Machines and the Mental

Author(s): Fred Dretske

Source: Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 59, No. 1
(Sep., 1985), pp. 23-33
Published by: American Philosophical Association
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MACHINESAND THE
MENTAL1.
FredDretske
University
ofWisconsin/Madison
Computersare machinesand thereare a lot of thingsmachinescan't do. But
thereare a lot of thingsI can't do: speakTurkish,
understand
JamesJoyce,or recognize a nasturtium
when I see one. Yet, numerousas are my disabilities,
theydo
not materially
affectmystatusas a thinking
I
lack
being.
specializedskills,knowledge
and understanding,
but nothingthat is essentialto membership
in the societyof
rationalagents. Withmachines,though,and this includesthe mostsophisticated
it is different.
moderncomputers,
thatis essential.
Theydo lacksomething
Or so somesay. And so sayI. In sayingit,though,one should,as a philosopher,
be preparedto say whatis essential,
whatare theconditionsformembership
in this
exclusiveclub. If an abilityto understand
JamesJoyceisn't required,
what,then,
mustone be able to understand?If one doesn'thaveto knowwhatnasturtiums
look
else one mustbe able to identify?Whatmightthisbe? If
like,is theresomething
one is toldthatthereis no specificthingone hasto understand,
orknowbut,
identify
or
other
towards
which
one
have
a
must
of
nonetheless,
something
degree competence,
it is hardto see how to denycomputers
admissionto the club. For eventhesimple
robotsdesignedforhome amusement
and learn. Or so I keep
talk,see, remember
readingin thepromotional
catalogs.Isn'tthisenough?Whynot?
I happen to be one of those philosophers
who, thoughhappyto admitthat
mindscomputer,and in thissenseare computers,
have greatdifficulty
seeinghow
computerscould be minded. I'm not (not now at least) goingto complainabout
the impoverished
innerlifeof the computer--how
theydon'tfeelpain,fear,love or
innerlightof consciousness.
anger. Nor am I goingto talk about the mysterious
For I'm not at all sureone needs feelingsor selfconsciousness
to solveproblems,
and
understand
can't
the
stories.
games,
recognize
play
patterns
Why
purethought,
sort of thingcomputerspurportedly
have, standto ordinarythought,the sortof
strollstandsto a hecticwalkdowna crowdedstreet?
thingwe have,thewaya solitary
The same thing--walking--is
goingon in both cases. It just seemsdifferent
because,
in the lattercase, so muchelse is goingon at the same time. A mathematician's
calculationsare no lessbrilliant,
no lessdeserving
ofclassification
as mental,
certainly
because he or she is blind,deaf and emotionally
in otherwords,
stunted--because,

Addressdeliveredbeforethe Eighty-third
AnnualMeetingof the
*Presidential
WesternDivisionof the AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation,Chicago,Illinois,April
26, 1985.
23

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24

APAPROCEEDINGS

thecalculations
occurwithina comparatively
anemicsensoryand emotionalenvironment. Whycan'twe thinkof our machinesas occupyinga positionon the farright
of thismentalcontinuum?Justa bit to therightof StarTrek'sDoctorSpock? We
don't,afterall, denysomeonethecapacityforlovebecausetheycan'tdo differential
or understand
stories
calculus. Whydenythe computertheabilityto solveproblems
becauseit doesn'tfeellove,experience
nausea,or suffer
indigestion?
areat doingwhatmostchildren
Nor am I goingto talkabouthowbad computers
theirnativelanguage,
makeup a storyor appreciate
can do--e.g.,speakandunderstand
a joke. For such comparisons
make it soundlike a competition,
a competition
in
whichhumans,withtheirenormoushead start,and barring
dramaticbreakthroughs
in AI, willremainunchallenged
fortheforeseeable
future.I don'tthinkthecomparisonshouldbe putin thesetermsbecauseI don'tthinkthereis a genuinecompetition
in thisarea at all. It isn't thatthe best machinesare stillat thelevelof two-yearto growup.
olds, requiringonly greaterstoragecapacityand fancierprogramming
Nor shouldwe thinkof themas idiot savants,exhibiting
a spectacularabilityin a
fewisolatedareas,but havingan overallIQ too low forfraternal
association. For
machines,eventhe best of them,don't have an IQ. They don't do whatwe do-at least none of the thingsthat,whenwe do them,exhibitintelligence.And it's
notjust thattheydon't do themthe way we do themor as well as we do them.
They don'tdo themat all. Theydon't solveproblems,
playgames,provetheorems,
recognizepatterns,let alone think,see and remember.They don't even add and
subtract.
to variousinstruTo convinceyou of this,it is usefulto look at our relationship
will not take us far,but it willset
examination
mentsand tools. The preliminary
of what I take to be the fundamental
difference
the stagefor a clearerstatement
betweenmindsandmachines.
of instruments
and toolswe tendto assignthemthecapaciIn our descriptions
ties and powersof the agentswho use them. We oftenthink,or at least talk,of
instruments
and machines--as
artifacts--tools,
tellingus things,recognizing,
sensing,
moments,
and,in general,doingthingsthat,in ourmoreserious,literal,
remembering
to be the provinceof rationalagents. In mostcases thisfigurative
we acknowledge
use of languagedoes no harm. No one is reallyconfused.Thoughwe open doors,
and keys open (locked) doors, no one seemsto worryabout whetherkeysopen
doorsbetterthanwe do, whetherwe are stillaheadin thiscompetition.No one is
to builda fifthgeneration
keythatwillsurpassus in thisenterprise.
Whynot?
trying
Since both keysand peopleopen doors,whydoesn'tit makesenseto ask who does
it better? Because,of course,we all understand
thatdoorsare openedwithkeys.
Thatwe sometimes
We are the agents. The keyis the instrument.
speakof theinto theagent,speakof thekeyas doingwhattheagent
in termsappropriate
strument
thereare
does with the key, shouldnot temptus into supposingthat,therefore,
some thingswe do thatkeyscan also do. We catchfishwithworms;we, not the
worms,catchthefish.
Beforeconcluding,
are,likekeys,merelyfancyinstruhowever,thatcomputers
unableto do what
mentsin our cognitivetool box--and,thus,takenby themselves,
anothercase. Whoreallypicksup thedust,themaid
we can do withthem--consider
thatthemaid
or the vacuumcleaner? Is the vacuumcleanermerelyan instrument
uses to pickup dust? Wellyes,but notquite thewayone usesa keyto opena door
or a hammerto pound a nail. One pushesthevacuumcleaneraroundbut it picks

