PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA, NICOLAS RETUYA and PACITA

VILLANUEVA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE

HEIRS OF EUSEBIA NAPISA RETUYA, respondents.
G.R. No. 143286 | April 14, 2004 (1D)
Facts:

Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of petitioner

Nicolas Retuya. Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot
5 children, namely, Natividad, Angela, Napoleon,
Salome, and Roberta.
During their marriage they acquired real properties and
all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and
Consolacion, Cebu.
Also, petitioner, Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a parcel
of land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited
from his parents.
Nicolas then no longer lived with his legitimate family
and cohabited with petitioner Pacita Villanueva,
wherein petitioner, Procopio Villanueva, is their
illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who
received the income of the above-mentioned
properties.
When Nicolas suffered stroke, petitioner Procopio has
been receiving the income of these properties.
Natividad, on failure to negotiate with Procopio,
complained
to
the
Barangay
Captain
for
reconciliation/mediation but no settlement was
reached, hence, the said official issued a certification to
file action
The trial court rendered a decision ordering the transfer
of the sole administration of conjugal properties of the
spouses Eusebia Retuya and Nicolas Retuya in
accordance with Art. 124 of the Family Code to Eusebia
Napisa Retuya;
On appeal, CA affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence
this petition.
o
The appellate court found that Pacita failed to
rebut the presumption under Article 116 of the
Family Code that the subject properties are
conjugal. The appellate court dismissed
Pacitas defense of prescription and laches
since she failed to have the issue included in
the pre-trial order after raising it in her answer
with her co-petitioners.

Issue: W/N CA erred in not applying instead the presumption

under Art. 148 of the Family Code in favor of co-ownership
between the spouses
Held: No
The only issue proper for resolution is the question of
whether the subject properties are conjugal.
Petitioners claim that the subject properties are
exclusive properties of Nicolas except for Lot No. 152,
which they claim is Pacitas exclusive property.
The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships
govern the property relations between Nicolas and
Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity
of Family Code.
o
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly
mandates that the Family Code shall apply to
conjugal partnerships established before the
Family Code without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired under the Civil Code or other
laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the
properties are acquired during the marriage,
the presumption is that they are conjugal.
The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they
are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the

requirement that the properties must first be proven to

have been acquired during the marriage before they
are presumed conjugal. Petitioners argue that Eusebia
failed to prove this pre-requisite. We disagree.
o
The question of whether the subject properties
were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas
and Eusebia is a factual issue. Both the trial
and appellate courts agreed that the subject
properties were in fact acquired during the
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.
Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152,
were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the
Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of
Nicolas and Eusebia. The burden is on petitioners to
prove that the subject properties are not conjugal. The
presumption in Article 116, which subsists "unless the
contrary is proved," stands as an obstacle to any claim
the petitioners may have. The burden of proving that a
property is exclusive property of a spouse rests on the
party asserting it and the evidence required must be
clear and convincing. Petitioners failed to meet this
standard.
Finally, petitioners reliance on Article 148 of the Family
Code is misplaced.
o
A reading of Article 148 readily shows that
there must be proof of "actual joint
contribution" by both the live-in partners
before the property becomes co-owned by
them in proportion to their contribution. The
presumption of equality of contribution arises
only in the absence of proof of their
proportionate contributions, subject to the
condition that actual joint contribution is
proven first. Simply put, proof of actual
contribution by both parties is required,
otherwise there is no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal sharing. Petitioners
failed to show proof of actual contribution by
Pacita in the acquisition of Lot No. 152.
o
In short, petitioners failed to prove that Pacita
bought Lot No. 152 with her own money, or
that she actually contributed her own money
to acquire it.

BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner, vs. RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE

C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented
by their mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents.
G.R. No 176556 | July 4, 2012 (2D)
Facts:

Herein respondent Rita C. Quiao filed a complaint for

legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido B.
Quiao.
This was granted by the trial court. It was also ordered
that the personal and real properties of the spouses
shall be divided equally between them subject to the
respective legitimes of the children and the payment of
the unpaid conjugal liabilities
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration
o
RTC: Although the Decision has become final
and executory, it may still consider the Motion
for Clarification because the petitioner simply
wanted to clarify the meaning of "net profit
earned."
o
NET PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of
forfeiture in favor of the parties' common
children, is ordered to be computed in

accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the

Family Code.
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner
filed this instant Petition for Review

Issue: W/N the trial court erred when it applied Article 129 of the
Family Code, instead of Article 102
Held: No
Petitioner confusingly argues that Article 102 applies
because there is no other provision under the Family
Code which defines net profits earned subject of
forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
From the record, we can deduce that the petitioner and
the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6,
1977. Since at the time of the exchange of marital
vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the
Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree
on a marriage settlement, the property relations
between the petitioner and the respondent is the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains. Article 119 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative community
of property, or upon complete separation of property,
or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
established in this Code, shall govern the property
relations between husband and wife.

Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that

what governs the property relations of the petitioner
and of the respondent is conjugal partnership of gains.
And under this property relation, "the husband and the
wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate
property and the income from their work or industry."
The husband and wife also own in common all the
property of the conjugal partnership of gains.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the
petitioner and the respondent's marriage the operative
law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the
instant case and the applicable law in so far as the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and
liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code
in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter
provision is applicable because according to Article 256
of the Family Code "[t]his Code shall have retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other law."

Issue: Was petitioners vested right over half of the common

properties of the conjugal partnership violated when the trial
court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles
63(2) and 129 of the Family Code?
Held: No
The petitioner is saying that since the property
relations between the spouses is governed by the
regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil
Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of
the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains,
pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which
provides: "All property of the conjugal partnership of
gains is owned in common by the husband and wife."
o
Thus, since he is one of the owners of the
properties covered by the conjugal partnership

of gains, he has a vested right over half of the

said properties, even after the promulgation of
the Family Code; and he insisted that no
provision under the Family Code may deprive
him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256
of the Family Code which prohibits retroactive
application of the Family Code when it will
prejudice a person's vested right.
Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals: A vested right is one whose
existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon
events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the
exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent
upon a contingency. The term "vested right" expresses
the concept of present fixed interest which, in right
reason and natural justice, should be protected against
arbitrary State action, or an innately just and
imperative right which enlightened free society,
sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights,
cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a titlelegal or
equitableto the present or future enjoyment of
property.
ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara,
et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
Ermita: The concept of "vested right" is a consequence
of the constitutional guaranty of due process that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason
and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state
action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from
new obligations created after the right has become
vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to
enjoyment
is
a
present
interest,
absolute,
unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not
be deprived of his "vested right," he may lose the same
if there is due process and such deprivation is founded
in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his
right to due process.
o
First, he was well-aware that the respondent
prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal
properties be awarded to her.
o
Second, when the Decision was promulgated,
the petitioner never questioned the trial
court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court
termed as "net profits," pursuant to Article
129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner
cannot claim being deprived of his right to due
process.

Issue: What is the meaning of the net profits earned by the

conjugal partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture
authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code
Held:

The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are

all the fruits of the separate properties of the spouses
and the products of their labor and industry.
Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant
case for purposes only of defining "net profit." As
earlier explained, the definition of "net profits" in
Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies to both the
absolute community regime and conjugal partnership
regime as provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of the
Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal
Separation.

Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal

partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code,
"the husband and the wife place in common fund the
fruits of their separate property and income from their
work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the
net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage."
o
From the foregoing provision, each of the
couple has his and her own property and
debts. The law does not intend to effect a
mixture or merger of those debts or properties
between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a
complete separation of capitals.
Considering that the couple's marriage has been
dissolved under the Family Code, Article 129 of the
same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's
properties in the event that the conjugal partnership of
gains is dissolved

Art. 112. The alienation of any exclusive property of a

spouse administered by the other automatically
terminates the administration over such property and the
proceeds of the alienation shall be turned over to the
owner-spouse. (n)

Art. 113. Property donated or left by will to the spouses,

jointly and with designation of determinate shares, shall
pertain to the donee-spouses as his or her own exclusive
property, and in the absence of designation, share and
share alike, without prejudice to the right of accretion
when proper.

Section 2. Exclusive Property of Each Spouse

Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of
each spouse:
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her
own;
(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by
gratuitous title;
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by
barter or by exchange with property belonging to only one
of the spouses; and
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the
wife or of the husband.
Art. 110. The spouses retain the ownership, possession,
administration and enjoyment of their exclusive
properties.
Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the
administration of his or her exclusive property to the
other by means of a public instrument, which shall be
recorded in the registry of property of the place the
property is located.

Art. 111. A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber,

alienate or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive
property, without the consent of the other spouse, and
appear alone in court to litigate with regard to the same.
(n)

Art. 114. If the donations are onerous, the amount of the

charges shall be borne by the exclusive property of the
donee spouse, whenever they have been advanced by the
conjugal partnership of gains.

Art. 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities,

gratuities, usufructs and similar benefits shall be
governed by the rules on gratuitous or onerous
acquisitions as may be proper in each case. (n)

ISAAC VILLEGAS, petitioner, vs. VICTOR LINGAN and ATTY.

ERNESTO CARREON, respondent.
G.R. No. 153839 | June 29, 2007 (3D)
Facts:

Petitioner was the registered owner of a parcel of land

in Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
In order to secure the payment of a loan from the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) the
petitioner constituted a real estate mortgage over the
said parcel of land in favor of DBP. The said loan and
mortgage was subsequently transferred by the DBP to
the Home Mutual Development Fund (HMDF).
When the petitioner failed to settle his loan, the real
estate mortgage he constituted over the property was
foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction and,
as the HMDF was itself the highest bidder at such

public auction, a certificate of sheriffs sale was issued

and, thereafter, registered with the Register of Deeds.
By virtue of a power of attorney executed by
petitioners wife, Marilou C. Villegas in favor of Gloria
Roa Catral, the latter redeemed the property from the
HMDF.
Catral, by virtue of the same power of attorney,
executed a Deed of Sale in favor of respondent.
Petitioner claims that the power of attorney executed in
favor of Catral, petitioners mother-in-law, created a
principal-agent relationship only between his wife,
Marilou Catral-Villegas (Marilou) as principal, and
Catral, as agent, and then only for the latter to
administer the properties of the former; that he never
authorized Catral to administer his properties,
particularly, herein subject property; and that Catral
had no authority to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of the respondent, since from the very
wordings of the power of attorney, she had no special
authority to sell or convey any specific real property.
RTC dismissed the complaint.
Dissatisfied, the petitioner appealed the adverse
judgment to the CA claiming that the trial court erred in
finding that there was a principal-agent relationship
between petitioner and Catral; and that the trial court
erred in concluding that the power of attorney is a
special power of attorney with an authority to sell.
CA affirmed RTCs decision. Hence this petition.

