Int J Psychoanal 2006;87:104958

A review of Lacans seminar on anxiety1

GILBERT DIATKINE
48 bd Beaumarchais, F-75011 Paris, France gilbert.diatkine@wanadoo.fr
(Final version accepted 20 December 2005)

The seminar on anxiety marks a turning point in the development of Lacans

thought from several perspectives. First, Lacan implicitly abandons his theory that
the unconscious is structured like a language. He also abandons the endeavour
to identify Freuds theory with his own. He develops some original new ideas
about anxiety, some of which are of great interest, such as the connection between
castration anxiety and narcissism; others, such as his denial of the existence of
separation anxiety, are absurd. Lacans main point of divergence from Freud, his
rejection of the inner world, also emerges clearly in this seminar.
Keywords: anxiety, object a, jouissance, separation anxiety, intrusion anxiety,
affect

The seminar on anxiety (Lacan, 2004) was held during the academic year 19623.
In 1953, Lacan had produced a ercely polemical manifesto, arguing that the
leaders of the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA)Hartmann, Kris
and Loewensteinhad misrepresented Freuds thought and that his own original
ideas concerning a structural identity between psychoanalysis, linguistics and
anthropology constituted a return to genuine Freudian thinking, hitherto misunderstood through hasty readings and faulty translations. In this manifesto, he also put
forward the justication for his most controversial innovation, the practice of short
sessions of varying length. A schism had emerged at this time within the Socit
Psychanalytique de Paris (SPP) and Lacan had become the leader of a new group,
the Socit Franaise de Psychanalyse (SFP), which had requested admission to the
IPA. The year before this seminar, in August 1961, the SFP had been accepted as
a Study Group, and active international negotiations were being conducted for its
admission as an IPA component society at the 1963 Congress. The main obstacle
to this reinstatement was the practice of short sessions, which Lacan saw no reason
to abandon. This is why only a part of the SFP rejoined the IPA in 1963 under
the name Association Psychanalytique de France, while Lacan then created a new
group, outside the IPA, the cole Freudienne de Paris. This diplomatic context may
explain why this seminar was written in a less polemical tone than the previous
ones. It seems to me, however, that Lacans personal development had led him to
accept the originality of his own ideas in relation to those of Freud, and that he
therefore felt less of a need to demonstrate in polemical fashion that he was the only
genuine Freudian.
Translated by Sophie Leighton.

2006 Institute of Psychoanalysis

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The end of the return to Freud

In fact, it is interesting to note that in this seminar, instead of striving to demonstrate

at all costs, as he had done previouslynot without some difcultythat his ideas
concurred perfectly with those of Freud, Lacan now identies many vacillations in
Freuds doctrine (2004, p. 377). He clearly sets out where he disagrees with it, so
that the reader can decide more easily on which points he has to choose between
Freud and Lacan, and on which points Lacans contributions usefully amplify
psychoanalytic theory. The divergences primarily relate to the theory of anxiety
as it is developed in Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety (Freud, 1926) (Lacan,
2004, p. 18). For Lacan, the signal of anxiety is not in the ego but in the ideal ego
(p. 138); birth anxiety is not phylogenetic, and he nds the notion of ancestral fear
absurd (p. 74). The childs separation anxiety relates not to the mother but to the
embryonic envelopes (pp. 1423), and the idea of the bedrock of castration that
Freud put forward in Analysis terminable and interminable (1937, p. 252) needs
to be transformed (Lacan, 2004, pp. 58, 161). Freud did not understand very much
about the uncanny (p. 60). Freuds theories of masochism (p. 125) and mourning are
inadequate (p. 132): it is not enough to say that mourning is an identication with
the lost object. We are only in mourning for someone of whom we can say I was
his lack (p. 166). In The psychogenesis of a case of homosexuality in a woman
(1920a), Freud is undoubtedly right to state that the young homosexual womans
scandalous behaviour conceals the unconscious wish to receive a child from her
father: but it is the phallus more than a child that she wants from her father (Lacan,
2004, p. 145). In general, Freud overlooked the question of femininity (p. 152).
However, beyond femininity, it is Freuds entire theory of the inner world that needs
to be challenged (p. 328). Freud also missed the essential point in Totem and taboo
(1913): the important issue is circumcision (Lacan, 2004, p. 239). The concept of
the automatism of repetition is questionable: why should repetition be automatic?
We repeat in order to awaken the memory of God (p. 290). Freud is also wrong to
see the Wolf Mans defaecation during the primal scene as a sacrice. In fact, it is
a passage to the act in the Lacanian sense (p. 301).
With this departure from Freud, Lacan relegates an essential part of his
programme in the Rome discourse (1956). In the discourse, delivered in 1953,
he sought to demonstrate that psychoanalysis was the same as linguistic analysis.
In 19623, Lacan may still have thought that the unconscious is structured like a
language but this ceased to be his watchword. Perhaps because he no longer has
to demonstrate his orthodoxy, here Lacan has stopped forcing himself to distort
Freuds concepts in order to make them accord with his own.
Affect

