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1. Jan A. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas
Aquinas (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 52), Leiden-New YorkKln 1996.
RTPM 64,2 (1997) 455-463
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dle Ages constitutes both a major shift in the conception of the discipline and one that had lasting and substantial impact in early modern philosophy3. Still, Aertsens claim is more encompassing than
either of these antecedents, since it applies to medieval philosophy as
a whole.
The more specific of the two theses concerns Thomas in particular, but goes hand in hand with the overall thesis concerning
medieval philosophy. According to Aertsen, Thomas does not adopt
the theological conception of metaphysics [common before him].
His understanding of first philosophy is transcendental (p. 127);
indeed, for him the very understanding of metaphysics has itself
become transcendental (p. 155). And shortly after, Aertsen adds:
The first and most fundamental aspect [of Thomas thought] is his
view of the subject of metaphysics [because it involves] a shift
from the theological conception of metaphysics, based on transmateriality, to an ontological conception, based on commonness. The
subject of first philosophy is not the first being, that is transcendent,
but being in general and that which is consequent upon being [so
that with Thomas] [t]he conception of metaphysics itself became
transcendental (p. 157).
In short, Aertsen claims that Thomas conception of metaphysics,
in line with the thesis he maintains concerning medieval philosophy
in general and medieval metaphysics in particular, is transcendental,
and it is so primarily because the subject of the discipline is identified with the transcendentals, namely, being qua being and its attributes. Moreover, elsewhere he also applies his general claim about a
transcendental approach in medieval philosophy to Thomistic metaphysics (p. 157).
As with the more general thesis, there are also antecedents of Aertsens claim concerning the metaphysics of Thomas. Cornelio Fabro
3. Ludger HONNEFELDER, Der zweite Anfang der Metaphysik. Voraussetzungen,
Anstze und Folgen der Wiederbegrndung der Metaphysik im 13./14. Jahrhundert, in:
J.P. BECKMANN et al. (edd.), Philosophie im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen, Hamburg 1987, pp. 165-186; ID., Ens in quantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden als
solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus, Mnster
1979 et 21989; ID., Metaphysik und Transzendenz. berlegungen zu Johannes Duns
Scotus im Blick auf Thomas von Aquin und Anselm von Canterbury, in: L. HONNEFELDER et W. SCHBLER (edd.), Transzendenz. Zu einem Grundwort der klassischen metaphysik, Paderborn 1992, pp. 137-161.
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had already claimed in the sixties that the transcendentals are the
proper focus of Thomas metaphysics4. But again, Aertsen goes well
beyond this antecedent because he claims that metaphysics itself has
become transcendental and that it has become so in Thomas not
only because of what it studies but also because of the way it does it.
The argument on which the less general thesis is in part defended
is based on the subject of metaphysics. It could be formulated like
this:
1. Metaphysics is a science.
2. The aim of every science is to study its subject and the properties of that
subject.
3. The subject of metaphysics is being qua being.
4. Being qua being and the properties of being qua being are the same as the
transcendentals.
5. Therefore, the aim of metaphysics is to study the transcendentals.
The argument used to support the conception of medieval metaphysics as the study of the transcendentals is similar to this, but the
argument used to support the claim that all medieval philosophy
involves a transcendental way of thought is of a different sort. For
this thesis maintains that not just in subject, but in approach as well,
medieval philosophy involves a kind of transcendentalism. I have not
enough space to examine in detail this second claim made by Aertsen
or the arguments he uses to support it, but I will say a few words
about the particular claim concerning the subject of metaphysics in
Thomas and the general claim that medieval philosophy is primarily
concerned with the transcendentals.
First concerning Thomas: Historians of philosophy should maintain a clear distinction between what the authors they study hold and
the implications of what those authors hold, for surely authors are
aware of what they hold but they are not always aware of the implications of what they hold. Indeed, it is a matter of common experience that we are frequently, and sometimes painfully, made aware of
the implications of our views. The failure to keep this distinction in
mind has unfortunate consequences for historical interpretation,
resulting in the attribution of views to authors who did not, and
4. Cornelio FABRO, The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse and the Ground of Metaphysics, in: International Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1966), p. 392.
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Let me finish by emphasizing, again, the value of Aertsens contribution to the understanding of the history of the medieval doctrine
of the transcendentals and the role it played in Thomas thought.
Aertsens book is a model of erudition and subtlety. The questions I
have raised concerning his characterization of medieval philosophy
and Thomas metaphysics should not obscure this fact8.
State University of New York
Buffalo