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For other uses, see Concept (disambiguation).

A concept is an abstraction or generalization from expe-

rience or the result of a transformation of existing con- cepts. The concept reifies all of its actual or potential in- stances whether these are things in the real world or other ideas. Concepts are treated in many if not most disci- plines both explicitly, such as in psychology, philosophy, etc., and implicitly, such as in mathematics, physics, etc.

and implicitly, such as in mathematics , physics , etc. When the mind makes a generalization

When the mind makes a generalization such as the concept of tree, it extracts similarities from numerous examples; the simpli- fication enables higher-level thinking.

In metaphysics, and especially ontology, a concept is a

fundamental category of existence. In contemporary phi- losophy, there are at least three prevailing ways to under- stand what a concept is: [1]

Concepts as mental representations, where concepts are entities that exist in the brain,

Concepts as abilities, where concepts are abilities peculiar to cognitive agents, and

Concepts as abstract objects, where objects are the


constituents of propositions that mediate between thought, language, and referents.

1 Etymology

The term “concept” is traced back to 1554–60 (Latin conceptum – “something conceived”), [2] but what is to- day termed “the classical theory of concepts” is the the- ory of Aristotle on the definition of terms. The meaning of “concept” is explored in mainstream information sci- ence, [3][4] cognitive science, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. In computer and information science contexts, especially, the term 'concept' is often used in unclear or inconsistent ways. [5]

2 Abstract objects

Main article: Abstract object

In a platonist theory of mind, concepts are construed as abstract objects. [6] This debate concerns the ontological status of concepts – what they are really like.

There is debate as to the relationship between concepts and natural language. [1] However, it is necessary at least to begin by understanding that the concept “dog” is philo- sophically distinct from the things in the world grouped by this concept – or the reference class or extension. [7] Concepts that can be equated to a single word are called “lexical concepts”. [1]

Study of concepts and conceptual structure falls into the disciplines of philosophy, psychology, and cognitive sci- ence. [8]

In the simplest terms, a concept is a name or label that regards or treats an abstraction as if it had concrete or material existence, such as a person, a place, or a thing. It may represent a natural object that exists in the real world like a tree, an animal, a stone, etc. It may also name an artificial (man-made) object like a chair, com- puter, house, etc. Abstract ideas and knowledge domains such as freedom, equality, science, happiness, etc., are also symbolized by concepts. It is important to realize that a concept is merely a symbol, a representation of the abstraction. The word is not to be mistaken for the thing. For example, the word “moon” (a concept) is not the large, bright, shape-changing object up in the sky, but only represents that celestial object. Concepts are created



(named) to describe, explain and capture reality as it is known and understood.

3 Issues in concept theory

3.1 A priori concepts

Kant declared that human minds possess pure or a pri- ori concepts. Instead of being abstracted from individ- ual perceptions, like empirical concepts, they originate


the mind itself. He called these concepts categories,


the sense of the word that means predicate, attribute,

characteristic, or quality. But these pure categories are predicates of things in general, not of a particular thing. According to Kant, there are 12 categories that consti- tute the understanding of phenomenal objects. Each cat- egory is that one predicate which is common to multiple empirical concepts. In order to explain how an a priori concept can relate to individual phenomena, in a man- ner analogous to an a posteriori concept, Kant employed the technical concept of the schema. He held that the ac- count of the concept as an abstraction of experience is only partly correct. He called those concepts that result from abstraction “a posteriori concepts” (meaning con- cepts that arise out of experience). An empirical or an a posteriori concept is a general representation (Vorstel- lung) or non-specific thought of that which is common to several specific perceived objects (Logic, I, 1., §1, Note



concept is a common feature or characteristic. Kant

investigated the way that empirical a posteriori concepts

are created.

The logical acts of the understanding by which concepts are generated as to their form are:

1. comparison, i.e., the likening of mental images to one another in relation to the unity of consciousness;

2. reflection, i.e., the going back over differ- ent mental images, how they can be com- prehended in one consciousness; and fi- nally

3. abstraction or the segregation of every- thing else by which the mental images differ

In order to make our mental images into con- cepts, one must thus be able to compare, re- flect, and abstract, for these three logical op- erations of the understanding are essential and general conditions of generating any concept

whatever. For example, I see a fir, a willow, and a linden. In firstly comparing these ob- jects, I notice that they are different from one another in respect of trunk, branches, leaves, and the like; further, however, I reflect only on what they have in common, the trunk, the branches, the leaves themselves, and abstract from their size, shape, and so forth; thus I gain a concept of a tree. — Logic, §6

3.2 Embodied content

Main article: Embodied cognition

In cognitive linguistics, abstract concepts are transforma- tions of concrete concepts derived from embodied expe- rience. The mechanism of transformation is structural mapping, in which properties of two or more source do- mains are selectively mapped onto a blended space (Fau- connier & Turner, 1995; see conceptual blending). A common class of blends are metaphors. This theory con- trasts with the rationalist view that concepts are percep- tions (or recollections, in Plato's term) of an indepen- dently existing world of ideas, in that it denies the ex- istence of any such realm. It also contrasts with the em- piricist view that concepts are abstract generalizations of individual experiences, because the contingent and bodily experience is preserved in a concept, and not abstracted away. While the perspective is compatible with Jamesian pragmatism, the notion of the transformation of embod- ied concepts through structural mapping makes a distinct contribution to the problem of concept formation.



