Ontology

1 Overview

This article concerns ontology in philosophy. For the

concept in information science, see Ontology (information science).
Not to be confused with oncology, odontology, or
ontogeny.
Ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of

Ontology, in analytic philosophy, deals with the determination whether categories of being are fundamental and
asks in what sense can the items in those categories be
said to be. It is the inquiry into being in so much as it is
being (being qua being), or into beings insofar as they
existand not insofar as (for instance) particular facts
can be obtained about them or particular properties belong to them.
Some philosophers, notably of the Platonic school, contend that all nouns (including abstract nouns) refer to existent entities. Other philosophers contend that nouns do
not always name entities, but that some provide a kind of
shorthand for reference to a collection of either objects
or events. In this latter view, mind, instead of referring
to an entity, refers to a collection of mental events experienced by a person; society refers to a collection of persons
with some shared characteristics, and geometry refers to
a collection of a specic kind of intellectual activity.[1]
Between these poles of realism and nominalism, stand a
variety of other positions; but any ontology must give an
account of which words refer to entities, which do not,
why, and what categories result.

1.1 Some fundamental questions

Principal questions of ontology include:
What can be said to exist?"
What is a thing?"[2]
Parmenides was among the rst to propose an ontological characterization of the fundamental nature of reality.

Into what categories, if any, can we sort existing

things?"
What are the meanings of being?"
What are the various modes of being of entities?"

being, becoming, existence, or reality, as well as the basic categories of being and their relations. Traditionally
listed as a part of the major branch of philosophy known
as metaphysics, ontology deals with questions concerning what entities exist or can be said to exist, and how
such entities can be grouped, related within a hierarchy,
and subdivided according to similarities and dierences.
Although ontology as a philosophical realm is academic
in the sense that it is inseparable from each thinkers
epistemology, it has practical application in information
science and information technology, where it informs
ontologies with chosen taxonomies.

Various philosophers have provided dierent answers to

these questions. One common approach involves dividing the extant subjects and predicates into groups
called categories. Of course, such lists of categories differ widely from one another, and it is through the coordination of dierent categorical schemes that ontology
relates to such elds as library science and articial intelligence. Such an understanding of ontological categories,
however, is merely taxonomic, classicatory. Aristotles
categories are the ways in which a being can be addressed
simply as a being, such as:
1

2 HISTORY
what it is (its 'whatness, quidditas or essence)

1.3 Types

how it is (its 'howness or qualitativeness)

Philosophers can classify ontologies in various ways using criteria such as the degree of abstraction and eld of
application:[4]

how much it is (quantitativeness)

where it is, its relatedness to other beings[3]
Further examples of ontological questions include:
What is existence, i.e. what does it mean for a being
to be?
Is existence a property?
Is existence a genus or general class that is simply
divided up by specic dierences?
Which entities, if any, are fundamental?
Are all entities objects?
How do the properties of an object relate to the object itself?
Do physical properties actually exist?

1. Upper ontology: concepts supporting development

of an ontology, meta-ontology
2. Domain ontology: concepts relevant to a particular topic or area of interest, for example, information technology or computer languages, or particular
branches of science
3. Interface ontology: concepts relevant to the juncture
of two disciplines
4. Process ontology: inputs, outputs, constraints, sequencing information, involved in business or engineering processes

2 History
2.1 Etymology

What features are the essential, as opposed to merely

accidental attributes of a given object?
The word ontology is a compound word, composed of
How many levels of existence or ontological levels onto-, from the Greek , on (gen. , ontos), i.e.
being; that which is, which is the present participle of
are there? And what constitutes a level"?
the verb , eimi, i.e. to be, I am, and -, -logia,
i.e. science, study, theory.[5][6]
What is a physical object?
Can one give an account of what it means to say that While the etymology is Greek, the oldest extant record of
the word itself is the New Latin form ontologia, which apa physical object exists?
peared in 1606, in the work Ogdoas Scholastica by Jacob
Can one give an account of what it means to say that Lorhard (Lorhardus) and in 1613 in the Lexicon philosophicum by Rudolf Gckel (Goclenius); see classical
a non-physical entity exists?
compounds for this type of word formation.
What constitutes the identity of an object?
The rst occurrence in English of ontology as recorded
When does an object go out of existence, as opposed by the OED (Oxford English Dictionary, online edition,
2008) was a work by Gideon Harvey (1636/71702):
to merely changing?
Archelogia philosophica nova; or, New principles of Phi Do beings exist other than in the modes of objectiv- losophy. Containing Philosophy in general, Metaphysicks
ity and subjectivity, i.e. is the subject/object split of or Ontology, Dynamilogy or a Discourse of Power, Relimodern philosophy inevitable?
gio Philosophi or Natural Theology, Physicks or Natural
philosophy, London, Thomson, 1663. The word was rst
used in its Latin form by philosophers based on the Latin
1.2 Concepts
roots, which themselves are based on the Greek.
Essential ontological dichotomies include:

