University of Puerto Rico

Ro Piedras Campus Law School

Achieving Intergenerational Justice Through Education INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE, Dere 7996

Prof. Vctor Muiz-Fraticelli

By: Tzeitel Andino-Caballero

I. Introduction In the award-winning documentary An Inconvenient Truth, former Vice President Al Gore states that [f]uture generations may well have occasion to ask themselves, what were our parents thinking? why didn't they wake up when they had a chance?' We have to hear that question from them, now. Although Gore poses these questions amidst the climate change discussion, it represents a collective notion of how intergenerational justice is socially conceived. Simply put, as a collective whole, we would never dare deny our responsibility as to the fate of our people in the distant and not so distant future. The problem arises, I believe, when we set ourselves to think about how much this aspiration should affect our present decisions. In other words, to what extent should we, collectively and individually, sacrifice and assume the cost for practices that will reap benefits in the future? These are precisely the musings that have engrossed legal philosophers, and to which definite answers are yet to be found. In this essay I shall try to solve such questions through the integration of several philosophical frameworks. I shall begin by setting the theoretical grounds which will enable the discussion around the subject of intergenerational justice. For this, John Rawls' framework will be essential, and it shall be complemented with the interpretations of Jane English and Brian Barry. Through this analysis, I shall aspire to answer the question of whether present generations should acknowledge that they have an obligation towards future generations. Then, John O'Neill's theorization will be used to supplement Rawls' framework in certain gray zones in order to determine if there is a reciprocal relationship between present generations and those in the distant future, which would justify our duty towards these. As part of this exercise, a concrete example of our current democratic structure will be given to sustain the validity of integrating both frameworks. Finally, I shall consider how such a feat me be accomplished in actuality, so that the obligation towards those who are not present in the present may be fulfilled. II. Present and Future: Is the First Obliged Towards the Latter? Rawls aimed to establish a theory of justice that is able to formulate the principles that are to regulate the background institutions.1 It is clear that his purpose was not to formulate a theory which would help solve the intergenerational justice dilemma. However, theorizing about justice inevitably lead him to this subject. We shall set forth, succinctly, the tract of ideas and concepts that brought about this result. Rawls commences by establishing that the primary subject of a theory of justice is society's basic structure or the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.2 Major institutions are defined as the political constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements.3 Some examples of these social institutions are the legal protection of freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, competitive markets, and private property. Their importance lies in their responsibility for determining men's rights and duties and influenc[ing] their life-prospects, what they can expect to be and how well they can hope to do.4 Considering all of the above, Rawls sets out embarks in a mental exercise which seeks to define justice for the basic structure of society conceived of for the time being
1 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 137 (1971). 2 Id. at 7. 3 Id. at 7. 4 Id. at 7.

