Journal of Theological Studies, NS, Vol.

58, Pt 2, October 2007

GREGORY OF NYSSA ON THE RECIPROCITY

OF THE VIRTUES
Abstract

SCHOLARLY readers of Gregory of Nyssa have often pointed out

the importance of the virtues in his theology. The concept of
virtue is central to his account of who God is and to his account
of the moral life and spiritual progress. For Gregory, these
are nothing other than participation in Gods virtues.1 In this
essay, I hope to make a contribution to the study of Gregorys
theory of virtues by examining his arguments for the reciprocity
of the virtues in both humans and in God. By the phrase
reciprocity of the virtues I mean that the virtues reciprocally
entail one another, such that whoever has one virtue has them
all. I call this the reciprocity thesis. It is closely related to what
I call the inseparability thesis, which says that each virtue is
inseparable from the others. For purposes of this essay, the
inseparability and reciprocity theses are the negative and positive
sides of the same point. According to the inseparability thesis, if
one virtue is taken away, the others will be destroyed. According
to the reciprocity thesis, if one virtue is present, the others will
I would like to express my gratitude for the helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this essay by Lewis Ayres, Michel Barnes, Mark DelCogliano, Verna
Harrison, David Sedley, and Warren Smith. I also wish to thank the staV of
the Bill and Carol Fox Center for Humanistic Inquiry at Emory University
for their generous support during the preparation of this article.
1
On the theme of participation in Gods virtues, see J. Warren Smith,
Passion and Paradise: Human and Divine Emotion in the Thought of Gregory of
Nyssa (New York: Crossroad, 2004), pp. 257, 163, 196; David L. Balas,
METOYSIA QEOY: Mans Participation in Gods Perfections according to Saint
Gregory of Nyssa (Studia Anselmiana, 55; Rome: IBC Libreria Herder, 1966),
pp. 68, 1527.
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Readers of Gregory of Nyssa have often remarked on the significance of

the virtues to his theology. However, a central aspect of his understanding
of the virtues has received insufficient attention: the notion that the
virtues reciprocally entail one another. It is argued that Gregory uses a
single theory to describe the interrelations between the virtues both as
they exist in humans and as they exist in God. This theory is the
reciprocity thesis, which posits that if one virtue is present, all the virtues
must be present. The possible philosophical sources for Gregorys view and
some problems with it are examined.

2
See John M. Coopers useful survey, The Unity of Virtue, in id., Reason
and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 76117.
3
For the view of Socrates (i.e. the view of the character Socrates in
Platos early dialogues), see Terence Irwin, Platos Ethics (New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 414, 801, 845; Terry Penner,
The Unity of Virtue, in Gail Fine (ed.), Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and
the Soul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 56086; for the Stoics,
see Cooper, Unity of Virtue.
4
I have not examined passages where Gregory presents the virtues as
following sequentially on one another or coming in a certain order; in my
view, the only study of Gregorys view of the unity of the virtues, that of

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538
ANDREW RA DD E-GALLWITZ
be present. There is a further thesis, upon which Gregory
sometimes relies, which I call the partwhole thesis. This states
that the virtues are parts of a natural whole, where the whole is
in no way prior to its parts.
The reciprocity of the virtues was a common theme in ancient
philosophy.2 I have chosen to avoid a common name that
scholars use for it, namely, the unity of the virtues, in order to
avoid confusion. That name is given both to theories of the
virtues like Gregorys, which hold that the virtues are nonidentical but reciprocal, and to other theories, like that espoused
by Socrates and some of the Stoics, that the virtues are
in fact identical. I call this theory the identity thesis.3
It claims that the various virtue-names that we use, like justice,
courage, wisdom, and prudence, all refer to a single item.
They may or may not be distinct in sense, but they are definitely
not distinct in what they refer to. Perhaps justice does not
mean the same thing that wisdom means, but the motivational
disposition in the soul that causes me to act justly is the
same motivational disposition that causes me to act wisely.
Gregory never, so far as I can tell, endorses the identity thesis.
Rather, he holds that the virtues are distinct, but inter-entailing
or reciprocal.
In this essay, I argue that Gregory holds the same theory for
the virtues both as they exist in human souls and as they exist in
God. Both the human virtues and the divine goods are
inseparable from one another; both the human virtues and the
divine goods mutually entail one another. In order to avoid
begging the question, I treat human and divine virtues
separately. My argument is based on passages in Gregorys
treatise De virginitate, the fourth homily De beatitudinibus, and
the Oratio catechetica. I have chosen these passages because they
set forth the logic of Gregorys reciprocity theory in a
particularly clear manner.4 This should not be taken to imply

THE RECIPROCITY OF THE VIRTUES

539
that the theory is confined to these passages. Yet a fuller
study would be required in order to demonstrate whether it
is present throughout Gregorys corpus, or whether Gregory is
always consistent in his account of the interrelation
of the virtues.

OF THE

VIRTUES

IN

In his early treatise De virginitate, Gregory provides a clear

statement of the various theses on the virtues that I wish to
attribute to him:
Those who are experts in such matters say (A) that the virtues are
not separated from one another and (B) that it is impossible to grasp
any one virtue according to its precise account for someone who has
not attained the rest as well. Rather, (C) when one of the virtues
comes to be in a person, the others also necessarily follow. Therefore
also, (D) inversely, the harm done to one of the things in us extends
to the life of virtue as a whole and really, just as the Apostle says, the
whole is disposed along with its members: if one member suVers,
the whole shares its suVering, and if (some member) is glorified,
the whole rejoices with it.5

In section A, Gregory states the inseparability thesis.

