!"#$%&'()*+,*(-)./*000*1%%%23+45$67%/%%%89:$;%(<=&(=()%%%>"?$%@%3A%@<%%%>"?

$%B2%C'D/

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

ROBERT B. KORY, ESQ. (BAR NO. 110750)

MICHELLE L. RICE, ESQ. (BAR NO. 235189)
LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT KORY
9300 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 200
Beverly Hills, California 90212
Telephone: (310) 285-1630
Email:
rkory@rbklaw.com
mrice@rbklaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant
SAMMY ORITI
BRIAN G. WOLF, ESQ. (BAR NO. 135257)
EVAN N. SPIEGEL, ESQ. (BAR NO. 198071)
TODD S. EAGAN, ESQ. (BAR NO. 207426)
LAVELY & SINGER
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
2049 Century Park East, Suite 2400
Los Angeles, California 90067-2906
Telephone: (310) 556-3501
Email:
bwolf@lavelysinger.com
espiegel@lavelysinger.com
teagan@lavelysinger.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
OKSANA GRIGORIEVA

16
17
18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WESTERN DIVISION

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

OKSANA GRIGORIEVA, an
Individual,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
v.
)
)
SAMMY ORITI, an individual;
)
and DOES 1 through 10,
)
inclusive,
)
Defendants.
)
)
________________________________ )

CASE NO. CV 09-03968 MMM (Ex)

DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFFS THIRD AND FOURTH
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FOR LACK OF
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
PURSUANT TO
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)

!"#$%&'()*+,*(-)./*000*1%%%23+45$67%/%%%89:$;%(<=&(=()%%%>"?$%&%3A%@<%%%>"?$%B2%C'D)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION...1
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
PURSUANT TO FED. R.CIV. P. 12(b)(1)....3
III.ARGUMENT..4
A. Plaintiffs Copyright Infringement Claim is Precluded by 17 U.S.C. 411(a)
Because Plaintiff Has Not Obtained Valid Certificates of Registration
For Any of the Allegedly Infringed Works..............................................4
B. Plaintiffs Claim For a Declaration of Sole Ownership In Each of the
Musical Compositions Does Not Arise Under The Federal Copyright Act
and Therefore Does Not Vest The Court With Subject Matter Jurisdiction.8
1. Plaintiff Has Not Stated a Valid Claim For Infringement
Because the Works Are Unregistered and Do Not Meet the
Jurisdictional Prerequisite Under 17 U.S.C. 411(a)....9
2. Plaintiff Has Not Stated a Claim That Requires Construction
of the Copyright Act......10
C. If the Court Dismisses Plaintiffs Third and Fourth Claims
On Jurisdictional Grounds,The Court Has No Discretion to Hear
The State Law Claims and Must Dismiss Them......12
IV. CONCLUSION..12

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

!"#$%&'()*+,*(-)./*000*1%%%23+45$67%/%%%89:$;%(<=&(=()%%%>"?$%-%3A%@<%%%>"?$%B2%C'E(

1
2

Table of Authorities
Cases

3
4

Brush Creek Media, Inc. v. Boujaklian,

2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15321 * 12, 2002 WL 1906620 * 4 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ............ 6

