cited in some cases including Jacobsen v Rogers [1995] HCA 6;
(1995) 182 CLR 572; (1995) 69 ALJR 131; (1995) 37 ALD 321; (1995) 76 A Crim R 400 (17 February
1995)
MASON CJ, DEANE, DAWSON, TOOHEY AND GAUDRON JJ
40
45
13. It is, we think, important to recognize that the Crown, being

relevantly the executive branch of government, carries out in modern
times multifarious functions involving the use and occupation of many
premises and the possession of many things. It carries out those
functions through servants and agents who, notwithstanding that they
act with the authority of the Crown, have no immunity from the
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10
Page 39
ordinary criminal law (15 See Bropho v. Western Australia (1990) 171
CLR at 21, 26; A. v. Hayden [1984] HCA 67; (1984) 156 CLR 532 at 580-582). The Crown itself may
not be subjected to criminal liability, save in the most
exceptional circumstances (16 See Cain v. Doyle [1946] HCA 38; (1946) 72 CLR 409 at
424), but those who actually occupy Crown premises or hold Crown
property are in a different position. There may exist on Crown
premises things which, whether the property of the Crown or not, will
afford evidence as to the commission of an offence or which are
intended to be used for the purpose of committing an offence, whether
the offence is one committed or to be committed by a servant or agent
of the Crown or someone else.
Thanks to Darren for locating this NSW Full Court of the Supreme Court case of Sydney City Council v Reid
1994 who highlighted some important paragraphs on how councils do not represent or act under the Crown.
15
20
25
Darren has highlighted page 19, but I have read this case in depth right through and there are other cases
listed within that case.. The Justices were correct on some points, but obviously they do not read the Quick
and Garran 1901 nor the Convention Debates 1890 to 1898 to actively determine who is local government.
This is an excellent case as a persuasive argument for the High Court on who is local government as no
lawyers, politicians, the courts and governors etc has done their homework in reference to this. The justices
are correct though that Parliament may amend the role of Councils and their employees. All this is an
argument for the High Court due to this Supreme Court Appeal court case. The Justices who all agreed are
correct if councils are elected by the people. But just like in Vic the Electoral Commission issue purported
writs instead of Governors for the purported elections. It is another argument to prove how council staff they
represent the people when we do not get a say usually at all and certainly most of the time, we are not
informed.
Regards David
From: Darren
from page 19 of Sydney City Council v Reid (1994) NSW Full Court pdf
Whilst local government is indeed a form of government, it is also a
creature of statute. Out of recognition of the imperatives of democratic self-government,
30
the statutory provisions have enacted the creation of largely

Page 19
independent corporations accountable (in the ordinary course) not to the
minister (that is, the Crown), but to the people who elect them. In this sense,
the high measure of independence of statutory corporations, by which local
35
government is ordinarily carried out, is inconsistent with viewing their

employees as servants of the Crown. The exceptional powers of ministerial
intervention remain that: exceptions. For the purpose of characterisation of
the nature of the service, it is more appropriate to catalogue it as being "in
the service of local government authorities" and not "in the service of the
p39
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Crown".
This view also coincides with what must be deemed to have been the view
of the drafter in making express provision for other highly independent
statutory corporations and adding them expressly to the list in Schedule 4 to
the GREAT Act. If local government employees are to be regarded as "in

the service of the Crown", so, almost certainly, would be all of the employees
of all of the employing authorities for whom express provision was made in
s 4 and Schedule 4 of the GREAT Act. It would render Schedule 4
unnecessary.
10
I do not say that local government employees should not be within the
ambit of the GREAT Act. In a very real sense, they are government
employees. They carry on many activities which are governmental in
character. They do so under legislation of the State Parliament. But from the
beginning of this form of statutory review, both under the Crown Employees
15
Appeal Board Act 1944 and under the GREAT Act, local government
employees have been excluded. As the terms of reference for the Bowen
Committee suggest, this has been a deliberate decision of succeeding
governments and parliaments. That decision can be unmade. But in the end I
have concluded that it should be unmade by parliament, not by the court,
20
reading into an admittedly ambiguous provision an operation which fairly

clearly was not intended.
MEAGHER JA. In this matter I have had the benefit of reading in draft
25
the judgment of the President. I agree both with his Honour's reasons and
with the orders he proposes. The issue with which the appeal is concerned is
whether an employee of a local council can be said to be "in the service of
the Crown". Manifestly he cannot. Even the learned solicitor who argued the
p40
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case for the respondent, Mr D M Bennett QC, did not advance so farouche
a submission that a municipal council was the Crown, or an arm of the
Crown, or an emanation of the Crown, or an agent of the Crown. The
Whilst local government is indeed a form of government, it is also a
creature of statute. Out of recognition of the imperatives of democratic selfgovernment,