In C, Gregory asserts the reciprocity thesis. He uses
2pakalou
e8n here. The standard word in philosophical texts
for the reciprocity of the virtues is 2ntakolou
e8n, but the
view seems basically the same. Gregory bases A and C on
the authority of unnamed experts. In D, he uses Pauls image
of the body and its parts rejoicing and suVering together in
a way that suggests that virtue is a whole with parts,
Evangelos Konstantinou, is too preoccupied with this theme. The problem is
that these passages tells us little if anything about the logic of why the virtues
necessarily entail one another. Evangelos G. Konstantinou, Die Tugendlehre
Gregors von Nyssa in Verhaltnis zu der antik-philosophischen und judischchristlichen Tradition (Wurzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1966), pp. 1215.
5
De virginitate (Virg.) 15.2.1323 (SC 119, p. 448); all translations are my
own unless otherwise indicated: Fas1 d1 ka1 o3 t1 toiaAta 2xhtak0te" m1
2pesc0s
ai t1" 2ret1" 2p 2ll0lwn mhd1 dunat1n e9 nai mi8" tino" 2ret8" kat1 t1n
2krib8 peridr0xas
ai l0gon t1n m1 ka1 t8n loip8n 2a 0menon, 2ll j L 5n
parag0nhtai m0a t8n 2ret8n 2nagka0w" 2pakalou
e8n ka1 t1" 4lla". O2koAn 2x
2ntistr0ou ka1 3 per1 ti bl0bh t8n 2n 3m8n e2" 7lon t1n kat j 2ret1n diate0nei b0on
ka1 5ntw", ka
0" hsin 3 2postolo", to8" m0lesi t1 7lon sundiat0
etai, 4n te p0sc:
m0lo" 5 n, sunalgoAnto" toA pant0", 4n te ka1 dox0zhtai, toA 7lou sugca0rounto".

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I. THE RECIPROCITY AND INSEPARABILITY

HUMANS

6
Pace Konstantinou, Die Tugendlehre, p. 122: Bei Gregor gibt es keinen
besonderen Wert fur eine jede Tugend, alle haben sie dieselbe Bedeutung und
denselben Wert, und alle dienen sie dem einen und selben Zweck.
7
See Homilia 1 in Cant. (Gregorii Nysenni Opera [GNO], 6,
pp. 35.1536.9).
8
See John Dillon, Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 1813 (commentary on Alcinous, Didaskalikos,
29.4); Paula Gottlieb, Aristotle on Dividing the Soul and Uniting the Virtues,
Phronesis 39/3 (1994), pp. 27590. The relevant Aristotle passages are
Nicomachean Ethics 1144b30ff. and Eudemian Ethics 2.1, 1219a35ff. For the
Stoics see n. 24 below.

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540
ANDREW RA DD E-GALLWITZ
though the claim as it stands is merely the inverse of the
reciprocity thesis.
Section B clarifies and perhaps qualifies the inseparability
thesis. It states that it is impossible to possess a virtue in
accordance with its precise account (kat1 t1n 2krib8 . . . l0gon) if
one doesnt possess the other virtues. Gregory doesnt specify
what he means by a virtues account (l0go") here. I will return
to this later, suggesting that each virtues account includes both
a primary and secondary set of conditions.6 So, for instance,
justices account primarily includes the properties of justice
(i.e. rendering to each his or her due), but secondarily
includes the properties of wisdom, goodness, and so forth.
Gregory does not spell out this elaborate scheme in this passage.
However, section B does imply a distinction between having a
virtue in accordance with its precise account and having
it without understanding its precise account. That is, it implies a
distinction between having a virtue in perfect manner and in a
less than perfect manner. We will see this again. For now, let us
note that having a virtue imperfectly in this passage just is
having it without having all the other virtues simultaneously.
Gregory is able to countenance the observation that most of us do
not experience the virtues as necessarily interconnected.7 I may on
a given day do a brave but unjust act, or vice versa. This is a fact
of experience. But this is not because of the nature of
bravery and justice themselves, but because I do not truly
grasp bravery and justice. To know any virtue truly is to
know its dependence on the others. On this point, Gregory
is fully in line with Aristotle and a range of Stoics and
Middle Platonists for whom it is only the perfect virtues that are
inseparable.8
In the De virginitate passage, Gregory does not say anything
about the identity thesis, either to accept it or deny it. So, we
cannot rule out on the basis of the passage the possibility that

Virg. 12.3.1418 (SC 119, p. 412): toAto ka1 2n tI 2nazht0sei t8"

2polom0nh" dracm8" o9 mai t1n k0rion 3m8n 3pot0
es
ai, 3" o2d1n 5elo" 4n 2k t8n
loip8n 2ret8n, 7" racm1" 3 l0go" 2n0mase, k5n p8sai paroAsai t0cwsi, t8" mi8"
2ke0nh" 2po0sh" tI chreuo0s: ucI.
10
For other passages that use the partwhole notion with respect to the
virtues and/or goods, see Homilia 5 in Eccl. (GNO 5, p. 356.1719); Hom. 7 in
Eccl. (GNO 5, p. 399.5); De instituto Christiano (GNO 8/1, p. 77.15); Homiliae
de beatitudinibus (Beat.) 2 (PG 44, col. 1213.50).
11
[Gregory] insists that there is really one virtue which includes all
conceptions of good; and this virtue he calls dikaios0nh, while the other virtues
comprised in it cannot be separated one from the other. The Platonism of
Gregory of Nyssa (University of California Publications in Classical Philology,
11; New York: Burt Franklin, 1930), p. 55.
9