Issue: W/N Marilou, the wife of the petitioner, as successor-ininterest, may validly redeem the property in question
Held: Yes
Section 6 of Act No. 3135 provides:

Sec. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is

made under the special power hereinbefore referred to,
the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial
creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any
person having a lien on the property subsequent to the
mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is
sold, may redeem the same at any time within the
term of one year from and after the date of sale; and
such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of
section four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and
sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so
far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act.
Section 27, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, provides:
SEC. 27. Who may redeem real property so sold. Real
property sold as provided in the last preceding section,
or any part thereof sold separately, may be redeemed
in the manner hereinafter provided, by the following
persons:
(a) The judgment obligor, or his successor-in-interest in
the whole or any part of the property;
xxxx

SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration

of redemption period; by whom executed or given. If
no redemption be made within one (1) year from the
date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the
purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession
of the property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60)
days have elapsed and no other redemption has been
made, and notice thereof given, and the time for
redemption has expired, the last redemptioner is
entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all
cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire period
of one (1) year from the date of the registration of the
sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be
executed by the officer making the sale or by his
successor in office, and in the latter case shall have the
same validity as though the officer making the sale had
continued in office and executed it.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the
purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and
acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the
judgment obligor to the property at the time of the
levy. The possession of the property shall be given to
the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer
unless a third party is actually holding the property
adversely to the judgment obligor. (emphasis supplied)
Under the above provision, petitioner could have
redeemed the property from Marilou after she had
redeemed it. The pleadings filed and the records of this
case do not show that petitioner exercised said right.
Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou
acquired ownership of the subject property. All rights
and title of the judgment obligor are transferred upon
the expiration of the right of redemption.
And where the redemption is made under a property
regime governed by the conjugal partnership of gains,
Article 109 of the Family Code provides that property
acquired by right of redemption is the exclusive
property of the spouses redeeming the property.
Clearly, therefore, Marilou, as owner, had the right to
sell the property to another.
o
In the present case, there is no property right
that exists in favor of the petitioner, and, with
more reason, no such obligation arises in
behalf of the defendant, herein respondent, to
respect such right. There was no violation of a
legal right of the petitioner.
o
It must be stressed that there is no allegation
or proof that Marilou redeemed the property in
behalf of the petitionerMarilou did not act as
agent of the petitioner. Rather, she exercised
the right of redemption in her own right as
successor-in-interest of the petitioner. Under
the circumstances, should there be any right
violated, the aggrieved party is Marilou,
petitioners wife. The property in question was
the exclusive property of Marilou by virtue of
her redemption. Thus, petitioner has no valid
cause of action against the respondent.
Section 3. Conjugal Partnership Property; RA 10572

The "successor-in-interest" of the judgment debtor

referred to in the above provision includes a person
who succeeds to his property by operation of law, or a
person with a joint interest in the property, or his
spouse or heirs.
Section 33, Rule 39, Rules of Court, states:

Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage,

whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is
proved.

Art. 117.
properties:

The

following

are

conjugal

partnership

(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at

the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition
be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or
profession of either or both of the spouses;
(3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received
during the marriage from the common property, as well
as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each
spouse;
(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure
which the law awards to the finder or owner of the
property where the treasure is found;
(5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or
hunting;
(6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the
partnership in excess of the number of each kind brought
to the marriage by either spouse; and
(7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings
from gambling or betting. However, losses therefrom shall
be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse.
Art. 118. Property bought on installments paid partly
from exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly
from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full
ownership was vested before the marriage and to the
conjugal partnership if such ownership was vested during
the marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the
partnership or by either or both spouses shall be
reimbursed by the owner or owners upon liquidation of
the partnership. (n)

Art. 119. Whenever an amount or credit payable within a

period of time belongs to one of the spouses, the sums
which may be collected during the marriage in partial
payments or by installments on the principal shall be the
exclusive property of the spouse. However, interests
falling due during the marriage on the principal shall
belong to the conjugal partnership.

Art. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for

utility or adornment, made on the separate property of
the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through
the acts or efforts of either or both spouses shall pertain
to the conjugal partnership, or to the original ownerspouse, subject to the following rules:
When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal
partnership and any resulting increase in value are more
than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses
shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the property of the ownerspouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said
property shall be retained in ownership by the ownerspouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of
the improvement.
In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall
be vested upon the reimbursement, which shall be made
at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Civil Code Provision
Article 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., petitioner, vs.

NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL, respondent.
G.R. No. 163744 | February 29, 2008 (2D)
Facts:

Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga

were married on January 19, 1985.
During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito
and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot.
Florencia then filed a suit for the declaration of nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, which
was granted by the RTC.
o
In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia,
ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the
ex-spouses conjugal partnership of gains.
Subsequent events saw the couple going their
separate ways without liquidating their
conjugal partnership.
Subsequently, Florencia, together with spouses
Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP 58 million
loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
(MBTC).
To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses
Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages
(REMs) on their properties, including one involving the
aforesaid lot.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros
to pay their loan obligation, the REMs were foreclosed
and eventually bought by petitioner bank in an auction
sale.
Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson
filed before the RTC a Complaint to declare the nullity

of the mortgage of the disputed property, alleging that

the property, which is still conjugal property, was
mortgaged without his consent.
RTC declared the REM invalid: Even as it declared the
invalidity of the mortgage, the trial court found the said
lot to be conjugal, the same having been acquired
during the existence of the marriage of Nicholson and
Florencia. In so ruling, the RTC invoked Art. 116 of the
Family Code.
The CA Affirmed with Modification the RTCs Decision.
Hence this petition.
MBTCs contention: Art. 116 of the Family Code could
not be of governing application inasmuch as Nicholson
and Florencia contracted marriage before the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
o
Citing Manongsong v. Estimo, Metrobank
asserts that the presumption of conjugal
ownership under Art. 160 of the Civil Code
applies when there is proof that the property
was acquired during the marriage.
o
To bolster its thesis on the paraphernal nature
of the disputed property, Metrobank cites
Francisco v. Court of Appeals and Jocson v.
Court of Appeals, among other cases, where
this Court held that a property registered in
the name of a certain person with a
description of being married is no proof that
the property was acquired during the spouses
marriage.

FRANCISCO MUOZ, JR., Petitioner, vs. ERLINDA RAMIREZ

and ELISEO CARLOS, Respondents
G.R. No. 156125 | August 25, 2010 (3D)
Facts:

Issue: W/N CA erred in declaring subject property as conjugal by

applying Article 116 of the Family Code.
Held: No
First, while Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160
of the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of the Family Code, is the
applicable legal provision since the property was
acquired prior to the enactment of the Family Code, it
errs in its theory that, before conjugal ownership could
be legally presumed, there must be a showing that the
property was acquired during marriage using conjugal
funds.
o
Contrary to Metrobanks submission, the Court
did not, in Manongsong vs. Estimo, add the
matter of the use of conjugal funds as an
essential requirement for the presumption of
conjugal ownership to arise.
o
Nicholson is correct in pointing out that only
proof of acquisition during the marriage is
needed to raise the presumption that the
property is conjugal. Indeed, if proof on the
use of conjugal is still required as a necessary
condition before the presumption can arise,
then the legal presumption set forth in the law
would veritably be a superfluity.
o
As the Court stressed in Castro v. Miat:
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the
New Civil Code. It provides that "all property of
the marriage is presumed to be conjugal
partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife." This article does not require proof that
the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership. The presumption applies even
when the manner in which the property was
acquired
does
not
appear.
(Emphasis
supplied.)
Second, Francisco and Jocson do not reinforce
Metrobanks theory.

As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains

on the acquisition of the property during the
existence of the marriage, then the
presumption of conjugal ownership applies.
The correct lesson of Francisco and Jocson is
that proof of acquisition during the marital
coverture is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of
conjugal ownership. When there is no showing
as to when the property was acquired by the
spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of
the spouse is an indication that the property
belongs exclusively to said spouse.

A residential lot, which is the subject property herein,

was previously covered by TCT No. 1427, in the name
of Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos
(respondents).
Eliseo, with Erlindas consent, to secure a P136,500.00
housing loan from GSIS, mortgaged TCT No. 1427. The
respondents then constructed a residential house on
the lot.
The title to the subject property was then transferred to
the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale,
executed by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact
of Eliseo
The respondents filed a complaint with the RTC for the
nullification of the deed of absolute sale, claiming that
there was no sale but only a mortgage transaction, and
the documents transferring the title to the petitioners
name were falsified.
RTC dismissed the complaint.
Applying the second paragraph of Article 158 of the
Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon. Fortun, the CA
held that the subject property, originally Erlindas
exclusive paraphernal property, became conjugal
property when it was used as collateral for a housing
loan that was paid through conjugal funds Eliseos
monthly salary deductions; the subject property,
therefore, cannot be validly sold or mortgaged without
Eliseos consent, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family
Code. Thus, the CA declared void the deed of absolute
sale, and set aside the RTC decision.

Issue: W/N the subject property is conjugal

Held: No
As a general rule, all property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have
been made, contracted or registered in the name of
one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless
the contrary is proved.
In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda
inherited the residential lot from her father has
sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal
ownership.
o
Pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the Family
Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title
by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be
excluded from the community property and be
the exclusive property of each spouse. The

residential lot, therefore, is Erlindas exclusive

paraphernal property.
The CA misapplied Article 158 of the Civil Code and
Calimlim-Canullas
o
As the respondents were married during the
effectivity of the Civil Code, its provisions on
conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to
189) should have governed their property
relations. However, with the enactment of the
Family Code on August 3, 1989, the Civil Code
provisions on conjugal partnership of gains,
including Article 158, have been superseded
by those found in the Family Code (Articles
105 to 133).
o
Thus, in determining the nature of the subject
property, we refer to the provisions of the
Family Code, and not the Civil Code, except
with respect to rights then already vested.
o
Article 120 of the Family Code, which
supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code,
provides the solution in determining the
ownership of the improvements that are made
on the separate property of the spouses, at
the expense of the partnership or through the
acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Under
this provision, when the cost of the
improvement and any resulting increase in
value are more than the value of the property
at the time of the improvement, the entire
property of one of the spouses shall belong to
the
conjugal
partnership,
subject
to
reimbursement of the value of the property of
the owner-spouse at the time of the
improvement; otherwise, said property shall
be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse,
likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost
of the improvement.
o
In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a
portion only of the GSIS loan through monthly
salary deductions. From April 6, 198942 to
April
30,
1992,43
Eliseo
paid
about
P60,755.76,44 not the entire amount of the
GSIS housing loan plus interest, since the
petitioner advanced the P176,445.2745 paid
by Erlinda to cancel the mortgage in 1992.
Considering the P136,500.00 amount of the
GSIS housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to
assume that the value of the residential lot is
considerably more than the P60,755.76
amount paid by Eliseo through monthly salary
deductions.
o
Thus, the subject property remained the
exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at
the time she contracted with the petitioner;
the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction
was not necessary.

ANTONIA R. DELA PEA and ALVIN JOHN B. DELA PEA,

Petitioners, vs. GEMMA REMILYN C. AVILA and FAR EAST
BANK & TRUST CO., Respondents.
G.R. No. 187490 | February 8, 2012 (2D)
Facts:

The suit concerns a 277 square meter parcel of

residential land, together with the improvements
thereon, situated in Marikina City and previously
registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela
Pea (Antonia), "married to Antegono A. Dela Pea"
(Antegono).