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PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS - DRETSKE

25

up the dust. In thiscase (unlikethe key case) the question:"Who picksup dust
better:peopleorvacuumcleaners?"does makegoodsense,and theanswer,obviously,
is the vacuumcleaner. We mayneverhavehad any realcompetition
fromkeysfor
but
we
to
seem
have
for
lost
the
race
dust
to vacuum
doors,
opening
pickingup
cleaners.
Whatsuch examplesrevealis thattheagent-instrument
is no certain
distinction
Wedo things.Machines
guideto who or whatis to be givencreditfora performance.
do things.Sometimeswe do thingswithmachines.Whogetsthe creditdependson
what is done and how it is done. To ask whethera simplepocketcalculatorcan
orwhether
it is we whomultiply
is to ask,whether,
withthecalculator
reallymultiply
relativeto thistask,the agent-instrument
relationis morelike our use of a keyin
openinga dooror morelikeouruse of a vacuumcleanerin picking
up dust.
ourcomputational
Well,then,arecomputers
keys? Or aretheymorelikevacuum
do thecomputational
cleaners?Do theyliterally
do without
tasksthatwe sometimes
thembut do it better,faster,and morereliably?Thismaysoundlikea rathersimplemindedway to approachtheissueof mindsand machines,
butunlessone getsclear
about the relatively
simplequestionof who does thejob, thepersonor the pocket
one is unlikelyto makesuchprogress
calculator,in addingup a columnof figures,
in penetrating
the morebaffling
machines
questionof whethermoresophisticated
exhibit(or willsomeday) someof thegenuinequalitiesofintelligence.
For I assume
thatif machinescan reallyplay chess,provetheorems,
a text,diagnose
understand
an illness,and recognizean object--allachievements
thatare routinely
creditedto
these
modernmachinesby sobermembers
of theartificial
intelligence
community--if
are literallytrue,thento thatdegreetheyparticipate
in theintellectual
descriptions
enterprise.To thatdegreetheyare minded.To thatextenttheybelongin the club
howevermuchwe, withour prejudicein favorofbiologicallook-alikes,
maycontinue
to denythemfulladmission.
So let me beginwitha naivequestion:Can computersadd? We maynot feel
if thisis all theycan do. Nevertheless,
if theydo eventhismuch,
verythreatened
thenthe barriersseparating
mindand machinehave been breachedand thereis no
reasonto thinktheywon'teventually
be removed.
is an attemptto showthatwhatever
it is thatcomputers
The following
argument
are doingwhenwe use themto answerour arithmetical
questions,it isn'taddition.
Additionis an operationon numbers.We add 7 and 5 to get12,and 7, 5 and 12 are
on numnumbers.The operationscomputersperform,
are not operations
however,
bers. At best,theyare operationson certainphysicaltokensthatstandfor,or are
don'tadd.
as standing
for,thenumbers.Therefore,
computers
interpreted
In thinking
about this argument(longerthanI care to admit)I decidedthat
therewas something
rightabout it. And something
wrong. Whatis rightaboutit
is the perfectly
valid(and relevant)distinction
it invokesbetweena representation
and what it represents,
betweena signand what it signifies,
betweena symboland
its meaningor reference.We havevariouswaysof representing
or designating
the
numbers.The writtennumeral"2" standsforthenumber2. So does "two." Unless equippedwithspecialpatternrecognition
machinesare notprepared
capabilities,
to handlethese particularsymbols(the symbolsappear on the keyboardforour
convenience).But theyhave theirown systemof representation:
open and closed
theorientation
of magneticfields,the distribution
of holeson a card. But
switches,