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THE RECIPROCITY OF THE VIRTUES

541
Gregory does in fact hold it. Yet, it is clear throughout the
treatise that Gregory assumes the virtues are non-identical. This
can be seen from the evocative images he uses for them.
For instance, he interprets the parable of the lost coin or
drachma (Luke 15:810) as an illustration of the interrelationship of the virtues. The woman in the parable, whom Gregory
believes to be a widow, begins with 10 drachmas, and loses only
one. If Gregory held the identity thesis, then losing one would be
identical to losing all ten; much as losing a dime and losing ten
cents are identical. As it is, the others remain, but are rendered
useless by the loss of the one. His interpretation is as follows:
I think that this is the point which the Lord suggests to us in the
search for the lost drachma, that no benefit comes from the rest
of the virtues, which the story calls drachmas, even if they all
happen to be present, if that one is absent from the widowed
soul.9 The drachmas are non-identical parts of a whole, a whole
which is in no way prior to its parts. Rather, its value as a whole is
rendered useless if one part is lost.
We can clarify this picture by turning to a passage in Gregorys
fourth homily De beatitudinibus. This passage provides an
argument for why the parts of virtue, that is, the particular
virtues, are inseparable from one another.10 Gregorys homily is
on the beatitude Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for
justice (dikaios0nh), for they will be satisfied. Gregory explains
that justice here stands for all the virtues. This does not mean,
as Harold Cherniss thought, that justice is the other virtues,
such that Gregory is asserting the identity thesis.11 Nothing in the
text warrants that interpretation. The point is weaker: it is that,
in being exhorted to hunger and thirst for justice, we are being
exhorted to hunger and thirst for all the virtues, temperance
(swros0nh), wisdom (so0a), prudence (r0nhsi"), or any other
kind of virtue.

542
ANDREW RA DD E-GALLWITZ
Gregory notes that Scripture customarily expresses the whole
by the part.12 He proceeds to give a rich explanation of this in a
passage that is worth quoting at length:

If the conclusion is that every virtue is indicated by the name

of justice, then the argument is the inseparability thesis.
We are justified in reading justice in the beatitude as a stand-in
for any virtue because justice without the other virtues is less
than just. In other words, in saying that something is just, one
is implicitly saying it is temperate, prudent, and so forth.
One simply cannot hunger for justice without hungering
for these also, because they are necessary conditions for justice.
12
Beat. 4 (PG 44, col. 1241.257): Sun0
w" d1 poll0ki" 3
e0a Gra1 di1 t8"
toA m0rou" mn0mh", perilamb0nei t1 7lon.
13
Beat. 4 (PG 44, cols. 12414): O2koAn ka1 2ntaA
a t1n dikaios0nhn to8"
makarist8" pein8si proke8s
ai 3
0go" e2p1n, p8n e9 do" 2ret8", di1 ta0th"
2poshma0nei, 3" 2p0sh" makarist1n e9 nai t1n ka1 r0nhsin, ka1 2ndre0an, ka1
swros0nhn pein8nta, ka1 e4 ti 5 teron 2n tJ a2tJ t8" 2ret8" l0gN katalamb0netai.
O2d1 g0r 2sti dunat1n 5 n ti t8" 2ret8" e9 do" t8n loip8n diezeugm0non, a2t1 kaq j
3aut1 tele0an t1n 2ret1n e9 nai. |W g1r 5n m1 sun
ewr8ta0 ti t8n kat1 t1 2ga
1n
nooum0nwn, 2n0gkh p8sa t1 2ntidiastell0menon 2p j a2toA c0ran 7cein
2ntidi0sthke
d1 tI swros0n: m1n t1 2k0laston
tI ron0sei d1 3 2ros0nh, ka1 3k0stN t8n
pr1" t1 kre8tton 3peilhmm0nwn 2st0 ti p0ntw" t1 2k toA 2nant0ou noo0menon. E2 oBn
m1 p0nta tI dikaios0n: sun
ewro8to, 2m0canon 5n e4h t1 leip0menon 2ga
1n e9 nai.
O2k 5n g0r ti" e4poi 4rona dikaios0nhn, 5
rase8an, 5 2k0laston, 5 4llo ti t8n 2n
kak0G
ewroum0nwn. E2 d1 pant1" toA ce0rono" 2mig1" 3 t8" dikaios0nh" l0go" 2st1n,
6pan 2n 3autJ p0ntw" t1 2ga
1n perie0lhen
2ga
1n d1 p8n t1 kat j 2ret1n

ewro0menon. O2koAn p8sa 2ret1 tJ 2n0mati t8" dikaios0nh" 2ntaA
a
diashma0netai . . .

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So when the Word says here that it is justice which those who hunger
in a blessed way have as their goal, he indicates through this virtue
every kind of virtue, since he is equally blessed who hungers for
prudence, courage, temperance, or anything else that is included in
the account of virtue. For it is not possible that any one kind of
virtue, which has been separated from the others, could be a perfect
virtue by itself. For if any of the things considered to be good were
not seen along with it, the opposite of this good would necessarily
find a place in it. Now the opposite of temperance is licentiousness, of
prudence folly, and so everything that is accepted as good has
something that is known to be its opposite. If, therefore, the other
virtues did not all appear together with justice, it would be impossible
that what remained should be good. For no one would say that justice
is foolish or rash, licentious, or anything else that is known to be a
vice. But if the account of justice is unmixed with every evil, then it
must comprise in itself every good. But everything acknowledged to
be a virtue is good. Therefore, every virtue is indicated by the name
of justice in this passage . . . 13

