Naturalism and Agnostism

NATUKALISM
AND
AGNOSTICISM
THE GIFFOED LECTURES DELIVEEED BEFORE
THE UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN
IN THE YEARS 1896-1898
BY
JAMES WARD,
Sc.D.
FELLOW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY

FROFESSOR OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND LOGIC
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
HON. LL.D. EDINBURGH
THIRD ED ITI OX
VOLUME
" Wer
die Gesetzmdssigkeit der
II
Natur fur das
verant-
wortlich mackt, teas wirklich geschieht, behauptet damit,
dass sie Gedanken realisiere,

wissen."
Sigwakt.
und
ist
Teleolog ohnt es zu
LONDON
ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK
1906
All rights reserved
First Edition (in tvjo volumes) published June 1899
Second Edition August 1903.
Tlilrd Edition
November 1906
CONTENTS
OF THE SECO^fD VOLUME
PAET
THEORY OF PSYCHOPHYSICAL
III.
PARALLELISM
LECTURE XI
VARIOUS FORMS OF THE THEORY
PAGES
These theories attempt to answer the question How are psychical changes related to the physical changes in the organism?
They all start from the Cartesian doctrine of the essential disparateness and distinctness of Matter and Mind. So far they
have common thought on their side hence it is advisable to
inquire first whether they are tenable even on this dualistic
assumption
:
What is meant by the physical

meaning
my
series readily ascertained.
of the psychical series not so clear.
consciousness as a unity for
me
as
a series of events for the psychophysicist.

phrase " parallelism " in this connexion
(1) Clifford's exposition of Mind-stuff
is
my
It is
much
not so
consciousness as
....
Ambiguities of the
7-13
only Matter-stuff over

13-17
again
The
3-7
But the
(2)
assumes that two incompatible standpoints can be stereoscoped into one
(3)
The Conscious Automaton theory leaves the dualism untouched, and while asserting invariable concomitance tries to
so-called Tioo-Aspects theory
17-22
deny any causal connexion the two series keep pace, but yet
each " goes along by itself." On the psychical side, sensation,
on the physical, life, are difficulties in the way of this theory.
:
How
they are got over.
separation
is
some form of crude monism, or one

end subordinate to the other
V
either lapses into

is
in the
Constant parallelism plus absolute
logically so unstable a position that this theory

series
22-29
CONTENTS OF
vi
Among scientific men
the primacy
Huxley taken as a type.
usually given to the material
is
He
maintains that sensation

an effect of molecular change, but will not allow that molecuTo justify this posilar changes are ever the effect of volition.
tion volition has to be regarded as feeling or sensation simply.
side.
is
'
'
'
'
29-33
LECTUEE Xn
THE CONSCIOUS AUTOMATON THEORY
Doctrine of Conscious Automatism or Psychical Epiphenomenalism examined. It is maintained (1) that there can be no
causal connexion between the psychical and the physical
series, and yet (2) that the psychical is a " collateral product"
or epiphenomenon of the physical.
The very statement is
thus
35-38
self-contradictory
Mind thus becomes impotent to

position Naturalism
(1)
it
is
and
For
really at variance with itself.
elsewhere assumes that mind
biological evolution,
In accepting this
control matter.
is
an
efficient factor in
....
(2) the physicist proper declares that
the laws of matter alone will not explain
However, taking the doctrine as

articles specially to consider:
it
life
stands, there are these
(a) the primacy
38-40
two
and indepen-
dence of the automaton, and {h) the illusory character of psychical activity. The latter to be discussed first
.
40-41
Huxley's endeavour to save himself from the charge of fatalism

only results in substituting a blind necessity for a logical one.
Again, he urges that we are free, "inasmuch as in maay
respects we can do as we like." But how so, if " volitions do
not enter into the chain of causation of the action at all " ?
Turning now to the mechanical world, of which the automaton
There
we
no
activity within that
is
a part,
is
then activity nowhere
talking of
it
how
find
even as illusory
How
And
then do
if
....
we come
41-48
to be
conscious automatism
The ground on
because
which Descartes called man ?i conscious automaton
is ignored by Huxof his intellectual and voluntary activity
ley and others. On their premisses Descartes would have
called man a mere automaton.
Huxley turned against himis
true,
is
illusion or error possible ?
The psychical series will not resolve into a series

and "volition counts for something as a condition
the course of events "
self.
of
feelings,
of
48-58
THE SECOND VOLUME

An
antinomy thus reveals

mechanical.
itself
vii
that of the teleological and the
The conscious automaton theory
the result of the
Attempts to find a half-way through loopholes within the

mechanical theory turn out to be futile
naturalist's preference
for materialistic tenninology.
....
LECTURE
58-64
XIII
SDMMART AND REFLEXIONS

Abstract Dynamics does not furnish us with a Natural Philosophy,
but with a descriptive instrument of uncertain range. Facts

cannot be maimed to fit it, but it must be modified to suit
them
66-68
Even what can be mechanically

ence
It is
may
convince us that
described need not be,
it is not,
and
experi-
mechanically jjrocZwcefZ
68-71
impossible to divest living beings of "internal determina-
tions
and grounds
of determination."
Descartes' distinction
and causa eminens. Physics recognises

The
only the former, and resolves that into an equation.
latter, being excluded from its premisses, is supposed to be
excluded from existence. On this fallacy the doctrine of conInertia not a fact but an ideal
scious automatism is built up.
of causa formalis
71-74
Conservation of energy essentially a law of exchanges. That the

whole energy of the universe is constant in amount and phe'
nomenal
The
'
74-78
in character, not proven
theoretical physicist having eliminated causation,
dogmatise about
the world
is
it.
The crux
must not
of irreversibility suggests that
not a mere mechanism.
scribes the utterances of real things
The physicist only deand the after-course of
He is
maximum breach
direction now
these utterances, so far as left alone.
obliged to admit
interference, but prefers a
of continuity far
off
rather than orderly
Such direction impossible

verse are inert.
if
No warrant
for
must
start
dead things
and if we want
preferring
rather than living as the type of such beings
and not merely

from some other type
to understand the world
78-83
all the beings in the objective uni-
to calculate
it,
we
83-86
The mathematical bias the source of naturalism. It can only be

Mechanism by
corrected by observing how it has arisen.
With mind first come law
itself is chaotic and meaningless.
and order. And mind we have seen implied as a vis directrix,
at least, in evolution, in natural selection, in psychophysics
86-93
CONTENTS OF
viii
PART
REFUTATION OF DUALISM
IV.
LECTURE XIV
GENERAL CONCEPTION OF EXPERIENCE
PAGES
The
discussion of Psychophysical Parallelism has led
we now
formal side of our subject
knowledge and what does
imply ?
it
What
ask,
up
is
to the
natural
97-99
Naturalism assumes a dualism of phenomena and epiphenomena,

But the real world from
the former having the primac}'.
which it starts is epiphenomenal. How then does it get to its
real world of matter in motion, and, having got there, how
'
'
does
'
'
it
get back ?
99-107
The perplexities of dualism have brought into favour an agnostic

monism or 'revised materialism.' If we are to transcend
dualism and this monism, it will be by making knowledge, or
rather experience
this question
itself,
by natural
an object of reflexion. Neglect of

science, psychology and the pre107-110
Kantian metaphysics
What we
find
not a dualism of mind and matter, but a duality
is
and object in the unity
of subject
of experience
Experience does not begin with a disconnected 'manifold.'

Sensations not
'
subjective modifications ' nor devoid of all
Relation of subject and object

terms.
Objective
'
tempts to treat
'
is
it
causal ?
use from two standpoints.
this relation as causal noticed
'
form
Ambiguity
Various
.
110-112
112-113
'
113-117
of
at.
117-123
LECTURE XV
EXPERIENCE AS LIFE
Recapitulation and further explication as to the general conception of experience.
difficulty
Its
fundamental character the whole

by imperfect analysis and
early reflexion misled
by deceptive analogies
Coming
to details,
we
124-130
note that every concrete experience
is
is a Life.
Kant's distinction of
matter and form ' and his Synthetic Unity of Apperception.'
Conation more fundamental than cognition. Subjective selection determined by the worth of objects rather than by their
content.
A purely cognitive experience impossible. Prac-
process of self-conservation,
'
'
'
'
tical interests
never absent.
Even
spatial
and temporal rela130-135

by feeling
tions involve elements due to activity initiated
THE SECOND VOLUME
ix
PAGES
Spatial perceptions
and conceptions compared and discussed by
way of showing the shortcomings of dualism.
Science, concerned only with the conceptions, ignores the elements due
to the conative
like
and practical
interests of the subject
136-146
comparison and discussion of temporal perceptions and
conceptions
The notion
of
cedents of
146-149
empty space and empty time,

the things and events that are
an inversion
as necessaiy antesaid to
fill
them,
is
149-151
of reality
LECTURE XVI
RISE OF DUALISM
Two
forms of experience have emerged in the course of our pre-
vious discussion
the experience of a given individual and
Experience as the result of intersubjective intercourse. Dualism maintained by misconception as to the relation of these
two, and by their separate treatment
the
one exclusively
by psychology, the other by the natural sciences. To refute

dualism, then, we need to show that the second form of experience is an extension of the first and that there is organic
unity throughout both
152-156
In the case of individual experience, this organic unity illustrated
by reference to (1) Range in time, (2) Familiarity or Expertness, and (3) Intellective Synthesis
156-165
Intersubjective intercourse leads to universal Experience,
gives rise to the naive dualism of
common
thought.
It
and
does
through (1) the notion of the transsubjective (naive

and (2) the hypothesis of introjection (animism).
protest against the phrase internal and external experience.' 165-176
this
realism),
'
'
'
LECTURE XVII
UNITY OF INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL EXPERIENCE
In what sense
subject ?
is
The
the transsubjective object independent of the

discussion of this question has brought out a
new
dualism, that of the empirical and the rational.
end,
we may
say, four
terms emerge
of individual experience,
knowledge.
In the
the subject and object
and the subject and object of rational

by Descartes, after-
Scientific dualism, started
wards drops out the second subject
178-183
CONTENTS OF
PAGES
We
bave now to inquire whether an organic unity can be

shown to exist between these. Beginning with the objects,
'
we
find that
'
content
'
'
for transsubjective experience is sup-
by immediate experience. Intellectual forms consist

But may not new
of relations between such 'fnndamenta.^
fundamenta emerge with the ampler parallax of miiversal
plied
'
experience
Cause,
Kant's
'
e.g. ?
What of the categories of Unity, Substance

This brings us to the subject of such experience 183-185
originally synthetic unity of apperception
The shortcomings
point.
'
'
the starting-
of his treatment of the categories
Causality traced not to logical function but to
discussed.
volitional activity.
In a sense Kant recognises this. Subdead remainder. But sub-
stance, however, left to logic as a
stances or things
is
a category due to the interaction of active,
self-conscious subjects with their environment
and
to their
185-196
intercourse with each other
We
conclude, then, that the subject of universal experience
is
one and continuous with the subject of individual experience,
and that in universal experience also there is the same intimate articulation of subjective and objective factors. Experience being then one organic unity, the charge of fallacy
196-198
against naive realism stands
Concluding remarks on dualism
the problem has been wrongly
Dualism, like geocentric astronomy, suffices for ordi-
stated.
nary
life
but for philosophy, a satisfactory monism
is still
198-202
to seek
PAET
V.
SPIRITUALISTIC MONISM
LECTURE XVIII
CAPITULATION OF AGNOSTIC MONISM

Neutral or agnostic
monism tends
to degenerate into materialism
might logically advance to idealism. If so, the teleoThe diffilogical must be shown to underlie the mechanical.
culties of the mechanical view not remedied by preaching
but
it
agnosticism
205-210
But on closer scrutiny such agnosticism contains admissions

which lead on to spiritualism. Thus Huxley confesses (a) that
our one certainty is the existence of the mental world,' and
'
(6) that
'
the notion of necessity has a logical not a physical
foundation'
211-219
THE SECOND VOLUME
The conception of natural laio examined.

in its origin as an organon or means of
controlling,
2.
xi
PAGES
1.
It is teleological
interpreting,
and so
Nature
219-221
a postulate
or hypothesis.
We here come upon the epistemological problem of Hume and Kant, viz., to determine the character of
general propositions relating to matters of fact. The evidence
of such propositions neither immediate nor logical.
Hume
failed to explain them by association and remained a sceptic 221-22&
It is teleological in its character, in so far as it is
But he made
Kant an alternative which he could not

For him the human mind was but " a bundle of
perceptions" though he was hopelessly at a loss to find the
"principle" that unites the "bundle." This principle Kant
declares to be the synthesising activity that yields self-conclear to
himself see.
sciousness.
we
In this activity
are to find the source of the
conception of nature as a system of unity and law
225-280
LECTURE XIX
NATUEE AS TELEOLOGICAL
The fact
upon
unity,
of self-activity, at once volitional
and intellectual, bears

ways as regards its
the conception of Nature in three
The Unity
of Nature
is
Causality,
immanence
this
232-235
the ideal counterpart of the actual unity
of each individual experience.
and beyond
regularity
its causality, its
Experience
of experience
itself is
unifying,
we cannot go
235-237
and the principle of causal uniformity or regularity
distinguished.
In discussing the former
divisions f experience
we may note
three
(a) that of intersubjective intercourse
and cooperation (6) that of the individual and his immediate

environment; (c) that of science, in which objective changes
are regarded solely in relation to each other. In (a) activity
;
and
passivity are
primQ facie
certain.
So in (b) as far as the

In (c) causality is
subject, but not the object, is concerned.
only analogically assumed.
Science disallows, or rather dis-
penses with, the analogy.
In the
scientific ideal individual
things and definite acts have no abiding place.

at once subordinates
Some supposed
difficulties besetting
activity discussed
This position
Nature to Mind
237-242
the conception of subjective
the fact of such activity remains
242-248-
CONTENTS OF
xii
As
regards Becjularity
the
the analogy of
law.
civil
PAGES
conception of natural law rests on
Both are contingent on the realisaUniversal and necessary
tion of certain necessary conditions.
knowledge of Nature presupposes thought here the conditions are in us and are necessary the result is contingent on
things conforming
248-252
:
If
they do conform,
we
are entitled to say (1) that Nature
in this respect teleological,
is
and
human
being consequently amenable to
by our
itself
(2) teleological further in
activity that this assimilation of
ends.
As
Nature
may be described as that greeting

which idealism has always maintained
the result
is
it is
solely
achieved,
of spirit
by
spirit
252-257
LECTURE XX
SPIEITUALISTIC MONISM
Laws
of Nature used in
causes
two senses
(a) as implying substantial
Does the
(h) as implying only constant relations.
substitution of the latter for the former enable positive science
anthropomorphic taint? No, for (1) its

it to be a human instrument
(2) it shews that things are ordered by measure and number,
but not what they are themselves.
Subjects with intrinsic
to clear itself of all
method and assumptions prove
and causally efficient, are facts of experience prior

and independent of it. It must come to terms with these
qualities,
to
when
We
challenged.
or there
is
intelligence
say then
beyond
it.
Either
it is itself
Either
intelligent
it is itself
causally
a causal agent behind it.

But for an
answer to these questions Naturalism refers us to Agnosticism.
259-267
And Agnosticism again betrays it
efficient or there is
Mr. Herbert Spencer's answer examined. A First Cause is "a

necessary datum of consciousness, but cannot in any manner
or degree be known in the strict sense of knowing." Nevertheless, his Unknowable turns out to be "the same Power
267-270
which in ourselves wells up under the form of consciousness
'
'
What
Mr. Spencer means by knowing in the strict sense.' The

Kantian distinction of determinant, and reflective, judgment
270-274
brought to bear
The
agnostic use of
not veil reality
'
'
Phenomenon
'
criticised.
Appearances do
274-276
THE SECOND VOLUME
xiii
PAGES
As a further
it is
objection to a spiritualistic interpretation of Nature,
no mind behind it, for it is never

This objection due to a confusion easily
said that there can he
interfered with.
exposed
276-278
Moreover, -when we divest ourselves of the scientific bias, and

contemplate the world in its historical concreteness, we can
see the true reality to be not a mechanism but a Realm of
Ends
......
Explanatory Notes to Part III

Explanatory Notes to Part IV
Explanatory Notes to Part
Index
278-283
285-286
286-290
290-294
295-301
PAET
III
THEORY OF PSYCHOPHYSICAL
PARALLELISM
THEOEY OF PSYCHOPHYSICAL
PAEALLELISM
LECTURE XI
VARIOUS FORMS OF THE THEORY
These theories attempt to answer the question
changes related
start
from
the
to
the physical
their side;
How
are psychical
They
all
Cartesian doctrine of the essential disparateness and
hence
So far they have common thought
and Mind.
distinctness of Matter
on
changes in the organism ?
is
it
advisable to enquire first whether they are
tenable even on this dualistic assumption.
What is meant by the physical series readily ascertained. But the

meaning of the psychical series not so clear. It is not so much my
me as my consciousness as a series of events

Ambiguities of the phrase ^^parallelism " in this
07isciousness as a unity for
for the psychophysicist.

connexion.
(1)
Clifford's exposition of Mind-stuff is only Matter-stuff over again.
(2)
The
so-called
Two
Aspects theory assumes that two incompatible
standpoints can be stereoscoped into one.

(3)
TJie
and while
Conscious Automaton theory leaves the dualism untouched,
asserting invariable concomitance tries to deny
any causal
connexion: the two series keep pace, but yet each ''goes along by
On
the psychical side, sensation,
the
way of
this theory.
plus absolute separation
How
is
on the physical,
they are got over.
logically so
theory either lapses into some
life,
itself''
are difficulties in
Constant parallelism
unstable a position that this
form of crude moni.im, or one
series is
in the end subordinate to the other.
Among
side.
scientific
men
Huxley taken as a
the
type.
primacy
He
is
usually given to the material
maintains that sensation

3
is
an
effect
PSYCHOPHYSICAL PARALLELISM
of molecular chanr/e^ hut will not

the efect of volition.
as
''feeling''''
To
molecular changes are ever
or sensation simply.
Since the dawn

tations
alloxo that
justify this position volition has to be regarded
modern philosophy
of
the
Descartes,
of
question
of
in
the
the
Medi
relation
of
body and mind has been continuously under discussion.

The complete disparateness between thinking substance
and extended substance, upon which Descartes insisted,
Of philoat once brought this problem to the fore.
sophical
attempts to transcend this dualism there has
been, as
we know, no
lack.
which works forward
ence,
than backward to supreme
But the progress

to
new
distinctions
for
example, that regarded
by the senses
directly apprehended
is
practically
obsolete
naive realism seems
so
now
that
of
sci-
rather
on the other
identities, has,
The crude
hand, only tended to widen the separation.

psychology,
of
extension
as
touch and sight,
even that vestige of
to have disappeared.
On
the
other hand, Descartes' ideal of the external world as a
complete mechanism has become for

certainty.
many
a scientifie
Psychology and physics, in short, have each
elaborated working conceptions appropriate to their

special facts, regardless of
eventual coordination.
cal
their
Substance and cause, metaphysi-
notions which Descartes would have used in the
same
are
any questions concerning
own
sense,
now
whether referring to matter or to mind^
discarded by physicist and psychologist alike.
Mass, indeed,
still
retains the one substantial attribute
of permanence, but matter as the support of
able qualities
and powers
is
no more
souls,
innumer-
on the other
hand, as simple and indiscerptible entities are replaced
THE THEORY
RISE OF
by consciousness, the
inert
mass with
so-called 'contents'
As
in continuous flux.
to cause,
efficiency,
and
it is
relations
equations of motion, and the like.
meaning
to be given to causal
But the
in dispute.
ence here asserts

tivity,
many
that what
psychologists
sci-
inherent acis
regarded
for they imagine
In
knowledge
fact, the
must
needs
determination of this
of all real categories, the category of
they leave depending on the solution of
very problem of psychophysics

chical facts being
of
of
held to transcend the limits of positive
is
do so in another.
ciency,
the more perfect
The notion
science in one department of
most central
on the
left
expressed in
In psychology the
being abandoned by the physicist,
with suspicion by
which are
efficiency, if any, is still
influence of
itself.
of
absurd to credit
we have
so
only quantitative
physical side
now
effi-
this
Psy-
before us.
meanwhile regarded as only a
flux
presentations, this problem takes the form of ascer-
taining
how
the
coexistences
and sequences
of
that
changing content are related to those motions of mass

elements,
which are held
to
constitute
the
physical
world.
The answer
tably leads
be
known
is
to
which 'modern science' almost
embodied
as the
in the doctrine
inevi-
now coming
to
law of jDsychophysical parallelism, or
the doctrine of conscious automatism, as the most usual
form of
it is
called.
This replaces in the creed of modern
Naturalism the coarsely materialistic doctrine of a generation ago, which, as
day repudiate.
we have found,
the agnostics of our
Disclaiming any knowledge of substance
either mental or material, disclaiming too
any knowledge
of efficient causes, they hold this doctrine of parallelism

to be simply a scientific inference
from facts and not in
any sense a speculative hypothesis.

on the contrary,
that,
and
it
is
upon a speculative
rests
basis of the
most unstable
Cartesian dualism, the doctrine,
kind, viz., the
shew
I shall try to
really at variance with facts
The
the complete disparateness of matter and mind.
theory
psychophysical
of
seems to me, but the
parallelism
scientific
is
of
i.e.
indeed,
as
it
counterpart of that occa-
sionalism to which the followers of Descartes were driven,

in
endeavour to account for the correspondence
their
between
mental
states
and bodily movements.
But,
whereas according to the Occasionalists the Deity inter-
vened as each occasion demanded, here the physical

series is
held to be mechanically predetermined and to be
Thus we
capable of calculation in Laplacean fashion.
seem driven to infer a

psychical
concomitants,
banishment from
ity
all
what we
of
like rigid
to
regions of
call
spirit
determination of the
admit, with
human thought and
activ-
and
It
spontaneity."
assuredly not a prepossessing doctrine

often
candidly allow.
ablest scientific
men
But,
Huxley, "the
this its upholders
inasmuch
are counted
is
some
as
of
our
among them, we may
be sure that the arguments that have led to such a position are not to be
summarily disposed
of.
Merely to lay
bare the defects of the dualism which this parallelism
not likely to be convincing,^ unless the
presupposes
is
theory
can be shewn to have defects which force us
itself
to question its implicit assumptions.

1
This
Lectures
is
Such
a procedure
the topic of the fourth section of these lectures.
XIV
ff.
See below,
THE PHYSICAL SERIES

is
the less likely to be convincing, as this same dualism
of matter
speech
common
and mind
is
engrained in
to this extent
sense on
common thought and
the doctrine of parallelism has
And
its side.
the history of
modern
philosophy shows the two questions, that concerning the

perception of an external world, and this concerning the
relation
of
body and mind,
be
to
closely
connected.
The whole subject is as difficult as it is important, and

we are bound to study it with the utmost attention and
When I say important, I mean important to the
care.
student of Natural Theology, for the fine saying of Henry
More is assuredly true Nidlus in microcosmo spiritus,
:
nullus in maerocosmo Deus.
To
begin,
we must make
main points
sure that
the doctrine
of
sumed under three heads
itself.
for
we
we understand
These may be
have,
physical changes or brain-processes
first,
the
re-
a series of
then, a simultane-
ous series of psychical changes or processes, accompany-
ing them
and
finally,
the
relation
between the two,
declared to be purely one of concomitance, not one of

teraction.
As
to remark
that the only correspondences of which
regards the physical series,
it is
in-
important
we
have any actual knowledge are such as have been found
between the physiological or pathological working of

nerve tissues on the one side and conscious states and acts
There
on the other.
instructive
is
nothing in such facts taken alone
and impressive though they
are, as
shew-
ing the intimate connexion between body and mind
prove that that connexion

of interaction.
knowledge
The
is
one of parallelism and not
specialists
of these facts
to
to
whom we owe
our
have indeed usually been of
opinion that the connexion
contrary opinion, then,
is
it is
The
one of interaction.
to be noted,
owes
rise,
its
not to the studies of mental physiologists or pathologists,

nor yet to the studies of comparative anatomists or comparative psychologists;
of the
it
rests simply
on the assumptions
According
upholders of the mechanical theory.
to those assumptions, brain-processes, in

vital processes, if
explained,
common with
all
they could be completely and perfectly
would be described not
even as physical, processes
as physiological, nor
but simply as the mechanically
So regarded,
connected motions of inert mass-elements.
the organic changes in brain and nerve become amenable,

in principle
and
not in fact, to that absolute determination
if
fixity that characterise the ideal operations of exact
mechanics.
They become
ble parts of
every element of which

other
distinguishable but insepara-
an unbroken and unbreakable mechanism,

is
rigorously linked with every
the whole working in perfect unison, without the
possibility of deviation or individual initiative
that
knows nothing
or of purpose
of space
ence of energy.
world
of spontaneity, of quality, of worth,
a world in which there
and time,
is
only uniformity
indestructibility of mass,
and
persist-
There must be nothing in that world
which a mathematician with
sufficient data
powers of calculation could not unlock
and adequate
its state
at
any
one instant, expressible in a single vast equation, must

be equally the key to
all its
past
and
to all its future.
Such a conception seems obviously to exclude
all inter-
ference from 'without as well as from within.'

there
is
no without or within
for inertia excludes internal
in the case.
change
In
No
and no
'
fact,
'within,'
without,'
THE PSYCHICAL SERIES
though force implies some mass external to the par-
for,
mass
ticular
affected,
recognises nothing beyond.
system and the system
do not propose to
recall
which we were led in our
this stage the results to
earlier
the masses
ex hypothesis all
yet,
there are are included in the
at
The time
examination of the mechanical theory.
apply these will be when we enter upon the task of
to
criticising
We
come, then,
we
now
to the
it.
What
psychical series.
by this?
to understand
But we must
parallelism.
complete the statement of
first
are
the doctrine of
Unhappily, there
answer forthcoming comparable
is
no
as respects definiteness
and precision with that given concerning the physical

For
series.
this
there
difference
many
are
reasons.
For one thing, quality has only been eliminated from

the physical world by relegating
and
the psychical
to
it
in consequence, relations of quantity
which there admit
and number,
of the utmost exactness, are here at
best but vague and approximate.
Again, when
we ask
after the laws determining the coexistences
and succes-
we
get in some
sions of elements of the psychical series,

cases
that
all.
In some cases, as
of
sensations, for
past,
in
others, as
in
said
to
determine
the
in
example
association
no
and
answer
purposive action, the future,

present.
In
volition
at
the
habit,
is
motives
spring from feeling but are controlled by deliberation

so in thought,
not to reason.
ties,
how
judgment
How
is
is
this ultimate diversity of quali-
are these processes so
different
character, to be described in terms

allel
superior to association, but
that
in
rank and
may run
par-
with the monotonous interplay of molecules in the
10
for me, or
is
external
yours as
the
are
difficulty
experience as
you, then
for
is
my
be
and
rised,
belong to
it
and are the outcome
So regarded they form a unity
those
all
prime
physicists'
the conceptions whereby they are
data,
all
it
which
perceptions,
further
is
If this psychical series is to
still.
it
But there
a skull?
cavity of
summa-
of its processes.
we
within this unity
find
indeed a duality, that of the correlatives, subject
and
object,
but we find no
internal, physical
come within the range

any notion
dualism of external and
we must
my
me, or your experience as
it
leave
for
you, your experience as
deed, as I
am
cal world,
and you
for
it
you.
my
is
like
manner
it
for
is
We
must
experience as
for me.
you primarily a portion

in
justify
the properly
experience as
is
take up instead the standpoint of

for
and to
of such a dualism
of parallelism,
psychological standpoint of
is
To
and psychical, matter and mind.
Then,
it
in-
of the physi-
for me,
it
becomes
natural to locate each one's experience inside his skin,

his
environment being outside
chairs
and
tables,
moon and
external world, he has ideas

tion
how
But
stars,
say that of the
to
and the
rest of this
to ask the puzzling ques-
these ideas are produced or whereabouts inside
that skin the thinking thing
body
it
to pieces in the
is
and
finally, to
take his
hope of answering the question.
this is still not the
worst
for,
once accustomed to
speak of one's fellow-man's experience as made up of

ideas in that man's head, one
is
soning to think the same of one's

there
is
led by parity of rea-
own
experience.
at least one further source of
when from
confusion
And
still,
concrete experiences, in which the individual
THE PSYCHICAL SERIES

percipient
and
what
is
where
plainly recognised,
is
and
date,
Psychology
our guard
experiencing
I refer
for
entirely
is
only beginning to clear
is
we
pass to
as the scientific or objective standpoint,
subject
confusions.
name, place,
has his
manifold idiosyncrasies,
his
known
the
11
to
when
itself
ignored.
of these
them now that we may be on
a physicist talks about matter, he
But
can generally provisionally define what he means.
many
men
able
least clear
mind without being
write about
what they mean.
As
in the
have already remarked,
there are three related but distinct questions that are
constantly playing hide and seek, especially during the

occasional excursions
by
cal
scientific
one
now
into
philosophical
made
regions
These questions are the psychophysi-
men.
before us, the psychological one concerning
the intuition of an external world, and the epistemological
one concerning the phenomenal and the
have agreed to postpone the
latter
be.
It will suffice for the present
that,
when
a psychical series
from the
strictly
experience as
is
brain and
examples of
it
my
the
we can
is
see
not regarded
Psychical
psychological standpoint.
my
my
if
spoken of as parallel with
a physical series, such psychical series
then means not
We
questions as far as
may
is
real.
experience as
it
is
for the physiologist,
for me, but
who
is
studying
organs of sense and movement.

confusing influence of
this
my
As
point of
view upon psychology proper, we have the prevalent

metaphor of impressions imprinted on the mind as in
Locke and Hume, the frequent
identification
of
action
with bodily movement, or the identification by certain

recent psychologists of emotion with
its
bodily expres-
12
One
sion.
further result of this confusion
dency to treat consciousness atomistically,

say
in other words, to regard
it
may
if
owing
as
the ten-
is
so
unity to
its
combinations and associations of sensations, feelings, or

ideas,
vaguely conceived as independent elements.
glaring instance of this
we have
lation concerning mind-stuff, to
The
ently.
standpoint
it
in Clifford's wild specu-
which
must
refer pres-
essential characteristic of the psychophysical
is
that
it
implies
two
say two
will be simpler to
subjects, or
as perhaps
percipients, whereas the
psychological implies only one.
Coming next
lelism
to the question
the answer
is
What
is
more uncertain
meant by
paral-
We
could
still.
readily understand the relevance of such a term
two
percipients, being
tuted,
were both occupied with
environment
as
the
same perceptual
the
when, for instance, two fellow-travel-
lers are together engrossed
a summer's day.
if
psychologically similarly consti-
We
by the sights and sounds of
should also admit parallelism,
if,
being psychophysicists, they were both simultaneously

occupied in scanning each other's brains
science having
previously devised means to obviate the thickness of their

skulls
and the turbidity of the contents.
In these cases,
along with the dual series that parallelism implies,
we
should have also the point for point correspondence that

is
quite as essential.
But
if,
while one watches
'
the lark
soaring and singing in the blinding sky,' the other peers

into his
head as he watches, where
the parallelism
is
" Parallels are lines that never meet,"
" and so
mind
it
is
that
is
it
will
the complete disparateness of
meant.
Psychological
be said,
matter and
analysis,
pursued
THE PAllALLELISM
never so
far, will
13
bring us no nearer to molecular motions,
and however mucli we lay bare the brain mechanism,
No doubt
thought will remain as distinct as before."
but surely parallelism

to
only absolute
express
Mental
disparateness.
and material processes may resemble
cesses
an odd metaphor to employ
is
pro-
parallels in
having no common element, but what have they answering to the point to point correspondence that parallels
imply ?
^'Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio
rerum "
is
a famous proposition of Spinoza constantly
quoted in this discussion
usually, I
which to be sure
is
to
me
Let
is
The
"
an idea and what
here quote a writer
expound such a parallelism
ford
to say,
But now, taking
not very clear.
words as they stand, what

thing
am bound
ignorance of Spinoza's context and meaning,
in entire
parallelism
who
the
has undertaken
late Professor Clif-
meant," he says, "
here
the
is
is
parallelism of complexity, an analogy of structure.
spoken sentence and the same sentence written are two

utterly unlike things, but each of
ments
of
them
consists of ele-
the spoken sentence of the elementary sounds
the language, the written sentence of
Now
its
alphabet.
the relation between the spoken sentence and
elements
is
the written sentence and
its
elements.
spondence of element to element
sound
is
bet, yet
its
very nearly the same as the relation between
There
is
a corre-
although an elementary
quite a different thing from a letter of the alpha-
each elementary sound belongs to a certain letter
or letters.
And
the sounds being built

1
Ethica.
ii,
7.
up together
to
14
form a spoken sentence, the
up together
letters are built
same way^ to form the written sentence.
in 7iearly the
The two complex products are as wholly unlike as the

elements are, but the manner of their complication is
the same.
Or, as we should say in the mathematics, a
sentence spoken
is
the same function of the elementary
sounds as the same sentence written
is
of the correspond-
Well, no one will question the apposite-
ing letters."^
"
uess of the term parallelism here.
continues Clifford, "
is
Of such
a nature,"
the correspondence or parallelism
But
between body and mind."
if
so,
then to every
molecule in a man's brain there must be an answering
elementary idea.
Also, since according to the prevalent
opinion of chemists, the seventy odd so-called elements

are to be regarded as combinations of one prime atom,
ideas in like
manner must be regarded as combinations of

But if the speculations of Lord Kelvin
one prime idea.
and others are

is
to be accepted,
and the prime atom
a state of motion in a primitive
what
is
the mental equivalent of this primordial
Again,
if
itself
homogeneous medium,
medium ?
the elements correspond, atoms to pieces of
mind-stuff, each to each,
and
if,
further, the function
is
the same, there cannot be more in the one order and
connexion than there
and connexion
one
into
what now
ideas?
kind of
is
is
in the other.
But the order
of mass-elements are ultimately resolved
the
order and
connexion,
the kinetic;
corresponding ultimate order
Is it associative contiguity, logical
appetitive urgency, or
what
On
the
congruency,
The elements correspond
numerically, and are, of course, simple; time

^
among
Nature of Things in Themselves^ Mind,
vol.
is
iii,
supposed
p. 61.
CLIFFOKD'S VIEWS
common
to be
to both series: there should remain then
What
only the question,

space
But whatever
15
the psychical analogue
is
since the functions corre-
be,
it
of
spond, this psychical space, or quasi-space, should admit

of
though
algebraic,
not
being our
prophet may
kinematics
Dr.
physics
hope to become a branch of
sentence as sentence
spoken or written
though
diverse
simply
the
in
matter
in
language,
logical
so
atom renamed.
same whether
the
is
here,
mind -stuff
his
that
made up
a complex
it
is
is
not
how from such
dust a living mind could ever spring; but

assert that " reason, intelligence,
one in form
is
Allowing
mind, he makes no attempt to show
erties of
Hicks
In short, as in Clifford's illustrative in-
the
stance,
expression.
geometrical,
of
Psychology then at length, like
is
content to
and volition are propthemselves
elements
of
not rational, not intelligent, not conscious."^
On
one point only in this maze of psychological bar-
barism
new
venture a remark.
will
properties
arise
never
justifiable, least of all
is
Even the
we may call a
in such a case as this.

position
when we
that
when,
in
the
ligent,
^
would speak
but
On
the
still
unity
so
is
only
so
call surface,
as three
a vague term
described
Nobody bent on
precede the whole.

cision
we
are
from and independent of them

Complexity, in truth,
several lines.
even
three lines that in a

triangle
introduce a fourth something
distinct
is
assertion that
mere complication or
conjunction of elements
certain
The
from any
the
parts
psychological pre-
of ideas as either conscious or intel-
less
would he speak
of ideas existing
Nature nf Things in Themselves, Mind,
vol.
iii,
p. 67.
16
in isolation apart
from, and prior
and
To such
intelligence.
a position, however, Clifford
professes to have been driven
and the doctrine
tinuity
ties
which
to
by the principle
Of the absurdi-
of evolution.
expounded by Mr.
to have followed, we
seems
Clifford
Had
have had enough already.
and applied the principle
instead,
of con-
this doctrine leads as
whom
Spencer,
consciousness
to,
he followed
Leibniz
of continuity in like
fashion, he could have speculated as to simple

his
heart's
that
content,
absurdity,
and
fearless
"a
but would
piece
of
never
minds to
have imagined
mind-stuff," to which his
logical interpretation of atomistic psychol-
ogy had led him
he would never have imagined that
the esse intentionale of mind,
term be
so scholastic a
if
allowed, could be described in terms that have a meaning
only
when
We
applied to the complexity of material structure.
cannot, then,
it
allelism as that offered
And
ford.
yet
it
and
psychology, as
of
crude monism of Clif-
this
call for notice
have
since
it
is
speculation
deal of naturalistic
The independent advance
vogue.
in
by
seemed to
a fair type of a good
now
seems to me, admit such a par-
of physics
remarked, has
already
revealed too clearly the entire disparity of their conceptions to leave any
room
But the monism now
in
men
face.
all
materialism.
old
many
intents
The problem
and law,
is
range.
The supposed
the
to bring the facts of
crux
diversity
hence the
scientific
and purposes,
as
a thinker setting out from the side
itself to
is
the
favour with
that old materialism, to
is
though with a new
two
for
it
presents
of matter
mind somehow within

and disparity
dualism.
of
the
The assumed
MIND-STUFF AND MATTER-STUFF

impossibility
of
any
with
interference
17
the
physical
scheme, except by miracle, leads next to the assertion
independence, and then
complete causal
of
ascertained facts
dent sets of
facts,
well-
psychophysics seem to point to a
of
Now,
parallelism.
the
the mere existence of
taken by
problem, for science at any
itself,
would constitute no
And
rate.
variations of cerebral development
two indepen-
the concomitant
and function on the
one hand, with mental development and function on the

other, in
no way excludes, and, as
have
was
said,
never supposed to exclude, the interaction of body and
But the conjunction
mind.
of
independence and par-
allelism at once confronts us as a formidable
The ordinary canons
method allow
of
and casual coincidence
problem.
independence
but independence and invari-
seem contrary to
able coincidence
of
all
reason.
Any
hy-
pothesis that will resolve the coincidence into identity

is
so far
sound
but
it
must not tamper with the
as Clifford's egregious travesty of mind-stuff

does.
Here the ideas
(ejects as he calls
the real things or things-in-themselves
facts
assuredly
them) become
while material
things become what others call ideas or mental pictures,
which mind-stuff
in
is
the thing represented.
But, as
the ejects stand divested of every mental characteristic,

it
is
see
a puzzle, at least as great as the puzzle solved, to
how
new
these
things-in-themselves,
ideas
are
they are
if
'
ever
to
begin.
not rational, not
Even
intelli-
gent, not conscious,' can neither have the motive nor the
power nor the
skill to
group themselves and take each
other's pictures.
Another rendering
of Spinoza's doctrine of parallelism
'
PSYCHOPHYSICAL PAEALLELISM
18
more in
absurd,
less
attributes
with
as
one
of
one
definitions,
not
as
attributes,
thought, chary of
if
and
as the
substance
ontal
'
'
may
'
altogether
two aspects
mind and matter
But they
substance.
the
phenomenal
affirm
known
Spinoza,
of
attributes
Spinoza's
philosophy,
his
that familiarly
is
Here,
theory.
not as
with
keeping
conceived
are
in
as
in
but
as
itself,
attributes,
so
are
Modern
say.
dogmatism, declines to
ontological
anything of such a conception as Spinoza's One
But while leaving
Substance.
this in uncertainty,
many
recent writers of note have been content to account for

the disparity between the psychical and physical series
by
That which
diversity of standpoints.
consciousness, in the other appears
appears as states of
as matter in motion, just as a deaf
the
strokes
of
the
as
bell-clapper
man may
perceive
while a blind
man
Once accept the deliverance

the psychologist that he does not know what mind
a substance is, and the like deliverance of the physi-
hears the sounds from

of
in one aspect
cist as to his
and
it
it.
own ignorance
of the substance of matter,
becomes an obvious superfluity to have two un-
known substances. Especially so, when one

who cannot do without any
and best of
knowable one,
will
amply
enally impassable.
fill
all,
is
those
an un-
phenom-
So we find the very men who are
loudest in their denunciation

tion
any gulf that
for
of
metaphysical specula-
complacently preaching this two aspects doctrine.
For, after
all,
what objection can an agnostic have to

?
But it is possible, I think,
an unknowable substance
without trespassing into metaphysics to shew that the

double aspects theory
is
not fundamentally tenable.
THE 'TWO ASPECTS' THEORY

Like much psychophysical speculation,
and exploded psychology and
faulty
its
fails
it
19
rests
upon a
largely through
metaphor to get really to the bottom of
free use of
The notion, countenanced by Locke and

by Kant, that the facts of mind are perceived by
an inner sense and the facts of matter by the outer
senses, breaks down before a more careful analysis.
the situation.
also
Even
if
this
distinction
were sound,
still
what
am
supposed to experience through internal perception

not another aspect of what
again
is
my
perceived externally;
is
nor
experience, taken as a whole, another side
scheme by which the natuwould describe the physical processes of my brain.
of that abstract conceptual

ralist
When
the normal
man combines
in himself the separate
movement seen
them
or 'aspects.'
But
perceptions of the blind and deaf, the
by the one, the tones heard by the
other, he refers
both to one thing, the
bell, as its states
now we never do
with our so-called internal and ex-
this
ternal perceptions.
aspect doctrine
dualism avoided.
the
places
fable,
did, then so far the two-fold

justified
and the problem
of
Again, when two percipients observe
different sides of the

in
we
If
would be
same thing,
they can
as
like the hasty knights
the knights did
change
and each connect the two aspects in one experi-
ence of an object.
In short the phrase
phrase merely, unless
it
is
possible in
'
two-sides
'
is
such manner to
pass continuously from the one to the other, from outer

to inner or
from inner to outer.
The whole psychophys-
ical
problem turns on the fact that this cannot be done.
To
give any meaning to this metaphor of sides or as-
pects, it should be possible to indicate the unity to
which
20
they belong, and to shew that they have such congruence as befits complementary sides or aspects of
But the unity cannot be indicated;
same thing.
unknown
substance
of our experience, or of the scien-
we formulate
conceptions by which
tific
no such unity
little
is
experience
have said
it,
Let us consider this a
forthcoming.
My
further.
so an
assumed.
is
Within the range
the
is
much beyond or
who may
not so
out of the present reach of the physiologist
con
my
brain
it is,
as a concrete individual experience,
absolutely distinct from his

tion of
my
and per contra
brain, for the very reason that
ception, can never be mine.
This
frequently urged that even
my own
brain
my
could conceivably observe
as I
do
mere
fact that the reflexion
positions
Similarly
it
my
brain,
tion as
may
and the face
if
you
actual brain
is
indirectly,
Certainly the
occupy
could conceivably have
working model
my
of
observa-
But now the physiologist

the reflexion
he can handle
Further, he must have
if
and their
know my own
should not even
had not independent knowledge

portraits.
When
portrait as
of other faces
touch one hand with the
other I have a double perception
hand
is
the copy from his previous acquaintance with the
original
mine
it
supposed to be to the obser-
both the brain and the model.
made
his per-
but
reflected
as accessible to
vation of the physiologist.
can see both the face and
like a
which would be
is
does not seem important.
space
in
be urged that
model
my
it
face in a glass for instance.
different
a facsimile
it
allowed
cannot directly perceive
if
is
his percep-
when
have only a single perception.
touch another's
So
if
could
THE 'TWO ASPECTS' THEORY

my own
actually manipulate
21
brain I should presumably
only add to that sense of embodiment, which
referred
is
These experiences the model

would not give and the physiologist would not have.
to the psychical aspect.
And
a
as to the possibility of a model,
but
conceivable,
is
not say
I will
is it,
permissible
it
hypothesis
refer not to the unattainable feats of
workmanship such
a model implies, but to the fact that
if
model
of a living brain
The
aspect.
model
twins
would have iU own psychical
nearest approach
we know
makes
that which nature
is
of
to such a
in the production of
and the process there runs back through
To assume
human development.
ages of
of
it
verily were a
it
any process more direct
is
the
assume the possibility of
to
setting aside the existing laws of nature, that
among
chophysical parallelism
all
the possibility
the rest,
if
of psy-
it
be a law of
of
combining
nature.
There
these
If
then,
is,
distinct
we
cause
'
it
would seem, no way
aspects
one
into
'
concrete experience.
are misled into imagining that there
we confound
(Avhich
is
all
the
general
the
physicist
or
is,
it is
knowledge of
be-
brains
physiologist really has,
and which we can share) with the concrete knowledge

implied in the notion of the physical aspect or basis
of
our
own
particular
possibly share.
of
the
And
psychical side
this
diversity,
the concreteness
contrasted with the abstract and
conceptual character of the physical,

several
we could not
experience, which
points in which
their
is
only one
characters
among
manifest an
incongruity incompatible with the theory of their being
complementary aspects
of
one
unity.
Thus the one
22
described as inextended, the other as extended
is
one
the
quality
all
wholly quantitative
and
With
on.
so
Another, and in some

of
ways
later.
interpretation
stricter,
phrase psychophysical parallelism goes to
the
the opposite extreme.
some way or
other,
Instead of seeking to escape, in
from the
between things so disparate,

successors did,
make
to
these points,
however, we shall have to deal more fully
still
other remaining
the
relegated,
is
those
of
difficulties
as
interaction
Descartes' immediate
who maintain
this
view boldly
the impossibility of such interaction their starting-
Whatever produces a physical change must, they
point.
contend, itself be physical
change must
itself
whatever produces a psychical
Though
be psychical.
it
unques-
is
tionably the case that changes in the one region accom-
pany changes
in
the other, yet their place in time
is
be explained entirely by the antecedent events in
to
their
own
the
in
series,
not at
all
by the simultaneous events
Their parallelism
other.
is
case
of
tence simply, not of causation in any sense.
coexis-
If there
were interaction between matter and mind, then physics,

is
it
said,
would be incomplete without a theory
psychical action, precisely as
should say,
magnetism.
is,
incomplete
On
it
would
be,
or perhaps
the other hand, states of mind,
would have
assignable spatial relations and configurations,
is
held to be distinct
ics.
It is
without a theory of electro-
able to diverse physical influences,
cease to be psychical.
of
The plane
toto coelo
if
amen-
to
have
and so
of psychology, in short,
from the plane of phys-
usual to illustrate the supposed absurdity of
attempting to connect the two causally in some such
THE 'CONSCIOUS AUTOMATON' THEORY
23
fashion as in the following quotation, which I borrow
The
from Professor James.
writer quoted asks us to
imagine "an idea, say of food, producing a movement,
"What," he
say of carrying food to the mouth."

"
the
is
method
composition of
the
the brain],
does
or
asks,
de-
molecules of the gray matter
[of
retard the
it
the direction in which
alter
Does
assist the
of its action
it
does
or
process,
shocks
the
are
it
distrib-
Supposing a case in which the gray matter

about to " fall into simpler combinations on the im-
uted ? "
is
an incident force," he then asks
pact of
"
the idea of food to prevent this decomposition

festly,"
he continues, "
it
How
can do so only by increasing
Good
the force which binds the molecules together.
Try
to
is
tractive
imagine the idea of a beefsteak binding two
molecules together.
sible
is
Mani-
Equally impos-
It is impossible.
to imagine a similar idea loosening the at-
it
force
allowed that
between two molecules."
we cannot
must be
It
picture ideas in the act of alter-
ing the chemical properties of molecules
and
if
illus-
we might at once
mind and matter are
trations of this kind are conclusive,

assert,
as
this
writer does, that
But unhappily such
absolutely separate.
do not help us much.
If
illustrations
mind and matter
are abso-
lutely separate, as separate, say, as music and minerals
what
are,
itance
of
are
a
we
make
to
mental
which the same writer

ness
1
" Wliy
Of. Mercier,
the
of
the invariable concom-
change with a bodily change,

insists
two occur
The Nervous System and
Principles of Psychology, vol.
i,
p. 135.
with
equal
together,
the
Mind,
p.
or
9
on
strenuous-
what the
see
W. James,
24
link
is
which connects
know, and most authorities believe
and never can know."

such ignorance
If
of
is
science
much
progress.
not
shall
surely
this,
invariably conjoined.
in this fashion in other cases
coexistence,
would not have made
it
venture again to maintain that inva-
concomitance and
riable
we never
an odd reason for asserting an abso-
had proceeded
unexplained
tliat
But, even granting
separateness of things thus
lute
"we do
them," he adds,
absolute
causal independence
and I will add further that

no " authorities " have ever been able consistently to
are incompatible positions,
maintain both.
What
mean when
people really
these
they assert parallelism and absolute separation, on the
ground that
produced by
like can only be
some-
like, is
thing very different from what they seem to say, something very trivial and hardly worth saying.
briefly to this, that
mind cannot be
It
amounts
the connexion between matter and
connexion,
psychical
and
cannot
therefore be expressed in psychological language
that
it
cannot be a physical connexion, and therefore
But
cannot be expressed in physical language.

the connexion exists, there are
distinct
also
possibilities
apparently only three
open, possibilities, however,
are
not mutually exclusive.
Either,
be,
whether we know
not,
it
or
since
first,
there
which
must
psychical facts not
psychologically explicable, psychical events without complete

be,
psychical antecedents.
Or
secondly, there
must
whether known or not, physical facts without com-
plete physical antecedents.
Or
thirdly, there
must be
an unknown something as the medium connecting and

correlating the two.
This
last,
which we may
call
the
SENSATIONS A DIFFICULTY
speculative alternative,
other two
and
tives,
Now
that adopted in monistic inter-
is
we have
pretations such as those
25
The
just considered.
may
be classed together as scientific alterna-
it
these that chiefly concern us at present.
is
on the psychological side we can
at once point to
a class of psychical events not psychologically explicable,
And
viz., sensations.
on the physiological side there
which has so
certainly one fact
at physical explanation
far baffled all attempts
mean
Here then, apart from any a
the fact of
-priori
platforms
selves
Why
the
life itself.
parallelistic
two things are on utterly
physical
and the mental
facts
facts
we
considerations,
have empirical grounds for demurring to the

position "that the
is
different
going along by them-
going along by themselves."^
sensations occur or recur, coexist together or suc-
ceed each other as they do, no psychology can explain,
no psychologist has ever attempted
Sensa-
to explain.
tions one and all are intrusions, interferences, affections,

or modifications in the
'
mental
So far they are
series.'
proof positive that that series does not altogether go
along by
Descartes
itself.
is
our best teacher here.
The
fearful perplexities
which beset him, the contradictions
which he
in his endeavour to account for sen-
into
sation
fell,
and yet maintain
dualism of body and
this utter
mind, are only escaped by the modern naturalist because
he does not face the problem as fairly as Descartes or
Malebranche
did.
The
substitution of a psychophysical
for a strictly psychological standpoint has led the
psychologist
first
for him, not as they are for you,

1
modern
to regard your sensations as they are
Clifford, Lectures
and then to speak
and Essays,
vol.
ii,
p. 56.
of
26
them
as
your subjective modifications, not as your objec-
He
tive presentations.
somehow
imagines your consciousness as
located in a sort of fourth dimension, within
Then, assuming that
your head.^
sional changes there belong to
the three-dimen-
all
what he
calls
par
excellence
the objective world, the independence of this world both
you and your sensations seems manifest
of
and so he
concludes that mental facts go along by themselves.
The
difficulties
on the side
gested by the phenomena of

fashion.
These, as
of the physical series sug-
life
we saw
are escaped in a different
in the last
consist
lecture,
primarily in the facts of direction and selection which

distinguish the
movements
motions of inanimate matter.

of force
and permanency
of
"
living
things from the
Tendency
of form," said
to equilibrium
Huxley, in a pas-
sage which he afterwards recanted, "these are the characters of that portion of the universe that does not live,
Tendency
take on forms which
the domain of the chemist and the physicist.

to disturb existing equilibrium, to
succeed one another in definite cycles,

of the living world."
distinguishing
mark
is
In other words inertia
attributed to matter.
The
is
the
is
of the one, effort of the other
primarily belongs that energy which
life
the character
to
figuratively
principle of least action
is
the crowning generalisation of physics, that of self-preservation and betterment the
first
law of
metrically opposed are the characters
of
life.
So dia-
the two that
our eminent physicists with scarcely an exception pro1
Descartes,
it
will
be remembered, preferred a location of no dimen-
sions.
-
Lay Sermons,
p. 75,
and Prefatory Letter,
p. vi.
LIFE A DIFFICULTY
claim the problem of
life to
be ultraphysical.
contribution of dynamics to
and physiologists
The
awake they seem
Nev-
doctrine which biologists
to
When
to
which the pure physicist
is
escape through a happy division
machine
already made, be
is
it
dynamo, or automaton, physical principles will
clock,
account for
when
automatic com-
of
the most part maintain and be-
for
difficulties
of labour.
The only
automatic maintenance of life."^
or
ertheless, this is precisely the
lieve.
"
biology," says
theoretical
Lord Kelvin, "is absolute negation
mencement
27
there,
its
So to deal with organisms,
working.
preeminently the business of the physi-
is
The main question for them is not how

the machine came to be, or what it is for, but how it
ologists.
works.
"You do
not explain the working of a clock by
referring to a chronometric principle, but
you point
the coiled spring and to the disposition of
and levers
when we
so we," they say, "
its
see a unicellular
organism positively heliotropic and turning to the

or negatively heliotropic
and turning from
not appeal to an occult
principle
of
life,
closer
to
explanation of
response.
its
the purely descriptive role
of
light,
we do
it;
we regard
such organism as an automaton, and seek in

struction the
to
wheels
con-
its
We
science,
keep
we
if
simply credit such an organism with hydrotropism or

chimiotropism or thermotropism than we should do
we
said that
it
drinks
and shrinks from the
when
cold.
thirsty, eats
And
ganisms are but complexes of
if
when hungry,
since the higher or-
cells,
we conclude
that
the same methods of interpretation are legitimately ap1
Properties of Matter,
p. 415.
28
For 'the most complex organism,' as
plicable to them.
Claude Bernard, the greatest of French physiologists, has

said, is but a vast mechanism resulting from the assemblage of secondary mechanisms.' " Suppose we now turn
'
round on that inept analogy

chronometric principle
cal friends that
of the clock
with
its
occult
and, reminding our physiologi-
clocks not only do not exist for them-
selves,
but neither make, mend, maintain, nor multiply
less
still
improve
themselves
these secondary mechanisms
connected
into
ble
we
Well,
are
come
mechanisms
find
he knows
narrow range
and looks
we have
how
ask
and to assem-
to
be,
of
vast
complexity?
then at once sent away with an intro-
duction to the biological specialist.
whose business
we
suppose
it
is
still
of
to
He
the person
is
But we
answer that question.
less
than the physiologist
the ultimate conceptions
of
from quite another
at our question
of
the
physics,
side.
As
previously seen, he takes the theory of evothe mainstay of
lution for
his
argument, regardless of
the fact that progress and development are conceptions
He
that do not admit of mechanical interpretation.
talks
naively of protoplasm, bioplasm, germ-plasm, and the

like,
without ever suspecting that under cover of this
figure
of
plasticity
he
is
availing
himself
of
psycho-
logical conceptions that he, equally with the physiologist,

is
bound
And
to disavow.
so,
spite of
the psychological impossibility of
accounting for sensation, spite of the emphatic declaration of the pure physicist that he cannot conceive inert,
rudderless, molecules, that have no insides
no change, giving
rise to
and undergo
wondrous automata that seem
PARALLELISM IMPLIES CONNEXION

afterwards to shape and direct them,
difficulties, the
man and
doctrine that
spite of all these
the organisms be-
neath him are but conscious automata
This
presentable.
lelism assumes
mon
substance,
29
made
is
to look
the form that the doctrine of paral-
is
when monistic speculations as

known or unknown, are left
the axiom that disparate things cannot interact
com-
to a
and
aside,
is
applied
to the one world of experience as sundered in twain
the
Cartesian dualism.
It
affords quite the
by
most im-
exhibition to be found of a fallacy to which
pressive
" scientific philosophy "
is
especially liable
that
of mis-
taking two halves for a whole, the fallacy again which

the philosophy of science
and
correct. 1
worlds were
the
If
each going along by

would,
hand,
I
if
itself,
and
mental
so-called
and
independent
really
bound
especially
is
to expose
material
separate wholes,
and interaction
parallelism
On
repeat, be alike inconceivable.
the other
they are really members of one whole, then
they cannot be severed and yet remain what they were

before.
To deny
the ground that
their interaction
on
neither
link
be found, will be true,
this
ground of
allelism
at
stable' a
is
I say
is,
combination
so severed,
on
can the connecting
though
trivial.
to
But
assert
on
their
an error which the alleged par-
once proclaims.
absolute separation
when
abstract separation,
their
causal independence
side
that
Constant
parallelism plus
once again, logically so unof
necessity
one or
other
term must be dropped.
And now we
shall find in fact that the
exponents of
animal automatism are continually lapsing either into

1
Cf. Hegel,
Encyc, Logik,
38,
Zusatz.
rSYCHOPHYSICAL PARALLELISM
80
vague monistic speculations, or subordinating the psychical
the
to
series
though more
we
rarely,
or
physical,
formulating parallelism
Sometimes,
both.
author setting out by
find an
with causal independence, and
yet in the end subordinating the physical series to the
Wundt, who, while affirmmind on matter, if it existed,
Such an author
psychical.
ing that the action of
would be
accept
of
the nature of
miracle, ^
yet contrives to
doctrine that the soul shapes
Aristotelian
the
is
the body and to assign to voluntary impulses the rdle

of
primum movens
opinions
is
a,re
in organic development.
mutually'" consistent
only
when
But such
parallelism
resolved into the almost trivial statement I have
ready referred
to,
that
viz.
psychology alone, nor from

the
interaction
statement
of
that
is
neither from the
that of
rather a methodological
It
of
physics alone,
body and mind comprehensible
than a law of nature.
al-
side
is
convention
amounts to saying: Let psy-
own
work may
chologists and physicists severally attend to their
business
when they do
sometimes run
tersect.
parallel,
With Wundt's
so,
their
lines
of
but will never be found to
in-
we have
for
doctrine as a whole
the present no concern and certainly no quarrel. *
More
serious
and important
scious automatism as
tific
writers
as
here the lapse
Du
con-
of
scien-
Bois-Reymond,
and
always to the side of subordinating
the psychical to the physical.

1
this doctrine
propounded by such purely
Huxley and
is
is
In Huxley's case indeed
Ueher psychische Causalitdt nnd das Princip der psychophysischen
Parallelismus, Philosophische Htudien, Bd. x, p. 33.

2
System der Philosophic, 1st
ed., p.
332.
* See Note
i,
p.
285.
SUBORDIXATIOX OF THE PSYCHICAL
31
the leaning towards the primacy of the physical side

often so pronounced that
ism at
is
can hardly be called parallel-
it
Spite of his vehement repudiation of the title
all.
of materialist as an affront to his untarnished agnosti-
cism,
know
few recent writers who on occasion
of
better deserve the
two from
his
On
Association,
and
me
Let
title. ^
the Hypothesis that
the
to
British
Animals are Automata
pendant to the address
History,^ the appropriate
its
quote a passage or
famous Belfast Address
" It
given by his friend Tyndall on the same occasion.
may
be assumed then," he remarks after describing cer-
tain
well-known
"that
by
experiments
and
Pfliiger
Goltz,
molecular changes in the brain are the causes of
all the states of consciousness of brutes.

Is there any
evidence " he remarks, " that these states of conscious-
may,
ness
cause
conversely,
which give
rise
"I
such evidence."
no
see
tinues
" It
is
those
And
true
quite
that,
to
judgment, the argumentation which

holds
equally good
caused by the molecular
substance.
there
men
is
He
changes
answers
he
presently
the
best
applies
con-
my
of
to brutes
and, therefore,
that all
consciousness in us, as in them, are immedi-
states of
ately
of
molecular
motion ? "
to muscular
It
seems to
me
changes
the
of
brain
that in men, as in brutes,
no proof that any state of consciousness
is
the
cause of change in the motion of the matter of the organism."
He
sciousness
1
Still,
down somewhat by
tones this
as
on the
related
wh(jle,
it
to
the mechanism
would be
far truer to charge
describing conthe
of
Huxley with incon-
sistency than with deliberate materialism.

