Mate v.

CA
Facts:
On October 6, 1986, Josefina Josie Rey and private respondent Tan went to the residence of
petitioner in Tacloban City. Josie solicited his help to stave her off her prosecution by respondent
for violation of B. P. 22. Josie asked petitioner to cede to respondent his 3 lots. Josie explained to
him that he was in no danger of losing his property as they will be redeemed by her own funds.
After a long discussion, petitioner agreed to execute a fictitious deed of sale with right to
repurchase after 6 months. Josie gave petitioner 2 post-dated checks to be used in redeeming the
property. However, the checks were both dishonored. Realizing that he was swindled, he sent a
telegram to Josie, and looked for her in Manila, but she was nowhere to be found. Petitioner filed a
criminal case against Josie for violation of B. P. 22, but the case was archived since Josie could not
be located. Petitioner filed a case for annulment of contract with damages against Josie and
respondent. Josie was declared in default and the case proceeded against respondent. Both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the sale.
Issue:
Whether the sale was null and void for want of consideration
Held:
It is plain that consideration existed at the time of the execution of the deed of sale with right of
repurchase. It is not only appellant's kindness to Josefina, being his cousin, but also his receipt of
P420,000.00 from her which impelled him to execute such contract. Furthermore, while petitioner
did not receive the P1.4 Million purchase prices from respondent Tan, he had in his possession a
postdated check of Josie Rey in an equivalent amount precisely to repurchase the two lots on or
before the sixth month. Unfortunately, the two checks issued by Josie Rey were worthless. Both
were dishonored upon presentment by petitioner with the drawee banks. However, there is
absolutely no basis for petitioner to file a complaint against private respondent Tan and Josie Rey
to annul the pacto de retro sale on the ground of lack of consideration, invoking his failure to
encash the two checks. Petitioner's cause of action was to file criminal actions against Josie Rey
under B.P. 22, which he did. The filing of the criminal cases was a tacit admission by petitioner that
there was a consideration of the pacto de retro sale.

Spouses Ladanga v. CA
Facts:
Clemencia A. Aseneta, a spinster who retired as division superintendent of public schools at 65 in
1961, had a nephew named Bernardo S. Aseneta, the child of her sister Gloria, and a niece named
Salvacion, the daughter of her sister Flora. She legally adopted Bernardo in 1961. On a single
date, 6 April 1974, she (then 78 years old) signed 9 deeds of sale in favor of Salvacion, for various
real properties. One deed of sale concerned the said Paco property (166 sq. m. lot located at 1238

Sison Street Paco Manila and administered by the Ladanga spouses, Agustin and Salvacion)
which purportedly was sold to Salvacion for P26,000. The total price involved in the 9 deeds of sale
and in the 10th sale executed on 8 November 1974 was P92,200. The deed of sale for the Paco
property was signed in the office of the Quezon City registry of deeds.
In May 1975, Bernardo, as guardian of Clemencia, filed an action for reconveyance of the Paco
property, accounting of the rentals and damages, with the CFI Manila. Clemencia was not mentally
incompetent but she was placed under guardianship because she was an easy prey for exploitation
and deceit. Clemencia testified and denied having received even one centavo of the price of
P26,000), much less the P92,000. This testimony was corroborated by Soledad L. Maninang, 69, a
dentist with whom Clemencia had lived for more than 30 years in Kamuning, Quezon City. The
notary public stated that he did not see Salvacion hand any money to Clemencia for the purported
sale when the deed was signed in the registry of deeds. The trial court declared void the sale of the
Paco property.
Clemencia died on 21 May 1977 at the age of 80. She allegedly bequeathed her properties in a
holographic will dated 23 November 1973 to Doctor Maninang. In that will she disinherited
Bernardo. The will was presented for probate. The testate case was consolidated with the intestate
proceeding filed by Bernardo in the sala of Judge Ricardo L. Pronove at Pasig, Rizal. He dismissed
the testate case. He appointed Bernardo as administrator in the intestate case.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the CFI, ordered the register of deeds to
issue a new title to Clemencia, and ordered the spouses to pay Clemencias estate P21,000 as
moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees and to render to Bernardo an accounting of the
rentals of the property from 6 April 1974. The spouses appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the sale is void for lack of consideration
Held:
The Ladanga spouses contend that the Appellate Court disregarded the rule on burden of proof.
This contention is devoid of merit because Clemencia herself testified that the price of P26,000
was not paid to her. The burden of the evidence shifted to the Ladanga spouses. They were not
able to prove the payment of that amount. The sale was fictitious. A contract of sale is void and
produces no effect whatsoever where the price, which appears therein as paid, has in fact never
been paid by the purchaser to the vendor. It was not shown that Clemencia intended to donate the
Paco property to the Ladangas. Her testimony and the notary's testimony destroyed any
presumption that the sale was fair and regular and for a true consideration.