Affect was particularly ill suited to the above operation, and it had therefore disappeared from Lacanian theory altogether, as Green (1999) has pointed out. Questioned
on television about Greens criticism that he had neglected the question of affect,
Lacan (1990) replied that he had discussed it in his seminar on anxiety (2004). In fact,
the question is dismissed at the very beginning of the seminar (21 November 1962,

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p. 29), in which Lacan, commenting on an article by Rapaport (1953), condemns

affect as a blanket psychological term that has no place in psychoanalytic theory.
He goes on to demonstrate this throughout the seminar by gradually drawing up a
two-dimensional picture in which the words from the title Inhibitions, symptoms and
anxiety (Freud, 1926) intersect, along with certain affects such as concern, seriousness and expectation (p. 12). In the course of the year, this picture is lled in from
one session to the next. The nal result is enigmatic (pp. 93, 131; see Table 1).
Table 1
Inhibition
Emotion
Agitation

Impairment
Symptom
Acting out

Embarrassment
Passage to the act
Anxiety

Something that appears nonsensical in a Lacanian text can always testify to the
readers intellectual incapacities. However, it can also indicate that Lacan regards
the problem posed as meaningless. Lacan did not change his views on the question
of affect: you can invent as many affects as you like, and interconnecting them is
even less worthwhile than Freud (1926), an essential reference point for American
analysts and the main target of Lacans critique. There is only one affect that interests
Lacan: anxiety.
Anxiety
Anxiety about returning to the mothers breast

This seminar is very unusual in containing two excerpts from Lacans own clinical
practice. One is a clinical extract (Lacan, 2004, p. 219) and the other is the following
fantasy.
Lacan imagined himself, wearing a mask, facing a huge female praying mantis,
not knowing whether she thinks he is male or female because he cannot see himself
in her gaze (p. 14). What does she want from him? (Che vuoi?) The fantasy of
returning to the maternal breast, which for others is the ultimate image of happiness,
is for Lacan the primary source of every form of anxiety (p. 215). What causes
anxiety is everything that tells us or enables us to see that we are going to go back to
her lap (p. 67). This type of anxiety plays an important role in the psychopathology
of romantic love, in which a subject, having obtained the favourable response that
he desired from the loved object, suddenly draws back, wondering what the other
person is going to do to him, illustrating the essential relationship of anxiety to the
desire of the Other: What does he/she want from me? (p. 14). It also appears almost
constantly in the impulse by which adolescents free themselves of their maternal
objects. The fear that excessive maternal concern will lead to the elimination of the
subjects desire is primordial for Lacan: What is most anxiety provoking for the
child is precisely when the relation on which he founds himself, from the lack that
produces desire, is disturbed, and it is most disturbed when there is no possibility of
lack, when the mother is on his back all the time, specially to wipe his bottom, as a
model of the demand, of the demand that could never falter (p. 67).

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It was also by giving a central position to this type of anxiety that Jean Laplanche,
a student of Lacan who broke with him at an early stage, went on to develop his own
theory of enigmatic signiers: what does this breast that is approaching me want
from me?
Castration anxiety

