Hazop Sheet - SSR-216

SPECTRUM PHARMATECH CONSULTANTS PVT. LTD.
OVALA,
THANE 400607
CLIENT: M/s NAVIN FLUORINE INTERNATIONAL LTD

PROJECT TITLE: MANUFACTURING PLANT NO 2
PROJECT NO.: PJ-21113
DOCUMENT NO.: R-216
Rev No-0
TITLE: HAZOP OF HYDROGENATION REACTOR SSR-216
Basis for Hazop study
HAZOP studdy is done based on approved Piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) & approved facility
layout. In addition to this HAZOP, study to be done considering specifc product manufacturing since facility
will be used for multi purpose application.
Equipment layout
2
Men Material Movement layout
3
Hazardous area classification layout
4
HVAC classiifcation layout
5
Safety Shower & Fire Exit layout
6
Fire Hydrant layout
7
Gas Detection system layout
8
9
P&ID No: G-01-4-16, Rev-2
Study Node
1
Reactor
2
Line
3
Operating instructions
Guide word
1
No
2
Less
3
More
4
Reverse
5
Other than
Severity
1
No
2
Low
3
Moderate
4
High
5
High High
Parameters
1
Flow
2
Temperature
3
Pressure
4
Level
5
Contamination
6
Relief
7
Electrical
8
Corrosion
Consequence
1
Process hazard (financial, quality of product)
2
Safety Hazards (Life & health)
Safeguard measures
1
Prevent based on the design
2
Detect by giving early warning
3
Mitigate
Recommendations
1
Low priority
2
Medium priority
3
High priority
Points to be considered during node identification
1
Normal operation
2
Routine start-up
3
Routine shutdown
1
4
5
Emergency shutdown
Commissioning
SPECTRUM PHARMATECH CONSULTANTS PVT. LTD.

OVALA,
THANE 400607
CLIENT: M/s NAVIN FLUORINE INTERNATIONAL LTD
PROJECT TITLE: MANUFACTURING PLANT NO 2
PROJECT NO.: PJ-21113
DOCUMENT NO.: R-216
Rev No-0
TITLE: HAZOP OF HYDROGENATION REACTOR SSR-216
Sr.No
1
Study
Node
Reactor
Parameter
Temperature
Guideword(Deviation)
More temperature in reactor
Severity (Based
on set point)
High
Possible Cause(s)
Due to reaction exotherm (addition of
hydrogen)
Consequence/Risks
Pressurization & Loss of
strength due to high
temp.
Safeguards/Control
measures
high & high high temperature
alarm
Action Plan
Close the On/OFF vlave on
hydrogen line
Action By
Hydrogen ON/OFF valve will
operate based on interlocks from
DCS
Separate cooling water line with

Cooling water On/OFF valve to be
On/OFF valve to be provided on
provided on inlet & outlet through
inlet & outlet of external coil. will
external coil after and before
manifold.
DCS
Due to uncontrolled heating
Temperature
Less temperature in reactor
Low
Pressurization
Rupture disk followed by pressure

safety valve- 2 Nos
Pressurization
Exteranally separate cooling coil

on shell & Internal coil
open the cooling utility vavle on

external/Internal coil
Field operator
Pressurization

alarm
Close the steam control& ON/OFF

valve
Steam control & ON/OFF valve will

DCS
Rupture disc will burst followed by Equipment

opening of saftey valve
Due to failuar of cooling water ON/OFF valve Pressurization
Internal coiling coil with Liquid

start the cooling water/ liquid
Nitrogen or cooling water (Manual
Nitrogen through internal coil
control)
Field operator
Malfunctioning of Temperature indicator
Pressurization
Two nos of temperature

transmitters
Calibration & maintenance SOP
HOD / Shift incharge
Failure of Hydrogen ON/OFF valve
Pressurization
high & high high pressure alarm

and Manual isolation valve
Close the manual isolation valve
Failure of steam control valve or ON/OFF

valve
Pressurization

alarm
Failure of Hot water ON/OFF valve
Pressurization

alarm
Due to failuar of cooling water ON/OFF valve
Reaction will slowdown

(Assumed)

transmitters provided
Due to failuar of Liquid Nitrogen manual

valve

(Assumed)

Hydrogen supply cutof

(Assumed)
Pressure transmitter provided with

Operator to investigate
low pressure alarm
Malfunctioning of Temperature indicator

(Assumed)

Due to reaction exotherm (addition of

hydrogen)
Pressurization
High & high high pressure alarm & Close the On/OFF vlave on
On/OFF Valve on hydrogen line
hydrogen line
Excess RM or catalyst addition
Pressurization
Rupture disk followed by pressure

safety valve- 2 Nos
Explosion
Separate section for

hydrogenation with three side RCC
Wall and one weak wall and roof
Fire
DCP flodding system, Fire hydrant operater to follow on site

network
emergency plan
Pressurization
Field operator

Close the ON/OFF or Steam control
valve
DCS
Change the manual valve
Field operator
Field operator
Field operator
Field operator
HOD/Shift incharge
NO/REVERSE/OTHER THAN Are not applicable
Pressure
More pressure in reactor
High High
High
Failure of steam control valve or ON/OFF

valve

DCS
Equipment
Field Operator

Close the ON/OFF or Steam control
valve
DCS
High
High
Pressure
Less pressure in reactor
Failure of Hot water ON/OFF valve
Failuar of cooling media
High
Malfunctioning of Pressure indicator
High
Failuar of Hydrogen PRV
High
Failuar of instrument air
Low
Due to excessive cooling