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26

APAPROCEEDINGS

theformof representation,
to operations
whatever
themachineis obviouslyrestricted
on the symbolsor representations
themselves.It has no access,so to speak,to the
to thethingstherepresentations
to thenumbers.
meaningof thesesymbols,
represent,
Wheninstructedto add two numbersstoredin memory,the machinemanipulates
in some electromechanical
wayuntilit arrivesat anotherrepresentarepresentations
that (if thingsgo right)standsforthe sum of what the firsttwo
tion--something
in contrast
stood for. At no pointin the proceedings
do numbers,
representations
to numerals,
in
to
two
to perform
add
one
has
involved.
And
order
numbers,
if,
get
thenwhatthe computeris doingis not
some operationon the numbersthemselves,
additionat all.
This argument,
as I am sureeveryoneis aware,showstoo much. It showsthat
in or by ourcentral
we don't add either. For whatever
operationsmaybe performed
it quiteclearlyisn'tan operationon the
nervoussystemwhenwe add two numbers,
numbersthemselves.Brainshavetheirown codingsystems,
theirownway of representingthe objects(includingthe numbers)about whichits (or our) thoughtsand
thana computer.
calculationsare directed. In thisrespecta personis no different
have
different
of
the
Biologicalsystemsmay
ways representing objectsof thought,
but they,likethecomputer,
are necessarily
limitedto manipulating
theserepresentations. This is merelyto acknowledgethe natureof thoughtitself.It is a vicarious
about two
business,a symbolicactivity.Addingtwo numbersis a way of thinking
and thinking
about X and Y is not a way of pushingX andY around.It is
numbers,
a wayof pushing
aroundtheirsymbolic
representatives.
Whatis wrongwiththe argument,
thatin orderto add
then,is theassumption
two numbers,
a systemmustliterally
someoperationon thenumbersthemperform
selves. Whattheargument
is thatin orderto carryout
shows,if it showsanything,
arithmetical
thenumbersand
operations,a systemmusthave a way of representing
the capacityfor manipulating
these representations
in accordancewitharithmetic
whatcomputers
have?
principles.Butisn'tthisprecisely
I have discussedthisargument
at some lengthonly to make the pointthatall
or naturalbiologicalsystems)will necescognitiveoperations(whetherby artifacts
sarilybe realizedin some electrical,chemicalor mechanical
operationoverphysical
structures.(Or, ifmaterialism
isn'ttrue,theywillbe realizedin or bytransformations
of mind-stuff.)
nature
This factalone doesn'ttell us anything
about thecognitive
of the operationsbeingperformed--whether,
forinstance,it is an inference,
a thought
or the takingof a squareroot. For whatmakestheseoperationsintothoughts,
incalculationsis, amongotherthings,
themeaningor,ifyou
ferences,or arithmetical
overwhichtheyare performed.To think
prefer,the semanticsof thosestructures
about thenumber7 or yourcousinGeorge,youneedn'tdo anything
withthenumber
7 or your cousin George,but you do need the internalresourcesforrepresenting
7 and Georgeand the capacityformanipulating
theserepresentations
in waysthat
standforactivities
andconditions
of thethings
beingrepresented.
This shouldbe obviousenough. Openingand closingrelaysdoesn'tcountas
addition,or as movesin a chessgame,unlesstherelays,or theirvariousstates,stand
fornumbersand chessmoves. But whatmaynot be so obviousis thatthesephysical
activitiescannotacquirethe relevantkindof meaningmerelyby assigning
theman
to or for us. Unlessthe symbols
by lettingthemmean something
interpretation,
meansomething
to thesystemmanipulating
them,theirmeaning,
beingmanipulated

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PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS - DRETSKE