Secondary to this anxiety about returning to the mothers breast is castration anxiety,
which Lacan describes as a total captivation by the mirror image (p. 19). The only
form of resistance to this threat of absorption is the autoerotic cathexis of the phallus,
which constitutes a libidinal reserve (p. 57) for the subject. This results in a break in
the specular image, which forms the basis for Lacans theory of the castration fantasy.
The only thing that protects the subject from his desire to be absorbed by Others
mirror image is a massive phallic cathexis. In this theory, the castration fantasy is no
longer an infantile sexual theory that results from the confrontation of the subjects
sexual desires with the reality of sexual difference, as with Freud, but relates solely
to narcissism and to a conception of narcissism that is itself highly specic, based on
the relation to the mirror image. Besides, Lacan also accepts in more classical terms
that castration anxiety is therefore connected with the perception of sexual difference, which he expresses in his terminology by stating that it arises when the phallic
lack appears in the place of the object of desire (p. 53). The idea that a libidinal
reserve is constituted at the threshold of a love relationship that appears to satisfy
all the subjects desires provides a good account of some paradoxical behaviours,
such as the sexual adventures that certain subjects embark on with despised gures
just before a marriage to a loved object. Lacans concept therefore constitutes a
useful supplement to Freuds theory.
Separation anxiety

In contradiction to common experience, on several occasions Lacan denies the

reality of separation anxiety. Many witnesses have described Lacans distress when
one of his patients, infuriated, put an end to the treatment. He was very well aware
of the anxiety provoked by loss of the object. Notwithstanding this, Lacan asserts
several times that it is not the absence but the presence of the mothers breast (p. 66)
or of the object in general (p. 67) that causes anxiety. He turns Freuds demonstration in Beyond the pleasure principle (1920b) on its head: if the child throws the
bobbin away, this is not in order to master its disappearance but to remove a source
of anxiety (Lacan, 2004, p. 80)! As it is nevertheless very difcult to argue that there
is no such thing as separation anxiety, Lacan concedes that the child experiences an
anxiety about separationnot from the mother but from the embryonic envelopes!
These envelopes are still only parts of the child, detachable from him, just like the
breast. It is therefore not the child who is sucking the breast; it is the breast and the
placenta that are sucking the mothers body (pp. 195, 337).
Birth anxiety

For Lacan, it is this anxiety about separation from the embryonic envelopes that
accounts for birth anxiety, and not, as Freud believes, some form of phylogenetic

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reproduction (p. 142). Moreover, the anatomical model of the relations between
the placenta and the foetus is fairly similar to one of the geometrical shapes that
represent for Lacan the new topography of the psychic space that he has invented,
namely the cross-cap (p. 143). However, birth anxiety is predominantly an anxiety
about intrusion (air into the lungs) and not an anxiety about leaving the maternal
environment (pp. 3778).
Signal anxiety

Signal anxiety therefore does not alert to the alleged loss of the penis or reproduce
a supposed phylogenetic event; it is only the signal of the failure of support that
comes from lack to protect the subject from returning to the lap, that is losing
himself completely in the specular image. Freud was mistaken. There is no internal
danger but only an anxiety about the Other: Although the ego is the site of the
signal, it is not for the ego that the signal is given. The signal warns the ego that the
Other desires it and is therefore seeking to annihilate it (p. 179).
Jouissance

Why is the ego at risk of being annihilated by the desire of the Other? First, as we
have seen, because it can be absorbed entirely by the specular image that the Other
represents for him, like Narcissus in the myth; second, because even if the subject
has secured this absorption for himself through castration anxiety, he is exposed to a
second, yet more formidable, danger. A child being held by his mother in the mirror
does not only see his own image and that of his mother, by which he wants to be
absorbed. He also sees that he is not adequate to satisfy his mother, and that there
is something that exists other than him, which she does not have and which arouses
her desire: the fathers phallus. This phallus appears solely as that which is lacking
in the Other, and therefore only as castrated, which Lacan denotes (pp. 53, 197).
Although making oneself the object of the mothers desire is always hazardous, there
is a more certain means of attaching the Other to oneself, which is to make oneself
the cause of her desire, by identifying with this castrated phallus. This is what Lacan
means by becoming the object of the Others jouissance. In the castration fantasy,
although the subject loses a valuable component of his specular image, he may also
acquire an identication with a faecalized, fallen and deposed object, which will be
certain to provoke the Others jouissance.
It appears at rst that in describing jouissance, Lacan is merely emphasizing
the role of the Other in that which Freud has long since described using the term
moral masochism. The existence of moral masochism is Freuds main clinical
argument in support of the death drive (1924). Without taking an explicit standpoint
on the question of the death drive, Lacan also situates that which he calls jouissance
beyond the pleasure principle (2004, pp. 148, 213). In this sense, jouissance is
radically different from orgasm, and the small amount of satisfaction that it brings
(p. 303). It is well known that neurotics unconsciously enjoy their symptoms and
therefore that the symptom is jouissance (p. 148). We did not need to wait for Lacan
to describe couples, or parentchild relationships, in which a subject prefers to be