2.2 Origins
universals and particulars
substance and accident
abstract and concrete objects
essence and existence
determinism and indeterminism

2.2.1 Parmenides and monism

Parmenides was among the rst in the Greek tradition
to propose an ontological characterization of the fundamental nature of existence. In his prologue or proem he
describes two views of existence; initially that nothing
comes from nothing, and therefore existence is eternal.

3
Consequently, our opinions about truth must often be
false and deceitful. Most of western philosophy including the fundamental concepts of falsiability have
emerged from this view. This posits that existence is what
can be conceived of by thought, created, or possessed.
Hence, there can be neither void nor vacuum; and true
reality can neither come into being nor vanish from existence. Rather, the entirety of creation is eternal, uniform,
and immutable, though not innite (he characterized its
shape as that of a perfect sphere). Parmenides thus posits
that change, as perceived in everyday experience, is illusory. Everything that can be apprehended is but one
part of a single entity. This idea somewhat anticipates
the modern concept of an ultimate grand unication theory that nally describes all of existence in terms of one
inter-related sub-atomic reality which applies to everything.
2.2.2

Ontological pluralism

Main article: Ontological pluralism

The opposite of eleatic monism is the pluralistic conception of Being. In the 5th century BC, Anaxagoras and
Leucippus replaced [7] the reality of Being (unique and
unchanging) with that of Becoming and therefore by a
more fundamental and elementary ontic plurality. This
thesis originated in the Hellenic world, stated in two different ways by Anaxagoras and by Leucippus. The rst
theory dealt with seeds (which Aristotle referred to as
homeomeries) of the various substances. The second
was the atomistic theory,[8] which dealt with reality as
based on the vacuum, the atoms and their intrinsic movement in it.
The materialist Atomism proposed by Leucippus was
indeterminist, but then developed by Democritus in a
deterministic way. It was later (4th century BC) that the
original atomism was taken again as indeterministic by
Epicurus. He conrmed the reality as composed of an
innity of indivisible, unchangeable corpuscles or atoms
(atomon, lit. 'uncuttable'), but he gives weight to characterize atoms while for Leucippus they are characterized
by a gure, an order and a position in the cosmos.[9]
They are, besides, creating the whole with the intrinsic
movement in the vacuum, producing the diverse ux of
being. Their movement is inuenced by the parenklisis
(Lucretius names it clinamen) and that is determined by
the chance. These ideas foreshadowed our understanding of traditional physics until the nature of atoms was
discovered in the 20th century.

which things experienced in sensation are at best merely

copies, and real only in so far as they copy ('partake of')
such Forms. In general, Plato presumes that all nouns
(e.g., 'Beauty') refer to real entities, whether sensible bodies or insensible Forms. Hence, in The Sophist Plato argues that Being is a Form in which all existent things participate and which they have in common (though it is unclear whether 'Being' is intended in the sense of existence,
copula, or identity); and argues, against Parmenides, that
Forms must exist not only of Being, but also of Negation
and of non-Being (or Dierence).
In his Categories, Aristotle identies ten possible kinds of
things that can be the subject or the predicate of a proposition. For Aristotle there are four dierent ontological
dimensions:
1. according to the various categories or ways of addressing a being as such
2. according to its truth or falsity (e.g. fake gold, counterfeit money)
3. whether it exists in and of itself or simply 'comes
along' by accident
4. according to its potency, movement (energy) or nished presence (Metaphysics Book Theta).
According to Avicenna, and in an interpretation of Greek
Aristotelian and Platonist ontological doctrines in medieval metaphysics, being is either necessary, contingent
qua possible, or impossible. Necessary being is that
which cannot but be, since its non-being entails a contradiction. Contingent qua possible being is neither necessary nor impossible for it to be or not to be. It is ontologically neutral, and is brought from potential existing
into actual existence by way of a cause that is external to
its essence. Its being is borrowed unlike the necessary existent, which is self-subsisting and is impossible for it not
to be. As for the impossible, it necessarily does not exist,
and the armation of its being is a contradiction.[10]