Balatbat v. CA
Facts:
A parcel of land was acquired by plaintiff Aurelio Roque and Maria Mesina during their conjugal
union. Maria died on August 28, 1966. On June 15, 1977, Aurelio filed a case for partition. The trial
court held that Aurelio is entitled to the portion at his share in the conjugal property, and 1/5 of

the other half which formed part of Marias estate, divided equally among him at his 4 children. The
decision having become final and executory, the Register of Deeds of Manila issued a transfer
certificate of title on October 5, 1979 according to the ruling of the court. On April 1, 1980, Aurelio
sold his 6/10 share to spouses Aurora Tuazon-Repuyan and Jose Repuyan, as evidenced by a
deed of absolute sale. On June 21, 1980, Aurora caused the annotation of her affidavit of adverse
claim. On August 20, 1980, Aurelio filed a complaint for rescission of contract grounded on the
buyers failure to pay the balance of the purchase price. On February 4, 1982, another deed of
absolute sale was executed between Aurelio and his children, and herein petitioner Clara Balatbat,
involving the entire lot. Balatbat filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession, which was
granted by the court on September 20, 1982, subject to valid rights and interests of third persons.
Balatbat filed a motion to intervene in the rescission case, but did not file her complaint in
intervention. The court ruled that the sale between Aurelio and Aurora is valid.
Issues:
(1) Whether the alleged sale to private respondents was merely executory
(2) Whether there was double sale
(3) Whether petitioner is a buyer in good faith and for value
Held:
(1) Contrary to petitioner's contention that the sale dated April 1, 1980 in favor of private
respondents Repuyan was merely executory for the reason that there was no delivery of the
subject property and that consideration/price was not fully paid, we find the sale as consummated,
hence, valid and enforceable. The Court dismissed vendor's Aurelio Roque complaint for rescission
of the deed of sale and declared that the Sale dated April 1, 1980, as valid and enforceable. No
appeal having been made, the decision became final and executory.
The execution of the public instrument, without actual delivery of the thing, transfers the ownership
from the vendor to the vendee, who may thereafter exercise the rights of an owner over the same.
In the instant case, vendor Roque delivered the owner's certificate of title to herein private
respondent. The provision of Article 1358 on the necessity of a public document is only for
convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not a requirement for the validity of a contract of
sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied in a public instrument. A contract of sale being
consensual, it is perfected by the mere consent of the parties. Delivery of the thing bought or
payment of the price is not necessary for the perfection of the contract; and failure of the vendee to
pay the price after the execution of the contract does not make the sale null and void for lack of
consideration but results at most in default on the part of the vendee, for which the vendor may
exercise his legal remedies.
(2) Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides that in case of double sale of an immovable property,
ownership shall be transferred (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in possession;
and (3) in default thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

In the case at bar, vendor Aurelio Roque sold 6/10 portion of his share to private respondents
Repuyan on April 1, 1980. Subsequently, the same lot was sold again by vendor Aurelio Roque
(6/10) and his children (4/10), represented by the Clerk of Court pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, on February 4, 1982. Undoubtedly, this is a case of double sale contemplated
under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code.
Evidently, private respondents Repuyan's caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the title of
the subject property on July 21, 1980. The annotation of the adverse claim in the Registry of
Property is sufficient compliance as mandated by law and serves notice to the whole world. On the
other hand, petitioner filed a notice of lis pendens only on February 2, 1982. Accordingly, private
respondents who first caused the annotation of the adverse claim in good faith shall have a better
right over herein petitioner. As between two purchasers, the one who has registered the sale in his
favor, has a preferred right over the other who has not registered his title even if the latter is in
actual possession of the immovable property. Further, even in default of the first registrant or first in
possession, private respondents have presented the oldest title. Thus, private respondents who
acquired the subject property in good faith and for valuable consideration established a superior
right as against the petitioner.
(3) Petitioner cannot be considered as a buyer in good faith. If petitioner did investigate before
buying the land on February 4, 1982, she should have known that there was a pending case and
an annotation of adverse claim was made in the title of the property before the Register of Deeds
and she could have discovered that the subject property was already sold to the private
respondents. It is incumbent upon the vendee of the property to ask for the delivery of the owner's
duplicate copy of the title from the vendor. One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a
defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as
against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein; and the same rule must be applied to
one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as
might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor. Good faith, or the
want of it is not a visible, tangible fact that can be seen or touched, but rather a state or condition of
mind which can only be judged of by actual or fancied tokens or signs.