2
Collected Essays, vol.
i,
cf.
pp. 239 2.
body
32
simply as a collateral product of
'
pressly
seems
one-sidedness
case
is
it
very
and
unreasonable,
not
is
in
We
this
any
in
naturally
inconceivable
less
itself
even
sight
first
not strict parallelism.
certainly
urge that
At
product of volition.
collateral
working,' but ex-
muscular motion as
to describe
declines
its
hovf
mind than it is how mind can

The
inconceivability Huxley fully
on matter.
act
admits.
"How the one phenomenon causes the other,"
matter
he
can
says,
on
act
"we know,
any other case

right to
causation
of
an
or
we have
to
an
is
as
little,
the
of
effect
in
much
as
that motion
believe
But against the admission

is, over and
impact."
of
effect
as
but we have
believe that the sensation
molecular change as
is
much
as
that volition causes physical changes, there
above the general inconceivability of

a
further
difficulty
difficulty
all transitive
that
out from, and
and
that, as
plete
into
ucts,'
on, the mechanical theory,
we have abundantly
and rigorous concatenation
seen, postulates a
com-
of all physical changes
one vast, undeviating process.
'
Collateral prod-
comparable to the shadow of a moving train or
the sound of
its
quently, by the
these
founded
is
naturalism
For naturalism
amounts to an absolute impossibility.

sets
for
action,
at
least,
influence, the
whistle,
way
is
it
may
though
working
thought
very
perhaps be imagined
they
may
indicate,
of the machinery.
can
it
is,
sinks into nothing.
notion of action becomes an illusion.
indeed goes along by
itself,
The
for
never
So regarded,
the psychological distinction between sensation

sponse, vital though
inconse-
and
re-
The very
material series
but the mental series only
^^ND A 'COLLATERAL PRODUCT'

goes along by
as does a
itself
succession of shadows.
" If these positions are well based," says

follows
that
we
the feeling
not the cause of a voluntary
act,
that state of the brain which
is
of that act."^
we must
How
33
Huxley, "
it
volition
is
call
but the symbol of

the immediate cause
far those positions are well based
further consider in the next lecture.

1
VOL.
II
i,
p. 244.
LECTURE
XII
THE CONSCIOUS AUTOMATON THEORY

Doctrine of Conscious Automatism or Psycliical Epiphenomenalism
examined.
It is maintained (1)
that there can be
no causal connexion
and yet (2) that the
or epiphenomenon of the physical.
between the psychical and the physical
series,
is a
collateral product
The very statement is thus self-contradictory.
psychical
Mind
'
'
where assumes that mind
and
(2) the physicist
not explain
an
is
and (b)
the
stands, there are these two articles
it
primacy and independence of the automThe latter to

illusory character of psychical activity.
:
(a)
the
first.
Huxley''s endeavour to save himself
from
urges that we are free, ''inasmuch as in
"
the charge of fatalism only
automaton
There
of
it
is
is
a part,
xoe
And
How
The ground on
loe
come
automatism
is
to be talking
true,
how
ichich Descartes called
is
man
because of his intellectual and voluntary activity
man a mere
The psychical
then do
if conscious
On
ignored by Huxley and others.
have called
Again, he
can do as we
find no activity xoithin that.
thus activity noiohere
even as illusory?
a conscious automaton
is
respects zee
so, if
illusion or error possible ?
a logical one.
many
" volitions do not enter into the chain of causation

aW''? Turning now to the mechanical world, of lohich
But how
of the action at
the
this
it else-
factor in biological evolution,
efficient
results in substituting a blind necessity for
like.
(1)
proper declares that the laws of matter alone will
However, taking the doctrine as
be discussed
For
itself.
life.
specially to consider
aton,
In accepting
thus becomes impotent to control matter.
position Naturalism is really at variance loith
automaton.
series will not resolve
tion counts for something as
their premisses Descartes
a condition of the course of events.''^

34
would
Huxley turned against himself.

voliinto a series of feelings, and
'^^
DUALISM OPPOSED TO INTERACTION

An
ist'' s
that
antinomy thus reveals
itself
of the teleological and the
The conscious automaton theory the
mechanical.
35
preference for materialistic terminology.
result of the natural-
Attempts to find a half-way
through loopholes within the mechanical theory turn out
to be futile.
In the preceding lecture we were occupied with
general survey and some passing comments on the doctrine
psychophysical
of
modifications of
form of
it
now
and the
parallelism,
various
Leaving aside one
in vogue.
admissible but unimportant, which merely
it,
announces the irrelevance and incongruity of psychological conceptions in jDhysics
the others result
and
we found
vice versa,
from reflexion on the intimate
cor-
respondence between mind and body, which physiological
The
now
and
comparative
first
and most obvious inference which
itself
to
facts,
is
psychology
before us.
set
suggests
an observer confining his attention to these

that
mind and body mutually
influence
each
other.
Yet such an inference has
itself in
the face of the dualistic conceptions with which
we one and
all
approach these
first
more psychologists and

tive
failed
to
maintain
questions.
The
physicists elaborate their respec-
data in isolation, the more inconceivable psycho-
physical interaction becomes.
Under
these circumstances
monistic hypotheses naturally present themselves, and

to a
monism
men
we must, no doubt, in the

monism now in favour with scien-
some
But the
end come.
tific
of
onlj^ escapes
sort
the lesser difficulty of parallel-
ism and absolute separation, by incurring others greater.
For
if
the
order and connexion of physical
that of the mechanical theory, and
nexion of
ideas
if
things be
the order and con-
conforms to that of physical things,
36
it
little whether we have one substance or two.

way our ordinary common-sense conception of
matters
Either
mental activity and initiative becomes altogether
sory.
monism
chanical parallelism would
mind has simply

mechanism,
to
me-
But
if
an automatic
of
whether we
little
illu-
this
be worth having.
shadow the working
matters
it
dispense with
that could
call it
another
aspect of the same substance, or a collateral effect in a

distinct substance
tion
substance
of
or whether, leaving the whole ques-
we
aside,
call
it
an epiphenomenal
accompaniment of physical phenomena.

insists that, if there
fact,
both unknown
a preference
any
but on grounds of economy acknowledges
for
one,
provided
it
unknowable.
is
In
dualism of the psychical and physical series
case, the
remains as Descartes
still
Agnosticism, in
two substances, they are
are
left
more pronounced.
it,
save that
He
is,
too,
it is,
anything,
if
main the
the
in
author of that doctrine of animal automatism by which
nowadays the
'
scientifically
we have
We
it,
mind and body

This,
described.
'
then,
is
said to be
the doctrine
have already noticed one serious ambiguity about
On
that there
it
the
is
will be well to
comment somewhat
one hand this doctrine maintains,
no causal connexion between the two
and that there cannot be any; yet on the

second place,
it
furfirst,
series
other, in the
represents conscious states as collateral
products of the physical

first
is
specially to examine.
on which
ther.
relation of
series.
of these positions, over
new ground
for the
and above the complete
parateness of mental and material facts,
is
dis-
found in the
doctrine of energy as mechanically understood.
This
is
MIND AS EPIPHENOMENAL
37
opposed both to the outgoing of energy from the physide as well
sical
as
the psychical side.
the
to
As
incoming of energy from
to the second
position, that
is
simply a desperate attempt to save appearances in the
Constant coexistence and correspondence
eyes of logic.
imply causal relation of some
brook no interference and

complete in themselves
The
sort.
but the vague and, so to say,
impalpable character of the psychical

agined, will allow us to regard
an
that
effect
energy of
its
The
from
the
a mosaic
the clock-bell, the colours of
impossible absolutely to
needful to dilate on
such a position.
though possibly
the
distinct
deny.
transparent
Germans
an endeavour
to attenuate to the uttermost a connexion

is
as
(or, as the
plainly indicate
Begleiterscheinung'),
it
physical
and particularly the
it,
newly coined phrase epiphenomenon
all
It
which
is
this is a
inconsistency
mechanism
The
If
physicist
is
said that
it is
without
the
must count
mind guides
expenditure
of
not entitled to use cause in two
mental states are simply products of molec-
ular conditions, however collateral, then
is
And
point which physicists are not slow to urge
material
work.
of
Even shadows and sounds involve work,

its amount is infinitesimal in compari-
when, with much more reason,
senses.
after
scarcely
son with that expended in driving the machine.
the
im-
is
figures used to describe this
from the stones that compose
say,
it
such as the shadow of the engine, the sound
relation,
of
series,
as a collateral effect,
it
nothing
yet takes
cause.
physical side will
processes are held to be
its
in with the rest.
To
these products
say that consciousness
an aura or epiphenomenon of the organism, which
38
itself
but a mechanical automaton,
is
not to face
difficulty,
is
shirk the
to
mental states are not simply
If
it.
products of material conditions, then matter must interact
The clock
with something else to produce them.
will
not sound in a vacuum nor cast shadows in the dark.
But the most
serious point in this
automatism
scious
that which
is
mind
point, the impotence of
which
practical consequences
but I do not
now
also
is
cardinal
its
to influence matter.
The
logically follow are serious,

It is true, as Huxley
The only question which
refer to these
says with reference to them
doctrine of con-
"
any wise man can ask himself, and which any honest
man
will ask himself,
is
whether a doctrine
true or
is
Consequences will take care of themselves
false.
most their importance can only
justify us in testing
at
with
extra care the reasoning process from which they result."
But
which
this
exclusively the
is
it
propose to ask your attention with a view to
very testing of the doctrine from which they follow.
To begin
then, I
would observe that
animal automatism, naturalism

itself.
For throughout
tion
assumes
an
consequences to
theoretical
it
its
though
efficient factor in
in this doctrine of
really at variance with
exposition of biological evoluoften covertly
that
mind
is
We
have seen Mr.
consciousness
on the scene
organisation.
Spencer adroitly bringing
when
is
the complexity of the organic reflexes,
which are
supposed to be purely mechanical, necessitates such direction,
and
much
as a barrel organ requires
start the appropriate
natural selection
instincts,
habits,
it is
tune.*
some one
to select
Again, in the theory of
everywhere taken for granted that
and inclinations are

* See Note
ii,
p.
285.
factors equally as
INCONSISTENCIES INVOLVED
39
potent as anatomical structure or physiological process.
Thus Darwin speaks of the sense of hunger and the pleas"no doubt, first acquired in order to
ure of eating as
induce animals to eat."

infer that the parental,
He
filial,
also thinks
and
we may
safely
social, affections "
have
been to a large extent gained through natural selection."
The upholders
who make
of animal automatism, however,
account for eating by a physical process of
a shift to
chimiotropism, ought to replace social impulses by various
homeotropisms, and so forth.
Moreover,
not merely
it is
constant concomitance that has to be accounted for, but
a constant concomitance that

fessor
As
teleological.
is
Pro-
James pertinently urges: "If pleasures and pains
have no
efficacy,
one does not see (without some such
a priori rational harmony as would be scouted by the

scientific
most noxious
acts,
such as burning, might not give
and the most necessary ones, such
of delight,
ing, cause
why
champions of the automaton theory)
agony."
But not only
is
as
we have had
thrills
as breath-
the automaton theory inconsistent with
the doctrine of evolution as ordinarily accepted,
sistent
the
it is also,
occasion more than once to notice, incon-
with the principles of mechanics as these are pre-
Those principles
sented by their authorised exponents.

will account for the
working of a machine, but they
not account for the machine

inventor with his means
his ends.
ing to the
And
let it be
strict
1
They
itself.
will
furnish the
they do not furnish him with
remembered further that accordphilosophy machine and
naturalistic
The Descent of Man,
vol.
i,
pp. 80
Principles of Psychology, vol.
i,
p. 144.
40
machinist alike are possible in only one way, as lusus

naturae, so to say
and more or
as casual
results of integration of matter
less
exceptional
and concomitant
dissipa-
We
tion of motion, to use again Mr. Spencer's formula.^
have from that no warrant to conclude that the cosmos
more than a lucky corner
which we may chance
able to a single truly rounded pebble

to find
is
an illimitable chaos, compar-
in
on a whole beach of shapeless stones.
What
seems
at first sight the result of intelligent guidance turns out

to be
but an incidental consequence of those secondary
and motion that accompany the
tributions of matter
mary
The
distribution.
as automata
take any given organism by

is
accounted
for,
inexplicable
only
then,
pri-
existence of organisms regarded
though mechanically as inexplicable,
the heath
dis-
if
as Paley's
itself,
watchmaker
there be no
after
if
we
watch on
is
haphazard method.
this
Nevertheless, the physicist proper, confining himself to
proximate causes, declares the origin of animate machines,
even more than the construction of inanimate,
to
be a result which the mere laws of matter and energy
To
will not explain.
set against this
we have nothing
but Mr. Spencer's poetic evolution of cosmic evolution,

in
which even the
fixity of definition
is
infected by the
subject matter;
like the
'
instabilities
a state of perpetual
However,
and parcel
1
This,
bk.
iv.
the
by the way,
lessly to its
/LteTa/3ao-t9
for the
of
and nascencies
is
moment
demanded by
and
'
all
logic
the terms,
they describe, are in
eh aXXb
yevo^.
accepting this result as part
naturalistic
scheme,
very ancient doctrine.
remotest consequences by Lucretius.
let
us see
It is carried
Cf.
how
out fear-
De Rerum Natura,
PSYCHICAL ACTIVITY AS ILLUSORY

The organism
things stand.
arisen without guidance.
an automaton that has
is
What we
"
call spirit
taneity," to recall
Huxley's striking words,
banished from this
side.
we
And
41
on the other
and sponis
already
when
side,
turn to the consciousness that shadows the working
of this automaton, there
is
only the illusion of activity
no real independence, and
Though but
is left.
a col-
the automaton
lateral product, it still is a product;
is
physically independent of the consciousness that accompanies
while the consciousness in the absence of an
it,
adequate automaton
is
We
an impossibility.
have here
then two articles of the conscious automaton doctrine
which we must specially consider: (1) the primacy and

and, (2) the illusory
independence of the automaton
;
character of psychical activity.

first
propose to defer the
and for the present
of these for a while,
to
con-
tinue the examination of the latter.
When Huxley^
as
'
mechanical as
purely
volitions
assures us that our voluntary acts are
'
our reflex actions, and that
simply accompany but do not enter into the
chain of their causation at
all,
the only voluntary acts
he contemplates are bodily movements.

inevitably commits
If
him
to a far
But
the theory
more extravagant
position.
the motor processes, with which our voluntary conparallel, are part of the
unbroken physical
series, the cerebral processes that are
attended by intel-
sciousness
is
lectual consciousness are equally parts of that physical

series.
ity
is
If volitional activity is illusory, intellectual activ-
illusory also.
If
voluntary movements are at bottom
determined by motor reflexes, then, by parity of reasoning,

^
Of. Collected Essays, vol.
i,
p. 241.
42
thought
is
Trdumen
mans
at
bottom determined by nervous connexions.
ist leicht
dreaming
is
und Denken ist sehiver, say the Gereasy and thinking is hard.
So it
seems; but nerve currents, like other physical changes,

Only,
take always the line of least resistance.
by the
process
slower; and what
is
the
easiest line is comparatively great, the
resistance
is
when
we
thinking
call specially
On
but the collateral product of the friction induced.
the physical side there

the effort
is
are no ends,
no
is
only seeming
effort,
and on the psychical
on the physical side there
and on the psychical, the ends do not
really
Logical processes become in truth but
control the means.
the concomitants of physiological processes, and physiological processes ultimately resolve into the integration
and the
of matter
ward trend
dissipation of motion, the steady
of inert elements
which sometime or
libration
back again to that equi-
or why,
must have been disturbed.

box every
of
absolutely determined; and

of every minutest
nobody can say how
other,
left the
detail
since that first catastrophe
Once the
their
what
movement
down-
is
fall
is
true of
dice have
entirely
and
them
true
is
of every minutest molecule
The dance
took place.
of
motes in a sunbeam and the dance of molecules in a

brain are, in this respect, altogether on a par;
in
the one case
we
while in the other
believe
we
there
say there
solely because these brain
is
movements
none.
are
the attendant psychical shadows, their

ucts,' are
of will or
though
a psychical aura,
is
'
Simply and
what they
collateral
are,
prod-
what they
are,
whether what we
what we
call
moral impotence, whether pure
reason or incoherent ravins:.
call strength
':
BLIND NECESSITY
And
43
wherefore shall we not call this fatalism?
"Be-
cause," replies Huxley, " I take the conception of necessity to
This
many
have a
logical,
a strange
is
and not a physical foundation."
and perplexing answer and suggests

In the
reflexions.
first place,
tions are simply 'the symbols
if
our mental condi-
consciousness
in
the
of
changes that take place automatically in the organism,'

then logical necessitation
is
like the rest.
It,
but
too, is
the shadow or symbol that actually accompanies organic
changes that actually take place.
supposed significance
its
existence of
is
is
an
Its existence is a fact,
illusion, precisely as the
the states of consciousness called volitions
'
a fact and their supposed efficacy an illusion.
necessitation
quite as important to
is
the
Logical
spiritualistic
view as voluntary freedom, but the doctrine of automatism

Accordingly Huxley argues quite consist-
excludes both.
ently
when he
says elsewhere of this idea of necessity
" It does not lie in the observed facts
that I can discover elsewhere.
For
and has no warranty
my
pudiate and anathematise the intruder.
Law
know
shadow
come
of
to
but what
is
part I utterly re-
Fact I know, and
this Necessity save
my mind's own throwing ?
"
How the shadows
throw shadows, even empty shadows,
question.
Descartes,
it
is
a nice
from such
Illusion seems as hard to explain
premisses as necessary truth.
an empty
will
be re-
membered, traced error to the independent activity of
But
that
being
gone,
should be impossible.
1
Methods, p. 245.
2 op. cit., p.
161.
will.
even throwing empty shadows
However, leaving
this
aside for
Cf. below, Lecture XVIII, pp. 212 f., 217

But Huxley gives a very different version of
conception of necessity in other places. CL, e.g., vol. y\,Hume,
etc., p.
ff.
this
285.
'
44
the present,
next
let us note in the
not necessary in the logical sense,
that
j^lace,
still
though
concomitance
this
of mental conditions, as collateral products of the changes
which take place
in the organism,
is
regarded as actually
Granted that we are only
It is natural law.
inevitable.
entitled to say that dice actually do
when they
fall,
thrown from the box, not that they must
we may only say
that
that their after course
and absolutely the result
must be
it
necessit}'-,
and
this
still
entirely
is
of the initial conditions, not that
Though not
enough.
is
a logical
yet the mechanical character of brain processes
their rigorous mechanical connexion with the other
phenomena
cal,
quote
to
fundamentally mechani-
of the universe, also
held to be a
is
that,
Also
fact.
our
it
is
held to be a fact
"the
authority,
stands
soul
lated to the body, as the bell of a clock to
and consciousness answers
when
out
gives
enough.
a
are
granted
fall;
There
it
is
is
material configuration and
it
is,
nor
'
fate,
shall
'
'
this
say,
must
'
about
Be
it
readily imagine
you please
in this sense there
nor
motions.
its
we can
or as not existing at
logically as contingent as
been decreed
Again,
struck."
bell
is
no logical necessity, certainly, about
great scale or on a small,

other than
works,
its
sound which the
to the
re-
may
it.
it
all.
may
It
it
may
as
be
never have
be neither
Theistic
on a
'
ought
notions
of
one need hardly say, are altogether alien to the
naturalistic standpoint.
actually on
But
a conscious automaton I
the naturalistic assumption, at
all
am
events.
For that philosophy, matter and energy are indestructible
and ingenerable, and the laws

1
Of. Lecture
of their
XVIII.
working
rigor-
'
FREEDOM AS 'FEELING'
wbat
as
the
And
and unalterable.
ous, exact,
is
Greeks called
beyond
this,
meant by natural or blind
is
45
This physical
it.
all cavil,
necessity, avd'^Ki)^
necessitation,
according to the doctrine of conscious automatism, ap-
without the
plies
and
thinking
says,
all
"but parts
abatement
of
possibility
our
acting.
We
"
to
are,"
of the great series of causes
our
all
Huxley
as
and
effects
which in an unbroken continuity composes that which

is
and has been and

Nevertheless
as in
many
we
shall be
are told that
we can do
respects
words do not mean
the
at all
we
as
mean,
This
is
all
shews clearly how
by an
like one
efficient
and
fact,
action such
little
and knows
ours to persist in
conscious only of
"Imagine,
all
The frequent
its
doing as we like
'
if
you can,"
such
said
motion continues,
motion.
its
This stone, since
own endeavour and deeply
its
it is
this
is
it
is
is
inter-
perfectly free,
continues in motion for no other reason than that
Now
re-
they can
that, so far as it can, it endeav-
ested therein, will believe that
wills.
agent
used long ago by Spinoza,
" that a stone, while
conscious,
But such
They
to mean.
sometimes accompany motor
they mean in
supposed to involve.
Spinoza,
"inasmuch
like."
conscious automatism be true.
if
use of illustrations
is
we
they simply indicate a special class of pleas-
ures, the pleasures that

flexes.
of existence."
are free,
what they seem
refer not to purposes carried out.
and arbiter
sum
and
it
so
freedom of man's will which
every one boasts of possessing, and which consists only

in
this,
that
men
are
aware of their own desires and
ignorant of the causes by which those desires are deter1
Huxley, Collected Essays,
vol.
i,
p. 244,
46
mined."
Spinoza,
may
it
concerned with free
mental activity simply.
Still
The
tion holds for both.
stand,
as
is
illusory
motion were due to

because
active;
and
inactive.
movements
So,
passing,
point of the
the
activity,
we
If
illustra-
to
under-
the
stone's
are
we should call the

not move itself, we call it
mind can
of the body, as
stone
inert
really determine the
assumed
it is
do in volun-
to
mind
tary acts, then such acts deserve the name, and the
truly regarded as active.
is
purely mechanical,
if
But
"volitions
if
name
of acts
voluntary acts are
do not enter into the
chain of causation of the aotion at

serve the
is
concerned with
are
the freedom.
as
the
if
we
itself,
does
it
observed in
be
while
will,
all "
they do not de-
and the activity
mind
of
is
an
illusion.
And now
we have
that
sided business this
seen clearly what a very one-
conscious
automatism
is,
now
that
we
are satisfied of the complete dependence (according
to
this
epiphenomenal
doctrine) of the
series
physical or phenomenal series, of which
it
is
on the
in
some
way but the collateral product, let us turn

moment to the primary series, and recall the de-
mysterious
for a
liverances of
activity
modern dynamics concerning the
allowed there.
The word
'
action
'
sort
of
and other
words, ordinarily connoting activity, occur often enough.
Thus we have
posite
repel,
'
'
'
Unlike
each other
Action and reaction are equal and opelectricities attract,

'
and so
Letters,
like electricities
But efficiency
The very notion
forth.
where strenuously disclaimed.
and
is
every-
of cause
No. 62, quoted by Sir F. Pollock, Spinoza., his Life ani
Philosophy, 1880, p. 208.
NO MECHANICAL ACTIVITY
is
47
voted a fetish to be replaced by equations, neither
which can with any propriety be called
side of
And
cause or effect.
either
accordingly the distinction of past
and future, otherwise so fraught with meaning, becomes

the future here
insignificant;
and
The whole course
clear.
An
one process.
must have been
the
line,
that
of a
must
it
at one time or other
Though
no force.
however,
its
And
chanical theory
it
was
first
we
energy.
no new
how long ago

of
action,
no fresh
standpoint of the me-
the
are told to regard the world.
set a-going, this too has
Since
been free from the
and has received no accession
Inert as a whole,
nowhere
have been set in
tell
under the action
it is
is
so from
action of external forces

of
So
off.
in a straight
position in space be regarded as
changing continuously, there

interference.
effect,
movens, there
be indefinitely far
motion from without, but no one can
fixed
on the other
but,
body moving uniformly
at this present time,
one
the
to
alike
is
primum
beginning;
may
hand, such beginning
we might say
of things
efficient cause,
at
open
both are
the past;
calculator as
scientific
just as
lies
and
inert in every part,
The
there
is
cist's
use of the term energy, must not mislead us, and
will not,
if
we
either choice or
upon
the body has no
power
to
The
it.
mass depends solely on
such energy as
physi-
bear in mind the strictly mechanical
terpretation which he puts

of a given
striving.
its
It
alter.
in-
actual energy
speed, and this
can receive only
another body imparts
to
it,
and can
only part with such energy as another body receives
from
it.
The nature
a mystery;
the
of such
law of
them
dynamical transferences
is
exact in
all
cases
is
and
48
always devoid of ambiguity.
preme throughout
Some
taneity.
there
is
Matter and law are su-
nowhere either
of the older materialists, as
Priestley, insisted
spon-
spirit or
Toland and
on the essential activity of matter, being
misled by Newton's metaphors of attraction and repulsion
and by such notions as Boscovich's of centres of
But
the mechanical theorists
none of
will have
much
it,
start itself
out, but
it
it.
turned,
move
The
this, at least,
of
the
is
process, not
confined to describing the
the sand, can give no account of

to
downward dance
it.
of
But once the

the last
this
glass
grain
just as inevitable as that of the first;
is
seen,
glass could not
was an interference before the
catastrophe, and no meaning

is
we have
as a whole, looked
was an interference from with-
Science, which
movements
force.
seems comparable to nothing so
an upturned hourglass.
as
during
The world
this.
at as they conceive
pur
sang, as
to
and the
movements being fixed, any collateral consequences of them must be taken to be fixed too.
There is then activity nowhere. The automaton would
several
belie its
name
if
its
spontaneity were not as illusory as
that which Spinoza imagined the falling sand to
How
of.
all?
then do
If there
then possibly
we come
were such a thing on the physical
we could understand
on the psychical side

be really active,
ter, in
it
dream
to be talking of activity at
contrast to
it
we can
it,
was non-existent.
Or
mind
if
readily understand that mat-
should be found to be
inert.
When
was a question whether the sun or the earth was
regarded as fixed,
but would
it
it
side,
the assertion that
to be
was plain that one or other moved
ever have been maintained that the motion
ILLUSION INEXPLICABLE
one of them was illusory,
of
Once grasp the notion
both had been
if
that the material world
devoid of activity, and that there
world which
that mental
niment, and
there
spontaneity,"
no
being
and
'up
it
to
call
but
is
be no
can
its
wholly-
shadowy accompa''
of
away the
banishing
illusion
cannot banish
unknowable and inconceivable.
may
is
no real activity in
question
explain
We
doing.'
is
still ?
the
of
non-
expose a counterfeit of what, as genuine,
existent, or
is
49
Paradoxical though
seem, yet even the illusion of activity and spon-
taneity
certain evidence that activity
is
somehow
really exist
are not found
and spontaneity
and since by common consent they
in the physical world, they
must be
in
the psychical.
And
here let
ther upon an
me go back
objection
scope of which will be

doctrine
sion
The
is
moment
to insist fur-
mentioned,
more apparent
still
and error equally with
comitant mind-state
:
now
of
be inexplicable.
ble
for a
just
later.
were true,
If the
this
logical necessitation
full
illu-
would
apposition of brain-state and con-
declared to be the closest possi-
the one keeps pace and varies with the
shadows follow
the
other,
as
and change with, the moving figThe clock cannot sound six when
If, as Huxley tells us, " our
once.
after,
ures that cast them.
the bell only strikes
mental conditions are simply the symbols in consciousness
changes that
of the
the organism,"
ticular
must
particular.
To
take
how can they
place
automatically in
belie these?
Concrete par-
then correspond immediately to concrete

the continuous series of neuroses^ molecular
changes in the automaton, will answer pari passu, a conVOL. n E
50
As
tinuous series of psychoses^ fleeting mental changes.
collateral products of the physical chain these miscalled
symbols have no direct connexion, either causal or

cal,
symbolise anything or
that cannot
we might
false,
logi-
Sensations or feelings, mere items
with each other.
call
them
be
true
either
or
but judgments they could
Relations of coexistence and of succession
never be.
they will have
but the recognition and affirmation even
of these will be a fact utterly beyond, and distinct from,
them, not an item among the
upon
collateral
carry of
another
plane from
rest.
their
may
distinct
mere existence
as
must be any significance they may

The
existence and relations beyond their own.
products,
consciousness in which they are symbols

ble
more
Still
is
with the ground on which shadows
not comparaObjects
fall.
project shadows, but shadows do not project objects,
or set aside the order in which they occur for an order

that explains their occurrence.
Great as
ular
is
motions,
it
is
we have
as
as
automatism
is
nothing to the disparity between
and
motions
molecular
whom,
the disparity between sensations and molec-
thought.
Thus
Descartes,
to
seen, the entire doctrine of conscious
due, habitually used the same term "idea,"'
to denote the cerebral excitation, as well as the sensa-
tion
The same ambiguity is found lurking

Locke's "new way of ideas," as Stillingfleet
proper.
again in
called
it
vigorous
and was the immediate occasion

polemic,
sensory idea
is
now
still
much
much a
too
very
purely mental nor purely material
forgotten.
of
Reid's
For the
tertium quid, neither
as
even Huxley's
phrase 'collateral product,' incidentally shows.
But
for
DESCARTES AND HUXLEY

Descartes, at
events,
all
necessary to mental
and
active
tially
life,
61
sensory ideas were not
these
which he regarded
independent of
essen-
as
Even
matter.
for
Locke, the intellectual elaboration of ideas depended on

the mind's
own
initiative
and
such had no part or share.
was
thinkers
these
not
which matter
effort, in
between sensations,
ideas
as
and cerebral impressions or material ideas
proper,
between mind, as active in thought and

matter as merely extended and inert.
but
volition,
and
In other words,
the dualism was between matter and spirit
man
regarded as an inexplicable blending of both.
no concern now
to dwell
as
In short, the dualism for
upon the inconsistency
philosophy of Descartes in this point,
where
being
have
of the
again, by
the way, he was followed in the main by Locke.
Having
emphasised the substantial duality and essential disparity

of
mind and
matter, a philosopher
had admitted nothing
nature both were merged, as
substance constituting
What
who
boasted that he
what was
clear
and
ought not to have been content to say that in
distinct,
human
as true but
interests
it
literally
it
automaton.
a conscious
us to note, however,
Simply and solely because of
were, into one
is
merely this
his intellectual
and volun-
tary activity was man, for Descartes, a conscious automaton,
and
for lack
automaton.
of such
activity
the brute a mere
In such intellectual and spontaneous activity
lay the essential and necessary characteristics of spirit.
Sensations and other

as inexplicable
the side
work;
of
'
passive states
'
from the side of mind
matter.
They were not
and they existed solely
for
were for Descartes

as
they were from
the mind's handithe
benefit
of
the
62
mind and body,
composite whole of
They were not
things are beneficial or hurtful to that.
to be regarded as elements of knowledge
man
alto-
Thus widely then did the conception

which the founder
as a conscious automaton,
theory entertained, differ from
mechanical
by
for this
and obscurity they were
their irreparable confusion
gether unfitted.
what
indicate
to
Huxley imagined him
The question then
of the
that which
and held himself.
to hold,
arises
of
Can
this
spirit
and sponta-
neity that for Descartes and Locke were the inalienable
property of mind, can these be banished from the psy-
must be
chical world, as assuredly they
doctrine
facts?
automatism
of
It is all
tism to say there

are there
if
the
What
stand?
modern
are
the
very well for the upholders of automais
Prima
to
is
no room
for them, but
facie their reality
is
what
if
they
unquestionable,
and the world at large would doubt the sanity of one

who should go about with great pains and labour to
prove
it.
naturalists
But what then
who
are
we
claim to disprove it?
Every man knows
the difference between feeling and doing,

reverie
modern
to say of our
between
idle
and intense thought, between impotent and aim-
less drifting
and unswerving tenacity
the slave of every passion
And what
he finds in his
own
mental contrast of passivity

be shared by
all his
or
and
of purpose, being
the master of
funda he believes to
experience
activity
himself.
this
fellow-men, nay, though in less de-
veloped forms, by every living
thing.
Experience in
every case consists in interaction between individual and
environment, an alternation of sensitive impression and
motor expression, the one relatively
passive,
the
other
THE REALITY OF ACTIVITY
53
Absolute activity and absolute passiv-
relatively active.
ity are limiting conceptions
which we have no an-
to
swering experience, the one being commonly attributed

to
God
and the other only
only,
Devoid
alike of creative efficiency
man
ference of senseless clay, each
well
feeling
as
by feeling to act.
It
even
mental?^
finds
himself,
and
what
for
And
receiving,
and
prompted
futile,
nay,
is
experience more funda-
there in
being thus fundamental, the prime staple
of all experience, it
since in the
as
must surely ever remain
attempt to explain either receptivity or
foolish, to
activity;
of the inert indif-
other sentients to be, at once sensitive and
believes all
reactive,
to primeval matter.
and
is
absurd to seek to prove them
and foremost sense of
first
and they are one.
Wliat then,
real,
reality the real
ask again, are
we
to
say of the attempt to disprove this reality?

It
is
useless for our opponents to reply that they have
no intention of denying the reality of consciousness, that
on the contrary they admit an answering psychosis

every neurosis.
But they
insist that the
to
psychoses shall
be always and wholly determined by the neuroses, and the
neuroses in no sense and never determined by the psychoses.
They
claim, supported
by a shallow and perverted
psychology, to treat all psychoses as affective or sensational,
calling
volitions
feelings,
and regarding them
equally with sensation as but the shadows or symbols of
molecular processes in the brain.
remark further on the inadequacy

of the sensational
But
if
do not propose to
of this account
and cognitive phase
even
of consciousness.
our acts are only feelings, only symbols of changes

1
Cf. below, Lecture
XIV
and Lecture XIX.
54
which they
in
no wise produce, changes predetermined
in the very structure of the physical world as a
mechanism,
then they are unreal, they are not what they seem to be.
If consciousness is
a fortiori
it is
powerless to affect the neural process,
without effect on the external changes that
are consequent
upon
When we
shrink.
and changed the
say that
and
this
is
cities,
civilization,
a statement from
automaton theory do not
of the
man
has subjugated nature
face of the earth, this
that the building of

of art
And
these.
which the upholders
is
only to
mean
that all the manifold triumphs
are but part
and parcel of the
one vast mechanical process, to which the upheaval of

volcanoes and the formation of crystals in their cooling
The consciousness
crust also belong.
of aims, acts, efforts,
that accompanied those miscalled artificial processes,
was
not the source of their supposed teleological characteristics.
The
physical
free
sufficient,
from
where a psychical
and where
rective
is
indefinite
it
series
series has
has not.
all
through has been
extra-physical
all
been
direction,
its collateral
Everj'^thing teleological
self-
alike
product,
and
di-
either absent or recedes asymptotically into the
And
past.
yet
we
the consciousness of activity

chical series of
'
feelings,'
we
physical series, goes along of
on the fact that
are
is
not to conclude that
illusory
because the psy-
are to understand, like the

itself.
Not
to insist further
this strict parallelism is
never upheld,
that the psychical series only goes along of itself in the
sense of not reacting upon the physical series on which

it is
functionally dependent, let us ask
to this view
is
What
according
the psychical series?
In 1868 Professor Huxley wrote these words:
"We
'
HUXLEY AT VARIANCE WITH HIMSELF

world which
live in a
and the plain duty
make
the
misery and ignorance,
full of
is
of each
and
of us
all
to try to
is
corner he can influence somewhat less
little
miserable and somewhat less ignorant than
he entered
55
To do
it.
be fully possessed of only two beliefs
the
by our
order of Nature
is
extent which
practically unlimited;
is
was before
it
this effectually it is necessary to
ascertainable
first,
that the
faculties to
an
the second, that
our volition counts for something as a condition of the

course of events."
agree
but what are
dation
of
Huxley
as
With this, I
we to say of
second belief
this
take
most
it,
of
us
the following emen-
by Professor
substituted
Our
a foot-note in 1892?
volition,
"or to
speak more accurately," he then added, "the physical
which our volition
state of
it
remarked, the physical
of our volition,
state
of
which our
!
volition
Not
possible
it
Again
For
to
I say it is
this,
make
my
the
is
Not, be
expression
count for something
'
but the physical state
the expression
itself
is
Is it possible to
the same thing?

Is
which
whereby that might
in the course of events.
gloss
the expression."
is
is
the
these two statements
part I say
it
is
new
mean
not possible.
prove the earlier statement illusory?

not possible.
Illusory experience obvi-
ously implies, as I have already urged, a counterpart
experience by which
falsity is
its
made manifest;
abso-
lute illusion, like absolute motion or rest, cannot be ex-
perienced.
is
The
contrast between receptivity and activity
essential to the experience
to experience at
sion
all.
when, having willed

^
of either of them, that is
paralytic
to
i,
is
make
p. 163.
the subject of
a
illu-
movement, he
2 i
(>^^
note.
is
56
unaware
illusion
no
that
movement has
possible, only because
is
The
his volition effective.
may
seizure
resulted
such
but
he has previously found
spectators of an epileptic under
be under the illusion that the
man
acting
is
violently, but again only because they have previously seen
who were
like violent action in persons
automaton theory
conscious
The
responsible.
and generalises
combines
these two cases of illusion, so as to exclude the very
On
experiences which makes the illusoriness apparent.

the psychical side, according to them,
like those of the paralytic
our volitions are
all
on the physical side
overt movements are like those of the epileptic.

scious automaton
is
all
our
con-
thus like a paralytic and an epileptic
rolled into one, the impotent volitions of the first keeping
To com-
step with the motor discharges of the second.
it
we must, as
have lately remarked, extend
to intellectual activity too,
and resolve thinking into an
plete the figure
orderly raving or reverie that accompanies the physiological

process of
But
cerebration.'
'
go back to the question
let us
the psychical series
for the sake of
What
which
to
quote Huxley's comment on himself.
his
unamended
creed,
we
course of external events

dress on
merely
act' but
then,
tion
we
is
ask, can
of the
According to
whereas according to his ad-
not the cause of
"a symbol
volition
is
a so-called
of a state of the brain."

it
is
was led
find volitions conditioning the
Animal Automatism, a
it
exactly
I
a 'feeling'
'
voluntary
But how
'count for something as a condi-
course of events
'
If
the psychical series
cannot intrude into the physical, then
the
course
events, into which volition enters as a determinant,
of
must
HUXLEY AND HUXLEY

itself
be part of the psychical series.
ably, decides for this alternative, for

his exposition of agnosticism
it is
of little
of matter in
make
to
now have
on proceeding with
tells
But what
this result?
of
got two
individual's
Huxley, presumus that " in
itself
moment whether we express the phenomena

terms of spirit, or the phenomena of spirit
in terms of matter."
we
he
67
in the present case are
plain that
It is
psychical series
directly belongs,
volition
When,
then,
from the
eral course of events
shall
and another con-
sisting of the general course of events, to
not directly belong.
we
one to which the
we
which
does
it
describe this gen-
spiritual standpoint, the
individual's volition counts for something, as condition-
ing that course, and each man's environment, his

corner,' is affected
When, on
of events
'
highest
by what he thinks and says and does.
the other hand,
we
describe this
same course
from the material standpoint, there
for such activity
is
no place
But surely these two

Huxley apparently means to call
and
as
truths,'
'little
efficiency.
them, are as hopelessly at variance as were the Aristotelian
and Christian dogmas which the scholastics were
wont
to
maintain side by side.
Had Huxley
too,
we
wonder, a doctrine in reserve like theirs of a 'twofold

truth
'
Did he too mean
to advocate a sort of
'
book-
keeping by double entr}^' one in spiritualistic terminology,
and one
in materialistic
scious automaton,
which
is
Anyhow
the notion of a con-
said to result from combining
the two, proves to be a palpable contradiction.
cannot give the
lie
to our direct experience,
If
whence
we
all
our conceptions of activity and the realisation of ends

1
o.c, p. 164.
68
are derived, and
concatenation of
also
if
we cannot deny
all things,
the unbroken
whether organic or inorganic,
we
in accordance with strictly mechanical laws,

to face with a
most serious antinomy
of the teleological
Coming upon
are face
the old antinomy
and the mechanical, in a word.
this
antinomy in
towards a solution that suggests
this wise, the first step

itself
to determine
is
epistemologically the more fundamental stand-
which
is
point,
that in
which
the
terminology
spiritualistic
is
employed, or that in which we employ the materialistic.
We
cannot be content to leave them on a par, confronting
each other but in irreconcilable antagonism.

only aggravate the antinomy.
theoiy, as
we have
The
seen, does not leave
them on a
par,
"
The
but decides to stand ultimately by the

terminology,"
materialistic
every way to be preferred.
phenomena
the other
to
of the universe,
clearness
is
whereas the
utterly barren,
nothing but obscurity and confusion
No wonder
ideas."
latter.
Huxley has told us, "is in

For it connects thought with
alternative, or spiritualistic terminology,
and leads
This would
conscious automaton
of
then that naturalism, seeming to find
and distinctness on the one
side,
and on the
other obscurity and confusion, ventures to discredit the

plain testimony of experience and to declare our
power
over nature illusory, spite of the violent absurdities to
which such a declaration leads and the inconsistencies

entails
upon the
naturalistic
philosophy
itself.
We
it
are
thus brought again to the second of the two positions

that
we had
reserved for special examination, the assumed
primacy of the physical
we have
series,
on which the position that
just examined, the denial of psychical activity
MECHAXISM AXD TELEOLOGY

and
But
initiative, is based.
upon the discussion
of that
ask you to consider
will
do not propose to enter
second position at once.
It
the subject of agnosticism that I
directly to
leads so
59
another question which
first
up
will afford us a convenient opportunity of gathering
some
of the results of this long examination of naturalism.
So
been assumed that the mechanical theory
far it has
shuts
us
up
to
with teleology.
view, but
in
is
determinism
rigorous
This
unquestionably
is
there no escape from it?
incompatible
prevalent
the
no way
Is there
which mind can influence matter without interfering
as it
were 'miraculously' with mechanical laws and so
far
subverting the supposed foundations of natural science?

Personally I believe there
conception which
whole discussion
no way.
is
we have taken
is
hold in
to
its
entirety,
the
physical
more certain that there
is
room
that, as
is
for
man, than
it
we have
is
Laplacean
it
this
even
is
world no
Laplace boasted, there
must say
and the
had the courage
seen have
physical world
is
We
no need for God.
in
If the
the text of
as
to
a complete whole in
naturalists
say
itself,
it
The
and goes
itself.
We must say The very
same laws fundamentally, that determine the varying
along altogether by
motion of the solar system, bring together from
the
four corners of the earth the molecules that from time

to time
join in
the
dance we
Dante creating immortal

Borgia teeming
we must
as
say:
irrelevant
with
know
verse,
or
unheard-of
The presence
of
and immaterial
their absence to the other.
the brain of a
as
as
the brain
crimes.
And
of
mental epiphenomena
to
the
one result
finally
as
is
is
60
renewed
are continually being
theory
chanical
some
itself
these absurdities.
The
its
these
escape
of
me-
to find in the
loophole
of
first
Descartes himself in the famous
from
made
attempts have frequently been
Nevertheless
and
from
was broached by
doctrine that the soul
punctual seat in the pineal gland directed the
movements
quantity
animal
the
of
of
motion,
spirits
mass x
Descartes maintained was constant, but
was more
imagined
or
its
afterwards shewn to be a mistake.
velocity,
direction he
was
This
indeterminate.
less
The
willed.
as it
product of
the
Descartes,
in
fact,
like
Mr. Herbert Spencer after him, was ignorant of the
full
meaning
of the principle
of Momentum.
According
the direction of a motion
force
the
and
other, can
this
as
is
by mechanical conditions as
little as
known
to
its
as the
Conservation
however,
principle,
completely determined
speed
The
is.
one, as
be altered without an external
in mechanics, external force implies a second
mass having an equal and opposite mass-acceleration

that
of
the
but realized
mass said to
this,
Had
be moved.
to
Descartes
urged Leibniz, he must have seen
the mechanical impossibility of the soul

flow of animal spirits in the
directing the
way he supposed; he must
have come round to the doctrine of the preestablished
harmony
as the only solution.^
of denying the unconditional
The much simpler plan
supremacy
of
the laws of
motion was hidden from Leibniz, though seen by Kant.
But more
of this hereafter.
Other attempts set out from cases
in
which the de-
termination of a movement, or of the course

1
Cf. Leibniz, Theodicee, 60,
6L
it
shall
SEARCH FOR MECHANICAL LOOPHOLES

take, are said
to
be
theoretically
tion of completely unstable
pose
as large as
it
upsetting
may
it
you
without the
possible
Take a body
expenditure of energy.
61
a posi-
at rest in
may
equilibrium: you
sup-
yet the work to be done in
like,
be less than any assignable amount,
to say, no limit but zero.

Perhaps the
most impressive instance of this kind is that of the
have,
that
blasting
of
is
'
Hell Gate
Sound, when, a
some
button,
little
million
at
'
girl
the
entrance to Long Island
laying a
tons
finger
earth
of
on an
and
electric
water
were
shot upwards with a deafening roar.
The brain change

movement was a case of
that determined that finger
disturbed equilibrium perhaps more wonderful

finitesimal
that might have been indefinitely greater than
Yet there
is
no ground
pressibly delicate
that
and
was.
it
saying that even the inex-
for
brain discharge was due to an initial
disturbance involving no transference of
suppose
in-
still,
compared with the resulting eruption
matter in however
To
energy.
unstable a condition
can be set in motion without receiving any energy from
without
is
theory,
but to deny the absolute validity of
not to find a loophole within the mechanical
fundamental conception
assumption
as
is
of
legitimate, the first
Whether
true.
that
it is
true or not
inertia.
If
its
law of motion
is
most
such
is
an
not
another matter; but
the attempts in question take this law for granted,
they are obviously fallacious, confounding, in
fact,
indefinitely small quantity with no quantity at
all.
The other
case
can best describe

well
"
mentioned
it
by a
is
brief
The dynamical theory
somewhat
quotation
different.
an
from Max-
of a conservative material
62
system shews us that in general the present configura-
and motion determine
tion
system, exceptions
instants
when
to
whole
the
rule
this
system passes through
the
the
course of
occurring only at the

certain
iso-
lated and singular phases, at which a strictly infinitesi-
mal force may determine the course of the system

one of a
finite
number
any
to
of equally possible paths, as the
pointsman at a railway junction directs the train to one

set of rails or another."
It is
assumed that such me-
chanically indeterminate phases predominate throughout

life
or
mind belongs the
determining along which
of
two or more me-
the organic world, and that to
power
of
chanically indifferent paths the elements of an organised
system shall go.
Brain-cells in particular are supposed
to be systems of
this kind.
whether such
any
reality,
guidance
is
not now,
is
whether
but
there
is
corresponding to dynamical equations with
singular solutions,
guidance
The question
exists,
to
confined.
which on
The
this
assumption
such
question, in other words,
is
whether the mechanical theory leaves any such loophole

extra-physical intervention.
for
must be No.
The answer,
it
seems,
For that theory does not admit material
systems in isolation, but insists on treating the whole

material universe as one
it is
can abstract one part from the

data
may
only in thought that

rest.
we
Even granting that
then be wanting to furnish an unambiguous
forecast, all
such indetermination,
it is
held,
would
dis-
appear as soon as other systems, or the rest of the universe,

^
were taken into account.
Revelations of Paradoxical Philosophy, Nature, vol. xix. p. 141.
Collected Papers, vol.
ii,
p. 750.
LOOPHOLES NOT ADMITTED
Many
other endeavours, more or less subtle and
made
genious, have been
and
purposive
taken
thus
action
in
judges
proper
they
apparently
the
the
validity
reject
them
which ex hypothesi
If,
mechanical
Mathematicians
entirety.
its
of
in-
to find a place for voluntary
ivitJiin
of
scheme,
are
the
such attempts, and
all.
motion can set matter in motion
it.
63
it
is
matter
only
If
in
plain that mind,
not matter in motion, cannot do
is
taking the universe into account, there are no un-
balanced forces, then whenever a given mass undergoes

a certain
acceleration,
subject
is
i.e.
an impressed
to
force, another mass simultaneously undergoes an equal
and opposite
acceleration,
is
i.e.
likewise subject to an
Calling the one the
impressed force.
other the reaction,
action,
and the
then becomes absurd to suppose
it
the reaction to be a mass-acceleration, and yet to contend

that the action
an impotent
which
'
is
a volition, unless such volition
aspect
'
the very supposition to be avoided.
is
seem, therefore, that there

Either the universe
is
is
no middle course
is
mechanical or
it is
what
thing:
it
But
out from this position,
spirit
it
all
we have
fail
to gather
it
to justify
seen, has for its base of
it
regions of
altogether.
up the
and, setting
undertakes " the gradual banish-
and spontaneity."
must
would
does not explain must be unreal and
operations the primacy of the physical series
ment from
It
mechanical theory must explain every-
Naturalism,
illusory.
but
left to us.
teleological
not likely to be a mixture of the two.*
naturalism, the
is
the opposite mass-acceleration,
of
results
human thought
of
what we
call
cannot succeed altogether,
If it
In the next lecture I propose

of
* See Xote
our inquiry on this point
iii,
p.
285.
64
and
to offer
We
shall then be prepared in later lectures to contest
some
final
reflections
which they suggest.
the assumption that for knowledge the primacy of the
psychical standpoint
barren and leading to

of ideas."
It will
Huxley has declared it, " utterly

notliing but obscurity and confusion
is,
as
then be not so
as with agnosticism that
we
shall
much
with naturalism
have to reckon.
LECTURE
XIII
SUMMARY AND REFLEXIONS

Abstract Dynamics does not furnish us with a Natural Philosophy,
Facts cannot he
but loith a descriptive instrument of uncertain range.
maimed
to fit
it,
but
Even what can

convince us that
he
it
must be modified
to suit them.
mechanically described need not
it is not,
he,
and
experience
may
mechanically produced.
impossible to divest living beings of " internal determinations
It is
and grounds of determination.^'' Descartes' distinction of causa formalis

and causa eminens. Physics recognises only the former, and resolves
The latter, being excluded from its premisses, is
that into an equation.
supposed to be excluded from existence.
is btiilt
On
this fallacy the doctrine of
an
Inertia not a fact but
up.
ideal.
Conservation of energy essentially a law of exchanges.
whole energy of the universe
is
constant in
That the
amount and 'phenomenal''
in character, not proven.
The
theoretical physicist having eliminated causation,
must not dogma-
The crux of irreversibility suggests that the world is not

Tfie physicist only describes the utterances of real
a mere mechanism.
tise
about
things
is
it.
and
the after-course of these utterances, so
obliged to admit interference, but prefers a
far as
maximum
left
alone.
He
breach of conti-
nuity far off rather than orderly direction now.
Such direction impossible if all the beings in the objective universe

Ko warrant for preferring dead things rather than living as
are inert.
the type of such beings
not merely to calculate
;
it,
and if ice want to understand the world and

we must start from some other type.
The mathematical bias the source of naturalism.

how it has arisen. Mechanism by
corrected by observing
and meaningless.
With mind
first
come law and
have seen implied as a vis directrix, at

selection, in psychophysics.
VOL.
II
65
least,
order.
It
can only be
itself is chaotic
And mind we
in evohition, in natural
66
We
have accepted the decision
upholders of
the
of
the mechanical theory of the world that in that theory-
no place
is
consciousness to intervene as a de-
left for
moment's reflexion
theory
with the
complete
the
If
rests.
whole
ferences of a
show
to
suffices
sition is incompatible
that
have seen
as
that such a suppo-
strict
material
on which
premises
world
changes
in
is
itself
but
trans-
stock of energy constant in
amount
all
if
common
We
changes.
terminant of material
its
are
from one to another of a common stock of vehicles or

receptacles, also constant;
if
such transferences are deter-
mined by nothing but relations of time and space and
number; and
if
time and space are continuous and uni-
form throughout,
there
no room for ambiguity, no
is
opportunity for meddling, and no possibility of control.
But we have not accepted

therefore
free
to
urge
those
this
and
premises,
result
argument
an
as
are
against naturalism, which has accepted them.
The mechanical theory
of the
world we have traced to
a natural prejudice supposed to be the special infirmity

of metaphysicians
to abstractions.
that
Now,
if
of ascribing objective existence
ever there were abstractions, the
time and space and mass of abstract dynamics are such.
In the earlier lectures

ress of
the
the
endeavoured to follow the prog-
mechanical theory, as one after another of
qualitative
diversities
we
were
perceive,
within the range of quantitative description,

at the
outset was avowedly but an
bodies
became
at
mate constituents.
last the
entire
How much
till
what
aspect of sensible
their
ulti-
this earth
than
reality
more
brought
is
of
a mass-point with a certain numerical value, moving in
DYNAMICS NOT PHILOSOPHY

among
accordance with dynamical equations
who imagine
that
that happens
all
mass-points,
when they have

by
traceable
on
resolved the whole
into motions of such
it
mathematical
pure
se
thus turns up where
have expected to find

hind what we see and
it
'
feel
we should
least
what actually goes on
we
is,
'
analysis,
The much
they have attained to a philosophy of nature.

decried thing per
the other
Yet there are people
mass-points of the solar system?
earth and
67
be-
are to believe, simply
the motions of one ultimate fluid characterised through-
out by negative attributes.
Others, whose faith
is
not
equal to this resolution of the phenomenal world into

" non-matter in
be the
truth,
reality
behind
they
too
viz.,
the
veil
of
phenomena
take to
not the
is
that
to
is
one
say,
mechanical theory, as we have
the
repudiate
dynamics
Abstract
done.
mechanism
that
we
seen what
have
motion,"
them not a natural
for
is
philosophy, but a hypothetical descriptive scheme, originally devised and

marise, in the
the
that
continually
do not conform to
its
much
it,
only conform
or
the worse for it;
purview, that
is
If,
it
sum-
or be
again, there are facts
not a reason for chopping
in
two, but a plain
transcends
its
range, and that the world
mechanical.
approxi-
must go
experience
mentally
to
If there are facts
in nature.
modified; the facts will stand.
beyond
as
so
simplest and most comprehensive form,
movements that occur
mately, so
amended
proof
To suppose
that
that
is
experience
not funda-
the
rigorous
determinism deducible from the abstract scheme

the simple reason
that
mental premises
mtost
it
has been put into
its
for
funda-
apply also to the real world
it
68
been devised to describe,
has
to take a very trivial illustration
man must
that a
must
fit
his
fit
coat,
it
would be
to say
and not that the coat
There may be nothing
the man.
absurd as
as
just
is
in the
answering to the conception of inert mass
it
world
may
be
pure a limiting non-entity as the prima materia of
as
And
philosophical speculation.
It
is
measure
latent
forms
senses
furnish
energy
of
no
clue,
there
may
direct
or
be,
fact.
energy and
all its
amount; impossible, again,
its
this
it,
but a regulative principle, an idea, not a
impossible to deprive a body of
is
so
conservation
the
energy analytically distinguished from
the
of
again
to
as
what
to say
which our
to
indirect.
On
both
these points, the assumed reality of
mechanical deter-
minism
the
and
the
energy-conservation,
To begin with
The physical
the
character
true
it
will
first
investigator
of
principle
be well to enlarge a
is
of
little.
never in the happy posi-
tion of the mathematical theorist, face to face with the
ultimate elements of mass in pure space and

like
demiurge
completely
able to assign to each

position.
its
master
element
The mathematical
its
of
all
and
time,
his
data,
share of energy and
theorist employs direct
methods, as when, to take the simplest case, two forces

being given, he ascertains their resultant; the physicist
is
largely shut
for
numerous
possible
his
up
to inverse
solutions, as
components have
methods which leave room
when, a force being given,
its
Hence
in
to be ascertained.
endeavours to describe physical phenomena in purely
mechanical terms, he
is
driven to imagine various me-
chanical devices to simulate them, and has to trust that
REALITY OF MECHANICAL DETERMINISM

phenomena
crucial
devices as are halt

in mass, space,
will gradually eliminate such of these
And when we
and lame.
and
reflect that
time, the physical speculator has at
continuum, we
a sixfold
disposal
his
69
begin to realise
that there need be no end to hypothetical
mechanisms*
Leibniz, for example, did not hesitate to affirm that in
a living body every smallest part
a machine, though
is
Our modern
such body be divided ad infinitum?cists,
however,
require
this
all
even bodies that are not
apparatus
But
living.
physi-
describe
to
let us imagine, as
we could magnify an organic cell or

we could examine it in detail, as we might
Leibniz did, that
nucleus
till
a factory full of machines
and
let us
within that a body that really did
and change
its
What would
suppose somewhere
move spontaneously
any impressed
direction free from
the theoretical physicist say to this
force.
With-
out a moment's hesitation he would quote his laws of
motion and postulate a second body (or mass-system) with

an equal and opposite acceleration
or, as
though no evidence
he would say, no other evidence
body, were forthcoming.

their preconception
avTL'xOaiv or
heavenly spheres,
phenomena
such a
fitness
postulated an
Earth to complete the decade of
thereby,
as
Aristotle
said,
"forcing
into accordance with certain reasonings
when
is
its
Monadologie, 64.
Of. note
it
may
law
This comparison, though
scope
is
by W. H. Thompson in
on Ancient Philosophy,
and
just in the one respect that the
notions of their own."
seem outrageous,
of inertia,
numerical
of
Invisible
of
Just so the Pythagoreans with
vol.
i,
made coextensive with
his edition of
p. 341.
* See Note
iv, p.
286.
that
Archer Butler's Lectures
70
animate and inanimate,
of the entire world,
is
ascertained fact
such as planets,
and other mechanical para-
law
this
observed.
That the bodies
Columbus
or
as
us,
to it is assuredly
however, return to our
physical theorist in the magnified protoplasmic
and
cell,
us assume that the movements of the spontaneous
let
being
we have supposed him
that
all
living
things
ments concur with certain
Certainly not,
controlling
if
and
determined motion
of
do not allow.
real
medium
movements
believe.
mind "
is
nor even
me
to
points
much
so
those
is
Here
a
is
of
This
a sheer impossibility.
to
an
complex
equally
Obviously, therefore, there

here
"
Rather he would say: "Self-
for
motion
Action at a distance, again,
mechanism.
seem affected
the physicist say
he abides by his principles: "Here

initiating
a conscious automaton."
complexity
move-
these
machines among
in turn
What now would
presence.
that
further,
states of the
which the being moves, while these

its
manifest
there
find
to
and discontinuity which commonly
diversity
characterise
by
be
Saint Paul, Christopher
of
Let
can
they
as
far
John Howard conformed
not an ascertained fact.
fact.
merely that mass-aggregates,
is
billiard-balls,
digms, conform to
assuredly
and not an ascertained
a preconceived postulate
What
is
my
is
principles
some
ethe-
the relations of this being's
the
machines
compel
me
to
Let us imagine that erratic being magnified
in its turn as the cell
was
before,
and we may hope
to
invent some concealed machinery which might account

for its unpredictable behaviour."
With such powers
of indefinite magnification
and
definite multiplication of hypothetical mechanism,
it
inis
MECHANICAL DESCRIPTION HYPOTHETICAL

most complex
possible, I say, that the
71
phenomena
vital
the physiologist can ever discover could be mechanically
But
described.
and
all
lish
that,
would not
it
them
beside
really
follow, even then, that they
To
were mechanical.
every infinitesimal mass
estab-
concerned must be
ascertained and ear-marked, the path of each
one must
be traced, and there must be no hidden machinery, no

resort to statistical averages,
or
the
very
beginning, could
accorded with
would be
become
his
then
conflict
the
would have
hypothesis
and the abstractness be at an end.
fact
with a
Meanwhile,
theory
however,
and,
would
it
be
obvious
can
But, on the other hand, there
is
it
refuted
no
been
has
there
further,
There-
guidance would not
psychical
refutation
be.
result
scheme, the verification
descriptive
;
from the
shew that the
directly
complete
the idea of
after
of coordinates,
the physicist, starting thus
If
like.
no ignoration
that
is
merely
by
facts.
such
direct
there
never
still
no pros-
pect of direct physical evidence to shew where psychical

actually
interference
quence
the
does
molecular
occur,
cease to be entirely determined
The question on
dijfficulties
this
and where
movements
plane
is
in
in
conse-
living
by mechanical
body
relations.
an open one, albeit the
besetting the mechanical
theory even of or-
ganic processes seem steadily increasing.
At
this point Kant's declaration, "
the death of
all
the law of inertia and
him
saying, " rests
science of
Hylozoism would be
natural philosophy," recurs to us.

its
nature," with
1
conservation,"
entirely
all
"
On
we have found
possibility
which name he
Cf. above, Lecture VI, p. 177.
of
a proper
dignifies this
72
abstract descriptive scheme, assumed by
Again
we must allow
I say
And what
would ask:
that this
Are we
then?
him
and again
so,
is
to
to be a priori.
conclude that
all
experience would lapse into unintelligible confusion un-
"absolutely devoid of internal
living bodies were
less
determinations and grounds of determination
"
But our
which Naturalism cannot seriously gainsay
own
activity
is
only possible, and the chief est part of our experience
is
only intelligible, on the supposition that living bodies
are not thus devoid of self-determination.
This, I
What
prove and explain away for those who can.

if
would
not a fact to prove or to explain, but one to
insist, is
we deny
that a living
man
or even
a living
dis-
then
mouse
is
merely, like the solar system for the astronomer, a material
aggregate devoid of
internal
For one, there
three things follow.
Two
determination?
is
an end
mechanical theory as conceived by Laplace.
" If
the cause of any change of matter whatever in
we
or
the
of
seek
life,
we
shall have," says Kant, " to seek it at once in another
substance, distinct from matter, although
bound up with
Laplace's famed intelligence then will have, as I
it."
have already
moment he
said,^
obtains
to
add
it,
a complete foreknowledge of all
to his
those changes of matter which

ing, as
we
moment.
mind
will induce, assum-
reasonably may, that the formula
account of
take
world -formula, at the
Still,
all
changes so
when we remember
itself
will
produced up to that
that even the chemical
atom, which might have some claim to rank as one of

1
Cf. Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgriindeder Naturwissenschaft, Hart-
enstein's edition,
3
Sammtliche Werke,
Cf Lecture VI, p. 176.