5
6

Franklin v. Cannon Films, Inc.,

654 F. Supp. 133, 134-135 (C.D. Cal. 1987) ............................................................. 10

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Goodwin v. Best Plan Intl,

2004 WL 1924147 *1 , 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17823 *3-4 (N.D. Cal. 2004) .......... 6
Hancock Park Homeowners Assn Est. 1948 v. Hancock Park Home Owners Assn,
2006 WL 4532986 (C.D. Cal. 2006) .......................................................................... 12
Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear,
254 F.3d 802, 805-6 (9th Cir. 2001)........................................................................ 1, 12
Jefferson Airplane v. Berkeley Systems, Inc.,
886 F. Supp. 713, 715 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ...................................................................... 7
Joyce v. Renaissance Design, Inc.,
2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17774 * 7, 2000 WL 34335721 * 2 (C.D. Cal. 2000) ........... 6
Just Water Heaters, Inc. v. Affordable Water Heaters and Plumbing, Inc.,
2006 WL 449136 * 3, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15321 *10 (N.D. Cal. 2006) .............. 6
Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc.,
152 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998) ............................................................................. 7
Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs.,
340 F. 3d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) ...................................................................... 2, 11
Loree Rodkin v. Ross-Simons, Inc.,
315 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. 2004) ................................................................... 2, 6, 7, 9
Mitchell v. Maurer,
293 U.S. 237, 244, 55 S. Ct. 162, 79 L. Ed. 338 (1934) .............................................. 3
Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization,
II

!"#$%&'()*+,*(-)./*000*1%%%23+45$67%/%%%89:$;%(<=&(=()%%%>"?$%D%3A%@<%%%>"?$%B2%C'E@

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988) ....................................................................... 4, 10

Muchnick v. Thompson Corp.,
509 F.3d 116, 123 (2nd Cir. 2007) ................................................................................ 8
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. REPLAYTV,
298 F. Supp. 2d 921, 924 (C.D. Cal. 2004).................................................................. 3
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
487 F.3d 701, 710, n. 1 (9th Cir. 2007) ......................................................................... 7
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick,
129 S. Ct. 1523, 77 U.S.L.W. 3059 (U.S. Mar. 02, 2009)(NO. 08-103) .................... 8
Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Intl Interlink,
284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002) ............................................................................. 3
Roberts v. Corrothers,
812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987) ............................................................................. 4
Ruhrgas Ag v. Marathon Oil Co.,
526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) ............................................................................................. 3
Safe Air For Everyone v. Meyer,
373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) ............................................................................. 3
Scholastic Entertainment v. Fox Entertainment Group, Inc.,
336 F. 3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2003) ...................................................................... 8, 9, 10
Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation,
873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) ............................................................................. 3
T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu,
339 F. 3d 823 (2nd Cir. 1964) ....................................................................................... 9
Taylor v. Anderson,
234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914) ............................................................................................ 2
Topolos v. Caldewey,
698 F.2d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 1983) ............................................................................... 10

28

III

!"#$%&'()*+,*(-)./*000*1%%%23+45$67%/%%%89:$;%(<=&(=()%%%>"?$%E%3A%@<%%%>"?$%B2%C'E&

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co.,

64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995) ............................................................................... 4
United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc.,
360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................................................................ 3
Vestron v. Home Box Office Inc.,
839 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) ................................................................... 8, 9, 10
Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc.,
171 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2001).............................................................. 3

10

White v. Lee,
227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000) ......................................................................... 3, 4

11

Statutes

12

17

17 U.S.C. 101, et seq. ................................................................................................... 1

17 U.S.C. 408(f) ............................................................................................................ 4
17 U.S.C. 411 ................................................................................................................ 7
17 U.S.C. 411(a) ........................................................................................... 2, 4, 5, 8, 9
17 U.S.C. 501(b) ........................................................................................................... 6
28 U.S.C. 1331 .............................................................................................................. 1
28 U.S.C. 1338(a) ..................................................................................................... 1, 8
28 U.S.C. 1367 .............................................................................................................. 1

18

Rules

13
14
15
16

19
20
21
22

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) ................................................................................................. 3

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) ................................................................................................... 3
Regulations
37 C.F.R. 202.16 ........................................................................................................... 5

23
24
25
26
27
28

IV

!"#$%&'()*+,*(-)./*000*1%%%23+45$67%/%%%89:$;%(<=&(=()%%%>"?$%.%3A%@<%%%>"?$%B2%C'E-

1
2
3

I. INTRODUCTION
In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges ten claims for relief against Defendant, most

of which are state law claims. Plaintiff alleges two causes of action, copyright

infringement and declaratory relief, which purportedly arise out of a single federal

statute, the Federal Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101, et seq. Plaintiff contends that this

Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 28 U.S.C.