To obtain a loan from A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila),

Antonio executed in favor of Aguila a notarized Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage over the property, for the
purpose of securing the payment of said loan
obligation.
Antonia then executed a notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale over the property in favor of respondent Gemma
Remilyn C. Avila (Gemma).
Gemma also constituted a real estate mortgage over
said parcel in favor of respondent Far East Bank and
Trust Company.
Subsequently, Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds
an Affidavit of Adverse Claim to the effect, among
others, that she was the true and lawful owner of the
property which had been titled in the name of Gemma;
and, that the Deed of Absolute Sale Gemma utilized in
procuring her title was simulated.
In view of Gemmas failure to pay the principal as well
as the accumulated interest and penalties on the loans
she obtained, on the other hand, FEBTC-BPI caused the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
constituted over the property. As the highest bidder at
the public auction conducted in the premises, FEBTCBPI later consolidated its ownership over the realty and
caused the same to be titled in its name.
Antonio and her son, petitioner Alvin, filed against
Gemma the complaint for annulment of deed of sale,
claiming that the subject realty was conjugal property,
the Dela Peas alleged, among other matters, that the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage Antonia executed in
favor of Aguila was not consented to by Antegono who
had, by then, already died.
RTC went on to render a Decision finding that the
subject property was conjugal in nature and that the
Deed of Absolute Sale Antonia executed in favor of
Gemma was void as a disposition without the
liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family
Code.
On appeal, CA rendered the herein assailed decision,
reversing the RTCs appealed decision, upon finding
that the property was paraphernal in nature for failure
of the Dela Peas to prove that the same was acquired
during Antonias marriage to Antegono.

Issue: W/N CA erred in reversing the RTC holding the subject

house and lot conjugal property of the spouses Antegono and
Antonia Dela Pea
Held: No
Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the
property was acquired with funds of the partnership,
proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential
condition for the operation of the presumption in favor
of the conjugal partnership.
In the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, this Court
categorically ruled as follows:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
However, the party who invokes this presumption must
first prove that the property in controversy was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition
during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the

operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal

partnership. The party who asserts this presumption
must first prove said time element. Needless to say,
the presumption refers only to the property acquired
during the marriage and does not operate when there
is no showing as to when property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in
favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong,
clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict
proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.

As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality

under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the Dela Peas did
not even come close to proving that the subject
property was acquired during the marriage between
Antonia and Antegono.
o
Beyond Antonias bare and uncorroborated
assertion that the property was purchased
when she was already married, the record is
bereft of any evidence from which the actual
date of acquisition of the realty can be
ascertained.
o
When queried about the matter during his
cross-examination, even Alvin admitted that
his sole basis for saying that the property was
owned by his parents was Antonias unilateral
pronouncement to the effect.
o
Considering
that
the
presumption
of
conjugality does not operate if there is no
showing of when the property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired, we find that the CA
cannot be faulted for ruling that the realty in
litigation was Antonias exclusive property.
Not having established the time of acquisition of the
property, the Dela Peas insist that the registration
thereof in the name of "Antonia R. Dela Pea, of legal
age, Filipino, married to Antegono A. Dela Pea" should
have already sufficiently established its conjugal
nature. Confronted with the same issue in the case Ruiz
vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled, however, that the
phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil
status of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean
that the husband is also a registered owner. Because it
is likewise possible that the property was acquired by
the wife while she was still single and registered only
after her marriage, neither would registration thereof in
said manner constitute proof that the same was
acquired during the marriage and, for said reason, to
be presumed conjugal in nature. "Since there is no
showing as to when the property in question was
acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the
wife alone is determinative of its nature as
paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse."

Issue: W/N CA erred in sustaining the writ of execution, the

public auction, and the certificate of sale of the subject property,
which the petitioner asserts as part of the conjugal partnership
and as such, it cannot be made to answer for her obligation with
Metrobank
Held: No
Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be
conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply, the
party who invokes it must first prove that the property
was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition
during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, the time when the property was
acquired is material.
Francisco v. CA is instructive, viz.:

EVANGELINE D. IMANI,* Petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN

BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Respondent
G.R. No. 187023 | November 17, 2010 (2D)
Facts:

Petitioner, together with some others, signed a

Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of
respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
(Metrobank).
As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank
whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI)
incurs.
Later, CPDTI obtained loans. CPDTI then defaulted in
the payment of its loans. Metrobank made several

demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This

prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against
CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of Metrobank. CA
affirmed this decision.
Consequently, the sheriff levied on a property
registered in the name of petitioner. A public auction
was conducted and the property was awarded to
Metrobank, as the highest bidder.
Metrobank undertook to consolidate the title covering
the subject property in its name, and filed a
Manifestation and Motion, praying that spouses Sina
and Evangline Imani be directed to surrender the
owners copy of the TCT of the subject property for
cancellation.
Petitioner opposed the motion, arguing that the subject
property belongs to the conjugal partnership; as such,
it cannot be held answerable for the liabilities incurred
by CPDTI to Metrobank.
RTC denied Metrobanks motion. On motion for
reconsideration filed by Metrobank, RTC set aside its
previous order.
But on petitioners motion for reconsideration, RTC
reinstated its first order. RTC relied on the affidavit of
Crisanto Origen, and declared the property levied upon
as conjugal, which cannot be held answerable for
petitioners personal liability.
CA then rendered the now challenged Decision
reversing the RTC.

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all

property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
However, the party who invokes this presumption must
first prove that the property in controversy was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition
during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. The party who asserts this presumption
must first prove said time element. Needless to say,
the presumption refers only to the property acquired
during the marriage and does not operate when there
is no showing as to when property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired.
To support her assertion that the property belongs to
the conjugal partnership, petitioner submitted the
Affidavit of Crisanto Origen, attesting that petitioner
and her husband were the vendees of the subject
property, and the photocopies of the checks allegedly
issued by Sina Imani as payment for the subject
property.

Unfortunately for petitioner, the said Affidavit

can hardly be considered sufficient evidence
to prove her claim that the property is
conjugal. As correctly pointed out by
Metrobank, the said Affidavit has no
evidentiary weight because Crisanto Origen
was not presented in the RTC to affirm the
veracity of his Affidavit.

presumed that it is one of conjugal

partnership." Besides, it appears that Lot 1201
was acquired during the marriage of the
Spouses Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar,
since the Original Certificate of Title indicates
that Lot 1201 was registered in the name of
Petra Unating, married to Aquilino Villar. Thus,
the property is presumed conjugal.

JESSIE V. PISUEA, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF PETRA

UNATING and AQUILINO VILLAR Represented by Salvador
Upod and Dolores Bautista, respondents.
G.R. No. 132803 | August 31, 1999 (3D)

Issue: W/N CA erred in ruling that Lot 1201 belongs to the

conjugal partnership of Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar

Real property acquired during marriage is presumed to be

conjugal. Such prima facie presumption, however, can be
overturned by a cadastral courts' specific finding, which has long
become final, that the lot in question was paraphernal in
character. The title to the entire property shall pass by operation
of law to the buyer once the seller acquires title over it by
hereditary succession, even if at the time of the execution of the
deed of sale, the seller owned only a portion of the property.
Facts:

The subject lot in dispute is a registered land in the

name of Petra Unating married to Aquilino Villar.
During the lifetime of the registered owners, Aquilino
entered into an oral partnership agreement for 10
years with Agustin Navarra involving the swampy
portion of the lot in question.
This arrangement continued until Aquilino died.
Thereafter, his share in the income of the partnership
was delivered by Agustin Navarra to Felix Villar and
Catalina Villar.
After the death of Agustin Navarra, his heirs executed a
Deed of Extra Judicial Partition and Deed of Sale of the
land in question in favor of the Spouses Jessie Pisuea
and Rosalie Navarra.
Respondents herein then filed an action for recovery of
possession against herein petitioner.
RTC: Since the disputed lot was the conjugal property of
Spouses Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar, its purported
sale by Felix and Catalina Villar to Agustin Navarra
could be considered valid. The court, however, ruled
that its validity pertained only to the share of the late
Petra Unating, considering that at the time of the sale,
Aquilino Villar was still alive. It likewise held that the
respondents, as heirs of Aquilino Villar, were entitled to
his one-half share in the disputed lot.
On appeal, CA affirmed the trial court's ruling in toto,
holding that the disputed lot belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar.
o
The lower court rejected the statement of the
Court of First Instance of Capiz in
Reconstitution Case No. 1408 that Lot 1201
was inherited by Petra Unating from her
mother. We agree with the lower court when it
found the phrase "having inherited said lot
from her mother Margarita Argamaso" as a
mere obiter, a finding of fact which we find no
justifiable reason to set aside. It must be
considered that the authority of the Court of
First Instance of Capiz to declare Lot 1201 as
having been inherited by Petra Unating from
her mother is doubtful.
o
We further agree with the lower court when it
held that "in the absence [o]f any evidence
o[f] any system [o]f property relation between
Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar, it is

Held: Yes
Both the CA and the RTC held that the disputed lot was
conjugal and dismissed, as obiter, the phrase "having
inherited said lot from her [Petra Unating's] mother,
Margarita Argamaso" found in the dispositive portion of
the Decision of the Court of First Insurance (CFI) of
Capiz in Reconstitution Case No. 1408. They explained
that the CFI had no authority to include the phrase,
because the only objective of reconstitution was to
"restore the certificate covering the property as it stood
at the time of its loss or destruction, and should not be
stretched to include later changes which alter of affect
the title of the registered owner."
The Supreme Court does not agree.
It must be emphasized that the dispositive portion of
the 1930 Decision, which was rendered by the same
CFI of Capiz acting as a cadastral court, already
contained the questioned phrase. Therefore, it cannot
be said that the CFI in 1980 exceeded its authority
when it ordered the reconstitution, in Petra Unating's
name, of the original certificate of title covering the
disputed lot or in stating therein that she had inherited
it from her mother. After all, such disposition was
copied from the same court's 1930 Decision, as
evidenced by an authentic copy of it on file with the
Bureau of Lands in Capiz.
Cadastral proceedings are proceedings in rem; like
ordinary registration proceedings, they are governed by
the usual rules of practice, procedure and evidence. A
cadastral decree and a certificate of title are issued
only after the applicants prove that they are entitled to
the claimed lots, all parties are heard, and evidence is
considered.
o
Thus, the finding of the cadastral court that
Petra Unating inherited the lot in question
from her mother cannot be dismissed as an
obiter, which is "an observation by the court
not necessary to the decision rendered."
o
The conclusion of the cadastral court was
found in the dispositive portion of its Decision,
and it was material to the nature of Petra
Unating's ownership of the lot.
o
Furthermore, it was based on the evidence
presented by the parties and considered by
the said court.
o
In any event, it must be pointed out that the
Decision became final a long time ago, and a
final judgment in a cadastral proceeding, or
any other in rem proceeding for that matter, is
binding and conclusive upon the whole world.
Therefore, the lot in dispute can properly be
considered as a paraphernal property of Petra
Unating.
Concededly, properties acquired during the marriage
are presumed to be conjugal. However, this prima facie
presumption cannot prevail over the cadastral court's
specific finding, reached in adversarial proceedings,

that the lot was inherited by Petra Unating from her

mother. Noteworthy is the fact that the parties do not
assail the validity of the cadastral court's Decision.
o
The 1980 reconstitution of the title to the lot in
the name of "Petra Unating, 40 years old,
married to Aquilino Villar, Filipino and resident
of Ivisan, Capiz, having inherited said lot from
her mother Margarita Argamaso . . ." was
notice to the world, including her heirs and
successors-in-interest, that it belonged to
Petra as her paraphernal property. Thus, the
words "married to" were merely descriptive of
Petra Unating's status at the time the lot was
awarded and registered in her name.
JOSEFA BAUTISTA FERRER, Petitioner, vs. SPS. MANUEL M.
FERRER & VIRGINIA FERRER and SPS. ISMAEL M. FERRER
and FLORA FERRER, Respondents
G.R. No. 166496 | November 9, 2006 (1D)
Facts:

