1. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY- EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.

284
FACTS:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in
83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being resolved
jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President
Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition to
their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the
excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold
more than two positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or
undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of
Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions
against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution
namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of
Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of
Sec. 8 of article VIII.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.
Decision:
No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.
Ratio:
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is
unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more that two positions in the
government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The phrase unless otherwise provided in this constitution must be given a literal interpretation to refer
only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.

2. GONZALES VS. COMELEC [21 SCRA 774; G.R. NO. L-28196; 9 NOV 1967]
Facts:
The
case
is
an
original
action
for
prohibition,
with
preliminary
injunction.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed
the following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a
maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among
the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although
each province shall have, at least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be
composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general
elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to
authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the
aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became
Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned
Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be
held on November 14, 1967.
Issue:
Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the Constitution.
Held:
In as much as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos.
1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby,
dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be contested
except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the
ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry
into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are
valid, insofar as the public is concerned.
"The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof."
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or
call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification.

From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate
knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run
for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.

3. IMBONG V COMELEC September 11, 1970RA 6132: delegates in ConCon;

Petitioner: Imbong VS Respondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor (Comelec Members)
Petitioner: Gonzales VS Respondent : Comelec Ponente: Makasiar
RELATED LAWS:Resolution No 2 (1967)
2delegates from each representative district who
shall be elected in November, 1970.
RA 4919

Resolution 4 (1969)
representative districts according to thepopulation. Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2
deledates.
RA 6132
officers/employees as resigned when they file theircandicacySec 2: apportionment of delegatesSec 5:
Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in theelection or from assuming any
appointive office/position until the final adournment of the ConCon.Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political
parties/organized groups from givingsupport/representing a delegate to the convention.
FACTS:
This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but relatedpetitions of running candidates
for delegates to the Constitutional Conventionassailing the validity of RA 6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and
Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire lawImbong: Par 1 Sec 8
ISSUE:
Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention (Validity of R.A. No. 6132) and
whether theparameters set by such a call is constitutional.
HOLDING:
The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention asa Constituent Assembly.
Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitionersare deemed as constitutional.
RATIO
Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution
Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132
Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to proposeamendments, or call for convention
for the purpose by votes andthese votes were attained by Res 2 and 4
Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Res 4 and is enough that thebasis employed for such
apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied byGonsales is not reasonable for that case granted more
representatives toprovinces with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equalto the
number of delegates I other provinces with more population.
Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualifymembers thereof. Furthermore,
this disqualification is only temporary. Thisis a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling
electionsand to allow them to devote more time to the Concon.

Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also toassure candidates equal
opportunity since candidates must now depend ontheir individual merits, and not the support of political
parties. Thisprovision does not create discrimination towards any particularparty/group, it applies to all
organizations

4. BAUTISTA V. SALONGA
Facts:
In the case of Sarmiento III vs. Mison, the Supreme Court held that only thoseappointments expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII are to be reviewed bythe Commission on
Appointments, namely, "the heads of the executive department,ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in thisConstitution." All other appointments by the
President are to be made without the participationof the Commission on Appointments.Since the
appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rightsis not specifically
provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of theCivil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whoseappointments are
expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of theCommission on
Appointments.
The President appoints the Chairman and Members of theCommission on Human Rights pursuant to
the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is,without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments because they are among theofficers of government "whom he (the President) may be
authorized by law to appoint." AndSection 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the
President to appoint theChairman and Members of the Commission on Human RightsOn 27 August
1987, the President of the Philippines designated Mary Concepcion Bautistaas "Acting Chairman,
Commission on Human Rights." Realizing perhaps the need for apermanent chairman and members
of the Commission on Human Rights, befitting anindependent office, as mandated by the Constitution,
the President of the Philippines on 17December 1988 extended to Bautista a permanent appointment
as Chairman of the Commission.
By virtue of such appointment, Bautista was advised by the President that she couldqualify and enter
upon the performance of the duties of the office of Chairman of theCommission on Human Rights,
requiring her to furnish the office of the President and the CivilService Commission with copies of her
oath of office.On 22 December 1988, before the Chief Justice Fernan, Bautista took her oath of office
by virtueof her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights.Immediately, after
taking her oath of office as Chairman of the Commission on HumanRights, Bautista discharged the
functions and duties of the Office of Chairman of the Commissionon Human Rights.On 9 January
1989, Bautista received a letter from the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments requesting her
to submit to the Commission certain information and documents asrequired by its rules in connection
with the confirmation of her appointment as Chairman of theCommission on Human Rights. On 10
January 1989, the Commission on Appointments' Secretaryagain wrote Bautista requesting her
presence at a meeting of the Commission on AppointmentsCommittee on Justice, Judicial and Bar
Council and Human Rights set for 19 January 1989 at 9A.M. at the Conference Room, 8th Floor,
Kanlaon Tower I, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City that woulddeliberate on her appointment as Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights.
On 13 January 1989, Bautista wrote to the Chairman of the Commission on Appointments stating,for
the reasons therein given, why she considered the Commission on Appointments as havingno
jurisdiction to review her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights.In
Commissions comment (in this case), dated 3 February 1989, there is attached asAnnex 1 a letter of
the Commission on Appointments' Secretary to the Executive Secretary, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr.
making reference to the "ad interim appointment which Her Excellencyextended to Atty. Mary

