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Philosophy of Values

On Emotion and Value in David Hume and Max Scheler

Marek Pyka
mpyka@oeto.pk.edu.pl

ABSTRACT: While some philosophers tend to exclude any significance of emotion for the
moral life, others place them in the center of both the moral life and the theory of value
judgment. This paper presents a confrontation of two classic positions of the second type,
namely the position of Hume and Scheler. The ultimate goal of this confrontation is
metatheoretical particularly as it concerns the analysis of the relations between the idea
of emotion and the idea of value in this kind of theory of value judgment. In conclusion, I
point to some important theoretical assumptions which underlie the positions of both
thinkers despite all the other differences between them.

In at least four types of ethical theories emotions and feelings are regarded as a vital factor
in explaining the nature of both value judgement and value itself. Such types of ethical
theories, however, offer not only different theories of value and valuation but they also
assume or imply quite different theories of emotions and feelings. A look at the history of
philosophical psychology can convince us that there has been no generally accepted theory
of emotion but the idea of emotion has been changing together with the idea of mind or soul.
(1) One could expect that there is a correlation between the idea of emotion and the idea of
value or the good in each type of the above mentioned theories.
In what follows, I shall discuss this correlation for two ethical theories in greater detail. I
shall consider the moral philosophy of David Hume which I construe as psychological
naturalism of non-relativistic type. (2) I shall also consider the case of emotional intuitionism
exemplified by Max Scheler. Both Hume and Scheler have formulated classic theories of
emotion and this is one of my reasons for choosing them.
Hume on Passion and Value
The relation between passion and value in Hume's philosophy has been repeatedly
discussed. (3) In contrast to some contemporary writers, Hume devoted a lot of effort and
space to the theory of passion before presenting his, based on emotion moral theory, in Book
III of the Treatise. (4)
However, as I believe, Hume's philosophy on the whole, contains not one, but two theories
of passion. One of them is a theory of the genesis of passions from pains and pleasures. The

second theory, on the other hand, refers to the group of passions which are after N. Kemp
Smith called 'primary' passions; and I will call it the descriptive theory of passion. The
Treatise is dominated almost exclusively by the theory of genesis but the role of the
descriptive theory in Enquiries is more important, and particularly in those places where
Hume argues against hedonism and egoism in his theory of motivation. On the theory of
genesis, passions are produced from pains and pleasures either directly or indirectly which,
as it is well known, leads to Hume's distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' passions.
According to the descriptive theory, however, the situation is quite different. In their
existence, the 'primary' passions do not depend on pleasures and pains, on the contrary,
pains and pleasures are 'produced' by them. There is an interesting tension between these
two theories in Hume's philosophy but this problem cannot be discussed here.
Theoretically, Hume could have related his moral theory to either of the two discussed
theories of emotion. The whole logical construction of the Treatise, however, reveals, that he
decided to base his moral theory on the theory of genesis. Hume devotes more than a half of
Book II of the Treatise to four 'indirect' passions, that is to: pride, humility, love and hatred.
In Book III, in turn, he determines the conditions in which the above passions become
'moral sentiments' or 'objective' forms of love and hatred. (5)
What kind of emotion is felt towards a good or an evil in Hume's philosophy? Within the
framework of the theory of genesis it must be a kind of pleasure or pain respectively. Even if
someone would like to relate a good to another passion, this passion, according to Hume's
theory, must come from a certain pleasure or pain. In the theory of genesis, the relation
between a good and pleasure is causal, a good 'produces' pleasure, as Hume puts it. On the
other hand, Hume's idea of the good is influenced by his theory of emotion. The only feature
of the good which is justified is that it is the cause of pleasure, and for Hume any other
characteristics of the good would be speculative in its character.
The above analysis is also valid for 'moral sentiments' in Book III of the Treatise. 'Moral
sentiments' are pleasures or pains of a special kind, and their causes are considered to be the
moral good and evil respectively. These pains and pleasures, in turn, give rise to particular
kinds of love or hatred and pride or humility. What can be a cause of "moral sentiments?" As
it is known, in Hume's stance, a 'character' or 'act' is morally good if it is useful or pleasant
for a given person or any other persons in question. H. Aiken says that Hume does not give
any justification that 'moral sentiments' should be related to the principle of utility. (6) In
Aiken's opinion 'moral sentiments' should be related to human rights rather than to the
principle of utility.
Are there any other possibilities open for Hume? As a matter of fact, Hume mentions one of
them but the scope of his discussion is limited by his theory of passion. (7) Let us examine
this point more carefully. On the theory of genesis, there are two kinds of relations between
a passion and its object. (8) An object can be related to a passion in virtue either of a 'natural'
principle or a 'natural' and 'original' principle. In the first case there is a common factor
acting in many different objects, whereas in the second case, due to 'emotional constitution'
of mind a passion has the only, specific object. Moral rules, and particularly the rules of
justice, as Hume argues, cannot be related to 'moral sentiments' in virtue of the 'original'
principle. Given the great number of the rules of justice, this would mean too much
complicated 'emotional constitution' of mind. The same argument is repeated by Hume in
his Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals, but the first time a very similar argument

appears is in Hume's theory of pride in the Treatise.

Nonetheless, Hume has not considered a much simpler alternative of the relation between
good and feelings. For he could have related certain kinds of goods to certain kinds of
feelings and not singular objects to singular and specific feelings. In such a case the
'emotional constitution' of mind would not be too complicated. Hume has not considered
this alternative in spite of the fact that he was fully aware of the differences among both
pleasures and goods; Hume's implied hierarchy of values is very close to that of J. S. Mill.
Why has Hume not considered the above alternative? Some reasons for this are likely to be
found in his theory of passions. One of them is that in Hume's theory of 'indirect' passions
some different pleasures, regardless of their character, can be the 'causes' of pride or love.
The other one is that Hume has not made any explicit distinction between sensual and nonsensual pleasures. (9)
In Enquiries Hume gives up his theory of sympathy and bases his moral theory directly on
'sentiment of humanity' which he also calls 'general benevolence'. This means, however, that
this time Hume unconsciously relates his moral theory to the descriptive theory of passion.
This also means that a good cannot be defined as a source of pleasure any more as 'primary'
passions are prior to pains and pleasures. In Hume's new position, however, there is no
explanation in what way a primary passion and its object are mutually related. (10) From
contemporary perspective we can say that it lies in the nature of some emotions that they
have certain intentional objects in their structure. Moral goodness would be thus the
intentional object of general benevolence. This interpretation, however, contradicts to
Hume's fundamental assumption that the nature of any good is exhausted by the fact that it
is a source of a pleasure. Two theories of passion imply two different interpretations of the
nature of moral feelings.
In the Treatise the nature of moral feelings is explained within the framework of the theory
of the genesis of passion with the help of the theory of sympathy, whereas in both Enquiries
moral feelings should be regarded as a kind of primary passion. It is interesting to notice,
however, that Hume does not list general benevolence when he introduces primary passions
in the Treatise. What is more, according to the theory of genesis, there cannot be such a
feeling as general benevolence since benevolence, due to the emotional constitution of
mind, is limited to those who we love. There is also a consequence of Hume's two theories
of passions in his theory of motivation; the theory of genesis at least seems to have
hedonistic implications, whereas the descriptive theory clearly has not such implications.
Max Scheler on Feelings and Values
Max Scheler has developed his theory of emotion and value within the phenomenological
tradition of continental philosophy. What kind of emotion is felt towards a good in the light
of Scheler's theory? To answer this question I have to sketch the outline of his two kinds of
fundamental distinction in the realm of emotions. One of them concerns the difference
between 'intentional' and 'unintentional' forms of feelings. (11) 'Emotional acts' and 'feeling
function' (feeling of something) are of an intentional character, whereas 'feeling states' are
not. Within the framework of the phenomenological theory of mind, intentional acts (and
'functions' in our case) have their own, 'immanent' objects. According to Scheler, values are
the objects of intentional forms of feelings, and values are regarded by him as some

objective, ideal properties.

What kind of feelings do we experience in the face of, say, a masterpiece? In the light of
Scheler's theory, there is not one but three different kinds of feelings at play. Firstly, there is
a value of beauty which 'is given' to us directly, secondly, there is our feeling of this value (a
feeling function), and finally, there is a pleasure (a feeling state) which appears as a
consequence of the first two. Such a theory of feelings, of course, supports a theory of the
good which is quite different from that of Hume's. The good is, first of all, the 'bearer' of an
ideal property, that is, the 'bearer' of value. The relation between a good and an emotion is
not causal, as in the case of Hume, but it is the relation of knowing in the phenomenological
meaning of the term, in which an ideal value 'is given' to us directly.
The second kind of Scheler's distinctions is of equal importance. Scheler also distinguishes
four 'strata' of feeling which are different from one another in their nature or 'essence', (12) all
the 'strata' are equally original phenomena and they are independent of one another. Does
this distinction, in the realm of emotion, influence Scheler's idea of value. The results of it
can be easily observed, for, in Scheler's stance, there are four kinds of value which differ
from one another in their nature or 'essence'. There are, namely, the following kinds of
value: values of sensual pleasures, values of life, spiritual values and finally religious
values. (13) All these kinds of value are ordered in an objective hierarchy and this order is
also 'given' in emotional acts of 'preferring' and 'placing after'.
In what way does Scheler justify that the above values are of a different nature or 'essence'?
Of particular interest for us is the fact, that in order to justify the generic differences among
values, Scheler resorts to the generic differences among feelings in which these values 'are
given'. Spiritual or religious values, for example, are given in feeling functions and acts
which have nothing in common with all the feelings of life in the biological meaning of the
term. There are also some other similarities between Scheler's idea of value and his idea of
emotion. Values of different kinds and feelings of respective 'strata' have some other
'essential' features in common.
Both Scheler's and Hume's ethics is of a teleological character. Hume relates moral feelings
to the principle of utility, whereas Scheler refers to the objective hierarchy of values. If our
preferences or acts conform with this objective hierarchy, then they are morally good;
otherwise the are morally wrong.
Some General Remarks and Conclusion
The main difficulty which faces any moral theory based on emotion consists in
distinguishing morally relevant emotions from all other emotions. It is very difficult, if
possible, to point out these emotion and not to resort to the notion of the good or value at the
same time. Both Hume and Scheler have made much effort, perhaps more than anybody
else, to overcome this difficulty. Have they been successful? On the one hand, they place
moral feelings (or value feelings) within the framework of their general theory of emotion.
But this would not do. They also have to resort to the notion of the good and value. Hume
resorts to the principle of utility. In his fundamental distinction between intentional and not
intentional forms of feeling, Scheler resorts to the notion of value; intentional feelings are
these feelings, in which values 'are given'.

On the logical level, therefore, both Hume's and Scheler's theory have some elements which
are circular. However, for each of them his own theory does not have such a character, since
each of them is sure that his theory is a pure description of mental phenomena (or of what 'is
given' in them). If the naturalistic interpretation of Hume's moral theory is correct, then
value judgements in both Hume and Scheler are of a cognitive character. On the other hand,
their theories of emotion have also something in common. Firstly, both of them can be
classified as 'normative' theories of emotion (14) which means that they are developed as
much to explain the nature of valuation as the nature of emotion. Secondly, and what is
more important, both Hume and Scheler share a fundamental assumption concerning
emotion; namely, that there is an original order between human emotions, on the one hand,
and the realm of the good and values, on the other. At this point their positions contrast
sharply with that of subjectivists and emotivists. One can risk here the statement, that a
similar mutual correlation between the idea of emotion and the idea of the good (or value)
could be found in any ethical theory which is based on emotion. Should we have an absolute
theory of emotion, we could decide which of these ethical theories is right. There is a hope,
however, that further research on emotion will throw some new light on the problem.

Notes
(1) See: Gardiner, H. M., Metcalf, R. C., Beebe-Center, J. G. - Feeling and Emotion. A
History of Theories, American Book Company, New York 1937.
(2) As I believe, this is the best interpretation oh Hume's moral philosophy; cf.: Norton, D.
F. - David Hume. Common - Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician, Princeton University
Press, Princeton 1982; Capaldi, N. - Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy, Peter Lang, New
York 1991.
(3) The 'classic' books on this subject are: Kemp Smith, N. - The Philosophy of David
Hume, Macmillan, London 1941; Glathe, A. B. - Hume's Theory of the Passions and of
Morals, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1950, (reprint 1969);
rdal, P. - Passions and Morals in Hume's Treatise, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh
1963. One should also mention here N. Capaldi, op. cit.
(4) Hume, David - A Treatise on Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby - Bigge, Clarendon Press,
Oxford 1888; hereafter cited as TN.
(5) See also: Baier, A. - Persons and the Wheel of Their Passions [in:], A Progress of
Sentiments. Reflections on Hume's Treatise, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA,
1991.
(6) Aiken, H. - An Interpretation of Hume's Theory of the Place of Reason in Ethics and
Politics, "Ethics" 90 (1979), October.
(7) TN, pp. 473-474.
(8) For recent discussion of the objects of emotion see: Sousa, de R. - The Rationality of

Emotion, The MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1990.

(9) For excellent discussion of this point see: Hudson, S. D. - Humean Pleasure
Reconsidered, "Canadian Journal of Philosophy" 5 (1975), no 4, pp. 545-62; Fieser, J. Hume's Classification of the Passions and Its Precursors, "Hume Studies" 18 (1992), no 1,
pp. 1-17.
(10) See note 8 above.
(11) Scheler, Max - Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, Gesammelte
Werke, Bd. 2, Francke Verlag, Bern - Mnchen 1954, pp. 256-278; hereafter cited as F.
(12) F, pp. 341-356. See also: Smith, Q. - Scheler's Stratification of Emotional Life and
Strawson's Person, "Philosophical Studies" (Irleand), 25 (1977), pp. 103-127.
(13) F, pp. 125 -130.
(14) Cf. Calhoun, Ch., Solomon, R. C. - What is an Emotion, Oxford University Press, New
York 1984.

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Philosophy of Values

A Study on the Hierarchy of Values

Tong-Keun Min
Chung Nam National University

ABSTRACT: I attempt to look into the issue of the ranks of values comprehensively and
progressively. Anti-values can be classified into the following six categories by ascending
order: (1) the act of destroying the earth-of annihilating humankind and all other living
organisms; (2) the act of mass killing of people by initiating a war or committing treason;
(3) the act of murdering or causing death to a human being; (4) the act of damaging the body
of a human being; (5) the act of greatly harming society; (6) all other crimes not covered by
the above. Higher values can be classified into the following five categories in descending
rank: (1) absolute values such as absolute truth, absolute goodness, absolute beauty and
absolute holiness; (2) the act of contributing to the development and happiness of
humankind; (3) the act of contributing to the nation or the state; (4) the act of contributing to
the regional society; (5) the act of cultivating oneself and managing one's family well.
Generally, people tend to pursue happiness more eagerly than goodness, but because
goodness is the higher value than happiness, we ought to pursue goodness more eagerly. In
helping people to get the right sense of values and to internalize it, education and
enlightenment of citizens based on the guidance of conscience rather than compulsion will
be highly effective.

1. Classification of Values
I will discuss what kinds of values exist, before talking about their hierarchy. Walter
Goodnow Everett classified values into the following eight categories; (1) economic values,
(2) bodily values, (3) value of recreation, (4) value of association, (5) character values, (6)
aesthetic values, (7) intellectual values, (8) religious values.
Everett's classification does not cover all the values in our life. To this we can add political
values, social values, legal values, cultural values moral values, educational values,
scholastic values, industrial values, athletic values, values of life, medical values, values of
language, technical values and emotional values. In addition to values in our life, things
have natural values, whether they are directly related to us humans or not.
The nature system such as the universe, the solar system, the earth is composed of time,
space and material, and is the most basic world of existence which provides living
organisms with the base for their existence. If there is no land, water, air or light, the

universe will become an empty space, in which no life can exist.