In
her
Complaint
for
payment
of
conjugal
improvements, sum of money, and accounting with
prayer for injunction and damages, petitioner alleged
that she is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer (Alfredo), a halfbrother of respondents Manuel M. Ferrer (Manuel) and
Ismael M. Ferrer (Ismael).
Before petitioners marriage with Alfredo, the latter
acquired a piece of lot. He applied for a loan with the
Social Security System (SSS) to build improvements
thereon, including a residential house and a two-door
apartment building. However, it was during their
marriage that payment of the loan was made using the
couples conjugal funds.
From their conjugal funds, petitioner posited, they
constructed a warehouse on the lot. Moreover,
petitioner averred that respondent Manuel occupied
one door of the apartment building, as well as the
warehouse; however, he stopped paying rentals
thereon, alleging that he had acquired ownership over
the property by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by
Alfredo in favor of respondents.
It is petitioners contention that on 2 October 1989,
when her husband was already bedridden, respondents
Ismael and Flora Ferrer made him sign a document,
purported to be his last will and testament. The
document, however, was a Deed of Sale covering
Alfredos lot and the improvements thereon. Learning
of this development, Alfredo filed with the RTC of Pasig,
a Complaint for Annulment of the said sale against
respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 61327.
o
RTC dismissed the complaint. The dismissal
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
o
Subsequently, this Court, in G.R. No. L-117067,
finding no reversible error committed by the
appellate court in affirming the dismissal of
the RTC, affirmed the Decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Further, in support of her Complaint, petitioner alluded
to a portion of the Decision dated 22 June 1993 of the
RTC in Civil Case No. 61327, which stated, to wit:

improvements became an exclusive and capital

property of Alfredo with an obligation to reimburse the
conjugal partnership of the cost of improvements at the
time of liquidation of [the] conjugal partnership.
Clearly, Alfredo has all the rights to sell the subject
property by himself without need of Josefas consent.
According to petitioner, the ruling of the RTC shows
that, when Alfredo died on 29 September 1999, or at
the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership,
she had the right to be reimbursed for the cost of the
improvements on Alfredos lot.
RTC denied respondents motion to dismiss. CA, on
appeal, granted respondents petition for certiorari.

Issue: W/N respondents have the correlative obligation to pay

the value of the improvements on the subject lot
Held: No
Petitioner was not able to show that there is an
obligation on the part of the respondents to respect or
not to violate her right. While we could concede that
the Civil Case made a reference to the right of the
spouse as contemplated in Article 120 of the Family
Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the
improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the
spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is
vested. There is no obligation on the part of the
purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold
by the owner-spouse.
Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining
the ownership of the improvements that are made on
the separate property of the spouses at the expense of
the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either
or both spouses.
o
Thus, when the cost of the improvement and
any resulting increase in value are more than
the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of the
spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the
value of the property of the owner-spouse at
the time of the improvement; otherwise, said
property shall be retained in ownership by the
owner-spouse,
likewise
subject
to
reimbursement
of
the
cost
of
the
improvement.
o
The subject property was precisely declared as
the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis
of Article 120 of the Family Code.
Section 4. Charges Upon and Obligations of the Conjugal
Partnership

In determining which property is the principal and

which is the accessory, the property of greater value
shall be considered the principal. In this case, the lot is
the principal and the improvements the accessories.
Since Article 120 of the Family Code provides the rule
that the ownership of accessory follows the ownership
of the principal, then the subject lot with all its

10

Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and
the legitimate children of either spouse; however, the
support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the
provisions of this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the
marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both
spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse
without the consent of the other to the extent that the
family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including
major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership
property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made
during the marriage upon the separate property of either
spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or
complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for
self-improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they
have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both
spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for
the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a
professional or vocational course or other activity for selfimprovement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the
suit is found to groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the
foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable
for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by
the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal properties
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family.

RA 10572: AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE LIABILITY OF THE

ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OR CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FOR AN
OBLIGATION OF A SPOUSE WHO PRACTICES A PROFESSION AND
THE CAPABILITY OF EITHER SPOUSE TO DISPOSE OF AN
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER
SPOUSE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLES 73 AND 111
OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, ALSO KNOWN AS THE FAMILY
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
SECTION 1. Article 73 of the Family Code, as amended,
is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity without the
consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid,
serious, and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether
or not:
(1) The objection is proper, and
(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the
objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the
objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced
against the community property. If the benefit accrued
thereafter, such obligation shall be enforced against the
separate property of the spouse who has not obtained
consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of
creditors who acted in good faith.
SEC. 2. Article 111 of the Family Code, as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
Art. 111. Either spouse may mortgage, encumber,
alienate or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive
property.

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed

upon them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by
either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and
indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of
illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced
against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if
the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of
the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be
charged for what has been paid for the purpose abovementioned.
Art. 123. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in
any game of chance or in betting, sweepstakes, or any
other kind of gambling whether permitted or prohibited by
law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged
to the conjugal partnership but any winnings therefrom
shall form part of the conjugal partnership property.

ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING, petitioners vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 124642 | February 23, 2004 (2D)
Facts:

Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI)

obtained a loan of P9,000,000.00 from the Allied
Banking Corporation (ABC).
By virtue of this loan, the PBMCI, through its Executive
Vice-President Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory
note for the said amount.
As added security for the said loan, Alfredo Ching,
together with some others, executed a continuing
guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to jointly
and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI
obligations owing the ABC to the extent of
P38,000,000.00.
The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans.
Hence, ABC filed a complaint for sum of money,
wherein Ching was impleaded as co-defendant.
ABCs application for a writ of preliminary attachment
was granted.

11

Subsequently, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her

husband Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the
levy on attachment, alleging that the 100,000 shares of
stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her
and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal
funds after the Citycorp Investment Philippines was
established in 1974. Furthermore, the indebtedness
covered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive
suretyship contract executed by petitioner Alfredo
Ching for the account of PBMCI did not redound to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
RTC then issued an order lifting the writ of preliminary
attachment on the shares of stocks and ordering the
sheriff to return the said stocks to the petitioners.
On appeal by ABC, CA reversed RTCs judgment.

Issue: W/N CA erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership

is liable for the payment of PBMCI loans
Held: Yes
Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code (now Article 121[2
and 3] of the Family Code of the Philippines) provides:

(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the

contract, i.e., he directly received the money and
services to be used in or for his own business or his
own profession, that contract falls within the term "
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough
that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of
the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the
contract of loan or services, the family stands to
benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered
to the business or profession of the husband. It is
immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails
or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband
contracts obligations on behalf of the family business,
the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation
will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband

for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in
the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
The petitioner-husband signed the continuing guaranty
and suretyship agreement as security for the payment
of the loan obtained by the PBMCI from the private
respondent in the amount of P38,000,000.
o
Ayala Investment and Development Corp. v.
Court of Appeals: The signing as surety is
certainly not an exercise of an industry or
profession. It is not embarking in a business.
No matter how often an executive acted on or
was persuaded to act as surety for his own
employer, this should not be taken to mean
that he thereby embarked in the business of
suretyship or guaranty.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability
that should appertain to the husband alone, there must
be a showing that some advantages accrued to the
spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership
responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to
one of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the
New Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the
solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. The
husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume
unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial
stability of the conjugal partnership.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that
the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was
benefited by the petitioner-husbands act of executing
a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with
the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI.
o
The contract of loan was between the private
respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the
benefit of the latter. No presumption can be
inferred from the fact that when the petitionerhusband entered into an accommodation
agreement or a contract of surety, the
conjugal partnership would thereby be
benefited. The private respondent was
burdened to establish that such benefit
redounded to the conjugal partnership.

It could be argued that the petitioner-husband was a

member of the Board of Directors of PBMCI and was
one of its top twenty stockholders, and that the shares
of stocks of the petitioner-husband and his family would
appreciate if the PBMCI could be rehabilitated through
the loans obtained; that the petitioner-husbands career
would be enhanced should PBMCI survive because of
the infusion of fresh capital.
o
However, these are not the benefits
contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil
Code. The benefits must be those directly
resulting from the loan. They cannot merely be
a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.
This is different from the situation where the husband
borrows money or receives services to be used for his
own business or profession. In the Ayala case, we ruled
that it is such a contract that is one within the term
"obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
Thus:

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and

ABELARDO MAGSAJO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING,
respondents.
G.R. No. 118305 | February 12, 1998 (2D)
Facts:

Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as

PBM) obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner
Ayala Investment and Development Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as AIDC).
As added security for the credit line extended to PBM,
respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of
PBM, executed security agreements making himself
jointly
and
severally
answerable
with
PBM's
indebtedness to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for
sum of money against PBM and respondent-husband
Alfredo Ching.
CFI rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondenthusband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC
the principal amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests.
Upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of
execution pending appeal.
Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr., Deputy
Sheriff of Rizal caused the issuance and service upon
respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale.
Private respondents filed a case of injunction against
petitioners to enjoin the auction sale alleging that
petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the
conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among

12

others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit

of the said conjugal partnership.
The lower court issued a temporary restraining order to
prevent petitioner Magsajo from proceeding with the
enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale
of the said properties at public auction.
On a Petition for Certiorari filed by AIDC, CA issued TRO
enjoining CFI from enforcing its order. The auction sale
then took place where AIDC being the only bidder, was
issued a Certificate of Sale by petitioner Magsajo
AIDC then filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
injunction filed before the CFI on the ground that the
same had become moot and academic with the
consummation of the sale.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence,
trial on the merits proceeded. The trial court
promulgated its decision declaring the sale on
execution null and void. CA affirmed the decision.
Hence this petition.