14
See Protagoras 332 C39 with Taylors comments ad loc.: Plato:
Protagoras, trans. with notes by C. C. W. Taylor (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1976), pp. 12730. I follow Terence Irwins claim that this argument is for the
reciprocity thesis and not the identity thesis: Platos Ethics (New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 80. I do so with reservations, given
Taylors perceptive criticisms of Vlastoss similar interpretation: see Plato:
Protagoras, trans. Taylor, pp. 1048. Taylors claim at p. 129 about Platos
argument is equally applicable to Gregorys: both equivocate between the
notion of polar opposites (i.e. qualities at opposite ends of a scale) and
contradictories (i.e. qualities one of which must be present in any relevant
situation). As Taylor explains, in pairs of contradictories (F and not-F), the
latter (not-F) includes not only the polar opposite of F (say, G), but also all
points along the scale between F and G.
15
See Verna E. F. Harrisons comments on such locutions in Gregorys
corpus: Grace and Human Freedom according to St. Gregory of Nyssa (Studies
in the Bible and Early Christianity, 30; Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press,
1992), pp. 44ff.
16
E.g. Contra Eunomium (Eun.) 1.168, 235; 3.6.7; Oratio catechetica
(Or. catech.) 5 (GNO 3/4, p. 17.9, 24, 26); De hominis opificio (Hom. opif.)
16.10 (PG 44, col. 184.13, 14, 20). For Origen, see Commentarii in Jo. 1.9.51ff.

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THE RECIPROCITY OF THE VIRTUES

543
They are necessary conditions for justice because, if any of
them is lacking, justice will be characterized with the opposite
of the absent virtue. This appeal to the notion that each
virtue has a single opposite is highly reminiscent of Socrates
argument for the reciprocity thesis in the Protagoras.14
The argumentfor Socrates as for Gregoryis basically that
anyone who is supposed to be just, if she lacks prudence,
will be foolish. But a fool cannot be perfectly just, since she is
unable accurately to describe the situation to which she might
apply her just motivation. Hence, her action will be less
than perfectly just. Gregory says that no virtue by itself will
be perfect. But this implies that virtues can as a matter of
fact be separated.
Gregory views the virtues as parts of a whole, though he
employs a variety of vague names for the whole. In this passage, he
uses such locutions as the things considered to be good (t8n kat1
t1 2ga
1n nooum0nwn), the things accepted as good (t8n pr1" t1
kre8tton 3peilhmm0nwn), and everything acknowledged to be a
virtue (p8n t1 kat j 2ret1n
ewro0menon). These phrases employ
participles with prepositional phrases, rather than nouns.15
Elsewhere in his corpus he simply calls these goods (2ga
0 or
kal0), which he certainly could have picked up from reading
Origen.16 The point for our present purposes is that there is no
conceptual diVerence between a good and a virtue for Gregory.
He uses the terms interchangeably. Moreover, he does so in the
case of God as well: he frequently calls God both absolute virtue

II. THE RECIPROCITY AND INSEPARABILITY

OF

DIVINE VIRTUES

Gregory devotes a long section of his Oratio catechetica to

explaining why God acted in the manner he did in the incarnation.
He responds to an imagined objection: why didnt God save us
by fiat? Gregorys response draws upon the inseparability
and reciprocity theses. Gregory takes the view that God could
have saved us by fiat to be equivalent to the view that God
could have acted out of sheer power, without simultaneously
acting in a manner that is just, good, and wise.19 Note that
the objection, as stated, is precisely a denial of the inseparability
thesis. It is easy enough to believe that there are tensions
between the divine attributes, such that Gods justice and Gods
mercy, for instance, are at least potentially at odds. This common
assumption implicitly denies the inseparability thesis in the case
of God. But Gregory assumes that the common conception of
God implies the opposite. He says that it is agreed upon by
all that one must believe that God is not only powerful, but
17
De vita Moysis (v. Mos.), praef. 7; 2.244.8; Hom. 5 in Eccl. (GNO 5,
p. 358); Hom. 7 in Eccl. (GNO 5, p. 407); Virg. 17.2.16; Hom. 1 in Cant.
(GNO 6, p. 36.5). In the second and third passages, it is Christ rather than
God who is described as pantel1" 2ret0.
18
Eun. 3.1.49 (GNO 2, p. 20.25); 3.4.45 (GNO 2, p. 151.30); 3.6.7 (GNO
2, p. 188.10); 3.7.201 (GNO 2, p. 222); De anima et resurrectione (Anim.
et res.) (PG 46, col. 92.37); Hom. opif. 16 (PG 44, col. 184.20).
19
It seems, though, that the imagined objector would hold that at least two
of the divine attributes, power and goodness, would be active in a salvationvia-fiat.

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544
ANDREW RA DD E-GALLWITZ
(3 pantel1" 2ret0)17 and the fullness of good things (t1 t8n 2ga
8n
pl0rwma).18 Thus, purely on the terminological level, Gregory
makes no strong division between the term good and the term
virtue. Nor does he sharply distinguish between the names
for the goods relative to humans and the goods relative to God.
My central thesis in this essay is that the same theory applies to
both human and divine virtues. The fact that Gregory uses the
same language for both suggests that any strong distinction
between the two will be imported by the interpreter.
But my case is based not simply on terminological similarity.
Rather, it is based on the observation that the same logic
operates for both sets, if indeed they are distinct sets; the
arguments about both sets are isomorphic. That logic is
summarized in the reciprocity and inseparability theses. It is
time now to move to passages in which Gregory uses this logic
for describing God and his action.

