Case 14-42, Document 169, 05/07/2015, 1503603, Page1 of 13

1442cv
ACLU,etal.v.Clapper,etal.

SACK,CircuitJudge,concurring:

IfullyconcurinJudgeLynchsopinionfortheCourt.Inonethelesstake
thelibertyofofferingseveraladditionalobservationsabouttheimportoftodays
decision.
Becauseourdecisionisbasedonourreadingofafederalstatute,notthe
Constitution,Congresscanineffectoverruleit.Theenactmentofastatute
amendingorsupplantingtheportionofsection215that,untilnow,hasbeen
interpretedtoauthorizetheNSAsbulkcollectionprogramwouldlikelydothe
job,subject,ofcourse,toasubsequentconstitutionalchallengeinthecourts.
Alternatively,Congressmightsimplyterminatetheprogram.Recentnews
dispatchesindicatethatitisconsideringdoingjustthat.1Andtheplaintiffshave
suggestedthattheirgrievancecouldbeaddressedbyastatutoryamendment

SeeJonathanWeisman&JenniferSteinhauer,PatriotActFacesCurbsSupportedbyBoth
Parties,N.Y.Times,May1,2015,atA1;seealso,e.g.,EllenNakashima,WithDeadline
Near,LawmakersIntroduceBilltoEndNSAProgram,Wash.Post,Apr.28,2015,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/withdeadlinenear
lawmakersintroducebilltoendnsaprogram/2015/04/28/8fd1cf6eedb411e4a55f
38924fca94f9_story.html;SpencerAckerman,NSAReformBillImperilledasitCompetes
withAlternativeEffortintheSenate,TheGuardian,Apr.28,2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/apr/28/housensareformbillsenateusa
freedomact;H.R.1466,114thCong.(2015).
1

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replacingthebulkcollectionprogramwithanarrangementunderwhichthe
telephonecompanieswillretainthemetadatainquestion,subjecttovalid
governmentsubpoenas.SeeArgumentTr.at78(Sept.2,2014)(statementby
counselfortheappellant);JonathanWeisman&JenniferSteinhauer,PatriotAct
FacesCurbsSupportedbyBothParties,N.Y.Times,May1,2015,atA1(reporting
that,underbipartisanbillsintheHouseandSenate,thePatriotActwouldbe
changedtoprohibitbulkcollection....Thedatawouldinsteadbestoredbythe
phonecompaniesthemselves,andcouldbeaccessedbyintelligenceagencies
onlyafterapprovaloftheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceCourt).
Inanyevent,asJudgeLynchsopinionmakesclear,itisCongresss
prerogative,notours,toresolvetheconflictunderlyingtheseissuesinthefirst
instance.Anteat7,90.

Inthatconnection,JudgeLynchsopinionreferstotheprimaryrolethat

shouldbeplayedby[Congress]indeciding,explicitlyandafterfulldebate,
whethersuchprograms[asthosepursuanttowhichtheNSAhascollected
telephonemetadata]areappropriateandnecessary.Anteat92.Iagree.Ithink
itnonethelessappropriatetopausetoensurethatthatstatementisnotreadto
devalueorminimizetheroleofthecourtsindeterminingthemeaningofany

Case 14-42, Document 169, 05/07/2015, 1503603, Page3 of 13

suchlegislation,itsfutureapplicationtoparticularactsorpracticesofthefederal
governmentandothers,oritsproprietyundertheConstitution.Thecourtsare
chargedwiththeresponsibilityofmakingthosejudgments.Theyare,asan
institution,taskedwiththeduty,inthecontextofcasesorcontroversiesproperly
broughtbeforethem,toseektoreconcilethenevercompletelyreconcilable
tensionbetweentheindividualsinterestinprivacyandrighttocivillibertiesand
thegovernmentsdutytoprotectAmericanlivesandproperty.2
TheroleofCongressunderArticleIoftheConstitutionandthatofthe
courtsunderArticleIII,inthefaceoftheconcernsaboutthereasonablenessof
the[]assertions[bytheExecutiveBranchunderArticleII]ofthenecessityofthe
datacollection,anteat90,are,moreover,notentirelyindependentfromone
another.CongresshasformorethanthirtyfiveyearslookedtotheForeign
IntelligenceSurveillanceCourt(theFISC),firstestablishedforsuchmatters
undertheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceActof1978(FISA),toadjudicate
casesandcontroversiesarisingoutoftheapplicationandadministrationofthe
Act.Seeanteat6.
Thewriterhasexpressedgeneralviewsonthesubjectelsewhere.SeeRobertD.Sack,
Speech:JudicialSkepticismandtheThreatofTerrorism,31W.NewEng.L.Rev.1(2009)
(adaptedfromLawDayspeechbeforetheFederalBarCouncil,NewYorkCity,May1,
2008).

