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Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
Office of the Clerk
5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2000
Falls Church, Virginia 20530
A 205-458-848
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
Sincerely,
D0ruu.- c
a.AA)
Donna Carr
Chief Clerk
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Adkins-Blanch, Charles K.
Grant, Edward R.
Guendelsberger, John
Userteam: Docket
Ferreira, Paula J.
Law Office of Miguel A. Elias
2301 Williams Blvd.
Suite E
Kenner, LA 70062
San Antonio, TX
Date:
MAY 142015
APPEAL
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Paula J. Ferreira, Esquire
APPLICATION: Reopening
The respondent appeals from the Immigration Judge's July 7, 2014, decision denying her
motion to reopen. The respondent was ordered removed in absentia on July 8, 2013. The appeal
will be sustained, the proceedings reopened and the record remanded.
We review an Immigration Judge's findings of fact for clear error, but questions of law,
discretion, and judgment, and all other issues in appeals, are reviewed de novo. 8 C.F.R.
1003.l(d)(3)(i), (ii).
The respondent claimed in her motion to reopen that exceptional circumstances prevented her
from attending her July 8, 2013, removal hearing (Resp. Mot. to Reopen at 3-6). Specifically,
respondent, through counsel, asserted that her attorney advised her that her pending motion to
change venue would be granted and she was not required to attend the hearing; and also that her
counsel suffered a computer virus that made his calendar inaccessible (Resp. Mot. to Reopen
at 3-6). The Immigration Judge denied the motion, finding that the mere existence of a pending
motion to change venue did not relieve the respondent of her duty to attend the hearing, and that
the computer virus did not amount to exceptional circumstances (I.J. at 2). On appeal, the
respondent, through the same counsel, maintains her claim of exceptional circumstances and
further asserts that she is not required to comply with the procedural requirements of Matter of
Lozada, 19 l&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), aff'd Lozada v. INS, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988), because
she is not claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, only that counsel's incorrect advice
constitutes an exceptional circumstance (Resp. Br. at 7).
The respondent is correct that both this Board and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this matter arises, have found that the erroneous advice of
counsel may constitute an exceptional circumstance excusing the respondent's failure to appear
See Matter of Grijalva-Barrera, 21 I&N Dec. 472 (1996); see also
for a hearing.
Galvez-Vergara v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 798 (5th Cir. 2007). However, in such a scenario,
substantial compliance with Matter of Lozada, supra, is still required. 1 See Lara v. Trominski,
1
Here, the respondent is represented by the same counsel who incorrectly advised her on her need
to appear for the hearing and has not filed any complaint regarding this conduct. Further, it
(continued ...)
Cite as: Lesy Erenio Sanchez-Matute, A205 458 848 (BIA May 14, 2015)
IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
216 F.3d 487, 496-98 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Hernandez-Ortez v. Holder, 741 F.3d 644, 648
(5th Cir. 2014); Rodriguez-Manzano v. Holder, 666 F.3d 948, 953 (5th Cir. 2012).
FOR
(...continued)
appears counsel still has not advised the respondent regarding the need to comply with Matter of
Lozada, supra.
2
Cite as: Lesy Erenio Sanchez-Matute, A205 458 848 (BIA May 14, 2015)
Based on the totality of the circumstances in this case, we will grant the respondent's motion
to reopen to rescind her in absentia order pursuant to our sua sponte authority. See 8 C.F.R.
1003.2(a); see also Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976 (BIA 1997). Accordingly, the following
orders will be entered.
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JUSTICE
BOO
DOLOROSA STREET,
SAN ANTONIO,
ELIAS,
2301
PAULA J.,
ESQ.
WILLIAMS BOULEVARD,
KENNER,
SUITE E
70062
LA
FILE A
IN THE MATTER OF
SANCHEZ-MATUTE,
205-458-848
DATE:
Jul
15, 2014
LESY ERENIO
UNABLE TO FORWARD -
300
78207
NO ADDRESS PROVIDED
JUDGE.
THIS DECISION
WITHIN
S...EE THE
30 CALENDAR DAYS OF
ENC1 OSEQ PEliM18 MtB
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FOR
ATTACHED DOCUMENTS,
PR01i'&'1Js
PR!P:MhNG
IOOR
APPEAL.
5107
Leesburg Pike,
FALLS CHURCH,
VA
Suite
20530
2000
WITH SECTION
SECTION
TO REOPEN,
800
DOLOROSA STREET,
SAN ANTONIO,
TX
SUITE
78207
300
OTHER:
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CC:
OHS
8940
SAN ANTONIO,
TX,
Room
78239
5045
MIGUEL A.
RODRIGUEZ,
SUITE
TX
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THE MATTER OF
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RESPONDENT
IN
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CHARGE:
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IN
On September 18, 2013, the respondent, through counsel, filed with the Court a motion to
reopen her removal proceedings. DHS did not file a response to the respondent's motion.