as a closed system isolated from other societies.5 He asserts, as part of his mental exercise, that the principles that will serve as guide for society's basic structure may be discovered. As English explains, it is here that Rawls' fundamental insight is presented. Specifically, he proclaims that self-interested and rational representatives of the members of society are to choose these principles by situating themselves in a standpoint, called the original position, and from behind a veil of ignorance.6 The veil of ignorance would hide from them facts they would need to know to render their judgment self-serving,7 such as religious beliefs, gender, social position, the generation to which they belong, amongst others. However, the representatives would still have access to information from areas of psychology, sociology and economics. This original position is supposed to be a point of view or basis for moral reasoning which anyone can adopt at any time. . . . From behind the veil of ignorance, [the representatives] are in the dark as to [their] period in history and as to what [their] predecessors have done.8 Such conditions, he believes, would then enable the actors behind the veil of ignorance to agree on how to constitute social cooperation, and lead them to the selection of two basic social principles. The first basic social principle is that each person is to have equal rights to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.9 These are the equal basic liberties of citizenship, which includes political liberty and freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person and the right to hold personal property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure.10 The second principle is to establish the social and economic inequalities so that they are (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.11 An important aspect of both principles is that these do not operate in isolation. Rather, Rawls limits their ambit. For this, in the Rawlsian scheme, the second principle is structurally protected by the first, which means that [t]he distribution of wealth and income, and the hierarchies of authority, must be consistent with both the liberties of equal citizenship and equality of opportunity.12 The second structural condition that he applies to both principles is the liberal interpretation with the purpose of mitigating the influence of social contingencies and natural fortune on distributive shares.13 The rationale for including such limitations is that Rawls takes it as a premise that [f]ree market arrangements must be set within a framework of political and legal institutions which regulates the overall trends of economic events and preserves the social conditions necessary for fair equality of opportunity.14 For this, the limitations he includes in his theory of justice strive to prevent excessive accumulations of property and wealth, and maintain equal opportunities of education for all.15 From the aforementioned, we can see that although social realities impose certain differences on people, a theory of justice cannot justify excessive differences. As Rawls argues, the natural distribution and particular position in which a person is born is neither just nor unjust, but how
5 Brian Barry, The Circumstances of Justice and Future Generations, in OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 229, (R.I. Sikora and B. Barry ed., 1978), citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra, at 8. 6 Jane English, Justice between generations, 31 PHIL. STUDIES 91 (1977). 7 Stephen Bickham, Future Generations and Contemporary Ethical Theory, 15 J. OF VALUE INQUIRY 169, 174. 8 Jane English, Justice between generations, supra, Note 6, at 98. 9 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra, Note 1, at 60. 10 Id. at 60. 11 Id. at 60. 12 Id. at 61. 13 Id. at 73. 14 Id. at 73. 15 Id. at 73.

institutions deal with these facts is just or unjust. In justice as fairness men agree to share one another's fate. In designing institutions they undertake to avail themselves of the accidents of nature and social circumstance only when doing so is for the common benefit.16 Because of this, a social system should be designed in such a way that no one gains or loses from his arbitrary place in the distribution of natural assets or his initial position in society without giving or receiving compensating advantages in return.17 Incorporating the perspective of the least advantaged to social institutions leads Rawls to the difference principle. He defines this principle as a strong egalitarian concept in the sense that unless there is a distribution that makes both persons better off . . . an equal distribution is to be preferred.18 It serves to express a conception of reciprocity or of mutual benefit, which should be satisfied in a way that's consistent with the first principle of justice, i.e., with the demands of liberty and fair equality of opportunity.19 Once the difference principle is accepted, it follows that the social minimums are to be set at a point which maximizes the expectations of the least advantaged group.20 But, keeping true to his concern of fairness, Rawls also limits the difference principle by avoiding the region where the marginal contributions of those better off to the well-being of the less favored are negative.21 The difference principle in the Rawlsian framework is crucial because it provides an interpretation of the principle of fraternity: the idea of not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of others who are less well off.22 Accepting the difference principle connects the traditional ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity with the democratic interpretation of the two principles of justice.23 This means that liberty, equality and equality of fair opportunity is associated to Rawls' first principle, while fraternity is related to the difference principle. These, taken as a whole, make possible the establishment of a social structure that can harmonize men's interests in order to allow reciprocal social advantages. Both principles are then crucial for choosing among various social arrangements in order to divide advantages and disadvantages, and underwrite an agreement on the proper distributive shares.24 These, in turn, determine the role of justice, while the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary,25 configure the circumstances of justice. In this respect, [t]he principles of justice simply are the principles for regulating distribution that will be chosen by people in a society where the circumstances of justice hold.26 To design a social system in which the resulting distribution is just, Rawls sees a need to set the social and economic process within the surroundings of suitable political and legal institutions.27 These supporting institutions are to be regulated by a just constitution that secures the liberties of equal citizenship,28 such as liberty of conscience, freedom of thought, political liberty, and equality of opportunity. In the case of equality of opportunity, Rawls understands that its achievement depends
16 Id. at 102. 17 Id. at 102. 18 Id. at 76. 19 Id. at 87. 20 Id. at 285. 21 Id. at 104. 22 Id. at 105. 23 Id. at 106. 24 Id. at 126. 25 Id. at 126. 26 Brian Barry, The Circumstances of Justice and Future Generations, supra, Note 5, at 231. 27 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra, Note 1, at 275. 28 Id. at 275.