the statutory provisions have enacted the creation of largely
Page 19
independent corporations accountable (in the ordinary course) not to the
minister (that is, the Crown), but to the people who elect them. In this sense,
10
the high measure of independence of statutory corporations, by which local

government is ordinarily carried out, is inconsistent with viewing their
employees as servants of the Crown. The exceptional powers of ministerial
intervention remain that: exceptions. For the purpose of characterisation of
the nature of the service, it is more appropriate to catalogue it as being "in
15
the service of local government authorities" and not "in the service of the
Crown".
This view also coincides with what must be deemed to have been the view
of the drafter in making express provision for other highly independent
statutory corporations and adding them expressly to the list in Schedule 4 to
20
the GREAT Act. If local government employees are to be regarded as "in

the service of the Crown", so, almost certainly, would be all of the employees
of all of the employing authorities for whom express provision was made in
s 4 and Schedule 4 of the GREAT Act. It would render Schedule 4
unnecessary.
25
I do not say that local government employees should not be within the
ambit of the GREAT Act. In a very real sense, they are government
employees. They carry on many activities which are governmental in
character. They do so under legislation of the State Parliament. But from the
p41
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beginning of this form of statutory review, both under the Crown Employees
Appeal Board Act 1944 and under the GREAT Act, local government
employees have been excluded. As the terms of reference for the Bowen
Committee suggest, this has been a deliberate decision of succeeding
governments and parliaments. That decision can be unmade. But in the end I
have concluded that it should be unmade by parliament, not by the court,
reading into an admittedly ambiguous provision an operation which fairly
clearly was not intended.
10
aldermen of a council are elected by popular suffrage, not appointed by the

Crown. They neither ask for, nor, in general, receive, any assistance from the
Crown in the discharge of their daily tasks. The extent to which the Crown
can interfere with their activities is slight, and the extent to which it does is
minimal. In what sense, then can it be said that an employee is "in the
15
service of the Crown"? Because, as Mr Bennett said -- and said more than
once-- local government councils exercise what a political scientist might
call"governmental functions": for example, they might build roads, or
conduct schools, or run hospitals. But, as is obvious enough, so can and do
many private persons and bodies. This suggested discrimen is inadequate.
20
POWELL JA. I have read, in draft, the judgment which has been prepared
by Kirby P. I agree with his Honour's conclusion that an employee of a local
council is not to be regarded as being a person "in the service of the Crown",
and with his reasons for so concluding.
25
30
Page 21
Sydney City Council v Reid (1994) 34 NSWLR 506 at 521 per Meagher JA, the Syd City Council was found
by the Court of Appeal not to be the Crown, or an arm of the Crown, or an emanation of the Crown, or an
agent of the Crown; see also Crown Solicitors Advice to the Auditor-General in Auditor-Generals Report
to Parliament 1999, Vol 2, pp 403-407.
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email me the significant parts and how you see it