Main article: Ontology

Plato was the starkest proponent of the realist thesis of universal concepts. By his view, concepts (and ideas in general) are innate ideas that were instantiations of a tran- scendental world of pure forms that lay behind the veil of the physical world. In this way, universals were explained as transcendent objects. Needless to say this form of real- ism was tied deeply with Plato’s ontological projects. This remark on Plato is not of merely historical interest. For example, the view that numbers are Platonic objects was revived by Kurt Gödel as a result of certain puzzles that he took to arise from the phenomenological accounts. [9]

Gottlob Frege, founder of the analytic tradition in phi- losophy, famously argued for the analysis of language in terms of sense and reference. For him, the sense of an expression in language describes a certain state of affairs in the world, namely, the way that some object is pre- sented. Since many commentators view the notion of


Classical theory


sense as identical to the notion of concept, and Frege re- gards senses as the linguistic representations of states of affairs in the world, it seems to follow that we may un- derstand concepts as the manner in which we grasp the world. Accordingly, concepts (as senses) have an onto- logical status (Morgolis:7)

According to Carl Benjamin Boyer, in the introduction to his The History of the Calculus and its Conceptual Devel- opment, concepts in calculus do not refer to perceptions. As long as the concepts are useful and mutually compat- ible, they are accepted on their own. For example, the concepts of the derivative and the integral are not con-

sidered to refer to spatial or temporal perceptions of the external world of experience. Neither are they related

in any way to mysterious limits in which quantities are

on the verge of nascence or evanescence, that is, com- ing into or going out of existence. The abstract concepts are now considered to be totally autonomous, even though

they originated from the process of abstracting or taking away qualities from perceptions until only the common, essential attributes remained.

4 Mental representations

Main article: Mental representation

In a physicalist theory of mind, a concept is a mental representation, which the brain uses to denote a class of

things in the world. This is to say that it is literally, a sym- bol or group of symbols together made from the physical material of the brain. [7][8] Concepts are mental represen- tations that allow us to draw appropriate inferences about the type of entities we encounter in our everyday lives. [8] Concepts do not encompass all mental representations, but are merely a subset of them. [7] The use of concepts

is necessary to cognitive processes such as categorization,

5 Notable theories on the structure of concepts

5.1 Classical theory

Main article: Definitionism

The classical theory of concepts, also referred to as the empiricist theory of concepts, [7] is the oldest theory about the structure of concepts (it can be traced back to

Aristotle [8] ), and was prominently held until the 1970s. [8] The classical theory of concepts says that concepts have

a definitional structure. [1] Adequate definitions of the

kind required by this theory usually take the form of a

list of features. These features must have two impor-

tant qualities to provide a comprehensive definition. [8] Features entailed by the definition of a concept must be both necessary and sufficient for membership in the class of things covered by a particular concept. [8] A feature is considered necessary if every member of the denoted class has that feature. A feature is considered sufficient if something has all the parts required by the definition. [8] For example, the classic example bachelor is said to be defined by unmarried and man. [1] An entity is a bache- lor (by this definition) if and only if it is both unmarried and a man. To check whether something is a member of the class, you compare its qualities to the features in the definition. [7] Another key part of this theory is that it obeys the law of the excluded middle, which means that there are no partial members of a class, you are either in or out. [8]

The classical theory persisted for so long unquestioned because it seemed intuitively correct and has great ex- planatory power. It can explain how concepts would be acquired, how we use them to categorize and how we use the structure of a concept to determine its referent class. [1] In fact, for many years it was one of the major ac- tivities in philosophy concept analysis. [1] Concept anal- ysis is the act of trying to articulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for the membership in the referent class of a concept.