Or. catech. 20 (GNO 3/4, p. 53.811): o2koAn 3mologe8tai par1 p8si m1

m0non dunat1n e9 nai de8n piste0ein t1
e8on, 2ll1 ka1 d0kaion ka1 2ga
1n ka1 so1n
ka1 p8n 7 ti pr1" t1 kre8tton t1n di0noian 0rei. The indefinite ending of the list
is characteristic of Gregory, as is the specific phrase pr1" t1 kre8tton, which
Cyril Richardson here translates (with its context) everything else that
suggests excellence. Edward R. Hardy (ed.), Christology of the Later Fathers
(Library of Christian Classics; Philadelphia: Westminster John Knox, 1954),
p. 296. For other instances in which Gregory uses this phrase, see Adversus
Apollinarem (GNO 3/1, p. 137.9); De professione Christiana (GNO 8/1,
p. 134.16); Hom. 8 in Eccl. (GNO 5, p. 426.3); Eun. 1.516 (GNO 1, p. 175.27);
Eun. 3/6.10 (GNO 2, p. 189.21); Eun. 3/6.49 (GNO 2, p. 203.13); Eun. 3/7.58
(GNO 2, p. 235.18); Beat. 4 (PG 44, col. 1241D); ibid. (1248A); Beat. 5 (PG
44, col. 1253; Beat. 6 (PG 44, col. 1268D); Beat. 8 (PG 44, col. 1300B);
Anim. et res. (PG 46, col. 160C); Hom. opif. 16 (PG 44, col. 184B). The terms
(goods) most often listed along with this phrase are: so0a, d0nami", zw0,
2l0
eia, dikaios0nh, 2ga
0th", 8", 2
ars0a, and their synonyms (e.g. t1 dunat0n
for d0nami"). The phrase is used for both divine attributes and human virtues.
For the synonymous phrase 2p1 t1 kre8tton, see Olympiodorus, In Alcibiadem,
214, ed. L. G. Westerink, Olympiodorus: Commentary on the First Alcibiades of
Plato (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1956; repr. 1982) Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta
(SVF), ed. J. von Arnim, 3.302. In Olympiodorus, insofar as every virtue
leads 2p1 t1 kre8tton, every virtue can be viewed as characterized by swros0nh.
That is, leading towards what is better is primarily a feature of swros0nh,
and secondarily of every other virtue. This account of primary and secondary
conditions of the virtues is reminiscent of Gregorys.
21
Or. catech. 20 (GNO 3/4, p. 53.1116; trans. Richardson, Christology of
the Later Fathers, p. 296, altered): 2k0lou
on to0nun 2p1 t8" paro0sh" o2konom0a"
m1 t1 m0n ti bo0les
ai t8n tJ
eJ prep0ntwn 2pia0nes
ai to8" gegenhm0noi", t1 d1
m1 pare8nai. ka
0lou g1r o2d1n 2 3autoA t8n 3 hl8n to0twn 2nom0twn
diezeugm0non t8n 4llwn 2ret1 kat1 m0na" 2stin

20

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THE RECIPROCITY OF THE VIRTUES

545
also just, good, wise, and everything that carries the mind to
what is better.20 Notice that the word good is both the
categorical name for the whole list and the name of one member
of the list: as the name of the category, it is interchangeable
with the word virtue, as we have seen; as one member of the set,
it means benevolent, philanthropic, and merciful. The common
conception to which Gregory appeals implies the theory we
have already seen for human virtues: It follows, therefore, in
the economy were presently considering, that there should not
be a tendency for one of the names fitting to God to be present,
while another was absent. For, in general, not one of these lofty
names by itself and separated from the others is a virtue, when
taken individually.21 The second sentence is closely parallel to
one in the fourth homily De beatitudinibus, which we have
already seen: For it is not possible that any one kind of virtue,

546
ANDREW RA DD E-GALLWITZ
which has been separated from the others, could be a perfect
virtue by itself.22
Gregory immediately proceeds to give the reason:

Here, Gregory oVers both the positive and negative sides

of the thesis. Positively, the virtues entail one another: in order
for anything to be good, it must also be just, wise, and powerful.
Negatively, the absence of any good destroys all of them;
goodness without power, for instance, is merely well-wishing.
These are the reciprocity and inseparability theses, respectively.
Once again, Gregory implicitly relies on the argument from
opposites as found in the Protagoras and as we have seen in
Gregorys De beatitudinibus.
I will digress briefly in order to comment on two possible
philosophical sources for the view that each virtue is characterized
by the properties of the others. First, Chrysippus and Panaetius
the Stoics appear to have held that each virtue has two sets
of concerns or conditions: a primary set and a secondary set.
So, for instance, justice primarily has the properties that make
something just (say, rendering to each his or her due); and
secondarily the defining properties of wisdom, courage, and
temperance.24 This theory seems to be implicit in Gregorys
22
PG 44, col. 1241.468: O2d1 g0r 2sti dunat1n 5 n ti t8" 2ret8" e9 do" t8n
loip8n diezeugm0non, a2t1 ka
3aut1 tele0an t1n 2ret1n e9 nai.
23
Or. catech. 20 (GNO 3/4, p. 53.1624): o4te t1 2ga
1n 2lh
8" 2stin 2ga
1n
m1 met1 toA dika0ou te ka1 sooA ka1 toA dunatoA tetagm0non (t1 g1r 4dikon 5
4soon 5 ad0naton 2ga
1n o2k 7stin), o4te 3 d0nami" toA dika0ou te ka1 sooA
kecwrism0nh 2n 2retI
ewre8tai (
hri8de" g0r 2sti t1 toioAton ka1 turannik1n t8"
dun0mew" e9 do"). 3sa0tw" d1 ka1 t1 loip0, e2 7xw toA dika0ou te ka1 toA 2ga
oA t1
so1n 0roito, 5 t1 d0kaion e2 m1 met1 toA dunatoA te ka1 toA 2ga
oA
ewro8to,
kak0an 4n ti" m8llon kur0w" t1 toiaAta katonom0seie