1338(a). Complaint 5. Thus, the Courts subject matter jurisdiction rests solely on

whether the Court has federal question jurisdiction as there is no diversity of

10
11

citizenship. Complaint 1, 2.
Plaintiff had at the time of the commencement of her action in June and has at

12

the time of filing the instant motion pending applications for copyright registrations in

13

the United States Copyright Office for the four Musical Compositions Plaintiff alleges

14

that Defendant has infringed. Doc. 3. Plaintiff did not proffer with her complaint

15

Certificates of Registration for each of the four works, but merely averred that she had

16

filed applications in the United States Copyright Office prior to filing her complaint.

17

Complaint 8, 27.

18

The primary issue before the Court is whether pending applications for

19

registration at the time of filing of the action are sufficient to confer subject matter

20

jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs infringement claim. If the Court finds that pending

21

applications for registration are insufficient, then the Court should then determine

22

whether Plaintiffs request for a declaration of sole ownership in and to the Musical

23

Compositions independently vests the Court with subject matter jurisdiction under the

24

Federal Copyright Act. If the Court answers both questions in the negative and finds

25

that it does not have original jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs federal claims, then the

26

Court should also dismiss Plaintiffs state law claims because, absent original

27

jurisdiction, the Court would not have supplemental jurisdiction to hear the state law

28

claims under 28 U.S.C. 1367. Herman Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d
1

!"#$%&'()*+,*(-)./*000*1%%%23+45$67%/%%%89:$;%(<=&(=()%%%>"?$%<%3A%@<%%%>"?$%B2%C'ED

802, 806 (9th Cir. 2001)(if the court dismisses for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it

has no discretion to hear and must dismiss all claims.).

It is Defendants contention that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to

hear Plaintiffs federal claims for two reasons. First, Plaintiff has not made a prima

facie showing of copyright ownership by proffering Certificates of Registration from

the United States Copyright Office in the four Musical Compositions. Thus, the

jurisdictional bar of 17 U.S.C. 411(a), which has been interpreted in the Central

District as requiring completed examinations by the Copyright Office and Certificates

of Registration, precludes Plaintiffs claim of infringement of each of the four

10

unregistered works. Loree Rodkin v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D.

11

2004).

12

Second, without a valid infringement claim, Plaintiffs claim for declaratory

13

relief does not independently vest the Court with subject matter jurisdiction because

14

the relief sought does not arise under the Federal Copyright Act (the Act).

15

Through her claim for declaratory relief, Plaintiff seeks solely a determination of

16

ownership in the Musical Compositions which will not require a construction of the

17

Act. Complaint 37(a). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, jurisdiction must be

18

determined from what necessarily appears in the Plaintiffs statement of his own claim

19

in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of

20

defenses which it is thought defendant may interpose. Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin.

21

Servs., 340 F. 3d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003)(quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74,

22

75-76 (1914)). Thus, Plaintiffs declaratory relief claim cannot vest the court with

23

federal question jurisdiction by anticipating Defendants potential defenses to

24

infringement. See Complaint 37 (b)-(c). Defendants claim of a co-ownership

25

interest in the Musical Compositions is based upon contract and equitable principles,

26

such as estoppel, which arise under state, not federal law. Oriti Decl. 3-10. As

27

such, the Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction as to Plaintiffs claim for

28

declaratory relief under the Copyright Act.

2

!"#$%&'()*+,*(-)./*000*1%%%23+45$67%/%%%89:$;%(<=&(=()%%%>"?$%/%3A%@<%%%>"?$%B2%C'EE

1
2
3

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)
Rule 12(b)(1) authorizes a party to move to dismiss a claim for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case

unless the contrary affirmatively appears. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of

Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).

Subject matter jurisdiction may be considered by the Court at any time. See

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3)(Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise

that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the

10

action.); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. REPLAYTV, 298 F. Supp. 2d 921, 924 (C.D.