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the faecalized object of the partners jouissance than to nd pleasure in a mutual

relationship. We are probably more indebted to Lacan for having demonstrated that
if the analyst reveals to the patient his desire to cure or to teach him, he simultaneously indicates to him how to make himself the object of his jouissance, by staying
ill or remaining stricken by intellectual inhibition.
The object a

The most certain way of becoming the object of the Others desire is therefore to
make oneself the cause of his jouissance by becoming his part object. However,
Lacan rejects the term part object because Freud (1926) regards the various part
objects as objects from which it is possible to separate, and Lacan will brook no
reference to separation anxiety.
The breast, the phallus, the scybalum and the childFreuds part objects
(1926)are what Lacan terms objects a. However, Lacan describes many
others, such as the foreskin in circumcision (2004, p. 247), the eye (p. 276), the
voice (p. 342), the superego (p. 341) and even Jesus Christ, who makes himself an
object a in the Passion, as a residue, fallen object, for the Other, God (p. 192).
The object a causes anxiety not because it might be lost but because it might
have to be shared (pp. 53, 107). It is never a case of an object being lost by the
subject, but objects lacking in the Other (p. 337). The object a is not the object
of the subjects desire but its cause (p. 323). The object a is that which eludes
specularization and signiantisation (p. 204).
The object a is itself the representative of a thing that is unnameable and
unrepresentable for the Other (p. 148). This is reminiscent of those subjects who,
constantly behaving abjectly towards those close to them, restore to life before their
eyes objects that have been lost to the previous generation in conditions that cannot
be represented in any other way.
Love

This theory of jouissance and the object gives rise to a disillusioned view of love,
since there is no better means of making oneself loved than to become a castrated
phallus and thus to be for the Other that which one does not have oneself (p. 139):
the formula love is giving what you do not have (p. 128) is the new watchword
which, in this seminar, replaces the unconscious is structured like a language.
The rejection of interiority

The object a initially appears as that which resists assimilation by the Other, and
therefore as the guarantor of the separation between ego and non-ego (p. 121).
However, the space in which the psychic events described by Lacan occur is not
well adapted to the internal/external distinction (pp. 290, 328). There is no internal
danger and the neurological apparatus has no interior (p. 179).
For the model that Freud proposes in The ego and the id (1923), in which the
psychic apparatus, with ego, id and superego, confronts the external world, Lacan

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substitutes various models without interior or exterior, such as Kleins bottle (p. 238)
or the Mbius strip, which has only one surface, so that by following it from one
end to the other you move from one side to the other without crossing it (p. 116). To
move from one side of the Mbius strip to the other, you have to make a hole in it:
the hole is the object a. However, this hole cannot be symbolized (p. 161). Like the
object a, the Mbius strip therefore has no specular image (p. 110). Conversely, the
object a has the shape of the Mbius strip.
The cross-cap (pp. 13, 51, 113, 115, 143) is another topographical model that
has both an exterior and an interior but in section it is the shape of an inner eight,
which resembles the Mbius strip (p. 115). Topographical shapes like the crosscap exist in nature (p. 377). For example, embryonic envelopes have this structure
(p. 143). This explains Lacans enduring interest in embryonic envelopes and the
placenta (pp. 1423, 195, 267).
Passage to the act and acting out