27

it is, is irrelevant
to evaluating
whatever
whatthesystemis doingwhenit manipulates
them.2 I cannotmakeyou,someone'sparrot,or a machinethinkaboutmycousin
in accordancewithwhichthis
George,or the number7, just by assigning
meanings
is what your (the parrot's,the machine's)activitiesstandfor. If thingswere this
thinkaboutmycousinGeorge.Everything
easy,I couldmakea taperecorder
depends
on whetherthisis themeaningtheseeventshaveto you, theparrot,or themachine.
of symbolsis
Despite some people's tendencyto thinkthatthe manipulation
as "addingnumbers,"
itselfa wondrousfeat,worthyof such inflateddescriptions
out its nextmove" the processis, in fact,ab"drawingconclusions,"or "figuring
a symI once watcheda gerbilmanipulate
solutelydevoidof cognitive
significance.3
thatI, butnotthe
standards--standards
bol, a symbolthat,accordingto conventional
stoodformybankbalance. I didn'thavetheslightest
gerbil--understood,
temptation
to see in thissymbolmanipulation
ofspecial
(actuallyconsumption)
processanything
if
Even
I
trained
a
fleet
of
to
in
some
significance.
gerbils arrangesymbols
computationallysatisfying
way (e.g., to balancemy checkbook),I don't thinktheyshould
be creditedwithbalancingmy checkbook. I would merelybe usingthegerbilsto
balancemycheckbookin thewayI use wormsto catchfish.
whata systemis doingwhenit manipulates
To understand
itis necessary
symbols,
to know,not just what these symbolsmean,whatinterpretation
theyhave been,
or can be, assigned,but whattheymean to the systemperforming
theoperations.
JohnSearle and Ned Block have dramatizedthispoint.4 Searle,forinstance,asks
one to imaginesomeonewho understands
no Chinesemanipulating
Chinesesymbols
in accordancewithrulesexpressedin a languagehe does understand.Imaginethe
rulescleverlyenoughdesignedso thatthispersoncan carryon a correspondence
in
to (written)Chinesequestionswith (written)Chineseanswers
Chinese--responding
in a way thatis indistinguishable
fromtheperformance
of a nativespeakerofChinese.
Clearly,thougha correspondent
mightnot be able to discoverthisfact,thesymbol
himselfdoesn'tunderstand
Chinese. Nor does thesystemof whichhe
manipulator
is a part. Understanding
Chineseis not just a matterof manipulating
meaningful
to thesystem
symbolsin someappropriate
way. Thesesymbolsmustmeansomething
theoperations.
performing
This shouldnot be takento implythatmachinescannotserveas usefulmodels
forcognitive
use in cognitive
processes.On thecontrary.Theirprevalent
psychology
indicatesotherwise. Whatit does implyis thatthe machinesdo not literallydo
whatwe do whenwe engagein thoseactivitiesforwhichtheyprovidean effective
model. Computersimulations
of a hurricane
do not blow treesdown. Whyshould
of problemsolvingmustthemselves
solve
anyonesupposethatcomputersimulations
problems?
But how does one builda systemthatis capablenot onlyof performing
operations on (or with) symbols,but one to whichthesesymbolsmean something,a
machinethat,in thissense,understands
themeaningof thesymbolsit manipulates?
Onlywhenwe can do thiswillwe havemachinesthatnot onlyproducemeaningful
in producing
thatoutputbearthemarkof the
output,but machineswhoseactivities
mental. Only thenwill we have machinesthatwe can not onlyuse to balanceour
checkbook,but machinesthatwill do it forus, machinesthatwill not only print
out answersto ourquestions,butmachinesthatwillanswerourquestions.
One thingseems reasonablyclear: if the meaningof the symbolson whicha
machineperforms
its operationsis a meaningwhollyderivedfromus, its users--if