.
vol. iv, p. 439,
FORMAL AND EMINENT CAUSES
73
Laplace's " real beings " has to be resolved into a complex

of prime atoms and these into mass-points before the me-
chanical theory can have full sway, nay, that even the ether
must submit
to analysis,
it is
obvious that the feats of the
Laplacean intelligence cease altogether to be conceivable.
we may
In short,
take
it
as definitely
conceded by the
themselves that descriptive hypothesis takes
physicists
the place of real theory.
Another consequence of admitting that mind can control
matter, will be that
somewhere within the
living
organism physical events will happen that have other than
Whether " natural science proper "

will ever penetrate far enough into this arcanum arcanorum to find itself face to face with such a miracle
remains to be seen. But up to those uncertain limits it
physical conditions.
'
'
besides,
And
have a vast range and unfettered scope.
will still
if it
renounces
its
old pretensions of being a nat-
ural philosophy, abjures the categories of substance
cause,
and only claims
to describe events,
might
it
and
still
be possible to express abstractly in mechanical terms effects

that in fact were not mechanical.
endeavoured just
lastic distinction
Such a procedure
now to picture. There

much used by Descartes
When
to put this in a clearer light.
is
that
the motion
but
if
is
if
one body
is
is
was a causa
seal, it
was a causa
by another
produced formaliter in the Cartesian sense
a body were set in motion by
would be produced eminenter.

motion
serve
set in motion
when, as the engraver to the
Thus
eminens.
may
a cause was related
to its effect as a seal, say, to its impress, it
formalis
an old scho-
mind such motion
To suppose
that every
mechanically produced would then be
much on
74
a par with supposing that
none drawn
by hand.
some reason
principle
calls it
that
parallelism.
Mill with
'priori fallacy, as
produced by
like can only be
whole
the
the base of
at
so excluding eminent causes,
like,
and
pictures are printed,
always moulded, and never engraved
seals
The
all
we have
lies, as
doctrine
of
seen,
psychophysical
then but an easy step to the exclu-
It is
sion of cause altogether
especially so,
when
the processes
concerned consist simply in the transference of motion
from one mass

seen, abstract
to
we have
This step, as
another.
dynamics has at length taken.
no longer a cause " whatever
force
is
produces or tends to pro-
duce a change in a body's state of
motion";
rest or
it is
merely the effect or event, dynamically described, as mass-
When,
acceleration.
not transferred motion
then,
is
it is
said that motion that
mechanically inconceivable, this
but an analytical statement pure and simple.

to saying that it
yet be active,
combination
is
or,
ah d
inconceivable that what
is
is
amounts
It
inert should
more generally, that you cannot get the

out of the elements
a, 5,
and
strength of such truisms to deny that there

active, to
is
deny the existence
On
c.
is
the
anything
of other elements than ,
5,
deny that matter is ever moved save by matter

is palpably a most unwarranted assumption,
motion,
in
and
c,
to
the only statement logically permissible being that the

descriptive
apparatus
called
recognise such motion.
abstract
mechanics cannot
Yet on such an assumption the
whole doctrine of psychophysical parallelism

built
up
reject that,
and there
is
is
mainly
no serious argument
left.
But, coming
now
to
the second point
the
precise
CONSERVATION OF ENERGY
75
import and range of the principle of the conservation of

energy.
If
mind can
movements
initiate or control the
of matter, in other words,
if
a living body
is
not inert
(whether because 'another substance, distinct from matter,' is
we
bound up with
it,
or for any other reason), shall
not have to set this principle of energy aside
seems a formidable problem.
But
we have
us recall a distinction
This
in the first place, let
already made.
one
It is
thing to ascertain the mechanical equivalents of various
forms of energy and to assert the absolute constancy of

these equivalents as part of the general postulate that
nature
is
uniform.
It
another
is
thing altogether to
assume that the quantity of energy in the universe

finite
and
being
that,
finite,
it
is
neither increases nor
decreases according to some law, or for some sufi&cient
The
reason.
is
attitude of physicists towards this question
much
very
the attitude of an imaginary economist,
who, knowing nothing of the production or consumption
no economic
of wealth, should suppose that there were
laws but those of exchange.
But now, even
so imperfectly mathematical as economics,
work out demand and supply
sible to
in a science
it is still
pos-
curves, spite
of
the fact that the laws of production and consumption
more or
of
less complicate
nature the
physicist calls
its
not be constant
amount.
He
them.
relations
In the grander economics
might be
working capacity or
he cannot
tell,
for
only knows that
its
What the
energy may or may
similar.
him
it is
an indefinite
rates of
exchange or
transformation are regular within the very narrow limits

of
is
his
observation
and even within
strictly confined to the
these
limits,
he
average results of innumerable

76
transactions.
individual
in
If
spite
of
ignorance
this
physicists assume that the total energy of the universe
much
constant,
London
the population of
the simplicity
is
than
thought
But
And how
the
only justification
the assumption and
of
purpose.
their
for
their
to be,
sufficiency
its
more a necessity
no
is
it
assumption
is
assumes
Cheapside crossing-sweeper
as
the
of
of
crossing - sweeper.
often in the history of science have false and
hasty assumptions been called axioms, only because they
were simple and could not be proved

Of course
and Professor
Spencer
or
tion
the
On
but with
is
road
priori
that
'
Mr.
of
the
crea-
inconceivable
as
of substance,
we
as
are so
far
and the noumenal I have already dwelt.

Mr,
but cannot
persists
and affirm
energy
destruction
or
not with
is
the high
the inconsistency and futility of this recourse
to metaphysics
It
'
Tait,
of
destruction
creation
safe.
we take
if
Unknowable
Spencer's
be measured, that
Force,
we have
knowable manifestations that do not
its
All
but are transformed continually.
that
to
do,
persist
we have then
besides the axiom that from nothing nothing comes
are
the experimental determinations of the quantitative equivalents
certain of those
of
From such
this
phenomenal
And
amount.
to
see
admit
energy
in
the
data
this
it.
in
it
is
energy
the
more
the
impossible
in
and
themselves
universe
more
insist
clearly,
that
must be
position as one
the
prove
to
universe
the
physicists
Those who
the same
transformable manifestations.
plainly
is
are
and
that
fixed
in
beginning
frankly
to
quantity of this
constant
seem
to
who should maintain
me
that
quantity of water in a vast lake must be constant
ENERGY AS PHENOMENAL
merely because the surface was always
could never reach
its
its
this
which
and capacity
for capacity for
by counting
in,
secondly,
only
nor
all
capacity for work
work not being on a par

energy, which is
work forever devoid
by allowing,
finally,
of
opportunity
and
that in every material system there
an indeterminate amount of
is
is
dissipated
capacity for
nothing
We
the so-called
first,
not actually energy at
is
mechanically of the same dimensions,
is
though he
depth.
its
assumed constancy
legs at all by counting in,
potential energy,
level,
shores nor fathom
must remember too that

kept on
77
latent
energy, of which
known.
But whether the whole energy in the world be constant or not, still if mind is to initiate material movements, must it not itself be a form of energy and have
equivalent transformations into other forms like the
its
rest?
An
this point,
objection of this kind^
and
may
be expected at
will appear unanswerable to those
it
who
accept the mechanical scheme as a complete and rounded
whole.
But
this
is
just the conception
concerned to combat.
Is there
we
are primarily
nothing beyond this ever-
lasting transference of motion from one
moving mass
to
another?
When
was a child
my mind
was much exercised,
because I could never find the beginning of a piece of

string; all the string I could get hold of had
beginning cut
off.
was
in a
fail'
way
string had no beginning, but that every piece

off
another piece, in turn cut
forever.
off
But one day, passing a

1
Cf. above,
had the
to conclude that
another,
was cut
and so on
rope- walk, there to
Lecture XI,
p. 23.
my
78
delight I saw string emerging

that was not string at
from a bundle of tow
Now
all.
Naturalism seems to
have taken up a position analogous to that into which

I was lapsing, and unfortunately there is no such easy
way
Naturalism reduces phenomena ultimately
of escape.
to motions determined by other motions, and so without
end.
It sees in the
illimitable
extent,
motions.
Keeping
standpoint,
it
to discover
new
ing to ideas,
to
fails
it
world but a variegated tapestry of
the warp and
the
to
either
it
The simple
upon
Du
Yet
'day of
its
it
did half
dawn
reflexion that the facts before
or theory must conform to

I say,
then, turn-
Bois-Reymond, might
as
it,
could never establish a negative
such reflexions,
its
scheme, according
inconceivable.
Damascus,' to use a phrase of
any time have dawned
are
from
by observation or experiment
devises a descriptive
is
which
of
discernible
threads entering the fabric
which such entry
upon him.
woof
facts
facts,
and again that ideas
not facts to theory,
would have
shew that
sufficed to
the determination of motion otherwise than by antecedent
motion
is
in itself neither impossible nor absurd.
Then,
with the scales of prejudice thus far cleared from

eyes, the one plain fact of voluntary activity
its
might have
been welcomed as a truth instead of being scouted as an

illusion.
At
all
events these two things seem certain
that
mind does somehow direct the movements of matter,

and that the constancy of the phenomenal energy of
the universe
is
neither a fact established by induction
nor a necessity of thought.
The
effects
of
determinations of the motions of inert matter,
psychical
if
matter
CAUSES AND EQUATIONS DISTINCT
79
be indeed inert, would, presumably, persist as truly as

the effects upon
Once
of antecedent motions persist.
it
within the fabric which the physicist seeks to describe,
they would be indistinguishable from other

as
we
Nay,
effects.
have seen, they never could be distinguishable so
long as physical description
is
confined to the use of an
abstract scheme, and cannot, even in the working of a
crowbar
come
to
to
close
must
but
Thompson and
recall
quarters with
all
even
acknowledge
Tait's
instance
the causes concerned;
simple
apparently
that
completeness 'an infinitely trans-
question to be in
its
cendent problem."
If the
exponents of modern dynamics
were content to recognise causes and to describe force

then mental direction would be a force.
as
Newton
If,
however, the conception of cause
did,
may
that description by equations
no right
Only the
to object;
physicist
of course
we have
order to be mathematical,
who, in
must not dogmatise about them.
no one supposes that causes are absent
from physical events

are ignored,
to be eliminated,
be possible,
nor indeed any ground to complain.
dispenses with causes
But
is
first,
causes are only ignored.
They
because mass-motions being alone con-
sidered, quantitative relations suffice
and again because,
such motions being both reciprocal and reversible, we

can not only say the cause equals the effect but
it
comes indifferent which we
effect.
call
cause and which
be-
But when qualitative

ment are in question
processes or processes of develop-
internal nature, both
of
this
is
no longer possible.
agent and patient, has to be
taken into account and the time-order

inert
The
mass has no qualities
is
essential.
But
and the conservation of
80
energy, regarded as a mechanical principle/

the maxim,
simply
is
Causa cequat effectwn, applied where only
mass-motions as quantities are concerned and where the
masses are assumed to be indestructible.
and Joule reduce

already seen.
principle.
total
It
it,
it is
sub-
is
Meyer
we have
of
as in the earlier lectures
In this form, however,
but a logical
no basis for assertions about the
affords
capacity for
This
which the expositions
stantially the result to
work
in the universe, nor for asser-
tions about its possible sources.
Such source or sources there must surely be
we
are to call
and
if
them too 'energy' the word must carry a

from that which the physicist gives
different signification
to mv^/2.
As
dissipated
energy can
available
is
there are no
energy,
may
be
known
processes by which
returned
to
its
as
not be that available energy
it
derived from a latent source to which
physically returned?
source
The
it
cannot be
reversibility, in short,
which
a purely mechanical scheme presupposes and which yet

the actual world does not permit, at once suggests to
the open-minded that there
than
is
course,
of
is
more
in
heaven and earth
dreamt of by the naturalistic philosophy.

in
whatever
But,
way we suppose changes
of
motion not determined by precedent motion, such supposition, it will be said, is
tantamount to regarding the
world as not simply a mechanism.

this,
and urge that the absence
implies
^
it.
The
The upholders
solar system
of the
for a wider interpretation.
Lecture VI.
new
of
Certainly, I admit
reversibility equally
would work
just as well,
science of Energetics contend, of course,
But they have
still
to
make
their
way.
Cf.
IRREVERSIBILITY
revolving from east to west, as
west to
much indeed
So generally in theory ; as
implied in treating causes and effects as
is
sides of
an equation, in which
the signs can be
all
So in theory,
Time-order does not enter.
changed.
How
say, but never so in fact.
crepancy
the
does revolving from
it
Reverse the spring, and a watch would
east.
go just as well backwards.
mere
81
is
understand, an anxious problem for
still,
mathematical
justified in
to get rid of this dis-
Meanwhile
physicist.
suspecting that there
physical causation than can find
The absurdity
is
its
we
are
not
something more in
way
into dynamical
equations
cesses
evident, the tree shrinking back into the seed,
life
is
beginning
of a reversal of organic pro-
a corpse and
in
ending with a
birth,
everything genealogical running backward, natural

lection
what
and survival
the fittest not excepted.
of
of the psychical series
as a collateral
the physical in such a case?
the
we
past
undone
are
helpless.
over what
hold our
is
still
What
to
then passes into veritable ivepyeia.
makes a new doing
Looking
their
mere
But what
rise
call the insides of things
II
is
done
on stepping-stones
may
it
not be that the
physicist deals only with the utterances of
VOL.
Svvafjic<i
dead selves to higher things.
at the world in this wise,
taking them for
facing
possible, so
That men may
Of
efficient,
done cannot be
is
do we can give or with-
Capacity for work
fiat.
product of
This question brings us
Facing the future we are
to the point.
se-
And
all, is
what we may
and dealing with them only and
thus led to deny inside existence
82
We
altogether?
whole procedure
as
how
have seen abundantly
how
is,
reality
slijDS
abstract his
through his fingers
he resolves atoms into ethereal vortices, and ether
into an
plenum
universal
ence as empty space
and
far,
he
question of an
all
And
inside
'
in
continuity
ing principle,
metaphysical
then, having
endow
or
motion.
Is it less scientific to regard
to
and orderly
continuous
direct the mass,
of his guid-
medium with
his
such interferences
Mind must
why
seems;
it
got thus
look to something extra-
to
physical
as
differ-
being utterly banished,
'
open violation
forced at length
is
devoid of internal
as
itself.
and
agitate
then, unless to simplify
mechanical description, has the physicist, to quote Professor
Tait,
called
life
And
call
" driven
or
having done
such
life
so,
operation
the
out
will
Kant's conception of
is
universe
man
clearly,
'
"
philosophy a
as
at once
and
to
Surely,
if
its
own,
better
way.
metaphysics but
all
phenomenon and
Perhaps Lotze puts the
better than this.
same idea more
product
collateral
'
from
might have learnt
noumenon
mystery
that
of
objective
by what logic does he contrive
or will a
Naturalism did not despise

it
the
of
in a
way more germane
to
these remarks, in a passage of his Microcosmus, which
has often
"
impressed
The course
have
it,
it.
of
but can have none
Where
Weltlmif)
beginnings
innumerable
beforehand
concluding with
me,
the world
not
whose
may
the
words:
every
moment
origins
necessarily
lie
outside
continued within
such beginnings are to be found we cannot

say
with
certainty
but
if
experience
vinces us that every event of external Nature

1
Unseen Universe,
p.
183.
is
at
con-
the
MENS AGITAT MOLEM

same time an
it
effect
cause in preceding facts,
its
remains possible that the cycle of inner mental
still
does not consist throughout of a rigid mechanism
life
working
but
necessarily,
freedom of will
unconditional
of
having
83
also
it
same thought that
the
possibly
the
physicist's
now
just
was
It
power
of
pursuance
in
suggested that
might
energy
acUuxl
so-called
unlimited
limited
possesses
commencement."
with
along
that
spring from an efficiency of a higher order as well as sink

to the level where, as dissipated energy,
available for
it is
work
no more.
But on
of the
primacy of matter and
surmises.
directs
the platform of our present argument

its
Suppose we assume
energy, and
is
laws these
then
to
that
of
are mere
mind
that
not a source of
would thus be comparable
that
Its
it.
only
action
a force acting
always at right angles to the direction of the moving

body, thus altering
Such guidance
its
entails
course without altering
its
speed.
no expenditure
theoretically
of
energy and so does not conflict with the law of energyconservation
but
it
conflicts
momentum, and is therefore

motion, as we have already
with the conservation of

contrary to
seen.
It
is,
laws
the
in
fact,
Cartesian injiuxus physicus which Leibniz exposed.

it
remains the
who
see
conception most
But
the absurdity of conscious automatism.

is
incompatible with
the thoroughgoing mechanical theory of things.

facts of life
Yet
favour with those
in
again I say even this conception
of
the
If the
and mind discernible in the external world
lead up to such a view, then those facts must lead us on

^
Microcosmtis, Engl, translation, vol.
i,
p.
261 (amended).
'
84
amount
of psychophysical parallelism
mind and matter
that
The
deny the Cartesian dualism.
also to
For guidance
distinct.
not
are
is
contradictions
so far to a proof
utterly
impossible
disparate
concerned in the objective universe are inert masses.

then
this conception
inert,
we
are brought back once more.
dead matter everywhere
where, Naturalism
But
maintains.
is
if it is
To
Is
anywhere ?
Every-
Nowhere, the
idealist
it
tries to believe.
and
the beings
all
if
not everywhere, then either there
must be two worlds, one world
and an-
of inert masses,
other of living things, or a single world in which these
somehow
In the former case
interact.
second world, and can neither

the
in
affect,
we belong
nor be affected by
can have neither knowledge of
first;
to the
nor interest
it
In the latter case, where living things and dead
it.
matter belong to the same world, then,
the physicist
if
could completely solve the problems he sets himself, he
would
set
find
some or
all of his
Psychophysics
aside.
laws of motion sometimes
would then become
science, unless indeed the actions of living things
scribed perhaps as the
perhaps
as
movements
the
that had no mass

formity.
in
movements
of
real
de-
of self-directing masses,
self-directing
manifested no
monads
'
kind of order or uni-
Again, on the view to which Naturalism clings,
a complete
world of dead matter, there would be
nothing but a mechanism, but there would be no machines
to talk of collateral products of
enal order would be stark absurdity.
an epiphenom-
But
us turn
let
again to the actual external world, and even from the
standpoint of natural science, what do
we
the very
is
first
distinction that meets us
see?
this
Surely
yevy one
LIVING THING OR DEAD, THE BETTER TYPE?

and dead
of living
dead:
call it
the path
from
my hand
from
course through the
pick up a stone and
and can describe
pick up a bird:
that stone, just as
bird, just as it
is,
its
it is,
But from the
the physicist derives his idea of inertia.
he declines to accept the idea of
Rather calling upon us to accept
direction.
can
but cannot foretell
too,
From
air.
my hand
There
will take.
it
that
toss
Here
things.
toss it
85
self-
his ideal of
mass-elements, he says. Magnify space and time indefinitely
and the bird
turn out to be but a vast system
-will
of inert masses, devoid, like the stone, of self-direction
How
and obeying only the laws of motion.
know
of diminishing space
and
its
does he
Suppose we suggest the opposite procedure
this ?
and time
indefinitely
how
motions become infinitesimal,
till
the stone
does he
know
that the whole sidereal system will not then turn out to
more
be
the
like
whole manifesting
bird
than the
and
life
an organised
stone,
self-direction
The one
sup-
position seems just as reasonable as the other.

It
insist
must be candidly confessed that, however much we

on the fact that mind can direct and control
we
inert mass,
are quite unable to analyse
In our ignorance the
and
simplest
statement
the
is
process.
the
can think of none simpler than saying that
always
hypothetical
and
abstract
best,
inertia,
conception,
per-
haps never applicable to anything in the world of concrete things,
We
is
certainly not applicable
must remember that matter and

and that the
identical,
describe
motion,
all
is
he knows
physicist,
to
inert
everything.
mass are not
though he attempts
of matter in
to
terms of mass and
careful to say at the outset that
"we do
not
86
know
and.
matter
zs."
probably incapable of discovering what
are
Unfortunately, before he reaches the end
his story, this preliminary caveat is too often forgot-
of
ten
Professor Tait, for example,
who makes
this state-
ment, has hardly begun his exposition before he

us that "matter
tells
thus identifying
But a mass means merely a concrete
matter with mass.
number,
simply passive,"
is
'
'
the term stands for a specific quantity not
i.e.
for a concrete thing
mass
a mathematical conception
is
devised solely to facilitate calculation, and was never
meant
to aid rational insight or understanding.
But
calculation will never content us
spiritual
light,
is
upon
flecting
Imagine a man
what we want.
the actual world as
him, bent on
before
seizing
its
rational insight,
it
as
lies
re-
a whole
meaning, seeking to
frame a clear and distinct picture, a Welt-anschauung,

a world-intuition, as the Germans expressively say, not
merely a world-formula.
The
starry
him, the moral law within his breast,

the meanest flower that blows gives
often
ing
lie
too deep for tears.
" Here
into
this, just
Here
stand.
and variety
is
above
him with awe,
him thoughts that
Imagine such a
in the impact of
whole
secret of the
firmament
fill
two stones
man
say-
I discern
the
Just as far as I can resolve
all
so far can I say that I see
and under-
the promise and potency of every form
of life
To
this
an ultimate analysis brings
us down, and on this a rational synthesis must build

up." Whereunto shall we
what can we compare him?
liken such a man,
and with
Surely, having eyes he sees
Tait, Properties of Matter, p. 14.
o.c, p. 5.
Of. Lecture II above.
THE MATHEMATICAL BIAS
having ears he hears not, neither can he understand.
not,
But there
this
no such man, you say
is
But there
is not.
is
such a system of thought, of which
is
now pretending
and
is
name.
its
have made
to
One and All
How
know.
by considering how
it
And
the concrete world as a whole.
may
first of
lay
all
it
down
But such
To
again and again.
mind and
and
matter,
But
canon
agreed
to defer.
as
dualism of
this
experienced
never been
that problem, closely as

us,
mixed up
is
it
we have
neverthe-
Meanwhile, taking Naturalism on
own ground, and assuming
its
is
it
defied
consequence, the fruitless en-
with the one immediately before

less
we
Naturalism has
begin, there
its
we
are
if
whole we must take
deavour to reunite what has

asunder.
ef-
To
so doing,
as a canon, that
to understand the world as a
whole.
Most
has arisen.
seems obvious that we must go back
this end, again, it
to
it
that he can ever
dispelled?
spectre to be
is this
fectively, surely,
up
liirriy
pronounces him to be impotent, and the Nature
presents, to be the only
well that there
of science, like Frankenstein, has conjured
monster
this
know
the logical outcome, and Naturalism
The man
it
87
the distinctness and the
primacy of the external world: here again our canon

is
set
tity,
aside,
and
all
when
qualities are all resolved into quan-
relations
but the mathematical discarded.
Descartes here, as before,

der.
versalis has
Some
is
the
first
and
chief
offen-
His grand conception of science as Mathesis Uni-
of the
never ceased to fascinate
and
consequences of this error
business to trace
and
in that
it
to mislead.
has been our
stupendous house of cards,
Mr. Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy, we have found an
88
As
impressive exhibition of them.
to the fascination of
such a conception, the reason for that

seek.
It
form and the boundless
cal
is
not far
to
simply the intuitive clearness of mathemati-
is
possibilities of
Here, and here only, the
construction.
geometrical
human
seems to be in possession of archetypal
intellect
ideas,
and to
approximate to the creative intuition attributed to the
The metaphysical
Deity.
cause, of being
region.
obscurities of substance
and
and becoming, do not intrude into
this
spatial
plenum
or primordial ether seems to
us the unity and permanence of being without
afford
mystery; in motion we seem to have change with-
its
out
its
contradictions
nexus.
and
But,
alas,
seem
to
When
of
human dreams
has quantity, has spatial and
is
temporal relations, there

of these.
vanity
the
for
though everything that
sists
differential equations
necessary interdependence without any causal
yield us
nothing that entirely con-
is
given whole resolves into an
aggregate of parts, these again have quantity, have spatial
and temporal
Proceed we never so
than these.
true
more
but again they are
relations,
far,
the same remains
only in the limit to which thought will carry us,
but to which experience gives us no warrant to go,
we
reach at length an empty world, not a world of things

having
mathematical relations, not an actual world at
but a world of conceptual

relations,
where the principle of
supreme principle of change

but need not be
need
not
possibilities
be
all,
of mathematical
least resistance
is
the
where masses can be moved
where energy can be transferred but
where
mass
is
energy invariably directionless.
invariably passive,
and
Such conceptions may
MERE MECHANISM MEANINGLESS
89
furnish an admirable descriptive scheme of " the motions

that occur in nature," but they explain nothing.
of explaining they regress
ad
In place
As they can
indefinitum.
give no account of any distribution of mass and energy,
save by reference to a previous distribution, they have no

title to
deny
interference, but only to
inadequate to deal with
to themselves, mechanical
happen
pen
indefinitely, provided
at the
On
itself.
as things are left
can
principles
tell
us what
next instant, what will tend to hap-
will
to
admit that they are
So long
it.
this
large
always the mechanism
left
is
assumption they can predict,
but on this only.
In a world so framed sentient agents
would have means
for their ends; for
would be one
of
them such a world

In itself it would be a
law and order.
chaos abated only by quantitative

absurd, then, to
but
sentients
make
the
all
life
epiphenomenal
the
motions in such a chaos
Chaos
and action
shadows
I call
described strictly in mechanical terms

vestige of meaning.
but there
sion,
But
as
it
is
There
its
we
live
formulation
acquaintance, what do
world
is
preci-
we
find?
and struggle
in
it:
and seeking a concrete

Certainly nothing that
ultimate resolution into homogeneous mass-
points mechanically interconnected.
Keeping
the concrete and historical, everywhere
we
strictly to
find variety,
whether we carry our gaze into the depths
of space or
the
for the
can have not a
no true unity and no sense.
confronts us while
avoiding abstract
diversity,
vortex-
us go back once more to the actual world
let
suggests
it,
of such
of
exactness, there
is
How
determination.
back in time through the geologic eras of
remote past, whether we compare the trees of
90
leaves on a tree, the
the
or
forest
pebbles at our feet
We
or the mountain peaks that pierce the sky.
content
ourselves with merely counting our cattle or sheep, only
when we have no
with them;
individual acquaintance
but even on a cursory glance differences appear, and the
more intimate our knowledge the more individuality

trudes
Even where
itself.
minuteness
the
we
hides their individual differences from us,
ob-
objects
of
frequently
have evidence that such differences are there.
Thus the
spores of half a dozen ferns sprinkled on the
hand look
but sow them, and both
all alike;
individual
so
short,
traits
will
surely as
we can
specific characters
shew themselves.
presently
find
means
and
In
to perceive the
particular thing or particular event, so surely individual
schoolmen
characteristics, hcecceities as the

to view.
I see
no reason to doubt that
even of the
true
to reach the
five
hundred
eye in a second,
only
emerge
would hold
light-waves said
billion
if
said,
this
we
could magnify
time sufficiently to note and compare them one by one.
Just in proportion as things elude our perceptive power

or fail to
common
interest
names, and
us,
do proper names give place to
common names
to stuffs
becomes history, history chronology, and

ing
life
then,
are
of
justifies
entirely
ferent.
An
things
the
alike,
but
cosmic
all
process.
doctrine of Leibniz
biography
the
teem-
Experience,
No two
things
and no two things are entirely
dif-
adequate and intuitive knowledge of the
world would embrace both these aspects, and so doing
would present the world

Scientific
in its true
knowledge, however,
adequate, but always
more or
is
and concrete
unity.
neither intuitive
less
general
nor
and sym-
MR. SPENCER'S MISSION

bolic
general concepts and symbols representing the
its
91
among
likenesses
individuals
and the likenesses among
these likenesses, so tending indeed towards an abstract
and spurious unity, but farther and farther away from

the living whole.
aside,
natural science
begins by leaving half the truth
It
two things are entirely alike; and
that no
viz.,
further leaves half the
facts
aside,
rather an essential part of every fact, in ignoring
and
Setting out from such
manifold implications.
its
and advancing in
a dualism
we wonder
or
mind
abstract fashion, can
this
we end in a blank mechanical scheme
that
diametrically opposed to everything teleological ?
The
of
surest
way
to exhibit the philosophical deficiency
such a scheme
crete world
is
to proceed to reconstruct the con-
by starting from
For
it.
sion Mr. Spencer has been destined,
So long
has done his work.
as
this
and admirably he
Naturalism continues
in vogue, so long, I cannot help thinking,
great
enterprise
its
is
Balaam's mis-
best refutation
Mr. Spencer's
while,
on the
other hand, had that enterprise succeeded nothing could
have established Naturalism more convincingly.

it
seemed
to
me
imperative to examine the Synthetic
Philosophy in some
ness
of
its
ideas
detail,
and
its
and to shew clearly the
trust,
but
it
had to be done.
says,
We
saw
that Mr. Spencer's entire performance
of philosophical sleight of
leave
me
ceptible
state,
energy,
will
only
loose-
grave defects of method.
confess the task was not difficult, and certainly
congenial
Hence
Sweep
hand.
the universe
was not
clearly,
was a
sort
the board, he
in a diffused, imper-
and setting out from the persistence of
shew
you how
celestial
bodies, organ-
92
and
isms,
societies,
must
that with such data
We
arise.^
j\Ir.
sa^Y, clearly, I trust,
Spencer could not get beyond
what he terms the primary
distribution
matter and
of
motion, the return of his diffused universe in the short-
and
est
easiest
ways back
to equilibrium
that,
on the
other hand, the so-called secondary distributions which

are to be the source of celestial bodies, organisms,
societies,
lection
one and
all
conceptions
and
imply guidance, direction, and

that
inert
se-
mass and directionless
energy can never by any possibility
yield.
Passing on to biological evolution over a gap of two

octavo volumes,
we came
still
missing from Mr. Spencer's work,
to biological evolution as specially
expounded
by Lamarck, Darwin, and their successors. Natural selection, taken alone, as Wallace urged and Darwin himself
allowed,
in
'
only a negative and destructive principle
is
struggle for existence and survival of the
we found
the other hand,

live,
but to live well, which
on
that stri\'ing not merely to

first
gives natural selection
Here we have a
''point d'appui.''
fittest,'
teleological factor,
its
and
one suggesting not so much a nondescript force called

vital,
and
as
will.
a psychical
something endowed with feeling
Feeling and will answer to the psychological
principle of self-conservation
ledge,
we
to give the
name
and supplement
when
to these
we add know-
of subjective selection, the counterpart
of natural selection
different order of species
ce
reach a principle to which I have ventured
and the source of a
to wit, species of environments.
Cf. Descartes' invitation to the readers of his
Le Monde, a
monde, pour en venir voir un autre tout nouveau
sa presence dans dcs espaces imaginaires.
sortir
de
qu'il fera naitre
en
MIND AS VIS DIRECTRIX

But
in the
way
of
all
93
this stood the theory of psy-
chophysical parallelism which has just occupied us, and

the
contradictions
thing more than a
endeavoured to
us
which,
of
it
if
be
taken for any-
methodological convention,
set forth.
ders the interaction of
mind and matter
and we have seen
from Descartes' day
it
that,
inconceivable,
our own,
to
never been consistently maintained.
has
have
which ren-
suspect the thorough-going dualism,
to
Those contradictions compel
Invariable
concomitance means causal connexion somewhere and a
fundamental unity of substance at bottom.

is
Naturalism
driven to assign the causality to matter and to treat
mental
'
epiphenomena
'
as
its
collateral products.
We
have seen many reasons discrediting this position, but

it
still
remains to be examined ab
may
once
to
the
epiphenomenal,
be content to say,
and
for
So
all.
that of critics of
its
we
far
to reduce
phenomenal
or
as
we
shall break with Naturalism
our part has been merely
constructions.
Agnosticism, will meet us as the

* See Note
In the en-
mind, and
deavour to defend the priority of

matter
iiiitio.
v, p.
Hereafter
critic
286.
its
ally,
of our own.*
PAET IV
LECTURE XIV
GENERAL CONCEPTION OF EXPERIENCE
The discussion of Psychophysical Parallelism has led up to the formal
our subject : we now ask, What is natural knowledge and what
side of
does
it
imply
Naturalism assumes a dualism of phenomena and epiphenomena., the

the primacy.
But the real world from which it starts is
former having
'
How
epiphenomenal.
then does
motion, and, having got there, how does

TTie perplexities
'
get to its
it
'
real toorld
'
of matter in
get back ?
it
of dualism have brought into favour an agnostic monism

If we are to transcend dualism and this
making knowledge, or rather experience itself, an
or ^revised materialism.''
monism,
object
will be by
it
of reflexion.
Neglect of this question by natural science, psy-
chology and the pre-Kantian metaphysics.
What
subject
toe
and
find
is
not a dualism of
mind and
Experience does not begin with a disconnected

Sensations not
'
subjective modifications
Relation of subject and object:

'
Objective
'
matter, but a duality of
object in the unity of experience.
is it
used from two standpoints.
'
'
manifold.''
nor devoid of
causal ?
all ^form.''
Ambiguity of
term.'i.
Various attempts to treat this
relation as causal noticed.
The
this
doctrine of conscious automatism, popularised in
country by the late Professor Huxley,
is
the crown-
ing tenet of Naturalism, the logical outcome of that

theory,
for
VOL.
which
II
Descartes
97
prepared
the
way, the
98
theory, that
is
to say,
which regards the material world

primary, fundamental, and
self-contained whole,
as
Minds, then, come to be looked
independent of mind.
upon
secondary and episodic
as
mere
collateral
pro-
ducts, that arise as often as matter falls into the appropriate organic condition
to react
upon
impotence
of
mind
discussed
at
and independence
of
already
be considered.
The
concomitant neuroses.
their
and contradictions involved
sions
the
psychoses^ that are powerless
in
of
matter we have
The assumed primacy
propose
confu-
assertion
control
to
length.
the automaton
But
this
remained to
still
now
merge
to
in
this
the broader question and to examine generally the as-
sumption of naturaUsm that physical phenomena are our
To do
primary facts and facts independent of mind.
some change
will entail
At
in our
method
the outset of this course (in the second lecture),
was remarked that our knowledge

and systematised
two
its
sides
in the sciences,
it
of nature, as unified
may be examined from
either formally as knowledge, in respect of
postulates, categories,
and the
for granted, as science itself does
be examined
its
this
of procedure.
in respect of
like
or
this
taking these
knowledge may
the real principles to which
supposed unity and completeness are ascribed.
began with
this latter side
and have dealt
in
We
turn with
the mechanical theory, the theory of evolution, and the
theory
of
psychophysical
parallelism.
And now
at
length our discussion of the last of these real principles

brinsfs us
What
round to the formal side and leads us to ask
in itself is natural knowledge,

1
Lecture
II. p. 40.
and what does
it
NATURAL KNOWLEDGE AND

imply
we
For
99
problem really involved, whether
this is the
challenge the particular doctrine that
man
prima-
is
an automaton and his consciousness but an epiphe-
rily
nomenal aura that accompanies

as
ITS IMPLICATIONS
now
this is
working, or challenge,
its
propose, the more general doctrine, of which
According to that
but the logical consequence.
doctrine,
if
we
sum
are to exhibit the
things from
of
the beginning and connect each to each completely,
must
start
"an ultimate
cer in effect has told us,
us
down and on
Of the same tenor
which
analysis brings
are
some words
" In itself," said
moment whether we
matter in terms
of
in terms of matter.
spirit,
.
phenomena
But with
to be preferred.
For
it
or
and leads
spiritualistic
to
diations of
is
in every
connects thought with the

.
terminology,
whereas the
is
alter-
utterly barren,
nothing but obscurity and confusion of
spirit
is,
'what
is
what matter
and usually too by indignant repu-
commonly understood by materialas that of Hobbes or of Holbach,
Such materialism
for example, is certainly
to-day.
spirit
sure such deliverances are usually guarded by
what
ism.'
of
a view to the prog-
agnostic disclaimers of any knowledge as to

or
is
To be
is,
it
express the phenomena of
or the
other phenomena of the universe,
ideas."
Huxley
Huxley, "
ress of science, the materialistic terminology
native,
of
have already quoted and will take leave to
quote in part again.
way
we
Mr. Spen-
this,
a rational synthesis must build
this
up."
of little
To
from matter and motion.
no part of the naturalism of
So far from saying that mind

^
i,
p. 164.
is
mode
of
100
motion,
scouts such a notion as sheer absurdity.
it
This
breach with the old materialism, to which Agnosticism

has led,
after
we have
is,
Naturalism
all, if
to stop at this,
is
What
avails
it
what have we
one materialism for another?
but the substitution of
know that mind is not

we must believe that
to
matter in motion,
But
allowed, a distinct advance.
if
actually itself
it
much
as
is
bound up with such motion as the shadows and the

whirring of its wheels are bound up with the working
of a
machine?
If
Spirit
and not Nature from

nology
'
is
the
leads
spiritual
to be derived
is
Spirit,
if
one means of rational synthesis and the

only to confusion of ideas, what
good of saying that both are symbohc

be
and
real,
materialistic
This
the
plain
terminology
the position that
is
from Nature
the materialistic termi-
'
implication
brings
'
the
is
Something must
so
us
far
is
that
nearest
we have now
'
to
the
that.
and
to examine,
on account of which we must inquire into the character

of natural knowledge.
For the common-sense man, and

ordinary
in
is
life
for all
a world of things that are seen,
felt,
a world of sensible objects, some of which

use,
men
in their
and intercourse, the world each one
while others
we
lives
and handled,
we seek and
This
neglect or destroy.
world of 'naive realism,' as philosophers say.
is
the
But from
the standpoint of naturalism a world described in such
terms
is
epiphenomenal.
The
'
real
world
'
the world of phenomena, on the other hand,

of mass-points transferring
tions, a
and transforming
world of quantitative diversity only.
losophers, as
we
all
of science,
is
a world
their
mo-
Now
phi-
know, have long vexed themselves
'THE UGLY BROAD DITCH'
101
with the endeavour to resolve the contradictions of unre-
common
flecting
and
sense,
to
world that we perceive.
reality of this external
ontological essays the
agnostic
derides
of reality as distinct from appearance,

us,
know
losophy
He
nothing.
the veritable
ascertain
as
we
These
futile
for
can, he tells
repudiates the materialistic phi-
but holds, nevertheless, that we have done the
most and the best that can be done when, accepting
we
materialistic terminology^
of matter
'
the
conceive the world in terms
But we have
and energy and their evolutions.
seen Naturalism, which undertakes this task, unable to
complete
and breaking down hopelessly when
it,
complete facts of
The
account.
life
and mind have
begins to blaspheme
to be taken into
naturalist cannot get back to himself as
In his desperation he
a living, thinking, acting being.
physics
much
mean he
begins to talk meta-
to the discomfort of his agnostic ally.
So he comes to speak
monism, of mind and matter
of
as comparable to the concave and convex aspects
one curve, and the
if
to the
the
indeed anything does
curve,
the
of
agnostic persuades
curve as distinct from
Meanwhile, his own
unknowable.
outside of
Then the
like.
him that what answers

the aspects
the
material
is
unknown and
standpoint
aspect.
is
Its
the
ter-
minology compels him to affirm that interference or spontaneity
is
impossible there
and
so the talk of conscious
automatism, collateral products, and epiphenomena
arises.
It is the absurdities of this doctrine that lead us to
ask:
How
did the naturalist ever get across 'the ugly
broad
ditch,'
return
To
over which he
this
now
finds
no satisfactory
comparatively simple epistemological
102
we saw when discussing
question some physicists, as

the mechanical theory,
They openly proclaim
now beginning
are
attend.
to
that mass-points and frictionless
media are not phenomena, but merely descriptive hypotheses, that can never be verified as facts
hypotheses
that would at once become obsolete, if simpler and

more workable conceptions should be found. Yet Naturalism pays little heed to these admissions, and even
less
to
Moreover,
the consequences that they entail.
men
even among physicists, to say nothing of other
many who
science, there are
had occasion
quote,
to
believe
that
behind what we can see or
"what
feel " is
sight and touch at any rate

certain
is
feel the
no
that
one
are
ever
ditl,
one
Naturalism,
ever
while
see
will,
we remember,
is
reality.
it
or
fric-
too wise to
claim for these supposed actualities behind what

ceptible
on
objects of
;
motions of mass-points or of vortices in a
tionless fluid.
of
have
actually goes
phenomena
or
these very motions
But the
mass-points so often described.
of
like
is
per-
any non-phenomenal, noumenal, or metaphysical
But
if
neither perceived nor perceptible,
how
then can they, with any propriety, be called phenomena

If
they are not empirical data,
cist
got at them
to these questions,
are agreed
and happily
who have
in
in this all those physicists
any way troubled themselves

inquiries.
These
behind what can possibly be seen or
not only not absolute
nomenal
has the physi-
There seems to be but one answer
with such epistemological

actualities,
how then
realities
the physicist has
realities,
supposed
felt,
are
they are not even phe-
they are simply conceptions which

reached by idealising what
he
can
PHENOMENA AND EPIPHENOMENA

and
see
It is plain that if this
feel.
phenomena
those prime and ultimate

after
be the truth, then

of
Naturalism are,
but epiphenomena, thoughts not things, ideas
all,
minds of
existing solely for the
and serving
physicists,
we
only to interpret and connect what

is
103
see
and
that
feel,
to say, other epiphenomena.
But what then
is
the force of the 'epi,' and what
becomes of the primacy of
The
complex
of
motions of
ethereal
prove to be but ideal
some
mass-points or
vortices,
these
conceptions
motions,
superimposed
upon phenomena by the mind that seeks
them
What we
Instead of states of consciousness super-
vening upon certain
etc.,
'
the facts of perception, become the real
feel,
phenomena.
peculiar
the materialistic terminology
seem to be completely turned.
tables
and
see
'
to
connect
in respect of their quantitative relations.
So far
from connecting '^thought with the

the universe," as
othe?'
phenomena
of
Huxley maintained, these conceptions
are themselves simply thoughts connecting those 'other
phenomena
'
together.
But the connexion
of such
phenomena with thought and consciousness

'
distinct question
and one that
This complete scission

of
all
escape
is
dualistic speculation
its
is
is
'
other
a wholly
left entirely aside.
in fact the Trpatrov x/reOSo?
and Naturalism does not
consequences by hearkening to the voice of
Agnosticism, and substituting phenomena and epiphe-
nomena for the Cartesian substances, matter and mind.

The first step of all is easy to take indeed, it is taken
;
unconsciously
ism of
and
common
farther,
till
for science sets out

sense.
But when
at length only a
from the naive dualit
has gone farther
system of mass-points.
104
or a homogeneous plenum, in motion
left,
is
then the
problem consciously to retrace the many steps that have
But
been taken proves hopeless.
said
it is
"
empirically given were our starting-point
Phenomena
observation,
experiment, deduction, and verification have accompanied
every step
ceased to
what point then have the phenomena

be phenomenal ? As we have advanced we
;
at
have but got nearer to the

ties,
ism on the
phenomenal
reali-
which our sensory presentations are
of course, of
Such
merely the symbols."
trine of
realities
way out
so
phenomena per
than that of things per
it
se,
the language of Natural-
is
becomes committed to a doc-
surely a
more glaring absurdity
can ever be.
se
we
to this challenge, as I hope
The
true answer
shall see, is to say that
the phenomena ceased to be phenomena at the very

tial step
when percept and
ini-
percipient were sundered
that the further steps consisted not of percepts but of
concepts, which as abstract
may have
actually a certain relative
validity,
very ruthlessness with which
hurry
it
onward
its
homogeneous plenum,
most convincing proof that
not set out to synthesise rationally
materialistic terminology.'
ous of
all this
stractions
as
The
reality.
to such ultimate abstractions as Bos-
yields perhaps the
but no
mathematical methods
covich's centres of force or Kelvin's
we can
and indeed have
and
real,
still
And when
after all
by the aid
of a
Naturalism, oblivi-
regarding these mechanical ab-
attempted to get back to mind, we
might safely have said that
it
was foredoomed
failure that has in fact overtaken
" promise and potency of
life "
it.
to the
There can be no
about mass-points chang-
ing in nothing but position and velocity, and that only
'
PHENOMENA PER SE
There
on external compulsion.
is
105
no mystery about geo-
metrical points and their movements; yet no sooner
is
and the name
of
there attached to
we
matter, than
them the notion of
are asked to regard
and hypothetical cause
Not
we are
them
is
that
as the
own
of states of our
again assured
mass or
in the inert
inertia
unknown
consciousness.
consciousness inheres
identical with its
the crass and dogmatic materialist of
'
movements, as
the bygone slime
No, states of consciousness pertain
foolishly imagined.
to a distinct but parallel aspect of these molecular motions,

albeit
a secondary and, for them, a contingent aspect.
But where, we have asked,

of such
moving points
is
the room for another aspect
So long as matter was
left
with
an untold residuum of active properties, as by materialists

like Priestley, the
annexation of thinking to matter was
not so obviously absurd, for such matter might prove

to be
mind
speculations
But Agnosticism forbids such
at bottom.
;
moreover, the increased exactness and pre-
no room for
cision of the materialistic terminology leave
them.
The result then

The external
this
which each and
to
which we seem to be led
world, as
all of
experiments belong,
is
it is
is
briefly
presented to us, and to
the naturalist's observations and

the
true world of phenomena.
This world cannot be severed from the minds that perceive
it,
and yet remain phenomenal; neither can
completely and
adequately
materialistic terminology.
explained
As
or
it
be
described in
the proximate
phenomena
presuppose perceiving minds, so do the so-called ultimate
phenomena, involving pure space, uniform time, inert

mass, and energy, presuppose intelligent minds that have
lot)
elaborated
these
experienced such
though they have never
conceptions,
The assumed primacy
realities.
physical as against the psychical
and
that in his absorption
is
due,
first,
of the
to the fact
interest in the objective atti-
tude the naturalist has forgotten himself ; and next, to

the fact that he has mistaken his abstract conceptions
for presented realities.
The notion
tradiction with the
itself
in flagrant con-
is
mechanical conception of a closed
From
system of connected masses.

physics
an epiphenomenon
of
supervening on physical phenomena
the standpoint of
such a notion could never
while from
arise;
the wider standpoint of psychology, to regard
the collateral product of
simply to invert the

reflexions
produce
evolve architects.
as
own external perceptions is

One might as well say that
own mirror, or that houses
its
facts.
their
We
mind
are led, in a word, to doubt that
mind and matter can be dual realities, either phenomenal

or ontal, and to doubt further that, if they could be, matter
The dogmatic Naturalism of a former
would be first.
age asserted this priority of matter as a substance; the
own
agnostic Naturalism of our

as a
phenomenon.
thoroughgoing
consistent.
time asserts
Of the two
materialists
is
positions
logically
It is besides a position
of matter
it
that of the
far
the
more
from which Natu-
ralism has been unwillingly driven, and hence the traditional bias still remains.
seen in the frequent lapses

of
Evidence of
this bias
we have
from the unstable equilibrium
psychophysical parallelism towards this primacy of
the materialistic standpoint.
Further, as Naturalism has
had to abandon that old stronghold

ism,
of
dogmatic material-
and can now only talk of matter as
'
the
unknown
MONISM IN DEMAND
and hypothetical cause of
states of consciousness,'
loud to proclaim en revanche that spirit
known and
107
also but
is
Even
materialistic bias
cause, spirit
is
these phrases of
in
shews
matter
itself:
Huxley the
honoured as
is
'
strata of groups of natural
But
phenomena.
which cannot be materialistic and
of a dualism of substance;
that
sub-
'
this
Agnos-
will
not be
any rate serves to exhibit the superfluity
idealistic, at
it is
the
referred to only as a cause or condition^
and then both are grouped together as imaginary
substrata,
is
hypothetical cause, or condition of states of
consciousness.'
ticism,
it
an un-
'
why
for
both are unknown
if
say there are two
how
It explains too
monism has become the order
of the day.
glance at that enterprising and significant journal, The
shew how eager
Monist, will
in the
new
the old materialism
is
scientific
movement.
In disto notice
It then,
totally distinct
is
to
when
declared
however, became apparent that

a
monism
that sets out from
and disparate orders
of
phenomena,
the spontaneity that belongs to the one
be
to
reject
we have had
we cannot hope much from

two
men who
in itself a hopeful sign.
cussing psychophysical parallelism
least of all
are to help
construction.
This demand for monism by
this
men
scientific
illusory
save the inertness
impotent, solely in
or
which
is
held to
of the other.
Nor again can we reasonably content
selves with a
monism which, however anxious not
called
or
materialistic,
spiritualistic
willing at
Two
yet
disclaims
the
order
be the essence
title
of
ourto
be
idealistic
with even greater vehemence, being un-
any price
to part
with
its
mechanical scheme.
questions then here present themselves
(1)
Can
108
EEFUTATION OF DUALISM
we transcend
and inevitable?
we then
phenomenal dualism, or
this
(2)
And
if
that
is
ultimate
it
not ultimate, can
is
beyond agnostic monism, with
also get
ma-
its
In some form or other these are
terialistic bias?
among
the oldest and most intractable problems of philosophy
what likelihood
there, therefore, that
is
we
shall succeed in
our day, when long centuries behind us are strewn with
Of course I do not for a moment suppose

that the last word will be heard on these questions in
failures?
our time
am
certain I
that the dicta of Naturalism and
Nor can
Agnosticism will not end the quest.
the ignorant commonplace that philosophy has

progress.^
And
urged in the
progress
all
is
that
from the nature of the case
finality
relative
first lecture,
we can
admit
made no
look for
As
impossible.
is
knowledge implies
relative ignorance,
and relative ignorance again implies
soluble problems.
Now
are often told,

this
end
ledge
science
the function of philosophy,
to organise
before
it is
itself
is
all
an object
and unify knowledge.
things necessary to
of
reflexion
does not do, and what
make know-
and study.
worse
is
we
To
the
This
dogmatic
metaphj^sics of Descartes, on which the whole fabric of
modern knowledge long
rested, did not
do
As
it either.
a consequence, the dualism of things mental and things

material, res co[)itantes
and
lem for the
knowledge ever
critic
of
res extensce, has been a prob-
not to be thought presumptuous

that during these
two centuries
if
of
since.
It
ought
philosophers claim
reflexion
on
that
problem they have made some progress.

Psychology and the natural sciences advancing inde'
Cf.
my article
"
Tha Progress of Philosophy,"
iVwrf, O.S.
xiii,
pp. 213
ff.
A THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CALLED FOR
we have
pendently on the basis of this dualism have, as
For natural science the
widened the breach.
seen, only
how
question was
from matter to mind
to get
109
the at-
tempted solution by the hypothesis of psychophysical
we have found
parallelism
defective and unsatisfactory.
For psychology the question was how to get from mind

to matter, the problem, in other words, of external per-
The
ception.
tive
and unsatisfactory.
how could
this
if
result, again, I
very
the
circle
am bound
to say,
Shut in within a
is
defec-
circle of ideas^
mind know the things beyond, which

shut out
how
could
it
trust the copies
the originals were forever beyond reach, nay,
know that there were any originals at
how
Such were
all?
the questions raised in particular by British thinkers,
from Locke to Reid.
Locke
slily
These were the questions which
remarked "seem not
and which Hume
want
to
difficulty,"
boldly declared hopelessly insoluble
while to resolve them Berkeley denied Descartes' outer

circle of things
and Reid
Meanwhile the
his inner circle of ideas.
rationalistic thinkers of the Continent,
setting aside sense-impressions as too obscure
and con-
fused to afford immediate knowledge, looked to clear,

distinct,
and orderly thinking as the one method by
which knowledge was to be educed.

too proved futile
and disclosed
when Wolff
character,
the
tradiction
Then came Kant, and

tion
at length
cardinal
its
made
principle
of
the law of conhis
philosophy.
the question of external percep-
was taken up into the wider one
experience.
This procedure
essentially formal
of
the nature of
For so we may broadly characterise the

Cf. Eraser, Life
and
Letters of Berkeley, p. 086.
110
inquiries of
three critiques
liis
and do,
and. feel
our facts and theories,
all
we know
since all that
our emo-
all
and ideals and ends, may be included in
tions
this
one
term experience.
It is
then by raising this question as to the nature of
experience that, as I think,
dualism and of
both of
nominally to supersede
because
he
first
we
shall see the untenability
monism that
the neutral
I have
it.
is
mentioned Kant, not
propose to follow him in detail, but because
raised the right question, avoiding in the
main
the one-sidedness both of his sensationalist and of his
There
precursors.
rationalist
are
active
well
as
as
passive factors in experience, and the pre-critical philoso-
To
phers had tended each to emphasise only one.
carry
the mind beyond itself Locke's tabula rasa was as helpless
in
the one
way
windowless monad was
But Kant, though he made both
in the other.
and understanding
make
Leibniz's
as
essential
to
knowledge, yet failed to
His
a satisfactory unity of the two.
the sensibility
'
of these affections
pendent
the
functions
in
of
establishing
much
affections
organic
apart
the result
of
knowledge
was too much that
sensationalism and rationalism placed side
by
Still it
problem, taking experience as a

ble,
and he entered upon
this,
fact, to
render
And
of
side, rather
was
his
it intelligi-
not by assuming a dualism
and mind, but by insisting on the duality
of subject and object.
did not
connexion.
than the complete reconciliation of both.
of matter
of
and the inde-
understanding, he
any true
His matter of knowledge and his forms

stood too
'
were only Locke's impressions over again.
Between the aggregate

succeed
sensibility
in unity
with this we too must
start.
EXPERIENCE A DUALITY NOT A DUALISM
111
Let uo one hastily conclude that between this duality
and that dualism there
only the faintest verbal
is
differ-
that subject
and object are but mind and matter
under other names.
According to the Cartesian philosophy,
ence,
of course,
mind and matter were not only
disparate,
but
for science,
mony,
But
great gulf fixed
arisen
and discuss
from them as
There
is
if
ask
mutually
miracle,
and one,
one
part
severally
their
they were
of
is
harfailed
be
this
experience
from
can
have
conceptions
but we cannot set out
validity,
facts.
for each but one experience, his
an experience that
so,
which the
too,
any rate there cannot
how such
inde-
and
preestablished
have
parallelism,
at
dividing
may
"We
was a
fact
occasionaKsm,
of
psychophysical
surmount.
another.
in
a stumbling-block
hypotheses
various
to
union
and
separate
absolutely
Their
pendent.
and
distinct
not owned
own
a contradiction.
is
and
We
can assign no fixed houndary to our experience except
by extending
and thought
Hence the phrase, 'content
experience.
or
in thought,
it
'content of consciousness,'
The experience
is
itself
of
of one is not limited
another portion of time or space.
ence
is
is
by the experience
is
The
is
limited by
continuity of
not then imposed from without.
In a word
it is
for the living individual, not
Experi-
we always regard
rather an organic unity that
as self -maintained.
it
experience,'
apt to be misleading.
of another as one portion of time or space
experience
involves
life,
life,
or
ySib?
^(ut/,
life
as
the inter-
action of organism and environment, with which the socalled biologist is exclusively concerned,
organism and
environment are
objects
and where both

for
distinct
112
observer.
It
behoves us therefore to take
all
possible
pains to keep these two very different standpoints
dis-
Psychology, as I have already remarked earlier
tinct.
in these lectures, has
been most seriously hampered by
confusing them.
We
in
with this duality of subject and object
start then
What
the unity of experience.
objects, or
what
indeed, as
we
are often told,
unknowable
the knowledge of either apart

their unity that
this to free us
a subject without
would
objects without a subject,
is
be, is
for in truth
a contradiction.
specially interests us, for
we
It is
look to
Some
from the perplexities of dualism.
current conceptions of this unity I feel bound to controFirst of all
vert.
experience or
and
The
as
life
to this I
it
is
held and rightly that to a given
there can only be one subject, but that
demur
there
must be many
objects.
unity of experience pertains to the objective as well
to
the
According to Kant,
subjective.
it
will
be
remembered, experience begins with a mere manifold or

disconnected multiplicity of sensations, which are then
Discon-
synthesised into a temporo-spatial continuity.
nected in a logical
sense this
manifold
may
but
be,
psychology, I trust, has outgrown this notion of isolated

particulars or 'mental atoms,'
on a 'thread of consciousness.'
somehow strung together

Whatever development
or differentiation an individual experience
does not become^ but always
e's,
a unity.
may undergo, it
Sensations are
not like grains that the subject picks up, but changes in an
objective continuum that
is
always there as an unbroken
whole, however indefinite as respects boundaries.

loath to dwell on this point, partly because
am
have done
SENSATIONS NOT SUBJECTIVE

and
SO already elsewhere,^
more because
still
to be generally conceded.
I pass
113
coming
it is
then to another more
open to debate.
Sensations are
commonly described
Such language
tions or modifications.
the incidental advantage of
conception of
atomic
the
language
this
not B's,
of
may
it
theless, I
point of
at least
is
A's experience, qud his and
all
and particularly
in the sensations
be
or idiosyncrasies
peculiarities
Never-
contend that the sensory and motor changes
processes
entering
each
into
conscious
experience
are objective for the subject of that experience
much
or
For cognition they are a
'this'
'what'; for volition they have a 'worth.'
individual
inas-
can be attended to or apprehended, liked
as they
disliked.
movements
sensations and
of
these
are
From one
undiscoverable and incommunicable.
are
that
or
subjective
is
either there
by the way,
But
sensations.
perhaps justifiable
is
In a sense
convenient.
has,
disowning by implication
primary presentations subjective?
view
as subjective affec-
experience,
are,
To
and a
say that
from the point of view
modifications of the subject,
forces us further to say, either that they are originated
by the
subject, or
by what we commonly
by an unknown thing
had
their advocates.
ji?er se.
The
All
first
call objects, or
have
tliree alternatives
and
third, the
theories
respectively of Fichte and Kant, are attempts to render
experience intelligible by transcending experience
the
one on the side of the subject, the other on that of the

object.
These, as they stand, have
Even Fichte had

1
to
satisfied
allow the duality of subject and
Encyclopcedia Britannica, article Psychology.
VOL.
II
nobody.
114
Kant
object within experience, and
per
se as a
his
thing
problematic and limiting conception.
The
The
second alternative
material thing
we
But
to
that of ordinary thought.
is
call
an independent
as
cipient
an orange
'real,'
this, as it stands, is just
colour,
and so on.
taste,
we have found
the theory
down, the theory that
to break
commonly regarded
is
that gives rise in each per-
sensations of
his
treat
to
on the dualism of
rests
phenomenon and epiphenomenon, and leads

difficulties
of
psychophysical
poses, too, that very
to
parallelism.
the
all
presup-
It
primacy and independence
as per-
taining to the physicist's external phenomenon, which
we have
is
seen reason to disallow.
not to be
a thing per
itself
just such sensory
sists of
albeit,
If
this
its
own
prcesentahilia''
This theory, at any
posed to cause.
exploded
'
se,
'^
phenomenon
reality con-
as
it
is
sup-
Kant has
rate,
unhappily, he never completely broke
away from the Cartesian opposition of mind and matter.