Concepcion Bautista on 14 January 1989 as Chairperson of theCommission on Human Rights" and

informing Secretary Macaraig that, as previously conveyed tohim in a letter of 25 January 1989, the
Commission on Appointments disapproved Bautista's "adinterim appointment' as Chairperson of the
Commission on Human Rights in view of her refusalto submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Appointments.On the same date (1 February 1989), the Commission on Appointments' Secretary
informedBautista that the motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of her "ad interim appointment
asChairman of the Commission on Human Rights" was denied by the Commission on Appointments.
In Annex 3 of Commission's same comment, dated 3 February 1989, is a news itemappearing in the 3
February 1989 issue of the "Manila Standard" reporting that the President haddesignated PCHR
Commissioner Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting Chairman of the Commission"pending the resolution of
Bautista's case which had been elevated to the Supreme Court.On 20 January 1989, or even before
the respondent Commission on Appointments hadacted on her "ad interim appointment as Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights"Bautista filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari with
a prayer for the immediateissuance of a restraining order, to declare "as unlawful and unconstitutional
and without anylegal force and effect any action of the Commission on Appointments as well as of
theCommittee on Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights, on the lawfully
extendedappointment of the Bautista as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, on the
groundthat they have no lawful and constitutional authority to confirm and to review her appointment."
Issue:
Whether the President, subsequent to her act of 17 December 1988, and after Bautistahad qualified
for the office to which she had been appointed, by taking the oath of office andactually assuming and
discharging the functions and duties thereof, could extend anotherappointment to Bautista on 14
January 1989
Held:
When Her Excellency, the President converted Bautista's designation as Acting Chairmanto a
permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on 17 December1988,
significantly she advised Bautista (in the same appointment letter) that, by virtue of suchappointment,
she could qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office (of Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights). All that remained for Bautista to do was to rejector accept the
appointment. Obviously, she accepted the appointment by taking her oath of officebefore the Chief
Justice Fernan and assuming immediately thereafter the functions and duties of the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights. Bautista's appointment therefore on 17December 1988 as Chairman of
the Commission on Human Rights was a completed act on thepart of the President.Constitutional Law,
to begin with, is concerned with power not political convenience,wisdom, exigency, or even necessity.
Neither the Executive nor the Legislative (Commission onAppointments) can create power where the
Constitution confers none. The evident constitutionalintent is to strike a careful and delicate balance, in
the matter of appointments to public office,between the President and Congress (the latter acting
through the Commission onAppointments). To tilt one side or the other of the scale is to disrupt or alter
such balance of power. In other words, to the extent that the Constitution has blocked off certain
appointmentsfor the President to make with the participation of the Commission on Appointments, so
also hasthe Constitution mandated that the President can confer no power of participation in
theCommission on Appointments over other appointments exclusively reserved for her by
theConstitution. The exercise of political options that finds no support in the Constitution cannot
besustained.Nor can the Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its
constitutionallydelimited power to review presidential appointments, create power to confirm
appointments thatthe Constitution has reserved to the President alone.
Stated differently, when the appointment isone that the Constitution mandates is for the President to
make without the participation of theCommission on Appointments, the executive's voluntary act of