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28

APAPROCEEDINGS

a
it is a meaningthat we assignthe variousstatesof the machineand, therefore,
thewaythesesymbolsare promeaningthatwe can changeat willwithoutaltering
thereis no way the machinecan acquireundercessedby the machineitself--then
no way thesesymbolscan have a meaningto the machineitself. Unless
standing,
a meaningtheypossess
thesesymbolshave whatwe mightcall an intrinsic
meaning,
and purposes,thenthismeanintentions
of our communicative
whichis independent
to assessingwhatthe machineis doingwhenit manipulates
ing mustbe irrelevant
them. The machineis processing
(to us) symbols,to be sure,but the
meaningful
of whattheymean--hence,
way it processesthemis quite independent
nothingthe
machinedoes is explicablein termsof the meaningof the symbolsit manipulates
and data
or, indeed,of theirevenhavinga meaning. Giventherightprogramming
base, we can contriveto make the sentencesa machineproducesanswersto our
ourquestionsthanis an autoquestions.But themachineitselfis no moreanswering
in the bankingindustry)
maticteller(now so prevalent
embezzlingmoneywhenit
ouraccount.
keepsourdepositwithoutcrediting
to approximate
of genuinecognitive
In order,therefore,
significance,
something
thatbearsa mark,if notall themarks,of the
in orderto givea machinesomething
mustbe givena meaningof theirown,
mental,the symbolsa machinemanipulates
of theiruser'spurposesandintentions.
a meaningthatis independent
Onlybydoing
thiswill it becomepossibleto makethemeaningof thesesymbolsrelevantto what
themachinedoes withthem,possible,in otherwords,to makethemachinedo someto makethesesymbols
thingbecauseof whatits symbolsmean,possible,therefore,
to themachineitself.
meansomething
And how mightthisbe done? In thesameway,I submit,thatnaturearranged
it in our case. We mustput the computerinto the head of a robot,into a larger
thatenable
theperceptual
resources,
systemthathas thekindof sensorycapabilities,
in Paul Grice'snaturalsense
whatgoes on insidethe computerto mean something,
of meaning5,about whatgoes on outsidethe computer.The elementsoverwhich
the computerperforms
its operationswill thenhave a meaningthatis independent
in thesamewaythe
of itsusers. Theywillthenmeansomething
of theconventions
in
the
of
means
electricalactivity
a
needle
something
regarding
swing
galvanometer
meanssomething
the circuitto whichit is connected,the way expandingmercury
the way a voltagespike in our visualcortex
about the surrounding
temperature,
on theretina.Thiskind
of lightimpinging
about the distribution
meanssomething
It is thekindof meaningwe associate
calledinformation.6
of meaningis sometimes
thekindof meaning
withreliablesignsand trustworthy
indicators,
possessedbydark
and theelectrical
smoke,acousticvibrations,
clouds,shadows,prints,leaf patterns,
a
robot
and
thedisembodied
between
in
the
The
difference
sensory
activity
pathways.
is thattheformer,
unlikethe
and laboratories
computerfoundin our officebuildings
latter,have symbolsystemsthatare also signsystems:signsbeingsymbolshavinga
of whatwe mightsay or thinktheymean. The only
meaningquite independent
derivedfromthearrayof pressure
in
is themeaning
most
intrinsic
meaning
computers
on its keyboard. The activitiesin the computermay meana
sensitivetransducers
move to KB-3 to us, but all theymeanto thecomputeris thatkey37 has been depressed.
assothekindof meaning
real information,
Thisis onlyto say thatinformation,
to theoperationofhighspeeddigitalcomputers
ciatedwithnaturalsigns,is irrelevant
to theoperationof livingsystems.If a sea snaildoesn't
in a wayit is notirrelevant

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PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS - DRETSKE

29

about the turbulence

in the water,if thereisn't some statein the
get information
as a naturalsignof turbulent
snailthatfunctions
water,it risksbeingdashedto pieces
whenit swimsto the surfaceto obtainthe micro-organisms
on whichit feeds. If
bacteria
did
not
have
inside
that
meant
that
thatwas thedirection
something
(certain)
of magneticnorth,they could not orientthemselves
so as to avoid toxic surface
water. They would perish. If, in otherwords,an animal'sinternalsensorystates
werenot richin information,
naturalmeaning,
aboutthepresenceof prey,
intrinsic
cliffs,obstacles,waterand heat,it could not survive.It isn'tenoughto
predators,
meansomething
have the internalstatesof thesecreatures
to us, forit to havesymbols it can manipulate.If thesesymbolsdon't somehowregister
the conditionsin
theirpossessor'ssurroundings,
the creature'ssymbolmanipulation
capacityis comis it to be able to handlesymbols
pletelyworthless.Of whatpossiblesignificance
forfood,dangerand sexualmatesif the occurrence
of thesesymbolsis whollyunrelatedto theactualpresenceof food,dangerand-sexual
mates?
In a sense,then,workon machineperception,
and robotics
patternrecognition,
has greaterrelevanceto thecognitive
capacitiesofmachinesthanthemostsophisticain such purelyintellectual
ted programming
tasksas languagetranslation,
theorem
or gameplaying.For a patternrecognition
deviceis at leasta devicewhose
proving,
internalstates,like thoseof the bacterium,
snailand humanbeing,meansomething
about whatis happening,
or the conditionsthatexist,aroundit. Thereis actually
what is happening
somethingin these machinesthat meanssomethingregarding
outsidethemand,moreover,
thatmeansthiswhether
or notwe,theusers
something
of the machine(or, indeed,the machineitself),recognizeit. We are not freeto
thanwe are freeto saywhatthe screech
assignor withholdthismeaning--anymore
of a smokealarmmeans. We can say thatthealarmmeansthereareleopardsnearby,
and for certainpurposes(e.g., in a children'sgameof make-believe)
we may even
wantto giveit thatmeaning. But thatisn'tactuallywhatthesoundmeans. That
isn'twhatit is a signof, not the information
it carries. And forthesamereason,
themeaningof theinternalstatesof a patternrecognition
device,or a robotequipped
with sensorycapacities,is a meaningthesestateshave which,if it isn'tactuallya
for themachineitself,is theonlymeaningthatshowsanypromiseofbeing
meaning
thatis relevantto assessing
whatthesemachinesare doing
promotedinto something
whentheymobilizethesemeaningful
elements
to producean output.
But have we come anycloserto understanding
thecapacity
genuinementation,
to add, subtract,plan,play games,understand
stories,and thinkaboutone's cousin
George? Whatwe have so far requiredof any aspiringsymbol-manipulator
is, in
that
effect,thatsome of its symbolsbe actual signsof theconditionstheysignify,
therebe somesystem-to-world
correlations
thatconferon thesesymbolsan intrinsic
of
meaning,a meaningtheydo not derivewhollyfromthepurposesand intentions
theirusers. This puts the symbol-manipulator
in the worldin a way it wouldnot
otherwisebe. Buthavewe come anycloserto understanding
how an element,symbol or sign,couldhavemeaningto the symbolmanipulator
itself,how thismeaning,
and not just the signhavingthismeaning,could be relevantto whatthesystemis
thesesigns?
doingwhenitmanipulates
Thinkabout a dog thathas been trainedto detectmarijuana.Custom'sagents
can use thesedogs to findconcealedmarijuana. Whenthedog barks,wagsits tail,
or does whateverit was trainedto do whenit smellsmarijuana,
thisalertstheagent
to its presence. As a resultof thedog'sbehavior,theofficialcomesto believethat

