Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs.

Republic of the Philippines

October 22, 2007 537 SCRA 473
Ponente: Justice Corona
Facts: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
filed a petition for the change of his first
name and sex in his birth certificate in
the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he
was born in the City of Manila to the
spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and
Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His
name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live
birth (birth certificate). His sex was
registered as "male." He further alleged
that he is a male transsexual. He
underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform
himself to a "woman" culminated on
January 27, 2001 when he underwent
sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok,
Thailand. Petitioner lived as a female and
was in fact engaged to be married. An
order setting the case for initial hearing.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered
a decision4 in favor of petitioner. On
August 18, 2003, the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed
a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law
allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex
alteration. February 23, 2006, the Court
of Appeals7 rendered a decision in favor
of the Republic. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.
Petitioner essentially claims that the
change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407
to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
Issues:
(Issue in the RTC and CA) sole issue here
is whether or not petitioner is entitled to
the relief asked for.
Whether or not a persons first name be
change because of sex reassignment?
Whether or not entries in the B.C. be
change on the basis of equity?
Held: Where the RTC affirms the petition
filed by the herein petitioner, through
the OSG, the republic appealed the case

in the Court of Appeals, whereby the

decision was set aside because there is
no law that provides for the change of
first name because of a sex
reassignment. The SC rules out that the
petition lacks merit where it was denied.
The SC held that a persons first name
cannot be change because of sex
reassignment and RA 9048 deliberately
expounded on how a name can be
change and sex reassignment is not one
of them.
Furthermore, the SC held No Law Allows
The Change of Entry In The Birth
Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of
Sex Reassignment. It is but clear to state
that a persons status is determined at
birth and not by reassignment. "Status"
refers to the circumstances affecting the
legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person
in view of his age, nationality and his
family membership.
The trial court opined that its grant of
the petition was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It
believed that allowing the petition would
cause no harm, injury or prejudice to
anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will
have serious and wide-ranging legal and
public policy consequences. First, even
the trial court itself found that the
petition was but petitioners first step
towards his eventual marriage to his
male fianc. However, marriage, one of
the most sacred social institutions, is a
special contract of permanent
unionbetween a man and a
woman.37 One of its essential requisites
is the legal capacity of the contracting
parties who must be a male and a
female.38 To grant the changes sought by
petitioner will substantially reconfigure
and greatly alter the laws on marriage
and family relations. It will allow the
union of a man with another man who
has undergone sex reassignment (a
male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various
laws which apply particularly to women
such as the provisions of the Labor Code
on employment of women,39 certain

felonies under the Revised Penal

Code40 and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among
others. These laws underscore the public
policy in relation to women which could
be substantially affected if petitioners
petition were to be granted.

RTC.

MTDC

moved

to

withdraw

as

plaintiff which was also granted by the

RTC.
On January 14, 1993, the RTC issued a
TRO directing the City to cease and
desist from enforcing the Ordinance.
On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a
decision

declaring

the Ordinance null

and void.
The City then filed a petition for review
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION vs. CITY
OF MANILA

on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

However,

the Supreme

Court referred

the same to the Court of Appeals. The

G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009

City asserted that the Ordinance is a

valid exercise of police power pursuant
to Local

FACTS:
On

government code

and

the

Revised Manila charter. Operators of

December

Mayor

Lim signedinto

law

the ordinance is unconstitutional since it

An Ordinance Prohibiting

Short-

freedom of movement; it is an invalid

time Admission,

Short-

S.

1992,

drive-in hotels and motels argued that

City

Alfredo

3,

and ordinance entitled

time Admission Rates,

and

Wash-up

Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging

Houses, and Similar Establishments in

violates the right to privacy and the

exercise of police power; and it is an
unreasonable

and

oppressive

interference in their business.

the City of Manila.