The nature system generates living organisms, letting them grow or become extinct, by
physically sustaining its constant state or changing itself, or chemically combining or
dissolving its various elements. The stars are moving, exploding or transforming themselves
in the apparently boundless universe by unmeasurable mysterious power. The stars have
limitless power and values over the humans as well as all the other living organisms on the
earth. These stars have values of sustenance and change, values of combination and
dissolution, values of conservation and generation, and values of standstill and movement.
Weight, energy, objects and light realize various values.
Thus the nature system has many values which constitute the base for the existence of the
humans. Values can be classified as follows by their qualities; (1) individual values and
social values, (2) natural values and artificial values, (3) physical values and mental values,
(4) instrumental values and intrinsic values, (5) temporary values and permanent values, (6)
exclusive values and universal values, (7) lower values and higher values, (8) unproductive
values and productive values, (9) active values and inactive values, (10) personal values and
impersonal values, (11) theoretical values and practical values, (12) relative values and
absolute values, and so on.
Values are indeed manifold and countless, and values in our life are interconnected. For
example, artistic values and social values depend on physical values, because we cannot do
artistic or social activities without our lives or bodies. Science, education and political
activities depend, more or less, on economic values, because we need some degree of
economic support for our social life. Conversely, we know that intellectual values and
political values influence our economy as some remarkable talent or excellent policy can
make a home or a nation prosperous.
2. Hierarchy of Values
In this chapter, I will think about the hierarchy of various values in this world, that is, the
question of what is the highest value and what is the lowest value.
First of all, M. Scheler(1874-1928) presented the following five principles in deciding the
rank of values;
First, the longer the value lasts, the higher it is. For example, while the value of pleasure
lasts for the duration of the feeling of pleasure, the mental value remains after the
disappearance of the circumstances. (timelessness);
Second, the harder it is to reduce the quality of the value as its carrier (Werttrager) divides
or the harder it is to increase the quality of the value as its carrier enlarges, the higher the
value is. For example, while the value of material goods reduces as the goods divide, the
value of mental goods is indivisible and not related to the number of people concerned.
(indivisiblity);
Third, the higher value becomes the base for the lower value. The fewer other values the
value has as its base, the higher it is.(independence);

Fourth, there is an intrinsic relationship between the rank of the value and the depth of
satisfaction from its realization. In other words, the deeper the satisfaction connected to the
value is, the higher the value is. For example, the physical satisfaction is strong but shallow.
On the contrary, the satisfaction from artistic meditation is a deep experience. The depth of
satisfaction is not related to its strength. (depth of satisfaction);
Fifth, the less the sense of the value is related to the existence of its carrier, the higher the
value is. For example, the value of pleasure has significance in relation to the sense of
sensuality. The value of life exists for those with the sense of life, but the moral value exists
absolutely and independently from those who feel it. (absoluteness).
In accordance with the above principles, Scheler classified the values into the following four
categories(from the bottom to the top); (1) the value of pleasure and displeasure(the
emotional value), (2) the value of the sense of life(and welfare as a subsidiary value to it),
(3) the mental value(perception, beauty, justice), (4) the value of holiness.
Further he divided the mental value into the value of beauty, the value of justice, and the
value of perceiving the truth. The value of holiness was strictly distinguished from all the
other values, which were thought to be given as the symbols of the value of holiness.
Thus Scheler suggested five principles, by which the ranks of values can be decided, and
presented four levels of values. This idea is very instrumental in deciding the ranks of
values. He placed the durable mental values higher than the temporary physical values, put
the mental goods higher than the material goods, placed the satisfaction from artistic
meditation above the material satisfaction, appreciated the value of the sense of life more
highly than the emotional value of pleasure and displeasure, and placed the mental value of
perception, beauty, and justice higher than the value of the sense of life. This is an excellent
idea that can offer the right sense of values for some contemporary people with the mistaken
sense of values.
Scheler's idea of values was succeeded by Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950), who left a
number of creative papers on this subject. Emphasizing that we just started the study of
values, he said that it was very difficult to decide on the ranks of values. He also said that
the hierarchy of values was formed objectively and never changed.
He said that the analysis of values clearly showed difference in the ranks of values in a small
range. For example, the love of neighbors (Nachstenliebe) is higher in terms of quality than
honesty, and the love of remote people(Fernstenliebe) is higher than the love of neighbors.
The love of persons(Personliche Liebe) is higher than the love of neighbors or the love of
remote people. Likewise, courage is higher than self-denial. Credit and Faith are higher than
courage. The virtue of giving(Schenkende Tugend) and good personality are higher than
credit and faith. He suggested goodness(das Gute), nobility(das Edle), fullness(die Fuelle)
and purity(die Reinheit) as fundamental ethical values.
He also talked about the relationship between the height and the strength of the value. He
said that the higher value was weak, but the lower value was strong. The higher value is
structurally complex, but the lower value is elementary. Something elementary is strong.
The betrayal of the lower value is a more serious sin than the betrayal of the higher value.
The realization of the higher value is more valuable than that of the lower value. For

example, murder is the most serious crime, but the respect for others' lives is not the highest
virtue. The property is the value lower than kindness, but the infringement of the property is
more severely condemned than unfriendliness. The betrayal of the lower value is
shameful(schimpflich), but the realization of the lower value is taken for granted. Even if
one betrays the higher value, he(or she) will not lose honor. However, if one realizes the
higher value, he(or she) will be praized. Thus the height of the value and its strength are
different from each other.
Here are examples in which Hartmann arranged values by their height. He arranged honesty,
integrity, the love of neighbors, unconditional faith, the love of remote people and the virtue
of giving by their height. Honesty is the lowest among these and the virtue of giving is the
highest. Furthermore, the anti-values corresponding to these values can be illustrated as
follows; dishonesty(for example theft), lie, the lack of love for neighbers, inability for
unconditional faith, the lack of love for remote people, the lack of the virtue of giving. The
strength is in the same order. That is, dishonest is the strongest anti-value, while the lack of
the virtue of giving is the weakest. Theft as dishonesty is a crime and the lowest anti-value.
A lie is not a crime but it is related to honor, while the lack of love is not a matter of honor.
Inability for unconditional faith is just a moral defect, and the lack of love for remote people
or the lack of the virtue of giving is not a defect at all.
Bearing in mind these ideas, I will look into the issue of the ranks of values more
comprehensively and more progressively. Hartmann's remarks that the higher value is weak
and the lower value is strong can be appreciated as grasping values ontologically. This can
easily be understood if we get to know his idea of layered existence in which he understood
the world in layers and divided the world of existence into four levels, which constituted
four layers of existence(Seinsschicht).
He said that there were (1)the layer of mental existence, (2)the layer of conscious existence,
(3)the layer of live existence and (4)the layer of physical existence. In the layer of mental
existence are the humans, in the layer of conscious existence are the higher animals, in the
layer of live existence are the plants, and in the layer of physical existence are the lifeless
things.
(1) The humans include all the four layers of existence in themselves and are understood as
concrete objects assembling these in a peculiar way.
(2) The higher animals are the aggregates of the layers of physical, live and conscious
existence.
(3) The plants are the aggregates of the layers of physical and live existence.
(4) The lifeless things include only the layer of physical existence.
The layer of physical existence is the lowest but most basic layer of existence on which all
the living organisms in the world live. If this layer of physical existence is destroyed, all the
living organisms as well as all the precious mental and cultural heritage of the mankind will
disappear at the same time. Therefore, the conservation of the layer of physical existence is
very important.

Hartmann said that murder was the most serious crime, but more review is required on the
act of murder. As for murder, there are the act of individual murder by an offender, the mass
destruction of humans by a war, or, in the modern era, the act of annihilating the mankind as
well as all the living organisms in the world by nuclear weapons. Considering the
destructive power of nuclear weapons held by some countries, which can turn the surface of
the earth into ashes, the act of provoking a nuclear war or that of destroying the earth is the
most serious crime. Thus the act of destroying the earth and annihilating the mankind as
well as all the living organisms is the most serious crime and the most dreadful anti-value.
The second lowest anti-value is the killing of a number of people by the crime against the
state or the nation. The nation states are among the largest organizations made by humans in
terms of geographical size or the number of people.
The act of a ruler who, by using a large organization as the state, initiates a war and causes
the nation to lose its lives and properties and suffer from the loss of the war, is clearly the
crime against the nation or the people. To drive the nation toward a war under the pretext of
the prosperty for the nation or the state and kill the people of another state is clearly the low
anti-value as an act of genocide. In the past, belligerent kings or rulers, who were very good
at martial art or military strategy and frequently invaded other states, were often praized as
heroes and respected as objects of adoration, but that should be considered the mistaken
sense of value. The person who defends the nation and the state from the invasion of another
nation or state, is of course a hero and patriot whose patriotism and courage should be
highly appreciated.
The act of treason against the nation and the state, which leads to the loss of a number of
lives of the people, is also a very low anti-value. This kind of serious crime against the state
is the act of destroying a group of values of life and the more comprehensive act of killing
or injuring than that of killing or injuring an individual. The serious crime against the state
becomes directly or indirectly the act of destroying many values. It destroys values of life,
bodily values as well as artistic, religious, political, economic, cultural, social and industrial
values.
The third lowest anti-value is the act of mudering a human. The act of murdering or causing
to death a human is the act of destroying the life and body of the human and is heavily
punishable up to death penalty under the Korean Criminal Code like the crime against the
state.
The next is the act of damaging the human body through violence and other means. The act
of damaging the life or the body, which is the base for human existence, is clearly the low
anti-value.
The low anti-value next to the act of damaging the human body is the act of destroying the
public security and order and harming a number of people such as arson, traffic violation,
etc. In addition to these, there are numerous immoral crimes including crimes relating to the
properties, which are basic and essential for human life, such as theft, fraud, etc.
The above anti-values can be classified into the following six categories by the ranks from
the lowest one:

(1) The act of destroying the earth, the act of annihilating the mankind and all the other
living organisms
(2) The act of mass killing of people by initiating a war or committing treason
(3) The act of murdering or causing to death a human
(4) The act of damaging the body of a human
(5) The act of greatly harming the society
(6) All the other crimes not covered by the above
When we are preoccupied by the evil, ugly, dirty anti-values which are committed by
humans, it is easy to have prejudices or misperceptions that everybody in this world seems
to be wrong and evil. Those who usually handle offenders in the court are prone to suspect
others as offenders.
On the contrary, if we observe the humans and the society, we cannot ignore the fact that the
human has a dual aspect. E. Durkheim(1858-1917), a French positive sociologist, advocated
the dual nature of the human. While the human is a selfish being with desires, he(or she) is
also a moral, religious being. While the human is a being of sense and sensual thinking,
he(or she) is also a being of reason and conceptual thinking. There is a confrontation
between holiness and filthiness, and there is a duality of the individual and the society.
There is a confrontation between selfishness and morals in the human mind. In the society,
there are good persons and bad ones, good deeds and crimes, and justice and injustice.
Now I proceed to think about right, good, beautiful, holy and wonderful higher values.
First of all, I will think about absolute values as the highest values. Plato(B.C.427-347) said
that there were absolute justice, absolute beauty and absolute goodness, and there were
absolute greatness(as the essence or nature of everything), health and power. The abovementioned absolute justice, absolute beauty and absolute goodness can be considered
absolute values, but at the present time truth in logic, goodness in morality, beauty in art and
holiness in religion are generally considered absolute values. Thus it can be said that
absolute truth, absolute goodness, absolute beauty and absolute holiness constitute the
system of absolute values as the highest values.
On the highest goodness or absolute goodness, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) said that the
highest goodness as the inevitable highest goal of the will as morally prescribed was the
genuine object of practical reason. He also said that the highest absolute goodness could be
found in the will of the rational being. It would be difficult to realize absolute goodness,
which could be found only in the will of the rational being. Absolute truth, absolute beauty
and absolute holiness could be found in the will or the mind of the wise, artistic or noble
being.
The second highest values are the acts of guiding the mankind to the right road or giving
happiness to them. The acts of Confucius, Buddha, Jesus Christ or Socrates belong to this
category. The acts of Edison, Beethoven or the sculptor who made Venus of Milo also

belong to it. These people, through the religious, educational, scientific or artistic activities,
saved the mankind, taught them the immortal truth, told them the lofty ideal or gave them
happiness of artistic meditation.
The third highest values are the acts of contributing to the nation or the state.
Aristotle(B.C.384-332) said that, although it was worthwhile to realize the personal goal, it
was more beautiful and nobler to realize the goal of the nation or that of the city state, and
he added that it was this goal that we studied scientifically, which was in a sense what
politics pursued. It is more worthwhile and more valuable to do good things for the nation or
the state than to do good things for an individual.
The fourth highest values are the acts of contributing to the development of the village or
the work place or the school, etc. Although the acts contribute only to the small society or
group, not covering the wide range of the nation or the state, they are also very valuable.
The acts are those of helping others, or contributing to the regional society, the work place
or the school, but basically it is necessary to observe the rules of the society, the work place
or the school.
Lower than the above, the next category of values in the hierarchy of values are the acts of
cultivating oneself and govern a household. It is very important to carry out the virtues of
self-denyal, moderation, or perseverance.
Socrates(B.C. 470-399) said that the virtue of a man was to govern the state well and the
virtue of a woman was to govern the family well. That was only because the man mainly did
external activities and the woman mainly did activities relating to the family at that time. It
is of course the virtue for a man to govern the family well. In the teachings of Confucious,
cultivating oneself was the basic value and the value of benefiting the world was put in the
highest place, and in between there were the values of managing well the family and the
state.
The above-mentioned values can be classified into the following five categories by the ranks
from the highest one:
(1) absolute values such as absolute truth, absolute goodness, absolute beauty, and absolute
holiness
(2) the act of contributing to the development and happiness of the mankind
(3) the act of contributing to the nation or the state
(4) the act of contributing to the regional society, social organizations, the work place, the
school etc.
(5) the act of cultivating oneself and managing the family well.
According to this hierarchy of values, we can easily understand that the act of benefiting
oneself is the most basic value and the act of benefiting neighbors, the state, the nation or
the mankind is the higher value.