He often seems to identify mind with the subject
of
experience on the one hand, and matter with the
object of experience on the other.
There could hardly
be a greater mistake than this identification; for the

duality in unity of subject and object at once lapses,
and the old gulf between thinking substance and extended substance, between external phenomena and
ternal
the
epiphenomena reappears.
terms
time,
and
But,
if
'matter'
to
keep
we must
An
is
safer
to leave
and 'mind' entirely aside

strictly to
talk
of
awkward, but
useful,
for
the facts of experience.
mind,
accepting the descriptions current

1
It
in-
word
let
among
us
beware
of
psychologists.
of Helmlioltz's.
EXPERIENCE IMPLIES OBJECTS

They may be admirable
115
rough approximations for
as
expository purposes, but even then are apt to confuse.
Thus no less eminent a writer than Dr. Bain suggests

" Mind is definable in the first instance by the
that,
method
of contrast, or as a remainder arising
from sub-
Object World from the totality of
tracting the
scious experience."!
con-
But when he reaches our present

is careful to add
problem of external perception he

*'
There
no possible knowledge of a world except
is
in
reference to our minds.
of
mind
We
the notion of material things
are
Knowledge means a
is
state
a mental fact.
incapable even of discussing the existence of
an independent material world
We
tradiction.
the very act
is
a con-
can speak only of a world presented
own minds." ^ And, of course, this is

ment we should prefer to accept; but then,
to our
the stateit
reduces
the preliminary definition to a contradiction, in so far

as conscious experience without objects
whereas the
is
such.
later statement recognises the
Again,
fundamental
unity of experience in the duality of subject and object,

the earlier explicitly contemplates
kinds
subject-consciousness
But there must be an objective

sciousness,
Are the
related
and a subjective
objects of
separation into two
object-consciousness.
side to the subject-con-
to the object-consciousness.
subjects then identical,
The
its
and
the
and how are the objects
subject-consciousness,
we
should be told, are those of an individual experience

only
in
those of the object-consciousness are the objects
which
all
other sentient beings participate.
quite willing to accept this answer;

^
Senses and Intellect, fourth edition,
p. 1.
it
am
leaves us free
^
o.c, p. 399.
KEFUTATION OF DUALISM
116
to
treat
sensations
as
essentially
objective,
and only
now mentioned, viz., that the

term objective is ambiguous till we know the standWhat is psychologically
point from which it is used.
brings out the fact just
objective
is
often treated as
epistemologically subjec-
by Kant, for example, continually.

One further point by way of elucidating our claim to
Such a claim is often distreat sensations as objective.
tive, as it is
allowed on the ground that sensations pertain really to

feeling
and not
to cognition
or again on the ground
that they are the matter of experience simply, whereas
the objects of cognition must have form.
know, was substantially Kant's
him
easier still for
to slide into
and made
chology since his time has,
we
it
defining sensations as
But the farther progress
subjective affections.
whole position.
position,
This, as
think, fairly
Sensations have form
of
psy-
routed this
in other words,
they have inalienable characteristics, quality, intensity,

extensity
*
what
'
again nowadays, they have a
as people say
as well as a
'
Again, they are not isolated
that.'
but, as I have already urged, they are changes in

for
want
I have been fain to call a

word
continuum. The so-called 'pure sensation
of a better
presentational
what
'
of certain psychologists
is
a pure abstraction; as
much
so as the mass-point of the physicist, but without perhaps
the same warrant on the score of utility.
The whole
doctrine of the gradual elaboration of perception out of
purely subjective material

region of psychological
is
fast
myth
being relegated to the

but
it
would carry us
too far from our main problem to discuss this in detail

here.
When
Locke treated sensations as
ideas, or pre-
RELATION OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT

sentations, as
"the
we should now
say,
objects of the understanding
117
and defined these
when
man
as
thinks,"
he was really nearer to the truth, than Kant was with
matter and form.
his artificial distinction of
phys-
It is
iology rather than psychology that has kept the notion
Primary
of sensations as subjective affections in vogue.
perceptual presentation
or
we mean, and such
all
is
term has the advantage of making the objective character

explicit,
and
of ignoring physiological implications
with
which we have nothing to do.
And now we may
pass to another question.
If these
primary presentations are essentially objective, not subjective, modifications,
how
the relation of the subject
is
The
to such objects to be conceived?

eral necessary relations
to these
we must
to
all
is
that relation of subject to

in virtue of
subject,
actual presentations,
refer presently.
bare fact of presentation there
subject has sev-
is
But
as regards
nothing to be said
object
and
of
and
the
;
it
object to
which they are severally subject
As the absolutely ultimate relation within

experience we can either say that it is inexplicable, or
that it needs no explanation, or we may entertain the
and
object.
notion of an Absolute, in which the unity of experience
But one
outlasts the duality.
not do
we must not attempt
subject and
effect.
relations
quite
object
thing, I think,
we must
to bring this relation of
under the category
cause
of
and
do not mean to deny that there are causal
between subject and

the contrary.
object, object
that the subject-object relation itself
out meddling with any
and subject
only demur to the assmnption
of
the
is
causal.
many vexed
With-
questions
118
concerning causation,
must be
real before
it
clear
they can be causes
consequent cannot give
own
rise to its
that
an
causes
effect
or
cause or antece-
Causality logically presupposes reality, not reality
dent.
But subject and object
causality.
ence
least
at
is
the real.
is
If
we
in the unity of experi-
disabuse ourselves of the psycho-
logical fiction of isolated sensations pattering like spots
on a tabula rasa from an outer nowhere
of rain
we
if
think instead of the objective factor (or presentational
as much
then we
continuum) as an unbroken whole

as a
mere continuum can be
that this
experience absolutely
for
be
cannot
lation
see,
We
causal.
a whole
think,
fundamental
ordinarily
re-
employ the
category of causality to relate one part of experience to

another, a change to an antecedent change.
very form
Thus
in its
presupposes distinction within experience,
it
and accordingly
this relativity within experience ceases
moment when the part coincides with the

we may assign a position to one part
at the very
Similarly
whole.
of the universe relatively to another, but not to the uni-
verse
absolute time
make
of
or absolute
causation absolute
And
en Hoc.
object
now
to recur to
prevent misapprehension
question
is
and object
lation of
arise
when we
it
try to
to experience
have engendered such
as causal
I referred to
difficulties.
place,
by extending
in fact all attempts to treat the relation
subject and
be well
analogous to those besetting
Difficulties,
itself.
these a
them
let
in
me
moment ago;
more
detail.
it
may
But
to
again repeat that the
not whether any interaction between subject

is
conceivable, but
subject and
object
as
simply whether the rethat
presents itself in
IS
THE SUBJECT-OBJECT RELATION CAUSAL?
the time-worn problem
external perception
of
119
can be
regarded as a causal relation.

First of all let
me
urge again that, at
have not the warrant
by the ambiguity
events,
we
of direct experience itself for so
Those who imagine
doing.
all
this are, as I think, misled
Thus mind
of the leading terms.
is
sometimes used as coextensive with an individual experience in its entirety, as
instance
that has the experience.
psychology,
in empirical
at other times it
for
restricted to the subject
is
manner, subjective
So, in like
refers at one time exclusively to this subject, at others

is
made
to cover both the subject
But once we
objects as such.
in our terms,
we
find
and the
up
clear
totality of its
this
vagueness
no warrant within experience for
regarding presentations as modifications of the subject
Comparative psychology, which
that has them.
ac-
cording to the usual expositions of the differentiation of

subject and
in support
ought
object
of this
to furnish strong evidence
assumption,
on the contrary, as
is,
RiehP has pointed out, conclusive against it.

But we may still entertain the hypothesis that the
Professor
immediate objects of experience are ultimately, in some
underground way,
we do
If
this
offsets or
in
emanations of the subject.
Leibniz's fashion,
that each several subject evolves
from within,
at
all,
suppose,
a world in which there
is
own
its
we have a world which
is
is,
experience
really
actually no
that
no world
community
or interaction, but only the semblance of them.
And
even this semblance, as in the famous example of the

1
Der philosophische Kriticismus, Bd.
ciples of Psychology, vol.
ii,
ch. xvii.
II,
ii,
p. 54.
Cf.
James, Prin-
120
two
clocks, is only secured
by the altogether extraneous
assumption of a preestablished harmony in the respective
developments of the isolated, independent, window-
less
monads.
we go
If
opposite extreme, and,
to the
following Fichte in his daring speculation, set out from
an Absolute Ego that posits

then a converse
There
difficulty,
own Non-Ego, we have
its
Fichte soon discovered.
as
no way for us from such an act to the world of
is
finite subjects, face to face
The
have not posited.

such experience
God and
is
where
with a Non-Ego which they
relation of subject to object in

it
We
was.
cannot begin from
Even
construct the universe.
if
we
persist in
calling the objective factor in our experience a subjective
modification, at least
the cause of
is
it.
we cannot pretend
There
is,
perhaps, no point in the
whole of philosophy as to which there

agreement
idealist
and
that the subject
is
and dogmatist,
sceptic
realist,
such complete
are here almost invariably at one.
Those who treat presentation
as a causal relation ac-
cordingly look to the object itself as the cause.
It is
in this aspect that the question "forms the most vital

crisis
in
in the whole history of speculation," as
one of his
called
it.
many
And had
brilliant essays
on the
Ferrier,
topic, has
Ferrier been familiar with the Kan-
tian controversies at the close of last century, or had he
lived to take part in the
the close of this,

for
his
neo-Kantian controversies at
he would have had
emphasis than his studies of
Brown, and Hamilton afforded.

refers to
two orders
of
objects
ampler grounds
still
Berkeley,
Kant, as
:
objects
is
Reid,
well known,
extra
nos,
or
external phenomena, and objects prcBter nos, or things
KANT'S DIFFICULTIES
per
The former he
se.
resolved into 'raw
To
stuff,'
men-
forms of intuition and
tally elaborated according to the
understanding.
121
this order the objects of
our expe-
and exclusively belong.
Of the second
things
order, the
per se, we have not and cannot have
any knowledge whatever neither knowledge that they
are nor yet knowledge what they are.
Returning now
to the raw stuff of phenomenal objects, we ask
What
does it come ?
is this, and whence
It consists, says
rience entirely
Kant, of sensible impressions or affections
duced by objects that excite our senses

only are objects given to
it is
in this
pro-
way
These objects that are
us.
'given' to us are, of course, objects of the first order;
but of which order are the objects that affect

that
objects
and so
'give,'
this question neither
set experience
the
us,
To
going?
Kant himself nor any of his sucand consistent
cessors has been able to find a satisfactory
answer.
vast literature has already gathered round
the question, and
the phenomenal
or are
sensory impressions
way
ever
it is
Are things per
se,
things in space the cause
of
growing
is
This
still.
the question.
is
answered special
difficulties
Which-
arise
it
is
therefore not surprising to find, sometimes things per
se,
and sometimes external

these
'
objects, assigned as the cause of
affections of our sensibility.'
Kant
we put forward things

per se as this cause, then how can we also maintain
their purely problematic and negative character ? ^ They
If,
as
become
at
in the
once
foundation stones
1
Cf. Drobisch,
main
does,
not 'the boundary stones'

'
of experience.
KanVs Dinye an
sich
und
We
but
must know
'the
that
sein Erfahrungshegriff.
122
they are
and further from the variety
we must
of their effects
surely be able to infer something as to their
In a word, the categories, instead of
nature as causes.
being confined to the raw stuff of experience, have
some positive application

produce
it
and
to these
these, thus
things per
se of a
higher order
if
Kant
is
their turn.
in
now seem
called for to
On
account for them, and so on indefinitely.^

hand,
which
se
ceasing to be prceter nos,
become only extra nos and phenomenal

Things per
now
the other
noumena
to be held to his description of
as purely problematic conceptions of what are objects
whose intelligence
for beings
ours,
it
idle to
is
is
essentially different
from
speak of them as causes concerned
in our experience.
Again,
if,
as
neo-Kantians in the main do,
we put
forward phenomenal objects as the cause of our sensa-
we seem involved
tions,
Vâihinger in his
as
in
" For,"
a hopeless circle.
monumental commentary remarks,
"these empirical objects are according to Kant's thousandfold
repeated
sentations.'
How
assurances
'nothing
objects first affect us in order that

cisely the presentations in
we may
pre-
obtain pre-
which alone they consist
In short, remembering that our question

relation of subject
our
but
then can or should these presented
and object generally,
is
this
"
as to the
answer
is
tantamount to saying that the objective element in experience causes
There
is
still
itself.
another view that
it
would be weari-
some, and as I think needless, to discuss, which should

1
Cf Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Kant, vol. i, p. 652.

Commentar zu KanVs Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Bd. II,
.
p. 51.
PRESENTATIONISM
perhaps be mentioned.
refer
123
to a doctrine,
now
in
favour with certain psychologists, that I have ventured

to
call
According to
Presentationism.
at starting only presentations,
this,
and these by
there
are
their inter-
action in due course give rise to a special presentation,

or rather
complex
Such a doctrine
of
presentations, called the
we are
is made
I believe
rule out of court
till
it
entitled
subject.
summarily to
plain to us
how
there
can be an experience with no unity, an experience that
nobody
has.
So far then may we not say that we have good reasons for demurring to treat the relation of subject and
object as primarily a
causal
relation
observations on this position and
compels
me
to withliold
till
its
Some
further
consequences time
the next lecture.
LECTURE XV
EXPERIENCE AS LIFE
Becapitulation and further explication as to the general conception of
Its fundamental
experience.
character the whole difficulty
early reflexion
misled by imperfect analysis and by deceptive analogies.
Coming
to details, ice note that every concrete experience is
of self-conservation.,
and
his
'
a Life.
is
KanVs
distinction of
Synthetic Vanity of Apperception.''
than cognition.
'
a process
matter and form
'
Conation moi-e fundamental
Subjective selection determined by the loorth of objects
rather than by their
'
content.''
A purely
cognitive experience impossible.
Even
Practical interests never absent.
spatial
and temporal relations
involve elements due to activity initiated by feeling.
Spatial perceptions and conceptions compared and discussed by
of showing the shortcomings of dualism.

the conceptions, ignores the elements due
way
Science, concerned only with
and practical
to the conative
interests of the subject.
like
comparison and discussion of temporal perceptions and con-
ceptions.
The notion of empty space and empty

of the things and events that are said
time, as necessary antecedents
to fill
them,
is
an inversion of
reality.
Let us
first
recall
general
the
drift
It is to ascertain if there be not
inquiry.
of
our
new
some way of
escape from that dualism of mental world and material

world,
in
sciences
centuries
consequence
of
which
the
departmental
physics and psychology have during two

become more and more severed and estranged
of
from each other.
Modern thought
124
finds
itself
in
RECAPITULATION
125
quandary familiar to most schoolboys working a sum,
when they bring out an answer which they know

not be right, while yet they
mere arithmetic.
their
see any fault in
to
fail
Physics in
can-
its
own department
seems to hold together, and psychology in like manner

in
we
this gulf which yawns between

and which hypotheses innumerable have
sciences,
To
failed to bridge.
and
human
of
that in experience
nothing of
find
these
know
Also we
department.
its
avoid this 'scandal of philosophy
Kant
reason,' as
called
we have
it,
posed to leave the special sciences on one
upon that experience
reflect
begin by sundering.
We
that
essential
experience there
side,
is
to
too,
subject
is
such
of
In
experience.
take
and object
as.
every concrete
one subject; and on the objective
is
an
experience
continually in
environment.
to
try our
we
say,
started from the duality of subject
first
we
Like the schoolboy,

;
and
a whole, which they
as
sum again on a new method

up the problem of knowledge.
the
side,
pro-
The law
one,
one
the
touch with one world,
one
is
of this life
entiation, development, there
may
is
life
change.
Differ-
be too; but such
life is
not a process of integrating particulars originally isolated

as
Given
well as distinct.
experience,
and
such
the
most
salient
ing
that
objective
the
response
to
must turn next.
an
feature
their
is
changes
first,
what has been already said

subject and object, which
in
the
this
bare
we have found
the
of
then
feel-
subject,
and
To these we
leads.
one or two
of
centre
complement,
interaction
induce
which such feeling
But
or
subject,
objective
remarks on
relation
of
to be the very
126
basis of experience.
two disparate substances
lation of
ence
forbids
in
Moreover,
that.
brought our
wrong
we
It cannot,
dualism
'
mode
is
went
describe
relation as a modification within one substance
say that the object
of
the
has
that
to a deadlock,
But can we even
wa3^
this
the unity of experi-
the
philosophy
scientific
'
say, be itself a re-
this
can
we
or the
subject
mode
of the object?
The attempt has been
made both ways, and both ways it has failed. The
subject a
sensationalism of Locke and the idealism of Berkeley

fall,
more or
under the one alternative
less,
the old
forms of materialism and the 'presentationism' of certain

of our psychological contemporaries belong to the other.
The former
do justice to the objective unity of
fails to
experience, and the latter

to do justice to
fails,
still
subjective unity.
its
more egregiously,
The attempt again
to describe this relation as causal scarcely succeeds bet-
The
ter.
volition,
subject,
for
example
suppose objects
or will posits
of
its
Also
nothing.
no doubt,
it
and willing preeither
perceptions we at
one
true that
the
presentation
change with change
is
But
object
the
more fundamental
just
where
Cf.
J.
it
least
or
know
rather
may prove
;
so
to
the
relate
indeed the special function of
the category of cause.

tion of particular
another
of
by thought
object,
one change in the objective continuum,

cause of
thought and
in
but thinking
a subject that
owai
is
active
is
to
this, like
particular
relation
of
any other
object,
subject
to
rela-
leaves
object
was.^
S. Mill,
third edition, p. 231.
Examination of
Sir.
W. Hamilton's Philosophy,
UNCRITICAL VIEWS OF EXPERIENCE
The fundamental and ultimate

tion
is,
127
character of this rela-
Experience
in fact, the whole dijQiculty.
advanced before even the rudest reflexion about
of
first result
embodied
for
can
it
Imperfect analysis and deceptive analogies are
begin.
the
far
is
in
such reflexion
and as these become
common thought and language they count
part of the facts, though really fictions that belie
them.
Thus, the subject being identified with the or-
ganism which
but a special object among others, the
is
whole objective continuum
said to be an affection of
is
environment
the subject, because the physical
affects
So we get the notion of sensations as sub-
the body.
jective affections,
whose causes are
still
Then
to seek.
come the metaphysical travesties of inner and outer,

which refer originally and literally to space divided
into two compartments by a man's skin.
But presently, since
but what
mean
it
first
is
said there
is
came through
nothing in the intellect

sense,
inner
'
the whole of each one's experience as
comes to
is
then the equivalent of subjective.
hand,
all
is
inner
Outer, on the other
the brain side of this particular subject plus
the rest of the external world
alike
for
is
it
him, the psychical side of his particular brain
are
supposed to participate.
in this all sentients
Imagine
dozen
genii, each
one hermetically sealed in a bottle, but
collectively
roaming at
allel to tliis figure of
moment
at another
large,
and you have a
inner and outer.

line,
from
its
fair par-
Again, look for
where reflexion shews
equally confused and incomplete.
The
sense
itself
of touch,
intimate connexion with muscular activity,
held to present the actual
all
while sight, spite of
its
is
pre-
'
128
eminence in cognition, being a fruitful source of

sion, is
found often to present things
as they
illu-
appear,'
'
i.e.
tangibly, palpably, are.
So
by an easy step all our sensible intuitions come to be
regarded as phenomenal the things per sg, which are
not as they actually,
we might test
now out of reach. But how then, we are
led to ask, can we speak of such things per se at all?
And yet the answer is easy, once we are committed to
held to be their cause, and by which
them, being
the notion that sensations
subjectively
are
affections,
and objectively appearances or phenomena.
For
validity of these notions being taken for granted,
argues
perfect cogency
Avitli
must have something

of
the sensibility."^
urally from
to
And
when he
phenomenon
a
indicates
phenomenon
also " that the very
sentation of which
is
we
again that "it follows nat-
the notion of a
relation to
Kant
"that
says
correspond to the receptivity
that something must correspond to

"
the
it
that
word
'
any sort
of
is
not
itself
phenomenon
something, the immediate pre-
indeed sensible, but which in
apart from this condition of sensibility, must
itself
still
be
Something, namely, an object independent of sensibility."^
But the prime question
of receptivity
is
not what the notions
and phenomenality implicate; but what
warrant these notions themselves possess in experience.
And
here
body
of
we can only
Kant's
critics,
follow suit and, like the great
preach to Kant from himself.
Let what may be outside experience,

anything, and the supposition
^
is
if
Kritik der reinen Vermtnft, Kehrbach's edition,
2o.c., p. 233.
there can be
not nonsense, at least

p.
403.
FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTER OF EXPERIENCE
129
there cannot be bare subjects lying in wait for objects,
nor objects that by definition never are positively objects.
If the categories of substance
and cause are only
valid within experience, they cannot be applied to
may
ing
involve,
validity,
it
surely cannot involve that of transcend-
Such miscalled transcendence,
itself.
must
ex-
Whatever implications experience
perience as a whole.
really be
If this duality in
immanence
if it
have any
at bottom.
unity of subject and object be in-
deed the fundamental fact of experience, present alike

in cognition, in feeling,
any
rate, there
for explanation
and
in volition, then, so far at
may
misconceived the
be taken as evidence that
On
facts.
must suspect and avoid
this
statements of experience
all
that introduce conceptions of
more
The demand
we have
ground therefore we
can be nothing to explain.
special than itself.
narrower and
relations
Such, for example,
is
the ref-
erence to organs of sense excited by external stimuli.
Such again
is
the contrast of perceptual experience with
experience as modified by intersubjective intercourse, a

contrast which leads us
first
to picture each individual
own
as confined strictly to his
and then with
inside,
Mr. Spencer and others to exclaim about "the mysteriousness of the consciousness of something that
is
out of consciousness, which, nevertheless," they say,

are obliged to think."
am
well aware that this
the region of controversy and that dogmatism

peculiarly unbecoming.
the situation.
The very
make
the old watchwords

1
But there
failures
it
is
is
is
here
another side to
that have overtaken
fitting to
Cf Spencer, Principles of Psychology,

.
yet
"we
ask,
vol.
ii,
whether
p. 452.
it
130
be not possible to take a

be charier
of
metaphors
whether
rate all attempts to explain
it
by what
on the one hand, or goes beyond

enounce that experience
a continuity, that
and object
not time to
is
it
attempts to explain experience, at any
treat as futile all
ject
granted, and to
little less for
is
falls short of it
more precisely
a whole, or
consists in the correlation of
it
universal factors,
as its
To
on the other.
it
sub-
a statement
is
that seems to tamper with no facts and to involve no
hypotheses.
We
must now look
of its unity
still
closer
holds good
and see
this conception
if
when we come
to details,
and advance from simpler to more complex forms

experience.
The
thing to note
first
in the concrete, that
that experience
is
any one's experience,
is
not a product.
We
ments of objects
as a product
speak
or a proposition of Euclid.
of
of
is
a process,
certain fixed
arrange-
house, for example,
But on the other hand
all
products, whether of thought or art or nature, presup-
pose processes, of which

that
we might
we
either
have,
course, recall the beginning of our
or
We
an experience.
have,
own
conceive
cannot,
of
experience, nor
can we, either by observation or inference, attain to any

conception of an experience which should be the simplest possible.
But
all
that
we know,
rectly,
warrants the statement that
process
but
directly or indiall
not merely change, not merely
felt interchange.
experience
'
is
felt change,'
Broadly speaking, every objective
change, every change of perception, entails a subjective
change
I
say,
and every subjective change an objective change.

broadly speaking, because
there
are
uninter-
EXPERIENCE AS LIFE
presentations,
esting
for
knowledge.
deserve
tive
continuum has no
distinction
no account even
definite
To
Such a beyond we
belongs
topic
this
and they con-
limits,
Leibniz's
between perception and apperception,
the conscious and the subconscious, with
To
gled questions thereto appertaining.
have to recur
subjective
they shew that the objec-
for future advance.
never without.
classic
no
is
of
tanto
In other respects, nevertheless, these
consideration
oui*
stitute a field
are
which there
to
and which are pro
reaction,
131
later.
But we may
all
the tan-
these
we may
for the present leave
all this aside.
The
selective
characteristic
in
interest,
which we may
some measure
of
all
fairly take as
experience, leads
remark that experience as a process may be further
to the
defined as a process of self-conservation, and so far justifies
us in describing
it
as
life,
or
/3io?.
It is scarcely
an exaggeration to say that the objects of experience

are not primarily objects of knowledge, but objects of
conation,
object
i.e.
of appetite
and aversion.
must be cognised before
still it is
attends,
it
For though an
can be liked or disliked,
to interesting objects that the subject
and
it is
acquires a closer and preciser acquaintance.

affinity
or
subject and
consensus between
its
mainly
with these, therefore, that the subject
objective continuum
of actual experience, so far as
intimacy and adaptation
is
feeling
this
is
certain
and acting
then characteristic
we can
ascertain.
Such
simply the counterpart of the
fact that to each subject there pertains a distinct organ-
ism and a special environment.

analysis, logical rather
It
was but a one-sided
than psychological, that led Kant
132
to resolve experience
into
Oddly enough Kant
form.
referring
illustrates
embryological
the
to
dualism of matter and
the
time, but yet fails to
see
between experience and

potheses concerning
how
close
the connexion
is
then in vogue
life
pothesis that
all
life
his
of
There were three hy-
life.
that of
first,
spontaneous generation from matter;
its
by
position
his
controversies
next, the hy-
But
begins from a germ.
of this
there were two varieties, the pre-formation hypothesis,
according to which the germ was literally a complete
organism in miniature, which merely unfolded like a
and the hypothesis of epigenesis, which denied
bud;
this
mere expansion of the germ, and maintained that
each organism was built up de novo
With
impulse or nisus.
was the best
established,
by a formative
hypothesis,
last
Kant compares
to the first he likens
of experience;
theory as commonly put

preestablished
niz's
this
down
harmony
correspond to the second.
It
to
which
own theory
his
the sensationalist
Locke
while Leib-
is
apparently
is,
no doubt,
meant
as hopeless
to try to conceive experience arising simply out of
mere aggregate
life
But
of sense-impressions as
is
it
the case really
mended when over
any
to conceive
emerging from any aggregate of material

is
to
particles.
against such
an aggregate of sense-impressions we set the pure rea

son of the Kantian philosophy with
and
is
of thought
indifferent,
indifferent,
vitalis
in
its
From pure matter
forms of intuition
to
which
and pure forms to which
how
is
all
a definite result possible
the hypothesis
of
epigenesis
was,
form
all
matter
The
is
nisus
after
all,
only formative within an already organised germ, and
PRACTICAL INTEREST ESSENTIAL
Kant
is
unformed matter.
to act directly on
was powerless
133
If
with his simile of epigenesis,
to be in earnest
then he must discard the formless matter of his sense-
As
manifold.
have already urged, psychology has
certainly disposed
of
Professor Stumpf, to
that
cannot
"that
and we may
it,
whom
be
this question
true
say with
safely
owes so much,
which
epistemology
in
Whatever may be the value
in logical analysis of the
metaphor of matter and form,
is
psychology."
false in
"the clumsy potter's phrase," as Herder styled

is
certainly inadequate to the
it,
it
synthesis of experience,
as indeed all material analogies are.
Kant represents
synthesis
this
experience as an
of
which
activity of the subject, an activity too

is
spontaneous.
cerned to insist
is
apart
taneity
thought
in
But the point upon which I am conthat there is no activity and no spon-
altogether
from
and
feeling
interest.
Experience can not without mutilation be resolved into

three
departments,
one
cognitive
or
To be
emotional, and one practical.
one
theoretical,
just to
it,
Kant's
must be combined into one. It is true

that what we take and what we find we must take and find
three critiques
as
it
that
is
is
But, on the other hand,
given.
take
we do not
uninteresting
seek unless
we
is
also true
do not take up
what
nor do we find unless we seek, nor
desire.
ence, in a word,
at least
it
is
far
The
cognitive aspect of experi-
more one
of
experiment, as
its
very etymology suggests, than one of mere disinterested

observation.
The philosopher may look
buyers and sellers in

^
on
the market-place, but
Psychologic und Erkenntnisstheorie, 1891,
p. 18.
at
the
the
real
REFUTATION OF DUALISiM
134
experience
their trafficking, not the notes of this de-
is
Regarding experience in
tached bystander.
as
self-conservation,
life,
conclude that
it
central feature,
its
not that
is
'
content
experience, but
which
their place in
or
positive
negative,
goodness or badness as ends or means to
their
We
worth
their
taking
we must
of objects,
'
them
the subject cannot alter, that gives

its
and
self-realisation,
conation not cognition as
this wise
truth
this
realise
cognitive
being
we try
if
to
life.
imagine a purely
apprehending or thinking
subject
but devoid of any interest in thought or aiDprehension.
What
psychologists call
limited field and
still
'
the span of consciousness,'
more limited
focus, has to be taken
into account.
What
enter this field,
and on which attention
trated
to determine
is
its
which objects
shall
shall be concen-
Kant, no doubt, did well in declaring the syn-
paramount principle
thetic unity of apperception to be the
of knowledge, but
it is
surely a mistake to suppose any
any unity,
synthesis, or
action
and
trality
and organisation
taken
very
interest in
practical
literally
from motives to
possible, apart
intend
which
all
things.
The
words
the
cen-
to
be
experience
concrete
manifests, could never arise to a merely cognitive subject
our
of
nor to us,
practical
only to turn
experience
changeable
meaning,
'
We
if
our intellective were independent
In
powers.
proof of this
we have
again to what Naturalism mistakes for
an
items
multiplicity
indefinite
only by
related
mechanical
laws.
Hence,
of
inert
un-
unchangeable, unthe
inability
of
can scarcely credit such a subject with an organism, for this
seems necessarily to imply sentient
activity.
PRACTICAL ELEMENTS IN SPACE AND TIME 135

Naturalism to connect such a centreless, aimless,
"a cosmic
scheme,
istic
relation to moral ends,"
that has no sort of
process
with experience as the
conservative process which
self-
for each of us.
it is
It
is
which we are seeking to remove.
this inability
Even
fatal-
spatial
and temporal
we
as
relations
actually
experience them involve practical elements, which can
only be accounted for

life
when experience
regarded as
is
For lack of these
and not merely as theory.
ele-
ments the mathematical conceptions of space and time

are abstract
and unreal.
Kant, as
we
know,
all
treats
both space and time as pure forms of intuition
and
space and time as conceptual ideals can be so treated.
But
for
we should have
think psychology teaches us that
had no perception
our
practical
perception
One
interests.
Though such move-
ments are objective changes as much
as sensations are
changes which produce
yet they are
of
here
to
present
is
that for which
and
we
To
prepare.
measure-
of
which we
the time in which
we
To
initiates.
all-important notion
too, the
Similar remarks apply in the
theres.
The
origin,
definite
of distance
objective
other
changes, and changes which the subject
them we owe the notions

ment. To them we owe,
spatial
of
essential
voluntary movement.*
is
or the other but
of either the one
we
relate
case
act
the present
of
all
time.
the future
we
actively
With
we have no dealings it is " over
and done with "as we expressively say, save as it leads
adjust
the
past,
as
look, listen, handle, pursue, retreat.

past,
us to expect and modify the future.

1
Huxley, Evolution and Ethics,
p.
34
* See Note
i,
Collected Essays, vol. ix, p. 83.
p.
286.
136
It
repay us to
will
on these points a
reflect
longer, as a comparison of our concrete time
perceptions,
if
lay bare the
find
the
if
factors
We
dualism.
shall
experience than would
of
dualism were true.
psychological
implies
space
shortcomings of
and objective
be possible
If
them, with the abstract
call
more intimate connexion between the sub-
a far
jective
so
and space current in exact science helps
ideals of time
to
may
little
and space
movement
active
the perception
that
doctrine
then
sound,
be
of
no
merely cognitive activity in apprehending and comparquality and
ing changes of
would make us
intensity
aware of space as an indefinite manifold of three or
We
more dimensions.
continuum
in a
might
and the changes
still
melody or in our organic
will for the present suppose
pared.
Time
sensations,
be
of
we should have would be
that
of
luminousness or massiveness that
might
succession
But the only element
thus be possible.
changes
we
remembered and com-
form
as the abstract
have our objective
in this, like the
would
of space that
extensity
the vo-
we now connect with
embodiment, but which we should then connect with

nothing, for
distinguish
there
it.
at the deck, or
sky above
Whether, on shipboard, we look down
away
to the horizon, or
us, the extensity of
in each case the
from which to
would be nothing
same
upwards
at the
the colour sensation
is
the difference in the space seen
due to acquired perceptions involving movement.^
is
1
fact first clearly brought out
New
by Berkeley
in his
Essay towards
Theory of Vision, thus opening a new chapter in the theory of

knowledge, and one the full significance of which has hardly yet been
realised.
^'
MOVEMENT AND PERCEPTION OF SPACE

"
We
imagine," says Kant, " that
can never
137
there
no space, although we can quite well think that

But, having thought
objects are met with^ in it."
how do we imagine
own words betray him
all objects,
Kant's
to be traversing this space
we
empty space
this
:
we suppose
is
no
away
itself ?
ourselves
and meeting with nothing
as
But how could such a progress be im-
proceed.
agined by a subject incapable of active movement; and

if
there were no such imaginary
be
pure space as an
left of
though in the
first
movement what would
infinite
And
whole?
part of his Critique
Kant
again,
describes
space as an infinite given magnitude, in the next he
has to allow that

in thought
we cannot think
drawing
it,
a line without
of
or of a circle without describing
it,
nor ever imagine the three dimensions of space
without producing three lines intersecting each other at
right angles through the same point
which
all
is
ob-
viously in contradiction with the notion of space as an

infinite
given whole.
may most
Perhaps we
is
clearly realise that
movement
an essential element in our spatial experience
contrast with
it
that omnipresence or
the schoolmen
as
called
it,
which
'
repletive
if
followed
they,
we
ubiety
by
Locke, Newton, and Clarke, attributed to the Deity.
In a remarkable passage in his
in his
Newton speaks
God and Clarke
Optichs^
of absolute space as the sensorium of
famous controversy with Leibniz^ compares the

mine.
Italics
Of course
with which
it is
we
are
empirical space not the abstract space of geometers
now
concerned.
Kant's great mistake was to con-
found the two.

3
Leibnittii
Opera Philosophica Omnia, ed.
J.
E.
Erdmann,
p. 750.
138
presence of
the soul
the
to
sensations
"in
little
its
sphere " with this living presence of the Deity throughout immensity.
as sentient
it
The ubiquity
body
of the soul in the
the schoolmen termed
'definitive ubiety/ as
thus the counterpart of the omnipresence of
is
in space
or,
according to the phraseology
God
have been
using, a presentational continuum of infinite extensity

is
present to the Divine Mind, but to the creature mind
continuum limited
With
organism.
as, for instance,
we
world
the impressions of a definite
to
the alleged defects of Newton's simile

that
makes God the soul
it
have at present no concern.
bring out one point
given whole
infinite
one in which every place
ble, is
To such
own
its
is
actively intervene even here only
a 'form of externality.'
'
places
little
Clarke's
sphere of
phrase,
But
it is
would not
it
the
can
Apart
suffice for
our conative interests
movements by which we advance
to the
belongs to psychology to explain this advance in
It
the distinction of the body as an occupied space
which impressions are
and
possi-
perception of space.
detail
in
all
by movements.
this restricted ubiquity
that lead to these
to
but such ubiquity
Within the
space.
sensorium, to use again
from these
full
here and
is
subject has ubiquity, but unlike the Deity,
finite
the
ubiquity movement would
be needless and even unmeaning
would not be our
of
serves
the only experience in which an
intuition of space as an
present together.
It
'localised'
the environing space
projected
'
into
from other bodies
which impressions are
the invariable reference to the body as the
here or point of departure
the steadily decreasing defi-
PERCEPTUAL AND CONCEPTUAL SPACE

niteness
the
of
these
spatial
perceptions as the
radius of
we pass from
we can discern both
the more
sphere extends, and
little
adjacent places, in which
139
direction
and distance, to those in which only directions are per-
from places so contiguous as to be controlled
ceptible,
by changes of posture to those amenable to control only

by locomotion.
with
tive space,
from
this psychological, perspec-
It
is
its
absolute origin in the
percipient, each successive shell, as
differing
centre,
characteristics
in
'
here
'
of the
we recede from
and
this
ordinates and
even dimensions, and differing largely by reason of the

different
movements
this concrete spatial
space of
to
which
scheme
it
it is,
correlated
is
I say, that the abstract
And
Euclid has been elaborated.
manifest traces of
its origin,
from
it
bears
as the recent developments
of generalised geometries abundantly shew.^
grant that
geometrj' involves intuitive construction and not merely

logical
distinction
but this construction presupposes
such free movements as our bodies can make, move-
ments either
of
translation
or
of
Had we
rotation.
been " evolved " to maintain like compass-magnets one

constant
rotation
to say
orientation,
or
screws to
like
and translation conjoined,
would be hard
it
what we should have made out
move only by
of space of three
dimensions.
But, though our geometrical space contains elements
due to our motor experiences,
it
et
monde
le
il
Entre Vhomme
faut Vhumanite, said Comte
precisely this intervention of

1
in important
differs
particulars from our spatial perceptions.
Even the phrase
'
'
and
it
is
humanity,' of Bezvusstsein
third dimension
'
is
in this
way
significant.
140
iiherhaupt, as
thought
Kant styled
call
it
what
understanding, reason,
of
it,
you
will
between
the
per-
cipient and his immediate objective experience that has
made geometry
given
possible
and
We
rise to dualism.
is
it
this
also
that has
have to deal with
shall
problem at length in the next two lectures
but
it
this
may
be helpful to anticipate that general discussion so far
and time
ment even of this
as space
adequate treat-
beyond our
propose to refer to only three closely related
limits.
An
are concerned.
special question is quite
topics in this transition from spatial perception to spatial
conception, the transition, in other words, from actual
experience of spatial relation to the bare idea of pure

Into the actual experience there enter always
space.
three factors;
active
of
series
viz.
various extensive continua, various
movements
motor continua, and a
or
primary position or origin, which we

all
as extensive,
choloerists call
is
movements
'
have what psy-
as protensive,
threshold values.
Such minima
'
furnish a standard of magnitude that

to
About
from the standpoint of individual

something absolute. Sensory impressions
these there
experience
'here.'
call
is
sensibilia
indeed relative
the individual, but not relative for the individual.
A man
must
cannot take thirty steps to the yard as a mouse
do, nor can he
gnat.
mark time
'
is
like the
wings
of a
have always admired the sagacity of Locke's
remarks on this point

says, "
'
duration too
extension, both of
in infinitum.
"
Every part
of
and every part
them capable
of
duration," he
extension
is
of addition or division
But," he adds with emphasis, " the least
portions of either
of them,
whereof we have clear and
'
LOCKE AND KANT ON SPACE

may perhaps
distinct ideas,
be considered by
fittest to
the simple ideas of that kind, out of which our
us, as
complex modes of
made
be
141
up,
and duration are
extension,
space,
and into which they can again be
He
resolved."
then proposes to
perceptual
this
call
distinctly
element of space "a sensible point, meaning thereby the
matter or space we can discern."
least particle of
What
is
epistemologically important in this passage
it
denies thoroughgoing relativity of our spatial
temporal)
while
perception,
(and
thorough-
such
allowing
that
is
going relativity to belong to our conceptions of space
Given only the pure space
(and time).
the geometers,
of experience
but, given this, the deduction of that is
The
intelligible.
Kant and
of
impossible to deduce the actual space
it is
one,
perceptual,
as
affords
really
foothold for the construction of the other as a concep-
Psychologically regarded,
tual ideal.
terms
are not purely relative
and
infinity are
cies in
Kant
of
us space
intuition
is
a blank cheque
not
is
is
large
sum
make
an
of
and small
'
Certain inconsistenthis
clearer.
a form of intuition
itself
'
while, per contra, zero
simply negations.
Kant's doctrines will
tells
'
First,
but a form
any more than
intuition,
money.
How
then,
do we obtain intuitions of definite pure spaces
we
To
ask,
this
question Kant gives two diametrically opposite answers.
On
the one hand he
tells
us that space ought not to be
called a Compositum, but a Totum,^ because the parts are
only possible in the whole, and not the whole through

the parts.
In conformity with this standpoint, he then
Human
Essay concerning
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kehrbach's edition,
Understanding, bk.
ii,
chap, xv,
p. 364.
9.
142
describes definite spaces as arising solely through the limi-
But on the other hand
tation of this infinite given whole.
he also asserts that space

ideale,
not a totum, but a compositum
is
"in which the idea
of
the part makes the idea
of the whole possible, and therefore necessarily precedes
not
keeping with this that he says:^ "I can-
It is in
it."^
any
imagine
drawing
in thought
however
line,
it,
i.e.,
small
from one point producing
But how,
the parts, one after the other."
all
How,
either procedure possible?

as an
infinite whole,
limitation,
am
without
be,
it
I ask, is
setting out from space
to determine
and how, from the point
the point by
as zero,
am
by
I,
a gradual synthesis of smallest possibles, to set up the

But there is still a third view of space
infinite whole ?
to be found in Kant's writings,
The
true one.
infinite
bility of space are ideals
and
this
extent and the

;
the
I think,
is,
infinite
divisi-
setting out from a finite line,
actually progress or regress indefinitely, but not
we can
Pure or absolute space
infinitely.
is
then not the pre-
supposition of spatial experience, but the consequence
can say space

far
so
is
we
In keeping with such a doctrine,
of idealising this.
both a totum and a compositum a totum
as our "little sphere" of extensity or ubiquity
goes, a compositum so far as wê quantitatively differentiate
and extend
which
it
just
by movements. This is the foothold

now referred, from which we proceed
measure the world.
to
to
Active experience thus becomes
the basis of geometry, not geometry of experience.

I pass
*here,'
1
now
to
however
my
second point.
relative
to
the
The
place
individual,
Kritik der reinen VernunfC, Analytik, 2G, note.
is
^
we
call
absolute
o.c, p. 160.
MEANING OF 'HERE' AND 'THERE'

for the
individual
tinguish right and
here
is
here
'
where we primarily
is
'
143
dis-
up and down, before and behind

the point through which we set up our recleft,
tangular coordinates and distinguish what Kant called
But suppose we
regions in space.
where
is
to be laid out
Anywhere
it
start
will be said,
not everywhere and everyhow and

times
different
The quandary
and anyhow,
Very good, but then
provided the axes are rectangular.
why
with pure space,
and how are these axes
this origin to be placed,
of
differently
at
the famous ass of
Buridanus is as nothing to this and no Leibniz can

come to the rescue with the principle of indiscernibles.
There
no here and no
is
space.
Its
absolute
it is
no
absolutely relative,
without a fundamentum
The form
there,
no west in pure
east,
thoroughgoing relativity constitutes
of a
human
a system
relationis,
hand,
if
and
an
it
of relations
so a non-entity.
we imagine
it
as the first
thing created, would certainly, as Kant says, be that of a

right
hand or that
of a left.
But
be a definite figure.
would furnish any evidence

in absolute space
Every actual figure must
cannot see that such a hand
of the distinction of regions
or even that
counterpart were placed beside
hand alone
and
left
in space
regions
do not
there.
it
it.
suffice
Referred
direction, as they perfectly well
would do so
A
to
constitute
both
might
suggest not symmetry but dissimilarity
to
the
be, they
;
if
its
and
right
left
right
same
would
and, in fact,
while to the harp-player they present the one character,

to
the pianist they present the
actual experience
all
is
the
first
other.
The
position in space
'
here
'
of
to this
other positions experienced are relative, as positions
144
in the environment.
from orientation in such a
It is
space, a space largely projective, the space, in short, of
own memory
our
others,
we
that
perspective,
visual
of
slowly advance, aided by
the past and
by intercourse with
the geometrical conception of
to
extensive continuum
But
in all respects.
space as
an
three dimensions, homogeneous
of
setting out from such an abstract
conception, simplified to the utmost
by long experience,
we should find it hard to attain to the concrete space

in which we live and find our bearings.
And how do we find our bearings? This brings us
to the last point I will venture to notice,
empty space
of
Common
nature
which we should certainly find none.
in
thought and science alike regard space as a
which
receptaculum,
empty, and
other;
the
is,
at
so
in
fact,
least
such
as
can
partly the
be
full
or
one and partly the
Newton conceived
nothing of the glaring logical
either
circle
it.
will
say
involved in thus
describing space by a figure of speech which presupposes
What
it.
is
in
any
wish to challenge
objects that are said to
contained in
all
perience
can
as
it
not of
is
nothing at
it.
all,"
is
the notion that space
independent of the empirical
sense prior to or
occupy portions
It
is
certain
of
it
that our
"extension which
is
and to be
first
ex-
extension of
but of bodies that are extended.
Nor
be maintained that since the perception of body
extended requires movement, and movement implies
space to
move
in,
therefore
the knowledge of occupied
space implies the knowledge of empty space as well.
There
is
no warrant for the assumption that movement

1
Croom Robertson, Mind,
vol. xiii, p. 422.
EMPTY SPACE
is
impossible without
Such a view takes
conclusively shewn,
More
esis."^
This,
consist
ulti-
as
Kant,
has
think,
"a purely metaphysical hypoth-
is
in keeping with
say the least,
Locke supposed.
particles, incapable of either dila-
compression.
or
as
for granted that bodies
mately of adamantine
tion
vacuum,
145
immediate experience, to
the view that occupation of space
is
is
not a mechanical but a dynamical occupation, and one
admitting therefore
varying
of
Whether nature abhors
vacuum
have no evidence of one.

displacement
no
and
is
other
possible, as
condition
empirical space
never
is
degrees
or no,
of
we
intensity.
at
any rate
Movement is possible where

we see in a globe of fish,
is
though
But,
necessary.
empty
the
space,
that
fact
bodies retain their forms and yet freely change their

places enables us, first to separate the
any particular body, and
from
given space
advance to the conception of

of
all
real
is
And had
there.
fixity of position,
ever attained to
it,
to
We
itself.
nothing there, but that only space

the empirical space, from which
derive this conception, been one in which
found any bodies
then
space as a whole devoid
content and occupied only by
do not say there

is
conception of a
we
we had never
possessing either fixity of form

if
we
all
the
our conception of pure space,
might have been one in which
or
parts were movable, though the motion could no longer
be distinguished.
of
space
fixed
of
As
it is
we have derived our
from relatively rigid
positions,
bodies
notions
and relatively
and accordingly we conceive the parts
pure space as immovable, though these parts can no

^
Kritik der reinen Verminft, Kehrbach's edition, p. 168.

VOL.
II
146
longer be distinguished.
odd
It is
imagining
(2) such a conception
have had
is
the subject in
and
It is
In a word, the space
nor
sense,
the
in
sense
apart
real
from
Newton and
of
indeed the work of the mind, has ideality
but not reality
validity,
concrete
neither a priori^ pertaining wholly
Kant's
experience
of
Clarke.
an ideal
is
only possible to subjects that
is
and displacements.
of the geometers
objects
only by
filled
us not forget two things
experience of extended bodies and their
full
relative places
to
let
a space filled
immovable space
pure, absolute,
this
(1)
But
empty.
it
how
here
to note
What would be true of

with adamant we predicate of a space
extremes meet.
experiences,
but also
which
in
is
it
both
based upon
and
subjective
objective factors cooperate.*
In the case of time the same general considerations

again present themselves, leading, as
The
scientific
dent variable,
the same
I think, to
It will suffice to refer to these
conclusion.
very
conception of time as the great indepen-
only attained by
is
way
of temporal per-
ceptions, involving active elements that in turn
on subjective
interests.
mere
give us no knowledge of time

that so long as
oblivious
''
of
we
time.
series of
indeed
"Z)m
it is
gliicklichen^'" said
It
is
depend
'nows' would
proverbial
are absorbed in the present
schldgt keine Stunde.^''^
ests
briefly.
we
the
are
poet,
the impulses and inter-
that the present does not satisfy that bring the
fact of time before us
it
is
appetition that leads us to
await; and the tension of pursuit gradually nearing

prize that
its
marks the succession and measures the length

1
Schiller,
quoted by Volkmann.
* See Note
ii,
p.
287.
PERCEPTUAL AND CONCEPTUAL TIME

of time.
The more
the facts of
life
147
upon
carefully psychologists reflect
the more clearly, as
it
seems to me,
they see that cognitive processes of retentiveness and

association,
sufficient
however indispensable, are

account for either
to
Only through
or expectation.
subjective selection with
and emphasis
restriction, differentiation,
sentations, can temporal order
such restriction and emphasis
become
occupation
of
this
For in
distinct.
and
consequent
its
of special pre-
we have what
ogist calls a focus of consciousness
successive
of themselves in-
memory
focus
the psychol-
it
that
by
is
their
perceptions
obtain definite time-marks.
But there
cession
We
have
may
more
is
there
all
is
in temporal
simultaneity
experience than suc-
and duration
these together in change
safely say,
is
as
well.
and change, we
the fundamental objective fact in
We
our time experience.
happening, unless two or more of
its
continuous phases
are perceptibly distinguishable within the limits of

is
is
for us
an enduring now.
discernible
been called
If
because
what
no difference of phase
within this 'specious present' as
whether
all
cannot perceive a change as
the
succession
it
has
is
too
rapid or too slow, or the difference too slight, matters
not
in such a case,
perceive none.
though there be a change, we
With time
shall
as with space, infinite divisi-
a certain natural tempo,
we have
which, however relative when
referred to pure time,
not relative for us.
In tem-
we have
a certain
bility is not a
matter of concrete experience
is
poral perception too, as in spatial,
limited ubiquity, a nunc stans or enduring now, within
which attention moves.
Such a movement or 'moment,'
148
" the time of one idea in our minds " as Locke

is
not positively resolvable into a succession
an actually experienced succession,

during present within which two
could
We
fall.
further
into
psychological
this is
is
more
or
them
of
characteristics
is
the
have no ground
and there
much
for
this
fact
that
There every duration

is
as
for distinguishing
re-
no nunc stems; the
Even
empty space we
a point of time, not a portion of
saying too
of
no counterpart in the
has
conception of time.
solves into succession
present
there were no en-
if
concerns us rather
perceptual experience
scientific
constitute
are not called upon, I think, to inquire
the
What
duration.
this
it,
and con-
moments could not themselves
versely such,
calls
in
it.
here from there, so
empty time we have none for distinguishing now

from then and even the oneness of direction, from past
to present, from present to future, is merged in oneness
in
It is easy to
of dimension.
the race has elaborated this abstract
tive experience of
empty time
ideal of
gard
it,
understand how the collec-
but
is
it
surely a mistake to re-
either as a form of intuition presupposed in all
temporal experience, or as having any kind of reality

apart from the events which are figuratively said to
it.
that
we can
forms,
it
experience
much on
it is
such as
preted when
it
is
/o'
is
'^/oo. etc.,
fill
from the side of these
give any meaning to such a notion at
In this respect
An
we approach
It is only as
all.
a par with indeterminate
which
can only be inter-
known how they have been
reached.
quite conceivable, in which there
would
have been no opportunity for the observation of natural,

or for the invention
of
artificial,
time-measurers.
In

EMPTY SPACE AND TIME UNREAL
such a
149
imagine, our quantitative conceptions of
case, I
time would have been as faulty, or as complex, as our

spatial conceptions in the absence
rigid bodies.
of all
experience of
But Avhether flowing evenly
cannot be conceived as flowing at
all
or not, time
unless
account both of duration and simultaneity.

cession only
can be
by a
the practice of representing
line, at
elements lurking under
it.
identify time with a line, but
we measure
once reveals the other
For we do not
by the length
duration, and by motion along
But we must have a
ceive succession.
the line presented as coexistent, and

positions of the
take
brought under the mathematical
rubric of dimension, but

this one dimension
we
True, suc-
finite
literally
of the line
it
we
con-
portion of
we must have two
moving point apprehended together and
yet distinguished
can conceive time
as
:
all
successively
occupied, before
we
which we find in every concrete
experience of change.
And
now, in conclusion, I must endeavour to indicate
the bearings of this discussion on our main problem,

the refutation of dualism.
Time and
space, I have con-
tended, belong neither to the subject alone apart from

the object, nor to the object alone apart from the subject,
but to experience as the duality of both.
They
are neither subjective forms psychologically or logically

prior to experience, nor are they objective realities inde-
pendent of experience.
elaborate
those
Before
conceptions
of
it
is
possible for us to
pure,
space and time, of which geometry and

dant, chronometry, treat,
tial
and temporal
we must
first
empty, absolute
its
possible pen-
experience spa-
relations in the concrete.
To
these
150
the child and the
brute
yond them
to
dividual
secures.
due
is
It
be-
partial
transcendence of
in-
intersubjective
intercourse
transcendence of any
this
is
that
which
experience
our advance
are confined
given
per-
ceptual experience which misleads us into regarding the
space and time of mathematics as independent of experience altogether

ist
to
which we
fundamental delusion of the dual-
shall
have to refer again and again.
Into our concrete experience of
spatial
and temporal
determinations there enter elements due not merely to

the cognitive activity of the percipient,
for a
but
moment
that such activity
if
we
allow
conceivable alone,
is
elements due to the conative and practical im-
pulses and interests of the subject as a living and self-
conserving unity.
procedure of
If this
be true, then obviously the
wrong
Naturalism must be
experience
cannot be disarticulated into dual worlds, one of phe-
nomena and one
of
epiphenomena
nor the latter be
regarded as secondary and dependent on the

the only world that
The notion
of
is
first
capable of going along of
empty space and time
cedent conditions, either in thought or
and events that are said
to
fill
as necessary antefact, of the
things
them, although a very
natural and persistent inversion of the truth, has

I
think been
as
itself.
as
conclusively shewn to he an inversion,
both by psychologists and epistemologists too of widely

different schools.
But my old
teacher, Lotze, has per-
haps done most to give this conclusion sterling currency in the philosophic world.
It
"
Only
fitting
then
some words
of his
in the content itself of
what-
to bring this lecture to a close with
concerning time.
seems
LOTZE QUOTED
151
ever happens, not in a form at hand outside
which
it
may
fall,
of its succession
.
can the ground
and of
Becoming and
its
lie
it,
into
both of the order
being a succession at
come
activity
first,
and
all.
bring
forth from themselves either the actual course of time
The
or the appearance thereof in us.

diction which imagination
our usual
inversion of
little
rises
one
would
mode
persistent contra-
allege against such an
thought,
of
we can
as
get rid of as of our habit of saying that the sun
and
sets
illusion
Unhappily,
as
but
well
may
we may hope to understand the

as we understand the other." ^
add, science
holds as
inveterately,
but with far more self-confidence, to the one illusion

as
common language
1
does to the other.

Metaphysics,
148.
LECTURE XVI
KISE OF DUALISM
Two forms
of experience have emerged in the course of our previous
and Experience as the

Dualism maintained by misconand by their separate treatment
discussion: the experience of a given individual

result
of intersubjective intercourse.
ception as to the relation of these two,
the one exclusively by psychology, the other by the natural sciences.

refute dualism, then, toe need to
is
an extension of
the first
show that
and
the second
To
form of experience
that there is organic unity throughout
both.
In the case of individual experience, this organic unity illustrated

to (1) Bange in time, (2) Familiarity or Erpertness, and
by reference
(3) Intellective Synthesis.
Intersubjective intercourse leads to universal

rise to the na'ive
dualism of common thought.
Experience, and gives
It does this
through (1) the
notion of the transsubjective {na'ive realism), and (2) the hypothesis of

'
introjection''
{animism).
A protest
against the phrase 'internal and
external experience.''
The
discussions that have largely occupied us during
the last two lectures have, I trust, brought out three

points.
sense
First,
there
is
we found
experience used in a double
the experience, the living experience, of
a given individual, filled with concrete events and shaped
by the paramount end of self-conserThere is also experience

vation and self-realisation.
from
first to
generally
last
Experience
empirical knowledge
with a capital E, the
common
of the race, the result entirely of

152
TWO FORMS OF EXPERIENCE

intersubjective intercourse, systematised
by means
conceptions.
abstract
of
153
and formulated
Next,
we found
grounds for suspecting that dualism has arisen from

misconception and ignorance as to the relation of these
two senses
of experience.
Experience in the
first
sense
being relegated to psychology, experience in the second
remained as the sole business of natural science;
and
the one experience coming then to be regarded as exclusively subjective and the other as altogether objective,
a clear line emerges between the two and the dualism
Mind and Nature is the result. But now, in the third

place, we have found that our primary, concrete experi-
of
ence
implies
invariably
factors,
both
subjective
these, not as
and seems to involve
and objective
separable and
independent elements, but as organically cooperant

bers of one whole.
If
mem-
they bear this character through-
out, then logical distinction of these factors is possible
but not their actual dismemberment; there
To
but no dualism.
scientific
thought then,
generalised
or
refute
it is
universal
is
really but
necessary to shew that the
an extension
concrete experience
rience
there
is
of,
of,
it
is
depends upon,
our primary, individual,
and to shew
always
duality
ordinary
Experience with which
immediately concerned has grown out
and
is
the dualism of
organic
also that within expe-
unity.
have tried
already to prove both to be true in the particular case

of space
and time
arguing
first,
that spatial and tem-
poral perceptions involve both subjective and objective

factors, are not purely subjective in the sense of
being
wholly a priori., nor purely objective in the sense of presenting independent realities
and arguing further, that
154
the conceptions of space and time scientifically in vogue
We
are idealised derivatives of these perceptions.
might
proceed to argue in like manner concerning matter and
But our
force.
discussions
earlier
of
the mechanical
theory have, I trust, sufficiently forestalled such detailed
In
inquiry in these cases.
fact,
we found
work
half our
done for us when we attended only to the teaching of
who have any claim to philosophical comThey admit that the matter and force of which
those physicists
petence.
they treat are not in themselves perceptual
realities, are
not phenomena, but abstract ideal conceptions devised

Perceptual realities at
for the description of such.
all
and
events belong entirely to individual experiences;
descriptive conceptions plainly imply intersubjective in-
tercourse
called,
we
in other words, universal, or, as
transsubjective
suspect
the
has been
Inasmuch, then, as
experience.
mind and matter
dualism of
grounded on the absence
it
of clear
to be
knowledge concerning
the relations of these two forms or phases of experience,

it
will help us
lines
and
most to continue our inquiry on broader
to omit
meanwhile further detailed discussion
of conceptions such as matter
But
first
of all a caveat
and
force.
must again be entered against
such terms as percepts, perceptual
which
reality,
as the only terms in general use
able altogether to avoid.
The
and the
like,
we have not been
assailant of dualism
is
at
a unique disadvantage; the very weapons he uses have
been forged by the enemy, and seem designed to betray

him.
Our
psychological terminology
treacherous of
What
all.
with in experience
is
is
perhaps the most
each one immediately deals
objective reality in the most fun-
UNITY OF INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE

But
damental sense.
first
155
was styled a picture
it
or
impression; probably because on the retina of the percipient an optical image of the things he looks at can
be seen by another.
shewed that our
Then, when the progress of science
so-called sensory impressions cannot be
literally representations, or copies,
they lapsed into vica-
rious representations, or symbols, of the objects of universal experience.
How
Finally came the vexed question;
how do any number
does the individual or
of indi-
viduals, all confined to vicarious symbols, attain to an
acquaintance with the real originals assumed to
yond?
Thought, foiled in
led to retrace
its steps.
At
lie
be-
attempts to advance, was
its
this juncture the protest of
Reid occurs and, despite his faulty reconstruction, the
Of
protest in itself was sound and weighty.
by
revival
problem
is
so
many
thinkers in our
a striking proof.
Two
this,
own day
the
of Reid's
things seem certain
Experience in which conceptions figure

experience in which they do not;
preceded by
is
and in
this earlier
experience the distinction of percept and object does not

arise.
Perceptual reality
is
then for us only a convenient
term to distinguish the present objects of the one experience from the objects of the other.
What
immediately deals with in his own experience
each one
is,
I repeat,
objective reality in the most fundamental sense,
have to be incessantly on our guard
and we
lest the psychological
we naturally use mislead us unawares.