Case 14-42, Document 169, 05/07/2015, 1503603, Page4 of 13

TheFISC,likethequotidianfederaldistrictcourtsandcourtsofappeals,is

establishedunderArticleIIIoftheConstitution.3Butbecauseofitsspecialized
roledealingwithmatterstouchingonnationalsecurityconcerns,itconductsits
proceedingsdifferently.Twoofthefundamentalcharacteristicsofordinary
ArticleIIIcourtsthatareoftenconsideredcentraltotheirmissionare
transparency(openness)andaproperlyfunctioningadversarysystem.Neither
transparencynoratrueadversarysystemcharacterizestheoperationoftheFISC.
Thus,mostArticleIIIcourts,includingthisCourt,operateunderastrong
presumptionthattheirpapersandproceedingsareopentothepublic.See,e.g.,
RichmondNewspapers,Inc.v.Virginia,448U.S.555,57172(1980).
Thevalueofopennessliesinthefactthatpeople...canhaveconfidence
thatstandardsoffairnessarebeingobserved;thesureknowledgethat
anyoneisfreetoattendgivesassurancethatestablishedproceduresare
beingfollowedandthatdeviationswillbecomeknown.Opennessthus
enhancesboththebasicfairnessofthecriminaltrialandtheappearanceof
fairnesssoessentialtopublicconfidenceinthesystem.
PressEnterpriseCo.v.SuperiorCourtofCal.,464U.S.501,508(1984)(emphasis
omitted).Peopleinanopensocietydonotdemandinfallibilityfromtheir

ThejudicialPoweroftheUnitedStates,shallbevestedinonesupremeCourt,andin
suchinferiorCourtsastheCongressmayfromtimetotimeordainandestablish.U.S.
Const.,Art.III,1.
3

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institutions,butitisdifficultforthemtoacceptwhattheyareprohibitedfrom
observing.RichmondNewspapers,Inc.,448U.S.at572.4

TheFISC,bycontrast,operateslargelybehindcloseddoors.Whileitmay

dosoatthecostofsomepublicconfidence,thecourtsabilitytodootherwise
wouldappeartobe,atbest,limited.Informationcannotsimultaneouslybekept
secretandmadepublicatthesametimeatleastnotthissideofquantum
physics.5

ThisconundrumisnotuniquetotheFISCitconfrontsanyArticleIII

courtaddressingwhatpurportstoconstitutestatesecretsorotherinformation
theconfidentialityofwhichisprotectablebylaw.See,e.g., UnitedStatesv.
Reynolds,345U.S.1(1953)(settingforththemethodforjudicialconsiderationof
TheSupremeCourtscaselawhasbeendevelopedlargelyinthecontextofcriminal
cases.Itlikelyalsoappliestocivilproceedings.See,e.g.,HartfordCourantCo.v.
Pellegrino,380F.3d83,91(2dCir.2004)(applyingprinciplesofFirstAmendmentrights
ofaccesstofederalcourtstoconcludethatthereisaqualifiedFirstAmendmentright
toinspect[civil]docketsheets,whichprovideanindextotherecordsofjudicial
proceedings);MarcA.Franklin,etal.,MassMediaLaw:CasesandMaterials596(8thed.
2011)(TheSupremeCourthasnotdecidedwhetherthereisaconstitutionalrightof
accesstociviltrials,butlowercourtshaveassumedthattheFirstAmendmentrightto
attendciviltrialsisatleastasstrongastherighttoattendcriminaltrials.(citing,inter
alia,Westmorelandv.CBS,752F.2d16,23(2dCir.1984);PublickerIndustries,Inc.v.Cohen,
733F.2d1059(3dCir.1984))).
4

Tobesure,theremaybeaspectsofFISCoperationsthatsimplydonotwarrantsecret
treatment.Cf.Weisman&Steinhauer,supra(reportingthatproposedcongressional
legislationwouldrequirethedeclassificationofallsignificantFISAcourtopinions).I
doubt,though,thatinlightofthelikelyscopeoftheseexceptions,theymateriallyaffect
myoverallobservationsaboutincameraFISCproceedings.
5