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30

APAPROCEEDINGS

thereis marijuanain thesuitcase. But whatdoes thedog believe? Surelynot what

thatthereis marijuanain the suitcase. Whynot? Thereis
the agentbelieves--viz.,
in
to thepresenceof marijuana,
some
obviouslysomething the dog thatis sensitive
neuralconditionwhoseoccurrenceis a sign,and in thissensemeans,thatthereis
the
is (as a resultof training)
thissomething
getting
marijuananearby. Furthermore,
a beliefto the
dog to wagits tailor bark. Whyisn'tthisenoughtojustifyattributing
dog, a beliefwith the content:thereis marijuananearby? If we had a Stanford
halfas well withblockson a table,we would doubtless
robot thatcould perform
be hearingabout itsextraordinary
recognitional
capacities.But nobodyseemsterriwiththe dog. The dog,one can hearthemsaying,has a wonderfully
bly impressed
senseof smell. It has sensorypowersthatexceedthoseof itstrainers,
discriminating
but itsconceptualor cognitivecapacitiesare modestindeed. It can smellmarijuana,
sureenough. It can evenbe trainedto respondin somedistinctive
wayto thissmell.
But it doesn'thave the conceptualresourcesforbelievingof whatit smellsthatit
is marijuana.
If we are goingto treatthedog in thisdeflationary
way,we shouldbe prepared
robots.
In industrial
to do the same with machines--including
fancy
applications
of machinevision,forexample,it is said thatmachinescan recognizeshortcircuits
on the printedcircuitboardstheyexamine. Not so. The machinemerelysearches
in the metallicdeposit. It is concernedwithspatial
for breaksor discontinuities
discontinuities.We, its users,are worriedabout electricaldiscontinuities.Under
thatdetectsthefirstas an instrument,
we can use something
therightcircumstances,
should
the second,but,just like the dog, the instrument
a means,for identifying
not be creditedwiththeconceptualtalentsof itsusers,whatwe are able to discover
thanthedog
thoughts
by usingit. The machineis no moreable to haveelectricity
is able to havemarijuana
thoughts.
Some people thinkthat what machineslack is consciousawareness. Perhaps
dog shouldteachus thatthisisn'tthemissing
theydo. But our marijuanasniffing
a thinkerof thoughtsout of a sign
not what we need to manufacture
ingredient,
the
the
whereas
custom's
For
agentis not,awareof thecondog is,
manipulator.
cealed marijuana. The dog smellsit and the agentdoes not. To givea systemthe
it is not enough
kind of meaningwe now seek, to giveit genuineunderstanding,
to giveit consciousawarenessof the stuffit is supposedto cognize. It isn'teven
enoughto make the creature'sconsciousawarenessof the stuffcause it to behave
all
in some appropriate
way towardthe stuff. For, as our traineddog illustrates,
conthis can be truewithoutthe system,animalor machine,havingthe slightest
that
ceptionof whatit all means. And whatwe are after,of course,is something
or startsitsmotors,notjust becauseit is awareof,
wagsits tail,activatesits printer,
judges,or believesthatit is marijuana.What
say,marijuana,but becauseit thinks,
notperception.
we areafteris conception,
betweenmachines(or dogs)and theagentswho use themis that
The difference
we
theinformation
machines
(and dogs) can pickup, processand transmit
although
efforts(this is what makesthemusefultools), although
need in our investigative
to meaningful
or programming)
signs,it isn't
theycan respond(eitherby training
the meaningof the signsthatfiguresin the explanationof whytheydo whatthey
conditionthat,in thissense,
someneurological
do. Some internal
signof marijuana,
means that marijuanais present,can cause the dog's tail to move,but it isn't the
factthatit meansthisthatexplainsthetailmovement.This,I submit,is thediffer-