11

Cal. 2004)(citing Ruhrgas Ag v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583

12

(1999)(Subject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own

13

initiative even at the highest level.). Federal courts have the duty to establish subject

14

matter jurisdiction whether or not the parties raise the issue. See United Investors Life

15

Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (a district court's

16

duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction is not contingent upon the parties

17

arguments, citing Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244, 55 S. Ct. 162, 79 L. Ed. 338

18

(1934)). The plaintiff in the case bears the burden of establishing that the court has

19

jurisdiction. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Intl Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002).

20

A party challenging a courts jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may do so by

21

either a facial attack or a factual attack. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir.

22

2000). In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a

23

complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. Safe Air For

24

Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In evaluating a facial attack

25

to jurisdiction, the Court must accept the factual allegations in the plaintiffs complaint

26

as true. Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1061 (C.D. Cal.

27

2001). In contrast when a movant raises a factual attack, the court may consider

28

extrinsic evidence presented on the jurisdictional issue. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812

3

!"#$%&'()*+,*(-)./*000*1%%%23+45$67%/%%%89:$;%(<=&(=()%%%>"?$%)%3A%@<%%%>"?$%B2%C'E.

F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, in evaluating a factual attack the court need

not assume the truthfulness of the allegations and may resolve factual disputes, if

necessary. See White, 227 F.3d at 1242.

Finally, federal subject matter jurisdiction must exist as of the time the action is

commenced. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858

F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988).

7
8

III.

ARGUMENT

9
10
11
12
13

A. Plaintiffs Copyright Infringement Claim is Precluded by 17 U.S.C.

411(a) Because Plaintiff Has Not Obtained Valid Certificates of
Registration For Any of the Allegedly Infringed Works
Plaintiffs claim for copyright infringement involves the alleged infringement by

14

Defendant of four songs that Plaintiff claims she composed in June 2003 and in

15

January 2005 entitled: (1) Remember Me; (2) Walking; (3) Doesnt Matter and

16

(4) Heaven (the Demo Recordings or The Musical Compositions). Complaint

17

8. Plaintiff further alleges that prior to filing this complaint, Grigorieva submitted

18

each of the Musical Compositions, including the recordings thereof to the United

19

States Copyright Office for registration in her name. Complaint 8, 27. In the

20

Report on the Filing or Determination of an Action or Appeal Regarding a Copyright

21

filed with the Court on June 3, 2009, Plaintiff describes the status of the four

22

registrations for the works at issue as pending. Doc. 3.

23

To state a claim for copyright infringement requires proof of two elements: (1)

24

ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of expression protected by that

25

copyright. Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th

26

Cir. 1995). Plaintiff does not state in the Complaint whether Plaintiff sought full

27

registration or preregistration under 17 U.S.C. 408(f) of the Musical

28

Compositions with the United States Copyright Office. A search conducted by

4

!"#$%&'()*+,*(-)./*000*1%%%23+45$67%/%%%89:$;%(<=&(=()%%%>"?$%@(%3A%@<%%%>"?$%B2%C'E<

Defendants counsel of the Copyright Offices public catalog of registrations and

preregistrations revealed no records for either registrations or preregistrations in

Plaintiffs name for any of the allegedly infringed Musical Compositions. Rice Decl.

2-3; 37 C.F.R. 202.16(12)(providing that the preregistration record will also be

available to the public on the Copyright Office website, http://www.copyright.gov.)

Thus, depending on Plaintiffs type of application, at the time of filing of Plaintiffs

complaint, her applications for full registration or preregistration were pending

because Plaintiff did not proffer either Certificates of Registrations or Certifications of

Preregistration. Further, Defendant has never sought to register the works in his name.

10

Oriti Decl. 6. Thus, the allegedly infringed works at the time of filing of the

11

complaint were and remain unregistered works.