3 Other ontological topics

3.1 Ontological formations

The concept of 'ontological formations refers to formations of social relations understood as dominant ways of
living. Temporal, spatial, corporeal, epistemological and
performative relations are taken to be central to understanding a dominant formation. That is, a particular on2.2.3 Plato
tological formation is based on how ontological categories
of time, space, embodiment, knowing and performing
Plato developed this distinction between true reality and are livedobjectively and subjectively. Dierent ontoillusion, in arguing that what is real are eternal and un- logical formations include the customary (including the
changing Forms or Ideas (a precursor to universals), of tribal), the traditional, the modern and the postmodern.

3 OTHER ONTOLOGICAL TOPICS

The concept was rst introduced by Paul James Global- of being human and the way the world is for us are cast
ism, Nationalism, Tribalism[11] together with a series of historically through a fundamental ontological questionwriters including Damian Grenfell and Manfred Steger. ing. These fundamental ontological categories provide
In the engaged theory approach, ontological formations the basis for communication in an age: a horizon of unare seen as layered and intersecting rather than singu- spoken and seemingly unquestionable background meanlar formations. They are 'formations of being'. This ap- ings, such as human beings understood unquestioningly as
proach avoids the usual problems of a Great Divide being subjects and other entities understood unquestioningly as
objects. Because these basic ontological meanings both
posited between the modern and the pre-modern.
generate and are regenerated in everyday interactions, the
locus of our way of being in a historical epoch is the com[12]
3.2 Ontological and epistemological cer- municative event of language in use. For Heidegger,
however, communication in the rst place is not among
tainty
human beings, but language itself shapes up in response
to questioning (the inexhaustible meaning of) being.[15]
Ren Descartes, with je pense donc je suis or "cogito
Even the focus of traditional ontology on the 'whatness
ergo sum" or I think, therefore I am, argued that
or 'quidditas of beings in their substantial, standing presthe self is something that we can know exists with
ence can be shifted to pose the question of the 'wholeness
epistemological certainty. Descartes argued further that
of human being itself.[16]
this knowledge could lead to a proof of the certainty of
the existence of God, using the ontological argument that
had been formulated rst by Anselm of Canterbury.

3.4 Ontology and language

Certainty about the existence of the self and the

other, however, came under increasing criticism in
the 20th century. Sociological theorists, most notably
George Herbert Mead and Erving Goman, saw the
Cartesian Other as a Generalized Other, the imaginary
audience that individuals use when thinking about the
self. According to Mead, we do not assume there is
a self to begin with. Self is not presupposed as a stu
out of which the world arises. Rather, the self arises in
the world.[12][13] The Cartesian Other was also used by
Sigmund Freud, who saw the superego as an abstract regulatory force, and mile Durkheim who viewed this as a
psychologically manifested entity which represented God
in society at large.

3.3

Some philosophers suggest that the question of What

is?" is (at least in part) an issue of usage rather than a
question about facts.[17] This perspective is conveyed by
an analogy made by Donald Davidson: Suppose a person
refers to a 'cup' as a 'chair' and makes some comments
pertinent to a cup, but uses the word 'chair' consistently
throughout instead of 'cup'. One might readily catch on
that this person simply calls a 'cup' a 'chair' and the oddity
is explained.[18] Analogously, if we nd people asserting
'there are' such-and-such, and we do not ourselves think
that 'such-and-such' exist, we might conclude that these
people are not nuts (Davidson calls this assumption 'charity'), they simply use 'there are' dierently than we do.
The question of What is? is at least partially a topic in
the philosophy of language, and is not entirely about onBody and environment, questioning tology itself.[19] This viewpoint has been expressed by Eli
Hirsch.[20][21]
the meaning of being

Schools of subjectivism, objectivism and relativism existed at various times in the 20th century, and the
postmodernists and body philosophers tried to reframe
all these questions in terms of bodies taking some specic
action in an environment. This relied to a great degree on
insights derived from scientic research into animals taking instinctive action in natural and articial settingsas
studied by biology, ecology,[14] and cognitive science.
The processes by which bodies related to environments
became of great concern, and the idea of being itself became dicult to really dene. What did people mean
when they said A is B, A must be B, A was B...?
Some linguists advocated dropping the verb to be from
the English language, leaving "E Prime", supposedly less
prone to bad abstractions. Others, mostly philosophers,
tried to dig into the word and its usage. Heidegger distinguished human being as existence from the being of
things in the world. Heidegger proposes that our way

Hirsch interprets Hilary Putnam as asserting that different concepts of the existence of something can be
correct.[21] This position does not contradict the view
that some things do exist, but points out that dierent
'languages will have dierent rules about assigning this
property.[21][22] How to determine the 'tness of a 'language' to the world then becomes a subject for investigation.