However, as the human has the greedy, selfish and evil character as well as the moral,
religious, good and holy character, he or she is often inclined to pursue the lower value and
not to pursue the higher value. Driven by the mistaken sense of values, the human often
pursues the lower values such as emotional pleasure, the wealth and shuns the moral or
religious values. As Aristotle said earlier, people believe that a certain degree of virtues are
well enough, but they endlessly pursue the wealth, money, power and reputation.
Money and the wealth must be the basic things for our survival and life, but these are not the
highest value but the lower value. Because the moral, artistic, religious values are higher
than the economic value, and, moreover, truth, goodness, beauty and holiness are the highest
values, we ought to pursue such higher values.
Yet because the human has the very strong emotional desire and the desire to possess, he or
she is inclined to endlessly pursue the wealth, money and power rather than the virtues or
the public welfare. Thus we first ought to make efforts to become a rightious and virtuous
human and pursue the wealth, money or power in a just way.
Immanuel Kant's remarks "der bestirnte Himmel ueber mir und das moralische Gesetz in
mir" show us his firm Western moral spirit. Kant clearly said that the good was different
from pleasure, and he also said that the highest goodness was the genuine object of practical
reason and the highest virtue as the first element of the highest goodness constituted
moralism, but happiness constituted the second element of the highest goodness. Such
words show us which one of goodness and happiness is higher as the value. Generally
speaking, people tend to pursue happiness more eagerly than goodness, but because
goodness is the higher value than happiness, we ought to pursue goodness more eagerly.
People generally pursue their own happiness and want others to be perfect, but they ought to
pursue their own perfection and others' happiness. Because people want others to be perfect
for the formers' own happiness, they blame others for the formers' unhappiness.
We ought to have goodness as our highest goal and others' happiness as our goal. Yet I do
not mean that we should not mind our just happiness at all. In the past, the natural desire of
the human was often considered bad and not to be pursued, while complete self-denial was
considered a virtue. That should be corrected in the modern era.
For example, the moral value is higher than the economic value, but the desire to be rich or
work diligently should not be regarded as unjust. We know the words by King Solomon or
Saint Paul on the wealth and diligence. Thomas Aquinas(1225-1274) annotated the thesis by
Saint Paul that those who do not work should not eat.
R. Baxter(1615-1691), a typical British Puritan, considered the wealth to be very dangerous
and seductive but the writings of Puritans said that taking a rest with the wealth, laziness
and lust caused by the enjoyment of the wealth, especially the deviation from the efforts for
a holy life should be morally rejected and the waste of time is a serious sin. After all
Protestantism did not view self-denial and the acquisition of the property as contradictory to
each other.
Protestantism taught that people should work together with diet, vegetarianism, and cold
shower. It is well known that as a result of the pioneer spirit and diligence of the Protestants,

many countries or regions where many Protestants live have become economically advanced
or rich. There is a saying that a miserly rich man is better than a generous poor man, which
is because the poor man does not have the wealth to help others with. Thus, in this modern
era, we should duly realize our just desire while controling our unjust desire, and contribute
to the prosperity and development of the individual, the family, the society, the state, the
nation and the mankind. By duly realizing the sexual desire, appetite, and desire to possess,
we can give birth to a human, help the human existence, and enrich the human life.
Therefore, we ought to keep in mind that promoting other's happiness, cultivating our good
character, duly fulfilling our duties and contributing to the prosperity and development of
the society, the state, the nation, and the mankind are the higher values.
3. Conclusion
I classified the anti-values into six categories and the higher values into five categories, all
with the ranks.
The word "value" has orginated from the economic field, but the value is different from the
price. It is difficult to convert the value into the price, and it is not easy to put the price on
life. The price is the exchange value and it is different from time to time, from place to
place, from people to people, and is constantly changeable.
No price or the cheap price does not necessarily mean no value or the small value. For
example, we do not put the price on air, but it is very valuable for us. Water or tap water is
cheap, but it is essential for human life and has the almost boundless value for us. Land, the
sun, and light also have the boundless and essential value for the existence of humans,
animals, and plants. Therefore, the air pollution, the water pollution, and the destruction of
the ecological system are very grave anti-values, threatening the existence of the humans
and other living organisms.
We now face not only the environmental pollution but also difficult problems such as human
alienation and unemployment, the depletion of natural resources, crimes, drug addiction, the
disintegration of the family, the deviation of youths and the mistreatment of the elderly, the
inequality of distribution, the threat of weapons of mass-destruction, the disruption of the
sense of values, etc.
The solution of these problems would require not only the individual efforts but also the
efforts and cooperation of social organizations, government agencies, and, furthermore,
international organizations.
In helping people to get the right sense of values and internalize it, education and
enlightenment of citizens based on the guidance of conscience rather than compulsion will
be highly effective.
Bearing in mind the ideas of some scholars on the classification and hierarchy of values, I
have tried to look into the issue of the ranks of values more comprehensively and more
progressively. The anti-values can be classified into the following six categories by the ranks
from the lowest one; (1) The act of destroying the earth, the act of annihilating the mankind
and all the other living organisms, (2) the act of mass killing of people by initiating a war or

committing treason, (3) the act of murdering or causing to death a human, (4) the act of
damaging the body of a human, (5) the act of greatly harming the society, (6) all the other
crimes not covered by the above. Then, the higher values can be classified into the following
five categories by the ranks from the highest one ; (1) absolute values such as absolute truth,
absolute goodness, absolute beauty, and absolute holiness, (2) the act of contributing to the
development and happiness of the mankind, (3) the act of contributing to the nation or the
state, (4) the act of contributing to the regional society, (5) the act of cultivating oneself and
managing the family well. Generally speaking, people tend to pursue happiness more
eagerly than goodness, but because goodness is the higher value than happiness, we ought to
pursue goodness more eagerly. In helping people to get the right sense of values and
internalize it, education and enlightenment of citizens based on the guidance of conscience
rather than compulsion will be highly effective.

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http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Valu/ValuAyal.htm

Philosophy of Values

Valores y Normas Eticas

Jorge M. Ayala
University de Zaragoza, Spain

RESUMEN: En esta comunicacin abordamos un aspecto de la filosofa de los valores: el

valor moral. Este participa de la naturaleza y de las caractersticas del valor en general, pero
tambin presenta notas especficas. Dos cuestiones se plantean aqu: cmo llegamos al
conocimiento del valores moral, y la distincin entre valors y normas ticas. Se concluye
haciendo referencia a la educacin moral o adquisicin de los hbitos morales. Se analiza el
concepto de ley. Entre el romanticismo o primaca del amor, y el rigorismo o primaca de la
ley existe un trmino medio, la ley como expresin del bien general querido por el hombre.

An se sigue hablando de que "las cosas tienen un valor u otro," de que tienen valor
"positivo o negativo." Esto es mirar el problema de los valores desde el punto de vista de las
cosas. Importa considerar los valores como algo que tenemos o que podemos tener en
nuestro interior las personas. Los valores estn arraigados en la misma condicin de la
existencia y los valores constituyen un punto de mira y el objetivo ltimo en la formacin de
toda la personalidad De hecho, una fuente de ansiedad de los jvenes es la de no contar con
los valores accesibles para construir la base que le permita establecer su propia identidad y
un modo personal de relacionarse con el mundo.
Un valor es la creencia estable de que algo es bueno o malo; de que algo es preferible a su
contrario. Estas creencias nunca van solas, sino que siempre estn organizadas en nuestro
psiquismo de manera que forman escalas de preferencia relativa.
Cada uno tiene una escala de valores. Esta afirmacin debera ser completada con otras, que
actualmente son aceptadas por la psicologa:
El nmero de valores que posee una persona es relativamente pequeo. Los verdaderos
valores, los que ntimamente me dicen "por dnde ir," son pocos, La existencia de muchos
valores acaba en dispersin y despersonalizacin.
Los valores son universales. Es decir, que existe un conjunto de valores que so comunes a
todos los hombres y a lo largo y ancho del mundo., Lo que diferencia a unos hombres de
otros es la mayor o menor intensidad que con que los viven.
Es verdad que los valores que tenemos reflejan nuestra personalidad, pero tambin lo es que

de nuestros valores son responsables, en gran medida, las instituciones en las que hemos
vivido, la cultura en la que nos movemos, y, en toda su amplitud, la sociedad.
Importancia de los valores. Los valores son pautas y guas de nuestra conducta. Slo el
hombre es capaz de trascender del estmulo al sentido. Las personas nos interrogamos
constantemente acerca del significado de nosotros mismos, de lo que hacemos y del mundo
que nos rodea. Esto es un indicador de que las personas tenemos necesidad de encontrar un
sentido, de obrar con propsito claro, de saber a dnde nos encaminamos y por qu razn.
Una escala de valores permite elegir entre caminos alternativos. Es como el mapa del
arquitecto; no es necesario que continuamente, pero conviene tenerle presente.
Un sistema de valores permite al hombre resolver los conflictos y tomar decisiones. La
escala de valores ser responsable en cada caso de los principios y reglas de conducta que se
pongan en funcionamiento. La carencia de un sistema de valores bien definido deja al sujeto
en la duda, a la vez que lo entrega en manos ajenas a su persona.
Los valores son la base de la autoestima. Se trata de un "sentimiento base" (McDougall), un
sentimiento de respeto por uno mismo. Este sentimiento necesita, para mantenerse y verse
reforzado, de un sistema de valores coherente. Slo s quin soy si s s lo que prefiero, si s
definir algunos objetivos de mi vida con cierta claridad. Y solamente s lo que quiero si he
asimilado algunos valores que me ayudan a entender, dar sentido y expresar mi relacin con
el mundo y con las cosas de manera integrada y que me proporciona paz.
Los valores defensivos. Hay valores y antivalores. Estos aparecen a veces camuflados como
valores. Por eso, los valores, como todo lo humano, deben pasar por la criba de la
autenticidad. Existen valores negativos, que simplemente justifican lo que uno hace.
Tipos de valores. Desde la clasificacin de Spranger, que clasificaba los valores en
"tericos," "econmicos," "estticos," "sociales," "polticos" y "religiosos," se han sucedido
las clasificaciones que intentan aclarar un mundo tan intrincado. Cuando pensamos que una
persona tiene un valor, estamos imaginando que estima mucho una forma de comportarse
los hombres. Siempre que pensamos en valores deberemos preguntarnos por nuestra
situacin interior en estos dos terrenos: el terminal y el instrumental.
Valores terminales. son los valores ms abstractos y de innegable universalidad (amistad,
aprecio, armona interior, autoestima,. Belleza, estabilidad, igualdad, la paz mundial, la
salvacin, libertad, placer, prosperidad, realizacin, sabidura, familia, felicidad, amor,
plenitud vital). De estos valores, unos son personales y otros interpersonales. En qu orden
los inculcamos y trasmitimos?
Los valores instrumentales son aquellos que se refieren a la estima que tenemos por
determinadas conductas y formas de comportarse de los hombres (abierto, afectivo,
ambicioso, animoso, autocontrolado, creativo, educado, eficaz, independiente, intelectual,
honrado, limpio, lgico, magnnimo, obediente, responsable, servicial, valiente). Esta escala
es relativa, pues de acuerdo con la consideracin social de cada uno, da preferencia a unos
valores obre otros.
Los valores son inseparables de la tica. Esto es natural, porque todo lo relacionado con el
hombre implica una dimensin tica. Por eso, educar en valores es una educacin en libertad

y para la libertad; sta es la base de la tica. As pues, no es suficiente conocer r los valores,
sino que hay que integrarlos en la propia vida. Este es el objetivo de la educacin moral. El
hombre es un ser tico o moral. Posee un conocimiento operativo de la diferencia objetiva
entre el bien y el mal y tambin de la posibilidad que el hombre tiene de realizar actos
buenos o malos. La bondad o maldad de un acto no depende de su realizacin fsica, sino de
su relacin a su propio fin y percepcin. Un acto es bueno cuando se ordena al fin propio del
hombre. La expresin del orden que regula los actos humanos es la ley. Moralidad y ley se
hallan estrechamente relacionados.
La conciencia, que incluye el conocimiento de la ley, es juez de la moralidad de nuestras
acciones. Ley no es una coaccin de la libertad, como tan frecuentemente se oye decir,
porque la ley expresa el orden que regula la bondad del acto humano. No proviene de fuera
del hombre, sino de su misma naturaleza. La educacin moral ha de conducir, por tanto, a la
formacin del hbito de cumplir la ley. Adquirir hbitos morales. A veces se ha contrapuesto
la libertad a la ley. El romanticismo da especial relieve a los hechos afectivos,
desvinculndolos de los actos de la voluntad. El rigorismo kantiano del imperativo
categrico pone a la ley frente al amor. Esta divisin rompe la unidad del humano.
Por voluntad se entiende una instancia desiderativa que no es orgnica, sino que es de la
misma ndole que el intelecto. Tiene la misma amplitud que el intelecto. El amor es una
forma del querer, y se encuentra en el principio y el fin de todo acto de voluntad. La ley es
expresin particular de la misma tendencia universal al bien que mueve al amor. La ley
posibilita a la voluntad la realizacin del bien. Es, pues, fruto del amor.
Una hermosa tarea de la educacin es crear la conciencia de que el ejercicio de la voluntad
est en el cumplimiento de las leyes y que en este cumplimiento se vuelven a ensamblar el
amor y la ley.
La educacin moral, como cualquier educacin, es primariamente intelectual; pero no
solamente intelectual. La necesidad de actividades concretas resulta fcil de programar y
realizar cuando se trata de hbitos particulares o destrezas. Pero cuando se trata de un hbito
tan general como "disposicin para el cumplimiento de las leyes," resulta muy difcil
determinar qu actos deben realizarse para adquirir tal disposicin.
Un acto tiene valor educativo cuando est bien hecho; en otro caso sera indiferente o tal vez
negativo para el fin que se persigue. Esto vale tanto como decir que en la formacin del
hbito para el cumplimiento de la ley sirven los actos en los cuales se cumpla bien alguna
ley. En otras palabras: la preocupacin por la obra bien hecha es esencial en la formacin de
cualquier hbito.
Conclusin
No existe coincidencia a la hora de sealar si son antes los valores o las normas ticas. Unos
creen que son las normas ticas las que sirven de fundamento a los valores: lo que se ajusta
a unas normas ticas determinadas "vale" como bueno, lo que contradice esas normas ticas
"no vale," porque es malo. Max Scheler introdujo la polaridad de valores, en la que los dos
polos (lo bueno y lo malo) "valen." Por el contrario, otros piensan que los son valores lo que
deben servir de fundamento a las normas ticas: lo que "vale," es bueno; lo que no "vale," es
malo. Nuestro punto de vista es el siguiente: primero estn los Valores, despus vienen las

Normas ticas y, por ltimo, est la relacin entre valores y normas ticas. Sealamos
tambin la naturaleza del valor moral: ste afecta a los comportamientos en los que la
persona se responsablemente (en libertad). Por eso, el valor moral aparece como la razn de
ser del hombre. Es el que ms influye en la forja de la personalidad del individuo. De ah su
complejidad: ha de realizar un ideal universalmente vlido, sin perjuicio de la peculiaridad
irrenunciable del sujeto en que se encarna. Segn escribe Jolivet: "El hombre, al inventar los
valores, invntase a s mismo a partir de s mismo y deviene propiamente lo que es."

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http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Educ/EducBufo.htm

Philosophy of Education

Personalism and Education: A Philosophical

Retrospect/Prospect
Thomas O. Buford
Furman University
Tom.Buford@Furman.edu

ABSTRACT: Committed to the metaphysical thesis that Person is first, working within the
Liberal Protestant Consensus, and believing that our minds are capable of grasping reality
(to some degree), Boston Personalists have followed two roads in developing their thought:
ratio and poeisis. The former is represented by Bowne and Brightman with their emphasis
on reason (empirical coherence, for Brightman), and the latter by Bertocci with his emphasis
on creativity. Though Bowne and Brightman were deeply concerned with education, it was
Bertocci who wrote on the subject, and his focus was on moral education. My interest,
however, is not in developing Bertocci's position. Rather I shall state the essentials of a
Personalist view of moral education within the poeisis tradition. To do that I shall address
this question: "Must one know to be good?" I shall discuss that question by examining the
life of the developing moral person and the place of knowledge in that life. As this
discussion unfolds, we shall see the educational ideal of Boston Personalism.

Introduction
Personalism deeply influenced education in America during the first two-thirds of the
twentieth century. Their influence was felt through the liberal Protestant consensus, which
was the intellectual framework for higher education, and which they helped forge. (1) During
the twentieth century forces eroded that consensus, and by the late1960's its influence was
weak. Many of us can remember the attack in the late 1960's on the Establishment waged by
counterculture forces, specifically Woodstock. The result is that something is now missing
that was in place fifty years ago. Let's call it the Center, the content of which was a
theological understanding of the persons and their world, certain books, and the
commitment to educating the intellect to know. Along with that Center went a view of
person and an understanding of what moral education could mean if it were attempted. What
I want to do is consider a part of what has been lost, specifically that view of persons and
their moral education. My reason for this is more than historical; we may have cast aside a
view of persons and moral education that ought to be given more careful consideration. To
do that I want to discuss a Personalist (that form of Personalism known as Boston

Personalism) view of education, particularly moral education.