24
Such a theory can be found in the reports of Stoic views (probably those
of Chrysippus) by Stobaeus and Plutarch: Stobaeus, 2.63.624 ( SVF 3.280
Arius Didymus, Epitome of Stoic Ethics 5b5); Plutarch, On Stoic SelfContradictions 1046EF ( SVF 3.299, 243). The language reported by
Plutarch is particularly close to Gregorys in Beat. 4 (PG 44, col. 1241.468):
both deny that a virtue or an action in accordance with a virtue can
be perfect without the other virtues; cf. Or. catech., prol. (GNO 3/4, p. 7).

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For goodness is not truly good unless it is arranged along with

justice, wisdom, and power (for that which is unjust, unwise, or
powerless is not good); nor is power which is separated from justice
and wisdom considered to be a virtue (for such a thing would be a
beastly and tyrannical form of power). It is the same also with the
rest: if wisdom is carried away outside of justice, or if justice is not
seen along with power and goodness, then one would rather properly
entitle such things vice.23

The account of the inseparability of the virtues given by Alcinous in

Didaskalikos 29.4 has similarities with Gregorys account in the fourth homily
De beatitudinibus. For Middle Platonist views, see Dillons commentary ad loc.
Alcinous and Apuleius both stress, like Gregory and the Stoic view discussed
in this note, that the inseparability thesis applies only to the perfect virtues.
25
Michel Barnes, The Power of God: D0nami" in Gregory of Nyssas
Trinitarian Theology (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America
Press, 2001).
26
See Jerome Wakefield, Why Justice and Holiness are Similar: Protagoras
330331, Phronesis 32/3 (1987), pp. 26776. I withhold comment on whether
this view is subsequently rejected by Socrates.
27
See Taylors comments: Plato: Protagoras, trans. Taylor, pp. 11112
(referring to Protagoras 330c1, d5).

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THE RECIPROCITY OF THE VIRTUES

547
claim that goodness is not truly good unless it is arranged along
with wisdom, justice, and power. In the context, good means
benevolent, merciful. One could act benevolently without
acting powerfully, justly, or wisely. But, Gregory implies, this
would not be truly good. This is, once again, the distinction
between perfect and imperfect virtue.
The second possible philosophical source for Gregorys theory
of the virtues as having primary and secondary conditions is
his understanding of natural powers, a theme which has been
well studied by Michel Barnes.25 An example of this technical
theory of power is the case of fire, which primarily has the
power of heating, but also secondarily dries and goes upwards.
The secondary powers are not proper to fire (earth too is dry
and air goes upwards), but they always accompany it. Gregory
could well have understood virtues as possessing powerssuch a
view is discussed in Platos Protagoras.26 The diVerence between
the powers of fire and the powers of a virtue is that the former
have opposites which inhere in natural substances, while the
latter do not. Fires heat is opposed by waters coolness.
But, assuming with Plato that a virtue is in some sense a thing
(pr8gma) with causal properties,27 none of the powers inherent in
the other virtues opposes justices powers; the only opposition to
the virtues comes from the vices, which are on Gregorys
account unnatural. Justice needs wisdom and power just as fire
needs air and earth (i.e. solid fuel), and there is no substance
opposed to justice in the way water is opposed to fire. Hence,
one gets the reciprocity and inseparability theses: all the members
of the category entail one another. Either of these source
suggestions (the reported views of Chrysippus and Panaetius or
the theory of virtues as having powers discussed in Plato)
would explain Gregorys account. In fact, they are probably not
entirely distinct traditions, as Plato (or at least the early Plato)

28
Or. catech. 26 (GNO 3/4, pp. 645). For wisdom, see also Or. catech. 20
(GNO 3/4, p. 54.1922). Gregory clearly implies that wise, just, good, eternal,
and all the names that are fitting to God do not have the same sense or
signification at Eun. 2.503 (GNO 1, p. 373.28): p8" 4n ti" o2h
e0h t1n
e0n, e2
so1" ka1 d0kaio" ka1 2ga
1" ka1 2idio" ka1 t0nta t1
eoprep8 kalo8to 2n0mata, e2
m1 m0a p8si nomis
e0h to8" 2m0masi shmas0a, 5 polumer8 g0nes
ai 5 2k metous0a"
to0twn t1 t0leion 3autJ sunage0rein t8" 0sew"; Cf. Ad Eustathium de Trinitate