3.5 Ontology and human geography

In human geography there are two types of ontology:
small o which accounts for the practical orientation, describing functions of being a part of the group, thought to
oversimplify and ignore key activities. The other o, or
big O, systematically, logically, and rationally describes
the essential characteristics and universal traits. This concept relates closely to Platos view that the human mind

3.7

Microcosmic ontology

can only perceive a bigger world if they continue to live

within the connes of their caves. However, in spite
of the dierences, ontology relies on the symbolic agreements among members. That said, ontology is crucial for
the axiomatic language frameworks.[23]

3.6

Reality and actuality

5
Whitehead proposed that his notion of an occasion of experience satises the criteria for its status as the philosophically preferred denition of an actual entity. From
a purely logical point of view, each occasion of experience has in full measure the characters of both objective
and subjective reality. Subjectivity and objectivity refer
to dierent aspects of an occasion of experience, and in
no way do they exclude each other.[24]

Examples of other philosophical proposals or candidates

According to A.N. Whitehead, for ontology, it is useful
as actual entities, in this view, are Aristotles 'substances,
to distinguish the terms 'reality' and 'actuality'.
Leibniz' monads, and Descartes res verae' , and the more
In this view, an 'actual entity' has a philosophical status modern 'states of aairs. Aristotles substances, such as
of fundamental ontological priority, while a 'real entity' Socrates, have behind them as more fundamental the 'priis one which may be actual, or may derive its reality from mary substances, and in this sense do not satisfy Whiteits logical relation to some actual entity or entities. For heads criteria. Whitehead is not happy with Leibniz'
example, an occasion in the life of Socrates is an actual monads as actual entities because they are windowless
entity. But Socrates being a man does not make 'man' an and do not cause each other. 'States of aairs are ofactual entity, because it refers indeterminately to many ten not closely dened, often without specic mention of
actual entities, such as several occasions in the life of extension in physical Minkowski space; they are thereSocrates, and also to several occasions in the lives of Al- fore not necessarily processes of becoming, but may be
cibiades, and of others. But the notion of man is real; it as their name suggests, simply static states in some sense.
derives its reality from its reference to those many actual States of aairs are contingent on particulars, and thereoccasions, each of which is an actual entity. An actual fore have something behind them.[25] One summary of
occasion is a concrete entity, while terms such as 'man' the Whiteheadian actual entity is that it is a process of beare abstractions from many concrete relevant entities.
coming. Another summary, referring to its causal linkage
According to Whitehead, an actual entity must earn its to other actual entities, is that it is all window, in conphilosophical status of fundamental ontological priority trast with Leibniz' windowless monads.
by satisfying several philosophical criteria, as follows.
There is no going behind an actual entity, to nd
something more fundamental in fact or in ecacy.
This criterion is to be regarded as expressing an axiom, or postulated distinguished doctrine.

This view allows philosophical entities other than actual

entities to really exist, but not as fundamentally and primarily factual or causally ecacious; they have existence
as abstractions, with reality only derived from their reference to actual entities. A Whiteheadian actual entity has
a unique and completely denite place and time. Whiteheadian abstractions are not so tightly dened in time and
place, and in the extreme, some are timeless and placeless, or 'eternal' entities. All abstractions have logical or
conceptual rather than ecacious existence; their lack of
denite time does not make them unreal if they refer to
actual entities. Whitehead calls this 'the ontological principle'.