12

The Copyright Act of 1976 requires certain conditions be fulfilled before an

13

infringement action, such as this one, may be brought. One such prerequisite is

14

copyright registration. Section 411(a) of the Act entitled Registration and

15

Infringement Actions states:

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

no action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be
instituted until preregistration1 or registration of the copyright claim has been
made in accordance with this title. 17 U.S.C. 411(a)(emphasis supplied).
1

The Artists Rights and Theft Prevention Act of 2005 created a preregistration option by
which certain classes of works that are susceptible to infringement prior to publication can be
preregistered in anticipation of publication. The process of preregistration has its own procedure
separate from the full registration process in the Copyright Office. 37 C.F.R. 202.16. The
preregistration is done online only and without deposit material. Preregistration is available for only a
very limited class of unpublished works. 17 U.S.C. 408(f); 37 C.F.R. 202.16. Plaintiff has not
averred that she has sought preregistration for the Musical Compositions under 17 U.S.C. 408(f).
Complaint 8, 27. The Copyright Office conducts a limited examination of applications for
preregistration. 37 C.F.R. 202.16(7). Upon completion of the preregistration process, the Copyright
Office provides the claimant official notification by email of the preregistration. 37 C.F.R.
202.16(10). The email contains information from the application and a preregistration number and
date. See UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE - PREREGISTRATION, available at
http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-prereg.hmtl <last visited on July, 18, 2009>. In addition,
once the preregistration process is completed, the preregistration record will also be available to the
public on the Copyright Office website, http://www.copyright.gov. 37 C.F.R. 202.16(12).
Preregistration does not constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright or the facts
stated in the application. 37 C.F.R. 202.16(13). A search of the Copyright Offices public catalog
5

!"#$%&'()*+,*(-)./*000*1%%%23+45$67%/%%%89:$;%(<=&(=()%%%>"?$%@@%3A%@<%%%>"?$%B2%C'E/

The Acts standing provision at 17 U.S.C. 501(b) also provides: the legal or

beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled, subject to the

requirements of section 411, to institute an action for any infringement... (emphasis

supplied).

The Central District of California has recognized that a completed registration is

a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit for copyright infringement. Loree Rodkin v. Ross-

Simons, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1056 (C.D. 2004)(finding that a federal district

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a copyright claim if the certificate of

registration is yet to be issued.); See also Joyce v. Renaissance Design, Inc., 2000

10

U.S. Dist LEXIS 17774 * 7, 2000 WL 34335721 * 2 (C.D. Cal. 2000)(dismissing

11

plaintiffs claim of copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. 411 (a) because plaintiffs

12

works were unregistered).

13

Other California District Courts have also held that the jurisdictional

14

prerequisite under Section 411 requires a completed certificate of registration to bring

15

an infringement action. See, e.g., Just Water Heaters, Inc. v. Affordable Water Heaters

16

and Plumbing, Inc., 2006 WL 449136 * 3, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15321 *10 (N.D.

17

Cal. 2006)(granting defendants 12(b)(1) motion and finding that the Act supports the

18

position that registration occurs when the Copyright Office issues a certificate of

19

registrationthe Court cannot accept the idea that an applicant can confer a copyright

20

on his work and thereby invoke the weighty protections of federal law merely by

21

depositing materials and a fee with the Copyright Office.); Goodwin v. Best Plan

22

Intl, 2004 WL 1924147 *1 , 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17823 *3-4 (N.D. Cal.

23

2004)(granting defendants motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

24

because plaintiff did not allege registration of copyrights claimed.); Brush Creek

25

Media, Inc. v. Boujaklian, 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15321 * 12, 2002 WL 1906620 * 4

26

(N.D. Cal. 2002)(remanding case to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

27
28

revealed no completed preregistrations in any of the Musical Compositions in Plaintiffs name. Rice
Decl. 2-3.