With this caution we may now resume our
terms
Before the stage at which experience

intersubjective intercourse, can
two independent wholes?
It
it
may
is
inquiry.
extended by
be dismembered into
suffice
to
select for
KEFUTATION OF DUALISM
156
consideration three distinct but related
We may
of developing experience.
in time
(2)
call
Familiarity or expertness
The
tive Synthesis.
first
characteristics
them (1) Range

:
Intellec-
(3)
of these has been already to
some extent anticipated in our previous discussion

Inasmuch as experience is always experience
time.
process or change,
an experience confined
much
each present instant would be as

as
strictly
to
a contradiction
In one or other of
these meeting extremes the matter of the physicist
placed
it
ates
is
neither as actual subject nor as concrete object
conceivable.
Not
nothing and
is
as subject, for as inert it initi-
indifferent to everything
varying external circumstances

as
of
an experience ranging indefinitely through an empty
time in which nothing happened.
is
of
object, because
of its
retains no trace.
it
in itself it is
Not
unchangeable and
its
external changes have severally succession but no dura-
Some such considerations as these were present

to Leibniz when in his early essay on Abstract Motion
he said, omne enim corpus est mens momentanea.^ The
tion.
conception of body suggests the extreme limits between
which experience proper

ence at
all
order to
this
In order to such experi-
there must be an enduring present
its fuller
tentiveness or
It has
lies.
memory
are the psychologists
in
re-
of the past.
difficult
problem for psychology
hold on the past secured by
who have
memory
realised
Far too commonly
what
it is.
mainly a matter of retentiveness
PhilosopMsche Schriften, Gerhardt's
a funda-
imagined that
memory
it is
and few
mental fact
and
development there must be some
always been a
is
eJ., iv, p.
230.
accord-
RANGE IN TIME
157
ingly wjien an array of physical instances of such reten-
memory
tiveness can be marshalled, the mystery of
But we could never
thought to be fairly cleared up.
mem-
find a single such instance save with the help of
would they be
ory, nor
even as physical facts
reliable
except on the assumption that
memory
Nay, the bare term 'retention'
itself,
and
'residuum,'
are
terms, such as
'trace'
or
is
is
trustworthy.
all
cognate
meaningless
unless some present circumstance can be related to the

past
inscribed records
strive
The analogy
thus they presuppose memory.
to
a favourite
is
elucidate the
we
nature of
ample.
Such an analogy
it
is
who
physical
about on a par with that
between the eye and a telescope

the other an
those
of
memory by
again and again in Locke, for ex-
imagery
find
resort
of
artificial,
the
one
is
a natural,
organ or instrument of vision
but neither will explain seeing as a psychological
fact.
Brain traces and written records are in the same case.
Such phenomena
hysteresis,
as those of resonance, phosphorescence,
and the
like, often
childish absurdity of
'
materials will in the explanation of
writer himself and what he
lacking
that
will carry
memory
as writing
ideagenous molecules,'
us about as far in the explanation of
still
support of the
cited in
is all!
is
memoranda
the
interested to retain are
But these
are the essentials,
the efficient cause and the final cause of
the result.
Physical analogies are here, as usual, worthless to the

true psychologist, and throw no light on
ledge.
and
Recourse to them
their
is
memory -know-
a consequence of dualism
ineptness so far a refutation of

i
Cf. Huxley, Collected Essays,
vol.
i,
p. 239.
it.
Apart
158
from the activity and
the subject there
interest of
is
no evidence of retentiveness, whatever be the physical
however frequent
intensity of the stimulus or
Nor
tition.
the so-called
is
'retention'
in
its
repe-
the
least
comparable to the unchanged persistence of an

or to the preservation of
On
from the teeth of time.
what we change,
tain
If the old
lation
as
is
it
of
bespeak
plainly
called,
past about
the
our
is
member nothing
that
own
What
own
It is
way
we can
re-
there arises at once

its
concrete
and
objective experience they immediately
from
conceptions,
time,
solidarity
both inseparable from the individual subject to
as its
pertain.
ate
it,
first
thus dated or
is
past experience
In this
else.
and
unity
our subjective or bio tic time along with

filling,'
when
as
which only subjective activity
interest can bring about.
remembered
which
indistin-
known
to be
obviously could not have had
it
the past
if
would be
simply present;
of individual experience
re-
assimilate.
These dates, or temporal signs as they may
present.
and
Or
a miser's store.
as
must bear the marks
marks which
be
what we
merely persisted, we should have an accumufruitless
guishable from what

it
we only
the contrary,
in other words,
merely recurred again unchanged,
past,
effect,
goods in a storehouse safe
finally,
this that
first
of
of
we advance
transsubjective
absolute time.
immediately presented content of
time
what
ceed to range events

historical time,
calls
'
my
time
chronologically
'
common
or
Again
the
each one
to the medi-
it
this
that
in
which we come to think of
is
from
subjective
the
we procommon
in dualistio
fashion as independent of all subjective factors.
THE PROBLEM OF MEMORY

Here, again, then
we have
159
to expose the covert dualism
that renders our psychological terminology unsuited to
As we
epistemological discussions.
know
said to
the process
both
it
is
to
present objects through impressions of them, so
we
are
supposed
are
the past through memory-images
On
the contrary, I venture to maintain that
The
equally immediate in both.
memory-image and past

of universal experience,
On
sible.
held to be alike mediate and vicarious in
is
cases.
know
distinction
of
object only arises at the level
when dualism
first
becomes pos-
the question of fact Reid seems to
me
to have
been here also in the right and far more consistent than
more learned exponent, Hamilton, who
his
forsakes him.
lible,
as in particular cases the
but there
is
at this point
memory may be falsenses may be illusory
In particular cases
no appeal in such cases which does not rest
on their general
So far the mediate knowledge
validity.
of universal experience presupposes the immediate
ledge of individual experience.
memory
memory-knowledge
know
is
lapse of time at all
It is only
If
we could never
would be impossible ever
But how could we ever
it.
all
implicitly, it
trust
mediate,
if
know-
memory
how
implicitly
could
we never know
trust
to test
it
we
if
ever
directly
our extreme familiarity with the universal
standpoint which hides from us the necessary priority of

individual experience, a priority which nevertheless seems
obvious on reflexion.
So far then we find the duality
and object in the unity of experience will not

resolve into an independent dualism of internal world
of subject
and external world.

1
Cf. Reid's Woi'ks,
I pass
now
to the second point.
Hamilton's edition,
p. 339,
and Appendix B.
160
Experience and familiarity, experience and expertness,
we
are closely akin, so closely that
that experience in which there
is
cannot, I think, call
To
nothing of either.
begin the exposition of experience from the standpoint
from that of Kant's chaotic
of Locke's tabula rasa, or

'
manifold,'
is
what
not from an empty plate, and

filled
last lecture,
we can
continue with a
In a word, as
an epigeuesis of experience
presentations
possible but
is
In any actual
wholly
not
are
As
strange nor the motor responses entirely inept.

this wise experience
so
continues in
it
is
its
from the
first
from
filled
urged in the
not an abiogenesis or generatio cequivoca.

experience the sensory
can
empty stomach but
from a larder but not with one
a chemist's cupboards.
We
not yet experience.
is
discuss digestion beginning from an
stomach
shew how expe-
in reality to attempt to
rience arises from
in
an organic unity,
development, when more and more
things are known, and more and more things
can be
done.
But
this advance, as regards
depends primarily,
it
may
circumstances, that
like
ture
'
and
this again,
is,
it
knowledge
be urged,
as
is
a cardinal
Such a view
doubt, part and parcel of the dualism
while,
we
regards individual exjDerience,

objective
it
is,
no
are seeking
Mean-
and will occupy us further by and by.
that whatever
rate,
on 'the uniformity of Na-
may
fact independent of all percipients.
to refute,
any
at
be said, on the repetition of
is
obvious
uniformity there might be,
it
would remain unknown or meaningless save to a subject

After
itself characterised by continuity and uniformity.
all,
though we talk
of uniformity of nature, as of
some-
FAMILIARITY AND EXPERTNESS

thing independent of us, yet
that
we mean.
It is not
about things per
se,
uniformity of experience
only idle to made suppositions
but indifferent what suppositions
Even though
we make.
it is
161
there were no assignable limits
to the diversities existing in the absolute elements
of
such things and in their ultimate relations, yet a subject
that could combine and select might
experience continuous and uniform.

place,
now
as I just
urged,
the
first
we can never shew
how
experience arises, cannot carry back our
we
reach a dualism of subjects per
and, in the second,
all
find its
still
For,
se
in
analysis
and objects per
till
se ;
our assertions of identity among
amount simply to saying

Even in such a world
that we discern no difference.
reals
are at bottom negative,
there could be events which, though diverse in them-
were alike in being helpful
selves,
and
others,
also
otherwise diverse, alike in being harmful, to a given

subject
whilst others were entirely neutral.
subject then,
power which
in earlier lectures
Such a
possessing some measure of that selective
to all things living,
we have found
by seeking the
the experience of that subject,
it
to belong
helpful so that, in
occurred frequently,
by avoiding the harmful so that it, in the same manner,

recurred seldom, and by simply ignoring the indifferent,
could secure for
itself
no experience deals
things per
se,
of things.
summer
sea
tator
sees
outward
so
an orderly environment.
Avith ultimate elements
For as
regarded as
no experience deals with the
totality
whole crowd may watch the moonlight on
and every wave
only
straisrht
the
one
from
reflect
it,
silvery
path
own
feet.
his
yet each specthat
stretches
In individual
162
experience, in like manner, each has his
These
a restricted range.
and
selection
are
own
two properties
and
centre
centrality
essential to the possibility of
indi-
vidual experience, and so far to the possibility of any

universal experience which presupposes
then to be no warrant for the

uniformity of experience
percipients,
a fact independent of
is
nature with which science deals,

entirely
of
conceptual.
It
is,
resolves
always more or
less
abstract
and
try to picture the world as a whole, in
and yet without
we
relation
to
events, themideal.
its
we
If
concreteness
specified
percipients,
by diversity and complication rather

by uniformity. Where is there one
not also many, that is a whole and not
impressed
thing that
is
merely a part
where
succession of several
one
meaning
in saying that a
we imagine
guests, it
as to
it
which we
not also a
To
dog
us, for
is
example, there
one thing
but
as extravagant so to regard
and
the notion to us.
thrive, as a complete
him
of a discharged rifle
is
To
organism
report,
it
Fechner has done to com-
us, again, the flash
one event
and crack
but were our tempo
of apprehension quickened to the pace of a gnat's,
momentary
if
seems extravagant to regard this planet,

live
spite of all that the genius of
mend
is
ourselves at the standpoint of his parasitic
would seem
many
event that
Relative to a specified subject,
some answer may be given.
in
any
scheme
are perplexed
than
is
into a
itself
general laws, connecting objects and
selves
all
The uniformity of
we must remember,
dualism maintains.
as
There seems
it.
assumption that the
the
has been imagined, would lengthen
out into a series of varied and intermittent noises.
Nay,
CENTRALITY AND SELECTION

if
163
that tempo were quickened sufficiently, even the
briefer scintillation
would occupy
we know not what
variety.
still
and present
for ages
it
Bis repetita docent, we say
but how, with our limited span of consciousness and the

could
infinite diversity of things,
we have any chance
of two like experiences apart from that subjective inter-
and
est
activity that enable us
Surely then
it is
from dualism
we can
to react
once again evident that
to experience
and to
select ?
we cannot
get
what sense
whether or in
get from experience to dualism remains to be
seen.
It is
by these
tive familiarity
and practical
new
each
is
is
this
second
not only not numeri-
difference of further intimacy
The thing
efficiency.
known, more
easily
the old in this
new advances
such progress
more
is
clearly
and adroitly done
way becomes
lies
and
and distinctly
and
familiar
of course as
and mechanical,
are in general possible.
which we have
But
not qualitatively, the same experience as the
there
is
This implies that
in general an advance.
experience of the same thing
first
acquire cogni-
of experience, so to say
facility or expertness.
recurrence
cally, it is
we
repetitions then that
experience
How much
of
behind any stage of experience, of
positive
knowledge, no
as regards the advance
one
can say.
from such stage, we can say
marked by a steadily increasing uniqueness.

The more developed two individual experiences, the
more truly is each one sui generis; 'none but itself
that
it
is
could be
its parallel.'
Its objects, its acts, its
memories,
its
aims and interests, in their concreteness are like those
of
no other.
This
is
a point on
which
have already
164
enlarged in earlier lectures, and there

detailed here
we
shall
no need to be
is
have to return to
in discuss-
it
But
ing the transition to universal experience.
now
it
no trace of unrelated and unrelat-
definiteness reveals
able
can only be
elements that
conceived
apart,
shews rather a duality in unity which we may
The
scribe as an organic whole.
subject inasmuch as they are
they properly objects.
but also
But a
all
objects
We
They have
all
de-
for
the
the independence
'
object
'
implies.
independence pertains equally to the
have come upon nothing so
far that can
which both factors do not
called reality into
come now
are
but
fitly
ends, and just so far are
its
the relativity that the term
like relative
subject.
We
just
concerns us chiefly to notice, that this increasing
to
synthesis,
intellective
somewhat vague phrase
propose
be
enter.
under which
consider
those
characteristics of developing individual experience
which
first
make
to
intersubjective intercourse possible.
Psychol-
ogy distinguishes between associative and intellective

but, if what I have said of subjective selecsynthesis
;
tion be true, there
is
no synthesis without a prior
differ-
entiation due to such subjective interest and apprehension.
no purely passive association of

By
as they occur.
intellective
objective changes just

synthesis,
however, I
understand specially that which rests upon comparison,
and leads
to the recognition of similarity in things
events that are partly different.
not be
indeed
cannot be
to say, theoretical
it
is
deliberate and, so
rather suggested
and here the truth
similarity'
comes
in.
The comparison need
at first
exigencies,
of
and
by
practical
Dr. Bain's 'flash of
In such ways, conation and cogni-
INTELLECTIVE SYNTHESIS
165
working always together, the individual subject
tion
comes to distinguish
its
own body
or
from other
self
bodies as not-selves, and to attribute to them also likes
and
and the power
dislikes,
know and
to
to do.
obvious that the presence of other individuals of
It is
its
own
species within its environment, together with its peculiar interest in these, will
facilitate
this recognition of
both as selves, and so in turn make the recognition of
How
other sorts of selves easier.
goes
Man
said, "
where
he
would be hard
it
At any
is."
to
researches of anthropologists
warrant us in assuming, that when

begins there
no dualism.
is
Goethe has some-
as
how anthropomorphic
never realises
rate, the
far this identification
tell, for,
human
And now
intercourse
at length let us
turn to this intercourse to ascertain the general characters
of
universal experience,
and how dualism comes
about.
"
When
"they
ten
all see
Hamilton
men
look at the sun or moon,"' said Reid,
the same individual object."
replies
" the truth
sons sees a different object."
But not
so,
that each of these per-
With
these diametri-
statements of the two chieftains of the
cally opposite
Scottish philosophy,
obvious that
is
we may begin our
inquiry.
they are here at different
It is
standpoints
Reid at that of universal, Hamilton at that of individual,
In Hamilton's sense not one of
experience.
ten sees the sun
which
all
mean,
in Reid's " the

is
object,"
not equivalent to the immediate ex-
perience of any one.
Hamilton
each concrete experience has

^
same individual
the
its
is
right in
own
so
far
as
concrete object
Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, vol.
ii,
p. 153.
166
Reid in so far
common
as
concrete objects to one
phenomenon.
convenience, by the way,
vast
would be
at
some pains
ferent meanings
It
experience relates
of
these
would be
It
philosophical writers
to distinguish these very dif-
'object'
mere slovenliness to
is
if
all
that
again emerge.
here
the concrete objects of
call
individual experience phenomena; for in that experience

there
is
nothing, as I have already urged, that answers
and
to the distinction of appearance

'It shines,
real.
it
here
is
moves,' not 'it appears to shine,
it
reality
all
appears to move,' would be the language of an individual percipient.
The conception
course, has brought with
it
phenomenal, of
of the
the conception of a further,
How these two realphenomena and the ontal beyond,
so-called noumenal, reality beyond.
the actual before
ities,
are related does not for the present concern us
enough
Our
it
is
to avoid confusing the two.
question
first
is
to get clear ideas as to the rela-
tion of the ten different (actual) objects of Hamilton's
statement to the one identical (phenomenal) object of
The
Reid's.
form
How
ferent
in
Yet the proper form rather

do the ten come
sense,
object of each
is
For except on the

munication
in
the
does the one sun become an object to ten dif-
men ?
what
question naturally presents itself
is
carries
to
know
is
How, and
that the actual
the same individual object for all?

basis of individual experience
impossible.
Yet obvious
com-
as this admission
consequences that are usually forgotten,
is,
it
so
dominant has the universalistic standpoint become.
Now
say,
if
the several subjects L,
M,
could, so to
change places and the presentations of one become
INTERSUBJECTIVE INTERCOURSE
accessible
actual entirety to
their
in
167
others, then
the
might be possible to ascertain directly how
it
object of one
But
another.
was comparable or
it
identical with that of
superfluous to say that this
is
the most impossible thing in the world.

consists
far the
precisely in
impossibility.
this
is
just
Individuality
when we
So,
speak of the totality of a given experience as Ego and
non-Ego, we regard such totality not merely as a logibut as an actual concrete, universe.
cal,
In this wise,
monads
as
mirroring the universe from a unique standpoint of
its
Leibniz, for example, conceived each of his
Thus when
own.
Ego L we have M or
non-Ego non-L we have non-
in place of the
N, so too in place of the
The
or non-N.
communicate to
much of
We may
so
is
both.
as
it
any part of
of
with simple indications
phantasy"
of
his
and then
each
own
can indicate or
own
to the
has
The
we
We
find resembling
;
prob-
"the sensible and true avouch
ultimately on indications.
round objects
is
be " something more than
description of this particular must,
ing,
very
fell
point to a particular thing
if it
eyes " that such particular
we
experience of
process apparently begins
and
so,
it
is
numerically
And
identical in their several experiences. ^
ulars that
experience,
and even now the maximum
attained.
as this or that,
common
is
his
be sure the earliest intercourse
far short of this,
ably never
most, then, that
even the
would seem,
rest
point to other particit
other
shining,
by suggesting
its
mov-
likeness
to these, take the chance that parallel relations or com1
In the case of ten hungry
ject-lesson
would be impressive.
men and
a loaf, for example, this ob-
168
parisons will be verified by our fellow-men.

differences
may
exist
That great
undetected between the particu-
one man's experience and the corresponding par-
lars of
ticulars
of
blindness.
another's
Of
shewn by the
is
these the world
the great chemist, appearing at his
colour-
facts of
was ignorant
till
Dalton,
Quakers' meeting
in scarlet hose, was led to investigate the anomaly.
no
case, then, can the particulars of experience be
In
com-
municated, whether they be objective or subjective, quali-
This
ties or intensities either of sensation or of feeling.

is
the kernel of truth which the sophist Gorgias tried
to turn to sceptical account in his paradoxical

tion that even
there were any knowledge
if
not be communicated.
and so
or the
even
each experience for
far the solipsist in theory
solipsist in conduct,
though
Schopenhauer
tion begins
proper
the
said,
and ends
the
in
and the
itself
egoist,
are logically unassailable
place
to
madhouse.
put
All
them be, as
communica-
establishing relations between
communicants
these primary realia of the

this is achieved
could
So far as reality consists in par-
ticulars, so far it pertains to
alone
contenit
so
far
as
they are said to understand each other.
Language, soon superseding mere gesture and exclamation,
becomes the medium
of
such understanding, and
the two mutually advance together.
Without this intersubjective intercourse mankind

would remain a herd; with it they become a society.
The common knowledge that results might be roughly
distinguished
as
practical,
historical,
and
theoretical,
including under the last both science and philosophy.

It
is
with this theoretical knowledge that we are
now
FORMS OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE

directly concerned, for
is
it
liere
problem of
that the
dualism becomes explicit and acute.
169
Nevertheless the
other forms of knowledge are worthy of remark, since
each of them contributes an element to the problem.
A knowledge
upon doing
of another's experience sets us
and thus the immediate experience of every member of a society is, in some degree,
extended through that of the rest. Such advance, by
and trying
for
ourselves,
ensuring greater practical efficiency and foresight, brings
with
a growing sense
it
power to shape a
of
environment to human ends.
But
mastery
this sense of
outcome of dualism, declares
Naturalism, as the logical
It maintains that
to be illusory.
plastic
we
are in reality con-
fronted by a system of matter and law which we are
This absolute domination of law
impotent to control.
and uniformity,
which
seems
found immediate experience on
and con-
to
contradict
its
active side,
is
almost
equally at variance with that historical knowledge which
we may
In so calling
call non-scientific.
following old usage.
and
history
lectualis
histories
civil history
we
are only
from science in his globus
or encyclopaedia;
are
it
Thus Bacon excluded both natural

intel-
and he did so because such
confined to the
concrete
and
particular.
Hobbes, who also excludes them, does so on the ground

that they are mere experieiitia and not ratiocinatio}
is this
cal to science as exclusively nomological
which we
do well to note in passing, and to which we

once again to return in later lectures.
1
Similarly,
schichte
It
opposition of experience as historical and practi-
Schopenhauer.
und Naturwissenschaft,
Cf.
shall
We
shall
have
have
"Windelband's Rectoratsrede,
1894, p. 21.
it
Ge-
170
and
concisely
familiar words
summed up
picturesquely
Grau, theurer Freund,
Und
Life
perform
Theorie,
Lebens goldner Baum.
griin des
wholly an
is
cannot
ist alle
Goethe's
in
affair of the real
abstract
and individual
experience
or
acts
we
abstract
events; everything here has not merely general proper-
but a unique setting, and counts only so far as
ties
has meaning and worth.

historical
on the practical or
It is not
common knowledge
that
side
it
with
conflicts
individual experience, for there the reference to indi-
vidual subjects
But
present and essential.
is still
subjective intercourse on what we
may
call
inter-
the theoretical
side leads almost inevitably to the omission of this ref-
erence
and
grey and
now
us
It
so for the living green
Man
"and Nature
at least
how
try to see
are at strife."
Let
seems to depend upon three elements or conditions
notion
and the
meaning
this
of
hope, become
third chiefly as
fusion of
what
intersubjective intercourse
reification
somewhat
as
clear
with
mainly concerned
transsubjective
of
the
transsubjective,
the
of
introjection,
the sombre
comes about.
this
which are consequences

the
we have
it
novel
we go
the
terminology
along.
first
hypothesis
two
We
and
implicated in these.
is
of
The
abstractions.
of
will,
shall
with
be
the
The term
has been devised to obviate the con-
is
objective from the standpoint of uni-
'
versal Experience, the
one individual object of Reid's
ten men, with what
objective
is
perience, the different objects

1
Cf. Volkelt,
of
for
an individual ex-
Hamilton's ten.
Erfahrung und Denken,
p. 42.
The
RISE OF DUALISM
sun as transsubjective object
sun or N's sun,
common
them
to
each neglecting,
if
may
all,
not
is
so say,
171
L's sun or M's
but
neglecting what
rather
peculiar
is
in particular, that direct
what
is
to
and immedi-
M, and N severally, which constitutes

own non-Ego. Apart from L or M their
ate relation to L,
for each his
respective non-Egos,
non-L, non-M, are non-existent,
and their respective suns in

sun as a transsubjective
object
what consciousness
Kant's
answer
so the
Since this
we might
an object, we have at
is it
'
filr
consciousness in general.
ness,
we ask
If
object.
Not
manner.
not the peculiar object of any given conscious-
is
ness, for
once
like
Bewusstsein
Following
icberhaupt' for
out this answer,
presently see that this conceptual conscious-
absolute consciousness we
presupposes and
fairly call it
may
is
(in this context)
inseparable from the
individual consciousness of immediate experience
in this
respect resembling the conceptual or absolute space and
time already discussed.

about the
rise
of
But we want
dualism.
To
first
to be clear
that end
it
will be
sufficient here to note that ordinary thought does not
raise Kant's question.
Regarding
the
It proceeds rather in this wise.
sun as independent of
severally, it concludes that it is
independently of them
L and
and remains an
and
object,
Such reasoning
all collectively.
N
is
about on a par with maintaining that the British House
Commons is an estate of the realm independent of each

individual member and that therefore it might be addressed
from the throne, for instance, though there were no memof
bers.
This fallacy of naive realism
dualism
is
one step towards
the hypothesis of introjection supplies the other.
172
The term
introjection
'
but recently taken from
'
we owe
of Zurich.
The hypothesis
enough and
as old apparently as
substantially
But
to a brilliant thinker
Richard Avenarius
us, the late
to
which
it
refers is familiar
human
what Professor Tylor has
speech;
called
it
animism.
making the
to Avenarius belongs the merit of
is
epis-
temological bearings of this primitive doctrine clearer
The
than they were before.

sists
essence of introjection con-
applying to the immediate
in
fellow-creatures conceptions which have no

in
my
own.
assume for
I find for
Bat
another.
me
thought and language lead

that his experience
in
him
in the
counterpart
is
distinct
myself can I logianother,
of
common
assume not merely
to
from mine, but that
Of the sun
my
in
environment
Thus while
my
is
a perception in him.
ment
is
an external world for me, his experience
an internal world in him.
am
creatures and
I naturally
that
This
is
introjection.
led to apply this conception to
instead
applied by
it is
apply
of
it
my
all
also to myself.
construing others'
and precisely on the

subject and object,
lines of
we
all
say
environ-
there
since I
it is
form of sensations, perceptions, and other
'internal states.'
me
my
myself in direct relation with
I find
environment and only w^hat

cally
my
experience of
my
is
for
And
fellow-
fellow-men to me,
Thus
it
comes about
experience exactly
our own,
as a duality of
are induced to misconstrue our
o\vn experience on the lines of a false but highly plausible assumption as to others
contradicts our
own.
common thought and
To
'
experience, which actually
this
language,
contradiction, latent in
we may
fairly attribute
the impasse to which the problem of external perception
INTRO JECTION*
With
has been reduced.
173-
this contradiction
lacy of naive realism just
now
referred
and the
to,
fal-
dualism
is
essentially complete.
But, so long as the problem of external perception does
not obtrude, the inconsistencies of these two positions, to
which
social thinking has led,
remain latent and unheeded.
Psychology and the natural sciences which work on the
own
level of this uncritical thinking take each their
of
what
if
they think about
it
at all
'
the transsubjective
as a fact, they
'
go their several ways,
common
Kant imagined belonged

it
itself
for its
To
till
in the
end they
So complete
alike to both.
is
essays to heal the
has no adequate language in which to express
breach,
new wine there are only the old bottles.

man its teaching is a stumbling-block
the plain
to the
sub-
not even time, which
when philosophy
the dualism that
all
and the other accepting introjection
have not a single term in
world devoid of
as a real
to
The one regarding
be a consistent and complete whole.
jective implications,
half
they suppose
man
are familiar
of
science
is
it
words used
in
foolishness.
Not merely
what seems an unusual and

is challenged which the
non-natural sense, but a position
several sciences have long held to be impregnable.
what
is true,
men
say,
matter are disparate
mind' cannot be
if
it
realities, if
at once
For
be not true that mind and

'
what takes place
in the
and always distinguished from
'what takes place without
it.'
Well,
it
is
not unfre-
quently a sure sign of radical disease, when the patient

maintains that he
is
sician.
Science and
to say,
in
this
in perfect health
common thought
plight as regards
and wants no phyare, I
dualism,
make bold
when they
174
of
refuse the ministrations

reflexion
prescribe
sooner or later to come, and
But
result.
it
is
cannot in the
can only
reached an advanced stage, and the
end
many
the practice of too
our day to defer this advice
in
We
philosophy.
and happily the reflexion
till
is
fail of its
philosophers
the mischief has
difficulties of a thor-
Let
oughgoing reflexion are proportionately increased.
me
refer to
some remarks
sure
of Professor
Ladd
in illustra-
In writing about the definition of psychology I
tion.
had argued that we cannot at the outset accept the disnot only
tinction of internal and external experience
;
because the reference to space which

involves
is
that distinction
confused, but because the distinction itself
is
one that psychology has to debate and explain. To this

" On the contrary, no distinction
Professor Ladd replies
:
seems,
'
at the outset,' to be
made than
is
this
more
by the reflective
clearly
mind
of all
and promptly
mankind.
It
only after the professional student has introduced cer-
tain metaphysical discussions,
which ought to be
left to
the later stages of psychology or to philosophy,

this seemingly obvious distinction becomes
that
debateable
and confused. "1 Had Professor Ladd but omitted the

one word 'reflective,' we should have been completely
for he would then merely have testified how
in accord
;
deeply ingrained
theless this
'
the
is
notion of introjection.
seemingly obvious
'
Never-
but really unsound
dis-
tinction ought, according to that eminent psychologist;
and many beside him,

because
itself
it is
to be left alone at the
with philosophical questions.

1
outset
not the business of psychology to concern
Nor
is it,
Psychology Descriptive and Explanatory,

,
others add,
p. 3.
'INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL' EXPERIENCE
175
the business of philosophy to meddle in the affairs of the
Such protests are doubtless the consequences
sciences.
of a just resentment on the part of science against the
presumptuous extravagancies
and
of a just repudiation of
Taken with
philosophy.
in such contentions
of a Schelling or a Hegel,
them on the part
of a soberer
a grain of sense, there
is
truth
but to admit them unreservedly
to err in the opposite extreme.
is
This mistaken deference
has perhaps done more than anything to facilitate the
monism we have
acceptance of the sort of agnostic
ready to some extent discussed.
Pcenitentia
al-
sera raro
vera; error then should be denounced and renounced as
soon as
it
can be understood.
of internal experience
till it
in
we
If
and external experience unexposed,
has, so to say, consolidated
two disconnected
leave this dualism
sciences
and intrenched
and only then invite philo-
what more
sophic reflexion to attempt their unification,
natural than that

of the
it
itself
should declare them to be two aspects
unknown and unknowable, and should maintain
the science of the external side, as the more exact and

orderly, to be also the
losophy
is really
more fundamental
to unify knowledge,
test against these
factitious
bond but the unknowable.

most intimately related
far
it
unities,
the
so
this false foundation,

rift
has grown.
yet this particular branch of psychology,
call it
science
and epistemology,
from accepting and building on
phi-
must perforce proof no
ought rather to shew how the seeming
As
if
which allow
Psychology,
to logic
No,
we might
the psychology of intersubjective intercourse, has
been rather neglected, and assuredly nothing will contribute
more
to its neglect than to accept, as Professor
176
Ladd
does, the
and
'
debateable'
seemingly obvious
distinction
but really
'
'
confused
and
internal
of
external
experience.
But we have seen how
has
this distinction
arisen.
It
helps to account for dualism, but not to justify
It
is
in
countenance, and jointly to acquire a semblance of
quite possible
truth,
is
which belongs
here.
When
two errors
for
it is
And
neither separately.
to
it.
to keep each other
said that psychology
is
so
it
concerned
only with internal experience, the external experience,
with which
it
supposed
not
tive or universal Experience.
shew,
it
is
to
deal,
is
transsubjec-
But, as I have tried to
impossible to maintain that from the indi-
vidualistic standpoint experience is all internal

jective.
We
may, then,
I venture to think, regard this
confusion as sufficiently cleared
An
important question, however,
up
still
for
our
pui'pose.
remains as to the
which we have traced dualmean naive realism. To that question we must
of the twin errors to
first
ism
or sub-
next address ourselves
problem of unifying
all
and
so pass to the philosophical
experience.
LECTURE XVII
UNITY OF INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL EXPERIENCE
In lohat sense
the transsuhjective object independent of the subject ?
is
The discussion of
this question
has brought out a new dualism, that of
and the rational. In the end, ive may say, four terms emerge
subject and object of individual experience, and the subject and
the empirical
the
Scientific dualism, started by Descartes,
object of rational knowledge.
afterwards drops out the second subject.
We
have now to inquire whether an
for transsubjective experience

lectual
may
is siipplied
consist of relations
'forms''
'
Beginning with the
exist between these.
organic unity
objects,
'
can be shown
we find that
'
by immediate experience.
between
szic/i
'
to
content
'
Intel-
fuudamenta.'
But
not nevj fundamenta emerge with the ampler parallax of universal
experience ?
What of
the categories of Unity, Substance Cause, e.g. ?
This brings us to the subject of such experience.
Kanfs
'
originally synthetic unity of apperception
The shortcomings of his treatment of
'
traced not to logical function but to volitional activity.
Substance, however,
recognises this.
But substances or
things
is
the starting-point.
the categories discussed.
left to logic
a category due
as a dead remainder.
to the interaction
self-conscious subjects with their environment
Causality
In a sense Kant
and
of active,
to their intercourse
with each other.
We
conclude, then, that the subject of universal experience is one
and continuous with
the subject of individual experience,
universal experience also there

tive
and
objective factors.
is the
same intimate
and that in
articulation of subjec-
Experience being then one organic unity, the
charge of fallacy against naive realism stands.
Concluding remarks on dualism
Dualism,
like geocentric
philosophy, a satisfactory
VOL.
II
the
astronomy,
monism
problem has been wrongly
suffices
for ordinary
is still to seek.
177
life;
stated.
but for
178
Naive realism, we have seen, regards the so-called

external world as independent not only of any particular subject and its experience, but of all subjects collectively
and
have called a
But,
fallacy.
not therefore true of
lective
will be said,
it
what
fallacious to argue that

is
This assumption
experience.
their
of
is
when
the col-
whole has some property which the isolated
viduals have not.
Mortality, for example,
every collection of
men
It needs, then, to be
as
it
made
only
true of each severally
is
collectively,
all
it
of
is
is
indi-
as true of
any individual man.
clear that the objects of col-
lective experience are not as independent of
humanity
as they are supposed to be of the individual experient.

It
may be
that the
new elements
that enter into collective
experience entail the same implication of subject and

object,
and that the whole constitutes an organic unity,
we found was the case with

we ought to make sure. I
just as
Still,
shew that
of time.
tions
individual experience.
have, indeed, tried to
this is true in the special cases of space
But
let
now
us
consider in general the rela-
between indiâdual
collective experience,
already said,
experience
when both
thought ignores when
and universal or
exist.
This, as I have
question
the
precisely
is
and
that
ordinary
rushes straight into dualism
it
instead.
If
we hold
it
true
that
subject and object, then

versal experience
that
it is
and the
experience implies both
all
we must
* and of
find a subject for uni-
such subject we must say
as essential to its objects

rest of
what we
call
the
sun, the earth,
together nature
as
the
individual percipient to the immediate sensory and motor

* See Note
iii,
p.
287.
DUALISM OF EMPIRICAL AND RATIONAL

events of
own
its
What
continuum.
objective
second subject, and what precisely are
this
Kant's answer, already referred
to, is
that
its
it
179
then
is
objects
the sub-
is
ject of consciousness in general, a sort of absolute
con-
sciousness intuiting conceptual objects in absolute space
We
and time.
ject
have, then, in all four terms
and object
sub-
individual or perceptual experience,
of
and the subject and object

experience
the
universal or conceptual
of
and we have to ascertain the relation
the second pair to the
of
This, I say once again,
first.
is
the epistemological question which the sciences ignore.
Psychology and the natural sciences together take three
and object
of the terms, both the subject
of individual
experience, but only the object of universal experience.
Then,
regarding
second
as
independent
become
these sciences
acquire
how
familiar
this
Through the
partly
how we know
this,
the
recognised,
the
conceptual
objects
to materialism.
known
matter becomes
answer
subject
committed to dualism, and
treat
which leads on
are partly copies,

again,
to
and
disparate
as
only
the
of
at once
tendency
that
as things iper se
ask
two objects
the
to us,
senses
symbols,
of
we
If
we
get the
our sensations
If
it.
we
ask,
then the puzzling problem of
external perception begins.
This problem British phi-
losophy essayed to solve, taking account only of the said
The
three terms.
rationalistic
thinkers of the Conti-
nent prior to Kant had meanwhile introduced, under the
name
the
a
in
of reason,
or
pure thought, what we have called
The only
second subject.
new
dualism,
addition
to
the
the
result
of
that
dualism of experience
dualism
of
matter
was then
and reason
and mind.
For
180
reason was regarded as independent of sensory experience,
and
discovered by the use
reality,
It
altered
dualism
this
is
experience
and
we
relation
its
and that
two
in
by Descartes, who was
rationalist.
face, the old
is
have to credit
its
share
we have
the
theory,
him
history
in
whereas the rationalism
more
corner-stone
say mainly, be-
closely,
that
great
ness his
famous Cogito ergo sum, his criterion
has left
nature,
The
rational
dent, without
which
it
tincture
God,
all
modern
these
philosophy,
into his
extended
his
wit-
of truth,
naturalism, though
it
mechanical theory of
idealistic
implications
structure remains, isolated
the reason which gave
ultimately depends.
But,
infused a very
idealistic
has retained and
we should
enterprise.
Descartes
of
decided
his conception of
the
Kepler, and even Hobbes, with
Galileo,
important
First,
once both dualist and
at
due mainly to
we examined
con-
modern naturalism were
The mechanical
of naturalism,
experience.
a bearing on our
respects.
laid
an
collective
individual
to
foundations of
that the
if
somewhat
concerning
change of
fact
cause
us with a
reason and experience has
of
question
meets
inquire
Yet, notwithstanding the

trast
of innate principles.
that
when
face
noumenal,
or
higher,
possessing
as
objects
its
it
aside.
and indepenbeing, and on
In the second place, the
old antagonism of rationalism and empiricism interests
us here, because their reconciliation was one prime motive of Kant's critical
philosophy, and that philosophy
way towards an answer to our

Kant's philosophy we have all our four
helps us a long
question.
For in
terms,
the subject and object of individual experience, and
also'
a;
KANT AND DESCARTES
181
the subject and object of universal or rational experi-
But they
ence.
well-known saying
his
" Perceptions without concep-
In other words
empty."
without
conceptions
blind,
are
tions
According to
are no longer severed.
we imagine
If
perceptions
periences completely sundered, the one
are
the two ex-
devoid of
is
all
generality and necessity, the other of all real content
raw material of knowledge,

the other only empty form. The two subjects must be
at bottom the same individual, and the two objects must
the one alone gives only the
be synthesised into one.
Not
experient
individual
the
Eoundly
so Descartes.
to
stated, his
mere
doctrine reduces
while
automaton,
reason attains a 'priori to a knowledge of the real per se;
and the one
we
which
result
have
examined, perhaps at
is
Hence,
entirely independent of the other.
is
when Naturalism drops out

Cartesian scheme, we have
the idealistic factors from the

the
odd result just noted
already,
the
in
We
inordinate length.
lectures,
earlier
have,
that
to say, the consciousness of an automaton on the one
side,
on the other a purely mechanical system
have no means
system
have
long as
well,
is
said to
tried to
we
are
independent of
be only phenomenal, but
shew, does not really
and so long
and we
True, this mechanical
of relating the two.
asked
to
as the
phenomena
recognise
and disparate from
mend
this,
as
matters so
epiphenomena as
are declared wholly

these.
We
have
phenomenon
and the dual-
indeed, only the further contradiction of a
per
se.
This logically barbarous notion,
ism of experience and
Kant helps us
reason
from which
to clear away, and
if
we
it
sprang,
follow up what
182
we may hope
he began,
to find both disappear.
But
will be the business of the present lecture.

first
This
me
let
recapitulate.
In the preceding lecture the naive dualism of ordinary
thought and language was traced to the union of naive

realism, based on the notion of the transsubjective, with
We
the hypothesis of introjection or animism.
have
now
seen further that, as scientific knowledge and philosophic

reflexion advanced, this naive dualism led on to a further
dualism of the empirical and the rational, such as we

for example, in the Cartesian philosophy
We
ments.
and
its
find,
develop-
have thus, in a manner, four terms and their
relations to consider
sensitive experience
viz.
the individual subject and
on the one hand, reason and
innate or a priori ideas on the other.
its
its
Naturalism with
the help of a spurious empirical psychology has got rid

of reason, resolving
it
in
common with
perception into
internal experience or the epiphenomenal, but retaining
the mechanical scheme of the Cartesian rationalism as a

universal and necessary system, a world of
per
se,
prior to
and independent
of all this internal expe-
rience.
It is this logical monstrosity, this
piricism
and dogmatism, trunk
clay, that
throw.
phenomena
of brass
hybrid of em-
and
feet of
miry
epistemology menaces and has begun to over-
And
Kant, der Alles Zermalmende, has been here
the chief iconoclast.
We
are,
now directly
we have rather
however, not
concerned with his destructive criticism
to turn to account his reconstruction, as far as that is
sound, and to carry
it
forward.
Let us recall once more what our problem

discussions
up
to this point
make
is.
Our
a more precise state-
SUBJECTIVE AND TRANSSUBJECTIVE

ment
of
refute
is,
we have
seeu, a consequence of intersubjective
no such dualism, but only a duality
we have
as
of
subject and
So much a whole indeed
object in one articulate whole.

that,
seeking to
are
In individual experience, taken alone, there
intercourse.
is
The dualism we
possible.
it
183
tendency was to treat the
seen, the
objects of this experience as merely subjective modifications.
Only
for the
new
experience that intersubjective
intercourse brings about was the distinction of subject
and object allowed to be well founded.
But
new
if
order of objects thus emerges, transsubjective objects in

contrast to the so-called subjective objects of individual
experience,
we
Is
it
how
naturally ask
related to the old,
and
are these
what subject
for
new
objects
are they objects
make
Though
not possible that such subject and those objects
one experience, constitute also an organic unity
way an
rationalism gave in one

question,
it
affirmative answer to this
only did so by setting up a
tween reason and
sense.
We
new dualism
ask then further
be-
Is it not
possible to unite both these into one experience, while

still
preserving the leading characteristic of each?
only possible, but the only possibility,

the critical philosophy
and the marks
and necessary
let
and particular
of rational experience to be universal
us inquire
if
to this
formulation of the
such a connexion between
the two subjects and the two objects can be
Beginning with the

tinct
'posi-
propositions.
Keeping for the present

question,
Not
the answer of
taking the marks of a purely
sensational experience to be concrete

tions/
is
latter
made
out.
the transsubjective, as dis-
from the sensory, object
is,
as
we have
seen, always
'
184
in
some measure general or abstract
conceptual.
Between the
lizard's
in
other words,
immediate experience
of
not
strictly
warm
stone occurring together, and our
admitting of statement
sunshine and
common under-
standing that the sun makes the stone warm,
lies,
to
use an instance of Kant's, this difference of perceptual
But the second
and universal experience.

elaboration,
The
first.
intellectual
my own
filling of
only an
of the
form must have the concrete
real experience before I can under-
stand what the proposition
means.
This proposition
what
called a
is
is
though a most important elaboration,
'
The sun warms
may
law of nature;
the stone
be taken as a type of
it
expresses not merely
temporal coincidence but causal, and so far necessary,
connexion
my
and
it
expresses this not merely as valid in
experience, but as universally valid.
my
which
itself, is
The content
immediate experience contributes, taken by
but an instance of that consecution des
betes,
which Leibniz used to distinguish from rational experience.
Nevertheless without this content the universal
and necessary factors
in the said proposition lapse into
empty form, become as incapable of yielding experience

The further this intelas empty dies of minting coin.
lectual process extends, the more abstract the result;
as, for instance, if we were to say not. The sun warms
the stone, but Ethereal undulations produce molecular
vibrations.
their
Still,
however
far
such operations extend,
results are only valid or objective provided they
rest ultimately
on a basis of immediate experience.
would seem, then, that
as
regards objects there
is
It
no
discontinuity between universal and individual experi-
HIGHER CATEGORIES
ence, since the intellectual
185
form which characterises the
one consists exclusively in establishing relations within

the concrete real that constitutes the other.
necessarily presuppose
Relations
fundamenta ; and though we can-
not advance to universal experience without relations, there

is
nothing but these fundamenta of individual experience
advance from.
to
But granting
nay actually the
possible,
upon
may
it is
still
surely
advance brings
that
realities
perceptual
isolated,
be said,
case, that the
new fundamenta^
light
to
all this, it
cannot
The
experience.
relations
with which intersubjective intercourse begins are

tions
dawn
rela-
comparison mainly, identifying the sun with
of
moving objects, and so forth.

But thought does more than classify; classification will
other round objects, other
not account for the categories of unity, substance, cause.
The dualism of matter and mind, res extensa and res

cogitans^ of phenomena and epiphenomena, which could
not arise for immediate experience, because of
may
immediacy,
the
ampler
Such a position
much
of
still
parallax
the
of
will be
mediate
experience
reveals.
found expressed or implied in
naturalistic writing
since
time
the
of
This demurrer brings us to the next point in
Kant.i
What
of
the
subject
may hope
of
Bewusstsein iiberhaupt and

I
very
be a necessity of thought, which
our inquiry, and there we
As
its
remarked in
my
this
its
to
remove
it.
wider whole, Kant's
categories or functions
lecture a
week
ago,
Kant does
not satisfactorily connect these forms of thought with

the
*
sensible
content
upon
which they are
imposed.
Cf. Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus, 3te Aus., Bd. II, p. 163.
186
Even
the
after
reading
the
shock to his earlier dogmatism which
Hume
of
strong leaven
consequence
the
of
to
occasioned, he
rationalism
old
eliminate
from
retained a
still
and
system
his
failed
But
the dualism of empirical and rational knowledge.

this
excrescence will disappear
if
in
altogether
we only
follow out
consistently Kant's method of reflecting upon experi-
ence
We
itself.
he made
point from which
highest
the
cannot begin better than he did
use of
all
thought, but
activity
as I
blest
this
even for
perception,
fundamental and essential
is
Not only
this
synthetic
much
so that,
have already urged, we cannot resolve the humexperience into a disconnected manifold.
subjective activity
is,
have
as I
merely or primarily cognitive.

motive or impulse
is
so
under-
the
standing and the whole of logic depend.'

for
when
the originally synthetic unity of apperception
'
is
But
was led
to
for the
discuss
urged, never
also
Activity devoid of
no better than fate or chance
not spontaneity or seK-activity, which
intends.
Again,
all
;
it
what Kant
is
piecemeal fashion in which Kant

experience he would
never
have
severed thought from will, nor both from objects, as

respectively pure thought and pure will.
Nor, had the notion of development been in Kant's
day what
heed
to
it
is
now, nay, had Kant
Leibniz's
principle
of
but
continuity,
paid
more
could
he
ever have been content to write that famous sentence
concluding
the
" There
are
perhaps
may
1
two
introduction
stems
of
spring from a
of
his
first
Critique
human knowledge, which

common but to us un-
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Analytik,
16.
'SYNTHETIC UNITY OF APPERCEPTION"
known
187
and understanding, objects
root, viz., sensibility
being given to us by means of the former, but thought
by means
a dualism
And
the latter."
of
to
that
the one
case, the years
and
It
a short step from such
is
epiphenomena and
of
as hopeless as the
is
he
phenomena.
In Kant's
other.
supposed to have spent in finding
is
'deducing' his table of
and in devising
categories
schemata to connect them with perceptions,^ together

with the reams and reams of exposition and opposition
that this strange medley of formal logic and faculty-
psychology has
called,
presumptive
fair
and
evidence
hopeless
of
yet Kant's failure partly supplies

the admissions that he
mediating terms he
though in
spite
sensibility
or
synthetic
is
driven to
of himself,
activity,
And
all this is
failure.
And
own remedy, in
make and in the
After
all,
comes out clearly that
it
experience
is
devoid
not
of
purely receptive and in no
not
is
its
forced to introduce.
is
individual
respect formative.
forth,
still calls
plainly,
if
it
were, the grad-
advance up to the stage at which intersubjective
ual
begin
would be
The
intercourse
can
brute
has not, and the child that has not yet,
'
that
understanding
pure
'
ought to
inexplicable.
make no progress
at
But even the preliminary, anoetic^ or rather hypo-
all.
noetic forms of synthesis, such as assimilation, association,
are
in
and the
like,
which Kant has
by themselves inadequate.
his
native speech,
or as
to
call to his aid,
The word
we might say
'
Hmidlung^''
'
handling,'
used to describe an action, and again the reference to

Kanfs Systematik
Of. Adickes,
Cf. Stout, Analytic Psychology, vol.
als systembildender Factor, pp. 17

i,
p. 50.
ff.
188
word language, might both have

Kant, and indeed to the earlier psycholo-
the tongue
the
in
suggested to
gists generally, a factor in experience still far too
As Paulsen
overlooked.
and
cal analysis
things,
is
has well said
synthesis,
" This practi-
which the hand performs on
repeated in the analysis and synthesis which
To
the understanding applies to perceptions.
hand correspond the conceptions
of the
standing.
much
That active attitude
the tools
the under-
of
man towards
of
perceptions which the brute allows to glide passively

by,
due primarily to his possession of hands ever
is
ready
experimentally
phenomena."
course
of
the indispensable
in-
interfere
to
Language
again,
in
the
strument of most of our thinking, seems due
of
first
emotional reactions that testify to man's livelier
all to
interest in his environment.

of the cooperation
ways
possible,
And
when, in consequence
and communication that are
the
spheres
of
individual
in these
experiences
begin both to overlap and to be more definitely centred,
into
and such categories as Substance and Cause come

we are not left merely to find these cate-
play,
taking
gories,
formal
logic
as
guiding
our
thread,
holding ourselves happy to have found them
all,
but
unable to connect them organically.
But with Kant's round dozen

little
concern.
unique
as
fruitless
much
to
an instance
ingenuity.
the
" that Kant,
of
categories
we have
His whole enterprise in this matter

of
perverted
is
and worse than
What Schopenhauer
said
is
here
point, "It is remarkable," he observes,

whenever he wants an example for clearer
1
Einleitung in die Philosophie,
p. 423.
CAUSALITY AND ACTIVITY

exposition, almost always selects
sality
is
for the simple
and
standing,
reason that the law of causality
remaining
the
form of the under-
eleven
and Cau-
and there
us,
mere
categories
Substantiality
Certainly,
what mainly concern
sality are
category of cau-
tlie
the actual, but also the only,
blind windows."^
189
much
is
truth in Schopenhauer's contention that Substantiality

is
The long and
ever, later on.

is,
More
through and through Causality.

that the category of
of this,
how-
short as regards causality
and
cause
effect
cannot be
found in any functions of thought belonging to formal

logic, for this is
independent of time; nor in modes of
time, for these are independent of logic

in
nor, therefore,
But
any imaginary schematism of the two.
tainly
is
found, and found
validity,
in
enough,
our
of
first
own doing and

to
repeat,
whatever be
all,
suffering.
recognise
in
cer-
it
It
its
not
is
and
imagination
kindred processes a sort of blind intellection mediating
between
and pure thought.
sensibility
Thinking
is
doing, and like all doing has a motive and has an end.
Ego
functioning
spontaneously out
of
Kant's
logical
time
but a chimsera buzzing in a vacuum and feed-
is
ing on second intentions
that
it
the thinnest of
is
abstractions, he himself allows.
But
this
defect
of
his
first
Critique
Kant
in
some
Here we have a
measure makes good in his second.
self-determining will, and not merely a supreme logical

centre, the ne plus ultra of impersonality.
however, Kant's practical subject

mediating forms of activity,
1
if
we
Sdmmtliche. Werke, Bd.
as
is
Unfortunately,
much
in
need of
are to connect indiii,
p. 529.
190
we have found
vidual with universal experience, as

subject
logical
to
arise
Man
the one to the other

is
We
as rational.
is
a hopeless
merely conational
as
how
cannot see
and
there
can^
man
gulf between the individual
active
of
moral imperative
the
till
ought discloses the practical
and
consciousness
the
If
be.
not
does
initiation
his
to get
from
so failing, the rift of dualism
"With this second dualism of Kant's
sure to extend.
a dualism m the practical sphere we must be content

to
deal
We
The
fashion.
our main problem
both to
more.
summary
a like
in
too
is
indirect
relation
to
justify
are only concerned to find the same con-
consciousness in general
tinuity between the subject of
we
and the subject of a given concrete experience, as

have found between the
one and the percepts
to
concepts of the
classificatory
of the other.
It
may
remark that without concrete springs

meaningless;
determination
is
Butler might
have
We
may
saved
so
tury thought
action self-
a knowledge of
far,
Kant from some mistakes.
characteristic
want
then
it
is
defect of eighteenth-cen-
of historic sense.
Such a defect
natural, perhaps the inevitable, consequence of
was the
the state of knowledge at the time.
had a tremendous
hardly existed
unscientific
the type
would
of
suffice
say generally of Kant's philosophy that
marked by one
sciences
of
be.
of
start
history was
The mathematical
the biological sciences
held
to
be
essentially
and a building or a town furnished

what a completed system of knowledge
Sharp divisions, line and rule, symmetry of
compartments, and so forth, are the leading ideas of

Kant's
'
Architectonik.^
The conception
of evolution has
KANT'S POSTHUMOUS TREATISE
191
placed the present centuiy on a better platform
we
the next,
may
trust,
quite outgrow the
and
dualism of
reason and experience as well as the dualism of matter
mind, both which we
and
owe
From our
rationalist, Descartes.
the
to
mathematical
standpoint
we have no
difficulty in seeing that activity is the
main feature
" Conduct,"
Arnold,
experience.
three-fourths
of
life
"
we can
of
"
is
and without unduly extending
we
the meaning of the word,

as far as
Matthew
said
find this true of
all life
Presentation, Feeling,
clearly observe.
Conation, are ever one inseparable whole, and advance
continuously to higher and higher forms.
psychology was in the
fact that
not for
own
its
of
much
of
passive
movements.
It
mous
treatise
sensations
especially
is
even Kant at length
in
would not have
activity
We
been so long overlooked.

so
his
should not have heard
and so
latest
active
that
find
Connexion of Physics and 3Ieta-
on the
venture
will
to
of
work, the posthu-
and published
to see the fundamental character of

I
little
interesting
physics, only recently discovered
ment.
for the
sake, but in subservience to speculation,
importance
cardinal
this
But
instance studied,
first
quote
to
one
came
voluntary movesentence
"
We
should not recognise the moving forces of matter, not
even through experience,
own
our
sion,
activity in
approximation,
often called the

finally, to
'^
our
if
we were not
etc.''^
But
to
own
p. 78,
of
repul-
Maine de Biran,
French Kant, to Schopenhauer, and,

British psychologists, Brown, Hamil-
Das nachgelassene Werk Immanuel Kant's:
Krause, 1888,
conscious of
ourselves exerting acts
u.s.io., edited
by A.
192
ton, Bain, Spencer,
is
To
ence.
the active side of experi-
of
then primarily, and not to any merely
this
intellectual
due the merit of seeing
especially
the paramount importance
function,
we may
safely refer the category
of causality.
But there still remains the category of substantiality,

which before all others is the stronghold of the Cartesian, nay, of
or
all,
There
dualism.
certainly
is
little
no analogy between the subject of experience and
the conception of substance, as applied to matter both
by Descartes and by Kant; indeed Kant,
we know,
as
in his first Critique denies that substantiality

cable of the conscious subject in
such a view,
if
we must
any
And
sense.
to
We
plainly
we
are striv-
imagine, concerned
are not, I
the rational psychology
resuscitate
predi-
allow material substance,
still
does not abate the rigour of the dualism

ing to transcend.
is
the Leibniz-
of
Wolffians which Kant demolished, in order to establish

the immortality of the soul on grounds which equally
We
prove the immortality of atoms.
hold
at
any rate are only
are
holding
in
justified
content to
that
the unity and constancy of the subject of experience

are due
to
the nature of
its
activity,
not to an un-
changeable substratum, of which thought and will are
but attributes or accidents.
and the validity
What,
substratum as applied to things

of
anything
then,
of this conception of
resolves
ultimately
is
All that
into
the source
an unchangeable
we know
changes that
it
produces in other things or undergoes through them.
With
so we
different
attribute
things these changes are different, and

to
each definite properties.
And, but
SUBSTANCE AND THINGS

we might
that sucli analysis seems inexhaustible,

at length, as in thought
tion
of
we do
one thing from another.
anything to distinguish
Into such a caput mortuum
we may
material substance always has, and,
always will tend to resolve

propriety call
it
We
itself.
safely say,
cannot with
and
real or actual, for real
actual, as
Lotze has pointed out, are predicates, and that
what substance can never

stitute
the whole of
can, then, in
tiality
be.
is
The changes which
just
con-
our direct experience of things
no way be explained by
this bare poten-
everything and actuality of
of
arrive
arrive, at the bare posi-
or that without
this
195
nothing.
Sci-
ence generalises these changes into a system of laws
but an unchangeable, indeterminate substratum will not

account for determinate laws of change, nor they for
The only conception
it.
that
of
is
that of determinate substances or
any
things,
avail
and
here
is
this
at
once brings the category of causality to the fore, and

enables
us,
instead
substantiality, to say,
No
saying,
No
causality without
substantiality without
causal-
This change of front philosophy owes to Leib-
ity. ^
niz,
of
and has seen no reason to abandon
since.
world
of such determinate things, in orderly interaction,
may
well lead our thought forward to a Supreme Principle

that maintains
or
it
self-subsistent
all.
But such an omnitudo
Being,
is
realitatis,
the very polar opposite to
matter, the equivocal substance of Descartes that only
gives content to the empty extent of space;

matter,
the phenomenal
substance of
Kant that only
adds permanence to the empty extent of time.