An actual entity must be completely determinate in

the sense that there can be no confusion about its
identity that would allow it to be confounded with
another actual entity. In this sense an actual entity
is completely concrete, with no potential to be something other than itself. It is what it is. It is of course a
source of potentiality for the creation of other actual
entities, of which it may be said to be a part cause.
Likewise it is the concretion or realization of poten3.7 Microcosmic ontology
tialities of other actual entities which are its partial
causes.
There is an established and long philosophical history
Causation between actual entities is essential to their of the concept of atoms as microscopic physical obactuality. Consequently, for Whitehead, each actual jects.They are far too small to be visible to the naked eye.
entity has its distinct and denite extension in physi- It was as recent as the nineteenth century that precise escal Minkowski space, and so is uniquely identiable. timates of the sizes of putative physical atoms began to
A description in Minkowski space supports descrip- become plausible. Almost direct empirical observation
of atomic eects was due to the theoretical investigations in time and space for particular observers.
tion of Brownian motion by Albert Einstein in the very
It is part of the aim of the philosophy of such an on- early twentieth century. But even then, the real existence
tology as Whiteheads that the actual entities should of atoms was debated by some. Such debate might be
be all alike, qua actual entities; they should all sat- labeled 'microcosmic ontology'. Here the word 'microisfy a single denite set of well stated ontological cosm' is used to indicate a physical world of small enticriteria of actuality.
ties, such as for example atoms.

REFERENCES

Subatomic particles are usually considered to be much [13] Mead, G. H. The individual and the social self: Unpublished work of George Herbert Mead (D. L. Miller, Ed.).
smaller than atoms. Their real or actual existence may be
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. (p. 107).
very dicult to demonstrate empirically.[26] A distinction
ISBN 0-226-51673-3
is sometimes drawn between actual and virtual subatomic
particles. One can reasonably ask, in what sense, if any, [14] Barry Smith: Objects and Their Environments: From
do virtual particles exist as physical entities? For atomic
Aristotle to Ecological Ontology The Life and Motion of
and subatomic particles, dicult questions arise, such as
SocioEconomic Units (GISDATA 8), London: Taylor and
Francis, 2001, 79-97.
do they possess a precise position, or a precise momentum? A question that continues to be controversial is 'to [15] Heidegger, Martin, On the Way to Language Harper &
what kind of physical thing, if any, does the quantum meRow, New York 1971. German edition: Unterwegs zur
chanical wave function refer?'.[2]
Sprache Neske, Pfullingen 1959.

Prominent ontologists

[16] Eldred, Michael, Social Ontology: Recasting Political Philosophy Through a Phenomenology of Whoness ontos,
Frankfurt 2008 xiv + 688 pp. ISBN 978-3-938793-787

See also

[17] Carvalko, Joseph (Summer 2005). Introduction to an Ontology of Intellectual Property. The Scitech Lawyer, ABA.

References

[1] Griswold, Charles L. (2001). Platonic writings/Platonic

readings.
Penn State Press.
p.
237.
ISBN
9780271021379.
[2] Isham, C.J. (1995). Lectures on Quantum Theory: Mathematical and Structural Foundations, Imperial College
Press, London, ISBN 1860940005, pp. 6367.
[3] Aristotle Categories Vol. 1, Loeb Classical Library, transl.
H.P. Cooke, Harvard U.P. 1983
[4] Vesselin Petrov (2011). Chapter VI: Process ontology in
the context of applied philosophy. In Vesselin Petrov, ed.
Ontological Landscapes: Recent Thought on Conceptual
Interfaces Between Science and Philosophy. Ontos Verlag.
pp. 137 . ISBN 3868381074.
[5] ontology. Online Etymology Dictionary.

[18] Davidson refers to a 'ketch' and a 'yawl'; see p. 18 in Donald Davidson (1974). On the very idea of a conceptual
scheme (PDF). Proceedings and Address of the American
Philosophical Association 47: 520.
[19] Uriah Krieger (2011). Two defenses of common-sense
ontology (PDF). Dialectica 65 (2). pp. 177204.
doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01262.x.
[20] Hirsch, Eli (2011). Chapter 9: Physical-object ontology,
verbal disputes and common sense. Quantier Variance
and Realism: Essays in Metaontology. Oxford University
Press. pp. 144177. ISBN 9780199732111. First published as Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and
Common Sense
[21] Hirsch, Eli (2011). Chapter 5: Quantier variance and
realism. Quantier Variance and Realism: Essays in
Metaontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 6895.
ISBN 9780199732111. First published as Quantier
variance and realism

[6] . Liddell, Henry George; Scott, Robert; A Greek

English Lexicon at the Perseus Project

[22] Hirsch, E. (2004). Sosas Existential Relativism. In

John Greco, ed. Ernest Sosa and His Critics. Blackwell.
pp. 224232. ISBN 0470755474.

[7] Sample Chapter for Graham, D.W.: Explaining the Cosmos: The Ionian Tradition of Scientic Philosophy.
Press.princeton.edu. Retrieved 2010-02-21.