Issue: W/N a surety agreement or an accommodation contract

entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within the
contemplation of Article 161 of the Civil Code
Held: No
Petitioners aver that the wordings of Article 161 of the
Civil Code is very clear: for the partnership to be held
liable, the husband must have contracted the debt "for
the benefit of the partnership; that here is a difference
between the phrases: "redounded to the benefit of" or
"benefited from" (on the one hand) and "for the benefit
of (on the other). The former require that actual benefit
must have been realized; the latter requires only that
the transaction should be one which normally would
produce benefit to the partnership, regardless of
whether or not actual benefit accrued.
There is no difference between the terms "redounded
to the benefit of" or "benefited from" on the one hand;
and "for the benefit of" on the other. They mean one
and the same thing.
o
Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article
121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly
worded, i.e., both use the term "for the benefit
of."
o
On the other hand, Article 122 of the Family
Code provides that "The payment of personal
debts by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to
the conjugal partnership except insofar as
they redounded to the benefit of the family."
As can be seen, the terms are used
interchangeably.
Petitioners further contend that the ruling of the
respondent court runs counter to the pronouncement of
this Court in the case of Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, that the
husband as head of the family and as administrator of
the conjugal partnership is presumed to have
contracted obligations for the benefit of the family or
the conjugal partnership.
Jurisprudence on the said matter:
o
Javier vs. Osmea: The debts contracted by
the husband during the marriage relation, for
and in the exercise of the industry or
profession by which he contributes toward the
support of his family, are not his personal and
private debts, and the products or income
from the wife's own property, which, like those
of her husband's, are liable for the payment of

the marriage expenses, cannot be excepted

from the payment of such debts.
o
Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin: Debts contracted by
the husband for and in the exercise of the
industry or profession by which he contributes
to the support of the family, cannot be
deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.
o
Ansaldo vs. Sheriff of Manila: The fruits of the
paraphernal property which form part of the
assets of the conjugal partnership, are subject
to the payment of the debts and expenses of
the spouses, but not to the payment of the
personal obligations (guaranty agreements) of
the husband, unless it be proved that such
obligations were productive of some benefit to
the family.
o
Liberty Insurance Corporation vs. Banuelos:
When there is no showing that the execution
of an indemnity agreement by the husband
redounded to the benefit of his family, the
undertaking is not a conjugal debt but an
obligation personal to him.
From the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of this Court,
we can derive the following conclusions:
o
If the husband himself is the principal obligor
in the contract, i.e., he directly received the
money and services to be used in or for his
own business or his own profession, that
contract falls within the term . . . . obligations
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is
enough that the benefit to the family is
apparent at the time of the signing of the
contract. From the very nature of the contract
of loan or services, the family stands to
benefit from the loan facility or services to be
rendered to the business or profession of the
husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his
business or profession fails or does not
succeed. Simply stated, where the husband
contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so,
that such obligation will redound to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership.
o
On the other hand, if the money or services
are given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor,
that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of
"obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." The contract of loan or services
is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor
and not for the surety or his family. No
presumption can be inferred that, when a
husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is "for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof
must be presented to establish benefit
redounding to the conjugal partnership.
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the benefits
the respondent family would reasonably anticipate
were the following:
o
The employment of co-respondent Alfredo
Ching would be prolonged and he would be
entitled to his monthly salary of P20,000.00
for an extended length of time because of the
loan he guaranteed;

13

The shares of stock of the members of his

family would appreciate if the PBM could be
rehabilitated through the loan obtained;
o
His prestige in the corporation would be
enhanced and his career would be boosted
should PBM survive because of the loan.
However, these are not the benefits contemplated by
Article 161 of the Civil Code. The benefits must be one
directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a
by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. Such benefits
(prospects of longer employment and probable
increase in the value of stocks) might have been
already apparent or could be anticipated at the time
the accommodation agreement was entered into.
Are indirect and remote probable benefits, the ones
referred to in Article 161 of the Civil Code? The Court of
Appeals in denying the motion for reconsideration,
disposed of these questions in the following manner:

(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the

marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by
both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the
other;

No matter how one looks at it, the debt/credit

respondents-appellants is purely a corporate debt
granted to PBM, with petitioner-appellee-husband
merely signing as surety. While such petitionerappellee-husband, as such surety, is solidarily liable
with the principal debtor AIDC, such liability under the
Civil Code provisions is specifically restricted by Article
122 (par. 1) of the Family Code, so that debts for which
the husband is liable may not be charged against
conjugal partnership properties. Article 122 of the
Family Code is explicit "The payment of personal
debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded
to the benefit of the family.
HONORIO L. CARLOS, petitioner, vs. MANUEL T. ABELARDO,
respondent.
G.R. No. 146504 | April 9, 2002 (1D)
Facts:

Petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money and

damages against respondent Manuel Abelardo, his sonin-law, and the latters wife, Maria Theresa CarlosAbelardo.
In the said complaint, petitioner alleged that:
o
Respondent and his wife approached him and
requested him to advance the amount of
US$25,000.00 for the purchase of a house and
lot located at #19952 Chestnut Street,
Executive Heights Village, Paranaque.
o
Thereafter, respondent expressed violent
resistance to petitioners inquiries on the
amount to the extent of making various death
threats against petitioner.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. CA, on
appeal, however reversed the lower courts decision.

Issue: W/N the loan incurred by the respondent is the liability of

the conjugal partnership
Held: Yes
The evidence adduced by petitioner sufficiently
established his claim that the US$25,000.00 he
advanced to respondent and his wife was a loan.
The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership
pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code:
xxx

(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse

without the consent of the other to the extent that the
family may have been benefited;
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the
foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties.

Xxx
While respondent did not and refused to sign the
acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife,
undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the
family because it was used to purchase the house and
lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and
his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of
consent of respondent, under Art. 21 of the Family
Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together
with his wife.

SECURITY BANK and TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. MAR

TIERRA CORPORATION, WILFRIDO C. MARTINEZ, MIGUEL
J. LACSON and RICARDO A. LOPA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 143382 | November 29, 2006 (2D)
Facts:

Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its

president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a
P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner
Security Bank and Trust Company.
Petitioner approved the application and entered into a
credit line agreement with respondent corporation. It
was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by
individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J.
Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves
jointly and severally with respondent corporation for
the payment of the loan.
Unable to collect the balance of the loan, petitioner
filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for
preliminary attachment against respondent corporation
and individual respondents.
RTC found that the obligation contracted by individual
respondent Martinez did not redound to the benefit of
his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the
attachment previously issued on the conjugal house
and lot of the spouses Martinez.
Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, petitioner appealed
to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the trial
courts
decision
in
toto.
Petitioner
sought
reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: W/N RTC and CA were wrong in ruling that the conjugal
partnership of the Martinez spouses could not be held liable for
the obligation incurred by individual respondent Martinez
Held: No
Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal
partnership is liable for "all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership." But when are debts and
obligations contracted by the husband alone
considered for the benefit of and therefore chargeable
against the conjugal partnership? Is a surety

14

agreement or an accommodation contract entered into

by the husband in favor of his employer within the
contemplation of the said provision?
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia: In acting as a
guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not
act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the
benefit is clearly intended for a third party.
Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v.
Court of Appeals: If the husband himself is the principal
obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the
money and services to be used in or for his own
business or profession, the transaction falls within the
term "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." In other words, where the husband
contracts an obligation on behalf of the family
business, there is a legal presumption that such
obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
On the other hand, if the money or services are given
to another person or entity and the husband acted only
as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by
itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. No
presumption is raised that, when a husband enters into
a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must
be presented to establish the benefit redounding to the
conjugal partnership. In the absence of any showing of
benefit received by it, the conjugal partnership cannot
be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by
the husband to accommodate a third party.
In this case, the principal contract, the credit line
agreement between petitioner and respondent
corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The
accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under
which individual respondent Martinez assumed the
obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was
similarly for the latters benefit. Petitioner had the
burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It
failed to discharge that burden.
To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation
pertaining to the husband alone defeats the objective
of the Civil Code to protect the solidarity and well being
of the family as a unit. The underlying concern of the
law is the conservation of the conjugal partnership.
Hence, it limits the liability of the conjugal partnership
only to debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

JOE A. ROS and ESTRELLA AGUETE, Petitioners, vs.

PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
BANK
LAOAG
BRANCH,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 170166 | April 6, 2011 (2D)
Facts:

Spouses Jose A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a

complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate
Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder
against PNB.
The averments in the complaint disclosed that plaintiffappellee Joe A. Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00
from PNB and as security for the loan, plaintiff-appellee
Ros executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel
of land.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a
result,
PNB
instituted
extrajudicial
foreclosure

proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the

extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was
issued in favor of PNB as the highest bidder.
Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete)
has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her husband
nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the
conjugal property a complaint was filed to annul the
proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and
consolidation of the property interposing the defense
that her signatures affixed on the documents were
forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit
of the family.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. However,
CA reversed the same.
o
Assuming arguendo that Aguete did not give
her consent to Ros loan, the appellate court
ruled that the conjugal partnership is still
liable because the loan proceeds redounded to
the benefit of the family. The records of the
case reveal that the loan was used for the
expansion of the familys business. Therefore,
the debt obtained is chargeable against the
conjugal partnership.

Issue: W/N CA erred in declaring, without basis, that the loan

contracted by husband Joe A. Ros with respondent Philippine
National Bank Laoag redounded to the benefit of his family
Held: No
The application for loan shows that the loan would be
used exclusively "for additional working capital of buy
& sell of garlic & virginia tobacco." In her testimony,
Aguete confirmed that Ros engaged in such business,
but claimed to be unaware whether it prospered.
Aguete was also aware of loans contracted by Ros, but
did not know where he "wasted the money."
o
Debts contracted by the husband for and in
the exercise of the industry or profession by
which he contributes to the support of the
family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive
and private debts.
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the
contract, i.e., he directly received the money and
services to be used in or for his own business or his
own profession, that contract falls within the term "x x
x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It
is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at
the signing of the contract.
From the very nature of the contract of loan or services,
the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or
services to be rendered to the business or profession of
the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business
or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated,
where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of
the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so,
that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
For this reason, we rule that Ros loan from PNB
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal
partnership.
YOLANDA LEACHON CORPUZ, Complainant, vs. SERGIO V.
PASCUA, Sheriff III. Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Trece Martires
City, Cavite. Respondent.
A.M. No. P-11-2972 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3430-P) |
September 28, 2011 (1D)

15

Facts:

Alicia Panganiban (Panganiban) instituted a criminal

case against Juanito Corpuz for violations of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.
When Juanito failed to comply with his obligations
under the Compromise Agreement in the said case,
Panganiban filed Motions for Execution of the MTCC
judgment. MTCC acted favorably on Panganibans
Motions and issued a Writ of Execution addressed to
the Sheriff of the MTCC of Trece Martires City
When Yolanda, Juanitos wife, and her daughter were in
her office at the Cavite Provincial Engineering Office of
Trece Martires City, Sheriff Pascua arrived at Yolandas
office and demanded that Yolanda surrender the Toyota
Town Ace Noah with Plate No. 471, which was
registered in Yolandas name, threatening to damage
the said vehicle if Yolanda would refuse to do so.
Offended, humiliated, and embarrassed, Yolanda was
compelled to file the present administrative complaint4
against Sheriff Pascua.
Sheriff Pascua argued that he only took Yolandas
vehicle after verification from the Land Transportation
Office (LTO) that it was registered in Yolandas name.
Yolanda is the wife of Juanito, the accused in Criminal
Case Nos. 2079 to 2082, and the vehicle is their
conjugal property, which could be levied upon in
satisfaction of a Writ of Execution against Juanito.