1
Cf.
Wundt's System der Fhilosophie,
and to
p. 312.
In the
194
form into whicli science has now brought

tion of matter,
it
stress
on the
is
"when
" Corporeal
Descartes lays
substance,"
distinguished from
fusedly conceived
concep-
this
remains the substratum of any-
and Kant on the temporal, aspect
spatial,
quantity.
this
cartes,
of
it
the substratum of quantity.
thing,
of
if
as
its
incorporeal."
"In
Des-
says
quantity,
all
is
con-
change
phenomena," says Kant, "substance endures, and the
quantity of
ished."
it
in nature
Kant
calls
is
we now understand
as
has no
neither increased nor dimin-
conception dynamical;
this
term
the
matter
dynamical,
Dynamical
the name.
title to
relations
but
require
substances or things, and so imply some degree of in-
But there
imply number.
dividuation,
between quantity and number.
difference
world of
To
this dif-
is
ference the conception of matter gives us no clue.
It
ought not, therefore, to surprise us to find Kant, in
expounding
the course of
slide
over from
lock
it
we
also
regress
the
from
can find no
We
may
stratum
can
but
substance to substances.
conclude, therefore, that this category of subis
not an element in experience, whether indiIt
answers to nothing
simply a logical residuum, ro
aireLpov.
real,
but
So long and
we can determine we have form and form

essentially causal.
The residuum at which for the
so far as
is
We
substances or things to substance
way back from
the
The same deadand we have seen
modern mechanical theory.
vidual or universal.
is
substance,
change.
again in Descartes,
find
in
of
the singular to the plural, without
justification for the
faintest
principle
his
The Principles of Philosophy,
pt.
ii,
9.
First Analogy.
SUBSTANCES AND CAUSALITY

time
we
halt
matter,
is
195
determinable, but as yet,
tlie
for us, undetermined.
But
of a definite or real thing
and
stantiality without causality,
we
to the
subject
alone, as
say
No
sub-
for this valid category
But we cannot
can find a source in experience.

either to the
it
we may
trace
merely cognitive, nor
We
object alone, as merely 'given.'
owe
it
to
the interaction of active subjects with their environment,
and
As
to their intercourse with each other.
extends in objective range,
We
character.
advance from bare consciousness to
consciousness, and from
forms of
it
experience
changes in its subjective
less reflective to
more
self-
reflective
As our acquaintance with other selves

we know our own self. The more
this.
extends the better
we
realise the
efficiency,
and
the more the mere continua of
xêr-
permanence, individuality,
purposiveness of
self,
ception and association become an ordered world of dis-
Thus
tinct things.
is
universal experience, like individual,
a growth and development, not a cut-and-dried sorting
according to ready-made, hard, and fast forms.
would be wasted in any further attempt

in
trate this
detail.
tences from Dr.
I will
Caird's
Words
to prove or illus-
quote instead a few sen-
admirable
treatise
on Kant,
directed against that dualism of universal and individual

experience, with which Kant's thought was
infected.
The point on which we have
more or
to insist
is
less
that
" the development of the consciousness of objects cannot
be separated from the development of self-consciousness."
"When we
Master of
consider the matter more closely," says the
Balliol,
"we
begin to see that as within and
without, subject and object, are strictly correlative, so
196
tlie
presence or absence of a knowledge of the one cannot
be separated from a presence or absence of a knowledge

of the other.
rance
of self,
All ignorance of the object
development of consciousness
all
To
igno-
is
also a
is
we know
know
the world as it reveals itself to us, is another way of
describing the same fact, which is expressed when we
development of self-consciousness.
nothing purely a
say that our conscious
the realisation in us [the
life is
gradual, progressive realisation
is
individual
experience
tion, the
same intimate
objective
factors.
conceptions of
be
so,
world
tive
subjective
and
we have
seen that
the
since
individual
has
for the
percipient
is
as
If
this
our charge of fallacy
substantiate
demurrer that led us to
been completely removed.
The wider
the
transsubjec-
intersubjective
of
which they
throughout one organic unity*
is
world,
experience,
and resynthesis, we conclude that
analysis
against naive realism

it
the same mutual implica-
is
universal experience depend upon
we can now
suspend
conceptions of
the
in
articulation, of
And
this
perceptions of
by
that
universal experience there
experience
a perfect
it] of
one and continuous with the subject
experience
of
elaborate
take
conclude then that the subject of univer-
sal
the
intelligence."
We may
say that
but only gradually come to
'priori^
such.
intercourse,
independent
indeed
Or,
to
of
more
be
the
individual
exact,
and
to
obviate a possible misconstruction on the lines of the
old Sorites sophism,

absence
is
i
the
But
this
Critical Philosophy of
Kant,
infinitesimal.
The
difference
* See Note
iv, p.
of
his presence or
transsubjective
vol.
288.
i,
pp.
423
f.
world
EXPERIENCE THROUGHOUT A UNITY

is
not
independent
universal
of
subject of universal experience
but
experience,
But once
object of that experience.
197
not numerically dis-
is
tinct
from the subject of individual experience
this
same subject advanced to the
sciousness,
and
cable, that
is,
is
not
from
apart from
but
is
self-con-
communi-
is
or
Universal experience
subjects, but
We
none.
all
it
rather to leave
it
common
to
all
can thus imagine
M, but we cannot
subjects without
to bring
is
all
peculiar to
the world without
that
of
so participating in all that
distinct
intelligents,
level
in all that is intelligible, in the experience
other self-conscious subjects.
of
the
again, I say, the
conceive
conceiving
it
But
it.
again into relation with subjects, or

still
universal object.
as
true to say that apart from sight there
is
If
it
be
no colour,
apart from hearing no sound, and generally apart from

sense no sensible world,
that
apart
world.
from
Intersubjective
the solipsism
into
there
intercourse
no
intelligible
secures
us against
is
which individual experience by
might conceivably
self
every whit as true to say
it is
intelligence
fall,
beyond the wider solipsism
but
if
it
it-
does not carry us
may
so term
it
of
Kant's consciousness in general, Bewusstsein uherhaupt.
You
cannot
dismember percipient
and percept,
indi-
vidual subject and concrete object, into two distinct and

separate things
As
little
here there
is
only duality in unity.
can you dismember universal, conceptual ex-
perience into an abstract logical subject per se on the
one hand and negative conceptions of things per

the
other.
se
on
In both cases the attempt leaves us with
an indeterminate
on the one
side,
which we have no
KEFUTATIOX OF DUALISM
198
right
to
and on the other an indeter-
a subject,
call
minate X, which has as
There
object.
the
is
lesson
we
And when we
little
an
claim to be called
no disarticulating experience.
is
This
from Kant.
learn
think out this lesson thoroughly,
we
begin to see that the problem of dualism has proved

intractable largely because
There
is
has been wrongly stated.
it
no hindrance to the solution of a question so

This
great as a faulty formulation at the outset.
is
truth illustrated at every turn by the whole history of
human
serious
which
a false issue
by naive
" Here
properties at opposite ends.

will take
Before
dualism.
magnet
is
Imagine two
it
are
the sources
realism,
have attempted to describe.
physicists saying
"I
with
so
upon knowledge has begun, we
reflexion
upon
started
of
And
knowledge.
has contrary
Let us divide and conquer."
away the south
pole to
investigate that," says the one
"
and
my
laboratory and
I will
do
my
best
with the north pole in mine," rejoins the other.
This
what happens when psychologists propose
study
is
internal
experience,
ence, exclusively.
get to
work
and
naturalists
Our imaginary
find, the
external
physicists
to
experi-
when they
one that a north pole, the other
that a south pole, has turned up at the fracture of the

original magnet.
objective
calls
in
The
psychologist in like manner finds
elements in his internal experience;
them subjective
external
modifications,
experience
finds
but he
and the physicist
subjective
elements,
but
When the imaginary

them laws of nature.
physicists meet again and join up the magnet, each is
puzzled to know what is gone with the new pole that
he
calls
PROBLEM OF DUALISM MISSTATED

he had
Similarly with
discovered.
and the naturalist
psychologist
except that the joining up
All your side
the serious business.
says the psychologist,
fication,
the
199
subjective modi-
is
No,
perhaps.
then
side is laws of nature, the naturalist
here
is
your
all
replies.
Or
the psychologist, having treated intelligence, in sensa-
mere outgrowth
tionalist fashion, as a
vidual
experience,
experience
universal
of isolated
indi-
and the naturalist having treated

mere
as
nature
from
divorced
mind, they agree that the objects of the one are copies,
the objects of the other originals, and then comes the
riddle of their extraordinary correspondence.
of
no one who has put
to
my
pher
since
such
Hume.
for
feel
it
would be unseemly to
Nor
quoting some sentences from him.
quotation
seems but
little
superfluous,
which we had to
for
Ferrier,
nowadays,
Our intercourse with the exhe says, "was the given whole with
deal.
The older philosophies divided
"
read.
ternal universe,"
this
point so ably as Ferrier,
this
thinking far the most brilliant Scottish philoso-
apologise
is
know
given whole
into
the
universe on the
external
one hand, and our perception of
it
on the other; but
they were unable to show
how
and the
again be understood to coa-
lesce.
sorcery,
subjective, could
these two, the objective
Like magicians with but half

they had
spoken
the
dissolving
severed man's mind from the universe
unable
to
articulate
the
this it did
a later
by admitting
It
powers of
which
was reserved
day to utter
which
spell
but they were
binding word
might bring them into union.

speculation of
the
this
again
for the
And
word.
in limine the distinction
but,
200
same time, by showing that each
at the
members again
resolves itself into hoth the factors, into
which the original whole was separated
way
we
this
unless
the
distinction
are
able to
undoes
how they
ask
and that
itself.
two things
think
separated from each other,

to
the divided
of
it
[But]
as
in
two and
vain and unreasonable
is
...
can become one
In the same
There
is
not a subjective and objective before us, but there
is
way, with respect to the question in hand.
what we
find to
be an indivisible subjective-objective,
when we commence by regarding what we imagined to

be the pure subjective, and there is what we find to
be an indivisible subjective-objective also, when we
commence by regarding what we imagined to be the
pure
that
the
question respecting the
the connexion between the subjective and
nature of
the
So
objective.
objective
comes to be
either
this.
What
is
the
nature of the connexion between two subjective-objec-
which an answer
tives (but this is not the question to
was wished), or else
this.
What
is
the nature of
the
connexion between one thing, one thing which no effort

of thought can construe as really
But, after
it
is
many
it
all,
is
two?"^
not enough to
necessary to kill
it.
'
scotch
'
a snake
Dualism has been refuted
times, but it has wonderful powers of recovery.
may
Philosophy
to recant
mutters
for me,
constrain 'common-sense,' for the nonce,
but, like Galileo before the Inquisition,
its
E pur se
you will
muove.
say.
An
it still
ominous instance that
For me, perhaps,
it
is.
But
it
will only afford solid comfort to the dualist, provided

1
Philosophical Works, vol.
iii,
pp. 278-284.
A SATISFACTORY MONISM WANTED
201
his persuasion of the truth of his position, like Galileo's,
always becomes the more cogent the more

but that
is
dualism of
examined
it is
Philosophy admits the

not what we find.
common language but language has been
As
for theoretical, but for practical, ends.
;
shaped, not
for practical purposes, it is simplest to talk of the
rising
to
and
talk
setting, so, for practical purposes,
of
matter and mind, of internal and external
experience, as
is
a costly
and the philosophical
departmental
inquiries
psychology in part
excepted
affairs,
the
of
of
in-
and time-consuming
standpoint
brous and unsuitable to ordinary

the
The use
and separable.
distinct
struments of precision
business,
sun
easiest
it is
as
is
and even to
special
the
cum-
as
sciences
instruments of
the laboratory or the observatory would be to the me-
chanic or the navigator.
common ways
As
science
itself
is
against
what used to be
called the Newtonian philosophy,
and it took a long
time before even the most reflective of mankind could
of thinking as respects
be convinced that the earth did not need supporting,

so
philosophy proper
is
against the
thinking as respects dualism.
dualism of
ordinary thought
common ways
of
But between the naive

and language, and the
efforts of philosophy to transcend all dualism,
we have
this dualism of science
which we have been examining.
And
seen, has not only
that,
as
we have
proved
itself
vulnerable from without, as soon as systematic reflexion
upon knowledge and experience begins

proved internally more
and
more
but
it
incoherent,
has also
as
the
body and
mind and concerning external perception have grown in
special problems concerning the connexion of
202
definiteness.
Hence
science
itself,
we have
has
seen,
been driven to a species of hybrid monism, which we

have by and by to examine somewhat
But from what we have seen already there
further.
shall
chance of that contenting
touch the real
difficulty.
And
us.
small
is
in saying this
Destructive criticism
we
never
is
sufficient
we look for construction as well. But, even
when dualism is abandoned by reflective minds, there
:
ensues only a struggle of diverse monisms to take
The
place.
monism
agnostic
not content us, and

say, the spiritualistic
of
science,
the idealistic, or, as I
monism
is
progress.
monism, how
far
How
we
far
we can
Still,
as
we succeed
Supreme
does
Spirit is
is
here again
transcend agnostic
can establish a spiritual
these are the problems that remain to us.

of spirits to a
feel,
would rather
of certain philosophers
unacceptable to scientific speculation.

there
we
its
monism
From
a world
a possible step.
So far
in solving these problems, then so far
shall have secured a basis for a Natural Theology.
we
PAET y
SPIRITUALISTIC
MONISM
LECTURE XVIII
CAPITULATION OF AGNOSTIC MONISM
Neutral or agnostic monism tends to degenerate into materialism;
but
might logically advance
it
to idealism.
be shoion to underlie the mechanical.

vieio
The
If so, the teleological must

difficulties
not remedied by preaching agnosticism.
such agnosticism contains
admissio7is which lead
Thus Huxley confesses (a) that

the mental world,^ and (b) that
'
of the mechanical
But on
our one certainty
on
closer scrutiny
to
spiritualism.
is the existence
'the notion of necessity has
of
a logical
not a physical foundation.^
its
The conception of natural law examined.

1. It is
origin as an organon or means of interpreting, and
Nature.
2.
It is teleological
or hypothesis.
and Kant,
to
We
in
its
character, in so far as
teleological in
so controlling.
it is
a postulate
here come upon the epistemological problem of Hume
viz., to
determine the character of general propositions relating
matters of fact.
The evidence of such propositions neither immediate

to explain them by association and remained a
nor logical.
Hume failed
But he made clear to Kant an alternative xohich he could not

For him the human mind was but ''a bundle of perceptions" ; though he was hopelessly at a loss to find the principle" that
unites the " bundle."
This principle Kant declares to be the synthesising
activity that yields self-consciousness.
In this activity we are to find the
sceptic.
himself
see.
'^^
source of the conception of nature as a
syste77i
of unity arid
laiv.
In the lectures immediately preceding we examined the

dualism of ordinary thought, ascertained certain primitive
misconceptions in which
it
first
205
originated,
and exposed
206
which
certain false abstractions by
But
tained.
losophies
find
has been since main-
be said, and said truly, that
are faulty somewhere.
monism
holds the
may
it
it
Unless,
then,
all phi-
we can
beset with fewer difficulties, dualism, which
field, sufficing for
of science, will surely
keep
daily affairs
and the routine
mankind
at large will be
it
content, as before, to get along without a final philosophy.

If,
however, the desiderated monism
is
forthcoming, the
practical conveniences of a dualistic phraseology will prevail against
as little as our familiar use of the
it
of the Ptolemaic astronomy against the
language
new astronomy
of
Copernicus and Newton.
There are three leading forms of monism,
ism, Idealism,
and
or, as I
viz.,
Material-
should prefer to say, Spiritualism,
Monism now in vogue

among scientific men. The first we may safely ignore
science no longer directly defends that. The last, however,
the Neutral or Agnostic
seems to
call for consideration, as well
wide acceptance, as because of
its
because of
its
supposed merit in avoid-
ing the absurdities of materialism and the difficulties of

dualism.
because
But
this
it is still
scientifically
popular mainly
essentially naturalistic,
and disparages
monism
is
the so-called psychical aspect as
ordinate to the physical.
have found to
monism
that
lie
is
epistemologically sub-
Thus whatever
objections
we
against naturalism are valid against a
naturalistic.
Again, this monism escapes
the absurdities of the old materialism more in seeming
than in
tic, is
fact.
Whereas that was dogmatic,
this is agnos-
materialism without matter, materialism with most
of its consequences, but divested of its metaphysics.
in this
monism the mechanical theory
is
still
For
regarded as
WEUTRAL OR AGNOSTIC MONISM
207
furnishing a concrete and complete presentment of the

objective world,
and
as excluding all possibility of sub-
Matter, indeed,
jective interference.
unknown and
resolved
even
resolved into the
is
hypothetical; but spirit

its
not merely so
is
supposed manifestations of spontaneous
monism
Finally, this
activity are declared illusory.
es-
capes the difficulties of dualism only by falling itself into
The
the opposite extreme.
essential
characteristic
of
As
experience
we
dualism
incompatible with the unity of experience, so
is
have found to be a duality in unity.
monism
naturalistic
with
incompatible
is
the
duality.
Subject and object cease to be cooperant factors in one

process of
life
aspects
of
neither
life
and experience, and lapse into concomitant
a single and unknowable process which
The concave
nor experience.
cannot interact with
its
convex
side, or the reflexion of a
figure in a concave mirror with its reflexion in one that
Nor can we say
convex.
convex than concave
is
side of a curve
that the curve
is
in itself
is
more
or the image in one mirror truer to
the original than the image in the other.
So
Unknown and Unknowable
it is
main-
is
not more
matter than mind, not more subject than object.
Ego than
tained that the
Non-Ego.
It
describe this
is
on
the neutrality, as
partial.
it
be?
spirit is
this
monism
account that I have ventured to
as both agnostic
we have
seen,
But
and neutral.
neither strict nor im-
is
Indeed, from the nature of the case,
how
could
Allow that the ultimate essence of matter and

unknown and unknowable, even then the practi-
cal question
is,
which of the two
raising such a question
another, that
is,
how we
we
are
is
at
better
known?
In
once confronted by
are to estimate the comparative
208
importance of different forms or qualities of knowledge.
But however we
settle this preliminary
bound
tion, the result is
monism we
the
but weighty ques-
And
to affect our theories.
so
are considering, preferring calculability
to intelligibility, simplification to meaning, materialistic
Yet even then
side.
two
positions
dualism
to the
terminology, leans
spiritualistic
to
pronounced
which
it
materialistic
unstable, oscillating between the
it is
materialism and unmediated
We
supposed to transcend.
is
now to the one, now to

new problem determines;
unknown and unknowable
find
in fact, inclining
the other,
as the stress of each
while the
it,
the
obscurity of
cover
take
it
what
for
serves to
Disregard this unknowable, or
vacillations.
its
worth, and the net result
it is
is
hybrid of
hazy dualism and
dualism
unsound, there seems to be no agnostic
is
halting
and
ing-place between materialism
Our whole
the
in
lies
after
all
possibility
the
in
lapse
such a change in
wanting, and
that
we can
it
call
Let
presents
itself,
that
to
is
us
such
that
this
temporary position
labile
monism may
Signs
direction.
are
hopeful of
monism an advance.
transition
enter
rest-
in
upon
them
But
the idealistic direction
this
inquiry
just
as
say.
First,
if
it
and the
be
true
that
physical, of
the
two
a supposed
Unknowable exactly correspond, though they cannot

one
it
from the standpoint of the new monism,
aspects, the psychical
teract,
of
thought are by no means
only as we
agnostic
If
spiritualism.
opposite
scientific
is
what does such a

imply?
in
interest
but a
materialism.
in-
then whatever be the order and connexion on the
side, there will
be an identical order and connexion
TELEOLOGY
on the
manner
209
one be teleologi-
If the characteristics of
other.^
so in like
cal,
MECHANISM
v.
will be those of the other
characteristics of one be mechanical, those of
But now, we must take
will be mechanical too.
the
outset
matter of fact
that
certain
not
the same time
grounds
are
that
erroneous.
It
knowledge
gardless
taken
but
on theoretical
the
physical side
monism,
By
illusion
is
other
the
of
however,
on the one
logically
is
need,
this
But Naturalism,
paramount.
has
straightway,
and,
physical
The
side
is
mechanical
strict
upheld, and, as
re-
as
begins to appear, has too hastily, decided for the

alternative.
the
both
here that the need for a theory of
is
becomes
of
this
Either there
view
the
or
of
teleological.
mechanical.
absolutely
position
cannot be right.
side,
maintained
characteristics of
and
ultimately
fundamental
as
the characteristics of the side of
is
it
the
it
a matter of theory but a
and mind are prima facie essentially
life
At
at
the
if
the other
necessity
it
first
the
of
consequence, the
spontaneity and purposiveness of the psychical side
is
declared to be illusory, a thing to be explained away.
Again, as events on the physical side are of one order,

mass-motions, so those on the psychical side must,
said, be of
ings
one order
what we
call
flux of presentations
thought and will can only be com-
plexes of such feelings or presentations
complexes of the
are
stuff
Unknown
on the other.
Cf. Clifford, as
nV
the changes and
on the one side
Unknown
as
mind-
But while the physical world
held to be complete in
VOL.
as matter-stuff
changes and complexes of the
it is
or feel-
itself,
there
are
is
no psychical
quoted above, Lecture XI, pp. 13
ff.
210
laws that
either
suffice
connect
to
together or to connect the successive
therefore regarded as
teleological
cies
mind
if
series,
and
and
morals
it
glaring
of
spite
we have found
series
inconsisten-
even spoken of
are
as
col-
do not, of course,
propose to weary you by recalling the

tions
of the
'
conditioned the seemingly
products of mechanism.
lateral
minds
feelings
'
The mechanical
same mind one with another.

is
individual
many
detailed objec-
to these positions as real principles,
but rather to discuss the general question now raised from

the more formal standpoint of epistemology.
The question
is
Can
be shewn to underlie
mechanical, or rather,
it
not?
It
most confident, and
The
pressed.
as
the
naturalist,
moralist,
Huxley has
one, as
all
experience
such,
most
such,
as
or can
it,
as
is
de-
told us, foresees the
matter and law advancing
tide of
with
that the
here
is
the teleological supplant the
till
coextensive
it is
the other conceives this advance
and spontaneity.
inevitably destroying all spirit
the outset one thing at least seems clear:
At
utterly
it is
fatuous to imagine that mere agnosticism can relieve us
from the burden of
those
the mechanical
to
turn
things,
to
as
is
know
ignorance,
beside,
if
know
'-
does
matter,
Cf. Miinsterberg,
and yet
But,
it.
actual
it.
will be re-
it
Huxley preached
if
verily knowledge,
a refuge from
supremacy at any rate

not
what
is
that are oppressed by
of
don't
problem
this
membered agnosticism
or
the supremacy
it
childish
is
necessary,
What
of
other
matters what
we do indeed know
Or,
this, if this
certain
is
not that but another
if
we
what we do
is
to all
Die Willenshandlung, 1888, pp. 105
tf.,
way
118
ff.
of
TREACHERY OF AGNOSTICISM
saying that this mechanical supremacy
is
211
perhaps not
ultimate, perhaps not absolutely certain?
The
truth
ism to the a
agnosticism
cessors.
new philosophy owes
that this
is
speculations
'priori
is
Such
alien
the
elements,
sceptical, the empirical
water, refuse permanently to blend.
its
and Hume's sucdogmatic and
and the speculative,
such an attempted combination
mon-
Spinoza, while
of
Hume
borrowed from
its
the
and
like oil
Only one
result of
foreseen and accepted:
is
the rationalism of Descartes and Spinoza, which takes
geometry as the type of knowledge, will serve
to secure
the supremacy of the mechanical, while the sensationa-
Hume
lism and scepticism of
the teleological and spiritual.

results emerge.
the
One
instability, I
of
these
will
suffice
to
discredit
But other and unforeseen
we have
already noticed
mean, which leaves
this
new monFrom
ism oscillating between dualism and materialism.
such instability Descartes with his clearly defined substances,
and Spinoza,
still
more, with his one supreme
substance, were practically free.
becomes
ally
apparent.
Agnosticism
second result
proves
now
treacherous
even for Naturalism, and ends by undermining
dogmatic foundations.
At
its
the same time mind, though
known nor completely knowable, turns out less of a fiction than matter.
The incursions into philosophy, spread over many years, of two
distinguished men of science, recently removed from us,
perhaps neither completely
Huxley and Du Bois-Reymond

trations of this
instructive illus-
'double decomposition,' to use a chemi-
cal phrase, of its rational
to
afford
and
its
which agnostic monism may
empirical components,
lead.
The
agnosticism,
212
attached primarily to the spiritual and teleological, ends
by fastening on the mechanical, while the teleological and

spiritual appear as the
truly rational and fundamental.
we examine what Huxley
If
we
naturalism,
us from the
delivering
agnosticism as
when he preaches
says
shall find, I think,
perplexities
some evidence
of
of this
transformation.
But
ments of
take
some
for clearness' sake let us first recall
that set forth the
his
original
impossible
prove
to
it is
anything whatever
that
utterly
may not
be the effect of a material and necessary cause

conjunction of
'
material and necessary
and that human

that any act
is
logic
is
[this
noteworthy],
is
'
"I
position.
to be demonstrable," he says, "that
it
state-
equally incompetent to prove
really spontaneous."
these positions are well based,
it
And
again
" If
follows that our mental
symbols in consciousness of
conditions are simply the
the changes that take place automatically in the organism.
We
conscious
are
automata,
but
none
the less parts of the great series of causes and effects,
which, in unbroken continuity, compose that which
and has been, and
shall
Now
of
the
meaning
be
this
the
sum
and many
that I have previously quoted

able.
It
is
this:
is
is,
existence."^
of
like
statements
plain
and unmistake-
we
entirely belong,
Nature, to which
an unbroken continuity of necessary causes, and of
is
these our mental
conditions are
2 O.C., p.
'the feeling
p. 45.
244.
we
The
i,
simply the
inefficient
p. 158.
clauses here omitted, referring to
call volition,'
have been discussed above.
what
is
termed
Lecture XII,
HUXLEY'S CONFESSIONS
We
symbols.
how
we
have no knowledge
these symbols
connected with those causes, but
are
that volitions do not enter into this

at
213
"The
all.
chain of causation
Huxupon many
consciousness of this great truth,"
ley has told us, " weighs like a nightmare

of the best
from
relief
But now
small wonder
'great truth'
is
supposed to
not fatalism, because,
is
Huxley, "I take the conception of
says
have a
logical,
am
necessity
;
and not a
materialism, "for I
physical, foundation "
utterly incapable
the existence of matter,
if
picture that existence."
there
is
The
if
us recall the
let
which agnosticism
this load
The
afford us.
And
minds of these days."
be indeed a great truth.
it
confident
are
it is
to
not
conceiving
of
no mind in which to
matter
existence of
is
inconceivable without mind, the conception of necessity
has a logical, but has no physical, foundation
this does
not sound like a mere declaration of ignorance, and has,
moreover, a decidedly idealistic ring.

there
is
all
Let us then exam-
advancing tide of matter and law.

ine
Perhaps after
substantial solace here for those alarmed by the
somewhat
closer these
two
articles
of
the agnostic
gospel.
It
is
second of them that chiefly concerns our
the
present inquiry;
but the
and defines the ground

necessity
not
its
is
logical,
home
taining the
first
is
important as
not physical, has
in matter,
clears
it
For
of the later discussion.
it is
its
source in mind,
desirable to begin
epistemology, or perhaps
if
by
we ought
the agnoiology, of these conceptions, matter
ascer-
to
say
and mind.
This Huxley gives us in the following brief sentences oi

1
Collected Essays, vol,
i,
p. 245.
214
reassurance
terrible
'
" For, after
all,
what do we know
own
hypothetical cause of states of our
And
what do we know
of that
'
spirit
of
consciousness?
over whose threat-
'
ened extinction by matter a great lamentation

ing
except that
and hypothetical
name
also is a
cause, or condition, of states
We
may
safely take
equivalent to states of consciousness

justifies this,
'
Indeed,
we may
'
and mind
as
We
the context itself
the other
the
one
hypothetical causes and as
The mention
facts.
here of
imaginary substrata, does
two
is
ambig-
on the other, matter
that the two are alternatives

real,
less
have, then, on
facts, and,
unknown and
two hypothetical causes,
and
as
go farther and replace
fairly
imaginary substrata of these
true
con-
phenomena here
by the simpler and
uous phrase, experiences.

hand, experiences as our
mean
of
and Huxley's statements elsewhere are quite
states of consciousness
not
aris-
imaginary substrata of groups of natural
for the
phenomena."^
explicit.
is
unknown
for an
In other words, matter and spirit are but
sciousness.
names
it
this
unknown and
matter,' except as a name for the
so that,
and unreal
false
if
one be
it
means
that duality pertains essentially to our experience as a

fact.
So
far,
therefore,
it
obvious there can be no
is
fear of one factor in this duality extinguishing the other,
whatever may
strata
befall the causes
we imagine
for them.
we assume
Nevertheless,
exaggeration to say that matter and
names
for
mind
unknown and unknowable
the
or the subit
is
a gross
are simply
;
Huxley's
agnostic deliverances themselves testify to the contrary.
Mind
is,
at
any
rate, the
^
name
for the subjective factor,
i,
p.
160.
215
and matter the name for an objective factor in experiIn speaking of both as causes, their cooperation or
ence.
interaction in experience
names
recognised ; and calling them
is
unknown means simply
for the
that
we have no
experience of the subjective apart from the objective, nor
from the subjective.
of the objective apart
mean nothing
these
or substrata
in experience
to treat experience
is
but to recognise the permanence in expe-
is
rience of both factors,
and calling them imaginary
is
To
in experience.
imaginary
is
to
establishes
is
as per-
deny the fundamental character
cede hypotheses and
again
say that their permanence here
perience as continuous process.
against dualism,
is
know them
nothing but the truism that we only
manent
say that
Again, speaking of both as substances
nothing.
itself as
To
fictions.
what Huxley
Plainly, facts
of ex-
must
pre-
Thus, in arguing really

himself so far
of
spite
not agnostic monism, but merely the dual-
ity in unity of experience.
And
article
so
we come
of
the
what
to
agnostic
now
I just
gospel.
because the existence of matter
It
is
It
existence
basis, of
is
of
not idealism
mind
which
it is
is
first
not materialism,
inconceivable with-
is
out mind to picture that existence.
run
called the
the words had
If
(or spiritualism)
because the
inconceivable without a physical
the function and collateral product,
we should have been less surprised and, on the whole,

am bound to say, such a statement would have seemed
more consistent. Nevertheless, Huxley, when this ques;
tion
is
definitely raised, rightly refuses to assert
verse inconceivability of
^
mind apart from
Cf. Collected Essays, vol. ix, p.
141.
the con-
matter.^
So,
216
then, matter
is
is
inconceivable apart from mind, but
not inconceivable apart from matter.
matter
and
is
mind
definitely,
not essential to experience, but only a subject,
Accordingly,
objects or ideas.
its
More
we
Huxley
find
declaring " the arguments used by Descartes and Berke-
shew that our certain knowledge does not extend
ley, to
beyond
states of
consciousness, to be irrefragable," that
" our one certainty
is
the existence of the mental world,
and that the existence
of
Kraft and Stoff
rank of a highly probable hypothesis."
the
falls into
And more
than
once he has said, "If I were obliged to choose between

absolute materialism and absolute idealism I should feel
The
compelled to accept the latter alternative."^

nificance of this admission for our present
solely in its recognition of
experience,
tion,
the originally
Kant styled
as
it,
lectures.
paired
by any defects
problematic, of
Its
in
lies
that subjective centrality of

synthetic unity of appercep-
which we have discussed in

therefore,
significance,
earlier
sig-
argument
the
is
not im-
dogmatic
idealisms,
or
Berkeley and Descartes; for they were
both essentially at one with Kant's transcendent ideal-
ism
on
this
Both would have subscribed
point.
to
Kant's words: "All the manifold determinations of perception have a necessary relation to the
the subject that
however,
is
is
conscious of them.
'
The
think
'
'
in
I think,'
an act of spontaneity that cannot possibly
be due to sense."
Nor, again,
is
the significance of this
admission diminished by Huxley's contention that he
is
relieved from the obligation to choose by our ignorance

1
Cf. Collected Essays, vol. ix, p. 130.
2 o.c, vol. vi, p.
279
vol. ix, p.
133
also vol.
i,
p. 172.
what matter
217
or mind, those hypothetical
and imaginary-
unknowns, may be
He
in themselves.
is
relieved from
the obligation to choose only by the fact that he has
The admission he has

we are not concerned,
chosen.
care for:
actually
made
is
all
we
either with the hypothe-
dualism, that experience implies two substances,
sis of
matter per
se
and mind per
se ;
nor with that of neutral
monism, that these two unknowns may be replaced by
On
a single unknowable.
the
of
nition
active,
the basis, then, of this recogsynthesis
subjective
makes
that
every experience an owned experience, and gives
only unity and continuity but centrality, we
it
not
may now
pass to the second article of Huxley's agnostic gospel.
The
'
great truth
and law
is
has
sity
'
as to the
advancing tide of matter
"the notion of neces-
not fatalism, because

logical,
not
physical,
foundation "
something illegitimately thrust into the perfectly
mate conception of law."

"I
utterly
repudiate
"For
my
part," says
"
is
legiti-
Huxley,
and anathematise the intruder."
Very good; then presumably he would wish us to withdraw the term 'necessary' from the passage just now
quoted, in which 'material and necessary causes' were
spoken of
" Fact I
as
conceivably the
know, and Law
only causes
know
asks, "is this Necessity, save an
own
mind's throwing?"
the
ordinary naturalistic
first of
This
there
are.
but what," he
now
empty shadow
is
positions.
of
my
an odd inversion of
It
reminds us at
Kant's claim to be the Copernicus of philoso-
phy when he maintained that

a priori
principles
of
objects
conform to the
our intelligence, not our
gence to the independent nature of things.
intelli-
Necessity,
218
Huxley seems
say,
to
not
is
imposed by
physically
nature on us, but psychically imposed by us on nature.
But then comes the paradoxical contention

imposition
Charybdis
only
the
should
alternative
the
in
no
or
what
yet
freedom without knowledge or knowledge with-
avails
However, further
out freedom?
hope presently
as I
necessity
is
not
to
reflexion
show
illegitimately,
that
i.e.
of
it.
Meanwhile
that necessary law
physical fact,
ence
already
is
this
the notion of
is
an essential
concession,
viz.,
wholly an ideal conception, not a
admitted,
ception, not a fact
these
again
the
to
therefore a con-
together will, I think, enable
mechanical;
the
matter
which reduces
the end to see that the
underlies
satisfy
along with the idealistic basis of experi-
rank of a secondary hypothesis
in
further
will
say illogically,
to
thrust into the conception of law, but
us
lost
freedom
no
Either
scepticism.
of
knowledge would be
part
We
of fatalism only to be
escape the Scylla
could be sus-
outlook would be a poor one.
tained, the
this
no part of
is
If this contention
the conception of law.
us
necessity
since
illegitimate,
is
that
that
teleological,
after
all,
cannot be the
spirit
effect of a material and necessary cause, but that nec-
essary causes are a postulate, and matter an hypothesis,
which mind has elaborated in order

ence conceptually manageable.
To
we now
its
return to pursue
the issue,
it
is
it
on
to render experi-
this
own
inquiry,
merits.
then,
As
to
encouraging and helpful to have found

all
further trouble
about such a question by emphasising
our inevitable
that the agnostic's proposal, to escape
ignorance of the self-contradictory,
is
based on a half-
'LAW AN ORGANON
CONCEPTION OF
219
conscious perception of the errors of dualism, and cul-
minates
an
in
admission
We
monism.
may
here disposes of
we have
say, indeed, that
Our one
itself.
with
neutral
agnostic
monism
incompatible
certainty
already reached in our
examination of dualThis
ism, the unity in duality of experience.
be the meaning of Huxley's words

is
then, let us
now
"
On
take to
Our one
mental world."
the existence of the
that which
is
certainty
this
basis,
proceed to examine the conception of
natural law.
In the
first
place, this conception
It is a
origin.
human
teleological in its
is
invention or discovery turned to
human ends
account for the furtherance of
as
much
so as the discovery of fire or the invention of the plough.
Whether
enlarging
in
his mental, possessions,
cedure in both cases
or
material,
his
man
alike active
is
famous aphorism
lectus sibi permissus,
res perjicitur
multum
quibus opus
quam ad manum.^
economy and
possession, as he
he
is
pensable for the other.
non minus ad
Whatever the
1
Novum
intellectum,
attempts, through
many
at length secured
the principles and postulates
at the outset as little in actual
implements and structures
Nor
indis-
are these necessary prereq-
discovered or revealed
without.
intel-
the arts, exactness and sim-
Of
of the
is
In the words
valet ; instrumentis et auxiliis
many
efficiency in
essential to the one,
his pro-
For both
Nee manus nuda^ nee
est,
After
plicity in the sciences.
uisites
by gradual advances, has man
failures,
and
essentially the same.
is
he must devise instruments and find helps.

of Bacon's
augmenting
in
forces
as
of
Organon, Lib,
existing
nature
i,
2.
ready-made
may
be,
the
220
laws of nature are not
two
the
the constant confusion of
facts, as
Every
conceptions might lead us to suppose.
such law was
merely a hypothesis await-
for us originally
Notably this was the case with one of
ing verification.
impressive and wide-reaching of
the most
laws the
law
universal
of
incompatible with his theory, and so
Newton was
what
is
abeyance for
his speculations in
many
true of laws of nature severally
ception of natural law in general

postulate;
mistake as
brought out a result
to the length of a degree of latitude
keep
natural
all
gravitation.
it
led to
And
years.
is
true of the con-
is
a hypothesis, a
an epistemological condition of the possibility
of scientific experience, but not itself a fact of experience.
urge this not with intent to disparage science.
Sceptical arguments of that sort are really illegitimate,
and
rest
upon a misconception
ledge which
is
poles asunder from the view I
ouring to maintain.
of
knowledge
of the genesis of
if
If
we were merely
'
generated
a quasi-mechanical fashion by association, as
who
follow
him
endeav-
passive recipients
knowledge were simply
the psychologists
am
know-
Hume
then
afiirm,
'
indeed
there could be no talk of nature or of natural laws.
the other hand,
if
sound, then there
and
even
the
our earlier analysis of experience

is
Thinking, at any
On
is
no pure passivity in experience
association
mechanically, but
in
and
of
ideas
is
determined, not
by subjective selection and

rate, is
interest.
an arduous labour, the very
and, without
amusement and relaxation
thought, such universal and necessary knowledge as the
It
conception of law implies would be unattainable.
was this view of the genesis of knowledge that Socrates
antithesis
of
'LAW A POSTULATE
CONCEPTION OF
221
sought to express by playful allusions to the maieutic
and Plato by
art,
fanciful
his
doctrine
of
avdîvr}cn<i.
For a process entailing such strenuous and persistent

exertion there must be
there
in the
is
an adequate motive
feeling that ignorance
entails
helpless-
knowledge
brings
security
and danger, whereas
ness
And
and power.
with
which Bacon
this truth,
consciousness of
full
and that
first
meaning and
its
realised
forth
set
systematically, has been the prime motive of man's think-
In a word, self-conservation,
ing activity throughout.

the
law of
first
here the ultimate spring of action,
life, is
and shews plainly that knowledge
But the
origin.
ledge
teleological
in
teleological character of natural
further evinced by
is
is
its
originally
its
know-
hypothetical
Let us now inquire farther what such form im-
form.
plies.
It
here
is
Hume
as
knowledge
end
is
is
important, and especially
and interpreted by Kant.
power,
it
is
and
said,
But
primarily sought.
is
certain,
is
Hume
that
criticised
as a
means
to be reliable it
True,
to
this
must be
and the only entire certainty that we possess
either
particular, confined
to present impressions, or
formal, restricted to the relations of ideas.
Neither of
these will give us prescience or control in dealing with

reality.
have
Sense-particulars
no
universality
ideas have
have reality indeed, but they
while
universality but no
the
logical
reality, in
are in the first instance only thought,
The extent
to
which such relations
of fact remains an
affected
by
their
relations
of
other words,
not knowledge.
will hold of matters
open question, a question in no way
truth and validity as thought.
This
222
between thought and knowledge marks the

Like all great truths, it
modern era of philosophy.
gained ground gradually. Bacon, Locke, and Leibniz
distinction
contributed in their several ways

tion
Bacon by
and
Locke by
interpretationes^ naturce ;
its
his distinction of
archetypal and ectypal ideas; Leibniz by
his distinction
But Hume placed
of truths of reason and truths of fact.
the distinction beyond dispute, once and for
argument
one point
says
it
is
his
in other respects, in this
generally acknowledged to be invulner-
"All the
able.
by
all,
Whatever be the
analysis of the conception of cause.
defects of that great
recogni-
between anticipationes
distinction
his
towards
objects
Hume, "may be
human
of
reason or inquiry,"
naturally divided into two kinds,
and Matters of Fact.
to wit. Relations of Ideas
Of the
kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and
first
Arithmetic
and
short
in
every affirmation which
either intuitively or demonstratively certain.

ositions of this kind are discoverable
tion
thought,
of
where existent
Prop-
by the mere opera-
without dependence on what

the universe.
in
any-
is
Matters of fact
same manner; nor
are not ascertained in the
is
is
our
evi-
dence of their truth, however great, of a like nature
The contrary
with the foregoing.

fact
is
possible
still
tradiction,
facility
reality.
and
and
is
because
in
That the sun
as
tvill
every matter of
therefore,
ever so conformable to
if
not rise to-morrow
is
no
less
and implies no more contradic-
than the affirmation, that
vain,
of
can never imply a con-
conceived by the mind with the same
distinctness,
intelligible a proposition,
tion,
it
attempt
it
to
will rise.
demonstrate
We
its
should
false-
HUME AND KANT

So
hood!"^
at one with
far
Hume
Kant
and Kant
223
Hume
agree.
is
even
in recognising the de facto validity of
general propositions relating to matters of fact, laws of
nature as
ground
we now
of this validity,
and remains a
loss
them.
call
association,
which
Hume
him
for
can only
fall
back upon
but a passive and mechani-
is
Kant, on the other hand,
cal process, devoid of reason.
appeals directly to the unity and spontaneity of

gence, and so gives us an explanation that
teleological.
teleology,
to
"It
is
Strangely enough,
as
in
Hume
is
to
intelli-
essentially
too has recourse
the following remarkable
more conformable
for the
acknowledges himself at a
He
sceptic.
when we ask
But,
passage:
ordinary wisdom of
the
nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind

that
"by which we infer
and
vice
by some
versa"]
dency, which
like
may
discover itself at the
and may be independent

of the understanding.
As
all
[viz.,
causes,
operations,
its
appearance of
of
like
or mechanical ten-
instinct
be infallible in
first
from
effects
life
may
and thought,
the laboured deductions
nature has taught us the use
our limbs, without giving us the knowledge of the
of
muscles and nerves
by which
they are actuated;
so
has she implanted in us an instinct, which carries for-
ward the thought
in a correspondent course to that Avhich
she has established
two remarks on
among
this
One
or
passage will
help
us
external
instructive
objects."
forward.
In the
first
Hume's view
1
place, the objection just
of association
Enquiry concerning
Human
Works, Green and Grose's edition,
now urged
must be repeated.
Understanding,
vol. iv, pp.
20
ff.
iv
against
AssociaPhilosophical
o.c, p. 47.
224
tion
not a passive and mechanical process
is
the subject
and
active
is
'impression' that chances
only
Even
such as
'
prove
the
at
first
are warranted in
is
and
correction
this
of
in
so
being
life
What
cannot be
we may
the next place,
it
inertia,
say, that
it
is
purely
but
'
instinctive
and excludes
indif-
mechanical.
With
grant the instinctive beginning
Hume
is
here refers.
may
But
only a beginning;
perhaps, for what Leibniz happily called
And
we
'
wholly inert and indif-
is
from nature
more than
experience to which
des bStes.^
interesting.
and thought
assuming a sort of conservation that
ferent cannot learn even
ference,
by
impressive
appearance of
other than mechanical.
tendency' implies
even here
Not any and every

retained and reproduced, but
selective.
it
then,
suffices,
consecutions
les
be true, as Leibniz goes on to
three-quarters of the
actions of
mankind
are
on this level, are like the practice of medical quacks or
who have no
empirics,
But the problem
theory.
account for theory, for the remaining quarter
is
to
in a word,
for the methodical inductions of science, or rather for the
custom may
tion, or
Mere imagination,
underlying them.
principle
associa-
suffice to explain that faulty induc-
by simple enumeration that Bacon denounced and

exposed but what we want to understand is the source
tion
of
what he called
felicitous
of
inductio vera.
In one of his most
aphorisms Bacon, by the way, gives us a hint
the true
Hume's
answer, which
atomistic psychology hid
Monadologie,
28,
and
from him, but which Kant's
sounder psychology and

singleness of mind enabled
1
sensationalist
must add, Kant's greater
him
clearly
Erdmann's edition,
and
p. 707.
distinctly
'
HUME'S FAILURE
^^Qui tractaverunt
to realize.
225
empirici^ aut dogmatici fuerunt.
''ttut
more, congerunt tantum,
et
the passage runs,
scientias,'''
Empirici^ formicce
utuntur ; rationales, aranearum
more, telas ex se eonficiunt: apis vero ratio media
materiam ex florihus
pria facultate
horti et agri elicit; sed
vertit
et
digerit.""
In
even to work out his own avowedly
Hume
for
est,
quce
tamen earn pro-
the
third
place,
insufficient theory,
has to assume the validity, both for nature
and
mind, of the very conception he has failed to explain.
Causal inference, he points out,
our
sary for
lished a causal order
is
an act
because
preservation,
among
of the
mind
Nature has
external objects.
necessary act of the mind, again,
is
itself
necesestab-
And
this
the result of
natural, quasi-mechanical laws, viz., the laws of associa-
which obviously, therefore, cannot themselves be
tion,
due to association.
Causation
psychological theory
supposes
which
explained away by a
is
the
all
while
doubly pre-
it.
This brings us at length to the point, to Kant's point
presuppose causality
more exactly, we
have to presuppose law and order before any experience
we have
can be
to
or,
and
explained,
can begin.
We
before
'
Universal
Experience
do not obtain the conceptions of natural
law and natural uniformity by an antlike accumulation

of particulars, nor are they
mere cobwebs of the
brain.
Impressions do not generate these conceptions for us,
but we apply the conceptions to them, thereby converting and transforming these crude experiences into the
one
the
'
Experience
Objective
ground
of
this
1
VOL.
II
'
rectified,
we
call
science.
To
find
systematised, universalised,
Novum Organon,
Lib.
i,
95.
226
Experience
we must remember,
is,
the sole problem.
It
not maintained that the unassimilated experiences of
is
the
already involve a conscious-
percipient
individual
ness of law, order, uniformity on his part; but simply
mere repetition
that no
by
as
of such
experience will suffice,
a sort of generatio cequivoca, to bring
ceptions
The more frequent
forth.
impressions
asks Mill, "
con-
the repetition
interesting impressions, that the

But
of
firmer
is
the association, the livelier the expectation.
"
why,"
a single instance, in some cases, sufficient
is
a complete
for
those
myriads of
while in others
induction,
known
concurring instances, without a single exception
way towards estabWhoever can answer

" knows more of the plii-
or presumed, go such a very little

lishing a universal proposition?
question," he truly says,
this
losophy of logic than the wisest of the ancients, and has

solved
the problem of induction."
question
Hume
paid small heed
To
there he
weighty
this
he refers to
And
one meagre paragraph.
in
it,
however,
first
admits
" that in
some cases reflexion produces the belief without the custom " but at once proceeds to explain away
;
the reflexion as merely 'custom,'
ing " in an oblique and
ment,
if
it
artificial
were as sound
as
i.e.
association,
manner." ^
it
is
But
work-
his argu-
plausible,
would
assuredly bring scientific induction within the range of

rats
and swine.
For he assumes
very proposition that

concurring instances
^
Logic, III,
p. 405.
iii,
Treatise of
]\lill
ivill
as true for the
nonce the
denies, viz., that myriads of
suffice to establish a universal
fin.
Human
Nature,
pi.
iii,
8,
Green and Grose's
edition,
KANT'S SOLUTION
proposition
227
and then from such direct associations con-
trives to glide
in an oblique
'
and
manner
artificial
to the principle of the uniformity of nature as also
effect
of
Hume
" Mr.
causality
is
his
patronised the opinion that the notion of
a sorry insight into the phi-
who suppose
a dogmatic theory of his own.

it
was a mere reduction
empiricism]
of
its
On
of
that this
was
the contrary, in his
dogmatism [rather
of
absurdity by showing the inconsistency
to
results."
crucial question,
Oddly enough,
was
satisfied
who
Mill,
was too profound a thinker
come, in a word, was for
raised the
with the empirical answer
and became 'the constructive Humist' that

self
upon
the offspring of experience engendered
losophy of that great thinker
hands,
Hume, however, we
As Hamilton puts it
scepticism.
But those have
custom.
the
In fairness to
custom.'
must not forget
'
'
Hume
Hume
The net
to be.
purely negative
But the negations
his persistent scepticism.
himout-
hence
of scepti-
cism are often the prelude to positive advance; and in

this
instance
Hume
high commendations
deserved the
Kant repeatedly accorded
to
him
as his
own and only
forerunner.
Kant's question, generally stated, was as to the epistemological character of
system of laws.
tives
The
Up
the
to
conception of Nature as a
Hume's time but two
alterna-
were entertained, and he clearly negatives

necessity implied in natural law
by the mere operation of thought.
is
not discoverable
Comparison of ideas
can only reveal agreement or difference

essentially analytical.
This necessity then
Lectures on Metaphysics, vol.
both.
ii,
formal logic
is
p. 394.
not
is
logical.
228
Nor again
matter of
is
it
empirical; for
neither
fact,
is
it
it
not given
is
given
spatial continuity of matters of fact.
causal
ception of
conception of Nature
This
and
so, as
never denies
a single
as
questionably exists.
the
orderly system,
un-
he
he concludes that
it
must be
subjective source he can find

suffice.
human
psychology had
human mind
to that " the
is
But
the only
and
this will
But he takes
agrees.
nature than
could do; and so a subjective possibility
which Hume's
say nowadays,
association,
Kant
a wider and deeper view of
we
subjective.
is
Hume
clear that the origin of
is
not 'objective,' as
not
yet this con-
must be remembered
it
all this
And
generally,
this conception is
With
temporal or
more
and,
necessity,
as
itself
the
in
is
Hume
open to him^
foreclosed.
According
[but] a system of different
perceptions or different existences, which are linked to-
gether by the relation of cause and

produce,
destroy,
Such was
influence,
and mutually
effect,
and modify each
other."
No wonder
his account of it in the Treatise.
then that in an appendix to later editions he confesses

"
But
all
my
hopes vanish, when
come
principles that unite our successive
ciple
'
that
satisfaction
Hume
perceptions in our
I cannot discover
thought or consciousness.
which gives me
to explain the
cannot
on
find
this head."
is,
of
any theory
This prin-
course,
originally synthetic unity of apperception.'
We
Kant's
have
already had to discuss the meaning and import of this

principle in examining dualism.
^
Treatise of
Hximan Nature,
vol.
i,
p.
But we come upon

541
Jin.
the like admission of Mill, Examination of Sir

Philosophy, ch. xii, fi)i.
2 Cf.
it
W.
Maviiltoii&
CAPITULATION OF AGNOSTICISM
new
in
light
where
here,
it
presents
229
the
as
itself
source of the conception of Nature as a system of unity
and law.
Reserving this point for the next lecture,
we have
us note, in conclusion, the result
let
attained so
far.
We
are
advancing
inquiring into the possibility of
from neutral or agnostic monism

idealistic or spiritualistic
to
We
type.
monism
an
of
have seen Huxley,
the scientific champion of agnosticism, run his ship high
and dry on the
idealistic side
and there capitulate
"
Our
one certainty," he acknowledges, " is the existence of the
We
mental world."
have, too, his admission that the
conception of universal and necessary laws
is
an
ideal,
own devising, not a physical

we have found his forerunner and master
in philosophy, David Hume, proving that this notion of
universal and necessary law holding among matters
invention of the mind's
Lastly,
fact.
of fact
is
and
ble
to
those
neither empirically given nor logically deducifurther, that
who deny
active, unifying
ness
and
it
is
psychologically inexplicable
that 'there
principle, the
self-determination.
naturalism just as
it
be really inside out.
presents
is
a spirit in man,' an
ground
In
of
brief,
itself,
self-conscious-
taking agnostic
we have found
it
to
Instead of the physical world be-
ing primary and fundamental, the mental world secondary and episodic, as
implicit in its
it
supposes, the precise opposite
own very
structure.
The
is
things known,
material permanence, mechanical necessity, natural law,

will not account for the
in
the
knower that
question.
If
we
do,
knower: can we
find anything
will account for them,

it
must be something
is
now
the
teleological.
230
Already we know that man's knowledge of nature has

been acquired by the sweat of his brow, as truly as any
other product of civilization;
methods of
logical
we
this process
shall
how
and the
far the
organon and
result itself are teleo-
do well to consider further.
LECTURE XIX
NATURE AS TELEOLOGICAL
The fact of
self-activity, at once volitional
the conception of
its
and
intellectual., bears
Nature in three ways ; as regards
its
unity,
its
upon
causality,
regularity.
The Unity of Nature

this
Experience
itself is unifying,
immanence of experience we cannot
Causality,
guished.
ence
counterpart of the actual unity of
is the ideal
each individual experience.
and
aiid
beyond
go.
the principle of causal uniformity or regularity distiî-
In discussing
the
former we may note three divisions of experi-
(a) that of intersubjective intercourse
and cooperation ;
(b) that
of the individual and his immediate environment ; (c) that of science, in

ichich objective changes are regarded solely in relation to each other.
In (a) activity and passivity are prima facie certain.

as the subject, but not the object, is concerned.
analogically assumed.
analogy.
In the
So in
(6) as far
(c) causality is
only
Science disallows, or rather dispenses with, the
scientific ideal individual things
no abiding place.
Some supposed
In
and
definite acts
This position at once subordinates Nature

difficulties besetting the
to
have
Mind.
conception of subjective activity
discussed : the fact of such activity remains.
As regards Regularity
analogy of
the
conception of natural law rests on the
Both are contingent on the realisation of certain

necessary conditions.
Universal and necessary knowledge of Nature presupposes thought : here the conditions are in us and are necessary : the
civil law.
result is contingent
on things conforming.
If they do conform,
toe
in this respect teleological,
are entitled to say (1) that Nature itself
and
quently amenable to hiiman ends.

this assimilation of
Nature
is
is
(2) teleological further in being conse-
As
it
is solely
achieved, the result
by our activity that
may
be described as that
greeting of spirit by spirit which idealism has always maintained.
231
232
Nature,
as science regards
it,
may
be described as a
system, whose parts, be they simple, be they complex,
of these laws
an indispensable means to that subjuga-
is
and control of Nature, upon which human welfare
tion
and advance in large measure depend.

suit
Knowledge
by universal laws.
are wholly determined
and acquisition
of such
knowledge
So
is
far the pur-
teleological, as
truly so as other practical pursuits and achievements of
human
But what
activity.
this systematic unity
That
too, I say,
Knowledge
and
and invariable conformity
means
teleological, is a
is
It is of
itself.
or postulate,
the conception itself of
of
differs
to
law?
to the end,
the nature of a hypothesis
from other hypotheses or postu-
lates relating to objective reality only in the fact that

it
them
underlies
would be absurd
nor
is
again
it
all.
But
deny
to
it is
it is
not an axiom, which
not in
itself self-evident,
Nor
a deduction from anything self-evident.
is it
much
so
brute fact thrust upon us willy-nilly.
Experiences of a sort are possible without
it;
and purely
formal knowledge, such as logic and arithmetic,
pendent of
it.
it
In neither of these senses then
is
inde-
is it
ob-
So far is this from being the case, that we can,

Kant has remarked, perfectly well imagine the variety
and diversity among things to be so bewildering, as to
jective.
as
set our
fiance,
powers of
and
impossible.^
rial
classification
render
any
And
it is,
as
actually assimilated
and
simplification at de-
systematisation
the
amount
and reduced
compared with the vast amount that

or
less
crude and intractable.

1
of
experience
of empirical mateto
still
law
is
small
remains more
Moreover, the range of
Cf. Kritik der Urtheilskraft, Einleitung, v.
;;
NATURE AS A SYSTEM OF LAWS

our experience in space and time
it
as
is
law of causa-
a law of the universe and prevails
is
But on such
tant stellar regions.
universe
the
well known, declared
to be folly to affirm confidently that the
tion
com-
infinitesimal
is
pared with the extent and duration of
and Stuart Mill accordingly,
233
a view
even in
dis-
we have no
longer law but only probability, and objectively,
i.e.
so
far as the universe goes, only indefinitely slight proba-
himself
Mill
as
bility,
expressly
we ought not
strictly speaking,
to talk
quite
even of proba-
inasmuch as any working theory of probability
bility,
presupposes
law and
uniformity.
Nature then, as a system of laws,

thetical; since it
tion
Yet,
allows.
and awaits
not self-evident, but admits of ques-
is
verification.
hypothesis, or postulate
rience
is
impossible.
prescience,
The conception of
is, we must say, hypo-
But
The
ideal of science
thoroughgoing explication;
observation, experiment, reasoning, in a

activity
an indispensable
it is
for without it scientific expe-
on our
part, is
and the conception
is
complete
but comparison,
word
an essential to
intellectual
realisation
its
of the universe as a realm of
law
is
the only assumption that can save us from wasting our

labour.
But how do we know

that Nature
Why
this?
must we assume
a connected system of uniform laws,
is
and
whence do we derive such a conception?

to these questions
selves
this
to be
found in
self-conscious, self-determining individuals.
answer
back, as
is
The answer
what we are our-
is
at once simple
we saw
and profound.
It brings us
in the last lecture, to Kant's
synthetic unity of apperception
'
as
And
'
originally
" the highest point
'
234
from which
use
all
Hume
the principle which

It
behoved him to seek
understanding depends "
the
of
it,
sought
for he
for,
but could not
find.
admitted that our succes-
sive perceptions are united in one consciousness; but he
could not find
it,
because perceptions were for him but
'distinct existences'
and "no connexions," he maintained,
"among distinct existences

man understanding." ^ But
wrong
rience from the
side
are ever discoverable by hu-
means approaching expeand it means also ignoring
this
;
everything in experience except the several

of
sense both
we commonly find
The convergence of radii
might seem puzzling if we set out by
which
oversights
towards a centre
regarding them as merely so
enough
centre
itself.
many
though
who saw them proceed from this

Such precisely are the respective positions
the whole
ledge of
Hume and
problem of
know-
experience and
Naturalism on the one hand, of Kant
and Spiritualism on the
other.
True, says Kant, almost
Hume's words, "no connexion can ever come
to us through the medium of
(conjunctio)
of intellect,
act
distinct lines,
to one
towards
repeating
impressions
psychology.
in naturalistic
plain
'
we may
is
sense.
Connexion
a spontaneous act of consciousness,
...
as distinguished from sense.
call
by the general name of synthesis
order to signalise (1) the fact that
we
i.e.
This
in
can be aware of
nothing as conjoined in the object unless we have previously ourselves conjoined
among
all
it,
our presentations,
'
and (2) the
connexion
that cannot be given by the object, but

solely
by the subject
1
itself,
since
Treatise, vol.
i,
it is
App.,
'
is
fact
that,
the only one
must be wrought
an act of
p. 559.
its
own
SELF-ACTIVITY AND THE UNITY OF NATURE

self-activity."
But
we must
think
tion
it
is
it
primarily
from
This
volition.
earlier lectures
or
truth
is
of
and
it is
fundamental
at
it
sufficient here to recall
length in
With
it.
supplement, then, the fact of self-activity, at once
and
volitional
intellectual, bears
Nature in three
its
practical
activity.
importance, but I have insisted upon
this
is
and
also
is
However much for purposes of exwe may abstract, we cannot separate, intellec-
conative
position
add,
the subject
of
self-activity
this
not merely intellective or apperceptive
235
ways as
and
causality,
upon the conception
regards
of
unity, as regards
its
Let us con-
as regards its regularity.
sider each of these in turn.
The Unity
actual
of
unity of
Nature
each
towards which we
is
the ideal counterpart of the
individual experience
first
advance when
and reasoning begin;
intercourse
an
ideal
intersubjective
and an
which
ideal
becomes clearer and more distinct as mythology gives

place to science, and, I will venture to add, as science
in turn
is
taken up into philosophy.
But
it is
unneces-
sary at this stage of our argument to enlarge upon the
monistic
character of
experience
this
we have done
The
already with sufficient detail in discussing dualism.
one point that
now
concerns us
preting this
monism
spiritualism
and in
that
is
is
this
that
is
to
say as a
connexion the fact that
formative in experience
jective activity is of
the possibility of inter-
idealistically,
is
all
primarily due to sub-
fundamental importance.
However
elementary or however advanced this formative process
may
be,
the
one
activity
1
complexly expressed
Analytik,
15.
as
'I
236
think,
all
that
do
feel,
is
implied throughout, connecting
is
'
presented or presentable with the one subjec-
Things per
tive centre.
se, if
we could
properly talk of
them, might be called distinct and separate existences;

as it is certain that they are nothing for me,
for
may
same, what holds

Nature, because
my
it
a function of
make them
life first,
but
it
It
bold
it
content,'
in this sense
paradox, that the
does
does not originate
is
'
not
create
just as
it.
organ-
it
but does not originate, the sense-particulars of ex-
The very
perience.
first result of this
nay, experience itself
we cannot
absolute,
nomena
and
is
this unifying,
The immanence
go.
is
it
on
this
of
process
is
unity;
and beyond that
experience
ground that we say
exist in one Nature, in complete
is
thus
all
phe-
community, in
one continuous space and one continuous time.

treat
selec-
though
determined primarily
not of logic.
makes Nature, though
It organises,
is
77ii7ie
not by an affinity of
we must understand Kant's
intellect
ises,
absolutely
affinity of interest,
and
and certainly
Moreover, that intellective or
by which
do not make them
that
all
they have necessarily that unity
certainly cannot get from them,
do give to them.
sub-
only because certain perceptions
is
my perceptions
tive S5m thesis
is
But the
in one sense, always egoistic, never
perceptions that they are perceptions at
in being
by an
experience will hold of
holds of experience.^
is,
disinterested; for
possible
of
it
ject of experience
which
they
in so
Nature and possible experience are one and the
far as
are
But
quite well be nothing for each other.
"We can
such phenomena as distinct and separable relatively

1
Cf.
Kant's Prolegomena,
36.
CAUSALITY AND SUBJECTIVE ACTIVITY

each other, but
to
onl}^
provided they are apperceived
and thereby made constituent parts
Hence Kant was
derived from
Of these
leaves
is
the chief
which Kant
For
out of account.
reason
this
Law or Regularity. Causal laics^ no

what man is mainly concerned to know,
Nature were regular in
method nor purpose
is
Tier
doubt, are
unless
for
action there could be neither
On
in ours.
the other hand,
if
we
simply passive, impotent to act and counteract,
were
science
teller,
would be for us no better than a gypsy fortuneand knowledge would certainly not be power.
Further,
unless
what causation
we have some
it
is,
laws,
neither
since
But they
causal laws will be meaningless.

universal
experience
concrete
their
ters of fact.
cases
of
We
them
are not sim-
depends
intuition,
is
relate to mat-
ask then for instances, and the famil-
cited.
judgments, we are
melts the
They
mathematical.
sun shining and wax
hardening, are
to call
universality
on laws of thought nor on pure
neither logical nor
of
seems obvious that universal laws
of causation will be universal laws simply
iar
it
Cause
bearing on that of Nature prior to any discus-
its
sion of
ply
and
in his first
desirable to consider the source of the notion of
and
cate-
all
now, we have to emphasise the prac-
side of subjective activity,
Critique
original,
it.
categories that of Causality
here, as I said just

tical
this
apperception from
of
it,
unity as a category, which, like
quantitative
is
one organic unity.
of
distinguish
careful to
qualitative unity, as he called
gories,
237
told,
softening,
or
clay
Such perceptions become causal
when
wax and bakes
it
is
the clay.
affirmed that the sun
But we may demur
238
to
So far as the relations of the one
such instances.
object to the other go, they afford us no direct experi-
ence of either cause or effect: in these relations there
Hume
nothing, as
is
truly urged, but spatial and temporal
proximity of sunshine and melting wax, sunshine and
And
hardening clay.
assuredly there
nothing in the
is
bare form of the hypothetical judgment to warrant the

addition to those perceptions of the notions of activity
and
Yet
passivity.
just as surely those notions are in-
volved in the affirmations
wax
the
is
got there
sunshine melts the wax,
But how have they

myth ? Precisely
melted by the sunshine.
Is it verily a case of solar
we have heard
so,
the
like that of Substance is a fetish,
Cause
the notion of
the naturalist reply:
we
items of anthropomorphic superstition
and both these

Yes,
eliminate.
from science perhaps, but certainly not from experience.