upon the establishment of a set of institutions which assure similar chances of education and culture for persons similarly motivated.29 In this scenario, the principles of justice [are to] define the crucial constraints which institutions and joint activities must satisfy if persons engaging in them have no complaints... If these constraints are satisfied, the resulting distribution, whatever it is, may be accepted as just (or at least not unjust).30 Having established this framework, Rawls then sets out to answer the question of whether the persons in the original position have obligations and duties to third parties, for example, to their immediate descendants.31 He believes that there is a motivational component which, in part, may answer it.32 Yet, he argues that the account for the circumstances of justice doesn't involve theories of human motivation, but rather its aim is to include in the description of the original position the relations of individuals to one another in order to set the stage for questions of justice.33 That being so, he resorts yet again, to the veil of ignorance and the original position in order to nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage.34 To put it in Barry's words, by postulating that people in the original position know the circumstances of justice, Rawls commits himself to the proposition that the circumstances of justice hold in all generations (past, present and future) since the people in the original position do not know what generation they belong to.35 Hence, the principles chosen by those in the original position will be such that anyone, in whatever time, would adopt its perspective, and would be willing to live with their consequences, irrespective of the generation they end up belonging to.36 After explaining the aforesaid, Rawls then puts his own answer to the test. He turns to the difference principle, applies it to the question at hand and observes that [t]he appropriate expectation in applying the difference principle is that of the long-term prospects of the least favored extending over future generations. Each generation must not only preserve the gains of culture and civilization, and maintain intact those just institutions that have been established, but it must also put aside in each period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation.37 By employing the veil of ignorance, Rawls conceives the list of people in the standpoint of the original position as a scheme of cooperation spread out in historical time . . . governed by the same conception of justice that regulates the cooperation of contemporaries.38 These would choose the just savings principle in order to solve the problem of justice between generations and to specify the social minimum. The result being that the accumulation for later generations would be a fair equivalent in real capital in return for what is received from previous generations that enables the later ones to enjoy a better life in a more just society.39 What is just or unjust in this context would be how institutions, using the just savings principle, deal with natural limitations and the way they are set up to take
29 Id. at 278. 30 Brian Barry, The Circumstances of Justice and Future Generations, supra, Note 5, at 232, citing John Rawls, Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice in Nomos IV, Justice 102 (C. J. Friedrich & John Chapman eds., 1963). 31 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra, Note 1, at 128. 32 Since the parties in the original position are thought of as representing continuing lines of claims... as deputies for a kind of everlasting moral agent or institution, he believes that it is safe to assume that at least they care for the well-being of those in the next generation. Id. at 128. 33 Id. at 128. 34 Id. at 136. 35 Brian Barry, The Circumstances of Justice and Future Generations, supra, Note 5, at X. 36 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra, Note 1, at 137. 37 Id. at 285. 38 Id. at 289. 39 Id. at 288.