Committed to the metaphysical thesis that Person is first, working within the Liberal
Protestant Consensus, and believing that our minds are capable of grasping reality (to some
degree), Boston Personalists have followed two roads in developing their thought: ratio and
poeisis. The former is represented by Bowne and Brightman with their emphasis on reason
(empirical coherence, for Brightman), and the latter by Bertocci with his emphasis on
creativity. Though Bowne and Brightman were deeply concerned with education, it was
Bertocci who wrote on the subject, and his focus was on moral education. My interest,
however, is not in developing Bertocci's position. Rather I shall state the essentials of a
Personalist view of moral education within the poeisis tradition. To do that I shall address
this question: "Must one know to be good?" I shall discuss that question by examining the
life of the developing moral person and the place of knowledge in that life. As this
discussion unfolds, we shall see the educational ideal of Boston Personalism.
Structure of Persons
We turn first to the life of the developing moral person. What can we say about that life?
Humans are creative-finders. Being instinctually deprived and thus open to the world in a
way that animals are not, they create structures for themselves. (2) They may be stable as in
traditional societies or unstable and open to change, as in modern societies. Yet in their
effort to overcome their instinctual deficit in their relation to the world and to provide safety
for themselves, they craft a world, including institutions. The exercise of this capacity
requires imagination and embodiment. This means that selves must "come up with," imagine
what is not already available to them in the world and with ways of realizing those
possibilities. The realization of the possible requires embodiment, the suggestiveness of the
"medium" in which we live physically and socially. Selves and institutions are nothing more
than abstractions if they remain only in the imaginative mind of the artist and on the
drawing board of the draftsman. They must be instantiated by "artists" in contexts that will
support them. But what is the place of creatively finding in the formation of our moral
personhood? (3)
First, as a creative-finder a person is an agent. We not only initiate actions but we have the
potentiality to act in a wide variety of ways. We shall call these "activity potentials." An
activity potential is that which a person is able to do in a situation that calls for it. Persons
have the following activity potentials: "sensing, remembering, imagining, thinking, feeling,
emoting, wanting, willing, oughting, and aesthetic and religious appreciation." (4) To possess
the activity potential of sensing means, for example, that one has the potentiality to see the
color of the Aegean sea, even though one has never actually seen it. If one were in a position
to see it, one would be able to do so. It is also possible for a person not to possess an activity
potential. A blind person does not have the activity potential of sight. We call these activity
potentials a complex unity because rarely is one potential developed without involving the
others. Persons do not simply see; they also think about what they see, appreciate what they
see, and remember what they see. And we must remember, that as agents with activity
potentials, those potentials actualize in a suggestive and limiting context. For one to sense
there must be something that is sensed. We cannot sense a red male cardinal as just any
color we arbitrarily choose. The bird sets limits to the actualization of my activity potential,
seeing.

Second, as creative-finders we are self-conscious of this complex of activity potentials as

belonging to ourselves. And as belonging, these activity potentials are owned. They are
mine. However, the fact that they belong to me does not mean they are consistent with each
other or that they work well together. Rather, they "belong" in the sense that they are all
owned by one person, me. But what is the person to whom these activity potentials belong?
For them to belong to me there must be a unifier to whom they belong. To ignore belonging
as implying a unity leaves us with simply unrelated experiences as the activity potentials
actualize their potentiality. That could leave us with the following oddity: I could hit my
finger with a hammer today and I could remember tomorrow that I hit my finger with a
hammer yesterday and the two experiences have nothing to do with each other. But, of
course they do; I connect them. Both belong to me and I am aware of that. The self cannot
be only a succession of experiences, as Hume contended. There can be no succession of
experiences without the experience of succession. Unless there is someone to whom they
belong and who acts as unifier, change and the interrelation of the activity potentials are
incoherent. A person is a unity-in-continuity.
Does this mean that a person is an entity that has the capacity to possess these
characteristics? No, a person is not an entity; a person is nothing other than the experiences
it has. No unchanging, mathematically identical soul unifies our activity potentials. While
the complex unity of activity potentials is nothing apart from the self, the self is not
reducible to this complex unity. The self is "a self-identifying unity in change, a selfidentifying being and becoming." (5) We find that we are a self-conscious unity amid
complexity. What does this mean?
Third, as creative-finders our identity is rooted in our experience of the continuity of
"nows." We are self-consciously aware that we are both self-identifying and beingbecoming. We are self-conscious of ourselves as complex unities who have identities and
that remain through change. "The unity that is undeniable is the complex now of selfexperience, a present that is no mathematical point but a saddle-back span, a telic moment
erlebst that gives way to another moment." (6) How are these "nows" to be interpreted? They
are our experience of ourselves as temporal beings. The most rudimentary experience we
have of ourselves is our now, our duration. As enduring, we are continuous with the past and
the future. For this reason we call this view a temporalistic view of the person. But how are
the nows connected to form our ongoing continuous selves? It seems at first sight that
reason is the best candidate to connect them. But reason is not the experiential basis for our
conviction of a continuous self, an identity. What evidence do we have that there is an
identity among our nows, that we are the same persons at the beginning of Franz Liszt's Les
Preludes as we are at the end of it?
On the one hand, the experiential basis of our belief that we are identical through change is
the experience of "again." The "now" that I am conscious of recurs again. "Againness" is
rooted in memory, especially recall, as in recalling a person's name that you are talking to.
This is the power both to form an image, an individual in the midst of the flux of sensation,
and to recognize now the reoccurrence of that individual.
On the other hand, as we connect our nows as happening again we may be in error. But to be
in error requires the identity of persons. Only persons are able to refer an experience to an
object or to claim knowledge of an object. If my student advisee, Reed, says that he is better
suited to being a salesman rather than an accountant, Reed believes something and refers it

to himself. He may be wrong about himself. Let's assume that he is, and that he would make
a better accountant than a salesman. The error was dependent on something being in Reed's
consciousness: "only a being who can be aware of x, continue to be and become as he refers
the x experienced beyond itself, and thus be the 'locus' of whether or not his reference is
correctonly such a unity-in-continuity, only such a being-becoming, can render the very
occurrence of error intelligible." (7) Only a person who remains self-conscious through nows,
who has identity, can be in error.
Fourth, and finally, as creative-finders we direct our lives towards ends. We want to become
doctors, salesmen, laborers, or whatever, and we work toward those goals. We may be
wrong or "misdirected" about those goals. But we must believe that persons who
purposively and imaginatively guide their successive experiences relative to ends are
continuous and self-identical through those telic successive experiences. (Define the latter as
tendencies toward and aversions from some object in the environment.)
Thus, as a creative-finder I am an interrelator of nows, a self-identifying, imagining
interrelator whose nature it is to act and be acted upon. A person as being-becoming is
deeply rooted in the constitutive imagination focused on the "medium" within which it lives.
What are we to make of a person as an interrelator that forms her personality?
Let's consider the nature of personality, how it arises, and then its relation to persons. A
personality can be defined as "that organization, by a self-identifying person, of those
psychophysical wants and abilities that uniquely characterizes his expressive and adaptive
adjustments to his environment." (8) How does the personality arise? Personalities are not
mere products of their environments or mere unfoldings of capacities. Personality develops
due to persons' responses to and understanding of themselves and their public environment.
As human beings, persons have needs, tendencies, potentialities, and interests. Individuals
select from their own capacities and telic tendencies. We select among these tendencies and
the environmental options available to us. Telic tendencies include drives, propensities,
needs, and motives, both innate and learned. Such tendencies are psychophysiological in
character and include the "bodily me" as well as some aspects of self-identity and ego
enhancement discussed earlier. Telic tensions, conflicts, and anxieties do not occur between
individuals and their environments (social and physical). Rather, "they have their locus
within the person whose dynamic, telic nature encourages the different meanings and values
he gives to what surfaces in his constant interaction with some environment." (9)
Personalities are the products of knowing-wanting agents who interact with their private and
public environments in the attempt to satisfy their own selections and abilities.
What is the relation of person and personality? There is an interrelator (Descartes' crucial
insight is correct), but this interrelator is not a timeless, unchanging, substantially identical
being. Persons are being-becomings. They objectify themselves, become, in relation to their
environment. In so doing their activity potentials through interaction with the total
environment are formed into a relatively coherent becoming. This is the personality. No
personality, no person. Likewise, no person, no personality.
We can now understand "poeisis," the metaphor drawn from art and its relation to the
formation of personality. Both the imagination and medium play central roles in the
formation of both the person and personality. If the self is to be understood as a complex
time-binding interrelation of activity potentials, the act of relating is an act that brings

something into existence that was not there before. The person is agent; but the person is
deeply the constitutive imagination on the basis of which the "medium" (the total
environment) is explored and the elements of the self are both interrelated and related to that
medium. No image no relations; and no relations no personal identity. (10) Further, the self
that forms its personality as it interacts with its environment must consider possible ends
towards which to move, and that requires the creative imagination. It could be that the self
forms its personality dyadically as in traditional societies. But even then it recognizes itself
as numerically other than the persons in their community. Or it could be that the self forms
its personality monadically as in modern, industrial society. In that case it attempts to form
its personality independently of other persons even though it may be influenced by them.
The modern personality is the peculiar development of the self as it relates to the specific
environment, social, political, economic, moral that is found in the West since the sixteen
hundreds. Thus, the temporalistic personalist helps us to understand how the self develops a
personality and in so doing helps us to develop the metaphor of "medium" that is necessary
to the imaginative development of the self, to creatively finding a self.
Summary: We now have before us an interpretation of the person as creator-finder. We
have seen that the imagination and "medium" are central to the self's formation of itself as a
personality. To bring into existence what was not there before, a person must imagine
possibilities. The self is constrained by a "medium," which we have seen, both suggests and
constricts by setting boundaries. Now we must discuss that which directs and unifies the
activity potentials of the self, its telic and regnant ideals.
Values and the Good
At the heart of the Personalist view of persons is that they are complex time binding unities
with regnant ideals. As moral agents persons are "capable of thinking and conducting
[themselves] in accordance with the ideals of truth and value." (11) But how do these ideals
arise? To understand that we must discuss the Good and its place in the life of persons as
creative-finders.
Persons are willing, feeling, emotive, wanting selves, as well as oughting ones. This means
that oughting is an activity potential. Oughting does not arise from knowledge; neither does
it arise from the person herself, as if it were made by that person or by society. As Bertocci
says, " . . . any person mature enough to conceive alternatives, who decides that x-value is
better than y-value, never experiences 'I ought to choose y' (even though it may turn out that
he does choose y)." (12) But what ought persons to choose?
What is the good for persons? This good has two components, the first of which is that
persons are ends. This means that "were persons not capable of thinking and willing in
relation to the alternatives consonant with their affective-emotive tendencies, they would
have no reason for treating themselves as ends; they could reasonably be treated as things.
Only that person can be an end in himself who can be an end for himself. This is the
baseline of a personalistic theory of the good and therefore of education." (13) However, this
is not enough. It remains empty until a person "decides what values and ideals are the best
for persons, . . . until we articulate an ideal of personality that ought to be realized as far as
possible (meliorism) in the context of the raw materials [read "medium"] of personal
experience. . . . The personalist's next question must be: How shall we reason about the
actual good open to persons, by which all educational choices, formal and material, ought to

be guided?" (14)
We must keep in mind that values are the wantings, strivings of persons. But some wants are
prized over others. We must evaluate them in the situations in which we find ourselves. As
we do so we find them forming patterns. "Any value pattern we discover will be a
description about persons in their world, or of the world with persons left in it. The ideal of
the life good to live will be a consequence of man's relating himself in thought and action to
his own activity-potentials and to his environment, as conceived and as it really is." (15) Once
we see this we find that some values are cardinal and support the development of others.
These cardinal ones are existence, health, and truth-values. These values are not concoctions
of impulse that can be dismantled in preference to others. "To live at all is to live 'in
connections' we can't escape; our problemthe fundamental one in educationis to
discover the framework, so to speak, of connections among our valueand disvalue
experiences." (16)
To live lives good to live also requires that we discipline ourselves by our ideals. That is our
character. "Character . . . is a simple word for a person's complex, learned, moral
dispositions to face value conflicts that inevitably or purposely arise in and around his
efforts to discover and increase values in his own life and that of others." (17) Succinctly,
persons ought to discover the best of which they are capable and strive to achieve it in the
face of whatever difficulties present themselves in their environments.
The achievement of these values, however, also involves affiliative and vocational values.
Persons find that their values are not only deeply "rooted in, but rendered more worthwhile
by, their associations with others." (18) And "the job one has, the work one does 'for a living,'
may well take its place alongside of family-experience as the gymnasium in which most
persons shape their personalities." (19) However, vocation is broader than work to earn a
living. It is one's calling, which is to actualize the purpose that allows for the full
actualization of his individuality.
And what is the interrelation of these values? There is no hierarchy here. Our lives move
and change as we creatively grow within and in response to our environments. Different
values come to the front to guide us at different times in our lives. It is best to think of a
symphony of values. "Hence the question always is: Which orchestration of values will not
foreclose values unnecessarily?" (20) As Bertocci says, "The goal in life, the meaning of
happiness, cannot be 'serene' fulfillment but a melioristic 'creative insecurity'. . . . His task,
ultimately of self-education, is the task of finding where he is, and how far he can go, in
relation to the total human venture in value realization." (21) "The moral life consists not in a
flight from insecurity, but in risky but blessed creativity, guided by a larger, imperfect vision
of what man and the universe can be." (22) Though the Personalist can develop a view of the
life good to live on the basis of a person's Lebenschauung, it points to a grounding in a view
of Being as Person.
Knowledge, the Good, and Persons
The universe is deeply moral and we can know its structure through the revelation of God in
the Judeo-Christian tradition. But we are not left to faith alone. Appealing to German
Romantic thought, particularly Kant and Hegel, we can argue that the universe is moral and
knowable by reason and experience. Nature is God's creation and by our own devices,

notably science, we can learn what God placed there. Humans, made in the image of God,
are best guided by reason as they interpret experience as well as being instructed by it. But
left to reason and experience alone persons drift and find no stable meaning in life.
(Scientific standards and procedures are not enough to build a life on.) Only on the basis of
their purposive, aiming, valuing activity can persons find meaning. But values are not
private or limited to society. Written in the heart of reality are moral patterns that are
universal and available to all persons. By grasping these moral values a person can integrate
them into her life, thereby finding the meaning that seems so elusive. Though a person,
thinking philosophically can grasp them, any person through the Judeo-Christian faith,
particularly the Protestant tradition, can grasp them and find in them meaning for their lives.
This reformulation of the tradition of the calling aids persons to find answers to the deepest
questions of their lives, specifically, Who am I? What am I to be? What am I to do? And in
answering them one supposedly overcomes the truncated and splintered personality and
finds rich identity. What gives our lives unity are values, purposes that transcend us and to
which we commit ourselves. Writing in 1908 Josiah Royce, the great Harvard philosopher
wrote, ". . . the answer to the question, 'Who are you?' really begins in earnest when a man
mentions his calling, and so actually sets out upon the definition of his purposes and of the
way in which these purposes get expressed in his life. . . . To sum up, then, I should say that
a person, an individual self, may be defined as a human life lived according to a plan." (23)
Further, we search for "some cause, far larger than ourselves, to which we are fully ready to
be loyal.". (24) When we find that cause we come to our full moral consciousness, we find
unity for our lives; and we also find our calling. It should not be assumed that the cause to
which one is loyal will actually fully and finally unity and integrate one's life. Edgar S.
Brightman wrote in 1925 that ". . . our incomplete and fragmentary minds give rise to an
ideal of a full and complete personality, that this ideal is the only one that fulfills the
demands of coherent thinking, and hence that the perfect personality is real." (25) And what is
the relation of that cause, that which is supremely valuable to that perfect personality, to
God? God is the home of universal values. They are the fundamental principles in terms of
which God created, sustains, and redeems the world. And only they can provide the unity a
purposive, aiming person seeks. Though our limited, finite, individual minds seek unity,
only God is fully integrated, unified personality.
Conclusion
Now, let me summarize. A Personalist answer to our question can be seen within the central
personalist concern regarding the education of the whole person. The whole person rests on
character and truth, the two rails on which the moral personality rests. Let's summarize what
we have said by focusing on the original question, "Must one know to be good?"
Person is a time-binding, complex unity of activity potentials, governed by ideals, "a fighter
for ends" (William James).
For persons to be good, to be a rich, full personalities, they must know those ideals that give
their lives coherence.
If one were to claim to be virtuous and did not know that the values chosen were the best for
the fully developed personality, that person cannot escape the charge that they could be
acting badly while they thought there were acting virtuously.
Hence, one must know the good to be good.

