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People vs.

Judge Villarama
FACTS: Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. After the prosecution rested
its case, counsel for private respondent verbally manifested in open court that private respondent was willing to
change his former plea of not guilty to that of guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No.
6425.
Respondent Judge issued an order directing private respondent to secure the consent of the prosecutor to the change
of plea.
The prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense.
Accused filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense, alleging that the
Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a
lesser offense. Respondent judge granted accuseds motion and convicted him guilty beyond reasonable-doubt of the
crime of violation of Section 17, Republic Act No. 6425 thus this instant petition for review.
Counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondents change of plea and his conviction to the
lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer open to review otherwise his
constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated.
ISSUE: W/N accused can invoke double jeopardy?
HELD: NO. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private respondents change
of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private respondent cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more
pertinent and applicable provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117 which states:
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily
includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances:
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of the offended party;

Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16
of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party, i.e., the
state. More importantly, the trial courts approval of his change of plea was irregular and improper.

People v. City Court of Manila


Facts: On Oct. 17, 1972, Diolito dela Cruz figured in an accident. The next day an info for serious physical injuries
thru reckless imprudence (SPIRI) was filed against private respondent driver of the truck. On Oct. 18, the victim
died. On Oct. 20, private respondent was arraigned on the charge of SPIRI; he pleaded guilty. On Oct. 24, an info for
homicide thru reckless imprudence (HRI) was filed against private respondent. On Nov. 17 city court of Mla
dismissed above info on the ground of double jeopardy.
Issue: WON there was double jeopardy.
Ruling: Where the victim of an accident died 2 days prior to the arraignment of the accused who pleaded guilty to an
info for SPIRI, he can no longer be charged with HRI as no new fact supervened after the arraignment.
Melo v. People supra held that where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured
person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. Above case not
applicable in the instant case because there was no supervening event

People vs. Judge Consulta


Facts: On June 23, 1973, petitioner Manuel Geromo filed with the Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay, a
complaint (Criminal Case No. 4578) against private respondent Lea B. Olaguer charging her with violation of the
Usuary Law (Act 2655, Sec. 1 in relation to Section 19). Upon arraignment, private respondent pleaded not guilty
and immediately moved orally to quash the complaint on the ground that it charges no offense.
On July 17, 1973, pursuant to the order of the Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay, private respondent filed' a
written motion to quash the aforesaid complaint alleging "that the allegations contained in the above-entitled case or
the facts charged do not constitute an offense (Paragraph (e), See. 2, Rule 117 of the New Rules of Court).
On January 31, 1974, the Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay ordered the dismissal of the complaint against
private respondent. Petitioner Manuel Geromo filed a motion to reconsider' said order and/or motion to reinstate or
accept an amended complaint against private respondent but the same was denied. As a result petitioner filed a

petition for certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Albay (Case No. 5003) smiling the order of the Municipal
Court of Guinobatan, Albay, dismissing the complaint he filed against private respondent.
On June 7, 1974, the, Court of First Instance of Albay dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
although it made known to petitioner that another complaint may be against private respondent in accordance with
the provisions of Section 3, Rule 117.
On June 17, 1974, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Albay, the respondent Court herein, another
complaint (Criminal Case No. 4738) for violation of the Usury Law against private respondent. But the respondent
Court dismissed the same upon a motion to quash filed by private respondent on the ground that the filing of the
second complaint will put the accused in double joepardy. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said order
but the same was denied by the respondent Court.
Issue: whether or not the quashal or dismissal of of Criminal Case No. 4578 of the Municipal Court of Guinobatan,
Albay, against private respondent upon motion to quash filed by the latter and the subsequent filing of another
complaint (Criminal Case No. 4738) with the respondent Court against her for the same offense had placed private
respondent in double jeopardy.

Held: NO, The posture taken by the respondent Court that the dismissal of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 4738
against private respondent is a bar to the subsequent filing of another complaint against her for the same offense on
the ground that the private respondent would be placed in double jeopardy, is wrong. It will be noted that the order
sustaining the motion to quash the complaint against petitioner was based on Subsection (a) of Section 2 of Rule 117
of the Rules of Court that the facts charged in the complaint do not constitute an offense. If this is so then the
dismissal of said complaint will not be a bar to petition for the same offense, for it is provided in Section 8 of Rule
117 of the Rules of Court that an order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense unless the motion was base on the grounds specified in Section 2, Subsection (f) and (b) of. this rule
Furthermore, the quashing of the first complaint (Criminal Case No. 4738) against private respondent for
insufficiency as prayed for by the latter can in no way be used by him to plead that he has already been placed in
jeopardy. 4 The act of private respondent in asking for the dismissal of the complaint against him operates as a
waiver, of her defense of double jeopardy in the second prosecution for the same offense. When a criminal case is
dismissed upon the express application of the defendant, the dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense because his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional prerogative
against double jeopardy as he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering
judgment of conviction against him

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