5.1.1 Arguments against the classical theory

Given that most later theories of concepts were born out of the rejection of some or all of the classical theory, [6] it seems appropriate to give an account of what might be wrong with this theory. In the 20th century, philosophers such as Rosch and Wittgenstein argued against the clas- sical theory. There are six primary arguments [6] summa- rized as follows:

It seems that there simply are no definitions – espe- cially those based in sensory primitive concepts. [6]

It seems as though there can be cases where our ig- norance or error about a class means that we either don't know the definition of a concept, or have in- correct notions about what a definition of a particu- lar concept might entail. [6]

Quine's argument against analyticity in Two Dog- mas of Empiricism also holds as an argument against definitions. [6]

Some concepts have fuzzy membership. There are items for which it is vague whether or not they fall into (or out of) a particular referent class. This is not possible in the classical theory as everything has equal and full membership. [6]

Rosch found typicality effects which cannot be ex- plained by the classical theory of concepts, these sparked the prototype theory. [6] See below.



Psychological experiments show no evidence for our using concepts as strict definitions. [6]

5.2 Prototype theory

Main article: Prototype theory

Prototype theory came out of problems with the classi- cal view of conceptual structure. [1] Prototype theory says that concepts specify properties that members of a class tend to possess, rather than must possess. [6] Wittgenstein, Rosch, Mervis, Berlin, Anglin, and Posner are a few of the key proponents and creators of this theory. [6][10] Wittgenstein describes the relationship between members of a class as family resemblances. There are not neces- sarily any necessary conditions for membership, a dog can still be a dog with only three legs. [8] This view is particularly supported by psychological experimental ev- idence for prototypicality effects. [8] Participants willingly and consistently rate objects in categories like 'vegetable' or 'furniture' as more or less typical of that class. [8][10] It seems that our categories are fuzzy psychologically, and so this structure has explanatory power. [8] We can judge an item’s membership to the referent class of a concept by comparing it to the typical member – the most central member of the concept. If it is similar enough in the rele- vant ways, it will be cognitively admitted as a member of the relevant class of entities. [8] Rosch suggests that every category is represented by a central exemplar which em- bodies all or the maximum possible number of features of a given category. [8]

5.3 Theory-theory

Theory-theory is a reaction to the previous two theo- ries and develops them further. [8] This theory postulates that categorization by concepts is something like scien- tific theorizing. [1] Concepts are not learned in isolation, but rather are learned as a part of our experiences with the world around us. [8] In this sense, concepts’ structure relies on their relationships to other concepts as mandated by a particular mental theory about the state of the world. [6] How this is supposed to work is a little less clear than in the previous two theories, but is still a prominent and no- table theory. [6] This is supposed to explain some of the is- sues of ignorance and error that come up in prototype and classical theories as concepts that are structured around each other seem to account for errors such as whale as a fish (this misconception came from an incorrect theory about what a whale is like, combining with our theory of what a fish is). [6] When we learn that a whale is not a fish, we are recognizing that whales don't in fact fit the theory we had about what makes something a fish. In this sense, the Theory-Theory of concepts is responding to some of the issues of prototype theory and classic theory. [6]

6 Ideasthesia

According to the theory of ideasthesia (or “sensing con- cepts”), activation of a concept may be the main mecha- nism responsible for creation of phenomenal experiences. Therefore, understanding how the brain processes con- cepts may be central to solving the mystery of how con- scious experiences (or qualia) emerge within a physical system e.g., the sourness of the sour taste of lemon. [11] This question is also known as the hard problem of con- sciousness. [12][13] Research on ideasthesia emerged from research on synesthesia where it was noted that a synes- thetic experience requires first an activation of a concept of the inducer. [14] Later research expanded these results into everyday perception. [15]

7 See also





8 References

[1] Eric Margolis; Stephen Lawrence. “Concepts”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab at Stanford University. Retrieved 6 November 2012.

[2]|The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language:

Fourth Edition.

[3] Stock, W.G. (2010). Concepts and semantic relations in information science. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 61(10), 1951–


[4] Hjørland, B. (2009). Concept Theory. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technol- ogy, 60(8), 1519–1536

[5] Smith, B. (2004). Beyond Concepts, or: Ontology as Re- ality Representation, Formal Ontology and Information Systems. Proceedings of the Third International Confer- ence (FOIS 2004), Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2004, 73–84.

[6] Stephen Lawrence; Eric Margolis (1999). Concepts and Cognitive Science. in Concepts: Core Readings: Mas- sachusetts Institute of Technology. pp. 3–83. ISBN 978-

[7] Carey, Susan (2009). The Origin of Concepts. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-536763-8.

[8] Murphy, Gregory (2002). The Big Book of Concepts. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. ISBN 0-262-

[9] 'Godel’s Rationalism', Standford Encyclopedia of Philos- ophy

[10] Brown, Roger (1978). A New Paradigm of Reference. Academic Press Inc. pp. 159–166. ISBN 0-12-497750-


[11] Mroczko-Wąsowicz, A., Nikolić D. (2014) Semantic mechanisms may be responsible for developing synes- thesia. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8:509. doi:


[12] Stevan Harnad (1995). Why and How We Are Not Zom- bies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1: 164–167.