Notes
(1) For a full discussion of the significance for higher education of the liberal Protestant
consensus see George Marsden, "The Soul of the American University," in George M.
Marsden and Bradley J. Longfield (eds.), The Secularization of the Academy (New York:
Oxford UP, 1992): 9-45 and George M. Marsden, The Soul of the American University,
From Protestant Establishment to Established Nonbelief (New York: Oxford UP, 1994).
(2) See Arnold Gehlen, Man in the Age of Technology. Trans. Particia Lipscomb (New York:
Columbia UP, 1980) and Max Scheler, Man's Place in Nature. Trans. with an Introduction
by Hans Meyerhoff (New York: Beacon, 1961).
(3) In what follows we shall be heavily dependent on the work of Peter A. Bertocci,
especially his essay, "The Essence of a Person." We agree with Bertocci and Bowne that the
starting point in our search for the nature of the person is experience and reasoning within
experience. It makes no sense to go beyond what experience supports; yet, we must seek the
most coherent account of experience as we find it. We want to achieve the most inclusively
systematic hypothesis regarding the nature of persons, their identity, and their unity.
(4) Peter A. Bertocci, "The Essence of a Person." The Monist 61.1:458.
(5) Ibid., 460.
(6) Ibid., 461.
(7) Ibid., 463.
(8) Peter A. Bertocci, "The Person, His Personality, and Environment." Review of
Metaphysics 32 (1979): 606.
(9) Bertocci, "The Person, His Personality, and Environment" 606.
(10) Vico is right. The central imaginative universal is Jove. From it all else human
develops. The self finds itself in and through sacred story. See Stephen Crites, "The
Narrative Quality of Experience." Journal of the American Academy of Religion 39
(September 1971): 291-311.
(11) Peter A. Bertocci. "A Personalistic Philosophy of Education." Teachers College Record.
80.3 (February 1979): 489.
(12) Ibid., 490.
(13) Ibid., 491.
(14) Ibid., 492.

(15) Ibid., 495.

(16) Ibid., 497.
(17) Ibid., 499.
(18) Ibid.
(19) Ibid., 501.
(20) Ibid., 503.
(21) Ibid. 504.
(22) Peter A. Bertocci. "Education and the Vision of Excellence." University Lecture 19591960. Boston: Boston UP 1960: 26.
(23) Josiah Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty (New York: Macmillan 1908, 1918): 168.
(24) Ibid.,170.
(25) Edgar Sheffield Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Holt,
1925):210).

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http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Educ/EducHuaq.htm

Philosophy of Education

Etica y Educacion Integral (1)

Vctor R. Huaqun Mora (2)
Universidad De Santiago De Chile

RESUMEN: Este trabajo establece una relacin entre tica, eticidad y educacin. Sobre la
base de un humanismo integral, el hombre se comprende como un ser multidimensional. La
multiplicidad de dimensiones o expresiones humanas, que se caracterizan por poseer
autonoma y universalidad, pueden perfeccionarse mediante una educacin integral al evitar
distorsiones e inadecuadas sobre valoraciones de stas. El ser humano es esencialmente
personal y comunitario a la vez. Desde esta perspectiva, satisface su naturaleza cuando
establece relaciones de sentido con sus congneres en un marco comunicacional; puesto que,
pertenece a su esencia el ser-con-otro, el ser-por-otro y el ser-para-otro. De esta forma,
compartir, recibir y dar constituye una exigencia tica que lo realiza o finaliza. La
educacin, por ende, actualiza estas condiciones humanas al implicar con ello valores
educativos fundamentales, que deben surgir de la bondad y sabidura de los educadores y
reciprocarse en los educandos. La educacin integral realiza la educatividad de educadores y
educabilidad de educandos en un proceso de desarrollo interactivo, continuo, crtico y
creativo al considerer las dimensiones humanas en una perspectiva holstica. La Etica, en
cuanto ciencia normativa, regula necesariamente la actividad educacional convirtiendo a la
educacin en la dimensin perfeccionadora de todas las otras.

La tica es la ciencia que, al estudiar la conducta humana en cuanto al deber ser, traduce sus
principios a exigencias prcticas que deben regular cualquier actividad, incluyendo el
estudio de la misma. Esta exigencia, es tan importante que, al normar desde un comienzo su
propia actividad, genera la paradoja que implica, por un lado, una responsabilidad inmediata
prctica, traducida a la buena o correcta voluntad de actuar bien y, por otro, la posibilidad
terica de descubrir principios ticos que pudieran contradecir la conducta eventual
relacionada con tal estudio. En otras palabras, la conciencia moralmente recta puede,
eventualmente, contraponerse a una conciencia ticamente errnea.
De la tica surge el fundamento terico de la moralidad de los actos humanos. Sn embargo,
la moralidad es una exigencia que ha derivado de las costumbres de los pueblos y se impone
por la conciencia moral nacida de esas costumbres. Esto suele llevar a errneas conclusiones
en torno a la universalidad de los principios ticos, al confundirse los ethos culturales con
principios subyacentes que implican necesariamente una conciencia recta aunque, jams,
absolutamente verdadera; pero, tampoco, plenamente falsa, como puede apreciarse en las
diferentes culturas. Es esa conciencia moral la que obliga a actuar responsablemente con el

conocimiento tico de que se dispone en un determinada cultura y tiempo histrico. De esta

forma, si la tica en cuanto ciencia se atiene a los principios de neutralidad objetiva, la
eticidad de los actos humanos obliga a actuar responsablemente siempre. La dualidad de
tica y eticidad puede percibirse en la historia.
El sensualismo de los epicureanos se basaba en una moral psicolgica traducible al
equilibrio biolgico del cuerpo humano, el cual entregaba mayores beneficios que los
desequilibrios. De esta manera, era tico obtener el mayor de los bienes posibles sobre la
base de la moderacin de los apetitos. Los estoicos, por su parte, no aceptaban establecer
principios ticos -supuestos inmutables- sobre la base de la mutabilidad de las pasiones
humanas que eran para ellos ilusiones espontneas. As, el dolor es "una espontnea ilusin
sobre la presencia de un mal" como el placer, "una espontnea ilusin sobre la presencia de
un bien" (Hirschberger, J. 1964); por lo tanto, los impulsos o pasiones fueron rechadas a
favor de conductas autocontroladas que implicaran ticamente un sentido de inmutabilidad,
producto de una recta racionalidad que no se confunde con las ilusiones de lo mutable.
Histricamente, las investigaciones ticas han generado dos importantes concepciones con
vingencia contempornea: Telelogica y deontolgica. La primera, busca las consecuencias
benficas de los actos humanos y, sobre la base utilitaria de mayores bienes fundamenta las
decisiones ticas y conductas correspondientes; el sacrificio de pocos por el beneficio de
muchos es un criterio utilitarista bsico. La segunda concepcin, mira la consistencia del
acto humano sobre la base de lo que debe ser correcto y no del beneficio obtenible. Manuel
Kant consider, en su "Crtica de la Razn Prctica", que no era ticamente aceptable
establecer una condicin para actuar sobre la base de ella. La posicin de los utilitaristas
como Jeremy Bentham (3) y John Stuart Mill (4) (el segundo ms moderado que el primero)
se traducira, en lenguaje kanteano, a juicios condicionales o hipotticos: "Si acto bien,
obtengo un beneficio". Kant, plante que no puede comprometerse un acto moral a
consecuencias pragmticas por muy buenas que ellas sean. A los "imperativos hipotticos"
(o tambin condicionales en cuanto algo es bueno para otra cosa y no en s), que responden
a "meros preceptos de la habilidad" antepuso los "imperativos categricos", los que "seran
leyes prcticas" (Kant, 1961). Un seguidor contemporneo de este pensamiento es John
Rowls. En su libro "A Theory of Justice" afirma la incomprometibilidad de la verdad y de la
justicia ("justice as fairness") sobre cualquier beneficio. (5) Establece as, una prelacin de la
rectitud del acto por sobre el bien esperado de tal acto. De tal manera, que una injusticia es
tolerable slo para oponerse a una injusticia mayor y no para lograr un bien mayor (Rowls,
1971).
Las morales de algunas religiones superiores (cristianismo, judaismo, islamismo), por su
parte, se basan en una concepcin del hombre que trasciende lo meramente natural. Ellas
generan un humanismo trascendente dando sentido a la conducta humana sobre la base de
fines que van ms all del sentido utilitario del momento, por un lado, y de la conciencia
meramente recta por otro; an cuando, en este segundo caso se acepta la conciencia recta
como criterio subjetivo de moralidad; pero, la necesidad de manifestar una verdad absoluta
sobre la base de la creencia en una divinidad exige un fundamento objetivo: La conciencia
debe ser recta y verdadera. La filosofa cristiana establece as, una tica de fines en que el
bien y el mal son aspectos humanos intrnsecos. El bien del hombre implica un beneficio
trascendente o fin ltimo. Para el cristianismo, la moral de bienes o de fines se une en un
solo concepto. El bien del hombre es el fin del hombre y viceversa. La rectitud de los actos
humanos est, por ende, intrnsecamente unida a bienes y fines inseparables. Por esto, el fin

ltimo, para estas religiones, es Dios; en consecuencia, no puede alcanzarse por medios
inmorales. El fin no justifica los medios. Un fin legtimo debe lograrse por medios
legtimos. Toda accin humana debe ser siempre intrnsamente buena desde el punto de vista
de la rectitud. Es esa misma rectitud la que obliga en conciencia a buscar la verdad de esa
accin.
La verdad, en cuanto problema emprico, se traduce en un proceso continuo de aumento de
conocimiento, pero siempre limitado por las condiciones espacio-temporales. La ciencia
est, justamente, en esto y sus resultados constituyen no pocas veces importantes cambios de
actitudes.
La educacin, por su parte, se encuentra con un problema permanente. Existen dos
exigencias fundamentales: Una relacionada con los conocimientos que deben ser creados,
re-creados, mantenidos, acumulados y transmitidos de generacin en generacin; otra, a mi
juicio la ms importante porque en esencia fundamenta esta transmisin, referida al sentido
de todas estas actividades educacionales y que se traduce aqu en uno de los temas tratado;
en una palabra, ETICA.
Estamos obligados a actuar ticamente siempre. Reiteramos que, si el estudio de la tica en
cuanto ciencia nos lleva a establecer la misma actitud de neutralidad cientfica como lo
enfatizaron los positivistas lgicos a principios del siglo XX, (6) la moralidad de nuestros
actos es una responsabilidad permanente que nos obliga a actuar aqu, ahora y siempre en
forma recta.
Lo nico que se determina, entonces, permanentemente en todo proceso educativo es la
eticidad o moralidad. La educacin debe corresponder a una educatividad profesional, desde
el punto de vista del conocimiento exigido por los tiempos y tambin de las exigencias o
responsabilidades ticas per se. Toda profesin debe generar intrnsamente una tica
profesional que d cuentas de la variedad de situaciones contingenciales relativas a la
carrera correspondiente.
Esta actitud de moralidad profesional permite dar un sentido nico, el cual, debe resolverse
en bienes humanos que no pierdan jams el fin por el cual nos educamos. De otra forma, la
educacin pierde su significado; ms grave an, se abre la posibilidad de que el proceso
enseanza-aprendizaje se dirija a fines que van a cualquier parte, como lo sugiere algunas
posiciones existencialistas. (7) El hombre puede darse as mismo su propio sentido; pero, el
sentido de algunos puede ser aniquilar, dominar, discriminar avasallar social, econmica,
poltica, religiosa, o culturalmente a otros.
Slo una educacin que busque adecuarse a lo que el ser humano es en esencia, podr ser
realmente educativa. Permtaseme citar dos ideas sobre el hombre:
Una idea, supone que el hombre es un producto de la materia y, en una posicin filosfica
materialista, se expresa en un monismo por el cual toda ciencia natural es el estudio de las
complicaciones de ella. Desde esta perspectiva, la fsica, la qumica, la biologa y hasta la
psicologa son ciencias naturales. La vida no es otra cosa que la capacidad que adquiere o
tiene la materia de producir, transmitir y crear informacin. Por su parte, el psiquismo
humano, producto de su sistema nervioso, sigue siendo material. El resultado ms
interesante del cerebro, la conciencia, debera entenderse como un fenmeno complejo, pero

en ltima instancia, natural. Por ende, digno de ser estudiado como tal.
Otra idea, supone que la materia no es el nico componente que explica al hombre; ste es
un compuesto de alma y cuerpo, a la manera aristotlico-tomista en la cual, segn la teora
hilemrfica, el alma es la forma y el cuerpo la materia dndose as una unidad esencial que
corresponde a una sola substancia. En una variante de esta idea, se puede suponer tambin
un dualismo a la manera cartesiana; en este caso, el hombre resulta ser dos substancias
unidas accidentalmente. De esta forma, E. Mounier(1968) dir al explicar las estructuras del
universo personal: "El hombre, as como es espritu, es tambin un cuerpo. Totalmente
"cuerpo" y totalmente "espritu."
La primera idea reduce al hombre a una especie animal ms en este planeta, lo que puede
traducirse en un humanismo cerrado o inmanente a lo natural; la segunda, establece una
diferencia esencial entre hombre y animales, generando un humanismo abierto o
trascendente elevando la idea de naturaleza humana.
Sobre la base de esta segunda idea, ha nacido la concepcin de un humanismo integral que
da cuenta de la multiplicidad de expresiones o dimensiones humanas. El hombre se autorevela, como un ser multidimensional. La educacin por la tanto debe responder a una
multiplicidad de exigencias que resultan de la naturaleza humana y de las situaciones
espacio-temporales en que cada individuo, grupo, sociedad, o cultura vive y se desarrolla.
Actualmente, las respuestas educativas de tipo formal tienden a normarse en funcin de
acreditaciones internacionales. La necesidad de generar competencias que resulten
compatibles tiende a hacerse imperativa. La preocupacin por el saber hacer unido al
creciente desarrollo de esta dimensin, suele manifestarse en actividades educativas
competitivas y cooperativas. El saber hacer juntos resulta aun ms eficaz .
La eticidad educativa exige, empero, un equilibrio en el desarrollo de la multiplicidad de
estas dimensiones. Ellas se definen por la autonoma y universalidad que se manifiesta en
cada una; as, la ciencia se muestra autnoma y universal desde su propia esfera. Es fcil
comprender que algunos individuos sean subyugados por esta dimensin generndose en
ellos una visin pan-cientificista de todo y negando o reduciendo cualquier otra expresin o
dimensin tan genuina como la ciencia. Tambin, la tcnica, la poltica, la economa, la
religin, por nombrar algunas, se caracterizan por esta autonoma y universalidad. Esto
puede generar tipos de hombres literalmente avasallados por estas expresiones humanas. El
pan-tecnicismo, pan-politicismo, pan-economicismo y pan-religiosismo son realidades que
la humanidad ha sufrido y, probablemente, seguir sufriendo, aun cuando, el pluralismo
filosfico y cultural actual ha generado mayor conciencia de principios universales. Una
respuesta concreta ha sido el desarrollo histrico de la "Declaracin Universal de los
Derechos Humanos" adoptada y proclamada por resolucin de la Asamblea General de las
Naciones Unidas del 10 de septiembre de 1948. El pluralismo contemporneo ha significado
que estas declaraciones se basen en tres filosofas diferentes, que incluyen desde el
"comunitarismo marxista y nacional, el liberalismo igualitario y clsico hasta el
conservadurismo clsico y facista" (Forsythe, 1988).
La educacin integral evita estas desviaciones. Al basarse en el hombre mismo, se descubre
que ste, en su propia esencia, se autorealiza existencialmente en tres condiciones de
relaciones compartidas. El hombre es un ser en relacin-con-otro, como lo postulara
Heidegger: sin embargo, la individualidad de cualquier sujeto parte de seres humanos que