advantage of historical possibilities.40 Because of this, justice then requires, as Barry shows, that the overall range of opportunities open to successor generations [are not] narrowed. If some openings are closed . . . others should be created (if necessary at the cost of some sacrifice) to make up.41 In other words, while making successors better off is a nice thing to do, but not required by justice, not making successors worse off is required by justice.42 Another important consideration is that Rawls essentially proposes here that what is saved and should be the subject of generational distribution are just institutions, and not primary goods such as wealth.43 Another important aspect of the just savings principle is the purpose it serves. Specifically, it acts as (1) a constraint to the difference principle,44 and (2) an understanding between generations to carry their fair share of the burden of realizing and preserving a just society.45 Based on this, Rawls answers the question of the obligation of present generations towards future generations by stating that the first have to uphold and further just institutions, while aspiring to reach a just state of things beyond which no further saving would be required.46 Hence, a present society's goal should be to work towards achieving the firm establishment of just institutions, so that in an eventual future no more net accumulation is required and society's duty may then evolve to maintaining just institutions and preserving their material base.47 III. Intergenerational Reciprocality: Myth or Fact? While expounding the just savings principle and its implications with respect to future generations, Rawls asserts that [i]t is a natural fact that generations are spread out in time and actual exchanges between them take place only in one direction. We can do something for posterity but it can do nothing for us . . . The only reciprocal exchanges between generations are virtual ones.48 However, I believe that Rawls had already set forth certain ideas that serve as starting points for justifying the reciprocality of intergenerations in the long term. It is based on these starting points that I will proceed to incorporate O'Neill's theorization to the Rawlsian framework. In order to illustrate the validity of this exercise, I will identify how the contractual theory limits Rawls' theorization of the problem of justice between generations, in spite of his recourse to the veil of ignorance and the original position. Then, I will establish how Rawls and O'Neill may be coherently united. Finally, I shall refer to the Constitution of the United States of America and use it as a concrete example of how a democratic society does incorporate, as an institution of its social structure, what O'Neill defines as a community. Legal doctrine establishes two essential aspects of contractual relationships which, when applied to the intergenerational scenario, become problematic because it ends oversimplifying intergenerational relationships. The first of these aspects is the promise of a party which binds himself to another party by agreeing to execute a certain duty in return for something.49 This notion of contractual relationships, I believe provides, in part, for the upsurge of theories of how since posterity can do nothing for us, we don't have to do anything for it.50 After all, only a present generation can
40 Id. at 291. 41 Brian Barry, The Circumstances of Justice and Future Generations, supra, Note 5, at 243. 42 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra, Note 1, at 244. 43 Jane English, Justice between generations, supra, Note 6, at 103. 44 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra, Note 1, at 292. 45 Id. at 289. 46 Id. at 289. 47 Id. at 287. 48 Id. at 291. 49 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 1:1 (Richard A. Lord, 4th ed. 1990). 50 Although not discussed here, such views are what I believe also permits the creation of arguments, such as Derek Parfit's non-identity problem. For Parfit, our present actions may not be judged, however moral or immoral, beneficial or detrimental they are to future

consciously and voluntarily bind itself to do something for the future, which means that the manifestation of mutual assent would be lacking, along with the consideration, or the bargaining for legal benefit and/or detriment.51 The second aspect that affects the intergenerational problem is the equivalence in the value of the parties' exchange, i.e., that the benefits to be received are equivalent to what will be given in exchange for these.52 This approach, in my view, responds to the interest of only doing those things for which a Return on Investment may be received upon the delivery of the obligation or promise. This expectation functions as a limitative condition for actions whose impact will be seen by unborn future generations, after one has seized to exist. Because of its limited perspective, it fails to explain other aspects that move individuals and societies to act. For this reason, obligations to future generations may be rationally, but not completely explained from the contractual doctrine's point of view. It is important to note that the previous perspective tries to explain intergenerational relationships solely from an economic standpoint, failing to consider the political, human and social aspects that also permeate these and affect their outcome. Although Rawls tried to surpass the problems that arise from the traditional contract approach through means of the original position53, when it comes to the subject of intergenerational reciprocality, his theory proves to be slightly limiting. However, even Rawls acknowledged that there was something more that acted upon human relationships (than what a contractual approach is able to explain) although, he failed to incorporate it as a formal requirement for his theory of justice. Specifically, he recognized the importance that the principle of fraternity plays in democratic theory because it conveys certain attitudes of mind and forms of conduct without which we would lose sight of the values54 expressed by the democratic rights, such as liberty and equality. For him, fraternity also implied a sense of civic friendship and social solidarity, which is basic to any democratic society.55 In my view, from Rawls' principle of fraternity naturally flows the concept of community on which O'Neill bases his proposal. For O'Neill, a community is constituted by members of a collective that understand themselves as having certain continuity over time, and who see their own interests as bound up with those of future members of that collective.56 It is in a community where members of a collective find a sense of identity that spread[s] across time.57 Since such a sense of identity requires and encourages participation in those projects whose success requires cooperation across generations, present generation's success is then found to be bound up with those of future generations.58 It is from this idea that O'Neill's central thesis then flourishes: future generations have the power to benefit or harm present ones because they are the only ones that are able to bring to fruition our projects.59 O'Neill believes that present generations can fail with respect to future ones in two ways: (1) We can fail to produce works or perform actions which are achievements. Future generations may not
generations because ultimately, whoever those future generations end up being, these would owe their own existence to such actions. In this sense, if they were to question past deeds of previous generations, in actuality they would be questioning their own existence, and its validity. In the case of present actions that cause extreme harm in the future, then no claim could be made because as those persons could not come into existence, no harm could be made. 51 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra, Note 49. 52 9C Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy 2246. 53 Jane English, Justice between generations, supra, Note 6, at 91. 54 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra, Note 1, at 105. 55 Id. at 105. 56 John O'Neill, Future Generations: Present Harms, 68 PHILOSOPHY 35, 47 (1993) 57 Id. at 47. 58 Id. at 50. 59 Id. at 41.