thanks
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?locid=%27GST/GSTR20065/NAT/ATO%27
5
https://books.google.com.au/books?id=apHcLfapqREC&pg=PA155&lpg=PA155&dq=Sydney+City+Counci
l+v+Reid+%281994%29&source=bl&ots=9t0Qc75ECe&sig=ThtKUcanYtNerRYcrLUZulH2fs&hl=en&sa=X&ei=CxntVI2rGInl8gXs4YKoAw&ved=0CDYQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=Sydney%20City
%20Council%20v%20Reid%20(1994)&f=false
Local governments
13. Local governments may be a State or Territory. As is the case for corporations, the Commissioner
considers that the principles developed by the High Court of Australia in cases concerning the meaning of 'a
State' in section 114 of the Constitution, as described at paragraphs 8 to 12 of this Ruling, also apply in
determining whether a particular local government is a 'State' or 'Territory' for the purposes of the GST Act.
14. There have been several cases in which the Courts have considered whether a local government is a 'State'
for the purposes of section 114 of the Constitution.
15. In The Municipal Council of Sydney v. The Commonwealth 23 (' Municipal Council of Sydney' ), in three
separate judgements, all judges of the High Court agreed that the Municipal Council of Sydney was the 'State'
for the purposes of section 114 of the Constitution. The power delegated to the Council, by State legislation,
which allowed the Council to levy rates, was the determinative factor in that case.
15A. In Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v. State Bank of New South Wales ,24 the High Court referred to
the Municipal Council of Sydney decision and said:
Indeed, the decision in Sydney Municipal Council v The Commonwealth is direct authority for the proposition
that a corporation exercising governmental functions is 'a State' for the purposes of section 114.
15B. The Full Federal Court's decision in Greater Dandenong City Council v. Australian Municipal,
Administrative, Clerical and Services Union 25 (' Dandenong City Council ) is another instance where a local
government was considered to be a 'State' for the purposes of section 114 of the Constitution, albeit that it
was the constitutional immunity under paragraph 51(xxxv) of the Constitution that was the key focus of that
case. In his judgement, Finkelstein J referred to the Municipal Council of Sydney decision and considered
several aspects of the statute under which the Council was established in reaching the conclusion that the
Council was a 'mere instrumentality of the State'. 26
15C. The Municipal Council of Sydney decision and the Dandenong City Council decision both turned upon
the specific features of the particular Councils involved; those specific features being bestowed upon them by
State legislation.
15D. These decisions demonstrate that the legislation constituting a particular local government must be
considered to determine whether it is a State for the purposes of section 114 of the Constitution. These
decisions do not stand for a general proposition that local governments are a State for the purposes of section
114 of the Constitution.
15E. The decisions in Municipal Council of Sydney and Dandenong City Council are contrasted with
decisions where the Court has determined that local governments do not operate as instrumentalities of a
State or Territory Crown, and therefore are not considered to have the immunities of the Crown.27 However,
the principles for determining whether an agency or instrumentality represents the 'Crown' and has been
endowed with the privileges and immunities of the 'Crown' for a particular purpose are different to the
p43
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Page 44
principles applied to determine whether a body is a 'State' for the purposes of section 114 of the
Constitution.28 Therefore, a local government that does not share the immunities of the Crown may,
nevertheless, be the State for the purposes of section 114 of the Constitution and may, similarly, be the State
or Territory for the purposes of the GST Act.
4 Attachments
View all
Download all
SYDNEY_CITY_COUNCIL_V_REID (1994) 34 NSWLR 506 (21 Sept 1994) councils employees not
Crown employees.
.pdf
10
Download View
Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Company - 55 U.S. 80 (1852) A Corporation cannot sue a human
.doc
Download View
15
Bropho v W. A [1990] HCA 24; 171 CLR 1 (20-6-1990) Bropho won. Abl land case. Govt or corporation
employees under Crown authority has no immunity if exceed duty.
.pdf
Download View
20
Shaddock Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) 1981 HCA 59; 150 CLR 225 (28-10-1981)
Council liable for misinformation negligence
.pdf
Download
END QUOTE
As indicated by the High Court of Australia that councils are acting as agents but are not
25 employed by the State Government. Still, as agents it is bound by the 19 July 2006 courts
decision to which the State Attorney-General Robert Hulls agreed to. This included the ABN
issue, regarding judicial bias, etc!
.
I look forwards to Buloke Shire Council refunding all rates and garbage monies it charged where
30 not legally entitled to this.
The legal doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur action denies any remedy to a litigant
(including a prosecutor) who does not come to court with clean hands.
35 If your own action is very unlawful and very unethical, if you come to court with Dirty Hands
best not to question others legality, morality, and ethics!
p44
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http://www.sclqld.org.au/qjudgment/2008/QSC/025
QUOTE
Catchwords
10
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW RESTRICTIONS ON COMMONWEALTH AND STATE LEGISLATION

RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IMPLIED IN COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTION Freedom of political
communication Particular cases Whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted to restrain the
Respondent from limiting the display of election signs within the City of the Gold Coast
EQUITY EQUITABLE REMEDIES INUNCTIONS INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS Where
Applicant seeks an order to restrain the regulation of political advertising by the Respondent
END QUOTE
QUOTE
15
20
25
30
BROWN v. TEXAS, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) -- CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE 3527. The law helps the vigilant,
before those who sleep on their rights. "A statute does not trump the Constitution." People v. Ortiz,
(1995) 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 292, fn. 2 Conway v. Pasadena Humane Society (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 163
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. JERRY ARBERT POOL, C.A. No. 09-10303, IN THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT (Opinion filed September 14, 2010), On
Appeal From The United States District Court For The Eastern District of California "A statutory
privilege cannot override a defendant's constitutional right." People v. Reber, (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d.
523 [223 Cal.Rptr. 139}; Vela v. Superior Ct, 208 Cal.App.3d. 141 [255 Cal.Rptr. 921], however, "the
judiciary has a solemn obligation to insure that the constitutional right of an accused to a fair trial is
realized. If that right would be thwarted by enforcement of a statute, the state ...must yield." Vela v.
Superior Ct., 208 Cal.App.3d. 141 [255 Cal.Rptr. 921 Obviously, administrative agencies, like police
officers must obey the Constitution and may not deprive persons of constitutional rights. Southern Pac.
Transportation Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 18 Cal.3d 308 [S.F. No. 23217. Supreme Court of California.
November 23, 1976.] If evidence of a fact is clear, positive, un-contradicted and of such nature it cannot
rationally be disbelieved, the court must instruct that fact has been established as a matter of law.
Roberts v. Del Monte Properties Co., 111 CA2d. 69 (1952) If they can get you asking the wrong
questions, they don't have to worry about answers. Thomas Pynchon They will do whatever we let them
get away with. Joseph Heller ~*~
END QUOTE
Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule-making or
35 legislation, which would abrogate them. Miranda v. Arizona 384 US 436, 125:
The claim and exercise of Constitutional Rights cannot be converted into a crime. Miller v.
Kansas 230 F 2nd 486, 489:
40 For a crime to exist, there must be an injured party (Corpus Delicti) There can be no
sanction or penalty imposed on one because of this Constitutional right. Sherer v. Cullen
481 F. 945:
If any Tribunal (court) finds absence of proof of jurisdiction over a person and subject
45 matter, the case must be dismissed. Louisville v. Motley 2111 US 149, 29S. CT 42. The
Accuser Bears the Burden of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.
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Lack of Federal Jurisdiction can not be waived or overcome by agreement of parties.