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civilcasestouchingonstatesecrets);UnitedStatesv.Stewart,590F.3d93,12532
(2dCir.2009)(describingatlengththemethodsemployedwhenacriminal
defendantinfederaldistrictcourtseeksFISAdocuments);Doev.CIA,576F.3d95
(2dCir.2009)(civil)(describingthisCourtsmannerofconductinganappeal
involvingstatesecrets).Insuchcases,courtstypicallyoperatepubliclyonlyto
theextenttheythinkpracticableafterevaluatingthebasisofthegovernments
purportedneedforsecrecyandtheeffectsofsuchsecrecyontheotherparties
beforethem.
TheabsenceofarobustadversarysystemintheFISCmaybeanother
matter.Itrequireslittlebeyondthecommonexperienceofbenchandbarto
establishthegeneralimportancetocourtsandthepartiesbeforethemofhearing
fromallsidesofadispute.TheSupremeCourthasrecognizedthat:
Adversaryproceedingsareamajoraspectofoursystemofcriminaljustice.
Theirsuperiorityasameansforattainingjusticeinagivencaseisnowhere
moreevidentthaninthosecases,suchastheonesatbar,whereanissue
mustbedecidedonthebasisofalargevolumeoffactualmaterials,and
afterconsiderationofthemanyandsubtleinterrelationshipswhichmay
existamongthefactsreflectedbytheserecords.Astheneedforadversary
inquiryisincreasedbythecomplexityoftheissuespresentedfor
adjudication,andbytheconsequentinadequacyofexparteproceduresas
ameansfortheiraccurateresolution,thedisplacementofwellinformed
advocacynecessarilybecomeslessjustifiable.
Aldermanv.UnitedStates,394U.S.165,18384(1969).

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Consideringtheissueofadvocacyinthecontextofdeliberationsinvolving
allegedstatesecrets,and,morebroadly,theleak6byEdwardSnowdenthatled
tothislitigation,7callstomindthedisclosuresbyDanielEllsbergthatgaveriseto
thelegendaryPentagonPaperslitigation.8Thedistrictcourtandcourtof
appealsstagesofthePentagonPaperscaseunfoldedinthiscourthousesome
fortyfouryearsago.UnitedStatesv.NewYorkTimesCo.(thePentagonPapers
case),328F.Supp.324,333(S.D.N.Y.)(Gurfein,J.),remanded,444F.2d544(2d
IusequotationmarksaroundthetermleakforreasonsadvertedtoinNewYork
TimesCo.v.Gonzales,459F.3d160(2dCir.2006)(Sack,J.,dissenting):
6

[T]heuseofthetermleaktoidentifyunauthorizeddisclosuresinthiscontext
maybeunhelpful.Itmisleadinglysuggestsasystemthatisbroken.Some
unauthorizeddisclosuresmaybeharmfulindeed.Butotherslikelycontributeto
thegeneralwelfare....Secretivebureaucraticagencies,likehermeticallysealed
houses,oftenbenefitfromabreathoffreshair.
Id.at183(Sack,J.,dissenting)(footnotesomitted).

7Thecomplaintwasfiledaboutoneweekafterandbasedonthedisclosure.SeeACLU
v.Clapper,No.11cv7562,DI1(Complaint).Althoughtheleakledtothislitigation,
ourdecisionisnotabouttheSnowdendisclosuresthemselvesnorshouldthe
significanceofourrathercomplexanalysisofthestatutebeconfusedwiththe
significancevelnonofthesecuritybreachortheNSAtelephonemetadataprogram.

8ALexissearchconductedbythewriteronApril29,2015disclosedmorethan40
articlescomparingthetwosetsofunauthorizeddisclosuresinMajorNewspapers,
includingTheLosAngelesTimes,TheHartfordCourant,TheGlobeandMail(Canada),The
BostonGlobe,TheSanFranciscoChronicleandTheSeattleTimes.AfurthersuchLexis
searchofTheNewYorkTimesalsofoundmultipleexamples.Seealso,Jonathan
Capehart,SnowdenIsNoDanielEllsberg,Wash.Post,July2,2013,atA15(Ipleadedlast
monthforanendtothebreathlesscomparisonsbetweenEdwardSnowdenandDaniel
Ellsberg.).