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548
ANDREW RA DD E-GALLWITZ
surely influenced Stoic ethics. However, Gregorys texts do not
permit us to say more precisely what his sources are.
To return to the passage from the Oratio catechetica: with his
account of the reciprocity thesis Gregory has presumably
answered his objector: God does not act out of sheer power
any more than he acts out of sheer goodness or sheer justice.
This is so, not primarily because of any controversial and
question-begging theory of the divine nature, but because of the
very nature of the properties power, goodness, wisdom, and
justice. To be sure, Gregorys understanding of these is
controversial: not everyone would grant that true power must
go together with true wisdom. However, he does not assume
the point he sets out to provenamely, that all of these are active
in Gods saving activity in the incarnation. Rather, he provides
a dialectical argument that takes the objectors assumption
that God acted out of sheer power and shows the impossibility
of that, on a proper understanding of power.
In what follows, he answers another threat to the reciprocity
of the virtues that arises when one reflects upon the incarnation.
If humans have enslaved themselves to the devil, then they are
by all rights his property. So, if God wishes to act benevolently by
releasing them from the devil, he must violate the justice which
he owes, yes, to the devil. The dilemma is set: either God acts
justly, in which case he abandons humans to their self-incurred
tutelage, to borrow a phrase; or God acts mercifully, in which
case he violates justice. Gregory could simply grasp one horn
of the dilemma. Most Christians, I suspect, would want him
to grasp the benevolent horn, rather than the just horn.
But Gregory does not: rather, he sets forth a tale in which Gods
justice and goodness are both at work. Here, it is the divine
wisdom that mediates the two. It devises a plan whereby
both can satisfy their own concerns. Here, the reciprocity
thesis seems to include an element whereby each virtue tempers
the others.
It is crucial for this argument that each divine virtue be
distinct from the others. Each brings its own concern based on
what defines it.28 Moreover, these concerns or definitions are

(GNO 3/1, p. 14.918): E2erg0thn g1r ka1 krit0n, 2ga
0n te ka1 d0kaion ka1 7sa
4lla toiaAta ma
0nte" 2nergei8n diaor1" 2did0c
hmen
toA d1 2nergoAnto" t1n 0sin
o2d1n m8llon di1 t8" t8n 2nergei8n katano0sew" 2pign8nai dun0me
a. J #Otan g1r
2podidJ ti" l0gon 3k0stou te to0twn t8n 2nom0twn ka1 a2t8" t8" 0sew" per1 7n t1
2n0mata, o2 t1n a2t1n 2mot0rwn 2pod0sei l0gon. |n d1 3 l0go" 5 tero", to0twn ka1
3 0si" di0oro". O2koAn 4llo m0n ti 2st1n 3 o2s0a h|" o4pw l0go" mhnut1"
2xeur0
h, 3t0ra d1 t8n per1 a2t1n 2nom0twn 3 shmas0a 2x 2nerge0a" tin1" 5 2x0a"
onomazom0nwn.
29
For justice, see Beat. 4 (PG 44, col. 1233D): Fas1 to0nun t8n 2xhtak0twn
t1 toiaAt0 tine", dikaios0nhn e9 nai 5 xin 2ponemhtik1n toA 4sou, ka1 toA kat j 2x0an
3k0stJ. For mercy, see Beat. 5 (PG 44, col. 1252B): Ka1 7stin 3 7leo", 3" 4n
ti" 7rN perilab1n 3rmhne0seien, 3ko0sio" l0ph 2p 2llotr0oi" kako8" sunistam0nh.
Within the fourth homily De beatitudinibus, Gregory appears to reject the
former definition of justice as appropriate to this passage on the grounds that
it is exclusivist: only those with power and wealth can qualify as just if justice
means rendering to each his or her due. But the counsel of the beatitude,
Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for justice, must be within the reach
of all. Consequently, justice must have a different sense here. However,
Gregory does not offer an alternative definition. Moreover, he endorses the
apparently rejected definition elsewhere (as in the Oratio catechetica passage).
Therefore, I do not agree with Elias Moutsoulas that Gregory is in fact
opposed to this definition of justice. He may be opposed to taking it on its
own, i.e. without the other virtues: the rest of the discussion in the fourth
homily is about the other virtues and virtue in general. He also identifies the
true justice with Christ: justice considered in isolation from Christ is
mistaken or incomplete, since Christ is the justice of God (1 Cor. 1:30). For
discussion, see Elias D. Moutsoulas, Le Sens de la justice dans la quatrie`me
Homelie sur les Beatitudes de Gregoire de Nysse, in Hubertus R. Drobner and
Albert Viciano (eds.) Gregory of Nyssa: Homilies on the Beatitudes (Leiden:
Brill, 2000), pp. 38996; cf. Lucas Francisco Mateo-Seco, Gregory of Nyssa,
De beatitudinibus, Oratio IV: Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for
righteousness, for they shall be satisfied (Mt 5,6), ibid., pp. 14963.
30
This was Stoic doctrine, and was reported as such by Origen at Contra
Celsum 4.29, 6.48. However, I see no decisive evidence that Gregory was
influenced by Stoicism on this point. Moreover, it does not follow from my
argument that the human and divine virtues have the same account that they
are the same virtues (as the Stoics seem to have held). Gods justice, while
answering to the same account as Pauls justice, is quite a different kind of
thing.

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THE RECIPROCITY OF THE VIRTUES

549
the same that we find when he talks about justice or mercy in
humans.29 It is in this sense that Gregorys theory of the divine
and human virtues is a univocal theory.30 Justice is concerned
with rendering to each his or her due; mercy with benevolence
towards those in need. The fact that the same account (l0go")
applies to both divine and human justice is necessary
for Gregorys arguments. It is because justice is what we
know it to be that we can say that it is necessarily
connected with goodness, wisdom, and power. A just disposition
entails the wisdom to apply justice to particular circumstances,
the power to make the disposition eVective, and the goodness

550
ANDREW RA DD E-GALLWITZ
to temper it, lest it be a beastly and tyrannical form of justice.
In sum, in the same way that the human virtues reciprocally
entail one another, so too do the divine virtues reciprocally
entail one another.
III. CONCLUSION