actualizan en otros algo que los realiza tambin a ellos mismos; de esta forma, a la
condicin humana de ser-con-otro se agregan las condiciones de ser-por-otro y de ser-paraotro. Todas ellas actualizan la naturaleza humana y se resuelven en exigencias o
responsabilidades personales y comunitarias.
El hombre es un ser personal y comunitario. Por lo tanto, su plena realizacin no puede
darse en forma puramente individual. Toda responsabilidad, aunque personal, tiene un
sentido comunitario. La relacin con otros es tan natural que el hombre puede ejercer mejor
su libertad en presencia de otros que absolutamente solo. Ms aun, la libertad humana se
desarrolla gracias a la presencia de otros; la convivencia establece relaciones de sentido que
llevan a un crecimiento de libertades mutuas dirigidas a resolverse en responsabilidades
compartidas. Evidentemente, la libertad humana implica tambin el abuso de ella, la
presencia de otros puede significar la "coaccin" en el sentido negativo-esclavizador (hasta
la aniquililacin del otro); pero tambin significa en el sentido positivo-liberador, accin
compartida, "co-accin" o, ms claramente, "con-accin". Si el otro significa la prdida de
libertad individual en una suerte de relacin de "ser-contra-otro", tambin significa,
esencialmente, la posibilidad de crecimiento de libertades individuales en la accin
compartida. De esta forma, el hombre es ms libre con otros que solo.
Si la tica supone la libertad humana, debe reconocerse que sta no puede entenderse como
restrictora de la existencia del otro, sino todo lo contrario. De esta forma, la libertad de uno
no termina (ni comienza) donde comienza (o termina) la libertad de otro. Esta imagen
dicotmica de la libertad es falsa, no slo desde una perspectiva terica sino tambin
prctica. En todo uso de libertad, puede haber, eventualmente, conflictos de intereses; pero
estos conflictos son productos de intereses extraos al uso legtimo de cualquier libertad
humana. La libertad humana puede condicionarse a estos intereses y determinar en no pocos
un empobrecimiento accidental de su ejercicio; pero, en esencia, el otro sigue siendo
absolutamente necesario. As, los humanos forman organizaciones de todo tipo. Estas
organizaciones parecieran literalmente esclavizar, en cierto grado, a toda la humanidad. Pero
no podemos decir que por esto el hombre es menos libre. No podemos decir que un
gobernador, rey, presidente o ministro es menos libre porque est bastante ms controlado
por su funcin que cualquier hombre comn; por el contrario, en la medida en que cumple
bien su funcin debe decirse que realiza mejor su libre albedro o libertad.
El principio doblemente unilateral supone una sobrevaloracin de lo que se gana o se pierde,
ya sea esto un bien material o intelectual. Supone que el otro me coarta en mi accin y que
yo a su vez lo coarto con la ma. As, por ejemplo, si yo ocupo con mis pies "casi" el mismo
espacio, tal vez, uno de los dos est pisando al otro. Esto se entiende como principio o
trmino de la libertad individual sobre, lo cual, se fundamenta el concepto de propiedad
privada. Mi cuerpo es aqu -"propiedad privada"y los bienes econmicos de que dispongo
tambin lo son.
Este modo de pensar, reduce incluso al hombre a una suerte de mercanca que puede
comprarse o venderse. El pan-economicismo puede concebir absolutamente todo en esta
perspectiva. "Mira cunto vales y te dir cun libre eres" sera un posible dicho extrapolado
temticamente de esta idea; para mientras ms bienes econmicos se poseen ms libertad
pareciera darse. Riqueza y pobreza material se traducen, en una concepcin paneconomicista, en libertad y esclavitud de dinero o bienes econmicos. Se pierde un sentido
genuino de libertad, esencialmente ms importante que los condicionantes y determinantes

espacio-temporales, socio-polticos, histrico-econmicos, y afines. La libertad humana

queda reducida, ms bien, a estos condicionantes y determinantes.
La esencia de la libertad humana se manifiesta en la capacidad de elegir entre posibilidades
que se abren y se cierran, aumentan y disminuyen, pero la capacidad de eleccin es lo
propiamente libre y no los concomitantes accidentales a ella. De esta forma, En el ejemplo
anteriormente sealado, el resultado final es indiferente cuando "el sujeto que pisa o el que
ha sido pisado retira su pie". Es un acto de libertad individual o compartido el que finaliza la
situacin. El sentido de las acciones libres determinan el cambio de situacin para mutuo
beneficio. Esto induce a una finalidad por lo cual las acciones libres son producto de la
habilidad humana para actuar o responder a los requerimientos del medio. A esto le
llamamos responsabilidad; sta, en cuanto normada por el fin o bien humano, es tica y, en
cuanto comn, co-responsabilidad tica. De esta forma, la tica se realiza por la libertad
humana a nivel personal y comunitario. Las co-acciones, en cuanto resultado de la
moralidad de los actos humanos, orientan y acrecientan la libertad personal de todos los
integrantes que participan de ellas. Cuando estas co-acciones son resultados de
inmoralidades individuales o compartidas, el riesgo de desorientar y disminuir la libertad
individual y colectiva surge como un "mal comn" que suele contaminar no solamente a
individuos y grupos sino tambin a organizaciones enteras de todos los tipos y tamaos.
Evidentemente, como la libertad se da situada y condicionada, los condicionantes pueden
anular la posibilidad de crecimiento y desarrollo humanos.
Los humanos nos separamos por estratos econmicos, por clases o por castas, nos
discriminamos o nos aceptamos. Todo esto genera en cada individuo una conciencia en
cierta forma autolimitante. El lenguaje, producto social que nos permite ejercer nuestra
capacidad simbolizante en alto grado al establecer la comunicacin propiamente humana,
implica tambin ciertas limitaciones. El hombre se autolimita en presencia de otros; pero,
tambin el otro genera las condiciones del crecimiento de las libertades personales. La
educacin juega en esto un rol fundamental.
La autolimitacin humana se percibe claramente en la delincuencia, en la corrupcin, en el
egosmo de algunos que se relacionan cofnicamente con otros. El poder poltico puede,
eventualmente, transformarse en un pan-politicismo restritor de libertades individuales
producto de ideologas, no pocas veces basadas en antropologas unidimensionales, en
humanismos parciales y limitantes de la diversidad de expresiones humanas. Lo que se
define como malincorrecto y errneoen el sentido en que se atenta contra el hombre
mismo, su naturaleza, su fin ltimo, es inmoral.
La educacin puede comprometerse en actividades manipuladoras y anti-educativas
tendientes a evitar y ocultar lo verdaderamente relevante. Por cierto, toda educacin genuina
es en esencia develadora en cuanto implica aumento de conocimiento, y por ende, ste
permite ejercer el libre albedro de la mejor manera. En este sentido se dice que el
conocimiento es liberador. El saber que se adquiere sobre alguna actividad manipuladora
genera necesariamente su propio antdoto. Si la voluntad no est corrupta; el ejercicio de la
libertad se dirige al develamiento de la manipulacin. La manipulacin genera la accidental
relacin de ser-contra-otro. Ella pretende exigir del otro al quitar lo que le debiera
corresponder en justicia y en verdad.
La condicin humana de ser-para-otro se caracteriza por una relacin natural de dar; as

como en la condicin de ser-por-otro, el de recibir y en la de ser-con-otro, el de compartir.

La educacin integral realiza estas tres condiciones de la naturaleza humana al formar
integralmente a los alumnos.
El humano es producto de otros; desde pequeo no depende de s mismo. El desarrollo a
nivel fsico y psico-social est en estrecha relacin con los dems, no puede desarrollarse si
no recibe. El alumno est definido como el individuo que aprende; su aprendizaje es, de
alguna manera, un recibir de sus prjimos; aun el auto-didacta se forma e informa del
producto comunitario. Todos nos hemos beneficiado y nos seguimos beneficiando a causa
de otros. Somos en esencia lo que somos debido a la impronta social.
La educacin exige que el alumno aproveche su condicin de recibir y obtenga por tanto el
mximo beneficio. Mientras mejor realize su condicin de ser-por-otro, mejor realizar la de
dar o de ser-para-otro, adems de la de compartir o de ser-con-otro. La educatividad docente
es una forma de realizar la condicin de ser-para-otro como la educabilidad discente, la de
ser-por-otro. De esta forma, damos y recibimos. Es natural que padres, profesores,
profesionales, cientficos y filsofos y, en general, individuos que estn en una situacin de
dar, ofrecer y enriquecer a los dems con sus oficios, profesiones y habilidades diversas,
realicen en forma natural la condicin humana de ser-para-otro.
Desde el punto de vista de la educacin integral, la condicin de ser-para-otro se da en una
adecuada preparacin de habilidades humanas que permitan entregar valores educativos
relacionados con los pilares fundamentales de la educacin y que son, a mi juicio, el amor y
conocimiento o la bondad y sabidura conjugada en el proceso de enseanza-aprendizaje, el
cual induce a ensear amando o amar enseando al actualizar plenamente la condicin de
dar en la dimensin educativa.
Desde esta perspectiva, la educacin es una actividad prctica que modela a travs de las
conductas y consecuentes actitudes de los educadores relaciones de sentido traducibles a
eticidad, lo que conlleva en la prctica docente la realizacin de lo moralmente recto o
bueno y, al mismo tiempo, la educacin es una actividad terica que estimula en los alumnos
la curiosidad natural de aprender en un contexto educativo genuino; es decir, lo moralmente
recto induce al docente a realizar lo intelectualmente vlido o verdadero. De esta forma, los
valores morales e intelectuales que entran en juego en el proceso educativo generado por lo
educadores, inducen valoraciones de estos valores en los educandos segn el modo en que
stos son entregados y percibidos.
Los valores morales e intelectuales constituyen lo esencial de todo proceso y producto
educativo. Ellos, tomados en conjunto, permiten la actualizacin de una educacin integral
en el marco de la educatividad docente realizando los educadores su condicin de ser-paraotro. Por su parte, el alumno recibe una formacin integral en el marco de la educabilidad
estudiantil realizndose en los educandos su condicin de ser-por-otro. En la medida en que
los educadores son conscientes de que la educacin genuina debe fundarse en estos dos
pilares fundamentales que establecen los fundamentos de una educacin integral, entonces,
es posible abrir en el alumno la expectativa positiva que transforma el proceso y producto
educativos en una verdadera conduccin liberadora y por tanto creativa.
Desde una perspectiva filsofica, la multiplicidad de dimensiones humanas deben ser
cubiertas; ms an, debe existir una perspectiva abierta a la consideracin de nuevas

expresiones humanas an no desarrolladas ni necesariamente conocidas. La voluntad de

querer bien lleva necesariamente al deseo de saber bien, a la bsqueda de la verdad en
forma honesta y sincera, libre de ideologismos que arriesgan entregar "sentidos o
significados" humanos que pueden, eventualmente, entravar el proceso de la genuina
bsqueda de la verdad, sobre la base de sobrevaloraciones ideolgicas que distorsionan en
las mentes de no pocos, la buena voluntad de querer saber.
Desde una perspectiva psicolgica, la educacin integral implica el desarrollo de todo el ser
humano; los factores conativo-volitivo, epistmico-cognoscitivo, afectivo-emotivo, y, por
ltimo, hasta somtico-fsico, son fundamentales en la elaboracin de los curricula en todo
los niveles del proceso educativo. De esta manera, resulta natural la actividad educacional y
la motivacin no queda restringuida a intereses forneos, sino a las necesidades propias de
los educandos. Por lo general, los curricula han tendido a enfatizar el factor cognoscitivoepistmico por sobre los otros. Por lo dems, un factor fundamental sino el ms importante,
el factor conativo-volitivo, ha sido omitido y en el mejor de los casos fusionado, no slo con
lo epistmico, sino tambin con lo afectivo en algunas taxonomas de objetivos
educacionales. Basta mirar los planes y programas de carreras y hasta los programas de
cursos para percatarse del nfasis en lo cognoscitivo y casi la nula participacin del factor
conativo. Esto resulta ms grave cuando asistimos a un mundo en que la corrupcin, la
drogadiccin, la delincuencia, la manipulacin de la opinin pblica y de la educacin,
suelen ser afectadas. Es poco lo que se puede hacer a nivel conativo si no se forma
integralmente a las nuevas generaciones. (8)
La educacin no puede reducirse a generacin y construccin de mero conocimiento. Las
profesiones deben estar llamadas a generar en los alumnos metas conativas de voluntad
recta. Pero, si los estudiantes se sienten prioritariamente llamados a estudiar carreras por los
beneficios que ofrecen a ellos mismos, en desmedro de la preocupacin por los dems, se
est generando en ellos el germen de la voluntad corrupta. No se mira a la realizacin del
ser-para-otro, si se sigue enfatizando el recibir sobre el dar.
La educacin integral debe entregar metas, fines y propsitos educativos dirijidos a
relaciones de sentido conducentes al perfeccionamiento humano. Los valores educativos
ms importantes deben orientar la accin hacia dichas metas. A nivel filosfico, se
manifiesta en la realizacin de la libertad que implica el cumplimiento de responsabilidades
y co-responsabilidades educativas; a nivel tico, en la accin de la voluntad que mantiene
las metas por sobre desviaciones tendientes a pervertir o anular su cumplimiento;
finalmente, a nivel psicolgico, en la aplicacin del autocontrol que permite sobreponerse a
eventuales manipulaciones o controles externos tendientes a recompensar conductas
inmorales y castigar conductas morales.

Notas
(1) La linea de Investigacin, Educacin Integral desarrolla actualmente el trabajo, "locus
de control y estrs en estudiantes universitarios" gracias al apoyo econmico del
Departamento de Investigaciones Cientficas y Tcnolgicas (DICYT) de la Universidad de
Santiago de Chile.