be able to bring our deeds to a successful fruition. (2) We can fail to produce generations capable of appreciating what is an achievement or contributing to its success.60 Because of this, he recognizes that present generations have a primary responsibility to try to ensure that future generations are part of a community with them, so that these may appreciate their works, goods and skills, and hence may contribute to their continuation. This is a two-fold condition because it is an obligation not only to future generations, but also to those of the past, so that their achievements continue to be both appreciated and extended; and to the present ourselvesso that we do not . . . undermine our own achievements by rendering impossible our own success.61 Now, O'Neill's proposal of how future generations can have a positive or negative effect on present and past generation's projects, is also tied to Rawls' idea of how [e]ach generation must not only preserve the gains of culture and civilization, and maintain intact those just institutions that have been established, but it must also put aside in each period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation.62 I would even venture to say that Rawls' proposal of generational responsibility rests upon the presumption that future generations will identify with past and present generation's culture, civilization, goods and just institutions and, because of this rapport, would then strive to advance their projects and institutions in the distant future. Consequently, if one links Rawls' principle of fraternity to his view of society as having a duty of maintaining just institutions and preserving their material base for the benefit of the future, one is led to the conclusion that, ultimately, he is just describing the intergenerational reciprocality, as understood by O'Neill in his proposal of the community. Since intergenerational cooperation, reciprocality and union requires a sense of identity not grasped by Rawls' theoretical concepts such as, the just savings principle and the original position I believe it must then be complemented with O'Neill's proposal. Also, seeing that O'Neill's definition of the community resonates with Rawls' structural framework I believe it is able to supplement Rawls' theory of justice in order to solve to the problems of intergenerational reciprocality. Nonetheless, one can easily concede to the fact that a concept such as community, although common amongst social scientists, would not be as easily adopted by political scientists or legal philosophers. But, if one turns to the U.S. Constitution, one may find a similar concept that gathers the essential ideas put forth by O'Neill's definition of a community and may help solve this problem. The Citizenship Clause in the XIV Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that [a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.63 Explaining this clause, it has been argued that since the Fourteenth Amendment mandates national citizenship before the equal protection of the law, it affirmatively guarantees national citizenship. In this sense, the guarantee does more than designate a legal status [since] it obligates the national government to secure the full membership, effective participation, and equal dignity of all citizens in the national community.64 It is important to observe three aspects contained by the previous the quotation. The first one is that citizenship is mentioned as being a part of a national community; the second one is that citizenship is equated to the institutions contained by Rawls' first principle, i.e., the just institutions associated with equal citizenship and equality of opportunity; and the third aspect is that this constitutional guarantee obligates present
60 Id. at 41. 61 Id. at 42. 62 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra, Note 1, at 285. 63 U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, 1. 64 Goodwin Liu, Education. Equality and National Citizenship, 116 Yale L.J. 330, 335 (2006) (emphasis added).