Griffin v. Matthews, 310 F supra 341, 342 (1969): and Want of Jurisdictionmay not be
cured by consent of parties. Industrial Addition Association v. C.I.R., 323 US 310, 313.
5 page 419 by Justice Gavin Duffy within McDonald v Cain Victorian Full Court Supreme
Court 28-05-1953 VLR Quote: What the Full Court of this Court said in Stevenson v The
Queen (1865), 2W.W. & AB. (L) 143, at p. 162 correctly states the law: The Legislature here is
not a Court. It does not assume to determine what are its own powers. The unseemliness of
one Court interfering with the privileges of another Court cannot occur. The powers of
10 both Council and Assembly are prescribed by statute to be within certain limits, and the
Court must if he question of law is raised, determine whether the power in dispute falls
within those limits or not. (Relevant Part).
A Maxim is a saying that is widely accepted on its own merits. A brief expression of a general
15 truth or rule of conduct
o Actore non probante reus absolvitur. When the plaintiff does not prove his case, the
defendant is absolved.
o Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat. The burden of the proof lies upon him
who affirms, not he who denies.
20 Dig. 22, 3, 2; Tait on Ev. 1; 1 Phil. Ev. 194; 1 Greenl. Ev. 74; 3 Louis. R. 83; 2 Dan. Pr. 408; 4
Bouv Inst. n. 4411.
o
Bonum judex secundum aequum et bonum judicat, et aequitatem stricto

juri praefert. A good judge decides according to justice and right, and prefers equity to
strict law. Co. Litt. 24.
o Domus tutissimum cuique refugium atque receptaculum. The habitation of each one is
an inviolable asylum for him. Dig. 2, 4, 18.
25
o Ex dolo malo non oritur action. Out of fraud no action arises. Cowper, 343; Broom's
Max. 349.
o Fraus est celare fraudem. It is a fraud to conceal a fraud. 1 Vern. 270.
o Fraus et jus numquam cohabitant. Fraud and justice never agree together. Wing. 680.
30
o Qui inique non erit aequi - He who has committed iniquity, shall not have equity.
Francis' Max., Max. 2.
o
Semper necessitas probandi incumbit qui agit. The claimant is always bound to prove: the
burden of proof lies on him.
35
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HALSBURYS LAWS OF AUSTRALIA says under (130-13460):
Consent to summary
jurisdiction. The consent to be tried summarily must be clear and unequivocal and a failure
to carry out the procedure for obtaining the consent will deprive the Court of Jurisdiction to
determine the matters summarily.
5
A man who exercises his rights harms no one a Legal Maxim.
Bowers v Smith (1953) 1 ALL ER 320 (Re Clarke Hall) and (Morrison on Children, 7 Ed, P3)
10 QUOTE
"... the first business of the court is to try to issue whether or not the case is bought within the terms of the
statute, and only if this be proven by proper evidence can the court proceed to decide upon treatment"
END QUOTE
..However, the judiciary has no power to amend or modernize the Constitution to give
effect to what Judges think is in the best public interest. The function of the judiciary,
including the function of this Court, is to give effect to the intention of the makers of the
Constitution as evinced by the terms in which they expressed that intention. That
necessarily means that decisions, taken almost a century ago by people long dead, bind
the people of Australia today even in cases where most people agree that those decisions
are out of touch with the present needs of Australian society.
15
20
":.. The starting point for a principled interpretation of the Constitution is the search for
the intention of its makers"
Gaudron J (Wakim, HCA27\99)
25
"... But in the interpretation of the Constitution the connotation or connotations of its
words should remain constant. We are not to give words a meaning different from any
meaning which they could have borne in 1900. Law is to be accommodated to changing
facts. It is not to be changed as language changes. "
Windeyer J (Ex parte Professional Engineers' Association)
30
35
Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally; Re Wakim; Ex parte Darvall; Re Brown; Ex parte Amann; Spi [1999] HCA
27 (17 June 1999)
QUOTE
Constitutional interpretation
1.
40
The starting point for a principled interpretation of the Constitution is the search for the intention of its
makers[51]. That does not mean a search for their subjective beliefs, hopes or expectations. Constitutional
interpretation is not a search for the mental states of those who made, or for that matter approved or
enacted, the Constitution. The intention of its makers can only be deduced from the words that they used in
the historical context in which they used them[52]. In a paper on constitutional interpretation, presented at
Fordham University in 1996, Professor Ronald Dworkin argued, correctly in my opinion[53]:
"We must begin, in my view, by asking what - on the best evidence available - the
authors of the text in question intended to say. That is an exercise in what I have called
constructive interpretation[54]. It does not mean peeking inside the skulls of people dead
for centuries. It means trying to make the best sense we can of an historical event someone, or a social group with particular responsibilities, speaking or writing in a
particular way on a particular occasion."
45
END QUOTE
50 .
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Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9; (1991) 172 CLR 84 (17 April 1991)
QUOTE CCH 92-217 page 78485 (1991)
The Court could not make an order which otherwise fell outside its jurisdiction merely because the parties
consent to it..
END QUOTE
.
10