submitting such appointment tothe Commission on Appointments and the latter's act of confirming or
rejecting the same, aredone without or in excess of jurisdiction.Assuming that the Executive may
voluntarily allow the Commission on Appointments to exercise the power of review over an
appointment otherwise solely vested by the Constitution inthe President. Yet, as already noted, when
the President appointed Bautista on 17 December1988 to the position of Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights with the advice to her that by virtue of such appointment (not, until confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments), she could qualify and enter upon the performance of her duties after
taking her oath of office, the presidential act of appointment to the subject position which, under the
Constitution, is to be made, in the first place, without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments, was then and there a complete and finished act, which, upon the acceptance by
Bautista, as shown by her taking of the oath of office and actual assumption of the duties of said office,
installed her, indubitably and unequivocally, as the lawful Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights for aterm of seven (7) years.
There was thus no vacancy in the subject office on 14 January 1989 towhich an appointment could be
validly made. In fact, there is no vacancy in said office to thisday.Nor can respondents impressively
contend that the new appointment or re-appointmenton 14 January 1989 was an ad interim
appointment, because, under the Constitutional design, adinterim appointments do not apply to
appointments solely for the President to make, i.e., withoutthe participation of the Commission on
Appointments. Ad interim appointments, by their verynature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only
to appointments where the review of theCommission on Appointments is needed.
That is why ad interim appointments are to remainvalid until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President
solely to make, that is, without theparticipation of the Commission on Appointments, can not be ad
interim appointments.Bautista can still be removed but her removal must be for cause and with her
right to dueprocess properly safeguarded. In the case of NASECO vs. NLRC, this Court held that
before arank-and-file employee of the NASECO, a government-owned corporation, could be
dismissed,she was entitled to a hearing and due process. How much more, in the case of the
Chairman of aconstitutionally mandated INDEPENDENT OFFICE, like the Commission on Human
Rights. If thereare charges against Bautista for misfeasance or malfeasance in office, charges may be
filedagainst her with the Ombudsman. If he finds a prima facie case against her, the
correspondinginformation/s can be filed with the Sandiganbayan which may in turn order her
suspension fromoffice while the case or cases against her are pending before said court.

5. OCCENA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

[GR 56350, 2 April 1981]; also Gonzales vs. National Treasurer [GR 56404]
En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 on official leave
Facts:
The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged
constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar
and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are
suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973
Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.
Issue:
Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa
resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.
Held:
It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the
dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and
mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It
then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could
even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that as of
17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by
the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court
says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed.
Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law.
It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has
both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and
Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not
only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there
is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere
dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in
Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in
point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity
of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.

6. TOLENTINO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

[GR 148334, 21 January 2004]
En Banc, Carpio (J): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion to which 3 join
Facts:

Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Senator Guingona) as Vice-President. Congress
confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February
2001. Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution
84 certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution 84 called on COMELEC to fill the
vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May
2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. Resolution 84
further provided that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve
only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., which ends on 30 June 2004.
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the provinces but one
(Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as
the elected Senators.
Resolution 01-005 also provided that the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6)
years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President. Ralph Recto (Recto) and Gregorio
Honasan (Honasan) ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in Resolution 01-005. On 20 June 2001,
Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the petition for prohibition,
impleading only COMELEC as respondent. Tolentino and Mojica sought to enjoin COMELEC from
proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the
winner in the special election for a single three-year term seat.

Accordingly, Tolentino and Mojica prayed for the nullification of Resolution 01-005 in so far as it makes
a proclamation to such effect. Tolentino and Mojica contend that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005
without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special
election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to
indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular
elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in
the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial
elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646.
Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for
the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that there were no two
separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective

of term. Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the
pendency of their petition. Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court required
COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentinos and Mojica's standing to
bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally
disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of
Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.
Issue:
Whether Tolentino and Mojica have standing to litigate.
Held:
Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act. The
requirement of standing, which necessarily sharpens the presentation of issues, relates to the
constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies. Thus, generally, a
party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual
or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the present petition. In questioning, in
their capacity as voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001, Tolentino and Mojica
assert a harm classified as a generalized grievance.

This generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all
the voters, who voted in that election. Neither have Tolentino and Mojica alleged, in their capacity as
taxpayers, that the Court should give due course to the petition because in the special election held on
14 May 2001 tax money [was] x x x extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protections against abuses of legislative power or that there [was] misapplication of such funds by
COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to any improper purpose. On the other hand, the
Court has relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give due course to
voters suits involving the right of suffrage.
The Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of
legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal
attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance
to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. The Court accords the same
treatment to Tolentino and Mojica in the present case in their capacity as voters since they raise
important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in the petition is
likely to arise again.