31
Aristotle explicitly argues that the gods do not have temperance or
courage at Nicomachean Ethics 10.8, 1178b816. However, it would be hard to
view this passage as influencing Gregory, since Aristotle also argues there that
the gods do not possess justice.
32
Plotinus, Ennead 1.2.7.56: t1 d1 oi|on 2ndr0a 3 2ul0th" ka1 t1 2 a3toA
m0nein ka
ar0n. Scholars have not been happy with the hapax 2ul0th" here.
Henry Blumenthal has conjectured a2t0th", and John Dillon follows him: see
Dillons translation in Porphyre: Sentences, ed. Luc Brisson, avec une
traduction anglaise de John Dillon (Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin,
2005), p. 812, n. 136. This fits well with what Porphyry says in the Sententiae,
in a passage which must be a summary of Ennead 1.2. Porphyry, Sententiae
32.6870: 3 d1 2ndr0a 3 taut0th" ka1 t1 2 3autoA m0nein ka
ar1n di1 dun0mew"
perious0an. Porphyrys version has the courage of the divine nous as its selfidentity.
33
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1a2ae.61.5, corpus: fortitudo autem
Dei est eius immutabilitas; cf. Quaestiones de Virtutibus Cardinalibus 1.4.

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I wish to conclude by asking whether this single theory is a

good fit for the diverse explananda to which Gregory applies it.
There are a number of problems with the theory as it stands.
First, Gregory holds that the virtues mutually entail one another.
Yet, the set of human virtues and the set of divine virtues
only partially overlap in terms of their membership. So, for
instance, Gregory includes temperance (swrws0nh) and
courage (2ndre0a) in the list of human virtues. Yet he never
attributes these to God.31 Doing so would require the kind of
conceptual acrobatics that one finds in Neoplatonists like
Plotinus, who says the analogue of courage in nous is immateriality and remaining pure on its own,32 or Thomas Aquinas, who
says that it is immutability.33 As we have seen, when Gregory
attributes the same virtue to God and to humans, he assumes
that the same account works for both. This raises a swarm of
issues about homonymy versus synonymy in theological language
which cannot be addressed here. The key point is that the lists
of divine and human virtues include some members that are
the same and some that are diVerent, and yet both lists are
supposed to be entirely mutually reciprocal. So, how can justice
both entail courage (in humans) and not entail courage (in God),
if justice means the same thing in both contexts?

34

V. Mos. 2.2889; Virg. 7; 17; Beat. 2.

On the theme of apatheia, divine and human, see Smith, Passion and
Paradise, pp. 256, 16470, and passim.
36
On the scale of virtues generally, see Joshua Hochschild, Porphyry,
Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas: A Neoplatonic Hierarchy of Virtues and
Two Christian Appropriations, in John Inglis (ed.), Medieval Philosophy and
the Classical Tradition: In Islam, Judaism, and Christianity (Richmond, Surrey:
Curzon, 2002), pp. 24559.
37
Virg. 4.1.417; 4.2.811; 4.5.124.6.34; 6.2.3941; 13.1.212; 13.3.57;
14.2.3.
38
Elenchos 1.19.18. The use of uniform (monoeides) there for the virtues is
curious, if they bear the twofold structure they bear for other Middle
Platonists, Gregory, and the Stoics. It could be that these are somehow
consistent with one another.
35

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THE RECIPROCITY OF THE VIRTUES

551
On a related point, in a number of places, Gregory makes
moderation of passions a necessary feature of virtue in this life.34
He subscribes to the doctrine of the mean. But this cannot
apply to divine virtues, for the simple reason that, for Gregory,
God has no morally ambiguous passions to restrain.35 Nor is there
an excess and a deficiency corresponding to Gods justice or
wisdom. This problem led the Neoplatonists to posit a scale
of virtues.36 But Gregory was either unaware of this theory
or unsympathetic to it. Yet, without something like this, how can
he avoid inconsistency?
Additionally, as readers of De virginitate know, Gregory
does not simply argue that the virtues are reciprocal; he even
more frequently in that text argues that the vices are reciprocal.37
So, if you have one vice, you have them all. Is there a
problem with using the same theory for the connection between
Gods justice and Gods wisdom as one uses for human foibles
like gluttony and lust? Perhaps not on a logical level, but it is
shocking. Nor was it the unanimous philosophical position:
for instance, in Hippolytus summary, Plato did not hold the
vices to be reciprocal.38
Finally, Gregory holds that God is simple, and yet does not
endorse the identity thesis, which came to be the standard
explication of the doctrine of divine simplicity. There are
good polemical reasons for him to reject the identity thesis: it
was the position of his major opponent in trinitarian theology,
Eunomius of Cyzicus. But one may ask whether divine
simplicity is compatible with anything less than the identity of
Gods attributes or goods with God and consequently with
one another. Or one may object that, while it is all well and good
to hold that the virtues are non-identical but reciprocal in humans,
the same cannot be true of God, on the grounds that God

ANDREW RADDE-GALLWITZ
Loyola University Chicago
araddegallwitz@luc.edu

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ANDREW RA DD E-GALLWITZ
552
is simple. However, this problem is less serious than the
previous problems outlined, because it relies upon the
problematic assumption that every theory of divine simplicity
must endorse the identity thesis. And that is merely to reject
Gregorys anti-Eunomian theology of simplicity without taking
it seriously.
Any philosophically interesting theory has its attendant
problems. I leave it to the reader to consider how fatal the
problems are that I have raised for Gregorys theory of the virtues.
At the very least, his theory reflects one of the many ways in
which late ancient Christians engaged with the philosophy of
their day when dealing with theological and exegetical
problems such as why did God save human beings in the way
God did? I hope to have shown that the logic of Gregorys answer
to this problem centres on his view that the virtueswhether
in God or in human soulsare reciprocal and inseparable.