Activity and
least
tive
passivity,
prima facie
doing and undergoing, are at
facts of experience,
connecting subjec-
change with objective change, and objective change
with subjective change.
It
is
prima facie certain
that,
within limits, I determine the course of external things,
and that
diate
this within limits
experience of activity and passivity
source of myth, but at least
analogy
that
determines me.
is
we
infer
it is
itself
may
be the
we
In
mythical.
second similarity only from a
given independently
of three to a second ratio save as

is
not
Such imme-
first
cannot advance by rule
we
are sure of a
first.
It
not then in the relation of one objective change to
another that
we put
thesise.
it,
we
first
find causation
that
is
rather where
in order intellectually to assimilate or syn-
Kant,
it
will be
remembered, applies the notion
EXPERIENCE OF ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY

and
of analogy both to the category of substance

of
is
that of reason and consequent in logic, the
analogical relation that of cause

in all
to that
but with him in the latter case the prime
cause
relation
239
Kant
repeat,
this, I
is
and
effect in time.
But
thinking only of the uni-
versality of causal laws, not at all of the specific char-
acter of the causal relation
instance
single
which
in
itself,
as manifested in each
As
occurs.
it
regards this
character in concrete instances, our procedure
The
analogical.
prima
facie.,
what we
we
activity
and passivity that
facts of individual experience, constituting
call the interaction of subject
transfer
and object in universal ex-
Such
inference, of course,
that other analogy by which
intercourse
we
solipsists,
we
hangs together with
regard such objects as
Both analogies are
things or individuals.
intersubjective
to be
and environment,
by parity of reasoning to what we regard
as the interaction of object
perience.
truly
is
are, at least
are
for,
forced
unless
to
facilitated
we
are
regard our
by
content
fellow-
creatures as individual agents interacting with us, and

interacting, like ourselves, with their environment.
From the point

we may make a
have
first
of
view of our present discussion, then,
threefold division of experience.
this experience
causal efficacy.
or influenced by
know
my
itself are
Society,
reciprocity
the
medium
prima
my fellow-man is
as I, in turn, am
civilisation,
the result of such interaction.
communion and
we say, through
is,
that
action,
or influenced by his.
intercourse.
of intersubjective
This yields a complete knowledge of what
is
not direct;
No
it
We
facie^
determined
determined
and science
doubt such
takes place,
or instrumentality of matter.
240
But a medium
or instrument
agent or a patient.
as
in
It
may
is
neither increasing nor diminishing nor
it is itself inert^
any way modifying what
through
this, for
transmitted or effected
and subservient position; and
mechanism we,
as a
it
is
So regarded, the material world occupies an
it.
entirely secondary
scribing
not necessarily either an
be perfect just in proportion
what
is
de-
in fact, only emphasise
means or con-
a machine but an artificial
doing? We
trivance to minister to
in
have next the ex-
perience of the individual subject in dealing, not with
other subjects, but with the physical environment simply.
There
is
here no evidence of mfgraction, such as
where there
fellows.
cooperation or conflict of
is
know
only
vironment answers
to
But
my
which
I act,
my
his
voluntary doing or activity, and
cannot
man with
that a certain change in the en-
a certain other change again to

passivity.
we have
my
involuntary doing or
perceive that,
environment
suffers,
in the cases in
nor
vice versa ; if I
infer these, I do so by assimilating the physical environ-
myself or to the social environment, as primitive
ment
to
man
does
streams,
when he
fire
and
personifies
pestilence.
sun and moon, winds and
Lastly,
versal experience of science, in
we have
are regarded solely in relation to each other.

is
no direct e\adence of action at all
of change, nothing else
is
the uni-
which objective changes
there
is
Here there
just the fact
directly discernible.
The
re-
peated coexistences and successions we observe among

these objects confirm the anthropomorphic interpretation
of
them
as
individual things interacting after the anal-
ogy of subjects.
but recurring
But
in
conjunctions
reality
of
we
discover nothing
qualities
and recurring
INTERSUBJECTIVE ANALOGIES
sequences
of
would lead us
Moreover,
events.
the
241
which
analogy
such objects as individuals would
to treat
medium for their interThe environing medium of such hypothetical
require us further to assume a

action.
subjects, too, can, of course, be again resolved into hypo-
thetical subjects of a lower order interacting in
an out-
standing medium, and so on indefinitely.
In point of
common thought and language never
relinquish this
fact,
intersubjective analogy so long as they refer to changes

as definite at
Scientific thought,
all.
strenuously disavows
on the other hand,
though implications of
it;
linger in the language of science
till
it
still
that takes the form
Meanwhile, science devises methods and
of equations.
elaborates conceptions, by which to resolve those variegated
uniformities of coexistence
sets out, into
and succession, from which
it
one continuous and unchangeable content in
space and one continuous and unalterable process in time.
But neither space nor matter, neither time nor motion,

any place for causal activity in the only form of
it of which we have any immediate knowledge.
Hence
it behoves us to realise, what most expositions of causation
I mean, that causation and causal uniignore or deny
affords
formity are entirely distinct.

necessarily uniform in
its
An
action,
efficient
cause
and uniformity
is
not
of se-
quence does not directly imply such causal intervention.
Within the
and
definite
scientific
acts find
scheme, then, individual things
no abiding-place.
one thing and the procession of

ous event.
Such
is
VOL.
II
it.
But, from the
this conception,
is
changes one continu-
Nature, and the course of Nature as
Naturalism conceives
have come upon
its
The whole
we
way
in
which we
see clearly that
efii-
242
cient causes are not in strictness eliminated

strict truth is rather that
is
nothing in
they never enter into
it
the
There
it.
therefore, that can possibly discredit that
it,
prima facie interaction

whole
from
social fabric
is
of individual minds, of
Nor, again,
a proof.
is
which the
there any-
thing that can possibly discredit that rapport^ alternately
predominantly passive and predominantly active, of each

individual subject with
its
own environment, on which
in
turn intersubjective intercourse and combination depend.
Such a conception
of Nature, I say, cannot possibly dis-
credit these divisions of experience

it
leaves
cause
for, in
the
first place,
them entirely aside. The conception of efficient

beyond its bounds: it recognises law, orderly
lies
sequence of events
we know
as activity
but
and
it
what
neither asserts nor denies
And
passivity.
in the
next place,
the conception of Nature, so limited, cannot discredit our
experience of activity and passivity, for the very exist-
ence of this conception presupposes both

as it
is
inasmuch
first,
but a formula or descriptive scheme, summarising
common
objective factor of universal experience
further inasmuch
it is
primarily
as,
in being a formula or
whatever validity
it
And
ideal intellectually elaborated.
scheme
may have
and
at
but
plainly, as
all,
an
we have
seen, objects without subjects are nonsense, intellectual
constructions without intellect impossible, and intellect
without synthetic activity a nonentity.

Nevertheless I have spoken of
only as prima facie such.

least is allowed
generally and
subjective
all
did
is
so,
activity
because this at
sufficient
to discrimi-
nate experience iu the concrete from the abstract scheme

of
science
and because, further,
it
was desirable
to
ANALOGIES BEYOND THE PALE OF SCIENCE 243

any semblance
avoid
admit
dogmatism.
of
But our
ism.
an end of
is
discussion shews,
side
They can only say we do not
the natural sciences.
and could make nothing

Beside
belong to us.
mon-
that at any
think,
effect-
spiritualistic
impugned from the
rate this reality cannot be
it,
such activity can be
that, if the reality of
ually challenged, there
we must
Still
of
it
we
if
negative
this
did:
it
of
find
does not
answer we have
placed the indirect argument, that the existence of the
themselves becomes inexplicable,
sciences
experiment, and
vation,
part and parcel
which,
less inconsistencies of
our
and
theory;
in
its
of
is
of the
we have now
ground, then, for misgiving
The hopeautomaton
true
place
of
The only
seen.
the
in
lies
alleged incon-
Unquestionably there
subjective activity.
ceivability of
themselves
conscious
the
actual inversion
experience
obser-
of
Nature within
found.
is
the search
such a position were exposed in
examination
earlier
science
computation, were
one course of
the
no spontaneity
said,
is
it
of
if
labours
error, the
for truth, the refutation of
among psycholowe cannot even attempt
a bewildering diversity of opinion
gists
on
this point, which, I fear,
to unravel.
ceivability,
fact
may
might
relation
But, happily,
but of
be in
fact.
itself
rather
is
not a question of con-
a very complex process
very plausibly
is
it
The conceiving of a very simple
the
maintain
rule
generally most intellectual
that
than
work
is
the
such
indeed one
an
exception
inverse
;
that
involved in the
satis-
factory determination and definition of the most elementary facts, and accordingly that
farther synthetically that
we
it
is
only as
we advance
can regress farther analyti-
244
Thus the psychologists know better what they

mean by perception than what they mean by sensation;
cally.
and the physicist
clearer about metals than he is about
is
matter.
would urge that we need not merely to distinguish between activity and the conception of activity,
but to distinguish also between activity and the percep-
But
tion
of
spection
When we
it.
we
active
really
word, we are at the level of
in
talk of perceiving that
sciousness or reflective consciousness;
one will maintain
that
is
Many
how
distracted
do?
How
can
How
can
be active,
is
What
soul at
is
first
What
if
"
He
arguments
their
how
the
in
done.
is
it
puzzling
fable,
exactly do
do when I
know how?
the content and conditions of
me?
Thus Mr. Bradley
the content of activity as

?
presume no
set about doing, unless I
activity are not clear to
"
the details of
centipede
ran, they ask,
it
self-con-
who complain
those
of
shew by
inconceivable,
that what they look for
Like the
and
it
asks,
appears to the
promises also to be duly grateful to
any one who will direct him 'to an experimental

quiry
'
into its particular conditions
continually endeavouring to
We
make apparently simple
into
links.
mental
action
to
physical
so-called
Ap2)earance and Reality, 2nd ed. pp. 604
f.
cir-
To imagine any
such method applicable to subjective activity

ilate
pro-
by resolving
complex processes that involve conspiring
cumstances and intermediate
in-
are of course
cesses of so-called transitive action distinct,
them
are
retro-
that consciousness begins, or always
remains, at this level.

activity
we
imply introspection, even perhaps
is
to assim-
action,
* See Note
i,
p.
the
290.
ACTIVITY AS CONCEPTION AND AS FACT
known
to the
unknown, the primitive
And
the fact to the fiction.
and time, because
allows,
it
245
to the derivative,
space
as the continuity of
nay compels, an
indefinite
regress, prevents the physicist's inquiry from ever
minating, so the like end for like reasons

the
befall
It
is
to
who
an 'appearance,' the
as
conditions of which are to be found

ances.'
sure
is
experimental inquiries of psychologists
by regarding activity
out
set
ter-
among
other
'
appear-
who
not surprising, therefore, that those
have adopted such methods soon confidently assert that

conscious activity
is
an
illusion,
due to certain combina-
And
and successions of sensations. ^
tions
so
is
reached
that thoroughgoing naturalistic phenomenalism or agnostic nihilism,
The
in completing itself refutes itself.
relation of subject
and object
an indissoluble relation, but
rience
We
one.
table
which
the objective
is
not only for expe-
it
an incommu-
is
cannot treat the subjective as we do
and form an
abstract scheme, a statics
dynamics, of spirit in Herbartian fashion.

of the essence of the relation
and giving
it,
is
though
the wide meaning
nowadays sometimes given
Kant that among
all
to
it
it
and
Activity
does not
is
make
to apperception that
we
may
our presentations this
say with
"the only
is
one that cannot be given by the object, but must be
wrought
own
its
solely
by the subject
little
a condition, for
1
Of.
ff.
my
it is
If we ask for the

we must transcend experience
There would be
pp. 75
since
self-activity."
this activity,
is
itself,
paper,
it
an act of
conditions of
to get them.
point in saying that the subject
only
is,
as it
is
active
nor that
'Modern^ Psychology, Mind, 1893, N.S.,
vol.
ii,
246
objects are a condition, for
they again only are verily
As Lotze very
objects, as they are apperceived.
"We
nently observes:
perti-
cannot go on indefinitely requir-
ing intermediary machinery
...
some point or other
at
mem-
the chain of intermediaries must consist of simple
bers connected together immediately and not requiring
something else to hold them together.

to explain still
action
way
further
and recurrence,
to elucidate
which they come
in
but they
fail
All attempts
these most simple elements of
to pass,
them by shewing the

must invariably fail;
not on account of the imperfection of our
knowledge, but because the very existence of what they

immediacy,
it
seems to me, we have in experience, in the activity
of
erroneously seek
and
cognition
is
This
impossible."^
Strangely enough, those
volition.
who
have such compunction about admitting mental activity

regard mental passivity as transparent fact; and yet a
very
little
involves
reflexion
or
more
The
activity.
which eliminates
might convince them that passivity
activity,
exactly
scheme
scientific
equally eliminates
as we have just seen
ception enters into
it
as
accordingly,
as
little
passivity,
the
the
one con-
other.
Inertia
means not merely inactivity, but also impassivity.

body, as the physicist regards
can do nothing and can
The changes, which
suffer nothing.
undergoes, resolve
which we say
it,
it
into
consists
motions
;
of
at first
we say
aggregate
the
it
of
and such resolution has no
assignable limit short of points in space

time.
and instants in
Changes within a body, defined by
its
qualities,
eventually become changes between punctual something'
Microcosmus, Eug. trans.,
vol.
ii,
p. 620.
NATURALISM AND EPISTEMOLOGY
247
These physical points
nesses defined only by quantity.
themselves, again, are strictly indifferent, devoid alike of

faculty
and
of capacity, neither endeavouring to change
nor resisting change, but incapable of

contra^ it
it.
And now
per
must be urged that we who experience change

to
are parties
it,
surprised by the
indifferent
only to the uninteresting,
unexpected, but attentive to
that
all
can hinder or help, feeling constraint only because conscious of freedom
and bent on progress.*
As regards Causality then, as we understand it in

our own immediate experience and in all human affairs,
we find it indeed excluded from the scientific realm of
Nature, but not thereby attainted or even impeached in
That Naturalism nevertheless should
native domain.
its
regard the whole notion
and branch,
is
of efficiency as extirpated, root
but a consequence of the unwarrantable
assumption that the realm of Nature

pendent, and complete in
is
becoming ever clearer
world per
we
se is
conceive
complete in
an
it,
is
But the
itself.
to us that
primary, indetruth, I trust,
such a phenomenal
a hopeless contradiction, that Nature, as

is
neither primary
that
itself;
abstract scheme
it
and
nor independent and
on the contrary, merely
is,
that,
as
such,
it
necessarily
presupposes intellectual constructiveness, and motives to

sustain the labour that such construction entails.
Epis-
temological inquiries, in a word, completely reverse the

situation,
which Naturalism, without condescending
such inquiries, simply takes for granted.

the
Mind
is
to
not
impotent shadow of Nature as thus shaped forth,
but this shaping

point
many
is
itself
the
work
of mind.
questions present themselves which

* See Note
ii,
p. 291.
At
this
might
248
tempt us
ralism.
once to press our advantage over
at
But
be really wiser to defer them
will
it
we have examined
Natu-
this
constitutes the last of
shaping
my
process
the
three points
till
This
itself.
regularity
of Nature as postulated by mind.
glance at the history of science, more particularly at
the development of those sciences which have advanced

the farthest towards the scientific ideal, would disclose
a curious inversion in the positions occupied by the notions of cause
and
The more
of law.
rdle
and, presently, they become hypostatized as 'self-
laws
existent
'
they
unchecked,
operate
supreme, 'binding nature fast in

substitution
this
science
emerges from
ence
dawn with
clear
its
in
is
among our
among them;
if
have
experi-
enters
now
fact.
the
know,
to urge
know
we do
do we find
we do
we know
not
If
the conception of active causes

that of
is
the level of individual experience
is
universal laws.
we may
perceive
but we do not as yet conceive of laws that deter-
mine them.
subjective
is
facts, so neither
anthropomorphic, so equally
facts,
human
" Fact I
premature, that
the sense in which
not find causes

laws
that
shadows, and
know," says Huxley.
reign
anthropomorphic or mythical
metaphysical
that this jubilation
Law,
the
they
Nevertheless by
fate.'
supposes
noonday of positive Knowledge.
and Law
At
substantial causes
out of sight, the more universal laws take on their
fall
This conception
intercourse, of
impossible
perfect, the
is
the
outcome
without some government, and
more law and order
Now we know
that
of
inter-
social cooperation; for society
are assured
pre-scientific
more
is
and
stable.
man assumed
the
LAW, JURAL AND NATURAL, COMPARED
249
prevalence of a divine law and order in Nature analo-
gous to
that
existing
We
among men.
know,
too,
that this assumption was at least the origin of the con-
Such an assumption may be
ception of scientific law.

natural
called
instinct;
itual
credulity, or spir-
superstition, religious
but at least
it
How
fact nor logical necessity.
neither incontestable
is
far is the final concep-
tion of scientific law of a different character?
Though
the
human mind, human
and human
society,
knowledge have developed continuously and pari passu,

yet we can deal with this question most effectively from
Kant
the reflective standpoint taken by
ing the
ledge
human mind
to be
what
knowledge universal,
real
now
is,
scientific
now is and society still

may ask how is society possible ?
by assum-
is
and
know-
real
how
then ask
is
such
experience pos-
assuming the individual mind
So,
sible ?
it
We
to be acquired.
still
that
be what
to
waiting to be founded,
it
questions are strikingly alike,
the more obvious of the two.

flood
"the whole earth was
speech
make
brick
and they
and ...
The answers
though that
We
of one
to these
to the last be
read that after the
language and of one
said one to another.

let
we
Go
to,
let us
us build us a city and a tower.
And the Lord said. Behold they are one people

and they have one language and this is what they begin
to do: and now nothing will be withholden from them,
which they purpose to do. Go to, let us go down and
.
there confound their language, that they
stand one another's speech.

build the city."
of
...
may not
So they
left
underoff
to
Here the conditions of the possibility
society are clearly implied;
when
common
under-
250
common
standing and a
when they
ble,
purpose
purpose, but there must be
common purpose
out which knowledge
is
By
but
in one bold passage,
here
possible experience
ideal
also
it is
more
its
thing purely contingent
'
bility are epistemologically
In this sense our ideal
it
is
know, not in the things
we can only
may
at all:
is
contingent
own
is
'some-
prove to be valid and
conditions of
it is
conditions
known.
and try
in this wise the

of
Nature
To quote Kant
again:
and necessary laws

because
knowledge,
this possi-
a consequent
are
As with
must be
it
who
in us,
Will the things

the social
this
way,
the conditions are necessaiy, actual realisation
if
late.
not contingent but necessaiy.
to be
trust
to some-
understand the
in itself
conform, will they be intelligible?

compact,
to
as
experience.'''
systematic
hypothetical,
conditions and those
the
are
ideal
But the
cease to be so.
i.e.^
place in virtue of universal
Such an
necessary laws.
may
we
possible
thought
" by referring
orderly and
of
which every item has
and
of
purely contingent, namely
scientific
it
Knowledge no doubt
not directly knowledge, but only indirectly,
thing
in
is
like
the condition with-
is
impossible.
thought before everything
Kant says
before there can be one people.
accord between thinking and being
is
at an end.
is
man has understanding and

common understanding and
not enough that each
It is
exist, society is possi-
any existing society
cease,
whole notion of universal
is,
then, essentially a postu-
"It
is
has this peculiarity that
it
proof, viz., experience, possible
not a
it
first
dogma
renders
its
and has always to
be presupposed for the sake of experience."

1
Kritik der reinen Vcrnunft, Ite Aus., p. 737.
KANT ON
Man may
'POSSIBLE EXPERIENCE'
be very helpless, but at least he makes this
demand, and looks
And
and power.
to its fulfilment to give

it
this result
would
Nature whose
fain persuade us that it is
man
ment, and that
laws
stamp by which
Nevertheless, passing strange
who have done most
those
be,
it
is
he
as
conceives,
impressed.
it is
and the
latter
certain
fact
as
It
achieve
civil
the
that
wax under
the
against this view
is
derived from the former.
is
to
no achieve-
powerless over against the
that I urge the analogy between

law,
him prescience
has been fulfilled, and he has power
and prescience accordingly.

though
251
law and natural
conception of
If
the
man had never
made laws he could never know law, and if he were not

a free agent he could neither make laws nor obey them.
How
a
absurd
would be
it
commonwealth
security,
men
to argue, that
in constituting
in order to obtain greater freedom
they can no longer each one do whatever
own
Equally absurd
eyes.
is it
experience,
we
because
a system
are deprived of
of
is
right in his
to argue that, in postu-
lating regularity in Nature as the one
in
and
thereby become slaves, because as citizens
ground
power and
all
universal
of rational
initiative,
and necessary law
nothing can be arbitrary and there can be no gaps.
If
the conception of mechanism enables us to summarise

details
that
would otherwise
bewilder us, this cannot
possibly nullify our independence, reduce us to parts of
the machine, and elevate that into an absolute fate.
very fact that
and use
it,
it
is
see its imperfections
that
we
tion
and not
are outside
its
The
our conception, that we devised
it
it
and amend them, shews
and above
it: its
helpless consequence.
a priori condi-
In a word, con-
252
cisely
express
to
scope
the
we must say
science postulates,
regularity which
that
of
Kant has done,^ not
as
only In mundo non datu7' casus, but also In mundo non
Nothing happens by blind chance, and
datur fatum.
of natural
intelligible,
law
is
always
'
as he is careful to point
Kant
out
In jural
of
affairs
analogy
this
far as there is either
to penalty.
we
But
also calls
it
to
it,
applies
the existence of
which obviously
pre-
we must
ever
the source,
natural
is
or
intelligible,
regularity
we
determined by law so
conformity to statute or submission
here,
are aware that
of
might say whatever happens
this
not
things, but only to their relations,
suppose them.
necessity
a conditional, and consequently
Moreover,
necessity.'
hypothetical, necessity, as
remember,
The
happens by blind necessity.
also nothing
where law has
its
would be nonsense
self-existent or self-executive.
strict
meaning,
to talk of it as
" Just as impossible
is
to assume," borrowing the words of Lotze, "that
there could be as absolute Prius,
necessary in themselves, a sort of
kingdom
it
first
of forms
immemorial Fate
and
then that there should afterwards be, however created, a
world subjected to the constraint of these laws in order

to give reality
to just
Rather
permit.
it
is
whatever their limitations might
the real alone that
is
and through
its
being produces the semblance of a necessity preceding
it,
much
ton,
as the living
body shapes within
round about which
Let
me now
the results
up
it
itself
the skele-
seems to have grown."
try to gather
up
in
a sentence or two
to this point of our discussion of Natural
Cf. the concluding
remarks on the third Postulate
Metaphysik, 1879,
8S fin.
of Experience.
253
RESULTS ATTAINED
Law, so
at
far,
as
least,
is
That argument
next step in our argument.
and mechanical
material
the teleological and
the
and
process,
in
have
law
natural
it
inasmuch
as it
means
an
may
as
to
natural
is
tele-
sus-
Also that the conception

in
character,
its
first
hypothetical, and every hypothesis a
organon that
end, a theoretical
not work
the
is
are pre-
and
prompted
is
teleological
is
of
seen that the process
tained by practical motives.

of
them and
conception,
the
since
origin,
its
that the
we have mainly considered
far
analysed
We
knowledge.
ological
So
the
clear
is
fundamental, but that
not
are
spiritual underlie
supposed hj them.
make
necessary to
may
or
secondly and more especially, inasmuch
hypothesis
that Nature
is
conditions of our intelligence.
conform to the
will
been needful to
It has
exhibit at length, and to emphasise, the fact that these
from
emanate
do
conditions
us
needful
to
explain
and maintain the daring position of Kant that the

tellect
We
makes
have
regularity of
the
causal
though
Nature,
traced
to
this
it
dispense, so long as
and
it.
the
with which positive science can

it
merely describes and computes,
remains, and remains necessarily, the

session
create
unity
the
the system of Nature, and have seen that
efficiency,
Mind.
of
not
does
source
in-
Of
course,
let
unassailable
me
pos-
parenthetically
observe, the standpoint of our discussion has been that

of
the duality of subject and object and implies
such independence as that

parateness of dualism with
we
per
se
this
result
claim to have
:
It
duality
its
involves
mind per
transcended.
the
only
dis-
se
and matter
We
have then
being in general granted that our con-
254
ception of the unity and regularity of Nature
is
entitled
name of knowledge being ever confirmed, never

by experience we are now equally entitled to
to the
falsified,
say that this unity and regularity of Nature proves that
Nature
(1)
new
the
it
and (2),
Such
and
contains
all
is
that
make its bearmentioned we find implied
I trust, suffice to
point
first
it
in
it.
word or two may,

In the
two respects
in
intelligence
step in our argument,
ing clear.
that
amenable to human ends.
is
essential to complete
is
human
conformable to
is
it
consequence,
and
teleological,
itself is
that essential oneness of thought and being, that recognition of the intelligible
spirit
I
by
spirit, for
do not propose
upon what
of
more germane
to a close to insist
every true idealism or
spontaneous activity
upon
matter
Agnosticism
tion of
this; it is
to
essential
this first
brought
tide
upon
have always contended.
of the
greeting
This granted, the rest soon follows; while
intelligence.
has
idealists
must soon bring
is
spiritualism, the
by ignoring
by intelligence, that greeting of
to dilate
to the discussion
still
which
is
and
and denying
us
to
grasp
dispel.
advancing
of
of
law,'
which
Of the bare
common
subject and object as
Naturalism
finally.
nightmare
'that
tightening
helpless
it
to all forms
rela-
and
phases of experience nothing can be said; by no means
can we ever get behind this
beginning
absolutely
indeed, strictly speaking,
We
can never get so far back.

as
cannot
but only as
know
in
we
experience
process,
and
here subjective spontaneity as selecting and connecting at
once asserts
process
itself.
apart
from
If
we
this,
try to conceive an objective
we
picture
kaleidoscopic
INTELLIGENCE AND THE INTELLIGIBLE

succession of numberless
elements in
binations but devoid of
any
The more
any progress.
depicting
such
nakedness,
mind-stuff
'
it
more hopeless and absurd
'
appear
will
in mentally
matter-stuff
which we
indifferent
is
we succeed
or
'
numberless com-
any connexion, or
fixity,
clearly
all that
Naturalism can logically offer
we regard
does,
experience
manifold
indefinite
as
known non-
matter of
experience
start
synthesis
can really begin
and
synthesis,
it
a constant
ject
ject
reciprocity,
if
this
is
before
by
activity
in
in
:
it.
we
experience
Now
not only
experience
only by means of
is
conative
No doubt
Kant
complement,
and interested
prompted and sustained, that
and unfold.
as
with such an
shaped and informed by
is
it
indispensable
but
the
If,
is
only made when
is
the point on which I have to insist

subjective
us.
objective
its
the subject conscious of
is
its
the
emergence
the
starting
as
must hasten to add, that the

this
it,
such a generatio cequivoca of experience
albeit
in
'
call
therefrom of a living, feeling Ego and a
Ego
255
which
this
it
can advance
such advance there
all
may
so
say,
is
is
between sub-
But my contention is that to the subbelongs the lead and initiative throughout, and
and
that,
as
object.
experience
developes,
this
subject
ever increasing activity and supremacy.

freer
is
than sensation and entails more voluntary effort;
thought
is
effort still.
freer
than
however
entailing
both,
Things need not conform
this
describe
is
more voluntary
to our thinking, as
when they do conform

brought about
we call them intelli-
the existence of error shews
gible,
shews an
Association
them
as,
in
content
or
essence,
ideal.
256
No doubt
own
our
our
first
the
further
With
self-revealing.
we judge
self-consciousness
clearer
and the main clue
it,
rude anthropomorphism gives us
and every advance in knowledge
bearings,
is
approxima-
of
series
we must seek
it
nature.
Not-self
by a
reached
is
but to find
tions,
is
truth
more
world
the
of
this
adequately, employ truer and more perfect categories.
But
through
all
non-Ego
and therefore
The
most
human
it
self-relisation is the
potent of
society
" as
man
tenance of
his
way
sole
means
all
the
non-Ego;
the
to
to advance.
self-realisation
of
is
sharpeneth iron so the coun-
iron
Here
fellow."
first
we transcend
narrow limits of individual experience, confined to
the
makes us
and
from
the
must,
we ask
logical;
we
so
reason
first
since
wholly of
But
all
and not merely

resolution
where
said,
of
experience
thoughts,
admit
constructive thinking,
its
need convincing,
questions,
thoughts
only
Discourse
expectation.
universal
for
tent
The
and
reminiscence,
perception,
''
Ego
the
assimilating
of
process
is
Ego, not
the
to
as
of
we
if
it
consists
necessarily
communication.
consider
its
con-
form, consists in assimilating.
mystery," as Dr.
Bain has some-
"is found in assimilation, identity,
may
frater-
for
The ultimate paradigm,
this
process we have in our own self-consciousness,
or rather in what we find common to all our self-
nity."
if
consciousnesses and call reason.
This
is
so say,
the truth em-
bodied in Kant's transcendental unity of apperception.

It
is
shadowed
in the
saying
forth,
Homo mensura
of
Aristotle
however perverted by
its
author,
doctrine of Protagoras, and in the

to
6/xotov
rw
ofjÔLOi
ytyvoyaKeadaL
MAN AND NATURE ARE RATIONAL

indeed in one form or other
it
a truth everywhere
is
In a sense, then,
apparent in the course of philosophy.
we
are always anthropomorphic.
257
According to Natural-
ism the myths and cosmogonies of
early thought
are
purely subjective, while the laws of Nature that refute
them
But
wholly objective.
are
there
is
no such
chasm between them.
In Baconian language both are
an
and
mentis
anticipatio
Naturce.
It
solely
is
of reason, strengthened
the
truer
success,
jective
and
so
and
from
objective,
reflective
II
an
interpretatio
obstinate
questionings
are
clarified
has
justifying
been
any
by the
effort,
reached;
dualism
and
of
that
its
sub-
should only assure an unbiassed
mind that Nature and Man
being rational.
VOL.
through
and
interpretation
far
both
are
one in
LECTURE XX
Laws of Nature used
in
two senses:
(a)
as implying substantial
causes; (6) as implying only constant relations.
Does
the substit^ltion
of the latter for the former enable positive science to clear itself of all
anthropomorphic taint?
human
be a
to
JVb,
instrument;
for (1)
(2)
its
method and assumptions prove
shoics that things are ordered
it
measure and number, but not xohat they are themselves.
it
by
Subjects icith
and causally efficient, are facts of experience prior to

and indepeiident of it. It must come to terms loith these when challenged.
intrinsic qualities,
We
say then
Either
it.
But for
And
ati
Either
it is
it is itself
intelligent or there is intelligence
itself causally efficient
answer
to these questions
Agnosticism again betrays
or there
is
Naturalism refers us
Mr. Herbert Spencer's answer examined.

in the strict sense of knowing.''''
turns out to be ''the same

the
form of
to
it.
Agnosticism.
it.
First Cause
sary datum of consciousness, but cannot in any
known
beyond
a causal agent behind
is
"a
neces-
manner or degree
be
Nevertheless, his Unknoicable
Power which
in ourselves wells up under
consciousness.''''
What Mr. Spencer means by 'knoioing f?i the strict sense.'' The
distinction of determinant, and reflective, jtidgment brought
Kantian
to bear.
The agnostic use of 'Phenomenon''
criticised.
Appearances do not
veil reality.
As a further
objection to a spiritualistic interpretation of Nature,
said that there can be no
mind behind
it,
for
it
is
it is
never interfered with.
This objection due to a confusion easily exposed.
Moreover, when we divest ourselves of the

template the loorld in
reality to be not
its
historical
scientific
concreteness,
a mechanism but a Eealm of Ends.
258
bias,
we can
and con-
see the true
Naturalism
that, when it
agents
causal
all
that
of
and properly
and become pure
of
pri-
is
implying
nor yet that
denied,
be
cleared
positive, ob-
law
of
conception,
jural
power, cannot
sovereign
in
application to Nature a Divine Lawgiver was
first
and
everywhere
course,
has
it
of
other words
in
taint,
seen,
conception
laws,
universal
259
we have
as
the
for
That the conception
science.
marily
its
substituted
spiritual implications,
jective,
granted,
for
takes
has
anthropomorphic
itself of the
LAW
SENSES OF NATURAL
TWO
always
In
anthropomorphic.
is
But
assumed.
the
of
this,
all
last
lecture
the
question was raised whether the scientific form of this
conception
is
essentially of a different character; in the
course of a general discussion of the nature of knowledge,

to
it
was answered
and
return to this question
more
We
I propose
in the negative.
deal with
to
it
now
in
special way.
find laws of
senses by scientific
spoken of
as
Nature used in two very different
Sometimes such laws are
writers.
self-existent
phenomena which they
are
and
independent of
as
said
to
But
of necessity conform to them.
the
govern and which

this
language
is
only defensible on one of two suppositions: either the

so-called self-existent laws are themselves causal agents
and phenomena the
result of their interaction; or
metonymy, such
we commonly employ
as
of civil law, the laws are said to be
sovereign executive
scientific
is
and
language that favours
of these alternatives:
.along
really
with laws
and
does.
now
one,
in
do,
what the
And we
now
by a
speaking
find
the other,
the former in speaking of forces
gravitation,
cohesion,
electricity, for
260
instance;
the
lectively
to
latter
Nature
thoroughgoing
referring
in
her
as
defend this usage of law;

last rags of a creed
self
from
all
laws.
we
as
naturalist,
He
Laws
But
if
we
of
pitch
we can
the analytic
use
succession.
is
here the
upon any concrete thing or

it
straightway
is
influences,
""
single out a definite
process continues.
are the relations,
ultimately related motions,
points
till
We
that
whole
to
one.
everything intrinsic
all
is
of
activity
The
is
the
or
'
that
what
sort
affinities,.
and passivity
relations
are
most that can
of related motions, motions so

is
of elements external to each
each element
'
have, then, an infinity of meeting-
or starting-points
related that the
this
we ask
If
are discarded phrases:
be safely said.
'
then attractions, repulsions,
anthropomorphic, metaphysical.
case
claims to
a whole
one of these parts,
possibly
so long as
tions
the
resolved into coexistences and successions: indeed
itself
rests
as
Nature are for
and
coexistence
of
Orderly relation of the parts of
are
off
it
the ontological trammels that such terms
him only uniformities
as
not
outworn, thinks he has freed him-
law in quite another sense.
outcome.
the
know, will
casting
as force or cause or nature involve.
fact
Nevertheless,
well
but,
laws coU
these
all
is
As
the analysis never
resolved into relations
other,
we may
constituted solely by
its
fairly
say
external rela-
True, the element in such a
the others.
becomes for any clear thinking a pure nothing;
for it is as impossible to get the shadowiest of 'its' out

of
mere
relations
as
to
get quantity by any multipli-
cation of mere coefficients
vanished.
But waiving
when your
this,
the
concrete term has
laws of Nature only
NATURAL LAWS AS RELATIONS

do not make them.
state the relations, they
are the relations established or maintained;
261
How,
how do
then,
these
elements, which are on, or over, the verge of nonentity,
keep up
fond
wondrous rapport?
this
talking
of
of
Certain physicists are
mazy
the
dance
of
molecules;
the ancient astronomers, too, imagined that the planets
had souls which steered
their
form of rapport that
clear
is
certed action on such a scale
communication;
of
should have to
cist calls
is
us;
to
indeed the only
but
even
inconceivable.
is
con-
More-
we know presuppose a
that were excluded we
concerted actions that
over, the
medium
Such concerted
courses.
action through mutual understanding
fall
if
back on
'
telepathy
And
action at a distance.
it,
would come the
difficulty
'
that these
the physi-
or, as
even then there
we
elements
are
supposing to act in concert, are not allowed to act at

Nevertheless, with extreme inconsequence, but to
all!
obviate these difficulties, the physicist postulates, not a
medium
of
communication, but a medium, of which
his elements are motions
of
motion
three
secured.
is
directions.
First,
and by which
all
strict continuity
This commits him to infinity in

his
ether
must be
in
infinite
extent; for gravitation, cohesion, and the like, which
mediates for
its
contents, are unavailing to give
it
it
bounds
or form, unless there be another ether to mediate in like
manner
for
it.
On
the other hand,
bility since it is absolutely
part of
it,
therefore, there
continuous
is
other words, no elements at

part of
it
it is infinite
an
all.
in divisi-
in every smallest
infinity of elements, in
Finally,
though every
can he moved, no part can move
itself;
the
motion therefore, apart from catastrophes, can never have
262
Perhaps
begun and can never end.

fully in
the
first
half-dozen
were content to take
for
it
an objective presentment of
concerned with
the
first
mogony
of
point.
But
lectures.
what
it
and
answer Yes,
Hesiod, but
it
we are now
human mind.
real principles
itself
we
there
purported to be
in its relation to the
anthropomorphic in
Is it
is
it
ought to apolo'
what was discussed so
gise for this brief restatement of
whole ?
as a
that
truly as the cos-
as
a vastly narrower scheme.
is
There are three things human beings can do, and by

these
the
character
of
scheme
this
fundamentally
is
determined: they can move things by contact, they can
To measure and com-
measure, and they can work sums.
pute motions, connected in the only manner conceivable
by
us, is all that this
scheme
and exact instrument, but

to
its
It is a
will do.
exactness
its
is
narrow range and formal character.
we can
emptiest thing
wonderful
due mainly
Time
measure, and the thing
the
is
we can
measure with far the greatest precision; but that gives

it
no supremacy over
fuller,
nor them
other
conceptions,
The
indispensable.
less
makes
fact
no
it
that me-
chanical laws are applicable to things shews indeed that

'
and number,' but not
things are ordered by measure
and numbers.^
that they are themselves only measures

Is a
system of
laws clear at least of further anthro-
sucli
pomorphic implications
answer,
By no
This
is
the
causal agents, are beyond
qualities, that
disprove
or
agents.
These
affect
we
second
point
That subjects with varied intrinsic
means.
the
existence
know
first
Cf. Lotze, Metaphysics,
its
of such
and
ken does not
things
or such
independently,
Conclusion.
and
SCIENCE AND ANTHROPOMORPHISM
we can
from them
pass
them.
We
tables,
because
devising.
to
are able to use

it
an
is
first
use mortality
instrument of our
as
we
have said
is
a mechanism.
verily
is
it
know
and independently, causal agents and things with
intrinsic
to
to
it
evidence that the world
Its utility, too, is
out from what
we
just as
analytical
verily a cosmos, but not that
Setting
but never from
it
it,
263
the
qualities,
mind looks
unscientific
and
account for changes,
Hence the
world in terms of their interaction.

sense
laws
of
on sufferance and
But though
repudiates.
there.
or less
Men
out,
many
seeking out
energy and undaunted by
Newton's
particular
genius
led
laws of motion and Laplace's led

nebular theory
it
has
left
still
do not cease to be every one more
sui generis,
untiring
prin-
in
triumph of human
this
them
devising contrives to leave
them
earlier
Nature and natural agencies, which
of
positive science only endures

ciple
them
to
represent the
to
strives
because
difficulty,
him
him
or because, last of
inventions with
all,
to
discover
the
propound the
to
Mr. Spencer has
evolved a theory of the universe in terms of these, into
which Newton and Laplace would have to

positive science scoffs
with power on thine

if
Is it
own
act
it
play-
is
anthropomorphic, only the
the poet, to say to a
license of
But
anthropomorphism,
at
ing a dangerous game.
When
fit.
man
"
Thou
art thou,
and on the world"?
man's intellectual and practical activity
is
fact
and not analogy, any formulation, however rigidly mechanical, of
leave
room
lenged.
what we
for
it
large
call natural
and come
part
of
phenomena, must
to terms with
human
it
activity
when
still
chal-
consists
in
264
communication and cooperation between man and man.

This again
is
fact,
not analogy, albeit fact reached only
by understanding, not fact

thunder
clap
might be
with eyes and
Hence
ears.
with anthropomorphism
articulations of
the lightning flash and
as
called facts
mine
as
not
to scare rooks or admit of
shall
not charge you
accept
these larj^ngeal
you
if
any sentient
for
that might
noise,
acoustic
serve
given the
analysis,
necessary resonators, but as
a more or
course addressed to you.
So generally, being ourselves
and
active
we understand
intelligent,
which science can only formulate

to be verily the acts
so
changes,
certain
matter in motion,
as
and expressions
we meet and
can
less rational dis-
only
rationals:
of
No
our fellow-men.
greet
ad-
vance in the essentially interminable description of that
mechanism can ever conceivably alter these facts, upon

which
as I have repeatedly urged
this whole business
nay
of physical description depends,
a part.
istic
So
far, at
any
rate, the
or spiritual character
and anthropomorphic
had no chance
to
'
of
it.
which
teleological
it is
itself
and
ideal-
experience seems clear;
confusion
obscure
of
of
Now
ideas
'
so
has
far
put mankind and
other sentients capable of mutual understanding on the
one side and their

the other.
this
The
common environment
relations of
as a
whole on
each individual subject to
environment are not confined to those in which
serves
as
the
medium
of
intersubjective
and, in fact, cannot begin with them.

apart from those relations,
its
it
intercourse,
But, before and
environment
is
for
subject an orderly objective continuum, affecting
each
it
mediately, and always in some measure amenable to
imits
QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED
acts
the environment
counterpart or non-Ego
its
is
265
its
microcosm we might perhaps
call
the facts for which,
every system of Nature,
I repeat,
mechanical or not, must
These, then, are
it.
room, or at least leave
find
room.
we
This non-Ego,
Either,
ble.
then,
beyond
intelligence
through
there
far
it; either,
is
say,
it
and
so,
intelligi-
intelligent,
or
there
orderly,
is
itself
is
Again,
it.
then,
it
is
it
or
or
Early thinking, so
it.
as it faced these questions at all,
affirming the
aspects
first
to shut out the

for
the
religion
But
alternative.
the environment were
of
trees,
whole
as
there
and independent
answered each by
the
many
concrete
then so obtrusive as
was no seeing the wood
proverb
the
with
itself causally efficient,
agent behind
causal
interact
goes.
Polytheism
unity,
in
forces in science were thus far
But the progress of thought has made

comprehend the world, at least formally, as
on a par.
easier to
is
and in proportion
as
the
it
questions just raised
have been fully faced, the second alternative has been

accepted in lieu of the
lords
first.
As
'the gods
many and
many,' so amenable to concrete representation in
poetry and
art,
have
paled
before
clearer
insight,
they have given place to one Supreme Being, beyond or
above the world and only intellectually conceivable.

too, the light, heat,
and
real
for
and other natural
common
sense,
have become but various
transformations of an underlying
yond perception.
their
way
intelligent
energy which
is
be-
Religion and philosophy had worked
to the sublime
First
So,
agencies, so palpable
Cause
idea of a
and
Supreme Being, the
Substance of
all
things,
266
long before science had accomplished

formulating
abstractly
of
matter and motion.
And when
tion of all Nature
complete, and
conceive
or
alter
have
mechanism,
intelligent,
stop
we
ever
can
And
evaded?
if
of
enabled to
are
but
therefore
inert
how then
itself;
be
too
terms
in
vaunted formula-
this
intelligible
but
working,
in
asked
answer
is
laborious task
its
things
these
the
to
not
or
start
we
questions
they
what
cannot,
there but that which philosophy and religion
is
would give?
The unity
of
would
Supreme Intelligence
as
while the inertness of
Him
as
Prime
its
spoke Descartes and
many
mechanism,
this vast
they
completeness,
say,
their
all
its
its
regularity and
point
all
only
one
the
to
sufficient
reason
equally points
parts
to
Mover and Efficient Cause.

So
Locke, Newton and Clarke, and
who were prominent as workers on this

fabric of modern science.
Can we have the intelligible
without intelligence
can we have things that wholly
vanish in relations; can we have continuous process and
beside,
nowhere an
efficient
cause?
Again
let
me remind you
that that older sense of Nature and natural laws, which

described,
I first
less
it
lingers
exact of the natural sciences,
ciple
obsolete.
averred,
scheme
is
though
Matter
itself
is
and
unavoidably in the
treated as in prin-
energy
only hypothetical conceptions

is
nay
but a descriptive apparatus.
are,
poses.
imply
what the
Naturalism then,
description
it
is
the whole
Still
if
verily something admitting of such description,
must
it
essentially
there
it,
too,
presup-
would seem, does not escape
spiritual implications, because science succeeds in strain-
AGNOSTICISM TREACHEROUS
ing
that science
is
to be
not be ignored,
blamed
for this:
that
what
and the
bare
demand
a right to
is
It is not
till
how much
we have seen
life
is
but how,
we
body
its
The complete-
itself.
only makes our
ques-
a dead body that
we know
Marvellous, even though but a
means.
this
skeleton,
of
answer more impressive.
more pressing and the
tions
anatomy
abstract separation
of the
we have
that
all
thus left out shall
is
universe
offered us as the living
ness
Not, let us remember,
doctrines clear of them.
its
267
system of positive law, beyond a doubt;
ask,
if
can these dry bones live?
this be all,
Science, as such, has nothing to do with the question;
but Naturalism, which has, evades
Agnosticism for
And
answer.
the
and sends us
it,
once
again,
seems to me. Agnosticism plays the rdle of

Taking Mr. Spencer to be
exponent
its
make
phenomenal world and
a First Cause, and though
manner
yet
ing,
or degree be
its
positive
consciousness."
as to
or
a very brief
existence
Waiving
how Mr. Spencer
let
necessary
knowing
at
belief,
to
all
But
First,
'
cannot in any
us, "
of
know-
datum
moment any
between
a middle
of
question
in the strict sense
find
'
strictly
term,
which
but positive and necessary
us note some of his
ing his Unknowable.

hensible Power.^
'
law and order to
strict sense
is
contrives
shall not be opinion or
tells
the
for
suffice
are obliged, he allows,

all its
known, in the
knowing and not knowing
affirmation
he
this,
what may be meant by
We
this treachery clear.
to refer the
it
traitor.
examination of his doctrine of the Unknowable will

to
as
to
he
tells
assertions
us,
incomprehensible
First Principles, 27, stereo, ed., p.
99
it
'
is
concern-
is
Incompre-
somewhat
rev. ed., p. 85.
268
ambiguous word
we say
the contradictory and nonsensi-
cal are incomprehensible,
Spencer uses the word
and we say man
for
when
Mr.
is
raised,
he remarks,
between personality and something higher,"
is
and elsewhere suggests that

being as
incompre-
the question of attribut-
ing personality to this First Cause
"the choice
is
It is in the latter sense that
hensible to the brutes.
much
to
may belong
it
"a
mode
of
transcending Intelligence and Will, as these
transcend mechanical motion."
" This consciousness of an
Incomprehensible Power," Mr. Spencer goes on to say, "

just that consciousness
makes much
is
on which religion dwells," and he
ground
of finding here a
between religion and science.
of reconciliation
Then, a propos of Man-
sel's
famous Bampton Lectures^ the chief source of
own
doctrine, he tells us that " our
duty
to
is
his
submit our-
selves with all humility to the established limits of our
which, by the way, he elsewhere describes

" Indeed,
imbecilities of the understanding
intelligence "
as the
'
it
'
seems somewhat strange," he continues, " that men should

suppose the highest worship to
lie
in
assimilating the
Not
object of their worship to themselves.
in asserting
a transcendent difference, but in asserting a certain like-
which they think
ness, consists the element of their creed

essential."
much
For
in religious
censure.
But
my
part, I feel that there
and theological
still is
scendent difference
'
it
is
only too
literature to justify this
not possible to admit 'the tran-
while yet asserting a
'
certain essen-
And, after all,

tial likeness' between God and man?
have not thoughtful men in every age allowed as obvious
that we cannot " find out the Almighty to perfection " ?
^
First Principles, 31, stereo, ed.,
ji.
109
rev. ed., p. 93.
MR. SPENCER'S THEOLOGY
But
it is
seek
we
certain that
and yet how
and no likeness
is
if
absolute difference
the affirmation forced uDon us by
As
established limits of our intelligence'?

said,
and no fact of
knowing
all positive
knowledge
is
'
cavil,
datum
he
tells us,
Either, then, Mr.
Spencer must go backward, or he must go forward.

the positive and necessary
the
have alreadv
more beyond
assimilating.
is
we
shall never find at all unless
search possible,
is
269
If
of consciousness, having,
a higher warrant than any
whatever,
other
be the affirmation of the absolutely different, then
as-
suredly irrationality and nonentity are at the root of us.
But
we may
if
ity or
attribute to that
Unknowable even Causal-
Power, then so far we assimilate
being causal agents
to ourselves, as
our nature we could not find that
were
it
such
too, in transcendent
And
again,
not that such
it
and, as I have argued at length,
is
measure,
is
the nature of God.
if we may go this far, we must go farther

we were face to face with chaos, as in the opening scene of Mr. Spencer's evolutionary epic, we might
perhaps identify his Incomprehensible Power with mere
still.
If
brute energy
but the First Cause of a Cosmos, to be an
adequate cause and deserve the name, must be a Supreme

Intelligence.
But, in truth, experience does not warrant
us in divorcing efficiency from intelligence.

written
many
Principles,
Mr.
years
after
Spencer,
the
discussing
the
alleged to be
true,
his
First
"
How
Unknowable, thus
be reached by successive
of
can
tacitly
modifica-
which was utterly untrue ?
Surely
the primitive belief was absolutely false, all
derived
tions of a conception
if
of
development
religious ideas, himself raises the question
a final consciousness of the
In a work,
publication
270
must
beliefs
absolutely
be
" Unexpected as
here to be
will be
is
that at the outset a
made
was contained
And
false."
namely, that the power which manifests

sciousness
replies
germ
the primitive conception
in
he
by most readers, the answer
it
truth
of
the
itself
truth,
in con-
but a differently conditioned form of the
is
beyond consciousness.
power which manifests
itself
Consequently, the
outcome of the speculation com-
final
by the primitive man,
menced
is
that the
Power mani-
fested throughout the universe, distinguished as material,

is
the
form
same Power which

of consciousness.
in ourselves wells
.
up under the
The conception to which he

is much less that of a uni-
(the explorer of Nature) tends
verse of dead matter than that of a universe everywhere

alive."
We may
conclude, therefore, that so far
it
is
only these inconsistent implications and admissions of an

altogether idealistic character that save Mr.
Spencer's
flimsy agnosticism from being utter nonsense.
But there
still
is
a point in abeyance.
This Life of
a Universe everywhere alive of which he has allowed

himself to
talk,
beyond
forever
of knowing."
Mr. Spencer's
it
is
Mr. Spencer
us, totally
tells
'strict
knowledge'
Briefly,
neither
is
confined entirely to what he
to use
For
terms 'the veil of
appearances,' the veil never lifted by

'
then,
more nor
than the positive knowledge of Naturalism.
Reality
and
our knowledge "in the strict sense

What, we must now briefly ask, is the
import of this agnostic dictum?
precise
less
is,
the
another of his phrases
'Inscrutable
which
it
abso-
lutely conceals; and these appearances again are either

1
Principles of Sociology, 659
f.
MR. SPENCER'S POSITIVISM

sense-particulars
once
thus
are
271
We
conceptual relations of such.
or
more
Hume's standpoint, and may
at
straightway concede the whole position to Mr. Spencer,

if
he
willing to take
is
the strict premisses
Thus from
consequences.
all
we can never prove
positivism
of
the existence of other minds or find a place for such
conceptions
as
and substance
cause
own mind and
premisses the existence of our
And
have not entered.
activity
those
into
for
self-
its
we have
accordingly
seen Naturalism led on in perfect consistency to resolve
man
into
still
vaster
an automaton that goes of
goes of itself because

inert cannot
question
Nature
automaton.
which goes of
ceived,
stop
or
is
time,
its
How
which indeed science

it
it
ever started
cannot
answer, but
one independent variable, extends indefinitely
of knowledge,
o'.ice
entirely self-contained
irrelevant, superfluous.
we are inside
the
is
what
place for
it,
Such a
so
Mind
and complete.
is
to
sys-
say, is
the alien,
Nature, according to this con-
ception, contains no hint of either

this
is
has no occasion to ask:
without hint of either beginning or end.
tem
con-
going, and being altogether
change.
which, on the other hand,
mechanically
as
True, this mechanism only
itself.
it
part of a
itself as
God
Mr. Spencer's
or
man
outside
Unknowable,
as
it all, and Mind

Not from within this system, but
only from without and independently, can the conception of mind be brought to bear upon it.
And the
is
transcendently different from
occupies that place.
result
is
as
when
Oriental palace of
its
the sacred
magic
name
the
is
uttered in some
whole fabric collapses
independent reality was an empty show.
But
obvi-
272
ously this result cannot come from within

cian
does
talks
of
phenomena, but with
only does so to rid

its
the magi-
Naturalism, I admit,
not exorcise himself.
fatal
inconsistency.
It
implications,
and
itself of spiritual
phenomena end by being phenomena per
se
fla-
But work your way to

that standpoint, ignoring yourself more than you can,
and what do you find that is phenomenal in time, or
grant contradiction, of course.
mass, or number, or in equations connecting
space, or
They
terms involving only these?
in
themselves give
no hint of aught behind or beyond that supplements

them,
or
any gap
of
needs to be
filled.
The
we
have no place here.
It
mit,'
for
they form
that
'established imbecilities of the
understanding, to which
of
system
the
in
are
is
bound dutifully
precisely
its
to sub-
independence
these that constitutes the fascination of this scheme
the
naturalist
caught up in
who
taken
is
out
of
and
himself
it.
An important distinction made by Kant, but only

when he had reached his third Critique, meets us at this
point
I mean the distinction between the determinant,
or as we might say, mechanical, judgment, and the
reflective or teleological
judgment.
Mr. Spencer's
strict
wholly the work of the former
or positive
knowledge
knowledge
we reach only by means of

In the former we constitute the whole from
in the latter we interpret the parts from the
the latter.
the parts
whole.
ends,
occur.
of
In the
are
latter,
everything;
From
is
other minds
the
meaning and purpose, deeds and

the
in
reflective
mechanical judgment
the
judgment
way
none
former,
is
easy
of
as prius
;
these
to
the
from the me-
'REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT'
chanical as
jt>rii*s
the
to
at all.
No doubt
chophysical
parallelism
way
reflective
in
there
the various
an
attempt
is
273
no
strictly
is
theories of
made
psy-
to find a
way, so far at least as to connect mind and mechanism.
But only because
existence of finite
the
And
be wholly ignored.
if
the case of finite minds,
in
method can lead us

Cause
of
lateral
lines
is
God should
product of
the
By parity of reasoning
He is at all, the col-
be, if
mechanism, another
universal
matter in motion.
aspect of
Monistic literature since
days of Spinoza abounds in notions of this
the
same
it likely that the
any adequate idea of the First
mechanism?
this
all
on these
to
minds cannot
those theories fail hopelessly
class,
but they only save themselves by negating themselves,

to use a Hegelian phrase.
mentioned together matter appears at once as
are
ter
The moment mind and mat-
secondary and dependent, so surely as mind
and matter
inert, so
active
mind has meaning and
surely as
and matter only subserves them.
purpose,
is
This
has
been the burden of our argument since we entered upon

epistemological questions, and I do not need to enforce
it
afresh, but only to apply it to
We
attain to the
knowledge
other creatures, the
Creative
Mr. Spencer's dictum.
of all minds, the
only by reflexion, interpretation, understanding.

adepts at this kind of
begun
to
acquire
knowledge
world.
this
conceptually
by
letter, of a piece of
T
are
summarise the
we can do without understanding
just as a compositor can set
all,
II
We
the positive, constructive, mechanical
at
VOL.
of
knowledge before we have even
by which we
But
minds
Mind and even our own,
up the
it
type, letter
literature in entire ignorance of
274
Between these two forms
sense.
its
tween the
the
difference
No
kind.
into
was but a
points
help
means
but
to
be valid at
able
mechanism
we
as
mechanism.
God
It
is
down
in
all
as
we
if
shall
allow
really,
have God only and no
verily a case of all or none
either
is
intermin-
His medium and instrument
we
it
Cause to
First
have God and
not
Nature
;
meaning, eVen though
Supreme Mind and

shall
all
will
only a
means only
is
And, accordingly,
what.
or mechanism, depends
we cannot from
not in
But
to regard
all,
is
breaks
it
itself.
anything
fundamentally, ultimately
find,
where
lurked for-
is
know
conception of a
the
imagine that
Unquestionably letterpress
say that
often do not
could
however,
analogy,
an end, not an end in
more reasonable
we
to
forward.
we can never
make a
man who had
will
product, a mere aspect of
collateral
note
be-
judgment,
a difference of
is
But only a
printing-office
This
it.
exact,
us
it
processes
inscrutable something that
or an
behind
ever
of knowledge,
teleological
printing
critic.
never been outside a
letterpress,
the
not one of degree
is
insight
litUratcur or even a
literature
and
determinant
which we
upon our standpoint, but
standpoint find both.
From
the
one standpoint, for rational reflexion, for philosophy, the

conception of the course of Nature as a pure mechanism
is
an obvious
fiction, as
of logarithms, a
much
transparently
course
of
Nature can
mechanical formulte
is
human
be abstractly
evidence
thought and things, which
device,
and so
far
Nevertheless, the fact that
thoroughly anthropomorphic.
the
a mere organon as a table
of
justifies
But from the other standpoint,
for
summarised
congruity
in
between
the idealist position.
the formulae themselves,
THE VEIL OF APPEARANCES

God
the conception of
275
not, as Laplace remarked, a hy-
is
pothesis that they do not need, but a conception wholly
But the same
without and beyond their horizon.

equally true
principle
in
of
minds, as
other
all
is
the
ineptness of psychophysical parallelism and the contra-
dualism sufiQciently shew.
dictions of
independence
the
thus
pertaining
It
is
precisely
mechanical
the
to
scheme which in the end, when reflexion begins, makes

its
dependence the more certain and impressive.
But
still
one point in Mr. Spencer's charac-
terisation of theistic
knowledge which we must not pass
there
is
word I
without a
mean
appearance and reality
his use of
the distinction
been the stronghold of Agnosticism.

he gives us to understand,
God
behind which
as
Inscrutable
many
mon
is
of
which has ever
distinction
Strict knowledge,
confined to appearances,
remains wholly and forever concealed
The term 'phenomenon,'
Reality.
like
other philosophical terms that have obtained comcurrency, has hereby acquired so
diverse meanings as to
whenever
make
have allowed that
knowing,
strict
and these again
formula
priety
any
is
sort.
not
'
of language
phenomenon
intelligible
But
veil
it
is
to
not reveal
God
at
would now urge that
of
We
mean
the
into a world-formula in terms
of matter and motion, does

of
if
Nature into coexistence and
resolution of the course of
mind
careful scrutiny imperative,
reappears in philosophical discussion.
it
succession,
many and such
appearances,'
phenomenal
at
all.
is
'
all,
sucli
or
not in pro-
The
idea of
or appearance," says Lotze, "in order to be
must presuppose not only
which appears, but
also,
and quite
as
being or thing
indispensably, a
276
second being by
whom
appearance
this
But who has ever perceived
The whole purport
not properly appearances at
forgets
science
and,
this
all,
but
inverting
only symbols
own
abstracts the true
absurdity
se.
we have
But if we
ance, unless
then should
it
we
so
true
phenomena,
it
attach to
or perceptible,
can
reality
Nay what
appear,
shine
remain totally and forever beyond

those to
whom
it
Why
faith,
human mind with
we never regard
communica-
man.
If
they mask when
cannot also mask
These acts
and utterances may be beyond the comprehension

on a lower intellectual
And why
level,
less
real
men
or true on that account.
should we argue differently,
the manifestations of a
^
of
and with narrower horizons,
when
leads us to see in a Universe declared to be

alive,'
of
Assuming good
his intentions are the precise opposite.
but they are not the
yet
a man's acts and utterances as mask-
his intention to deceive, surely they
when
and
knowledge
the
another.
ing, but rather as manifesting the

it is
can they
else
forth,
the
should
Let us turn, as we have
appears?
done before, to the case we know best

tion of one
why
the bad sense of concealing,
it
appearances not be reality
How
phenomena
decline to call anything an appear-
rather than the good sense of revealing?
be?
relation,
j)erpetrates the
often stigmatised of
either perceived
is
the
of
And when
themselves the symbols and
declares perceptions to be
per
of
that they are ideal conceptions, not perceptions
is
perceptions which are the real appearances.
its
mass-points in motion, vortex-
atoms, or ethereal undulations?

these
perceived."
is
Microcosmus, Eng.
'
Supreme Mind?
trans.,
ii,
p. 160.
reflexion
everywhere
DETSTIC VIEWS
277
This brings us to another agnostic objection

raised
time, not by Mr.
this
though
Professor Clifford,
the
days of Epicurus.
fest
themselves by
Spencer, but by the late
anti-theistic
Finite minds,
it
thinkers since
is
said,
mani-
interfering in the course of Nature.
man imagined
Primitive
one
has been in substance a
it
commonplace objection with
but
that he discerned like interfer-
ences of a superhuman kind; and from such premisses
concluded
enough
correctly
But now it
Bois-Reymond say,
men."
"God walked
that
This objection again, though
it
unquestionably had weight for ages, seems to lose
the
once
Mind
we
is
that lives
in
the
whole of things, and the
To
to parts.
whom Locke
this sceptical objection has
the " fanaticism which
itself
all its
overlook this
dif-
to be guilty of the fallacy of 'the poor Indian
philosopher,'
Good
has
take account of the difference between
minds that are confined

ference
Du
that Science has banished the gods
from the universe.
force,
with
maintained, as I once heard
is
No doubt
has immortalised.
been indirectly confirmed by
would
like to see the Supreme

some other way than that which it has
chosen, or which believes that Good to be attain-
active in
some shorter path than the roundabout way of

formal orderliness which it has itself entered upon." ^
able by
Once again
let
let
us consider
us turn to what
how
and
to the thoughts
this objection
would look
and best
if
a theory or to carry out
he does not retract
first
applied
human mind regarded

When a man sets to work
acts of
a whole in themselves.
expound
we know
earlier
some practical
statements,
Lotze, îcrocosmus,
ii,
p.
727.
or
as
to
project,
change his
278
first
amend
plans, save to
unforeseen defects
the
own
his
more he
error or to
remedy
master of his pur-
is
pose the less of such interference there will be.
when we look at
and practice, we
more they approximate
more they have
perfection, the
human thought
the collective results of

see that, the
of
fixity, or
at
to
of
least
man with
Finally in the intercourse of
orderly progress.
And
man, the more steadfast purpose
that
is directed by clear
more intimate the unity and community
the
insight,
possible
is
the more expectations are realised, the
more sure and secure

foundation of
fect
such
all
orderliness
is
each among
life
But
all.
and intelligence
the prime
that per-
is
Nature which science mistakes for
of
brute, mechanical necessity.
But
is it
needful to say again that the laws of Nature
are not self-existent at

sity
all,
and that therefore
can not be the necessity of a Fate
at once
their neces-
Science cannot
renounce metaphysics and play the metaphysician.
It
was allowable
to
the notion of
whether
to itself.
for atheists
and
who
deists alike,
substantial causes, to regard
started
by Divine Power
But from such a
cut off by the meaning
position
or not
held
the world
as
now
left
modern Naturalism
has given to law.
it
still
is
So soon as
laws are defined as constant relations, so soon reason compels us to look
Such a
beyond them.
definition brings
the ground and source of the relations nearer instead of
removing them farther

cannot operate
in
the
absence
Matrimony
is
they
of
off.
may
the
Relations
subsist,
things
to
a constant relation,
there are husbands and wives
may
hold, but they
but they cannot exist
which they
pertain.
and actual so long
service
is
as
a constant re-
REALITY AND RELATIONS
279
and actual provided there are masters and servants.