QUOTE Mr. HIGGINS:
I think it is advisable that private people should not be put to the expense of having important
questions of constitutional law decided out of their own pockets.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE Main v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).

The law provides that once State and Federal jurisdiction has been challenged, it must be proven.
15 END QUOTE
QUOTE Hagens v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533,
20
Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven

END QUOTE
QUOTE Standard v. Olsen, 74 S. Ct. 768,
No sanctions can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction.
END QUOTE
25 QUOTE Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 2nd 906 at 910,
Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time, even on final determination.
END QUOTE
.
30
QUOTE Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 157, 7 L.Ed. 381; Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cr. 9, 3L. Ed. 471.
Where there is absence of jurisdiction, all administrative and judicial proceedings are a nullity and
confer no right, offer no protection, and afford no justification, and may be rejected upon direct
collateral attack.
END QUOTE
.
35 QUOTE Neil v Nott (1994) 68 ALJR 509 at 510 (High Court)

A frequent consequence of self representation is that the court must assume the burden of endeavouring to
ascertain the rights of the parties which are obfuscated by their own advocacy
END QUOTE
.
40 http://www.nswbar.asn.au/docs/professional/prof_dev/BPC/course_files/Dealing%20with%20unrepresented
%20litigants%20-%20Pulsford.pdf
QUOTE
Duty of the court The court has a duty to give persons who represent themselves a fair hearing, and it
may be appropriate for the court to give some assistance to such persons in order to fulfill that duty.
45
The exacting nature of the task imposed upon the judge in civil and criminal trials has been well
summed up by Bell J of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Tomasevic v Travaglini & Anor [2007] VSC
337 (13.9.07) [139]-[141] where his Honour said:
Every judge in every trial, be it criminal or civil, has an overriding duty to ensure the trial is fair. A
fair trial is the only trial a judge can judicially conduct. The duty is inherent in the rule of law and the
50
judicial process. Equality before the law and equal access to justice are fundamental human rights
specified in the ICCPR. The proper performance of the duty to ensure a fair trial would also ensure
those rights are promoted and respected.
p48
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Most self-represented persons lack two qualities that competent lawyers possess legal skill and ability,
and objectivity. Self-represented litigants therefore usually stand in a position of great disadvantage in
legal proceedings of all kinds. Consequently, a judge has a duty to ensure a fair trial by giving self
represented litigants due assistance. Doing so helps to ensure the litigant is treated equally before the
law and has equal access to Justice.

The matters regarding which the judge must assist a self-represented litigants are not limited. The judge
must give such assistance as is necessary to ensure a fair trial. The proper scope of the assistance
depends on the particular litigant and the nature of the case. The touchstone is fairness and balance. The
assistance may extend to issues concerning substantive legal rights as well as to issues concerning the
10
procedure that will be followed.

Where the interests of justice and the circumstances of the case require it, a judge may:
Draw attention to the law applied by the court in determining issues before it;
Question witnesses;
Identify applications or submissions which ought to be put to the court;
15
Suggest procedural steps that may be taken by a party;

Clarify the particulars of the orders sought be a litigant in person or the bases
for such orders.
(The above list was not regarded as exhaustive and there may well be other interventions that a judge
may properly make without giving rise to an apprehension of bias.)
20
The LexisNexis commentary14 provides:

A breach of these guidelines may result in procedural unfairness, which may in turn require a re-trial:
See S v R and the Childrens Representative (1999) 24 Fam LR 213; FLC 92-834. See also In the
Marriage of Sadjak (1992) 16 Fam LR 280; (1993) FLC 92-348 per Nicholson CJ, Nygh and Purdy JJ
where the particular needs of litigants whose first language is not English are discussed. See also In the
25
Marriage of Su and Chang (1999) 25 Fam LR 558; FLC 92-859 (FC).