!"#$%&'()*+,*(-)./*000*1%%%23+45$67%/%%%89:$;%(<=&(=()%%%>"?$%@&%3A%@<%%%>"?$%B2%C'E)

and finding that the plain language of the statute forecloses copyright suits while a

copyright application is pending and before a certificate of registration issues (or is

denied.)); Jefferson Airplane v. Berkeley Systems, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 713, 715 (N.D.

Cal. 1994)(finding that such registration is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit for

infringement.).

As the Loree Rodkin court observed, the Ninth Circuit has yet to issue a clear

rule on whether the registration requirement of Section 411(a) requires a Certificate of

Registration before initiating an infringement suit. Loree Rodkin, 315 F. Supp. at

1057. In a case decided in 1998, Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., the Ninth Circuit

10

stated: copyright registration is not a prerequisite to a valid copyright, but it is a

11

prerequisite to a suit based on a copyright. Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 F.3d

12

1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998). In Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., decided in 2007, the

13

court in response to Googles argument that the court lacked jurisdiction over a

14

preliminary injunction to the extent it enforced unregistered copyrights, the court

15

observed in a footnote that:

16
17
18
19
20
21

Registration is generally a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit for copyright

infringement. See 17 U.S.C. 411Once a court has jurisdiction over an action
for copyright infringement under section 411, the court may grant injunctive relief
to restrain infringement of any copyright, whether registered or
unregisteredBecause at least some of the Perfect 10 images at issue were
registered, the district court did not err in determining that it could issue an order
that covers unregistered works. Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 710,
n. 1 (9th Cir. 2007)(emphases supplied).

22

The implication of the Perfect 10 footnote is that a court must first consider whether it

23

has jurisdiction under 411 for any of the allegedly infringed works by determining

24

whether at least one of the allegedly infringed works is registered. Here, unlike the

25

situation presented in Perfect 10, none of the works allegedly infringed are registered

26

works.

27
28

More recently, the Second Circuit, in Muchnick v. Thompson, Corp., questioned

and declined to follow the Perfect 10 reasoning to the extent that it suggested that
7

!"#$%&'()*+,*(-)./*000*1%%%23+45$67%/%%%89:$;%(<=&(=()%%%>"?$%@-%3A%@<%%%>"?$%B2%C'.(

jurisdiction vested over any infringement claim so long as there was at least one

registered work at issue. Muchnick v. Thompson Corp., 509 F.3d 116, 123 (2nd Cir.

2007)(vacating class certification and settlement after holding that the district court

lacked jurisdiction over copyright infringement claims in unregistered copyrights),

cert. granted in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 129 S. Ct. 1523, 77 U.S.L.W.

3059 (U.S. Mar. 02, 2009)(NO. 08-103)(limiting petition granted to the following

question: Does 17 U.S.C. 411(a) restrict the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal

courts over copyright infringement actions?).

Because none of the four Musical Compositions at issue in this case are

10

registered works, the Court should find that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking and

11

dismiss Plaintiffs Third Claim for Relief for copyright infringement pursuant to Rule

12

12(b)(1) and 17 U.S.C. 411(a).

13
14
15
16
17

B. Plaintiffs Claim For a Declaration of Sole Ownership In Each of the

Musical Compositions Does Not Arise Under The Federal Copyright
Act and Therefore Does Not Vest The Court With Subject Matter
Jurisdiction
In her Fourth Claim for Relief, Plaintiff moves for declaratory relief under the

18

Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that

19

she is a sole owner of all right, title, and interest in and to each of the Musical

20

Compositions. Complaint 37 (a). Plaintiff contends that this Court has subject

21

matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1338(a), which give a federal court

22

original jurisdiction over any civil action arising under federal copyright law.

23

Complaint 5. The Ninth Circuit has held that it is well established that just because

24

a case involves a copyright does not mean that federal subject matter jurisdiction

25

exists. Scholastic Entertainment v. Fox Entertainment Group, Inc., 336 F. 3d 982, 986

26

(9th Cir. 2003)(citing to Vestron v. Home Box Office Inc.,839 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir.