generations, through means of their government, by imposing them the duty of securing those institutions associated to Rawls' first principle. Because of this, I propose that it is through the concept of citizenship that the ideas contained in O'Neill's proposal of the community may be easily incorporated into the Rawlsian framework. Integrating the ideas aforementioned, one may then conclude that the citizens of past, present and future generations have a reciprocal relationship, since they are all part of the same national community. Present generations are then responsible for carrying their fair share of the burden of realizing and preserving a just society65 in which full membership, effective participation, and equal dignity of all citizens is achieved. Failing to do so, harms past and present generation's aspiration of future continuation and fruition of their projects. IV. Just Institutions for Future Generations: How are These to Be Guaranteed? As we have already established, past, present, and future generations have a reciprocal relationship as citizens of the same national community. Present citizens are then obliged to guarantee, through their institutions, the future continuation of past and present generation's projects, culture, civilization, and goods. Having then answered the question of whether and why we owe future generations anything, the guiding purpose of the present section will be to answer the question of how such an obligation is to be achieved. Political, civil, and social equality all play an essential role in Rawls' theory of justice. For this reason, justice as fairness considers those principles of justice that reflect the idea that all citizens should be regarded as free and equal persons. But, to become a free and equal person, fair equality of opportunities are initially required. This means that a certain set of institutions will have to insure similar chances of education and culture for persons similarly motivated.66 It is then upon this that we construct citizenship, within the Rawlsian framework, to signify having not only a set of legal rights and duties, but also a level of human functionings and capabilities essential to being regarded by oneself and by others as a full member of one's society.67 Drawing upon arguments of freedom and equality, Rawls sustains that equal opportunities of education for all should be maintained. The reason for this is that [c]hances to acquire cultural knowledge and skills should not depend upon one's class position, and so the school system, whether public or private, should be designed to even out class barriers.68 In other words, everyone should have an equal right to participate in all the facets of citizenship cultural, professional, economic, etc. and education is the institution which ensures that citizens will acquire the know-how to be able to perform basic democratic responsibilities in the future, such as freedom of speech and assembly. And so, integrating with our previous arguments, equal citizenship is achieved through the social systems of support and opportunity which are responsible for providing a foundation for political and economic autonomy and participation.69 The prime institution in such system of support and opportunity is education. Now, by complementing equality with the difference principle, Rawls is able to justify the allocation of resources in education in order to improve the long-term expectation of the least favored.70
65 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra, Note 1, at 289. 66 Id. at 278. 67 Goodwin Liu, Education. Equality and National Citizenship, supra, Note 64, at 342. 68 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra, Note 1, at 73. 69 Goodwin Liu, Education. Equality and National Citizenship, supra, Note 64, at 407. 70 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra, Note 1, at 101 (emphasis added).

There are two central ideas present to this proposal. First, that the education project is one that transcends the present because of the long-term expectation that members of society have. In this way, education becomes one of those just institutions that must be saved and should be part of intergenerational distribution. Second, the educational institution justifies the investment of present resources, even when its benefits will be reaped in the long run. However, Rawls advises that the importance of education transcends the underlying arguments of the difference principle. Specifically, he establishes that the value of education should not be assessed solely in terms of economic efficiency and social welfare. Equally if not more important is the role of education in enabling a person to enjoy the culture of his society and to take part in its affairs, and in this way to provide for each individual a secure sense of his own worth.71 This argument is extremely potent because it establishes how education transcends the economic and social realm in view of the fact that it is essentially concerned with helping future citizens adjust early on to their social environment, with raising the majority's level of self-esteem and with forming effective actors for future political scenarios. It is precisely because of the transcendental function that education plays in the continuation of a just society that Rawls includes education as one of the supporting political and legal institutions necessary to set the social and economic process that will establish the distribution process in a social system. In this way, he stipulates that to secure fair equal opportunity, in addition to maintaining the usual kinds of overhead capital, the government tries to insure equal chances of education and culture for persons similarly endowed and motivated either by subsidizing private schools or by establishing a public school system. It also enforces and underwrites equality of opportunity in economic activities and in the free choice of occupation.72 Hence, being born into undeserved inequalities that would ordinarily deprive a person from an equal access to education, activates the principle of redress contained in the difference principle so that such a person may be somehow compensated. Redress of unequal distributive shares, then serves to justify how greater resources might be spent on the education of the less rather than the more intelligent, at least over a certain time of life.73 The practical effects of such policies would be that while society covers the costs of training and education, it attracts individuals to places and associations where they are needed the most, leaving to each individual the liberty to decide and do those things that best accord its aims. Even though Rawls believes that the doctrine of redress applies to the educational scenario, he notices that variations in wages and income will result, and that the prerequisites of the positions that citizens are to take will influence the choices they make.74 But these only act as limitations which affect, but not determine, the individual's freedom to choose. Hence, in terms of the economic implications of education, Rawls limits the principle of redress so that it has no applicability in this secondary aspect. We can then deduce that education neither coincides with nor guarantees economic equality; it only aspires to guarantee full participation and equal belonging to society. Since a just scheme should answer to what men are entitled to; [and should satisfy] their