Issue: W/N the subject vehicle can be presumed as the conjugal

property of the Juanito and Yolanda
Held: No
Sheriff Pascua cannot rely on the presumption that the
vehicle is the conjugal property of Juanito and Yolanda.
Indeed, Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that
"all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
o
However, for this presumption to apply, the
party who invokes it must first prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage.
Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non to the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, the time when the property
was acquired is material. There is no such
proof in the records of the present case.
Sheriff Pascuas assertions of diligence do not
exculpate him from administrative liability. After inquiry
from the LTO, he already discovered that the vehicle
was registered in Yolandas name only. This fact should
have already prompted Sheriff Pascua to gather more
information, such as when Juanito and Yolanda were
married and when did Yolanda acquire the vehicle,
which, in turn, would have determined whether or not
Sheriff Pascua could already presume that the said
vehicle is conjugal property.
SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO, Petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former
Division, and ROMULO NICOL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 145222 | April 24, 2009 (2D)
Facts:

Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado (petitioners) filed a

complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol (Erlinda).
Said action originated from Erlinda Nicols civil liability
arising from the criminal offense of slander filed against
her by petitioners.

The trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to

pay damages. Said decision was affirmed, successively,
by the Court of Appeals and this Court.
Finding Erlinda Nicols personal properties insufficient
to satisfy the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a
notice of levy on real property on execution addressed
to the Register of Deeds of Cavite.
Romulo Nicol (respondent), the husband of Erlinda
Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of
sale and damages with preliminary injunction against
petitioners and the deputy sheriff.
RTC dismissed respondents complaint. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.

Issue: W/N the obligation of Erlinda arising from her criminal

liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership
Held: No
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal
in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code16 explicitly
provides that payment of personal debts contracted by
the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Unlike in the system of absolute community where
liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a
crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute
community of property, in the absence or insufficiency
of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the
same advantage is not accorded in the system of
conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership
of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the
liability of the debtor-spouse.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be
concluded that the civil obligation arising from the
crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for
the personal obligation contracted by one spouse,
unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have
accrued to the conjugal partnership.
In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the car
which was claimed by the third party complainant to be
conjugal property was being levied upon to enforce "a
judgment for support" filed by a third person, the thirdparty claim of the wife is proper since the obligation
which is personal to the husband is chargeable not on
the conjugal property but on his separate property.
EFREN PANA, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR.
and JOSE JUANITE, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 164201 | December 10, 2012 (3D)
Facts:

The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (Efren),

his wife Melecia, and others of murder before the RTC.
RTC rendered a consolidated decision acquitting Efren
of the charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding
Melecia and another person guilty as charged and
sentenced them to the penalty of death.
On appeal to this Court, it affirmed the conviction of
both accused but modified the penalty to reclusion
perpetua.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the
deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ,
resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the
names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of
levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued.

16

Petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to

quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied
properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets
of Melecia.
RTC denied the motion. On appeal, CA dismissed the
petition for failure to sufficiently show that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in issuing its assailed
orders. Hence this petition.

Issue: W/N CA erred in holding that the conjugal properties of

spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for
the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder case
Held: No
Article 122 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by
the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal properties
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities
imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.

However, the payment of personal debts contracted by

either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and
indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support
of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be
enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article
have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should
have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the
partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has
been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that
Melecia has no exclusive property of her own, the
above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in
the murder case imposed on her may be enforced
against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have
been covered.
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children,
and the legitimate children of either spouse; however,
the support of illegitimate children shall be governed
by the provisions of this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the
marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by
both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the
other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse
without the consent of the other to the extent that the
family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including
major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership
property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made
during the marriage upon the separate property of
either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or
complete a professional, vocational, or other activity
for self-improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they
have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both
spouses in favor of their common legitimate children

for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing

a professional or vocational course or other activity for
self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless
the suit is found to be groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the
foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties.

Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows

payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his
wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before
these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such
indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership
assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the
preceding article have been covered." No prior
liquidation of those assets is required. This is not
altogether unfair since Article 122 states that "at the
time of liquidation of the partnership, such [offending]
spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purposes above-mentioned."

Section 5. Administration of the Conjugal Partnership

Property; Rule on Forum Shopping; Article 124 FC .
Guarduanship v. Summary Proceedings
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly.
In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall
be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors.

17

Art. 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal

partnership property without the consent of the other.
However, either spouse may, without the consent of the
other, make moderate donations from the conjugal
partnership property for charity or on occasions of family
rejoicing or family distress.

Civil Code Provisions

Article 165. The husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership.

Article 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and

within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the
courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband
entered into without her consent, when such consent is
required, or any act or contract of the husband which
tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal
partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this
right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently
alienated by the husband. (n)

Article 1390. The following contracts are voidable or

annullable, even though there may have been no damage
to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving
consent to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a
proper action in court. They are susceptible of ratification.
(n)
MELANIA A. ROXAS, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and ANTONIO M. CAYETANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 92245| June 26, 1991 (2D)
Facts:

Petitioner discovered that her estranged husband,

defendant Antonio S. Roxas, had entered into a
contract of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano
covering a portion of their conjugal lot.
Due to the illegal lease contract entered into between
the herein defendants and the resultant unlawful
deprivation of petitioner from operating her own
legitimate business on the same lot of which she is a
conjugal owner, plaintiff has been compelled to seek
redress and ventilate her grievance to the court.

Defendant Antonio M. Cayetano moved to dismiss the

complaint on the sole ground that the complaint states
no cause of action.
Respondent judge dismissed the complaint. Petitioner
directly appealed the Decision of the lower court to the
Supreme Court. The Court referred the case to CA.
Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment
affirming in toto the Order of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: W/N a husband, as the administrator of the conjugal

partnership, may legally enter into a contract of lease involving
conjugal real property without the knowledge and consent of the
wife
Held: No
Under the New Civil Code (NCC), "Art. 165. The
husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership," in view of the fact that the husband is
principally responsible for the support of the wife and
the rest of the family. If the conjugal partnership does
not have enough assets, it is the husband's capital that
is responsible for such support, not the paraphernal
property. Responsibility should carry authority with it.
The husband is not an ordinary administrator, for while
a mere administrator has no right to dispose of, sell, or
otherwise alienate the property being administered, the
husband can do so in certain cases allowed by law. He
is not required by law to render an accounting. Acts
done under administration do not need the prior
consent of the wife.
However, administration does not include acts of
ownership. For while the husband can administer the
conjugal assets unhampered, he cannot alienate or
encumber the conjugal realty. Thus, under Art. 166 of
NCC "unless the wife has been declared a non-compos
mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or
is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership the wife's consent. If she refuses
unreasonably to give her consent, the court may
compel her to grant the same."
o
This rule prevents abuse on the part of the
husband, and guarantees the rights of the
wife, who is partly responsible for the
acquisition of the property, particularly the
real property. Contracts entered into by the
husband in violation of this prohibition are
voidable and subject to annulment at the
instance of the aggrieved wife. (Art. 173 of the
Civil Code)
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not a lease
is an encumbrance and/or alienation within the scope
of Art. 166 of the New Civil Code.
Under Art. 1643 of the New Civil Code "In the lease of
things, one of the parties binds himself to give to
another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price
certain, and for a period which may be definite or
indefinite. However, no lease for more than ninety-nine
years shall be valid." Under the law, lease is a grant of
use and possession: it is not only a grant of possession
as opined by the Court of Appeals. The right to possess
does not always include the right to use. For while the
bailee in the contract of deposit holds the property in
trust, he is not granted by law the right to make use of
the property in deposit.

In the case at bar, the allegation in paragraph 2 of the

complaint indicates that petitioner's estranged
husband, defendant Antonio S. Roxas had entered into

18

a contract of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano

without her marital consent being secured as required
by law under Art. 166 of the Civil Code. Petitioner,
therefore, has a cause of action under Art. 173 to file a
case for annulment of the contract of lease entered into
without her consent. Petitioner has a cause of action
not only against her husband but also against the
lessee, Antonio M. Cayetano, who is a party to the
contract of lease.
Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA COPUZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 125172 | June 26, 1998 (1D)
Facts:

Over the objection of private respondent and while she

was in Manila seeking employment, her husband, Junie
Corpuz, sold to the petitioners-spouses one half of their
conjugal property, consisting of their residence and the
lot on which it stood.
Private respondent then filed an Amended Complainant
against her husband Judie Corpuz and PetitionerSpouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang, seeking the
declaration of the deed of sale, which involved the
conjugal property of private respondent and her
husband, null and void.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Gilda.
Dissatisfied, petitioners-spouses filed an appeal with
the Court of Appeals, which however, affirmed the
lower courts decision.

Issue: W/N CA erred in finding no reversible error in the trial

court's ruling that any alienation or encumbrance by the
husband of the conjugal propety without the consent of his wife
is null and void as provided under Article 124 of the Family Code

compare the same with the equivalent provision of the

Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 166 of the
Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnershit
without the wife's consent. The alienation or
encumbrance if so made however is not null and void.
It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an
action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance.
Thus the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the
intimidation referred to by petitioners were perpetrated
in the execution of the document embodying the
amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial
that barangay authorities made her sign said document
through misrepresentation and coercion. In any event,
its execution does not alter the void character of the
deed of sale between the husband and the petitionersspouses. The fact remains that such contract was
entered into without the wife's consent.
THELMA A. JADER-MANALO, petitioner, vs. NORMA
FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and EDILBERTO CAMAISA,
respondents.
G.R. No. 147978 | January 23, 2002 (1D)
Facts:

Held: No
The contract entered into herein falls within the ambit
of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly
applied by the lower court:

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the

conjugal partnerhip properly shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disgreement, the husband's
decision shall prevail, subject recourse to the court by
the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or

otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of
the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (165a) (Emphasis supplied)
Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the
Civil Code, the trial court adroitly explained the
amendatory effect of the above provision in this wise:
The legal provision is clear. The disposition or
encumbrance is void. It becomes still clearer if we

Petitioner Thelma A. Jader-Manalo allegedly came

across an advertisement placed by respondents, the
Spouses Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and Edilberto
Camaisa, in the Classified Ads Section of the
newspaper BULLETIN TODAY for the sale of their tendoor apartment in Makati, as well as that in Taytay,
Rizal.
As narrated by petitioner in her complaint filed with the
RTC, she met with respondent spouses and made a
definite offer to buy the properties to respondent
Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity
of his wife, respondent Norma Camaisa in the presence
of the real estate broker. This agreement was
handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto.
When petitioner met again with respondent spouses
and the real estate broker at Edilberto's office for the
formal affixing of Norma's signature, she was surprised
when respondent spouses informed her that they were
backing out of the agreement because they needed
"spot cash" for the full amount of the consideration.
Petitioner reminded respondent spouses that the
contracts to sell had already been duly perfected and
Norma's refusal to sign the same would unduly
prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma refused to sign the
contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint for
specific performance and damages against respondent
spouses before the RTC to compel respondent Norma
Camaisa to sign the contracts to sell.
The trial court rendered a summary judgment
dismissing the complaint on the ground that under Art.
124 of the Family Code, the court cannot intervene to
authorize the transaction in the absence of the consent
of the wife since said wife who refused to give consent
had not been shown to be incapacitated.
Petitioner, thus, elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals:
o
The Court of Appeals explained that the
properties subject of the contracts were
conjugal properties and as such, the consent
of both spouses is necessary to give effect to
the sale. Since private respondent Norma
Camaisa refused to sign the contracts, the
sale was never perfected. In fact, the

19

downpayment was returned by respondent

spouses and was accepted by petitioner. The
Court of Appeals also stressed that the
authority of the court to allow sale or
encumbrance of a conjugal property without
the consent of the other spouse is applicable
only in cases where the said spouse is
incapacitated
or
otherwise
unable
to
participate in the administration of the
conjugal property.
Issue: W/N the properties subject of the contracts herein were
conjugal properties and as such, the consent of both spouses is
necessary to give effect to the sale

TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, petitioner, vs. GILDA L.