27

1988)).

28
8

!"#$%&'()*+,*(-)./*000*1%%%23+45$67%/%%%89:$;%(<=&(=()%%%>"?$%@D%3A%@<%%%>"?$%B2%C'.@

Without a valid infringement claim, the Court must determine if Plaintiffs

declaratory relief claim arises under the federal Copyright Act. To determine if a

claim arises under the federal Copyright Act, the Ninth Circuit has adopted the

majority rule set out in T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F. 3d 823 (2nd Cir. 1964).

Scholastic, 336 F. 3d at 986.

The Harms test states that an action arises under the copyright laws

(1) If and only if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act, e.g., a

8
9

suit for infringement or for statutory royalties for record reproduction or

(2) asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act as in DeSylva, or,

10

(3) at the very least and perhaps more doubtfully, presents a case where a distinctive

11

policy of the Act requires that federal principles should control the disposition of

12

the claim.

13

T.B. Harms, F. 3d at 828.

14

If any of these three grounds is satisfied, the federal courts have jurisdiction. Vestron,

15

839 F.2d at 1381.

16

The Harms test is essentially a reiteration of the well-pleaded complaint rule

17

that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of

18

a properly pleaded complaint. Scholastic, 336 F.3d at 986.

19
20
21
22
23

1. Plaintiff Has Not Stated a Valid Claim For Infringement Because the Works Are
Unregistered and Do Not Meet the Jurisdictional Prerequisite Under 17 U.S.C.
411(a)
At the time of the commencement of Plaintiffs complaint, Plaintiff did not

24

possess Certificates of Registration for each of the allegedly infringed works and filed

25

the infringement claim based on pending copyright applications. Doc. 3. Thus,

26

Plaintiff cannot meet the first part of the Harms test because the works were

27

unregistered at the commencement of the action and therefore the court lacks subject

28

matter jurisdiction to hear her infringement claim under 17 U.S.C. 411(a). Loree
9

!"#$%&'()*+,*(-)./*000*1%%%23+45$67%/%%%89:$;%(<=&(=()%%%>"?$%@E%3A%@<%%%>"?$%B2%C'.&

Rodkin, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1056; Morongo, 858 F.2d at 1380 (jurisdiction must exist

as of the time the action is commenced).

The Ninth Circuit stated in Vestron:

4
5
6
7
8
9

Where there is a fatal flaw on the face of a complaint that purports to assert an
infringement action, the suit should be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction....If an action survives this scrutiny and affidavits or other materials
reveal the infringement claim to be spurious, then the proper avenue is dismissal for
failure to state a claim under federal copyright law. Vestron, 839 F.2d at 1382
(emphasis supplied).
Thus, the lack of Certificates of Registration is a fatal flaw on the face of

10

Plaintiffs complaint and Plaintiffs Third Claim for Relief should be dismissed for

11

lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

12
13
14

2. Plaintiff Has Not Stated a Claim That Requires Construction of the Act
In her Fourth Claim for Relief, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Grigorieva is

15

the sole owner of all right, title, and interest in and to [the, sic] Musical Compositions,

16

including the copyrights and all ancillary rights thereto. Complaint 37(a). Further,

17

Plaintiff also seeks a declaration that there was no written transfer of ownership of

18

copyrights in and to the Musical Compositions and that any contribution made by

19

Defendant to the Musical Compositions was de minimus. Complaint 37(b)-(c).

20

Plaintiff cannot establish jurisdiction under the second prong of the Harms test

21

because whenownership is the sole question for considerationfederal courts [are]

22

without jurisdiction. Vestron, 839 F.2d at 1382 (citing Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d

23

991, 994 (9th Cir. 1983) ); See also Franklin v. Cannon Films, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 133,

24

134-135 (C.D. Cal. 1987)(dismissing the copyright claim for lack of jurisdiction as not

25

arising under the copyright laws and finding that where the claim is essentially for a

26

naked declaration of ownership or contractual rights, jurisdiction is most often

27

declined.); Scholastic, supra, 336 F.3d at 983 (dismissing copyright infringement

28
10

!"#$%&'()*+,*(-)./*000*1%%%23+45$67%/%%%89:$;%(<=&(=()%%%>"?$%@.%3A%@<%%%>"?$%B2%C'.-

claim after finding lack of subject matter jurisdiction because questions regarding the

ownership of copyright are governed by state law.).