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Cir.)(enbanc)(percuriam),revd,403U.S.713(1971)(percuriam).Theissuesin
thatcase,liketheconcernsthatledtothedeliberationsoftheChurchCommittee,
andthentoFISAsenactmentandthecreationoftheFISC,arose,asJudgeLynch
putsit,duringtheearly1970s,inaclimatenotaltogetherunliketodays.Ante
at5.HisobservationisreminiscentofJudgeGurfeinssombercontemporary
dictumaboutthesameera:Thesearetroubledtimes.PentagonPapers,328F.
Supp.at331.
Thedisclosures,thenationalsecurityissues,andthechallengesfacingthe
PentagonPapersdistrictcourtandtheFISCaredifferent.Thereis,however,at
leastoneaspectofthePentagonPaperscasesthatmaybeinstructivehere.
TheFISCshearingsare,asnoted,heldexparte.Thetargetsoftheir
proceedingsareordinarilynotrepresentedbycounsel.(Indeeditseemslikely
thattargetsareusuallyunawareoftheexistenceoftheproceedingsortheir
subject.)InthePentagonPaperscase,thecourtheldahearing,partinpublicand
partincamera,todeterminethefactsofthecaseandthewhetherfurther
publicationofthepaperswouldendangerlegitimatenationalsecurityinterests.
Inboththeopenandclosedportionsofthehearing,TheNewYorkTimesenjoyed
theassistanceofhighlycompetentcounsel.TheTimesanditscounselalready

Case 14-42, Document 169, 05/07/2015, 1503603, Page9 of 13

hadaccesstothematerialthatthegovernmentwasattemptingtokeepfrom
furtherpublicview;barringtheirpresenceintheotherwiseclosedhearingroom
wouldnothaveadvancedthelegitimatesecurityinterestsoftheUnitedStates.
Theirattendanceatthehearingapparentlyturnedouttobepivotal.
Duringthepublicportionofthehearing,therewaslittleindicationthat
JudgeGurfeinwassympathetictotheTimespositionthatfurtherpublicationof
thePapers,whichweremarkedclassified,wasconstitutionallyprotectedor
otherwisepermissible.SeeDavidRudenstine,TheDaythePressesStopped:A
HistoryofthePentagonPapersCase10752(1996).Asthepublicportionofthe
hearingclosed,thegovernmenthadreasontobeconfidentthatitwouldprevail,
andtheTimeslawyerscouldtakeverylittlecomfortfromwhathadsofar
occurred.Id.at152.
ItwasonlyupontheTimescrossexaminationofthefirstwitnessinthe
subsequentcloseddoorhearing,inwhichtheTimescounselfocusedrelentlessly
onwhat,specifically,inthePaperswouldpresentathreattotheUnitedStatesif
disclosedandwhy,thatJudgeGurfeinsapparentleaningbegantoshifttowards
thepositionoftheTimes.Id.;seealsoJamesC.Goodale,FightingforthePress:The
InsideStoryofthePentagonPapersandOtherBattles10507(2013)(describingthe

Case 14-42, Document 169, 05/07/2015, 1503603, Page10 of 13

participationofcounselfortheTimesatthecloseddoorhearing).TheJudges
ownquestioningofthewitnesses9evincedhisemergingacceptanceoftheTimes
positionandhisembraceofthenatureofthegovernmentsburden.Onlyafter
hearingextensiveargument,examination,andcrossexamination,fromboth
sides,didJudgeGurfeinconclude:Iamconstrainedtofindasafactthatthein
cameraproceedingsatwhichrepresentativesoftheDepartmentofState,
DepartmentofDefenseandtheJointChiefsofStafftestified,didnotconvince
thisCourtthatthepublicationofthesehistoricaldocumentswouldseriously
breachthenationalsecurity.PentagonPapers,328F.Supp.at330.Bycommon,
ifnotuniversal,consensus,thedistrictcourtsconclusionthatthepublicationof
thePapersbytheTimeswouldnotinvolveaserioussecuritydanger,informed
Byhappycoincidence,alsocontributingtotheabilityofthedistrictcourteffectively
toaddresstheissueofthenationalsecurityimplicationsoffurtherpublicationwasthe
factthatJudgeGurfeinhadspentfouryearsinWorldWarIIandafterasanofficer,
risingtotherankofLieutenantColonelintheO.S.S.(OfficeofStrategicServices).See
BiographicalDirectoryofFederalJudgesGurfein,MurrayIrwin,FederalJudicialCenter,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=930&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na(last
visitedApril30,2015).TheO.S.S.wasthepredecessoroftheCentralIntelligence
Agency.SeeHistoryoftheCIA,CentralIntelligenceAgency,https://www.cia.gov/about
cia/historyofthecia/index.html(lastvisitedApril30,2015);seealsoGoodale,supraat
101(describingJudgeGurfeinsuseofhisintelligencebackgroundduringthehearing).

Notably,thepossibilityofgivingtheFISCimprovedaccesstorelevantexpertise
isreflectedincurrentlyproposedlegislation.SeeWeisman&Steinhauer,supra(The
legislationwould...createapanelofexpertstoadvisetheFISAcourtonprivacy,civil
liberties,andtechnologymatters....).