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PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS - DRETSKE

31

ence betweenthe dog and itsmaster,betweenthemachineanditsusers,betweenthe

is prorobotand thepeopleit replaces.WhenI smellmarijuana,
myfinger
wagging
conditionthatmeans
duced,not simply(as in thecase of thedog) by a neurological
that marijuanais present,but by themeaningof thisneurological
condition,
by the
is profactthatit meansthisand not something
else. In mycase themotoractivity
of a
duced by themeaningof an occurrent
sign;in the dog'scase by theoccurrence
to me
meanssomething
signhavingthatmeaning.To say thatthe smellofmarijuana
thatit doesn'tmeanto the dog is merelyto say thatitsmeaningwhatit doesmakes
a difference
to whatI do but not to whatthedog does. Thatis whyit is trueofme,
but not the dog, thatI wagmyfinger
because
becauseI thinkmarijuanais present,
I am in an internalstatehavingthiscontent.The dogis in a statewiththesameconbetween
tent,to be sure,but it isn'tthiscontentthatwagsthetail. The difference
a thinkerof marijuanathoughts(me) and the meredetectorof marijuana(dog or
in whatour internalsignsmean,but a
machine)is not, then,merelya difference
in whether,and if so, how,thesemeanings
are implicated
in themanagedifference
mentof thesignsthemselves.
I seemto havepaintedmyselfintoa corner.At leastI expectto be toldas much
who are deeplysuspiciousofmeaning.I expectto be toldthat
by thosephilosophers
not something
thatcould playa rolein the activities
of a
meaningis an abstraction,
symbolmanipulating
system.Fromthecontrolpointof view,meaningis an epiphenomenon.It is causallyinert. Evenif one agreesthatthereare signsin thehead,it
not theirmeaning,thatturnthecranks,pullthelevers,and
is the signsthemselves,
depressthe accelerator.It is thegreystuffinside,notwhatit means,thatactivates
the motorneurons.Justask theneurobiologists.
If, in orderto promotea processor
of meaningful
into a real thinker
signsinto a systemwithgenuineunderstanding,
of thoughts,
we mustgivethemeaningof thesesignsa roleto playin theway these
signsare processed,in the way the motorcontrolsystemoperateswiththem,then
the prospectsforeffecting
notjust formachines,
such a promotion,
but forhuman
beingsas well,look bleakindeed.
Such pessimism,
thoughwidespreadthesedays,is unwarranted.Meanings,of
the kind now in question,are whatphilosophers
like to call abstractentities,but
are
no
no
more
and
less
a causal inabstract,
they
certainly
capable of exercising
in weight,brightness
and orientation.Justas the
fluence,thanare, say, differences
in weightbetweena basketballand a bowlingball may be responsible,
difference
forthe behaviorof a beam balance,the correlations
constitucausallyresponsible,
the
of
a
ting
meaning
signcan, and regularly
do, affecttheway a systemprocesses
that sign. The correlation
betweena ringing
bell and someone'spresenceat one's
thatconferson the ringing
bell themeaningthatsomedoor,thekindof correlation
one is at the door,changesthe way a (suitablyexposed)nervoussystemprocesses
the internalsign of a ringing
to this
bell. Exposure(eitherdirectlyor indirectly)
correlationproducesa difference
in whether,and if so, which,motorneuronsare
activatedby theinternalsensorysignof a ringing
bell. This,it seemsto me,is a case
wherethe meaningof a sign,and not just the signthathas thatmeaning,
makesa
difference
in how a systemprocessesthatsign--hence,
a case wherethesign'smeaning,and not the signitself,helpsto explainthebehaviorof the systeminwhichthat
signoccurs.
My doorbellexampleis a homelyexampleof thecausalroleof meaning.Some
may thinkit ignoresall the interesting
questions. For it involvesan agentalready