The only things of which we have positive knowledge are
lation,
subjects with intrinsic qualities, things that are something

in
All else
themselves and something for themselves.
may be
science,
into relations
resolved
which replaces
conception of empty
qualities
between these.
by
relations,
Hence
ends with the
and formless matter, that
is
nothing
itself,
that can receive no determination
and can impart none.
Again, such subjects are the only
for itseK,
causes of
or in
which we have positive knowledge
a nature of their
own
here again natural science that
knows not mind knows not cause

therefore,
of the
by transferences
of
direcpov and another,
matically determinate
it
they have
and hence can interact, determine,
And
and be determined.
causes are replaced,
motion between one portion

transferences only
mathe-
and otherwise inconceivable.
not plain, therefore, as I have
Is
argued at length before,
that reality consists in the concrete things and events

that science sets out from, and not in the network of
relations
which
is
its
goal?
If then, as rational beings
who have other ends in life than calculating and classifying, we want to interpret and understand the full meaning of the world, must we not return to it in its fulness
When we so regard it, and consider first
and variety?
what we know best, the interaction of mind with mind
and this must be the basis of our interpretation if we are
we do not say, that between man
to understand at all
intervenes
some entity called a body of
and man there
relations.
The
intercourse, the cooperation or
conflict,
actual or possible, of the individuals themselves is their

relation.
As Lotze
forcibly puts it:
"The
passion and
280
action of things must take the place of relation.
when, and in so
they related to one another
there are no objective rela-
and
tions other than this living action
Why,
then,
in
as
itself,
living
intelligible
may we not
intelligence,
individual subject, everything that
and
passion."'
law and order are only
if
outcome of
the
law,
you
if
manner with other
With
subjects
experience in the concrete,
no
in
torily
dreams of
means
way,
other
interpreting
natural as well as civil
no absolute
the
and exact
best
and what concerns
how
far
But above
of
all,
the
us
is
the
of
and below
it
all
In
'
How
extends,
God
far
concep-
below
of
incompatible with the
is
the
one
Supreme.
Microcosmus,
On
ii,
us,
tell.
for that postulates necessity,
Such a
scientific
whereas
contingency into the very heart of things.
no longer things, but only the con-
be said,
;
'
we cannot
may
lets
as the living unity
conserving acts
this
history
foothold for positive
view,
conception of law
by
world
scientific
necting,
it
thinker
what we understand
most.
historical
there can be only
it
deal satisfac-
competent
little
science, the historical
above,
pecul-
no mere repetitions,
find
though affording thus
yet,
own
small scope for measurement or for
fixity,
mathematics, the indispensables of

tion
an
as
its
we can
no
history
we
itself
will
equally determinate?
scheme of universal laws.
of
and
as
regard each
anything for
is
or
active essence or character, interacting in

iar
Just
on one another, are
far as things act
It
p. 635.
the antithesis between conceiving (Begreifen) and understand-
ing (Verstehen)
see
an interesting paragraph
in die Philosophie, 2 Aufl., p. 384.
in Paulsen's Einleitung
EXPERIENCE AND NECESSITY

is
true
not only admit
but contend that any other
it,
world would be meaningless.

not
that
of
everything that
is
a law in
is
has an end for
itself,
generalisations do not justify
where rational necessity
itself,
still
is
and cannot demand.
No
intelligible.
For
possible,
is
man
sane
resents
normal laws of
of thought,
conduct, normal laws of taste, or demands that
truth,
goodness, or beauty should be other than they are.
freedom consists in conformity
whom we
For God,
conformity
Now
an
remains
it
be.
ideal.
of a blind mechanical neces-
no meaning
at least one thing
start confronted
we keep
it
and
to
is
it
is
actual
is
historical at
is
is
it
does not end
ever appealing
we have
the
left
provided
it
only
gone,
all
historical
that
is
long
so
beginning to forget that experience in
We
all.
other hand, to insist that
the fact
that
be rendered to
For science has
due.
is
mind
experience
insisting that there shall
aside that
all.
experience does not
Science
clearly in
and determined.
experience,
which we are led
to
the whole of
so confronted
itself
certain
is
in reason at
and determined by mechanical necessity
and the conclusion
its
to
there could be no talk of ideal standards, either of
thought or of conduct
to
us
for
But were we the creatures

sity,
Real
conceive as essentially perfect, this
complete
is
what ought
to
is
as
this scientific
supreme, freedom
is
normal laws
as a constraint
so far
and more than
for rational necessity,
and things must be
freedom *
of
In such a world there
and seeks the good.
room
For the contingency
but that
chance,
281
it is
happily one there
wholly historical
* See Note
is
have, therefore, on the
historical altogether
no gainsaying.
and so
iii,
p.
292.
far,
too, it
and
Yes, the
is
'
the
282
unknowable
crete fulness, that
defy
knowing
in the strict sense of
must science ignore
precisely on this account
Steadfastness
truths
'
such
to
from
science
of
so long
but entail
but
all
whereas for us experience
it,
and measurement.
an ideal cannot
strict
And
formulation.
as the ideal of science is calculation
exclusion
and will ever
to say, it has defied
is
our attempts at adequate
all
in its con-
'
whole consists
as
the
necessary
'
from end to end of 'contingent truths.'
The
difference
between these Leibniz happily compared to that between
commensurable and incommensurable numbers.
" For as
with commensurable numbers," he says, " resolution into a
common measure
is
found.
But
minable
series, so
that
is
just
infinite,
with necessary truths a
possible, so
demonstration or reduction to
as surd
truths
identical
ratios
lead
can be
an
to
inter-
contingent truths involve an analysis
and possible
to
God
alone."
This
in-
commensurability of the necessary and the contingent,

the scientific and the historical, answers to the difference
between validity and

that "reality
only
'
is
science,'
propositions,
reality,
and shows,
richer than thought."
not existence
we
secure the simplest
again, gives us only the
the 'particular,' which
is
'
an interminable
But
this
it
De
gives us
'
Thought,
position.'
universal,' the relational
the 'surd' for
it
it
or
must
from
the real
start,
but
can never return save by traversing
series.
reality,
richer
than thought,
Science cannot originate experience

1
Thought
cannot, by piling up
meeting point or subject of relations

to this particular
same time,
at the
Scientia Universalis Opera,
is
experience.
for experience
Erdmanu's
edition, p. 83.
is
the
THE CONCLUSION
283
source of science, yet always more than

surely as the
workman
more than
is
but the skeleton, while experience
is
a means, and experience the end
examine that necessity which

ground
how
and the
of its utility
singular
is
the result
the historical
ideal,
we
is
Science
his tools.
the
life
is
science but
And when we
itself.
the boast of science, the
criterion of its perfection,

find
For the sake
of this
metaphysical elimi-
ignored, the
is
product, so
its
nated, substance and cause become fetishes,
God
a super-
fluous hypothesis, and mind an enigma, a troublesome
by-product, a veritable ghost that cannot be laid.
remains
theless this necessity itself
turn
it,
Never-
and
in
scouted as but a shadow of the ghost or anathe-
is
Naturalism can do nothing with-
matised as an intruder.
out
inexplicable,
and Agnosticism can do nothing with
one can only attain reality
it.
For the
by treating necessary truths
as
truths of fact, and the other can find no necessity in facts

at
But
all.
Leibniz
if
we have
them, truths of
rightly called
originate in
but
these necessary truths,
reason.
universal
They
the subject of experience, not in the object
the objects conform to them, then
rational;
seen, are as
our reason
reason.
monism, and to
is
Such
this
all
experience
confronted and determined

is
world of
the
world, as
is
by
spiritualistic
have tried to show.
Naturalism and Agnosticism eventually lead us in spite

of themselves.
is
Thus
their
demurrer to
theistic inquiries
not sustained.
1
Of. Lotze quoted above,
p,
252.
"
EXPLANATOEY NOTES
PART
III
Note i, p. 30. Notwithstanding what is said in the text, I

have been supposed by some critics (of. e.g., Mr. H. R. Marshall
in Mind, 1902, p. 487 n.) to reject the 'methodological' use of
Cf.
Quite the contrary.
parallelism which is there described.
I have dealt with this point more fully in the
also pp. 35, 93.
article Psychology, Ency. Brit., 10th ed., vol. xxxii. pp. 66-9.
The reader interested in Mr. Spencer's

Note ii, p. 38.
philosophy will do well to compare the more guarded statements
in the revised edition of his First Principles ( 71 c) with what
he had said in the earlier editions (stereo, ed., 71, pp. 217 f.)
concerning the metamorphosis of physical force into feelings, etc.
" The only supposition ha^nng consistency," he now thinks, " is
that that in which consciousness inheres is the all-pervading ether
" This, however," he adds, " is but a semblance of an explana" Such an explanation," he continues, may be
Verily.
tion."
than symbolise the phenomena by sj'mbols
no
more
said to do
Anyhow, Mr. Spencer is "vvith us in
of unknown natures
!
condemning
the
conscious
automaton
theory,
and
that
is
something.
Professor Ritchie^ asks: "May not the

Note iii, p. 63.
universe be both at once, through and through mechanical when
regarded in its material and spatial aspect, teleological when
Unquestionably, provided
1
regarded in its spiritual aspect
.
the teleological be regarded as ultimate and supreme, provided

too we are not asked to accept an irresolvable dualism of material
and spiritual. That the mechanical aspect in itself is thorough^
Nature anid Mind, in the
Philosiyphical Beview, vol. ix., 1900, p. 264.
285
EXPLANATORY NOTES
286
going is precisely the position frankly accepted in the text.

Again, the facts (1) that the teleological is there, and (2) that the
mechanical scheme can find no place for it, are precisely the
reasons which lead us to conclude that the mechanical theory
Professor Ritchie's own
cannot be either ultimate or supreme.
conclusion, that " the ultimate reality of all things animate and
inanimate is their meaning for the one mind which is the
universe in its inner aspect" is, as he surmises, 'not very
different from my own.
'
Note iv, p. 69.

VHypothhe (above,
Note
V,
93.
p.
Cf. the reference to Poincare's
vol.
i.
One
La
Science
p.
314) in support of this statement.
of
my
et
reviewers^ regrets that in this
discussion of Psychophysical Parallelism I have not dealt Avith

" more recent phases of the controversy, in which criticism of
the parallelistic theory has been undertaken by such writers as

Busse, Rickert, Wentscher, Erhardt, and others.
But the
controversy to which reference

these lectures were delivered
is
retract,
and
much
I find
detailed discussion
made did not begin

I
Still
do not
find
that I have said confirmed.
would be unsuitable
in a
work
till
after
anything to
more
like the present.
For this the reader may consult the Zeitschrift fur Philosophic und
phU. Kritik, 1898-1900.
PART IV
Note
i,
is
ment
'
and
"
'
that 'one essential of spatial

leads one of my reviewers
my
(Nature, vol.
idealism,
This statement
voluntary movement
135.
p.
perception
62, 1900, p. 26) to question 'the quality' of

to ask " where does he get the voluntary move'
am
far
from
clear as to the precise point of this
that in the reviewer's opinion

voluntary movement psychologically implicates the experience
of space, whereas in my opinion such movement is but one factor
criticism.
It
is
just possible
and what
I have called extensity diflferentiated

But I
the other, equally essential, factor.
have dealt with the psychological analysis of spatial experience
in this experience,
into local signs
is
Professor Weuley, Psychological Review, 1901, p. 298.
PART IV
at sufficient length elsewhere.
287
Cf. the article Psychology, Ency.
On 'The Sensation of
pp. 53-55.
ment,' cf AV. James, Principles of Psychology, ii. pp. 1 7 1 ff.
Brit.
9th ed.
vol. xx.
Move-
Note ii, p. 146. The discussion commencing on p. 135 and

here brought to a close has been referred to ^ as if its main
purpose were to refute Kant's theory of space.
Accordingly it
has been condemned as an ignoratio elenchi, because with Kant
a priori,' it is said, is used always in a logical sense, Avhereas in
this discussion psychological priority is meant.
The critic incidentally allows that " Kant mixes up a great deal of psychology
with his logical analysis of knowledge."
Unfortunately the
'
has not seen that it is just this psychology of Kant with

which the present ai'gument is primarily concerned. Moreover,
it implies an altogether false \dew of Kant's thought to speak of
the psychologically
innate as merely
mixed up with the
epistemologically a priori.'
Kant's a priori has everywhere its
psychological side, and is so far one with the Leibnizian innate
most of all is this true of his forms of intuition, pure space and
time.
And whereas according to him these forms lie ready in
the mind (' im Gemiithe apiiori bereit liegen '), motion and change
are altogether a posteriori and empirical.
In opposition to this it
is maintained in the text that the experience of motion and
change precede any knowledge of space and time, and are
essential constituents of such knowledge.
But the question is
too technical and extensive for discussion in a work like this.
Volumes of controversy have been already devoted to it. For
full details the curious reader may consult Vaihinger's Commentar
critic
'
'
'
'
'
zur Kant's Kritik, Bd.
Note
me now
iii,
p.
178.
ii.
At
1893.
the outset of this discussion
to try to obviate a
misunderstanding which
it
behoves
did not at
first anticipate.
In spite of the constant reference to Kant the
mention of two pairs of subjects and objects has led to misapprehension such as the following:
"Professor Ward then
presents us with two orders of duality in unity
the individual
subject and object indissolubly joined together, and the universal
subject and object
the latter being Nature and the former God.
This is his way of approaching the theological question, and it
I
closely
is
In point of fact I am
neither with a universal subject nor with a
related to that of Hegel "
here concerned
D. G. Ritchie, Nature aiid MviwL, in Phil. Rev. vol.
ix.,
1900, pp. 246
f.
EXPLANATORY NOTES
288
universal object, but vrith universal experience, Experience Avith

a capital E, the common empirical knowledge of the race (p. 152),
It is, however, quite true that Nature is the object of this
experience.
But the subject of it is not God but any individual,
who through intersubjective intercourse advances to the stage
of self-consciousness and reason ; and so, transcending the limits
of individual perceptual experience, attains to a knowledge of
The reference to two orders of

Nature or the transsubjective.
experience seemed the fairest way of setting about the problem
of establishing this continuity, which certainly could not be
taken as granted.
For on the one hand naive realism or dualism
requires subjective factors in the higher and, on the other hand,
while rationalism completely separated the higher from the lower,
even Kant failed to exhibit clearly their organic unity. Farther,
this initial distinctness of the two implied one way or other in
both forms of dualism, this sharp contrast of individual and
universal, perceptual and conceptual, brings out the difficulty of
How can experiences so distinct be organically
the problem
continuous ?
On this see next note.
;
Note iv, p. 196. The validity of the argument by which, as

supposed, this conclusion is reached has been challenged by
several of my reviewers and correspondents.
First it is said
that no transition is possible from a strictly individual experience,
that such an experience is by definition solipsistic, and so must
I
Again it is said that since " perceptions without

conceptions are blind," a purely perceptual experience can never
cure its own inherent defect and become conceptual.
In other
ever remain.
words, if universal, conceptual experience is verily a development

of an experience originally individual and perceptual, then it
must obAdously in some sort have been implicit in this from the
Assuredly not only do I admit this now, but it has
first.
The best
been all along an essential part of my argument.
reply to my critics is therefore to recall the relevant points in
this
only premising that I have never taken the absolute
disjunction as a fact, but found it already confronting us as an
assumption
the very assumption, forsooth, that I am mainly
concerned to refute.
Those epistemologists who contrast individual experience as
subjective with universal experience as objective usually accept
widel}' current in psychology
of sensations as
the definition
subjective modifications. I, on the contrary, have contended that
:
PART
289
IV
for individual experience, for psychology, our so-called 'sensa-
are not subjective, not feelings,' but objects, or rather

changes in an objective continuum, environment or non-ego.
If an experience consisting wholly of subjective modifications
tions
'
'
was a possible one, it would certainly at first sight seem that it

would inevitably be and remain solipsistic. It was this apprehension, in fact, that led Eeid, as he tells us,^ to abandon the
Berkeleian philosophy.
But further reflexion might, I think,
convince us that
" If experience were
as I have said elsewhere
throughout subjective, not merely would the term subjective itself
be meaningless, not merely would the conception of the objective
never arise, but the entirely impersonal and intransitive process
that remained, though it might be described as absolute
becoming, could not be called even solipsism, least of all real

experience." ^
Or, as Dr. Caird, in a letter to me, still more
" If we start with mere sensation as feeling,
concisely puts it
:
it is
as
much
a problem how
But
we
get into ourselves as
how we
get
even individual experience involves both

subject and object, both ego and non-ego, both self and other,
Moreover, not only has every ego
it is so far not solipsistic.
its correlative non-ego,^ but these several non-egos are not
We
mutually limited and conterminous like the cells of a hive.
may regard every non-ego or objective continuum in Leibniz's
In
fashion as the universe mirrored from a single standpoint.
other words, two individual experiences are only mutually exclusive as regards their standpoints, not as regards boundaries.
Within a certain range all is idiosyncrasy, idiomorphic, so to
Two men can never share the same organism, and what
say.
But as the range of each
one eats the other must go without.
extends in ivays that I have already described,'* mutual recognition, the indication of objects of mutual interest, and the communication of comparisons mutually verifiable, become possible
to the idiomorphic is added the anthropomorphic, which both
can share and by which both may gain.
All this, of course, implies what I have called intellective
synthesis,' ^ and here we are met by the second objection, that a
ovi of ourselves."
if
'
Intellectual Powers, Hamilton's edition, pp. 283, 285.

Perhaps I
Ency. Brit., 10th edition, vol. xxxii. p. 55a.
may
be allowed
to refer to this article for a fuller treatment of the points raised in this note.
^ Cf. p. 167 above, and Ency. Brit. I.e.
* Cf.
pp. 156 flf. above, and Ency. Brit. I.e. p. 56 n.
^
p.
164 above.
VOL.
EXPLANATORY NOTES
290
purely perceptual experience is 'blind.'

To this, I think, the
best answer is that a purely conceptual experience is 'empty.'
Again I have to urge that I have never taken this absolute
disjunction of sense and thought as valid on the contrary, this,
That such
too, is part of the dualism I am seeking to refute.
dualism of empirical and rational is not absolute is shown
by the fact that the human race has transcended it, and the
process is nowadays psychologically, and in the main, perfectly
plain.
As we have grounds for rejecting the old doctrine of
sensations as merely passive impressions, so we have grounds for
denying that these are passively built up into complex perceptions
by a quasi-mechanical process of association. As I have said
(pp. 186 fF.) the genetic treatment of psychological problems was
not in the air in Kant's day, and this fact considering his
rationalistic bias
makes his doctrine of a pure synthesis of
imagination mediating between sense and understanding all
the more striking, though it cannot be called adequate.
third objection calls for notice.
One of my ablest reviewers
suggests that I have derived the higher form of experience from
the lower by a process of abstraction.^
I do not think this
objection will be upheld by any reader who does not overlook
both my criticism of Kant's derivation of the categories and my
own derivation of them as "new fundamenta, realities that
from
cannot dawn upon isolated, perceptual experience"
:
'
'
'
'
self-conscious activity (pp. 191
fi'.).
PART V
Note i, p. 244. Mr. Bradley's words in

the content of activity as it appears to
distinction from it as it is for an outside
soul later on 1 "
He seems to think that I
full are
"What is
the soul at first, in
observer, or for the
:
have unawares made
controversial capital out of this omission of the later clause.^
confess I did not see that this omission Avas any gain to
nor indeed do I see
it
now.
My
my
whole point was and
case,
is
that
the psychological method implied in raising such a question at

all
experience.
rests upon an entirely false conception of
^
Professor Ritchie, rhil. Rev. ix. p. 265.

Some Remarks on Conatmi, in Mind, N.S. 1901, vol. x. p. 450.
PART V
291
does not first arise within an exit

as 'an appearance to the soul.'
Experience, I must still maintain, cannot be wholly resolved into
cognitive content: in order to knowing there must be being,
and in spite of Mr. Bradley's questionings I also still maintain
See next note.
that " apart from activity there is no being at all."
Activity, as I understand
perience
Note
ii,
it,
then devoid of
till
p.
247.
Objections,
partly psychological, partly
have been urged by Mr. Bradley and others

against the views of activity here maintained.
Mr. Bradley contends that though I claim to be in possession
of the idea of activity, I have not accounted for the possession,
but rather have sought to get rid of this problem by 'distinguishing between the fact of activity and our consciousness of
philosophical,
Activity I regard as a constituent of all experience

the fact.'
whatever, and the idea of activity as the exclusive possession
To account for this possession is
of self-conscious experients.
then to trace the development of self-conscious or universal
This,
experience from mere conscious or individual experience.
I think, has been done sufficiently for the purpose of my
argument and as fully as my limits allowed. I have certainly

dealt very summarily with Presentationism, the theory on
which, so far as I understand him, Mr. Bradley relies to explain
But Presentationism (or Intellectualism) has
this development.
been so often found wanting that I felt justified in ignoring it
moreover I had discussed it at some length elsewhere.^
here
I had also long ago tried to deal with Mr. Bradley's views on
;
In the last
(cf. Mind, xii. 1887, pp. 62-67, 564-575).
three volumes of Mind, Mr. Bradley has developed his doctrines
this topic
concerning practical experience in a very masterly way, and the

controversy which I have no doubt will follow the completion
of his exposition can hardly fail to remove the scandalous
neglect of this subject of which he has so long complained.
His recent papers have caused me many heart-searchings, and it
distresses me greatly to have to confess that I have not so far
been able to find any common ground from which I for my part
could profitably resume the controversy, though I suppose it
will be my duty to try.
But "however much activity is 'a fact of experience,' a
question," Mr. Bradley urges, "may still be raised as to the
ultimate truth and reality of activity."
I admit this, in so far
1
Cf.
'Modern'
Fsychologij, in
Mind, N.S.,
ii.
1S93, pp. 54-82.
EXPLANATORY NOTES
292
as I must admit that ultimate truth and reality are altogether

beyond us ; but I do not admit that there is anything within
our experience or reached by reflexion upon it that is more true
and real than activity. Mr. Bradley concludes his Appearance
and Reality with the words " Outside of spirit there is not, and
there cannot be, any reality, and the more that anything is
spiritual so much the more is it veritably real."
I am content
to abide by this.
The sort of question as to ultimate reality Avhich Mr.
Bradley perhaps had in view is actually raised by Mr. A. E.
Taylor in his able review {Mind, 1900, ix. p. 258): "In
fact, there is no environment for an ultimate and universal
mind to act against, and thus, if God is really all and
mechanism nothing, God
can be neither active nor passive."
That is to say, if there were an independent environment or mechanism for God 'to act against,' he would be
active only in our sense
he would be a mere demiurge confronted by matter and simply shaping it
and so we should
have dualism in excelsis.
But surely the old Aristotelian
and Leibnizian conception of actus purus will carry us beyond
this, yet without making divine activity illusory.
But now comes
another difficulty
"If the real world of minds should prove to
be an anarchic realm of independent and conflicting purposes,
both activity and passivity would no doubt be ultimate char'
'
'
'
'
'
we should then have the finite

and certain of our contemporary theologians, and what then would become of the divine actus purus ?
"But if, on the other hand, it (the real world of minds) is an
orderly system manifesting the guidance of a single intelligence
then there are really no conflicting purposes and no real
In other words,
acteristics of it."
God
of J. Stuart Mill
failures.
The
'consciousness of activity' can only arise
from an illusory belief in an antagonism that does not really

exist."
The seeming opposition by which we are here confronted
doubtless calls for mediation.
But we shall make a sorry
beginning if we abandon the reality of our own activity, though
that entails the reality of conflict and failure too.
And though
anarchy and government are incompatible notions, it is not
certain
that finite freedom cannot co - exist with divine
sovereignty.
To me at least it does seem certain that both
imply real activity.
Note
iii,
p.
281.
The contingency
is
not that of chance but that
PART V
293
" This very scholastic distinction between two kinds

of freedom.
of contingency is not," said the late Professor Ritchie, " further
explained.
The
assertion of contingency
'
in the very heart of
things' seems to imply a real absolute contingency, and not

merely a name for our ignorance when the causes are very
complex." ^
I cannot admit either that the distinction in
question is fairly chargeable with that excess of subtlety Avhich
the epithet scholastic implies, nor yet that it is not further
explained. On the contrary, it must be plain to the dullest that
real absolute contingency,' the purely fortuitous, is incompatible
both Avith the universal order which we strive to conceive as a
system of laws, and with the concrete drama of history
die
JFeltgeschichte ah das JVeltgericht, to use Schiller's striking phrase
which, as one increasing purpose we strive to understand.
It is plain again that the historical is not incompatible with
And yet
natural laws, but necessarily presupposes these.
such at least is my contention, and has been all through the
historical is not to be reduced to or deduced from such laws.
Several reasons for this are, I think, clearly indicated in the
immediate context, and are more fully though, for lack of space,
First, science
inadequately
elaborated in the earlier lectures.^
deals with the abstract and conceptual
history with the actual
and concrete. It is not the complexity of causes that separates
the one from the other, leaving the historical as an incommensurable remainder with which we in our ignorance are
'
'
'
'
'
'
deal.
It is the efficiency and individuality of
the causal agents that history recognises, and science repudiates,
which makes the essential difference.
Secondly, science postulates necessity
history presupposes freedom in the choice of
ends.
Lastly, this conception of ends introduces us to a new
group of categories the categories of worth or value, which
underlie every aspect of life
conative, intellectual, aesthetic,
moral and religious but are wholly foreign to the mechanical
scheme of natural science.
If the nature which that scheme
symbolises is subservient to the realm of ends, it has a meaning
as an absolute mechanism, so to say, it is meaningless.
But if
incompetent to
Philosophical Review, 1900, p. 263.

Cf. above, vol. i. pp. 179 ff., vol.
Windelband's admirable address there
ii.
pp.
cited, I
169
ff.
may now
In addition to
refer to Rickert's
und NaUortoissenschaft, 1899, and to his longer work. Die

der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffshildung :
cine logische EinIcitung in die historischen Wissenschaften, 1902.
Kulhirivissenscha/t
Grenzen
EXPLANATORY NOTES
294
nature
agents
is
is
thus subservient,
contingent to it.
its
direction
and control by
free
,"
Professor
"Contingency and freedom of the will
Eitchie continued, " prepare us to expect a system of pluralism,
.
which Professor James seems to favour. ...

God
only one among other first causes and independent
substances is at the most prvnus inter pares / and the universe
in which these substances exist is either a universe of chance (as
in Democritean atomism) or is pervaded by some spiritual
principle supreme over this limited Deity." The important problem of the One and the Many which Professor Eitchie has here
raised lies beyond the demurrer of Naturalism and Agnosticism,
But the
to which the present discussion has been confined.
conclusion, to which I think we have been led, would be almost
worthless if it foreclosed the subsequent discussion by such a
Pure chance in the
disjunction as Professor Eitchie lays down.
Democritean sense we, of course, reject equally with the blind
The serious question then
necessity of the mechanical theory.
is whether the contingency due to the freedom of the Many
reduces God to one among the rest, and requires an Absolute
beyond.
I quite admit that there is still much to do in
differentiating the conception of God, to which experience
directly leads, from the conception of the Absolute which belongs
like that
who
is
This, as part of the whole

entirely to philosophical speculation.
problem of the One and the Many will, I believe as a brilliant
French writer has already said^
be the problem of the
twentieth century
and it is already in the air. Without
attempting to anticipate that discussion here we may at least
say that a principle which resolves the freedom of the Many
into their own private illusion, and so reduces divine government to an empty make-believe, in no sense deserves to be
If divine government is a reality, our wills
called spiritual.
must be ours, though we know not how,' and yet God must
A philosophy of the Absolute incombe veritably supreme.
patible with these positions may fairly be suspected of having
'
over-reached
1
itself.
E. Boirac, L' Id6e
du Pldnommc, 1S94,
p.
247.
,;
INDEX
Absolute, the, i. 24 ff,\ as a term,
Mr. Spencer's, 219 /. ; ii.
122
267/. and God, i. 294
Abstraction and analysis distinct, i.
biology,
122
distance, i. 124, 126
certed A., ii. 261
i.
ii.
ii.
70
261
Activity, physical eliminated,
i.
at
con-
46 ff.
psychical, as illusory, ii. 41 ; yet

even so needs explaining, 48 ; as
real, 52 ff., 246, 279 ; as essential
to experience, 131, 134, 186/., 191
220 ; recognised by British
f.,
psychologists, 191 ; subjective A.,

and the unity of nature, 235 ff. ;
and
causality,
237
ff.
diflSculties
of this conception, 242 jf., 290/.

Agnosticism, i. 18 /. ; ii. 35, 210
its
relation to Naturalism, i. 20 ; ii.
211-219,229,
267/
;
Anthropomorphism, ii. 165, 257, 259

and positive science, 262/
Aristotle, his entelechy, i. 282, 298
on the Pythagoreans, ii. 69
on
knowledge as assimilation, 256
Aspects, doctrine of Two, ii. 17-22, 207
;
Bacon, Lord,
225
Association of ideas, not passive or

mechanical, ii. 223/
Atomic theorv, of Democritus, i. 122,
143, 169/; modem, 124, 312
Atoms, rigidity and
elasticity of,
i.
128
hypothetical, 307 /.
Automatism, i. 179, 291
ii.
271 ;
conscious A., theory of, ii. 22-26,
at variance with
29, 101, 212
;
i.
165
ii.
221, 222, 224,
i. 146
on definition of
115 on assimilation, 256
Berkeley, ii. 109, 136, 289
Bernard, Claude, ii. 28
Body Alpha, Neumann's, i. 72
Body, the, its relation to the mind, i.
14, 177/ ii. 4/., 35 interaction
of the two, ii. 38/., 285
Boltzman, Prof. L., on Theoretical
Bain, Dr. A.,
Mind,
ii.
Physics,
307
verse,
i.
82, 119, 150, 166,
81,
on equilibrium of the Uni209
Boscovich, Pere, his theory of matter,

i. 125/, 143, 144; ii. 104
Bradley, Mr. F. H., on phenomenalism,
i. 64
on activity, ii. 244, 290/
Brain, processes as physical, i. 9 ii. 7/
;
working model
of,
20/
instability
of B. substance no argument against
physics,
^vith
49
Analogies, danger of, i. 119, 149

mechanical, 156
Kant's A. of
Experience, ii. 239/.
and
255/.
Action, contact,
38
the two articles of, 41, 98 ;

regards psychical activity as illuin this intellectual
sory, 41
activity must be included, 41
39
mechanical determinism,
Bunge, Prof. G., on Vitalism,
ii.
i.
61
Dr. E., on development

consciousness, ii. 195/, 289
Caibd,
178
of
Calculation and understanding distinct,

Cf. 280
ii. 86, 273.
Causality, principle of, a postulate of
source of, in conscience, i. 175
scious activity, ii. 193, 237 /.,
247 ; scientific C. excludes effi;
ciency, 241,
295
247
INDEX
296
Cause, elimination of the conception,

i.
62, 64, 67, 139; ii. 4, 238,
246
278
/.,
" formal " and
in psychologj', 5 ;
" eminent " C, the
distinction applicable in psychophysical problem, 73 /.

C. and
Law, 237, 248
;
49
CliflFord, J. K., on molecules, i. 100
on
on perfect fluid, 131 /.
/.
kinetic energy, 163 on mind-stuff,
177; ii. 17; on psychophysical
parallelism, 13-16, 25
CoUocations, i. 47/., 207, 225
Consciousness, its " contents" nowadays
Chalmers,
T.,
on
collocationfl, 1.47/.,
replace the soul, ii. 4 ; as "collateral product " of brain work,

content of C,
31/., 36, 101, 106
a misleading terra. 111 ; "C. in
;
general," 171, 185, 197
Contingency, ii. 280/., 292/

Continuity and evolution, i. 259, 283
Cotes, Roger, his three classes of natural
philosophers, i. 87 ; on gravity, 125
Crook es, Sir W., on atoms, i. 103, 106,
224
240
Cuvier,
i.
on distribution of elements,
du Bois - Eeymond,
E., on Laplace's
imaginary intelligence, i. 41, 170
on science as atheistic, ii. 277
du Bois-Reymond, P., on atoms, i, 123
Duhem, Prof., quoted, i. 164
Dynamics, abstract, its method, i. 51
its laws, 58/, 67, 77
ff., 138
its application to phenomena, 67 Jf.,
70 /., 79 /, 138 /. its hypo;
thetical
character,
153
71
ii.
81,
83,
138,
Economics, suggested parallels of, with

physics, i. 110
ii. 75
Effects, Multiplication of, i. 233-237
Ego and non-Ego as concrete universe,
;
ii.
167/, 264/
Energetics, science
of,
157, 169
i.
Energy, Conservation of,

170-175, 215 /.;
214
postulate, 172,
11, 91, 156,
i.
ii.
75
80
/.;
as
what
mind a form
ii.
energy, 157 jf.; is

of ? ii. 77
relation to matter, i.
159/".
mechanical
kinetic, 163
equivalents of, 163, 167
ii. 75
possible unkno^NTi transformations
Dissipation of,
of, i. 167/, 290
will not suffice to
192/, 199
Conservaexplain Evolution, 216
is
279
7,
Daltos,
his colour-blindness,
ii.
168
Darwin, on the descent of Man, i. 7 ;

Origin of Species, 273 on natural
selection, 274, 281
on Lamarck,
279/ on instincts, ii. 39
Death, i. 289
Descartes, i. 165
ii.
4, 25, 28, 92 ;
accepted mechanical theory, i. 166
animals
on
as automata. 291
;
ii. 36
on error, 43 on man as
intellectual and active,
51
his
his Mathesis universalis, 87
rationalism,
on corporeal
180
;
substance, 193/
Dissolution, i. 191, 198
tion of E. and Mind,

Source of E., ii. 80
ii.
36/, 83
Environment and organism, i. 14

species of,
antagonism of, 289
297
Epiphenomenou, i. 178 ii. 37, 100 jf.,
106
Ether, the, one or more, i. 113 jf., 116
mechanics of, 114, 117 primordial,
;
118, 128/, 311
Evolution, chemical,
233/, 315
treats
i.
107, 112, 190,
Theory of
E., 186/.,
Universe as a single
188 /.
E. with guid;
the
object,
without,
and
205 /
primary and secondary, 207 /
Mr. Spencer's formula for, 212
biological and mechanical, 272,
ance,
Drude, Prof. P., on ether, i. 117

Dualism, of matter and mind, i. 13,
178, 269 ; ii. 6, 35 /., 67, 83, 87,
pheno103, 106, 179, 181, 214
menal D., ii, 108 question of its
refutation, 153
its origin traced
to "naive realism," 171 ; and to
"introjection," 172
problem
of, wrongly stated, 198 jf. ; D. of
reason and sense, ii. 179, 183
;
275/
Experience, general conception
of,
ii.
110 Jf., 125 /. as life, 111, 131134 duality of, 112, 125, 129
unity of, 112, 130, 160 individual
and universal, distinguished, 152
unity of U.E., 196-198
/., 287
;
;;
297
INDEX
characteristics
of
Homogeneity, Instability
developing E.,
and expertness, 160 /.

Universal E. and intersubjective
the subject
intercourse, 165 ff.
of, 178 /., 185 /., 196 /.; the
156-165
184 ; higher
in relacategories of, 185-196
tion to Causality, 239-241, 265.
"External and internal," ambiguity of,
objects
179,
of,
ii.
115, 127, 129, 174/.
External World, problem

154/., 179
Eye, the, Sturmius on, i. 6
323;
233,
summary
of,
on,
227
Mr. Spencer's
instances of, 228/

Hume, on divinity and
metaphysics,
on causality, 175 ii. 221on unity of consciousness,

;
228, 234
Huxley, T. H., on progress of science,
on chemical evolution,
i.
17 /.
112 on mental states as symbols,
179 on characters of life, ii. 26
on animal automatism, 31, 52
on volition, 41
on necessity, 43,
213 on freedom, 45
inconsistencies here, 54 /.
his agnostic
gospel, i. 18/.; ii. 210/
its imi.
17
225
of,
ii.
109,
Helmholtz
on, 7
Faraday,
222-
i.
222 /.,;
difficulties,
128
Ferrier, J. F., on dualism, ii. 120, 199/
Fluid, primordial of Lord Kelvin, i.
131-138 ; ii. 261
its stability,
how secured, i. 134
Force, its present meaning, i. 60-62
centres of, 126
not a cause, 61
Mr. Spencer's uses of, 213 /.,
235, 241
Freedom, Laplace on, i. 41, 177
Huxley on, ii. 45 / Spinoza on,
45
F. and reason, 281
i,
215/
plicit idealism,
Hylozoism,
i.
177,
ii.
71
Idealism or Spiritualism, elements of,

in Mr. Spencer, i. 269
ii.
270
in Descartes, ii. 180
in Huxley,
;
215/
see also
Monism
i.
ii.
246 per58, 60, 133
haps nothing altogether inert, ii.
of Lord Kelvin's medium,
68, 83
experience of, 162 range
i. 133/
of the law of problematic, ii. 69,
Kant's view of, 71 ; conse85
quence of limiting, 72
Inertia,
God, Laplace's dictum, 1. 4, 23 ii. 274

and mechanism, i. 48 / ii. 266,
274 as Unknowable, 267/.
Gorgias the sophist, ii. 168
;
Guidance, without work,
ii.
62,
83
Hamilton,
Sir W., on memory, ii. 159

on Reid's use of "object, 165
Hegel and Mr. Spencer contrasted, i.
247 on abstraction, 258
Helmholtz, H. von, i. 7, 83, 200, 203
on vortex-motion, 128
on Conservation of Energy, 160 ff., 173,
2\bf.
Heredity, i. 277, 300/., 327
Herschel, Sir J., on molecules as
" manufactured," i. 100, 111 ;
quoted, 247
Hertz, H., i. 115, 128, 156
Heterogeneity, instability of, i. 231 /.
'
Inertial system,
i.
72/
Intersubjective intercourse, ii. 166 /.;

knowledge resulting from it, 168
a
/; leads to dualism, 170
possible psychology
reason, ii. 256, 264
Introjection,
ii.
175
of,
and
172
Hicks, Prof.
Address,
W.
i.
M.,
his Brit. Assn.
129/., 145, 146, 153,
165
Historical,
James, Prof. W., quoted, i. 327 ii. 39

Joule, J. P., on Conservation of Energy,
i. 173, 174
;
Kant, on the decline of Philosophy,

;
contrasted with
the,
180
169/., 280/., 293
scientific,
i.
ii.
89,
the
163,
i.
on the mechanical theory,

on hylo166 on causality, 175
ii.
zoism, 177
on man as
71
phenomenon and noumenon, ii. 82
on experience, 109 /.
171, 185,
on relation of subject and
197
object, 113 /
120
on the
notion of a phenomenon, 121, 128
21
his synthetic unity of apperception,
134,
186,
228,
234
on space,
INDEX
298
137, 140/., 287;
tion of rationalism
his reconcilia-
and empiricism,
181/.; defects of his first Critique,

186 /.; partly met in the second,
and in his posthumous

on substance, 194, 239;
on cause, 223/"., 239 on "possible
experience," 250/ on determinant
and reflective judgment, 272/
189
/.
work, 191
Kelvin, Lord, his theory of vortex-atoms,

i. 87 Jf.; sure about the luminiferous ether, 113 ; his primordial
118
ether,
104
ii.
theory of matter, i. 137

pation of energy, 199
on kinetic
on dissi;
200
on
life,
27
ii.
Kinematics, relation to dynamics, i. 57,

replacing dynamics iu the
66
vortex-atom theory, 146/
KirchhofF, on force, i. 61 ; on physics
;
as descriptive, 62, 83
Knowledge, Kelativity
theory of
etic
what
natural,
of,
and the kin-
matter,
it
i.
implies,
Locke, recognised the activity of mind,

ii.
51
on problem of external
world, 109 ; on space and time,
140/, 148 ; on knowledge, 222
Lodge, Prof. 0., on primordial ether, i.
146
ii.
99
/.; 270 #.
132
Lotze, on treating the universe quanti-
218 on psychical initia82 on time, 150/; on

action, 246, 279
on form and
reality, 252, 262 on phenomenon,
275 on the Supreme Good, 277
tatively,
tive,
i.
ii.
MacGregor,
Mach,
Prof.
Prof. J. G., i. 72, 78

E., on cause, i. 62
on
absolute rotation, 75/.; on reality

and symbols, 179
Mansel, his Bampton Lectures and Mr.
Spencer, ii. 268
Mass, the conception of, i. 54/, 59, 163
a quantity not a ffubstance, 57, 62
quantity of inertia, 58 ; ii. 86
Conservation of, i. 85 ; the simplest
assumption, 91
Materialism rejected by the agnostic,
ii.
i.
18
99, 105, 106, 206 ;
its terminology retained, i. 19
Matter, distinct from mass, i. 54, 57 ;
Ladd,
Prof. G. T.,
ii.
174, 176
174, 176
Lamarck, his laws, i. 273, 277/.; dis-
Lagrange,
i.
279
Laplace, no need of God in his system,
i.
4 23, 64, 275
his imaginary
intelligence, i. 41, 176, 178
E. du
Bois-Reymond on it, 41 /. not
omniscient 42
Jevons's reference
to,
on dimensions of the
45
universe, 94
Larmor, Dr. J. J., on the kinetic theory
of matter, i. 129, 149; on ether, 311
Leibniz, on a "plenum" i. 151; his philosophy, 181 on the Cartesian vncredit of,
83
fluxus physicus, ii. 60,

organisms machines ad
on continuity of
things,
inf.,
90
on
his
69;
in-
dividual experience, 119 its limit,

156 each of his monads unique,
167 his consecution des bites, 184,
224 on substance, 193 on know;
ledge,
222
i.
8 /., 261/; relation
to the mechanical theory, 177,
200
L. anabolic, 289
ii.
26
and mechanism, i. 291 /.; ii. 27
/.. 82
;
ii.
i.
what
87, 118, 127,
primacy
unknown,
it is,
57
i.
hydrokinetic theory
of,
128-137
of,
assumed
273
41, 58, 98 /.,
ii.
implies mind, 215 /

Matter and Mind, dualism of
see
Dualism as unknowns, i. 18
Maxwell, J. Clerk, i. 54, 55, 57, 59,
115, 125, 149, 164, 313 ii. 61 on
molecules, i. 99^. on ethers, 113
on Lord Kelvin's "])lemim," 134,
137 his "sorting demon," 201/
Mayer, J. R., on Conservation of Energy,
i. 173, 174
Mechanical bias, i.
164-167,
169
;
88, 262,
ii.
272
Mechanical models, i. 118/,

Mechanical theory, i. 40 ff. Laplace's
statement of, 41, 50 its supremacy, 96, 169
taken as reality,
130 ii. 67 ; summary of results,
138-148 its formal character,
1.
ii. 66, 260, 262 /., 272
151 /
no end to, i. 153 ii. 261 influence of imagination in, i. 165, 169
ii.
QQ
Descartes and Kant on,
;
Life, origin of,

of,
85
85
ii.
INDEX
166
involved
determinisin
Natural
in,
69
attempts to find
loopholes in, 59-64
Mechanics
see also Dj'namics
application to molecular physics, i.
ii.
66,
59,
95/., 118, 137, 164; indkectness

iL 71 ;
of this application, 98
;
and Dynamics, distinction of, 124

Molar and Molecular M., their
;
140-143
Memory, problem of, ii. 156-159
Mercier, Dr. C, quoted, ii. 23
I\Ietageometry, i. 21
Mill, J. Stuart, sceptical about ether,
i. 113
on the function of labour,
200 on induction, ii. 226 /. on
the range of natural law, 233
Mind and brain, i. 9 /"., 292 concomitance of M. with life, 281 jf.
control of matter by M., denied, ii.
consequences of admitting, ii.
38
72 /., 78 use of the term, 119
Molecules, i. 93 /.
mechanical treatment of, 95/. as "manufactured
articles," 99-103, 108, 112
their
how far hypoimmutability, 104
thetical, 109
Moleschott, i. 278
relation,
Momentum,
i.
67
conservation
of,
by Mr. Spencer, 228

misunderstood by Descartes, ii.
forgotten
60
Monism,
Leibniz on, 60, 83

naturalistic or agnostic,
ii.
16,
objections to,
35/., 101, 107, 202
206 /. unstable, 208 capitulaspiritualistic, as
tion of, 229 /.
problem, 202, 229 ; as result,
lect. XX. 259 /.
Motion, absolute, i. 69, 150
relative,
72 first law of, its application,
;
resolution of phenomena
72, 77
ii. 260, 278 ; coninto, 140, 150
;
tinuity of postulated, in
atom theory, i. 146/.
Naturalism,
uncritical,
three real
rejects
186
20,
i,
22
ii.
principles
spiritualistic
vortex-
ii.
104,
of,
i.
87
247
40
terminologj',
assumes
i. 19
58, 100/., 247
the primacy of physical phenobut does not
mena, 98 /., 106
escape from spiritualistic implica266
tions, 262/
;
ii.
299selection,
;
Nature, laws
46, 48
of,
274,
i.
ii.
92
297, 302
i. 300, 327-333
variations,
as "secondary causes,"L
as causal at
281,
275,
and
all,
ii.
22>T ff.
compared with jural laws, ii. 249

two senses of, 259 ; as
ff., 259
Uniformity
relations, 260, 278/
of N., and experience, ii. 160 ff.
;
the conception of this uniformity,

teleological in origin,
219^.; and
221 /., 232 /. ;

distinct from conception of active
cause, 241
unity of N., and
as
intelligence, 235 /., 266
a
postulate,
254
teleological,
itself
274
/.,
God's non-interference with, 277

Necessity, the conception of, ii. 43/,
natural N.,
213, 217 /., 227
;
rational, 281
45, 278
Neo-Darwinians, i. 273/, 300/, 327/
Neo-vitalism, i. 178, 285
Newton, Sir
Isaac, his recognition of
on time, space,
6, 43
on absolute
and motion, 68-74
rotation, 73
on the range of
mechanical principles, 82, 84, 155
on contact action, 122, 124
Nihilism, physical, i. 140 /., 150
ii.
God,
i.
3,
260, 271
Objective, ambiguous term, ii. 116

Objects of individual and of universal
experience,
ii.
166^.
Organisms and machines,

ii.
Palet,
282,
i.
291/
27/
his Natural Theology,
i.
psychophysical, i. 9 ff.,
178 ii. 5/, 109,273, 285/.; meanlogically incoming of, 13 ^.
patible with dualism, 24, 29, 37
leads to monism, 31/., 93, 208/
Paulsen, Prof. F., on active attitude,
ii. 188 ; on conceiving and understanding, 280
Pearson, Prof. Karl, i. 57. 83, 117
Phenomenon, what the term implies, i.
24; ii. 104/, 214, 275/ relation
Kant's use
to Absolute, i. 26, 39
of, ii. 128 ; 7. per se, a contradiction of Naturalism, 104, 181, 272,
Parallelism,
;
276
Physics, as
merely descriptive,
i.
62,
INDEX
300
66
mechanical description
adequate to, 116, 138, 153, 164
;
if
Plants, biological character of,
i. 282,
287, 329
Poincare, Prof. H., i. 115, 314, 317
Presentationism, ii. 123, 126, 209
Protagoras, his Homo Mensjira, ii. 256
Protista, the, i. 283, 287/.

Psychical, processes, ii. 9 f,
of, 11
i.
151
ii.
69
Qdalitt replaced by quantity
in the
mechanical theory,
i.
96 /., 112
279 relations of, non-plus the
Laplacean calculator, 176/.
ii.
Rationalism, dogmatic, ii. 109

its
dualism of reason and experience,
;
179/
;
178/., 196
Reality, and symbols, i. 179/
perceptual, ii. 154 /., 168
as concrete, ii. 87, 89, 279
R. and
appearance, 166
Reflex movements, i. 286
ii. 38
Reid, ii. 109, 155
on memory, 159 ;
use of " object," 165
Reversibility, mechanical, i. 203 /. ;
absence of, in the universe a
;
mechanical theory,
such absence may point
difficulty for the
to a " source " of energy, 80

Reynolds, Prof. 0., his Rede Lecture,
1.
313
87/
Segregation, i. 237-242
Selection
see Natural ; Sexual, i. 278 ;
Human, i. 278 Subjective, 294329
297,
Organic, 294, 329 /.
ii. 92, 131, 161
Self-conservation, i. 290-294 ; ii. 92,
:
134
131,
and
progression,
i.
298/
Sensations, not psychologically explicable, ii. 25 ; not subjective modi-
127/, 289;
fications, 113-117,
have "form." 117
Sense, distinction of internal

ternal, ii. 19
Skin-colouration, i. 278
Solipsism, ii. 168, 197
Space, absolute,
i.
68
ii.
and ex-
142/, 146
71
ii. 143
S. and
Lord Kelvin's medium, 132 ; perception of, implies activity, ii. 135
leads on to conception
/., 286
of, 139 /.,
149 /.
views of
i.
Kant
and
Locke
"here"
140 /
142; empty
on,
as "origin,"
144/
S.,
Spencer, Mr. Herbert, on the Absolute,
24 ii. 267/. ; on science, i. 26

on Conservation of Mass, 86
on Conservation of Energy, 171/ ;
on Evolution, 187/, 212/., 318/.;
on eqv.Uibriuvi vwhile, 198, 321
on Persistence of Force, 215-220
1.
;
;
sources
philosophy, 243,
253
his procedure described,
illustrated and criticised, 246-259,
Brit. Quarterly on, 255 ;
270
confuses abstraction vvith analysis, 256 ;
on the origin of life,
262 /. on the transition to mind,
265 /., 286, 327 ; on Equilibration, 275 ; his criticism of this
of
his
Riehl, Prof. A., on Mr. Spencer,

on sensations, ii. 119
Romanes,
Realism, naive and the R. of science,

ii.
100
naive R. and the transsubjective, 171, 173
fallacy of,
81
Orbis
scientiarum, 27, 38, 40
contrasted with the concrete world, ii.
relative,
ii.
99
ii.
meaning
Psychological and psychophysical confusion of, ii. 10/., 21/., 117, 127
Psychology, and physics, i. 15
ii. 4/.,
16, 22/., 108/., 124/., 153, 173,
179, 198
Pythagoreans,
and the mechanical
theor}',
on the progress of, 17

and nescience, i. 26 /.
i.
225
280
1.
Rotation, absolute, i. 73-80

Riicker, Sir A., his British Association
Address, i. 305-315
work, 317 /. ; his mission, ii. 87,

on consciousness, 129
91
on
psychophysical parallelism, 285
Spinoza on self - conservation, i. 290
and parallelism, ii. 13, 18
on
freedom, 45 his monism, 211, 273
Stallo, J. B., on a body and its relations, i. 80
;
Science, its non-theistic character, i.

20
ii.
its limitations
5,
277
;
and gaps,
i.
8/., 27,
30/
Huxley
INDEX
Statistics, in physics,
i.
110/.
Dr. G. F., his Analytic Psychology referred to, ii. 187

Strasburger, Prof. E., on organisms as
machines, i. 293
Struggle for existence, i. 274, ii. 92
Stumpf, Prof. C, quoted, ii. 133
Stout,
Subject, and object, their relation in

presentation, ii. 117-123 ; view of
Kant, 113 /., 120 /. ; of Fichte,
113, 120 ; of Leibniz, 119 ; of
Neo-Kantians. 122
Subjective, an ambiguous term,
ii.
119
S. activity, see Activity
Substance, elimination of the conception, i. 57, 64, 67, 122, 139, ii. 4
retained by Prof. Tait, 146
for
Descartes and Kant primarily quan;
titative,
and mechanical, antinomy of, ii.

which is fundamental ?
58, 63
210, 218, 229/., 253/, 264, 285
Theism, demurrer of modern thought
against, i. 37. 39
ii.
283
and
poljlheism, 265
Mr. Spencer on,
;
267/
Theologj-,
Natural,
i.
6,
23;
Bridge-
water Treatises on, 6 ; Rational,

23 Emotional, 31 /.
Thomson and Tait, Natural Philosophv,
i. 57, 162
Thomson, Prof. J. J., quoted, i. 147 ;
his "corpuscles," 312
Time, absolute, 68 mean, 70 /.
perception of, analysed, iL 146-148 ;
conception of, 148/
"Transsubjective," meaning of, ii. 170
;
193/.
Substantiality, source of the category of,

ii.
192-196 ; implies causality,
Universe,
it
193/.
Survival of the
i. 14, 275
ii. 92
and the Kirchoff
179 and reality, 179
fittest,
school on,
i.
evolved?
is it
i.
188/
is
195/
limited?
Unknowable,
the.
i.
24
ii.
IS,
101,.
207/, 267/
Huxley
Symbols,
301
276
Mr. Spencer on, i.
Mental states as, ii. 49
Sj-nthesis, intellective, ii. 164
"anoetic," 187, Kant's use of, 234, 236
Vitalism, i. 178
Vortex-atoms, theory of, i. 87 /., 118,
mass and quasi128, 137, 144
mass of, 135/.
Tait, Prof. P. G., i. 57, 62 his Inertial

system, 73
on mass and energy,
on matter, ii. 86
158/.
Wallace, A.
/.
269
ii.
Human
Teleologieal factors in evolution,
/., 288/.,
290-300;
ii.
277
92; T.
i.
R.,
i.
Selection,
273,
275
on
278
Weismann, Prof. A., i. 273, 300/

Wundt, Prof. W., on psychophysical
THE END
parallelism,
ii.
30

Naturalism and Agnostism

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Naturalism and Agnostism

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NATUKALISM

FELLOW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY

HON. LL.D. EDINBURGH

die Gesetzmdssigkeit der

Natur fur das

wortlich mackt, teas wirklich geschieht, behauptet damit,

dass sie Gedanken realisiere,

First Edition (in tvjo volumes) published June 1899

Second Edition August 1903.

What is meant by the physical

series readily ascertained.

of the psychical series not so clear.

consciousness as a unity for

a series of events for the psychophysicist.

only Matter-stuff over

assumes that two incompatible standpoints can be stereoscoped into one

so-called Tioo-Aspects theory

they are got over.

some form of crude monism, or one

either lapses into

Constant parallelism plus absolute

logically so unstable a position that this theory

Among scientific men

usually given to the material

maintains that sensation

The very statement is

Mind thus becomes impotent to

really at variance with itself.

elsewhere assumes that mind

(2) the physicist proper declares that

the laws of matter alone will not explain

However, taking the doctrine as

stands, there are these

(a) the primacy

Huxley's endeavour to save himself from the charge of fatalism

activity within that

then activity nowhere

illusion or error possible ?

The psychical series will not resolve into a series

THE SECOND VOLUME

antinomy thus reveals

that of the teleological and the

The conscious automaton theory

the result of the

Attempts to find a half-way through loopholes within the

for materialistic tenninology.

SDMMART AND REFLEXIONS

but with a descriptive instrument of uncertain range. Facts

Even what can be mechanically

described need not be,

impossible to divest living beings of "internal determina-

and causa eminens. Physics recognises

Conservation of energy essentially a law of exchanges. That the

in character, not proven

theoretical physicist having eliminated causation,

of irreversibility suggests that

not a mere mechanism.

scribes the utterances of real things

The physicist only deand the after-course of

these utterances, so far as left alone.

interference, but prefers a

rather than orderly

Such direction impossible

rather than living as the type of such beings