Further, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, Plaintiffs anticipation of

Defendants defenses to infringement cannot create federal jurisdiction. See

Complaint 37(b)-(c); Lippitt, 340 F.3d at 1040.

In his Declaration, Defendant proffers evidence that demonstrates that there was

an agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant regarding shared ownership of the

Musical Compositions. Oriti Decl. 3-10, Exh.1-2. In January 2009, when

Defendant wrote Plaintiff to advise that she could not unilaterally exploit the Musical

10

Compositions without his permission, Plaintiff did not repudiate his claim of rights in

11

the Musical Compositions. Oriti Decl. 10, Exh. 2. To the contrary, Plaintiff

12

reconfirmed in writing their shared ownership of the Musical Compositions by

13

asserting her reciprocal right to request that he seek her permission for any exploitation

14

of the Musical Compositions. Id. In November 2006, Plaintiff agreed and approved of

15

the preparation of a label to place on a CD entitled Oksana containing recordings of

16

the Musical Compositions. Oriti Decl. 6; Studer Decl. 4. This label was used on

17

demo CDs subsequently distributed by both Plaintiff and Defendant. Oriti Decl. 6.

18

The CD label lists the four Musical Compositions and plainly states: All songs written

19

by Oksana and Sammy Oriti and Produced by Sammy Oriti. Oriti Decl., Exh. 1;

20

Studer Decl., Exh. 1.

21

Review of Plaintiffs Complaint and Defendants Declaration reveals that there

22

is a genuine dispute regarding ownership of the Musical Compositions. Defendant

23

respectfully submits that resolution of the ownership issue will not require construction

24

of the Act, but rather application of state law principles of contract and equitable

25

principles such as estoppel.

26
27

Because the Plaintiffs claim for declaratory relief does not arise under the
Act, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

28
11

!"#$%&'()*+,*(-)./*000*1%%%23+45$67%/%%%89:$;%(<=&(=()%%%>"?$%@<%3A%@<%%%>"?$%B2%C'.D

C.

2
3

If The Court Dismisses Plaintiffs Third and Fourth Claims on

Jurisdictional Grounds, The Court Has No Discretion to Hear
The State Law Claims

If the Court dismisses Plaintiffs federal claims on jurisdictional grounds, the

4
5

only claims remaining are Plaintiffs state law claims for breach of contract,

conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, common law misappropriation of the right of

publicity, violation of right of privacy, constructive trust, an accounting and injunctive

relief.

The Ninth Circuit has held that if a court dismisses for lack of subject matter

10

jurisdiction, it has no discretion to hear and must dismiss all claims. Herman Family

11

Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805-6 (9th Cir. 2001)(declaring that

12

supplemental jurisdiction cannot exist without original jurisdiction.) Dismissal on

13

jurisdictional grounds means that the court was without original jurisdiction and had

14

no authority other than to determine its jurisdiction. Id. See also Hancock Park

15

Homeowners Assn Est. 1948 v. Hancock Park Home Owners Assn, 2006 WL

16

4532986 (C.D. Cal. 2006)(dismissing plaintiffs state law claims upon determining that

17

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs federal claim under the

18

Lanham Act.).

19
20
21

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant prays that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

22
23

DATED July 20, 2009

Respectfully submitted,

24

By: /s/ Michelle L. Rice

25

MICHELLE L. RICE
ROBERT B. KORY
LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT B. KORY
Attorneys for Defendant
SAMMY ORITI

26
27
28

12