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APAPROCEEDINGS

32

forinterpreting
signs,understanding
meanings,
possessedof theconceptualresources
his or her behaviorin the lightof experiencedcorrelations.Thisis
and modifying
at almost
can be illustrated
true,but irrelevant.For the verysame phenomenon
an
level
at
It
in
occurs.
which
is,
fact,
level,
learning
merely
biological
every
every
thewaya
theorists
describeas thecontingencies
instanceof whatlearning
modifying
systemprocesses,and hence respondsto, the internalsignsforstimulusconditions.
earlierchangesthewayitprocessessignsbyexposing
Eventhelowlysnailmentioned
the meaningof thesesigns. And it is, surely,the
it to the correlations
constituting
factthatour internalstatesare correlatedwithcertainkindsof externalconditions
the ultimateoutcomeof the motoractivitiesproducedby
thathelpsto determine
what
thathelp to determine
theseinternalstates. It is the correlations,
therefore,
kindof feedbackwe receivedfromsuch activities
and,hence,thelikelihoodof our
not
the correlations,
repeatingthemin the same circumstances.It is, therefore,
behavior.
internal
that
the
correlates,
Learning,
explain--learned
merely
shape--hence,
with
in fact,is a processin whichthemeaningof internalsigns(i.e., theircorrelation
not (merely)thesignsthemselves,
howthese
externalconditions),
helpsto determine
signsare exploitedfor purposesof motorcontrol. For such systemsthe internal
thismeaningaffectstheway thesystemmanagesthese
signsnot onlyhavemeaning,
to thesystemin which
signs;and it is in thissensethatthe signsmean something
theyoccur.
betweenthe signprocessing
difference
This, it seemsto me, is a fundamental
that
various
It
is
a
difference
of
helpsexplainwhyit seemsso
systems.
capabilities
naturalto say of some of them(humanbeingsand some animals)but not others
meansomething
thatthesymbolstheymanipulate
(machinesand simpleorganisms)
ourconviction
thatunderlies
I submit,
to the symbolmanipulator.It is a difference,
aregenuinethinkers
of simpleorganisms,
thatwe, but not themachinesand a variety
is a long and
thisdifference
of thoughts. Whatgivesus the capacitiesunderlying
ourmultiple
I think,issuesin learning
sensory
theory,
complicatedstory. It involves,
accessto thethingswe requireto satisfyour needs,and thekindof feedbackmechainternalsignsby the
nismswe possessthatallow us to modifyhow we manipulate
have produced. But this,clearly,is a
kind of resultsour previousmanipulations
All I have
not fromphilosophers.
storythatwe expectto hearfromneurobiologists,
for
been tryingto tell is a simplerstory,a storyabout the entrancerequirements
admissionto the club. I leave it to othersto worryabout how different
systems
theserequirements.
manage,eachin theirownway,to satisfy
Footnotes
and manyusefulsuggestions.
1. My thanksto DennyStampeforcarefulcriticism
I also want to acknowledgethe help givenme by Fred Adamsand the other
scepticsin theaudienceat AugustanaCollegewhereI readan earlydraftof this
paper. They convincedme thatthe draftI read themwas earlierthanI ever
suspected.
that,according
2. This is whatHaugelandcalls"originalintentionality,"
something
themselves
to Haugeland,computersdon't have: "'To put it bluntly:computers
books
more
than
their
tokens
don't meananything
onlymean
do)--they
(any
by
on theotherhand,is intentional
whatwe say theydo. Genuineunderstanding,

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PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS - DRETSKE

3.
4.

5.
6.

33

fromsomething
in its own right"and not derivatively
else. MindDesign,John
Books;Montgomery,
Vt., 1981, pp. 32-33. A number
Haugeland(ed.), Bradford
of authorshave made essentially
thispointin theirown way;e.g.,Jerry
Fodor,
"Tom Swiftand His ProceduralGrandmother,"
Cognition,6 (1978), reprinted
in Representations,
1981; HilaryPutnam,"Brainsin a Vat,"
MIT/Bradford,
Reason, Truthand History,Cambridge
Press,1981, pp. 10-11; Rob
University
Cummins,TheNatureof Psychological
1983, p. 94;
Explanation,MIT/Bradford,
Tyler Burge,"BeliefDe Re," The Journalof Philosophy,LXXILV, 6 (1977);
JohnSearle,"Minds,Brainsand Programs,"
The Behavioraland BrainSciences
3:3 (1980).
In explainingwhyhe thinkscomputers
can (or will someday),MarvinMinsky
Can't,"AI Magazine,Fall 1982), seemsmost
(in "WhyPeopleThinkComputers
forinstance,withthefactthat"computers
can manipulate
impressed,
symbols."
JohnSearle,"Minds,Brainsand Programs,"
TheBehavioraland BrainSciences,
3:3 (1980); Ned Block,"TroubleswithFunctionalism,"
in Wade Savage(ed.),
Minnesota
Perceptionand Cognition:Issues in the Foundationsof Psychology,
Studiesin thePhilosophy
ofScience,Vol. 9, Minneapolis,
Minn.;1978.
Paul Grice, "Meaning,"PhilosophicalReview, vol. 66 (1957), pp. 377-388.
See my Knowledgeand the Flow of Information,
MIT/Bradford:
Cambridge,
Mass.,1981.

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