END QUOTE
As the Infringement Act requires matters to be placed before the Infringement Court, which
however is not as court invested with federal jurisdiction then clearly the matter is at an end. A
30 magistrate cannot act in violation of legislative authority and hear and determine a case invoking
federal jurisdiction merely because the Infringement Court fails to have jurisdiction. It is also
very clear that the legal procedures employed within the Infringement Act for a determination by
the Infringement Registrar is in clear violation to the prescribed legal processes applicable to the
Magistrates Court of Victoria. As such, one cannot apply the legal processes of the Infringement
35 Court to the Magistrates Court of Victoria exercising federal jurisdiction. It is simply
incompatible. As I understand it the magistrates court of Victoria doesnt include in its reporting
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all and any of the orders/warrants issued by the Infringement court, which also indicates that in
reality the Infringement Court may lay claim to be part of the Magistrates Court of Victoria but is
not as such recognised by the Magistrates Court of Victoria itself. Whereas any objection to an
Infringement Registrars decision must be heard before a judge on review DE NOVO I
5 experienced that the Infringement Registrar simply refused to allow for this and as the High court
of Australia in Harris v Caladine made clear that a failure for a review makes the Registrars
decision to be unconstitutional.
10
15
20
25
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/1991/9.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query="otherwise%20fell%20outside%20its%2
0jurisdiction%20"
Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9; (1991) 172 CLR 84 (17 April 1991)
QUOTE
The Full Court on appeal from Maxwell J. held that the review of the Deputy Registrar's decision was
confined to an inquiry whether the parties did in fact consent to the terms of the order and whether the terms
agreed upon were in a form appropriate to the type of order sought and were enforceable. But the order made
by the Deputy Registrar must have been made pursuant to s.79 - the section which confers power upon the
Court to order a settlement of or an alteration in the property interests of the parties. The Court could not
make an order which otherwise fell outside its jurisdiction merely because the parties consented to it
and it follows, a fortiori, that a Registrar, exercising a delegated power, could not do so. Thus, for instance,
under s.80(1)(j) of the Act the Court may make an order by consent, but only in exercising its powers under
Pt VIII. Section 37A(1)(g) allows the delegation to the Registrar of the power to make an order by consent,
but only where it is a power of the Court. And O.36A, r.2(1)(n) delegates to the Registrar the power referred
to in s.37A(1)(g).
END QUOTE
At no time did I in the past consent to an Infringement Registrar to hear and determine matters
nor do I intend to do so in future.
As the Framers of the Constitution made clear:
30 Hansard 8-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates
QUOTE
Mr. OCONNOR.-No, it would not; and, as an honorable member reminds me, there is a decision on the
point. All that is intended is that there shall be some process of law by which the parties accused must be
heard.
35
Mr. HIGGINS.-Both sides heard.