JARDELEZA, ERNESTO L. JARDELEZA, JR., MELECIO GIL L.
JARDELEZA, and GLENDA L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
G.R. No. 112014 | December 5, 2000 (1D)

Held: Yes
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal
property by the husband as administrator in
appropriate cases requires the written consent of the
wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article
124 of the Family Code provides:

Facts:

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the

conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court
by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed
of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or

otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of
the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (Underscoring ours.)
The properties subject of the contracts in this case
were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be
effective, the consent of both husband and wife must
concur.
Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give
her written consent to the sale. Even granting that
respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating
for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied,
her written consent to the sale is required by law for its
validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that
Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent
Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for
the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being
merely aware of a transaction is not consent.
Finally, petitioner argues that since respondent Norma
unjustly refuses to affix her signatures to the contracts
to sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the
Family Code is warranted.
o
The argument is bereft of merit. Petitioner is
correct insofar as she alleges that if the
written consent of the other spouse cannot be
obtained or is being withheld, the matter may
be brought to court which will give such
authority if the same is warranted by the
circumstances. However, it should be stressed

that court authorization under Art. 124 is only

resorted to in cases where the spouse who
does not give consent is incapacitated.
In this case, petitioner failed to allege and
prove
that
respondent
Norma
was
incapacitated to give her consent to the
contracts. In the absence of such showing of
the wife's incapacity, court authorization
cannot be sought.

Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza were

married long before 03 August 1988, when the Family
Code took effect.
Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. then 73 years old, suffered a
stroke and lapsed into comatose condition. To date, his
condition has not materially improved.
Petitioner then commence with RTC a petition for
appointment of judicial guardian over the person and
property of Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. and prayed for the
issuance of letters of guardianship to his mother, Gilda
L. Jardeleza
Petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for the
issuance of letters of guardianship to him, rather than
to his mother, on the ground that she considered the
property acquired by Dr. Jardeleza as her own and did
not want to be appointed guardian.
Respondents filed with the trial court an opposition to
the petition for guardianship and the motion for
issuance of letters of guardianship to petitioner.
The trial court issued an order dismissing the petition
for guardianship.
o
The petition is superfluous and would only
serve to duplicate the powers of the wife
under the explicit provisions of Article 124,
second paragraph, of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration pointing
out that the Court of Appeals held in a case under
Article 124 of the Family Code where the incapacitated
spouse is incapable of being notified or unable to
answer the petition, the procedural recourse is
guardianship of the incapacitated spouse.
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration
finding it unmeritorious. Hence, this petition.

Issue: W/N Article 124 of the Family Code renders "superfluous"

the appointment of a judicial guardian over the person and
estate of an incompetent married person
Held:

Very recently, in a related case, we ruled that Article

124 of the Family Code was not applicable to the
situation of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and that the
proper procedure was an application for appointment of
judicial guardian under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition. (See next
case)

JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L.

JARDELEZA, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents
G.R. No. 109557 | November 29, 2000 (1D)

20

Facts:

Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging

to his parents, Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza and Gilda L.
Jardeleza, private respondent filed a petition of
guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.
Teodoro averred therein that the present physical and
mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. prevent
him from competently administering his properties, and
in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the
Jardelezas real and personal assets, there was a need
for a court-appointed guardian to administer said
properties.
Respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza then herself filed a
petition, regarding the declaration of incapacity of
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of sole powers of
administration of conjugal properties, and authorization
to sell the same.
RTC found that Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. was truly
incapacitated to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, and that the sale of a conjugal lot
and the improvements thereon was necessary to defray
the
mounting
expenses
for
treatment
and
Hospitalization. The said court also made the
pronouncement that the petition filed by Gilda L.
Jardeleza was "pursuant to Article 124 of the Family
Code, and that the proceedings thereon are governed
by the rules on summary proceedings sanctioned under
Article 253 of the same Code x x x.
Gilda Jardeleza disposed by absolute sale Lot No. 4291
and all its improvements to her daughter, Ma. Glenda
Jardeleza Uy.
Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the motion for
approval of the deed of sale. This was denied by the
lower court.
On appeal, CA promulgated its decision reversing the
appealed decision and ordering the trial court to
dismiss the special proceedings to approve the deed of
sale, which was also declared void.

Issue: W/N Petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto

Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke, a cerebrovascular accident,
rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties,
and could not manage their conjugal partnership property may
assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property
under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of
land with its improvements
Held: No
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr.
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the procedural rules on summary
proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family
Code are not applicable.
o
Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take
care of himself and manage the conjugal
property due to illness that had rendered him
comatose, the proper remedy was the
appointment of a judicial guardian of the
person or estate or both of such incompetent,
under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules
of Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier had filed
such a petition for judicial guardianship.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court
by the wife for a proper remedy which must be availed

of within five years from the date of the contract

implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or

otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of
the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (165a).
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code govern the
proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code.
o
The situation contemplated is one where the
spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has
abandoned the other or consent is withheld or
cannot be obtained.
o
Such rules do not apply to cases where the
non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
incompetent to give consent.
o
In this case, the trial court found that the
subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in
comatose or semi-comatose condition, a
victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident,
without motor and mental faculties, and with a
diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case,
the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship
proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court.
Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code may apply to the
wife's administration of the conjugal property, the law
provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of
administration has the same powers and duties as a
guardian under the Rules of Court.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real
property as such administrator of the conjugal property
must observe the procedure for the sale of the wards
estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95,
1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with
the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court.
Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the
requirements of the summary judicial proceedings
under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not
serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated
spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the
petition should not be granted.
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent
an opportunity to be heard, the decision rendered by
the trial court is void for lack of due process.
o
The doctrine consistently adhered to by this
Court is that a denial of due process suffices to
cast on the official act taken by whatever
branch of the government the impress of
nullity.

WALTER
VILLANUEVA
AND
AURORA
VILLANUEVA,
petitioners, vs. FLORENTINO CHIONG AND ELISERA CHIONG,
respondents.

21

G.R. No. 159889 | June 5, 2008 (2D)

Facts:

Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were

married sometime in January 1960 but have been
separated in fact since 1975.
During their marriage, they acquired a lot, one-half of
which was later sold by Florentino to petitioners.
Shortly after their last installment payment, petitioners
demanded from respondents the execution of a deed of
sale in their favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign a
deed of sale.
Elisera filed with the RTC a Complaint for Quieting of
Title with Damages. Petitioners also filed with the RTC a
Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages.
Upon proper motion, the RTC consolidated these two
cases.
Florentino executed the questioned Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of petitioners.
RTC, in its Joint Decision, annulled the deed of absolute
sale. CA affirmed the RTC's decision.

Issue: W/N the sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent valid

Held: No
In Vda. de Ramones v. Agbayani, citing Villaranda v.
Villaranda, the Court held that without the wife's
consent, the husband's alienation or encumbrance of
conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988 is not void, but merely
voidable.
Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code provide:
ART. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non
compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband
cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wife's consent

PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA, Petitioners,

vs. MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf
of INGRID D'LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK D'WIGHT
VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND
INGRELYN DYAN VILLA ABRILLE, Respondents
G.R. No. 160708 | October 16, 2009 (2D)
Facts:

This article shall not apply to property acquired by the

conjugal partnership before the effective date of this
Code.

ART. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and

within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask
the courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the
husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should
the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after
the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value
of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and
Florentino is necessary for the sale of a conjugal
property to be valid.
o
In this case, the requisite consent of Elisera
was not obtained when Florentino verbally
sold the lot and executed the Deed of Absolute
Sale on May 13, 1992.
o
Accordingly,
the
contract
entered
by
Florentino is annullable at Elisera's instance,
during the marriage and within ten years from
the transaction questioned, conformably with
Article 173. Fortunately, Elisera timely
questioned the sale when she filed Civil Case
No. 4383 on July 5, 1991, perfectly within ten

years from the date of sale and execution of

the deed.
Petitioners finally contend that, assuming arguendo the
property is still conjugal, the transaction should not be
entirely voided as Florentino had one-half share over
the lot. Petitioners' stance lacks merit.
o
In Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares
citing Bucoy v. Paulino, et al., a case involving
the annulment of sale executed by the
husband without the consent of the wife, it
was held that the alienation must be annulled
in its entirety and not only insofar as the share
of the wife in the conjugal property is
concerned. Although the transaction in the
said case was declared void and not merely
voidable, the rationale for the annulment of
the whole transaction is the same. Thus:
o
The plain meaning attached to the plain
language of the law is that the contract, in its
entirety, executed by the husband without the
wife's consent, may be annulled by the wife.
Had Congress intended to limit such
annulment in so far as the contract shall
"prejudice" the wife, such limitation should
have been spelled out in the statute. It is not
the legitimate concern of this Court to recast
the law.

Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro

Villa Abrille are husband and wife.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent
to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was
still single and which is registered solely in his name
under TCT No. T-26471.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his
family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their
movables to support the family and the studies of her
children.
By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two
lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo
Ravina.
Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her
objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and
the two lots without Mary Anns consent, as evidenced
by a Deed of Sale.
Mary Ann then filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale
against Pedro and herein petitioners (the Ravinas).
The trial court ruled in favor of herein respondent Mary
Ann.
On appeal, CA rendered the following judgment:
o
The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 26471 in
favor of defendants spouses Wilfredo and
Patrocinia Ravina is declared valid.
o
The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 88674 in
favor of said defendants spouses Ravina,
together with the house thereon, is declared
null and void.

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Issue: W/N the subject property covered by TCT No. T-88674 by

Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Anns consent
Held:No
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded
after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that
now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a)
without the consent of both the husband and the wife,
or (b) in case of one spouses inability, the authority of
the court.
Article 124 of the Family Code, the governing law at the
time the assailed sale was contracted, is explicit:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court
by the wife for proper remedy which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or

otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of
the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving
the wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or
encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code.
It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the
conjugal partnership property by the husband without
the consent of the wife is null and void.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of
property, if the husband, without knowledge and
consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is
void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the
approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a
disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of
the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the
contract implementing the decision of the husband to
institute the case.
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for
annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date of
sale and execution of the deed. However, her action to
annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and
lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No. T26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and
which he can dispose of freely without Mary Anns
consent.
In addition, petitioners contend that they are buyers in
good faith.
o
To establish his status as a buyer for value in
good faith, a person dealing with land
registered in the name of and occupied by the
seller need only show that he relied on the
face of the sellers certificate of title. But for a
person dealing with land registered in the
name of and occupied by the seller whose

capacity to sell is restricted, such as by

Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code or
Article 124 of the Family Code, he must show
that he inquired into the latters capacity to
sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for
value in good faith.
In the present case, the property is registered
in the name of Pedro and his wife, Mary Ann.
Petitioners cannot deny knowledge that during
the time of the sale in 1991, Pedro was
married to Mary Ann. However, Mary Anns
conformity did not appear in the deed. Even
assuming that petitioners believed in good
faith that the subject property is the exclusive
property of Pedro, they were apprised by Mary
Anns lawyer of her objection to the sale and
yet they still proceeded to purchase the
property without Mary Anns written consent.