Hydrogen supply cutof
Malfunctioning of Pressure indicator
Reverse
Low
Emptying of Hydrogen cylinder
High
Internal coil leakage during operation
Pressurization
Pressurization
Pressurization
Pressurization
Operation of
instrumentation valve
High & high high pressure alarm

hydrogen line

DCS
Close the hot water ON/OFF or

Steam control valve

DCS

hydrogen line

DCS
Two nos of pressure transmitters

provided
Safety valve in hydrogen line

Equipment
Alarm is provided
ON/OFF & Control Valve on LPS

line is of fail to close type
Inbuild action by valve
Valve on Hydrogen line is fail to

close type
Valve on cold utility supply, return

lines are of fail to open type
Pressure transmitter provided with
low pressure alarm
Two nos of pressure transmitters
provided

(Assumed)
(Assumed)
(Assumed)
Reactant material can go
NRV provided
in to Hydrogen line
Field operator
HOD/Shift incharge
HOD/Shift incharge
Field operator
Field operator
HOD/Shift incharge
Equipment
NO/OTHER THAN Are not applicable

5
Contamination
Less/More
Utility leakage inside the

reactor
Pressurization
High & high high pressure alarm
close the isolation valve
Field operator
Close H2 line ON/OFF valve
Field operator & DCS
High temperature & High pressure

Runaway reaction due to
Equipment pressure testing before
HOD/Shift incharge
alarm through DCS & Safety Relief
utility content ingrace
batch
valve/Rupture Disk
Low
Moderate
Seal leakage
Improper opening of valves, or valve
passing of utilities
Process material addition, manual
H2 venting (Relief)
Less/More
High
High
flow of reaction mass

towards utility
Pressure transmitter to be
provided on cooling water return
line, close hydrogen On/OFF valve
and utility inlet outlet valve
through DCS
Fild operator to close manual

isolation valve on internal coil
utility line, SOP to address total
shutdown procedure
Batch contamination
Select suitable material which is

compatible
HOD/Shift incharge
Follow the SOP while applying

utility
Field operator
Follow the venting SOP
HOD/Shift incharge
loss of utility
double manual valve is provided

at both inlet & outlet
Process dependent
Vent of the reactor is passed

Due to pressurization or to release pressure Hydrogen will be present through water pot & vent of the
at the end of batch
& may catch fire
same to open atm along with the
steam purging
From PSV vent in case of high pressure
Hydrogen will be present Vent routed to safe location. No

& may catch fire
electrical installation nearby
Facility
Chocking of vent line
Venting will get afected Vent valve to open slowely
Field operator
Reverse flow of water in

to the reactor
Locat water pot at 5 mtr or

mezzanine level inside the
hydrogenation area, provision of
local level indicator and pressure
gauge
SPCPL to incorporate in layout and

P&ID, NFIL to encorporate in SOP
High
No water in venting pot
H2 will vent directly to

U loop given to venting pot for
atm without weting may
water hold up at all the time
cause fire
Field operator
High
No steam purging in vent
Steam and water provided as a

H2 will vent directly to
weting media and vent to be
atm without weting may
located at safe location, no
cause fire
electrical installation nearby
Field operator
Floor washing
Follow the unloading SOP
Field operator
Flame arrester is provided on PSV

vent, & release to safe location
HOD/Shift incharge
Change over and check the utility

pump & unit
Field operator
Flow of flame
Reverse
High
External fire and venting simultaneously
Utility failure
Other than
High
Pump or utility unit trip
Leakage of gases
Other than
High
leakage from flange
Explosion
rise or decrease of
temperature
Unsafe working
environment
Pressure indication & alarm given

in DCS (On utility header)
Hydrogen & Oxygen Gas detection

Action to be taken as per SOP
system is provided
HOD/Shift incharge
Elephant trunk is provided out let

of which is directly connected to
scrubber
Field operator
Tounge & Groove flanges provided

9
10
Sharp edges inside

the equipment
Other than
High
Design flaw or improper manufacturing
Bottom valve
Leakage
Other than
High
Chocking
Valve passing
Personal injury during

equipment entry
Action to be taken as per SOP

Equipment
Joint inspection by NFIL & TPI
Point to be noted during inspection TPI / NFIL
Human hazard, loss of

material
Blind falnge provided after valve
Follow the operational SOP
Field operator
Human hazard, loss of

material
Blind falnge provided after valve
Field operator
11
Electrical/Static
electricity
No
High
Discontinuty or damage of earthing
Cause fire & may lead to Double earting provided on both

explosion
body and motor
Check list by field operator signed

by HOD
12
Electrical/Static
electricity
No
Hign
Jumper not provided
Cause fire & may lead to