Mr. OCONNOR.-Yes; and the process of law within that principle may be [start page 689] anything
the state thinks fit. This provision simply assures that there shall be some form by which a person
accused will have an opportunity of stating his case before being deprived of his liberty. Is not that a
first principle in criminal law now? I cannot understand any one objecting to this proposal.
40 END QUOTE
45
The Infringement Act clearly violates that both sides heard requirement as it only relies upon
what the prosecutor submits regardless if such submitted details omit relevant issues critical; to
the Infringement Court objection to its jurisdiction.
.
The High Court of Australia held that where a party pleads the non-application of a State
Act because of Commonwealth legislation then the State Court is exercising Federal
jurisdiction. (However only if the State Court can invoke jurisdiction, which VCAT cannot and
neither is a court!) Troy v Wrigglesworth (1919) 26 C.L.R. 305; 25 (1926) 38 C.L.R. 441; 33
50 A.L.R. 66.
.
p50
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Held by the High Court of Australia that the expression Court or judge of a State does not
include a Judge sitting in Chambers exercising the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Wilcox v
Donohoe, (1905) 3 C.L.R. 83; 12 A.L.R. 54.
As such an Infringement Court determining a matter without an open court hearing cannot be
5 deemed excising jurisdiction of a Magistrates Court of Victoria! And as the Infringement
Registrar never did consider, such as in the past, an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION then
clearly it never invoked jurisdiction in the first place and all and any of its orders, including any
warrant issue, are without legal authority.
10 Again:
Lack of Federal Jurisdiction can not be waived or overcome by agreement of parties.
Griffin v. Matthews, 310 F supra 341, 342 (1969): and Want of Jurisdictionmay not be
cured by consent of parties. Industrial Addition Association v. C.I.R., 323 US 310, 313.
15 http://www.news.com.au/national/victoria/black-rock-landowner-fined-for-tall-grass-takes-council-to-court/storyfnii5sms-1227233918828
QUOTE
AN 85-year-old woman has been fined $1100 for not mowing her lawn.
Ruth Rosenbaum owns a vacant block in Black Rock and is taking Bayside Council to court over the fines.
20
Ms Rosenbaum is refusing to pay two fines of $550 imposed last month for not clearing her Beach Rd land,
which she has owned and left vacant for more than 20 years.
END QUOTE
How on earth can it be that one council enforced State legislation with a $550.00 fine while
25 Buloke Shire Council applies an about $1,475 fine?
As indicated above the problem is that Buloke Shire Council is faced with my successful 19-72006 County Court of Victoria decision to uphold both my appeals. As this included (Not
challenged by the Attorney-General for the State of Victoria or any other Attorney-General for
30 that!) and considering that the High Court of Australia would be bias to hear and determine any
matter that directly involves the judges own standing, then Buloke Shire Council would have to
get a hearing before the Privy Council to have the matter heard. And this besides the fact that it
may have no legal standing as it seeks to enforce State of Victoria legislation in regard of a
matter the State of Victoria for which it allegedly acts has been comprehensively defeated on 19
35 July 2006 in this matter. So to say no second bite on the cherry.
Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Company - 55 U.S. 80 (1852) A Corporation cannot
sue a human
Again
40 QUOTE
45
15. In The Municipal Council of Sydney v. The Commonwealth 23 (' Municipal Council of Sydney' ), in three
separate judgements, all judges of the High Court agreed that the Municipal Council of Sydney was the 'State'
for the purposes of section 114 of the Constitution. The power delegated to the Council, by State legislation,
which allowed the Council to levy rates, was the determinative factor in that case
END QUOTE
Bing it that the 1904 HXA decision was before the Land Taxation Act 1910 of the
Commonwealth of Australia, and the States then lost the right to levy land taxation (so the
Councils on its behalf) then Buloke Shire Council may argue that when it comes to Infringement
p51
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Page 52
Notices it enforces it not on its own behalf but that of the State. Then clearly it is bound by the
19-7-2006 County Court of Victoria decision as the State of Victoria is, and also again it
question how can it then charge about 3 fold regarding an alleged offence versus another
council? And, also then if it is acting for the state the monies must be placed in the Consolidated
5 Revenue Funds (as any unconstitutional rates/land tax must be) as the State nor could Buloke
Shire Council for the State can draw monies without any Appropriation Bill.
I may also add that as I understand it after federation the commission of the Governor of the
Colony of Victoria was withdrawn and replaced with Letters Patent for a permanent Office of the
10 Governor of the State of Victoria, gazetted on 2 January 1901 that the Governor shall appoint
members to an impartial administration of justice (judiciary). Clearly the ABN number used
by the courts and the State Government and others cannot provide for this separation of powers.
We therefore have a conflict that the members of the judiciary are appointed to be separated from
the State executives but are not in practice, which violates each and every appointment.
15
QUOTE
Publication of
Governors
Commission
20
25
IV. Every person appointed to fill the Office of Governor shall with, all tine
solemnity, before entering on any of the duties of his Office, cause the Commission
appointing him to be Governor to be read and published at, the seat of Government, in
the presence of the Chief .Justice, or some other Judge of the Supreme Court of the
State, and of the Members of the Executive Council thereof, which being done, he shall
Oath to be taken
by then and there take before them the Oath of Allegiance, in the form provided by an Act
Governor.
passed in the Session holden in tile Thirty-first and Thirty-second years of Our Reign,
Imperial Act3l& 32 intituled an Act to amend the Law relating to Promissory Oaths ; and likewise the
Viet. c. 72.
usual Oath for the due execution of the Office of Governor, and for the due and
impartial administration of justice : which Oaths the said Chief Justice or Judge is
hereby required to administer.
END QUOTE
30 Clearly this requires and for the due and impartial administration of justice!
The Letters Patent also refers to in Our name and on Our behalf and as such cannot be used as to
purport to be under a purported Queen of Australia. Hence, the Governor is bound to comply
with the terms of the Letters patent under the British Crown or fails to exercise any valid
35 appointment of the judiciary! It means the judiciary cannot operate under a purported Queen of
Australia but is limited to and bound to operate under the British Crown and in the name of the
British Crown any and all charges are to be laid.
Again:
45
50
55

March 24, 2005
QUOTE
END QUOTE
.

(Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention),
QUOTE Mr. OCONNER (New South Wales).Because, as has been said before, it is [start page 357] necessary not only that the administration of
justice should be pure and above suspicion, but that it should be beyond the possibility of suspicion;
END QUOTE
p52
2-5-2015
Page 53
QUOTE
Sir JOHN DOWNER.-Now it is coming out. The Constitution is made for the people and the states on
terms that are just to both.
END QUOTE
As such the State cannot unilaterally alter the terms of the constitution without approval
by a state referendum! As I have indicated above also:
QUOTE
It means that the colonial constitution subject to this constitution became a state
constitution where the State Parliament no longer was a sovereign Parliament, and so any
purported amendments not being those as result of the Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act 1900 (UK) including the purported Victorian Constitution Act 1975 is
and remains to be ULTRA VIRES.
10
15
20
25
30
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Dr. COCKBURN: All our experience hitherto has been under the condition of parliamentary
sovereignty. Parliament has been the supreme body. But when we embark on federation we throw
parliamentary sovereignty overboard. Parliament is no longer supreme. Our parliaments at present are
not only legislative, but constituent bodies. They have not only the power of legislation, but the power
of amending their constitutions. That must disappear at once on the abolition of parliamentary
sovereignty. No parliament under a federation can be a constituent body; it will cease to have the
power of changing its constitution at its own will. Again, instead of parliament being supreme, the
parliaments of a federation are coordinate bodies-the main power is split up, instead of being vested in
one body. More than all that, there is this difference: When parliamentary sovereignty is dispensed
with, instead of there being a high court of parliament, you bring into existence a powerful judiciary
which towers above all powers, legislative and executive, and which is the sole arbiter and interpreter
of the constitution.
END QUOTE
.
It would indeed be absurd that the Framers of the Constitution debated that if the GovernorGeneral was to be appointed not by the Home Office at 10 downing Street, London but in
Australia then the issue of the Governor-General to be elected by the people or not was to be
35 canvassed, somehow now the politicians hijacked this choice from the people of the
Commonwealth of Australia without their right of a choice. As a CONSTITUTIONALIST I see
no validity in the State of Victoria purported Victorian Constitution Act 1975 and so its
Parliament and neither therefore laws purportedly enacted since 1975 as such. Neither any
legislation that purports that municipal/shire councils are a local government, this as I have
40 set out extensively in my published books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series on certain
constitutional and other legal issues that local government is a constitutional embedded legal
principle that refers to a state government and central government refers to the
Commonwealth of Australia.
I view that Buloke Shire Council did better to act in the interest of citizens of the shire, to deal
45 with the untreated water issue then to pursue me in the manner it has so far done regarding
alleged fire danger, while it has weed growing all over in excess of 1 metres high!
Awaiting your response,
50
G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Gerrit)

Our name is our motto!)
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20150502-Schorel-Hlavka To Buloke Shire Council Care of Mayor

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Buloke Shire Council

Re: Infringement Notice -Fire danger etc

INSPECTOR-RIKATI & What is the -Australian way of life- really?

ADDRESS TO THE COURT

QUOTE ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2

16 August 2000 ASSEMBLY

COURTS AND TRIBUNALS LEGISLATION (FURTHER AMENDMENT) BILL

ADDRESS TO THE COURT Part 1

32 790 228 959

MAGISTRATES COURT VICTORIA

60 265 617 271

Federal Magistrates Court of Australia

Last updated on: 02 Sep 2005

32 790 228 959

Active from 01 Nov 1999

Retrieved on: 03 Sep 2005

Effective from 01 Jul 2000

view current details

Main Business Locations

Last updated on: 02 Sep 2005

32 790 228 959

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

77 057 165 500

42 426 227 089

SENIOR MASTER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF

Many questions now start to come up.

Commonwealth Government Entity

Definition Save to Favorites See Examples

Read more: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/due-process.html#ixzz2mjxpd0CQ

The corporatising of our courts

HANSARD 9-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Hansard 23-3-1897 Constitution Convention Debates

5 QUOTE 23-6-2014 Email re land tax

LAND TAX Acts

LAND TAX ABOLITION. No. 2 of 1953.

From the above it shows

So let us look at Commonwealth legislation.

QUOTE LAND TAX ABOLITION C1952A00081

Hansard 19-4-1897 Constitution Convention Debates

Sir GEORGE TURNER.-An exclusive power?

Hansard 27-1-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

HANSARD 31-1-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Hansard 1-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

(Official Record of the Debates of the National

5 Hansard 8-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

On Saturday, October 11, 2014 6:22 PM, Mr Gerrit H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

Ok we cut it before we went away to the west.

Anyhow, how is it with your health? Is it settling?

MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

10 The appellant acknowledges:

(d) deterrence to wrongdoers.

[7] [1993] VicRp 69; [1993] 2 VR 201.

[16] Ibid, 118.

[21] Road Safety Act 1986, s 87(1) read with s 77(2).

(IMAGE NOT INCLUDED)

As I indicated in past correspondences (for example 20150112-G. H. Schorel-Hlavka to

SYDNEY_CITY_COUNCIL_V_REID (1994) 34 NSWLR 506 (21 Sept 1994) councils employees

13. It is, we think, important to recognize that the Crown, being

the statutory provisions have enacted the creation of largely

government is ordinarily carried out, is inconsistent with viewing their