French analysts used to translate the term acting out by passage lacte (literally,
passage to the act). Lacan draws a distinction between passage to the act and acting
out (pp. 93, 135, 372). Passage to the act is the leap into the void at the moment of
conjunction between desire and the law (p. 130); i.e. the identication with an object
a and the simultaneous condemnation of this identication by the subject whose desire
was in fact thought to be provoked by this identication (p. 131). The object a is that
which is dropped (p. 136). Lacan gives the example (p. 145) of the young homosexual
woman seen in consultation by Freud (1920a), who had thrown herself off a bridge
after being seen by her father in the company of the woman she loved.
In the passage to the act, the subject leaves the scene (p. 136). In acting out,
however, the subject remains on the scene. We might suppose the scene to be the
psychic scene or the scene of the transference, in which case acting out would be
an act that could be interpreted. However, Lacan gives it a broader denition. The
scene is the scene of the Other, which exists in every relationship between two
people. It stands in contrast to the world. The world is the place in which the real
occurs (p. 137). When Freuds homosexual woman throws herself on the tracks,
this is a passage to the act because the judgement read in her fathers gaze removes
her from her position as cause of his desire. When she has an affair with the Lady,
this is acting out because nothing that occurs between her and the lady has dislodged
her from this position as subject.
Similarly, in the Dora case (Freud, 1905), when Dora slaps Mr K, this is a
passage to the act, because Mr Ks declaration, You know I get nothing out of
my wife (p. 98), has dislodged her from her position as cause of desire for the two
members of the couple. When she has had a love story with Mr and Mrs K, this is
acting out, because nothing that has occurred has deprived her of this position.
Femininity

Lacan takes a rm stance against Freuds theory of penis envy in women (pp.
152, 211, 214). He draws (without naming it) on Andreas-Saloms theory of

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the location of the vagina in the anus (1916) to deny the existence of alleged
vaginal jouissance on the grounds that the vagina is insensitive (Lacan, 2004,
p. 307). Here, jouissance has to be understood in the orgasmic sense. However,
if we distinguish jouissance from orgasm, the female orgasm occurs at a fairly
primitive point and is therefore older than the existing compartmentalization of
the cloaca (p. 307). It is therefore easier for women than men to put themselves
in the position of the object a for the Other. They have a simpler relationship
to the desire of the Other (p. 214) and a better understanding than men of the
relationship of desire to jouissance (p. 208). This means that female analysts have
an easier access to their countertransference and it is therefore no surprise that it
should be mainly women who have written on this subject (pp. 208, 214).
Unlike men, women are not afraid of losing their phallus (p. 214) since they
dont have it (p. 233), but they are afraid of provoking castration anxiety in men
(p. 58; see also Cournut-Janin and Cournut, 1993). The womans object a is the lost
member of Osiris or the sacred heart of Marie Alacoque, or alternatively the priests
penis for the woman who loves priests. Don Juan is a female fantasy, that of an
uncastratable man (p. 233). Adopting the more traditional hypothesis of the woman
as phallus, Lacan writes that the woman presents herself as a non-detumescent
phallus (p. 308).
The analytic process

The analytic process consists in the successive abandonment of every form of

identication with the object a of the Other: It is to the extent to which you leave
the demand unanswered that there arises what? Not aggression followed by
regression, but a
re-examination of that which aggression intrinsically seeks out, namely the relation to the
specular image. It is the extent to which the subject exhausts his passions on this image
that determines the emergence of this series of demands, leading to an ever more original
demand, in historical terms, and that regression as such is modulated. (p. 65)

There is no genetic reconstruction but there is a reinterpretation of the bedrock

of castration: In fact, it is to the extent to which all the forms of the demand are
exhausted to their term, to the end of the line, until the zero demand, that we see the
relation of castration emerge.
Newspeak

Lacan always deploys paradoxical formulations that have a shock effect and pose
a challenge to received ideas. They occur particularly frequently in his seminar on
anxiety. For example:
It is not castration from which the neurotic draws back; it is making of his castration that
which the Other lacks [p. 58].
Do you not realize that it is not the nostalgia for the maternal breast that engenders anxiety,
but its imminence? [p. 66].
The security of presence is the possibility of absence [p. 67].
It is not a question of loss of the object but its presence; objects are not missed [p. 67].

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What is the relation of desire to the law? Answer: It is the same thing. Desire is the law [p. 97].
The castration of the complex is not a castration [pp. 113, 125].
After all, the mother herself is not the most desirable object [p. 125].
Anxiety is the signal of the real [p. 188].
The object of male desire is the absence of the phallus [pp. 215, 231].
Metaphor does not oppose the intrinsic meaning to the represented meaning [p. 250].
Of all the forms of anxiety, orgasm is the only one that really ends [p. 275].
The phallus constitutes castration itself [p. 308].