The Court

of

Appeals reversed

On December 15, 1992, the Malate

constitutionality of the Ordinance.

the

decision of the RTC and affirmed the

Tourist and Development

Corporation

(MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory

relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining

ISSUE: WON

the ordinance is

unconstitutional

order (TRO) with the RTC of Manila and

prayed that the Ordinance be declared
invalid and unconstitutional.
On

December

White

Light

Corporation

21,

1992,

petitioners

Corporation,
and

Sta.Mesa

Titanium
Tourist

Development Corporation filed a motion

to intervene, which was granted by the

HELD: Yes.
For

an ordinance to

be

legitimate

exercise of police power,

(1) It must appear that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished

from those of a particular class, require

We cannot discount other legitimate

an interference with private rights and

activities

the

reasonably

proscribe or impair. There are very

necessary for the accomplishment of the

legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting

purpose and not unduly oppressive of

the room out for more than twice a day.

private rights.

Entire families are known to choose pass

means

must

be

which

the Ordinance would

the time in a motel or hotel whilst the

(2) It must also be evident that no other

power is momentarily out in their homes.

alternative for the accomplishment of

In transit passengers who wish to wash

the purpose less intrusive of private

up

rights can work.

legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays

and

rest

between

trips

have

in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or

(3) A reasonable relation must exist

groups of persons in need of comfortable

between the purposes of the measure

private spaces for a span of a few hours

and

with purposes other than having sex or

the

means

employed

for

its

accomplishment.

using illegal drugs can legitimately look

to staying in a motel or hotel as a

Lacking

concurrence

of

these

convenient alternative.

requisites, the police measure shall be

struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into

The Ordinance makes

private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc,

between places frequented by patrons

the exercise of police power is subject to

engaged in illicit activities and patrons

judicial

engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it

review

when

life,

liberty

or

property is affected.

no

distinction

prevents legitimate use of places where

illicit activities are rare or even unheard

It cannot be denied that the primary

of. A plain reading of section 3 of

animus

the Ordinance shows it

behind

the ordinance is

the

makes

no

curtailment of sexual behavior. The City

classification of places of lodging, thus

asserts before this Court that the subject

deems them all susceptible to illicit

establishments have gained notoriety

patronage and subject them without

as venue of prostitution, adultery and

exception to the unjustified prohibition.

fornications

in

Manila

since

they

provide the necessary atmosphere for

The behavior which the Ordinance seeks

clandestine entry, presence and exit and

to curtail is in fact already prohibited and

thus

for

could in fact be diminished simply by

prostitutes and thrill-seekers. Whether

applying existing laws. Less intrusive

or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene

measures

of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied

proliferation

that legitimate sexual behavior among

dealers through active police work would

willing

or

be more effective in easing the situation.

which

is

So

will

be

became

the

ideal

married

consenting single adults

constitutionally
curtailed as well.

haven

protected

would

such
of

the

as

curbing

prostitutes

strict

and

the
drug

enforcement

of

existing laws and regulations penalizing

prostitution

and

drug

use.

These

measures would have minimal intrusion

on the businesses of the petitioners and

other legitimate merchants. Further, it is

The promotion of public welfare and a

apparent that theOrdinance can easily

sense

be circumvented by merely paying the

deserves the full endorsement of the

whole day rate without any hindrance to

judiciary provided that such measures do

those

not trample rights this Court is sworn to

engaged

in

illicit

activities.

Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes

of

morality

among

citizens

protect.

can in fact collect wash rates from

their

clientele

by

charging

their

customers a portion of the rent for motel

rooms and even apartments.

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is

We reiterate that individual rights may

be adversely affected only to the extent
that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or
public welfare. The State is a leviathan
that must be restrained from needlessly
intruding into the lives of its citizens.
However

wellintentioned

the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an

arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the
rights of the establishments as well as
their

patrons. The Ordinance needlessly

restrains the operation of the businesses

of the petitioners as well as restricting
the

rights

of

their

sufficient
The Ordinance rashly

patrons

without

justification.
equates

wash

rates and renting out a room more than

twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions.

to minimize if not eliminate the use of

the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and the like. These
goals,

by

themselves,

are

unimpeachable and certainly fall within

the ambit of the police power of the
State. Yet the desirability of these ends
does not sanctify any and all means for
their

achievement.

However

well-

intentioned the Ordinancemay be, it is in

effect

an

intrusion

arbitrary
into

the

and

whimsical

rights

of

the

establishments as well as their patrons.

The Ordinance needlessly restrains the
operation

of

the

businesses

of

the

petitioners as well as restricts the rights

of

their

patrons

justification.

without

sufficient