explosion
Jumper provided in flange joint
Check list by field operator signed

by HOD
13
Electrical
No
High
Power failure at MCC or PCC
Process dependent
HOD/Shift incharge
14
Agitator RPM
More
Moderate
Malfunctioning of VFD
Reaction rate may

increase
RPM indicator provided, Local push

button for stop is provided
Field operator
Less
Low
Malfunctioning of VFD
Reaction rate may

decrease
RPM indicator provided
Field operator
No
Low
Decoupling of agitator, Jaming of agitator,

no power supply
Reaction rate may

decrease
At no load & overlaod, motor will

trip & alarm, On/OFF indication
provided on DCS
Field operator
Others
Low
Malfunctioning during the operation
Ajitator jam or damage,

excessive vibration,
Spark, abnormal sound
Switch of the motor
Field operator
Others
High
DCS operator strat the motor
Human hazard
Field operator
No auto start
DCS control
Before starting, connections to be

checked.
HOD/Shift incharge
Field operator
HOD/Shift incharge
On/OFF indications provided in

DCS
Local push button station to stop

the motor
Only local push button station is
provided to start the motor
Remote will have only stop
command
Reverse
15
Level
16
Low
Wrong connectons
No,More,less,other than
Process dependent Manual error
More
Process dependent Use of non compatible process material
Reaction will get afected

Process dependent
Leakages
Corrosion
Team members
SPCPL Name
1 Mr. Mahendra Sarvankar
2 Mr. Suhas Kadam
Sign
NFIL Name
1 Mr. T Bhaskar
2 Mr. Subba Reddy
Sign
3 Mr. Chaitanya Chabukswar

Note: * - Indicates Part Participants
3 Mr. Sanjeev Sheth

4 Mr. Shamkant Suryavanshi
Action Assingend to
Remark/ comments
SPCPL To Incorporate in
DCS
SPCPL to incorporate in
P&ID and DCS
NFIL Operating procedure

DCS
Discussed and agreed

during HAZOP Dated 12
& 13 May 2014

DCS

SPCPL to incorporate in
DCS

DCS
Discussed and agreed

during HAZOP Dated 12
& 13 May 2014

DCS
DCS
DCS

SPCPL to check valve
specification
specification
specification
SPCPL to add pressure

transmitter in P&ID. NFIL
operating procedure
Process dependent, HAZOP
to be carry out as per
process requirement by
NFIL
To be confirmed during
PSSR
SPCPL & NFIL

TPI / NFIL
These procedures are
NFIL Operating procedure existing for loading and
unloading and to be used
for reactor charging
Process dependent, HAZOP
NFIL Operating procedure to be carry out as per
process requirement by
NFIL

HAZOP to be carry out as
per process requirement
by NFIL
HAZOP to be carry out as
per process requirement
by NFIL

Hazop Sheet - SSR-216

Încărcat de

Informații document

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Hazop Sheet - SSR-216

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

SPECTRUM PHARMATECH CONSULTANTS PVT. LTD.

CLIENT: M/s NAVIN FLUORINE INTERNATIONAL LTD

SPECTRUM PHARMATECH CONSULTANTS PVT. LTD.

Separate cooling water line with

Due to uncontrolled heating

Less temperature in reactor

Rupture disk followed by pressure

Exteranally separate cooling coil

open the cooling utility vavle on

high & high high temperature

Close the steam control& ON/OFF

Steam control & ON/OFF valve will

Rupture disc will burst followed by Equipment

Due to failuar of cooling water ON/OFF valve Pressurization

Internal coiling coil with Liquid

Malfunctioning of Temperature indicator

Two nos of temperature

Calibration & maintenance SOP

HOD / Shift incharge

Failure of Hydrogen ON/OFF valve

high & high high pressure alarm

Close the manual isolation valve

Failure of steam control valve or ON/OFF

high & high high temperature

Failure of Hot water ON/OFF valve

high & high high temperature

Close the manual isolation valve

Due to failuar of cooling water ON/OFF valve

Reaction will slowdown

Two nos of temperature

Close the manual isolation valve

Due to failuar of Liquid Nitrogen manual

Reaction will slowdown

Two nos of temperature

Hydrogen supply cutof

Reaction will slowdown

Pressure transmitter provided with

Malfunctioning of Temperature indicator

Reaction will slowdown

Two nos of temperature

Due to reaction exotherm (addition of

Excess RM or catalyst addition

Rupture disk followed by pressure

Separate section for

DCP flodding system, Fire hydrant operater to follow on site

high & high high pressure alarm

Steam control & ON/OFF valve will

Change the manual valve

Calibration & maintenance SOP

NO/REVERSE/OTHER THAN Are not applicable

More pressure in reactor

Failure of steam control valve or ON/OFF

Hydrogen ON/OFF valve will

Steam control & ON/OFF valve will

Less pressure in reactor

Failure of Hot water ON/OFF valve

Failuar of cooling media

Malfunctioning of Pressure indicator

Failuar of Hydrogen PRV

Failuar of instrument air

Due to excessive cooling

Emptying of Hydrogen cylinder

Internal coil leakage during operation

high & high high pressure alarm