7. JAVELLANA v EXECUTIVE SEC

The Facts:
Sequence of events that lead to the filing of the Plebiscite then Ratification Cases.
The Plebiscite Case
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by
Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.
Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August
24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held
on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on
June 1, 1971.
While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No.
1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential
Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds
therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution
on January 15, 1973.
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the
Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from
implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court," upon the
grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the calling ...
of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots
to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the
purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress ...," and "there is no proper
submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no
freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the
contents thereof."
On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of
Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution.
On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973,
when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January
15, 1978, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order No. 20, moreover, "suspended in the
meantime" the "order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No.
1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution."
Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court
deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date
nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially.
Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session
on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the
President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor,

which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the
plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress
and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these
cases.
"In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an "urgent
motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15,
1973."
The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the
respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said "urgent motion" and "manifestation," "not later
than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973." Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the
petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a "supplemental motion for issuance of restraining
order and inclusion of additional respondents," praying:
"... that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections,
as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roo; the Department
of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating
Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all
other officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing
and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-called Citizens' Assemblies
referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period
comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of
this Supplemental Urgent Motion."
On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said
case G.R. No. L-35948 to file "file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday,
January 16, 1973," and setting the motion for hearing "on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m." While the
case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the
writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was
delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the
President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties
in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public
there present that the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice,
signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.
Thereupon, the writer read Proclamation No. 1102 which is of the following tenor:
____________________________
"BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1102
"ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION
PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
"WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional
Convention is subject to ratification by the Filipino people;
"WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in
chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of all
persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age or
over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members kept by
the barrio, district or ward secretary;
"WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of citizen
participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express their
views on important national issues;
"WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A,
dated January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or
Barangays: Do you approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify
the new Constitution?

"WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14,976,561)
members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed
Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who
voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people would still like a plebiscite
to be called to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight thousand eight
hundred fourteen (14,298,814) answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of
the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite;
"WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the
members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the Katipunan
ng Mga Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should already be deemed
ratified by the Filipino people;
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposed
by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an
overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens
Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect.
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the
Philippines to be affixed.
"Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-three.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS"President of the Philippines
"By the President:
"ALEJANDRO MELCHOR"Executive Secretary"
_________________________________
The Ratification Case
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary
and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and their
subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found
in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a
"Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter" and as "a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of
all citizens and voters similarly situated," was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in
substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the
President had announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet,
respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in
implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-inChief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies";
that the same "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is
without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that
the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."

The Issue:
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore nonjusticiable, question?
2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with
substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions?
3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by
the people? (acquiesced - "permission" given by silence or passiveness. Acceptance or agreement by
keeping quiet or by not making objections.)

4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?

5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?
The Resolution:
Summary:
The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when the crucial
question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court (Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion, together
Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the
1973 Constitution.
Details:
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore nonjusticiable, question?
On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of
Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and
Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second
question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been
approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually
been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the
people's will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or
not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or
three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."

2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with
substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions?
On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the
1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in
accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters.
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been
validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding
the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the
manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In
view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there
was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution
without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to
hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have
cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV,
hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has
been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally
ratified."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view
there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid
ratification.

3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by
the people?
On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed
Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the
people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution."
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free
expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the
Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice
Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the
effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted
acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage
prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has
elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom
of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law." 88
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the
question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that
"Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle
restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have
accepted the Constitution."
4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?
On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro
so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis,
is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than
judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are relevant and unavoidable." 91
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to
deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.
5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?
On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it
is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no
vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with
judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not
enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices
Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being
the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in
force and effect.
It is so ordered.

8. DE LEON V. ESGUERRA, 153 SCRA 602, AUGUST, 31, 1987

(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with
the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of
Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay
Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but
signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent
Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as
members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared
null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain
and Barangay Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222),
their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until
their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the
ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to
replace them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials
were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional
Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the
Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to
have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during
the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.

Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987
designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov
could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions
occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of
6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

9. SANIDAD VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [GR L-44640, 12 October 1976]

En Banc, Martin (J): 1 concurs in result, 4 concur in separate opinions, 2 dissent in separate opinions,
2 filed separate opinions
Facts:
On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a
national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among
other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his
present powers. 20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related decree,
Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of
Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens
Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly,
Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991. On the same date of
22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to he submitted
to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976.
The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the
interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to
the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the
exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September
1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991
and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031,
insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the ReferendumPlebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976.
They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to
exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30 September 1976,
another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by Vicente
M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose
amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the
interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still another petition for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr.,
and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees
relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
Issue:
Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.
Held:
Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all
its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of

all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the
question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that "Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of such amendment or
revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory
Provisions is conferred with that amending power.
Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the
interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this
Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof."
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of
normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the
proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a
Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly.
However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted
upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments
may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call
by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent
President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim
National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of
the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing
conditions of peace and order in the country.
When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware
of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could
convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim
National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15,
1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the
convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies
("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly.
Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National
Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and
delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim
National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had
already resolved against it.
In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a
Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the
amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter
itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular
National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While
ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional
conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is
made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The
distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any
proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies
only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of
amendments to the Constitution.

10. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)

Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms,Modernization
and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of
elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987
Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the
publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing.
At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest
Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors.Senator Roco
filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizableby
the COMELEC.
The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action
for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the
several arguments, such as the following:
(1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed;
(2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting
of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The
Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct
of such initiative.
(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of
the Constitution.
Held:
(1) Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory, thus, without implementing legislation the
same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people
cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.
(2) The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is void. It has been an established rule that
what has been delegated cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The
delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules
and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative.
(3) The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of
the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal
access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be

done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue of
whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic
11. LAMBINO vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006)

Requirements for Initiative Petition

Constitutional Amendment vs. Constitutional Revision
Tests to determine whether amendment or revision
FACTS:
The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution and then filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for ratification under Sec. 5(b)
and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735.
The proposed changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. COMELEC did not give it due course for lack of an
enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to Santiago v. Comelec
ruling
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision
(2) Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement on
direct proposal by the people
RULING:
(1) Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by people Sec.2, Art. XVII is
the governing provision that allows a peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.
While this provision does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed
amendments, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that:
a. the framers intended to adopt relevant American jurisprudence on peoples initiative; and
b. in particular, the people must first seethe full text of the proposed amendments before they
sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text.
The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is
that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must
be present.
2 elements of initiative
1. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative
can sign on their behalf.
2. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. The full
text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If
so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of
the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments
before not after signing. Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of
the nature and effect of that which is proposed and failure to do so is deceptive and misleading
which renders the initiative void.

In the case of the Lambino Groups petition, theres not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text
of the proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of
the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the
people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system of
government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes
before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text
of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the
people. Thats why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be directly proposed by the people
x x x in a petition - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nations fundamental law, the writing of
the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special
power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through initiatives
article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution.
1. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members.
2. The second mode is through a constitutional convention.
3. The third mode is through a peoples initiative.
(2) Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to any amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies
only to amendments to this Constitution. This distinction was intentional as shown by the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies
only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a
constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.
Does the Lambino Groups initiative constitute a revision of the Constitution?
Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the
abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.
Amendment vs. Revision
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a
constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like
altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also
revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution.
On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without
altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution,
while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended. Where the proposed
change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or
article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision.
For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an amendment and
not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100% to
60% is an amendment and not a revision.
Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the
Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.The changes in these examples do not entail any
modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended.

These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances
among or within the three branches.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a
single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the
substitution of the word republican with monarchic or theocratic in Section 1, Article II of the
Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of
the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it
affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system
of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a
deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires
harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered.
Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional
conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow peoples initiatives, which do not
have fixed &identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments & not
revisions.
Tests to determine whether amendment or revision
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like
in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The
quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly
the substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. The
court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change
.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The
main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision. Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government
is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan includes
change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of
the basic governmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of government & the
system of check and balances
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Groups initiative is a revision & NOT
merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Groups proposed changes overhaul two articles Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive -affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire
Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of the government, from
presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great coequal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of
powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a UnicameralParliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a
radical change in the structure of government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus
of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances
within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.The Lambino Group theorizes that the
difference between amendment and revision is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino
Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive
changes are called revisions because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. The
same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called amendments because the
changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an occupation, profession, or vocation out of such
endeavour. The SC, however, ruled that the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the
Constitution contradict the Lambino Groups theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the
Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.

12. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS [267 SCRA 408; G.R. No. 122156; 3 Feb 1997]

Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent GovernmentService Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to
the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December
1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent Manila HotelCorporation. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2)
bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share,
or
P2.42
more
than
the
bid
of
petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of
the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renon Berhad.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that
the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an
earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its
power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it
has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of
the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS,
a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part
of
the
tourism
industry is
unquestionably a
part
of
the
national
economy.
Issue:
Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of
Filipino
First
policy
and
is
therefore
null
and
void.
Held:
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the
highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a
significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the
plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this
Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman
of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered
that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to
purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and
thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for purpose.

13. REV. ELY VELEZ PAMATONG VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC
declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a
national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC
violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage
a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in
disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he
possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of
waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he
also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries,
and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust
or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not selfexecuting, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access"
provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves
much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the
clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly
defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service"
are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not
the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some
valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody

equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not
sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who
is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is
exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates
who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a
compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards
this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably,
the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to
mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization
of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates
with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral
process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a onenote joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral
process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless
sacrifice on the part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis
of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of
further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence,
to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus
more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the
Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of
the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day
of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election.
At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.