(2) Doctor en Educacin (T.C. Columbia University, USA). Psiclogo y licenciado en

Psicologa (P.U.C. Chile). Profesor de Filosofa y Licenciado en Filosofa (PU.C. Chile).
Miembro de la Sociedad Internacional de Honor en Educacin KAPPA DELTA PI - EEUU.
Miembro de la Sociedad Chilena de Filosofa. Acadmico del Departamento de Filosofa y
Educacin de la Facultad de Humanidades de la Universidad de Santiago de Chile.
(3) Para J. Bentham el principio de utilidad fundamenta toda las acciones humanas sobre la
base de la maximizacin del placer y de la minimizacin del dolor, tanto a nivel individual
como comunitario. "From An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation" por
Jeremy Bentham. Ver " Utilitarianism and Other Essays - J.S. Mill and Jeremy Bentham"
editado por Alan Ryan (1987).
(4) Para J. S. Mill el" Principio de la Felicidad Mayor" ("Greatest Happiness Principle") o
"Utilidad" afirma que las acciones son rectas en proporcin a la felicidad que conllevan y
errneas o incorrectas en proporcin directa con la infelicidad que producen. Mill ampla la
posicin utilitarista de Bentham con un "socialismo tico" "Utilitarianism" por J.S. Mill Ver
supra. Idem.
(5) "Being first virtues of human activities, truth an justice are uncompromising" (Rowls,
1971 )
(6) En su artculo "Qu pretende la Etica?", Moritz Schlick (1930) dice que la tica slo
busca conocimiento. Afirma que la tica es una ciencia fctica; ya que, al agotarse en
descubrir slo el significado del concepto de "bueno" no puede ser "ciencia normativa". Al
limitarla solamente a la bsqueda de explicaciones causales de la conducta moral reduce a la
tica a psicologa, puesto que, el mtodo para lograr est bsqueda es psicolgico. Por su
parte, C. L. Stevenson (1937) al analizar el significado emotivo de los trminos ticos niega
toda concepcin normativa de stos afirmando que son un vehculo para la sujestin. Los
enunciados ticos son para l "instrumentos sociales" que determinan una conjugacin
mtua de intereses y nada ms.
(7) Para J. P Sartre el hombre es "una pasin intil" porque todos sus proyectos terminan en
fracaso al otorgar el "Para-s", o conciencia moral en este caso, la significacin que el "Ensi" no tiene por naturaleza ontolgica. Su concepcin ontolgica lo obliga a establecer una
dialctica del bien y del mal mutuamente sustentable; el mal existe por el bien y el bien por
el mal, la afirmacin del uno requiere la del otro. Pero, esto genera la contradiccin de que
la moral es, por un lado inevitable (necesaria existencia del bien) y por otro, imposible
(necesaria existencia del mal) llevando todo proyecto humano a un situacin sin salida. Cf."
L' tre et le nant. Essai d'ontologe phnomenologique" (Sartre, 1971).
(8) La actual reforma nacional chilena ha generado, a travs de los objetivos denominados
"transversales", la posibilidad de introducir en los proyectos educativos de la educacin
primaria y secundaria, objetivos relacionados con este factor.

Referencias Bibliograficas
Forsythe, D. Derechos humanos y poltica mundial. Cap. 5. La filosofa poltica de los

derechos humanos Eudeba, 1988. pp. 155-179.

Hirschberger, J. Historia de la Filosofa, Tomo I. Editorial Herder, Barcelona, 1964. p. 177.
Kant, M. Obras Selectas de Manuel Kant, Ed, El Ateneo, B.A. Argentina, 1961.pp 716-717.
_________. Crtica de la Razn Pura, Ed, El Ateneo, B.A. Argentina, 1961.pp 716-717.
_________. Crtica de la Razn Pura Prctica, Ed, El Ateneo, B.A. Argentina, 1961.pp 716717.
Mounier, E. El personalismo, Ed Universitaria de B. A. 1968, p. 12.
Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press Cambrige,
Massachusetts,1971, pp. 3-53.
Ryan A. Utilitarianism and other Essays, J.S. Mill and Jeremy Bentham. Editado por Alan
Ryan, Penguin Books, 1987. pp. 65-111 (Bentham) y pp. 272-338 (Mill).
Sartre, J. P. L'tre et le nant. Essai d'ontologie phnomnologique. Editions Gallimard,
France, 1971. Tercera, cuarta parte y conclusin. pp. 275-720.
Schlick, M. Qu pretende la tica? Artculo editado por Spinger, Viena, 1930,
Reproducido por A. J. Ayer en su libro: "El positivismo lgico" Fondo de Cultura de
Econmica, Mxico, 1965. pp. 251-268.
Stevenson, C. L. El significado emotivo de los trminos ticos, Artculo aparecido por
primera vez en Mind, 1937, reproducido por A. J. Ayer , Idem,1965 pp. 269-286.

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http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TEth/TEthCana.htm

Theoretical Ethics

El Papel Educador de la Sociedad

en la Adqusicin de la Virtud
Patricia Moya Canas
Universidad de los Andes
pmoya@uandes.cl

RESUMEN: En este artculo se explica el papel educador de la sociedad en la adquisicin

de la virtud desde la perspectiva aristotlica, teniendo en cuenta el anlisis que realiza sobre
estos temas Gadamer en sus obras Verdad y Mtodo I y II. Este autor destaca la peculiaridad
de la razn prctica que, a diferencia del modo de operar de la ciencia terica, tiene como
objeto el hecho fctico. En el trabajo se analizan, en primer lugar, los aspectos en los que la
tica aristotlica constituye un aporte para el problema hermenutico, particularmente en el
caso de la aplicacin, pues la tica pone de relieve la tensin entre lo general y lo particular
y hace necesaria la aplicacin de la ley a la situacin concreta, lo cual constituye en cierto
modo una correccin de la ley. Junto con esto se afirma la necesidad de comprender esta
racionalidad prctica dentro de un contexto de ideal de vida, que supone un anlisis terico
de lo que es el bien del hombre. El examen del captulo 9 del libro X de la Etica a
Nicmaco sugiere interesantes indicaciones acerca de la educacin de la virtud que no se
pueden llevar a cabo sino a partir de un sustrato virtuoso, pues el hombre que no practica la
virtud, slo podr vivirla por la coercin de la ley, pero sin conseguir de este modo el
verdadero hbito por el que no slo practica la virtud, sino que sta constituye en el sujeto
como una segunda naturaleza. Slo se consigue mover a la prctica de la virtud cuando ya
existe una inclinacin favorable a sta la cual se consigue fundamentalmente por la
educacin y por el papel de la ley que dispone favorablemente al hbito por medio de la
costumbre.

Este estudio lo he centrado en el anlisis aristotlico de la educacin de la virtud,

principalmente a partir de la Etica a Nicmaco y desde la perspectiva de Gadamer. El
estudio se divide en dos apartados: en el primero analizar brevemente los aportes de la tica
aristotlica al problema hermenutico y en el segundo me centrar ms particularmente en la
enseanza de la virtud y en la importancia que adquiere en este mbito el hbito.
I. Aportes De La tica Aristotlica Al Problema Hermenutico
En sentido estricto, no podemos hablar en Gadamer de un tratamiento exhaustivo del tema
tico, pero s encontramos interesantes aportes en su anlisis de la tica aristotlica, tanto en

Verdad y mtodo como tambin en algunos de los artculos recogidos en el segundo tomo de
esta obra.
Cul es la intencin de Gadamer al estudiar la tica aristotlica? Lo hace porque la ve
como un caso privilegiado para una mayor clarificacin del problema hermenutico el cual
tiene como ncleo la idea de que la tradicin como tal tiene que entenderse cada vez de una
manera diferente. Se da en la hermenutica, al igual que en la tica, la problemtica de la
relacin entre lo general y lo particular: "Comprender es, entonces, un caso especial de la
aplicacin de algo general a una situacin concreta y determinada". (1)
En la tica aristotlica no se trata el problema hermenutico, pero s se trata de un saber que
no se da al margen del ser, sino "desde su determinacin y como determinacin suya". (2) La
tica aristotlica, nos seala Gadamer, no es una tica intelectualista, como lo fue la
socrtico-platnica, y por eso Aristteles la funda como disciplina autnoma respecto a la
metafsica. Aristteles no busca esclarecer sin ms la nocin de bien, sino investigar qu es
lo humanamente bueno, qu es lo bueno para el actuar humano. Por eso, seala Gadamer, la
filosofa prctica de Aristteles es el "nico modelo viable para formarnos una idea
adecuada de las ciencias del espritu". (3) La razn la explica ms adelante en el mismo
captulo, al sealar que lo esencial de las ciencias del espritu no es la objetividad, sino la
relacin previa del sujeto con el objeto. Esto es posible en la tica de Aristteles, pues ste
supo elevar la praxis humana a una esfera autnoma del saber, planteando as una va de
racionalidad prctica que entra en conflicto con el ideal de la teora y de la filosofa terica
porque seala que este dominio peculiar de la praxis no se rige por las mismas leyes que la
teora. (4)
La tica aristotlica tiene en comn con la conciencia hermenutica la tarea de la aplicacin
que es la dimensin problemtica central de la hermenutica. (5) Esta tarea aristotlica se
revela, para Gadamer, plenamente actual para el tema de la hermenutica y, como ya hemos
sealado, esclarecedora de conceptos hermenuticos fundamentales como son el aplicar y el
comprender. Esto se ve en la comprensin aristotlica del saber tico, que es saber slo en la
medida en que pueda aplicarse a una situacin concreta; un saber general acerca de la accin
humana carecera de sentido por s mismo y, ms an, ocultara las exigencias concretas que
emanan de una determinada situacin si no fuera posible concretizarlo por referencia a ella.
(6)

Es quizs interesante recordar aqu que efectivamente el saber prctico y, ms

concretamente, el ejercicio de la phronesis se refieren a la situacin concreta del aqu y del
ahora, pero que este saber no est desligado del todo de una concepcin de la vida buena
que, en el caso aristotlico, es la mxima realizacin de las capacidades propias del hombre
y que se presenta como fin prximo de la accin humana. Se da as una articulacin entre lo
que es bueno in genere -que no constituye un conjunto de normas, sino ms bien un
proyecto de vida-, y lo que es bueno ahora, que en realidad es la aplicacin de esa
concepcin total a la situacin particular. Esta aplicacin tampoco puede ser entendida de un
modo mecnico, "legalista" o deductivista, sino que va acompaada por el juicio prudencial
para el cual la norma puede ser una ayuda, pero no la solucin absoluta, pues la situacin
sobre la que se debe juzgar siempre es ms compleja y variable que lo que puede ser
expresado por la norma. Es en este sentido que cabe decir que la situacin particular siempre
excede a la norma y requiere una aplicacin prudencial.

Hace ver Gadamer que la resistencia actual a aplicar el concepto moderno de teora a la
filosofa prctica, pues ella misma se autodenomina prctica, no significa la ausencia de
legitimacin de su propia naturaleza, es decir, la ausencia de teorizacin acerca de la praxis,
sino ms bien la inconveniencia de hacer uso en este terreno- en la misma praxis- de
argumentos de tipo cosmolgico, ontolgico o metafsico. Se trata de encontrar un tipo de
racionalidad, diferente a la de las disciplinas que hemos mencionado, que sea capaz de
legitimar o explicar un mbito de la vida humana que se caracteriza por una menor exactitud
considerndola comparativamente con la de las ciencias. Esta teorizacin es necesaria
porque la tica no es un saber meramente descriptivo de las normas vigentes, sino que busca
fundamentar la validez de stas o introducir unas normas ms justas y, lo que es ms
importante, busca comprender no una esfera determinada de la accin humana, sino la
cuestin decisiva del bien del hombre. (7) Aristteles seala la necesidad de una
fundamentacin del saber prctico cuando afirma que se trata de una "racionalidad" prctica,
es decir, de un saber que es capaz de dar cuenta de s mismo. (8)
Toda esta cuestin nos remite a la tensin entre lo universal y lo particular que se da en la
comprensin de la racionalidad prctica: la norma y la aplicacin. Efectivamente Gadamer
insiste al tratar de la aplicacin en que sta es el acto de corregir la ley, es decir, la
aplicacin exige hacer un uso adecuado de lo que est prescrito en trminos generales y sin
tener en cuenta las circunstancias concretas de la accin que se juzga. (9) Hay una tensin
entre la generalidad de la legislacin vigente y la singularidad del caso que debe ser resuelta
por el que aplica la ley para que realmente se d la justicia. Segn esto toda ley debe ser
interpretada creando una nueva realidad, del mismo modo que toda interpretacin artstica
es siempre una nueva creacin. Por esta razn Aristteles concibe la justicia en unin con la
epieikeia, que no se opone a ella, sino que la lleva a su plenitud al atenuar la letra y
mantener, por as decir, el espritu de la norma. (10)
Al respecto, es interesante reparar, junto con Gadamer, en la evolucin que se ha dado desde
el primer perodo de la poca moderna con respecto al trmino "jurisprudencia"; en el
primer perodo se utiliza este trmino que significa literalmente "prudencia jurdica" y que
evoca el legado de la filosofa prctica aristotlica que tiene como virtud principal de la
racionalidad prctica a la prudencia. En cambio, a fines del siglo XIX adquiere predominio
la expresin "ciencia del derecho" que indica la prdida de la peculiaridad metodolgica del
saber jurdico y su reemplazo por una concepcin racionalista. (11)
En este contexto, seala Gadamer el problema del mtodo adquiere relevancia moral. El
cmo acercarnos a las cuestiones ticas, el cmo indagar acerca de ellas no es una mera
cuestin metodolgica, sino que su planteamiento inadecuado puede poner en juego la
posibilidad misma de esclarecimiento de lo que constituye lo propio de la racionalidad
prctica.
II. La Enseanza De La Virtud Y La Importancia Del Hbito.
Hemos visto que una de las caractersticas decisivas de esta racionalidad es la de su
"inexactitud", es decir, un modo de proceder diferente al de las llamadas ciencias exactas,
porque el saber tico slo puede dar a conocer lneas generales que ilustren la conciencia
moral, siempre autnoma, para que as sta sea capaz de la aplicacin concreta. (12) Pero esta
"inexactitud" no se entendera adecuadamente si no se tuviera tambin en cuenta que el
sujeto que asume esta concepcin tica debe reunir tambin unos requisitos. No se trata slo

de tener un "esquema" de accin moral y de aplicarlo como mejor parezca segn las
diversas situaciones, sino que el sujeto moral tiene que haber desarrollado unos hbitos,
esforzarse por mantenerlos y avalarlos con su accin correcta. (13) Un elemento clave para la
aplicacin, desde la perspectiva aristotlica es que la ley se ajuste rectamente a la situacin
particular con la ayuda de la experiencia y de la prctica de la virtud por parte del sujeto. El
hombre prudente conoce el bien porque tiene experiencia y porque vive la virtud, por eso
reconoce el bien con ms certeza y prontitud que el que carece de bondad moral, y su juicio
es prudente.
Para comprender mejor esto y siguiendo una indicacin del propio Gadamer, analicemos el
ltimo captulo de la Etica a Nicmaco que parece ser una introduccin a su Poltica.
Decamos que el sujeto tico desarrolla o ejecuta su actuar moral desde unas disposiciones
bsicas -las virtudes- que ha adquirido por la educacin y que ha hecho suyas con un
comportamiento conforme a estas virtudes. Afirma Aristteles, que el ser bueno o virtuoso
no es una cuestin de mero conocimiento terico de la virtud o del bien, sino de su prctica.
(14)

Los hbitos juegan un papel central en la doctrina prctica aristotlica y esto queda
ejemplarmente demostrado en el tratamiento de la incontinencia que no se explica tanto
dentro de los marcos de una teora de la accin, como en el campo de la formacin del
carcter (thos) por medio de los hbitos. Esta afirmacin tiene aqu relevancia, pues este
enfoque aristotlico desmonta la relacin que dentro de la tradicin socrtica, de carcter
ms bien intelectualista, se haba establecido entre incontinencia, saber e ignorancia. (15)
Por esto es interesante preguntarse qu es lo que mueve a la prctica de la virtud. Seala
Aristteles que los razonamientos slo son capaces de mover a los jvenes generosos y que
aman verdaderamente la bondad, es decir, a los que ya son virtuosos, pero no mueven al
vulgo que acta ms bien por temor al castigo. La dificultad que se encuentra en estos
ltimos hombres es que les resultar muy ardua la adquisicin de la virtud, si no imposible,
porque no tienen experiencia de ella y, por lo tanto, los discursos no conseguirn reformar
los hbitos arraigados que los inclinan a la bsqueda de placeres exclusivamente pasionales.
(16)