10

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asitwasbytheparticipationoflegalrepresentativesofallparties,wasright.10
Itmaybeworthconsideringthattheparticipationofanadversarytothe
governmentatsomepointintheFISCsproceedingscouldsimilarlyprovidea
significantbenefittothatcourt.TheFISCotherwisemaybesubjecttothe
understandablesuspicionthat,hearingonlyfromthegovernment,itislikelyto
bestronglyinclinedtoruleforthegovernment.Andatleastinsomecasesit
maybethatitsdecisionmakingwouldbeimprovedbythepresenceofcounsel
opposingthegovernmentsassertionsbeforethecourt.Membersofeachbranch
ofgovernmenthaveencouragedsomesuchdevelopment.11

SeeRudenstine,supra,at32629.Someyearslater,ErwinGriswold,who,asthe
UnitedStatesSolicitorGeneral,arguedthecaseintheSupremeCourt,concededas
much.Hewrote,Ihaveneverseenanytraceofathreattothenationalsecurityfrom
thepublication[ofthePapers].Indeed,Ihaveneverseenitevensuggestedthatthere
wassuchanactualthreat.ErwinN.Griswold,SecretsNotWorthKeeping:TheCourts
andClassifiedInformation,Wash.Post,Feb.15,1989,atA25.Hefurtherobserved:It
quicklybecomesapparenttoanypersonwhohasconsiderableexperiencewith
classifiedmaterialthatthereismassiveoverclassificationandthattheprincipalconcern
oftheclassifiersisnotwithnationalsecurity,butratherwithgovernmental
embarrassmentofonesortoranother.Id.

11TheyincludePresidentObama,TranscriptofPresidentObamasJan.17Speechon
NSAReforms,Wash.Post,Jan.17,2014,http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full
textofpresidentobamasjan17speechonnsareforms/2014/01/17/fa33590a7f8c11e3
95564a4bf7bcbd84_story.html,judgeswhopreviouslyservedontheFISC,seeCharlie
Savage,NationWillGainbyDiscussingSurveillance,ExpertTellsPrivacyBoard,N.Y.
Times,July10,2013,atA16;JudgeJamesG.Carr,ABetterSecretCourt,N.Y.Times,July
23,2013,atA21,andsomemembersofCongress,seeFISACourtReformActof2013,
H.R.3228,113thCong.(2013);TheU.S.A.FreedomAct,H.R.2048,114thCong.(2015).
10

11

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Havingsaidallthat,Ireiteratethatwedonotassertanyinstitutional
capabilitytoprovide,recommend,orintheabsenceofacaseorcontroversy,
passontheproprietyofFISCsdeliberations.AsJudgeLynchsopinionmakes
clear,itisCongressthatmustdecideinthefirstinstanceunderwhat
circumstancethegovernmentcanobtaindatatouchinguponconflictingnational
securityandpersonalprivacyinterests.
Recognitionofthedangerstothefundamentalrightsofcitizensthat
inevitablyarisewhenthenationattemptseffectivelytotreatgraveexternal
threatstolivesandpropertywasnotdependentonthecreationoftelephone
metadataorthepreparationofsecretreportsontheoriginoftheVietnamWar.
ItisasoldastheRepublic.
Safetyfromexternaldangeristhemostpowerfuldirectorofnational
conduct.Eventheardentloveoflibertywill,afteratime,givewaytoits
dictates.Theviolentdestructionoflifeandpropertyincidenttowar,the
continualeffortandalarmattendantonastateofcontinualdanger,will
compelnationsthemostattachedtolibertytoresortforreposeand
securitytoinstitutionswhichhaveatendencytodestroytheirciviland
ButseeLetterfromHon.JohnD.Bates,Director,Admin.OfficeoftheU.S.Courts,to
Hon.DianneFeinstein,Chairman,SelectComm.onIntelligence,U.S.Senate(Jan.13,
2014)(arguingthat[t]heparticipationofaprivacyadvocateisunnecessaryandcould
provecounterproductiveinthevastmajorityofFISAmatters,whichinvolvethe
applicationofaprobablecauseorotherfactualstandardtocasespecificfactsand
typicallyimplicatetheprivacyinterestsoffewpersonsotherthanthespecified
targets).

12

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politicalrights.Tobemoresafe,theyatlengthbecomewillingtorunthe
riskofbeinglessfree.

TheFederalistNo.8(AlexanderHamilton).Wejudgeshaveanoftencriticalpart
toplayinresolvingtheseissues,butonlybyaddressingtheminindividualcases,
accordingtothelawandConstitution,andasbestwecan.

13