71 Id. at 101 (emphasis added). 72 Id. at 275. 73 Id. at 100-101. 74 Id. at 315.

legitimate expectations as founded upon social institutions,75 it is clear that, for Rawls, education is the social institution through which a just scheme for the present and the future may be achieved. Because of this, Rawls essentially treats justice among generations as involving each generation's passing on to the next a suitable accumulation of intellectual, economic, and educational 'capital' so that the next can have the werewithal to continue or to establish just institutions, as well as support a reasonable standard of living.76 After analyzing Rawls' proposal, I believe that education is the institution that he conceives as capable of structuring a just society for the future from the present, while forming young generations so that these may embrace their up-coming future citizenships. This means that: (1) from the present, important intergenerational transfers take place through means of the educational institution,77 (2) education is the just institution through which reciprocal intergenerational relationships are established, (3) intergenerational cooperation is regulated through the educational institution, and (4) education is future-oriented in the sense that the value of [its] practice depends, at least in part, on the possibility that it will continue to be realized. . . . the benet or continued involvement of future people in the project is constitutive of its value for the past- or presently-living people who undertake them.78 Let it also be noted that not only is education the institution designed for transferring knowledge amongst generations, but it is responsible for teaching history, as a formal subject matter. Understanding society's history, I believe, empowers present and future citizens with the capacity to question and modify inherited institutions, while preserving the principles important to their tradition and existence. Therefore, failing in education creates the following series of present and future damages: (1) wrecks just institutions and their material base, (2) jeopardizes the future continuation of past endeavors, (3) impairs present and future generation's rights and duties, (4) minimizes society's contribution to the least advantaged groups in the present and in the future making them even more dependent on their class position and hardening, in the process, social class barriers. Hence, failing to guarantee education is equal to barring generations, present and future, from continuing past projects and obtaining a just society. As we have seen, education has a direct bearing on society's progress because it structures fundamental rights and duties which are to be exercised by citizens, in the distant and not so distant future. It is then the institution through which present generations may distribute into the future democratic liberties and duties, the means to continue the future-oriented practices of past persons and the way of respecting the ongoing interest of present and future people to continue these practices.79 As O'Neill pointed out, it is through the education of succeeding generations that one establishes not only an audience for one's work, but also participants in the same enterprise who are able to render it a possible success. Hence, to fail to educate succeeding generations is not only to damage them, it is also to damage oneself.80 For this, I propose that education is the institution through which we are to pay our dues to previous generations, while guaranteeing just institutions and life conditions for those who are yet to be born. V. Conclusion In this essay, a series of questions have been answered, based on Rawls' and O'Neill's framework. Specifically, we have defined what constitutes intergenerational justice; if present
75 Id. at 311. 76 Stephen Bickham, Future Generations and Contemporary Ethical Theory, supra, Note , at 169. 77 Richard A. Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1476 (1989). 78 Vctor Muiz, The Problem of a Perpetual Constitution, in INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE 390 (Mayer A. Gosseries ed., 2009). 79 Id. at 390. 80 John O'Neill, Future Generations: Present Harms, supra, Note , at 41.

generations have a duty towards future ones; how much should they sacrifice; and how are just institutions to be guaranteed. However, the first question that was posed in the Introduction (Al Gore's question) is yet to be resolved. Our parents think what society has historically taught them to. Hence, to Al Gore I would say that their inability to wake up when they still have a chance is the result of past generation's omission in establishing an educational institution guided by just principles. Such a failure has put at risk the perpetuation of past projects, values and institutions while endangering the continuation of human life and individual lives, as we know them. It is then the responsibility of their sons and daughters to bring justice to what should have never been unjust, and to give those in the future access to the education that previous generations were denied.