Lo interesante de este captulo es la idea de que la enseanza y el razonamiento no tienen

fuerza sino en aquellos que -como tierra bien cultivada- los pueden aprovechar porque
poseen hbitos para poder seguir el dictado de la razn. El que no posee el hbito, sigue el
dictado de la pasin y no es capaz de escuchar la razn. El hbito recto predispone el
carcter con respecto a la virtud, porque hace amar lo que es noble y tener aversin a lo que
es vergonzoso. (17) Tambin juega aqu un papel importante la persuasin y, por ende, la
retrica y la dialctica, pero se trata en este caso de un convencimiento que es inseparable
del conocimiento de la verdad, porque en este caso lo que se persigue es el bien concebido
no como producto exterior del hacer (ergon), sino como praxis (energeia), es decir, como un
bien que hace al hombre bueno. Para que esto sea posible el propio hombre debe estar
dispuesto a ese bien, a hacerlo suyo y realizarlo en la accin. Es as como la ley o las
constituciones no "producen" hombres buenos, sino que mueven a cada hombre, ya sea por
la conviccin interior o por la coersin, al bien. (18)
Para comprender esta concepcin de la praxis como objeto de la filosofa prctica, hay que
tener en cuenta quin es el hombre: un ser cuya vida no se desarrolla siguiendo la pulsin de
los instintos, sino guindose por la razn y que se perfecciona y realiza a s mismo en el

ejercicio de esta racionalidad. El actuar moral deja en el hombre su impronta, le confiere

disposiciones estables que configuran su carcter tico. Estos "hechos" quedan formalizados
por la dimensin habitual que el hombre ha conquistado para s en el ejercicio de su libertad.
No se trata pues meramente de una dotacin intelectual que se limita a perfeccionar a la
razn terica, sino que es ms bien una potenciacin de la libertad que incide una y otra vez
en la accin y que enriquece al hombre entero. (19) La praxis, como diferenciada de la knesis
y de la poiesis, nos descubre la riqueza incomparable del actuar humano, y particularmente
del actuar moral, que no puede entenderse de un modo mecnico ni tampoco productivo,
sino como una accin que tiene por fin al propio hombre, perfeccionndolo e incrementando
su valor humano. Esta perfeccin no slo redunda en el propio hombre que ejecuta la
accin, sino que se proyecta hacia los dems seres y, de un modo particular, hacia los dems
hombres que estn existiendo en una comunidad humana. (20)
Es pertinente reparar en la importancia que adquiere en la tica el "hecho" (hoti), pues el
hombre adquiere la capacidad de conocer lo que es noble y justo, es decir la virtud,
precisamente a partir de la prctica de la accin buena y justa que es la que nos ha habituado
y hecho capaces de reconocer estas acciones como virtuosas. Esta no es simplemente una
advertencia de que las virtudes exigen prctica, sino algo mucho ms relevante: es la
afirmacin de que la prctica es un poder cognoscitivo; es el camino por el que nosotros
aprendemos qu es noble y justo. Segn esto, la educacin no slo nos debe decir o ensear
tericamente lo que es bueno y justo, sino que ha de guiar al hombre en su conducta para
realizar las acciones buenas y justas y permitir as que la voluntad descubra que aquello que
hemos aprendido o a lo que hemos sido conducido por nuestros educadores, es verdadero.
En un comienzo se acta movido por la confianza en aquellos agentes que tienen un papel
educador, pero la virtud se alcanza cuando la accin se realiza, podramos decir, por propia
conviccin, cuando ya se ha hecho parte de la propia naturaleza. Cuando esto sucede, la
accin justa, que es ya virtuosa, se realiza por ella misma, porque ella engendra placer (en el
contexto que tiene en Aristteles su concepcin del placer), y no por coercin o por
disciplina. En definitiva, se realiza porque se tiene el hbito que ha sido, insistimos en este
punto, generado por la prctica. Tambin, segn lo que hemos visto, el hbito -y con l la
prctica- han engendrado un conocimiento de los fines virtuosos, pues los reconocemos
como bienes para nosotros y los buscamos por ellos mismos. Este conocimiento puede ser
perfeccionado, alcanzando la sabidura prctica que incluye no slo el qu, la facticidad o
prctica, sino tambin el conocimiento del porqu, llegando as a la plenitud de la virtud. Es
as que el joven al que se refiere Aristteles en EN, 10, 9, 1179b 7-10, es educable en la
sabidura prctica, porque tiene ya el hbito, en cambio aqullos que no tienen el hoti, (en
este caso, diramos la experiencia de la virtud), no tienen el punto de partida para el recto
razonamiento prctico, por el cual puedan internalizar el valor y el sentido de la virtud; no
comprendern las razones que les puedan mover a la prctica de ella, no la aman por s
misma, no la ven como parte de su felicidad. (21)
Gadamer concuerda con el anlisis que hemos hecho de la racionalidad que debe presidir
toda la praxis y que no es otra que lo que Aristteles designa con el nombre de phronesis. El
mtodo que rige esta peculiar racionalidad prctica, no es la explicacin del juicio universal
o del axioma, sino ms bien la prctica de la virtud, "lo que se da" el hoti, la facticidad. (22)
Este principio opera particularmente en la educacin de la juventud, pero no slo los
educadores tienen un papel en la juventud y en toda la sociedad, sino que tambin la ley
juega, segn Aristteles, un rol educador, pues dispone favorablemente respecto a la virtud
en cuanto que por la coercin que la ley ejerce en los hombres que viven en sociedad

engendra en ellos la fuerza de la costumbre que predispone al hbito recto. Al hablar de las
leyes, Aristteles est hablando, en el fondo, de la educacin que es pieza fundamental en la
sociedad, pues, es la educacin la que da la orientacin, y con ella tambin la fuerza para
vivir de acuerdo con el recto orden. Este papel educador le corresponde fundamentalmente a
la polis, pero si sta lo descuidara, cada ciudadano debe tomar esta tarea y ayudar a sus hijos
y amigos guindolos hacia la virtud. (23)
Un elemento aristotlico de la explicacin de la accin moral muy importante para tener en
cuenta en la cuestin de la motivacin para el actuar virtuoso es la unin que concibe el
estagirita entre la razn prctica y el deseo. En la decisin moral (proairesis) confluyen el
entendimiento y el deseo, pues la decisin ser correcta en la medida en que se conozca con
verdad y se desee con rectitud. (24) Esta unidad, propia de la virtud, en la que tambin los
deseos y las pasiones se han ordenado al bien, es lo que explica que el contexto social y
educacional jueguen un papel decisivo en la vida moral, porque es a la vez principio y
refuerzo de esta eleccin de la voluntad por el bien y por la virtud. Una sociedad que
muestra los "resultados" de la virtud, una sociedad de hombres virtuosos, es un impulso para
continuar en el ejercicio de la misma virtud y, a la vez, sirve de terreno propicio para que
desde pequeo el hombre se incline hacia el bien.
Este anlisis del ltimo captulo de la Etica a Nicmaco, nos obliga a considerar finalmente
que la concepcin aristotlica de la moralidad est fundamentada en un ethos. Seala
Gadamer que la moralidad humana se distingue de la physis en que en ella no acta una
fuerza o capacidad, por as decirlo, ciega, sino que el hombre se convierte en tal, podramos
decir alcanza la virtud, a travs de un comportamiento elegido, pero para el cual est como
predispuesto, o en el que parte como principio originario de una situacin o ethos. Para
practicar la virtud, debemos partir de la apreciacin de su valor y esto se consigue, en gran
parte, gracias al entorno social en el que se desarrolla la vida del hombre. La phronesis,
entendida como la misma racionalidad prctica, no es una facultad neutral que escoge los
medios para la accin, sino que parte de un arj que le sirve de gua en sus decisiones
concretas y ste es el ethos. Tal como seala Aristteles en el captulo nueve del libro X de
la Etica a Nicmaco, la filosofa prctica presupone que estamos ya conformados por las
ideas normativas en las que fuimos educados y que presiden el orden de toda la vida social.
Por eso sera vano el intento de derivar las ideas normativas en abstracto y darles validez
con el pretexto de su rectitud cientfica. Toda virtud o prctica de la virtud se da encarnada
en este ethos concreto. Esto tambin significa que el ethos puede ser cuestionado o entrar en
crisis como de hecho ha sucedido as en la historia. (25)
Aqu nos podemos plantear la cuestin de si acaso este ethos tiene o no alguna
fundamentacin ulterior. Qu sucede cundo l entra en crisis? O tambin, ms
radicalmente, nos podemos preguntar qu significa que la facticidad, el hoti, en el cual se
sustenta el ethos, pueda adquirir el carcter de principio? (26)
Gadamer da respuesta a estas cuestiones explicando que no se trata aqu solamente de la
facticidad entendida como el hecho que exige una explicacin, sino que ms ampliamente la
facticidad se entiende como las creencias y valoraciones compartidas por los hombres de
una sociedad. As el ethos designa "el paradigma de todo aquello que constituye nuestro
sistema de vida" (...) "el ser logrado con el ejercicio y el hbito". (27) Este paradigma no
significa la pasiva aceptacin de lo establecido, sino que se constituye en el dilogo e
intercambio entre los hombres y esto es lo que Gadamer denomina convencin, dndole un

sentido positivo, en cuanto no se trata de un sistema de reglas impuestas desde fuera, sino el
estar de acuerdo y dar validez a aquello en lo que coincidimos en la sociedad o con el resto
de los hombres con los que compartimos nuestro actuar social. Es fundamentalmente la
coincidencia en los fines la que nos lleva a asumir responsablemente unos medios. Pero esto
exige, segn Gadamer, la comn aceptacin de un determinado ideal de racionalidad y el
estar capacitado para la discusin de este ideal, pues no todo hombre tiene la aptitud para
enfrentar esta cuestin. De acuerdo con la interpretacin que hace Gadamer de Aristteles,
lo esencial para la bsqueda de una fundamentacin del saber prctico es partir del mismo
origen que es la realidad social del ser humano y no desde un concepto general de ciencia.
(28)

Notes
(1) Verdad y mtodo, Sgueme, Salamanca, 1977, p. 383.
(2) Ibd.
(3) Verdad y Mtodo II, Sgueme, Salamanca, 1992, cap. 23, p. 309.
(4) Ibd. p. 313.
(5) Cfr. Verdad y mtodo, p.387.
(6) Cfr. Ibd., p. 381.
(7) Cfr. Verdad y mtodo II, 22, pp. 295-6.
(8) Cfr. EN. VI, 7, 1141b 21-23. Sin embargo, la cuestin no es tan clara en el contexto
aristotlico en el que se han abierto dos lneas de interpretacin de la comprensin de la
racionalidad prctica. La primera reduce el conocimiento moral a un cierto empirismo, es
decir, al mero conocimiento de la bondad de la accin, sin una justificacin terica, es decir,
sin la referencia a un conocimiento universal. Esta sera una interpretacin cercana a la tica
de situacin. De esta postura se deduce tambin que el nico mtodo apropiado para la
justificacin tica sera el dialctico, ya que la tica no puede gozar de la necesidad y
universalidad de los saberes propios de la episteme. La segunda lnea interpretativa, es la
que sostiene que efectivamente el conocimiento moral no es cientfico y la moral no es una
ciencia, sino que es fundamentalmente phrnesis, es decir un conocimiento original que no
es ni dialctico ni cientfico, pero que rene la particularidad propia de un saber que se
refiere a la accin humana y a la universalidad que sirve de fundamento o justificacin de la
accin. Se trata en este caso de los fines buenos, no de una universalidad terica (cfr.
Gauthier et Jolif, L Etique a Nicomaque, Introduction, Traduction e commentaire,
Publications Universitaires, Louvain; paris, 1970, T. II, pp. 24-5). Esta segunda lnea
interpretativa sera deudora, a su vez, de la interpretacin de Toms de Aquino quien
efectivamente reconoce que el conocimiento de la prudencia es original, pues, a diferencia
de las dems virtudes especulativas, no conoce lo universal y necesario, sino lo contingente.
Pero para este conocimiento contingente la prudencia requiere tambin del conocimiento de
los principios universales, en este caso, de la razn prctica, los cuales aplica en su

conocimiento del particular, es decir, de la accin (cfr S. Teol., II-II, 47, 2 y 5). Estos
principios morales universales responden a la ordenacin natural del entendimiento humano
y son, por esta razn, conocidos por todos los hombres (cfr. Ibd., I-II, 58, 5 y 94, 2). Esto se
debe a que todos los imperativos prudenciales tienen en comn su fundamento general e
inmediato que consiste en nuestra especfica naturaleza humana. Es esta comn naturaleza la
que da el carcter de hipotticamente universal al imperativo prudencial. Esta afirmacin se
avala por la importancia que tiene el ejemplo como medio para suscitar conductas ticas; lo
mismo cabe decir del consejo, ya que ste no tendra ningn valor si no se supone una
misma naturaleza que haga vlida la experiencia de otro (cfr. Milln Puelles, La libre
afirmacin de nuestro ser, Rialp, Madrid, 1994, pp. 524-531).
(9) Crf. Verdad y mtodo, p. 24 ss.
(10) Cfr. EN, V, 10, 1137b 15-33.
(11) Cfr. Verdad y mtodo II, 22, pp. 301-2.
(12) Cfr. EN, I, 7, 1098a 25ss y II, 2, 1104a 1-10.
(13) Cfr. Verdad y mtodo, p. 385.
(14) Cfr. EN, X, 9, 1179a 34-1179b.
(15) Cfr. para este tema el interesante artculo de A. Vigo, "Incontinencia, carcter y razn
segn Aristteles" en prensa para Philosophia, Mendoza, U. Nacional de Cuyo. En este
artculo se estudia detalladamente la estructura del acto del incontinente y se demuestra que
ste no puede explicarse por razones meramente cognitivas, sino que resulta ms bien del
influjo perturbador de las pasiones y los deseos irracionales sobre la capacidad intelectual de
evaluacin de la situacin de accin. La causa ltima de esta perturbacin que sufre el
incontinente es la no consolidacin de hbitos del carcter: "El incontinente no ha logrado
transformar su ideal de vida en un thos, sino que carcter e ideal de vida permanecen en l
ampliamente disociados" p. 11.
(16) Cfr. Ibd, 1179b 1-20.
(17) Cfr. Ibd., 30. Esto es justamente lo que no logra el incontinente por la disociacin
interior de thos e ideal de vida que se debe a que ste no ha logrado transformar su ideal de
vida en su thos, a travs del proceso de habituacin. Cfr. A. Vigo, art. cit., p. 22.
(18) Cfr. Verdad y mtodo II, 22, p. 299.
(19) Cfr. Llano, "Libertad y sociedad" en Etica y poltica en la sociedad democrtica,
Espasa Calpe, 1980, pp. 96-7.
(20) Ibd. p. 79.
(21) Cfr. EN, 10. 9, 1179b 13-20. En todo este anlisis he seguido el artculo de M.F.
Burnyeat, "Aristotle on Learning to Be Good", en Essays on Aristotles Ethics, ed. by
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London,

1980, pp. 69- 92. Aqu concretamente me he referido ms particularmente a las pginas 7274; 78; 81.
(22) Cfr. Verdad y mtodo II, 23, p. 314.
(23) Cfr. EN, 10, 9, 1180a 30.
(24) Cfr. Ibd, VI, 2, 1139a 30-31.
(25) Cfr. Verdad y mtodo II, 22, p.306-7.
(26) Cfr. EN, I, 7, 1098a 33- b4.
(27) Cfr, Verdad y mtodo II, 23, p. 315.
(28) Cfr. Ibd., 23, pp. 315-6.

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