SPOUSES REX AND CONCEPCION AGGABAO, Petitioners, vs.

DIONISIO Z. PARULAN, JR. and MA. ELENA PARULAN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 165803 | September 1, 2010 (3D)
Facts:

Real estate broker Marta K. Atanacio (Atanacio) offered

two parcels of land, which in the name of respondents
Spouses Maria Elena A. Parulan (Ma. Elena) and
Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr. (Dionisio), who have been
estranged from one another, to the petitioners
The petitioners went to the Office of the Register of
Deeds and the Assessors Office of Paraaque City to
verify the TCTs shown by Ma. Elena
There, they discovered that the one of the lots had
been encumbered to Banco Filipino in 1983 or 1984,
but that the encumbrance had already been cancelled
due to the full payment of the obligation. They noticed
that the Banco Filipino loan had been effected through
an SPA executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena. They
found on the TCT of the other lot the annotation of an
existing mortgage in favor of the Los Baos Rural Bank,
also effected through an SPA executed by Dionisio in
favor of Ma. Elena, coupled with a copy of a court order
authorizing Ma. Elena to mortgage the lot to secure a
loan of P500,000.00.
Following their verification, the petitioners delivered
final amount to Ma. Elena, who executed a deed of
absolute sale in their favor.
Ma. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owners copy
of TCT No. 63376 as promised. In due time, the
petitioners learned that the duplicate owners copy of
TCT No. 63376 had been all along in the custody of
Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold an SPA
executed by his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell
both lots.
Subseqeuntly,
Dionisio,
through
Atty.
Parulan,
commenced an action praying for the declaration of
the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma.
Elena, and the cancellation of the title issued to the
petitioners by virtue thereof.
RTC ruled in favor of Dionisio. CA affirmed the RTC,
opining that Article 124 of the Family Code applied
because Dionisio had not consented to the sale of the
conjugal property by Ma. Elena; and that the RTC
correctly found the SPA to be a forgery.

Issue: W/N Article 173 of the Civil Code and not Article 124 of
the Family Code should apply to the sale of the conjugal
property executed without the consent of Dionisio

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Held: No. Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal

properties made after the effectivity of the Family Code
To start with, Article 254 of the Family Code has
expressly repealed several titles under the Civil Code,
among them the entire Title VI in which the provisions
on the property relations between husband and wife,
Article 173 included, are found.
Secondly, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or
after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code.
o
The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article
124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that
any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal
property made during the effectivity of the
Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the
Family Code.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:

Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the

conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court
by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed
of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without authority of
the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on
the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
Issue: W/N CA erred in affirming the RTCs finding that the sale
between Mrs. Elena and the petitioners had been a nullity under
Article 124 of the Family Code
Held: No
Article 124 of the Family Code categorically requires
the consent of both spouses before the conjugal
property may be disposed of by sale, mortgage, or
other modes of disposition. In Bautista v. Silva, the
Court erected a standard to determine the good faith of
the buyers dealing with a seller who had title to and
possession of the land but whose capacity to sell was
restricted, in that the consent of the other spouse was
required before the conveyance, declaring that in order
to prove good faith in such a situation, the buyers must
show that they inquired not only into the title of the
seller but also into the sellers capacity to sell.
Thus, the buyers of conjugal property must observe two
kinds of requisite diligence, namely:
o
the diligence in verifying the validity of the
title covering the property; and
o
the diligence in inquiring into the authority of
the transacting spouse to sell conjugal
property in behalf of the other spouse.
Petitioners knew fully well that the law demanded the
written consent of Dionisio to the sale, but yet they did
not present evidence to show that they had made
inquiries into the circumstances behind the execution

of the SPA purportedly executed by Dionisio in favor of

Ma. Elena. Had they made the appropriate inquiries,
and not simply accepted the SPA for what it
represented on its face, they would have uncovered
soon enough that the respondents had been estranged
from each other and were under de facto separation,
and that they probably held conflicting interests that
would negate the existence of an agency between
them. To lift this doubt, they must, of necessity, further
inquire into the SPA of Ma. Elena.
The petitioners contend that the forgery of the SPA
notwithstanding, the CA could still have decided in their
favor conformably with Veloso v. Court of Appeals, a
case where the petitioner husband claimed that his
signature and that of the notary public who had
notarized the SPA the petitioner supposedly executed
to authorize his wife to sell the property had been
forged. In denying relief, the Court upheld the right of
the vendee as an innocent purchaser for value.
o
Veloso is inapplicable, however, because the
contested property therein was exclusively
owned by the petitioner and did not belong to
the conjugal regime. Veloso being upon
conjugal property, Article 124 of the Family
Code did not apply.
o
In contrast, the property involved herein
pertained to the conjugal regime, and,
consequently, the lack of the written consent
of the husband rendered the sale void
pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code.
Moreover, even assuming that the property
involved in Veloso was conjugal, its sale was
made on November 2, 1987, or prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code; hence, the sale
was still properly covered by Article 173 of the
Civil Code, which provides that a sale effected
without the consent of one of the spouses is
only voidable, not void. However, the sale
herein was made already during the effectivity
of the Family Code, rendering the application
of Article 124 of the Family Code clear and
indubitable.

SPOUSES RENATO and FLORINDA DELA CRUZ, petitioners,

vs. SPOUSES GIL and LEONILA SEGOVIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 149801 | June 26, 2008 (1D)
Facts:

Petitioner Florinda dela Cruz (Florinda) wanted to

purchase two (2) parcels of land located at Paltok
Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, Lot 503 with an apartment
unit erected thereon and Lot 505 with a residential
house. The two lots were being sold together for
P180,000.00.
Inasmuch as Florinda had only P144,000.00 at hand,
she asked her sister, respondent Leonila Segovia
(Leonila), to contribute P36,000.00 to complete the
purchase price.
The sisters agreed that Lot 503 and the apartment unit
thereat would belong to Leonila upon full payment of its
purchase price of P80,000.00, while Lot 505 with a
residential house would belong to Florinda.

24

The properties were then registered in the name of

petitioner Renato dela Cruz married to Florinda. The
parties, however, verbally agreed that Leonila and her
family would stay at Lot 505 until she had fully paid for
Lot 503.
Florinda and Leonila then signed an Agreement
embodying the detailed scheme of payment for the lot
covered by the sisters agreement.
Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for Nullity of
Contract/Agreement with Damages on the ground that
the said Agreement executed did not contain the true
intention of the parties because Florindas consent
thereto was vitiated by mistake.
RTC dismissed the complaint. As to the contention that
the subject agreement had no force and effect on
account of the absence of the signature of Florindas
husband, petitioner Renato dela Cruz (Renato), the RTC
ruled to the contrary, thus:
o
Indeed, Renato dela Cruz did not sign the
Agreement, however, he was present at the
time the Agreement was signed by the parties
and their witnesses, and the same was
presented to him for his signature. In fact,
attempts were even made to procure his
signature, but plaintiff wife Florinda dela Cruz
insisted that her signature already carries that
of her husband Renato dela Cruz. The parties
never insisted that Renato dela Cruz sign the
Agreement as the wife has spoken. It is further
observed that by his actuations Renato dela
Cruz has agreed and has given his conformity
to the agreement. He also did not object to the
execution of the same at the time it was
signed by his wife Florinda dela Cruz on
September 9, 1991, even he was present and
he was shown and furnished a copy of the said
agreement.
The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC in its decision.
Hence this petition.

Issue: W/N Art. 124 of the Civil Code which was relied upon by
the petitioners is applicable in the case at bar
Held: No
Article 124 of the Family Code relied upon by
petitioners provides that the administration of the
conjugal partnership is now a joint undertaking of the
husband and the wife. In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal partnership, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
However, the power of administration does not include
the power to dispose or encumber property belonging
to the conjugal partnership. In all instances, the present
law specifically requires the written consent of the
other spouse, or authority of the court for the
disposition or encumbrance of conjugal partnership
property without which, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void.
The foregoing provision finds no application in this case
because the transaction between Florinda and Leonila
in reality did not involve any disposition of property
belonging to any of the sisters conjugal assets.
o
It may be recalled that the agreement was for
the acquisition of two lots which were being
sold together for P180,000.00.
o
Florinda who had only P144,000.00 asked
Leonila to contribute P36,000.00 to complete
the purchase price of said lots. With money

pooled together, the sisters agreed that Lot

503 be valued at P80,000.00 and Lot 505
valued at P100,000.00.
o
The P36,000.00 contribution of Leonila shall be
applied to the 503 property which upon full
payment of the remaining balance of
P44,000.00 advanced by Florinda shall belong
to Leonila. On the other hand, of Florindas
P144,000.00 contribution, P 100,000.00 shall
be considered as full payment for the
purchase of the 505 property and the
P44,000.00 which was the balance of the
purchase price of Lot 503, as loan to Leonila.
o
To secure payment of the loan, Lot 503 was
provisionally registered in the name of
petitioners. Hence Lot 503 was at the outset
not intended to be part of the conjugal asset
of the petitioners but only as a security for the
payment of the P44,000.00 due from
respondents.
Moreover, while Florindas husband did not affix his
signature to the above-mentioned Agreement, we find
no ground to disturb the uniform findings of the trial
court and appellate court that Renato, by his
actuations, agreed and gave his conformity to the
Agreement.
o
As found by the courts below, Renatos
consent to the Agreement was drawn from the
fact that he was present at the time it was
signed by the sisters and their witnesses; he
had knowledge of the Agreement as it was
presented to him for his signature, although
he did not sign the same because his wife
Florinda insisted that her signature already
carried that of her husband; Renato witnessed
the fact that Leonila contributed her hard
earned savings in the amount of P36,000.00 to
complete their share in the purchase price of
the properties in question in the total amount
of P180,000.00. The aforesaid factual findings
of the courts below are beyond review at this
stage.

Section 6. Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership Regime;

Collection suits against partnership; Death of a spouse
Art. 126. The conjugal partnership terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the
marriage under Articles 134 to 138

25

Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and

wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal partnership,
except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses
to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right
to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of
the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be
obtained in a summary proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership
property, the separate property of both spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse
present shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding, be
given judicial authority to administer or encumber any
specific separate property of the other spouse and use
the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.

Art. 128.
If a spouse without just cause abandons
the other or fails to comply with his or her obligation to
the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court
for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for
authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal
partnership property, subject to such precautionary
conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding
paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when
he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention
of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal
dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within
the same period to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no
intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.

26