These pervasive shock formulae often form the introduction to an interesting new
idea. Sometimes, they are rank absurdities, such as the idea that the mother is not
desirable to the child. Their abundance ultimately leaves the reader with a sense of
having read them somewhere before. They are reminiscent of the Newspeak watchwords from the Ministry of Truth in George Orwells 1984 (1954, p. 7), which were
themselves inspired by communist slogans such as the democratic dictatorship of
the proletariat:
WAR IS PEACE
FREEDOM IS SLAVERY
IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH

This is not a new comparison. The abrupt alternations between seduction and threat
that characterize Lacans oratorical style in his seminar, in which his patients participated, have often been compared with the police technique of brainwashing. Lacan
knows this and replies to itin Newspeak. It is extremely good for a psychoanalyst
to wash his brainof his erroneous ideas:
Therefore, what I am evoking for you here is not metaphysics. It is rather a form of
brainwashing.
This is a term that I had allowed myself to use a few years before it was done any injury by
current events. What I mean by this is a method of teaching you how to recognize that which
appears in your experience in its correct position
I may sometimes have been criticized for the presence of some of my analysands in my
seminars. After all, the legitimacy of this coexistence of these two relationships with me
listening to me and having me listen to youcan only be judged from the inside
As I said, brainwashing (2004, p. 85)

There could be no better way of expressing it.

Translations of summary
Eine Neubetrachtung von Lacans Seminar ber Angst. Das Seminar ber Angst markiert in
verschiedenerlei Hinsicht einen Wendepunkt in der Entwicklung von Lacans Denken. Erstens rckt Lacan
implizit von seiner Theorie ab, dass das Unbewusste wie eine Sprache strukturiert sei. Er verzichtet auch auf
den Versuch, Freuds Theorie mit seiner eigenen in eins zu setzen. Er entwickelt neue, originelle Ideen ber
die Angst, die zum Teil, wie beispielsweise die Verbindung zwischen Kastrationsangst und Narzissmus,
auerordentlich wichtig sind; andere, etwa seine Verleugnung der Existenz von Trennungsangst, sind
absurd. Der wichtigste Punkt, in dem Lacan von Freud abweicht, nmlich seine Ablehnung einer inneren
Welt, wird in diesem Seminar ebenfalls deutlich.
Una resea del seminario de Lacan sobre la angustia. El seminario sobre la angustia marca un punto
crucial en el desarrollo del pensamiento lacaniano desde varias perspectivas. Primero, Lacan implcitamente
abandona su teora de que el inconsciente est estructurado como un lenguaje. Tambin abandona el intento

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GILBERT DIATKINE

de identicar la teora de Freud con la suya propia. Lacan desarrolla algunas nuevas y originales ideas
sobre la angustia, algunas de gran inters, como la conexin entre la angustia de castracin y el narcisismo;
otras, en cambio como la negacin de la existencia de la angustia de separacin, son absurdas. La principal
divergencia de Lacan con Freud es su rechazo del mundo interno, lo cual tambin surge claramente en este
seminario.
Compte-rendu de Langoisse de Lacan. Le sminaire sur Langoisse marque un tournant dans lvolution
de la pense de Lacan plusieurs points de vue. Lacan y renonce implicitement sa thorie que linconscient
est structur comme un langage. Il cesse de chercher identier la thorie de Freud la sienne propre. Il
dveloppe de nouvelles ides originales sur langoisse, les unes trs intressantes, comme le lien quil
tablit entre langoisse de castration et le narcissisme, les autres absurdes, comme le dni de lexistence
de langoisse de sparation. Sa diffrence principale avec Freud, son refus du monde intrieur, apparat
clairement dans ce sminaire.
Resoconto del seminario di Lacan sullangoscia. Il seminario sullangoscia segna una svolta importante
nello sviluppo del pensiero lacaniano sotto diversi punti di vista. Innanzitutto, Lacan abbandona
implicitamente la teoria secondo la quale linconscio strutturato come un linguaggio. Abbandona inoltre
il tentativo di identicare la teoria di Freud con la propria. Sviluppa poi nuove idee originali sullangoscia,
alcune molto interessanti, come il nesso che stabilisce fra angoscia di castrazione e narcisismo; altre invece,
come il suo diniego dellesistenza dellangoscia di separazione, risultano assurde. In questo seminario
emerge inoltre chiaramente il suo riuto dellesistenza di un mondo interiore che costituisce la sua maggiore
divergenza da Freud.

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