[23] Harvey, F. (2006). Ontology. In B. Warf (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Human Geography. (pp. 341-343). Thousand
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc

[8] Ancient Atomism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)". Plato.stanford.edu. Retrieved 2010-02-21.

[9] Aristotle, Metaphysics, I , 4, 985
[10] Nader El-Bizri, 'Avicenna and Essentialism, Review of
Metaphysics, Vol. 54 (2001), pp. 753-778.
[11] James, Paul (2006). Globalism, Nationalism, Tribalism:
Bringing Theory Back In Volume 2 of Towards a Theory
of Abstract Community. London: Sage Publications.
[12] Hyde, R. Bruce. Listening Authentically: A Heideggerian Perspective on Interpersonal Communication. In
Interpretive Approaches to Interpersonal Communication,
edited by Kathryn Carter and Mick Presnell. State University of New York Press, 1994. ISBN 0-7914-1847-2

[24] Whitehead, A.N. (1929). Process and Reality, Cambridge

University Press, Cambridge UK, passim.
[25] Armstrong, D.M. (1997). A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge University Press,Cambridge UK, ISBN
0-521-58064-1, p. 1.
[26] Kaiser, D. (1994). Niels Bohrs legacy in contemporary
particle physics, pp. 257268 of Niels Bohr and Contemporary Philosophy, edited by J. Faye, H.J. Folse, Springer,
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[27] Corazzon, Raul. Living Ontologists - Bibliographical
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External links
Ontology. Its Theory and History from a Philosophical Perspective
Logic and Ontology entry by Thomas Hofwebwer in
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Intentionality entry by Pierre Jacob in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy
International Ontology Congress
A short lm with a general introduction to ontology

8 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

8.1

Text

Ontology Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology?oldid=656611412 Contributors: AxelBoldt, Mav, The Anome, Larry Sanger, Andre Engels, Mirwin~enwiki, William Avery, Hirzel, Stevertigo, Edward, Nealmcb, JohnOwens, Michael Hardy, Nixdorf, Gabbe, Karada,
Mac, Ronz, Kingturtle, Glenn, Andres, Kaihsu, Denny, Beck, RodC, Charles Matthews, Timwi, Wikiborg, Anakolouthon, Jm34harvey,
Radgeek, Markhurd, Pedant17, Hyacinth, SEWilco, Buridan, Spikey, Bcorr, Marc Girod~enwiki, Banno, UninvitedCompany, Owen,
Robbot, Wblakesx, Peak, Tim Ivorson, Rursus, Sunray, DataSurfer, Seth Ilys, Ancheta Wis, Matthew Stannard, Giftlite, Cobra libre,
Mporter, ShaunMacPherson, Wolfkeeper, Leyman, Dmb000006, Chameleon, Tagishsimon, JRR Trollkien, Slurslee, Pgan002, Andycjp, Gdm, Antandrus, Piotrus, Jossi, Karol Langner, JimWae, Icairns, Deeceevoice, Fanghong~enwiki, Flex, Lucidish, Ma'ame Michu,
Varada, Rich Farmbrough, Liso, Cacycle, Kzzl, Paul August, Bender235, Djordjes, El C, PhilHibbs, Scorn, RoyBoy, Meggar, Robotje,
Nk, NickSchweitzer, MPerel, Mdd, Xgoni~enwiki, Alansohn, Gary, 119, Kjetil, Ricky81682, Logologist, WhiteC, Ott, Alex.g, Nickthompson, Stemonitis, Cauri~enwiki, Ruud Koot, Sir Lewk, Kelisi, GregorB, Norro, Wayward, Palica, Wulla, Graham87, BD2412,
Qwertyus, Sj, Vary, Matuszek, AJackl, FlaBot, Airumel, Zaintoum, TheDJ, AndriuZ, Maustrauser, Tedder, M7bot, Guliolopez, Dnadan, Banaticus, YurikBot, Wavelength, Mukkakukaku, Nochiel, Fabartus, Bovineone, Leutha, LaszloWalrus, Grafen, Mccready, Nick,
Christian Kotnik~enwiki, BOT-Superzerocool, Joelperozo, Tomisti, Jules.LT, Langdell~enwiki, RDF, Josh3580, Loy, Pdraic MacUidhir, Jonathan.s.kt, Innity0, DVD R W, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, RedHouse18, Lestrade, David.Mestel, Jagged 85, Eskimbot, Vassyana,
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8.2

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8.3

8.3

Content license

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