[13] David Chalmers (1995). Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):


[14] Nikolić, D. (2009) Is synaesthesia actually ideaesthesia? An inquiry into the nature of the phenomenon. Proceed- ings of the Third International Congress on Synaesthesia, Science & Art, Granada, Spain, April 26–29, 2009.

[15] Gómez Milán, E., Iborra, O., de Córdoba, M.J., Juárez- Ramos V., Rodríguez Artacho, M.A., Rubio, J.L. (2013) The Kiki-Bouba effect: A case of personification and ideaesthesia. The Journal of Consciousness Studies. 20(1– 2): pp. 84–102.

9 Further reading

Armstrong, S. L., Gleitman, L. R., & Gleitman, H. (1999). what some concepts might not be. In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, Concepts (pp. 225–261). Massachusetts: MIT press.

Carey, S. (1999). knowledge acquisition: enrich- ment or conceptual change? In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core readings (pp. 459–489). Massachusetts: MIT press.

Fodor, J. A., Garrett, M. F., Walker, E. C., & Parkes, C. H. (1999). against definitions. In E. Mar- golis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core readings (pp. 491–513). Massachusetts: MIT press.

Fodor, J., & LePore, E. (1996). the pet fish and the red Herring: why concept still can't be prototypes. cognition, 253–270.

Hume, D. (1739). book one part one: of the un- derstanding of ideas, their origin, composition, con- nexion, abstraction etc. In D. Hume, a treatise of human nature. England.

Murphy, G. (2004). Chapter 2. In G. Murphy, a big book of concepts (pp. 11 – 41). Massachusetts:

MIT press.

Murphy, G., & Medin, D. (1999). the role of theo- ries in conceptual coherence. In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core readings (pp. 425–459). Massachusetts: MIT press.

Prinz, J. J. (2002). Desiderata on a Theory of Concepts. In J. J. Prinz, Furnishing the Mind:

Concepts and their Perceptual Basis (pp. 1–23). Massechusettes: MIT press.

Putnam, H. (1999). is semantics possible? In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core readings (pp. 177–189). Massachusetts: MIT press.

Quine, W. (1999). two dogmas of empiricism. In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core readings (pp. 153–171). Massachusetts: MIT press.

Rey, G. (1999). Concepts and Stereotypes. In E. Margolis, & S. Laurence (Eds.), Concepts:

Core Readings (pp. 279–301). Cambridge, Mas- sachusetts: MIT Press.



Rosch, E. (1977). Classification of real-world ob- jects: Origins and representations in cognition. In P. Johnson-Laird, & P. Wason, Thinking: Readings in Cognitive Science (pp. 212–223). Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Rosch, E. (1999). Principles of Categorization. In E. Margolis, & S. Laurence (Eds.), Concepts:

Core Readings (pp. 189–206). Cambridge, Mas- sachusetts: MIT Press.

Schneider, S. (2011). Concepts: A Pragmatist The- ory. In S.Schneider, The Language of Thought: a New Direction. Mass.: MIT Press.

Wittgenstein, L. (1999). philosophical investiga- tions: sections 65–78. In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core readings (pp. 171–175). Massachusetts: MIT press.

The History of Calculus and its Conceptual Devel- opment, Carl Benjamin Boyer, Dover Publications, ISBN 0-486-60509-4

The Writings of William James, University of Chicago Press, ISBN 0-226-39188-4

Logic, Immanuel Kant, Dover Publications, ISBN 0-

A System of Logic, John Stuart Mill, University Press of the Pacific, ISBN 1-4102-0252-6

Parerga and Paralipomena, Arthur Schopenhauer, Volume I, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-

Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience, H. J. Paton, Lon- don: Allen & Unwin, 1936

Conceptual Integration Networks. Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, 1998. Cognitive Science. Volume 22, number 2 (April–June 1998), pages 133–187.

The Portable Nietzsche, Penguin Books, 1982, ISBN

Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis “Concepts and Cognitive Science”. In Concepts: Core Readings, MIT Press pp. 3–81, 1999.

Birger Hjørland. (2009). Concept Theory. Jour- nal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 60(8), 1519–1536

Georgij Yu. Somov (2010). Concepts and Senses in Visual Art: Through the example of analysis of some works by Bruegel the Elder. Semiotica 182 (1/4), 475–506.

Daltrozzo J, Vion-Dury J, Schön D. (2010). Music and Concepts. Horizons in Neuroscience Research 4: 157–167.

10 External links

Concept Mobiles Latest concepts

TED-Ed Lesson on ideasthesia (sensing concepts)

What is a concept?--"It is an assumption.”, some- times.


11 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

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