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plagued Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic on Wilsons high-minded but
futile attempts to spread democracy through U.S. overseas engagements.
Good Neighbor Policy Not That Good
Surprisingly, Smith identifies the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as a
paradigm of U.S. imperialism in the Western Hemisphere. Under FDR, the U.S.
renounced military intervention in Latin America and condemned interference in the
internal political life of sovereign nations. Smith charges that Roosevelt sought to
inextricably bind Latin America to the U.S. by strengthening economic and
diplomatic ties throughout the region. He accuses the U.S. of inducing Latin
American nations into arrangements of greater economic and political cooperation,
maintaining that the United States managed to reach trade agreements only with
countries that were heavily dependent on U.S. markets for agriculturalproducts
(73). However, some critics might dispute this point, arguing that U.S.-Latin
American relations visibly improved under Roosevelts leadership.
The Good Neighbor policy resulted in an economic trade boom and curtailed U.S.
tampering throughout the region, curbed media stereotyping of Latin Americans,
and secured hemispheric support for the U.S. during World War II. Smith
acknowledges that cultural exchange between the U.S. and Latin America prospered
under FDR, and admits that the political principles of national sovereignty and the
juridical equality of states made some headway under the Good Neighbor policy.
Nonetheless, he explains this by asserting that that U.S. tactics had changed, but
goals were much the same (79). The ostensible cooperation and goodwill that
typified hemispheric affairs during Roosevelts presidency, he argues, disguised the
U.S.s intention to politically and economically exploit Latin American nations for its
own gain. Unfortunately, one might quibble that the author fails to convincingly
verify that the U.S. foresaw its hemispheric objectives in such realist terms.
Smith skillfully analyzes the extrahemispheric concerns, ideological convictions, and
strategic priorities that characterized U.S.-Latin American relations during the Cold
War. He comprehensively details the distribution of power, policy goals, and national
interests that framed U.S. involvement in the Western Hemisphere between 1940
and 1980. Smith places particular emphasis on U.S. national security concerns and
the perceived need of the U.S. to contain Soviet global expansion. He argues that
the U.S. strategy of backing authoritarian regimes in Latin America did not
necessarily represent a break from the U.S.s preference for democracy, but rather
coincided with the governments concealment of its intended goals: It represented,
instead, a cold-blooded calculation: that dictatorial regimes would be more
predictably and efficiently anticommunist than other types of government, including
democratic systems (125). Through his exposition of the dynamics that
characterized the inter-American relationship during the Cold War, Smith reinforces
his abiding thesis that U.S.-Latin American affairs largely reflect perceived national
interests and the global balance of power.
1994 refugee operation in Haiti. Yet, Smith could be undermining his portrayal of
U.S. uncontrolled preponderance in the region through his perfectly plausible
portrayal of the War on Terror as a valuable, if unintended opportunity for Latin
American nations to explore unexpected policy alternatives. The rise of the pink
tide, skepticism over the neoliberal economic model, the increasing role of Brazil
as a global economic actor, the failure of the FTAA, and the forging of stronger trade
and diplomatic ties with China and the Middle East attest to Latin Americas
newfound ability to reassert its importance as a political and economic actor.
Furthermore, this line of thinking helps to establish how costly the distraction of Iraq
has been on Washingtons ability to plough a straight line in a habitat where the
region was provided with all sorts of options to diversify and pluralize its ties with
new players, be they slumbering candidates for superpower status, like India, or
rogue nations in the White Houses purview.
Washingtons War on Terror
Smith argues that the War on Terror has transformed the dynamics of the interAmerican relationship. It has recast the political status of Cuba, drug trafficking, and
illegal immigration as fundamental concerns of U.S. national security. The U.S.
largely has ignored Latin American opposition to the Iraq War, resulting in
institutionalized neglect of hemispheric concerns (320). Yet, Smith alleges that
Latin America merits high-level attention from the U.S. due to its geographical
proximity and status as a potential breeding ground for terrorists. He claims
perhaps overly dwells on the possibility that Latin America could provide a base
for terrorists seeking to launch assaults, that terrorist movements could arise from
within Latin America itself, and that the U.S. could be forced to divert valuable
resources to the region in the event of political or social upheaval. Smith suggests
that the U.S. should view its conduct of relations with Latin America as a matter of
authentic foreign policy (377). He nevertheless concedes that the relative
tranquility of the region has benefited U.S. political, economic, and national security
imperatives. He warns that continued U.S. neglect of Latin America could result in a
proliferation of terrorist activity throughout the Western Hemisphere, but he is
unconvincing in his claim that a real threat exists or is likely to develop. This is
perhaps the most disabling aspect of his analysis, and one might like to query the
author as to why he headed down this seeming dry gulch when Latin America, as a
new zone of fast-growing autonomous behavior, provided such rich grounds for
informed speculation.
No Easy Path to Ones Destiny
Smith additionally urges the region to turn to a strategy of collective solidarity in
order to obtain bargaining power that will offset U.S. influence in the region. He
suggests that the more unified the countries of the region, the greater their overall
bargaining power with the United States (414). Yet, his emphasis on continental
unity and the Bolivarian ideal of solidarity conflicts with an apparent hemispheric
trend toward greater transnational economic, migratory, and cultural flows (414).