II. Motion to Reopen
A. Notice
Counsel for the respondent does not claim a lack of notice. See Respondent's Motion to
Reopen. Notice was properly sent to counsel on May 21, 2013. Exhibit 4. Because notice to the
respondent's counsel of record is deemed notice to the respondent, the Court finds that notice of
hearing was properly provided to the respondent. See 8 C.F.R. 1292.S(a); Matter of Barocio,
19 I&N Dec. 255, 259 (BIA 1985).
B. Exceptional Circumstances
Less than 180 days between the date the Court ordered the respondent removed in
and the date the respondent filed her motion to reopen and therefore, the respondent's
motion to reopen based on exceptional circumstances is not time-barred. INA 240(b)(5)(C); 8
C.F.R. 1003.23(b)(4)(ii).
absentia
Counsel for the respondent claims two exceptional circumstances kept the respondent
from appearing at her hearing and should excuse her failure to appear. See Respondent's Motion
to Reopen. First, counsel claims there was a pending motion to change venue before the Court.
See id. Second, counsel for the respondent claims that a computer virus deleted her computer
calendar data. See id
Counsel claims she filed the motion to change venue over thirty days before the hearing
and that it was still pending on the date of the hearing. See Respondent's Motion to Reopen.
However, the motion to change venue was filed with the Court on June 17, 2013, which is less
than 30 days before the July 8, 2013 hearing. See Exhibit 8. The motion to change venue was
also not pending on the date of the hearing. See Exhibit 9. The Court denied the motion to
change venue by written order on June 28, 2013 and that order was mailed to counsel on July 2,
2013. See id. Thus, there was not a pending motion to change venue on July 8, 2013 when the
Court ordered the respondent removed in absentia. Even if there were a pending motion to
change venue before the Court, the mere submission of a motion to change venue does not
relieve the respondent of her obligation to appear for a hearing. See Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804,
806 (5th Cir. 1986); Matter of Rivera, 19 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 1988) (respondent could not
merely assume that the motion for a venue change would be granted). Until the motion to
change venue is granted, the respondent is required to attend the hearing. See id.
An in absentia order of removal may be rescinded only (i) upon a motion to reopen filed
within 180 days after the date of the order of removal if the alien demonstrates that the failure to
appear was because of exceptional circumstances, or (ii) upon a motion to reopen filed at any
time if the alien demonstrates that she did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or
(2) of section 239(a) of the Act or the alien demonstrates that she was in Federal or State custody
and the failure to appear was through no fault of her own. INA 240(b)(S)(C); 8 C.F.R.
1003.23(b)(4)(ii).
---
The respondent has not established any exceptional circumstances that would excuse her
failure to appear. See INA 240(b)( 5)(C); 8 C.F.R. 1003.23(b)(4)(ii).
Accordingly, the following order is hereby entered:
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
Date:
Tv L '1
, 20 14
Glenn P. McPhaul
United States Immigration Judge
In regard to the computer virus, counsel claims the computer crash caused her to lose all
of her calendar data as of June 26, 2013. See Respondent's Motion to Reopen. Counsel claims
this loss of data prevented her from following up with the Court about the motion to change
venue and advising the respondent when to appear for her hearing. See id But counsel has not
explained why she did not simply review her files to recreate her calendar after her data was lost.
See id Counsel also has not explained why she did not advise her client to appear for her
hearing on July 8, 20 13, when counsel had already received the written order denying the motion
to change venue. See id.; Exhibit 9.
A 206-016-315
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
Sincerely,
DonrtL ct1AA)
Donna Carr
Chief Clerk
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Guendelsberger, John
Userteam: Docket
Department
Justice
U.S.
of
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Date:
MAY 142015
Pro se
Kristin Linsley
Assistant Chief Counsel
The respondent, a native and citizen of Guatemala, appeals the decision of the Immigration
Judge, dated December 17, 2014, ordering his removal from the United States. The respondent's
appeal, which is opposed by the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), will be dismissed. 1
As an initial matter, we reject the respondent's assertion that the Immigration Judge made a
"very quick" decision in this case. The respondent was served with the Notice to Appear
("NTA") on August 5, 2014 (Exh. 1). These proceedings were continued on September 9, 2014,
September 30, 2014, October 23, 2014, November 18, 2014, and December 9, 2014. Overall, the
record reflects that the Immigration Judge provided the respondent with a substantial amount of
time to obtain counsel and that she made a significant effort to ensure that the pro se respondent
understood the nature and purpose of these proceedings. Cf. Matter of C-B-, 25 l&N Dec. 888
(BIA 2012) (holding that an alien did not have sufficient time to obtain counsel where he was
ordered removed within 10 days of being served the NTA).
We affirm the Immigration Judge's decision. On appeal, the respondent does not raise any
argument which persuades this Board to disturb the Immigration Judge's holding that he is
subject to relief from removal because he is an alien who is present in this country without being
admitted or paroled by an immigration officer or who arrived at any time or place other than as
designated by the Attorney General (l.J. at 1-3; Exh. 1). See section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i); see also section 291 of the Act,
8 u.s.c. 1361.
1
The DHS has advised this Board that, on February 12, 2015, the respondent was removed from
the United States. However, the respondent has not updated his address with this Board. As
such, this decision will be mailed to him at the detention center in Woodstock, Illinois where he
was held at the time that he filed his appeal. As we deem the appeal to be timely, we conclude
that, despite the respondent's removal from the United States, we have jurisdiction to consider
this appeal. Matter ofDiaz-Garcia, 25 l&N Dec. 794 (BIA 2012).
ORf
ioARD
'
On appeal, the respondent refers to nonimmigrant status under section 10l(a)(l5)(U) of the
Act, 8 U.S.C. 110l(a)(l5)(U). However, he has not meaningfully articulated sufficient facts,
i.e., having been a victim of a crime and providing assistance to law enforcement, to demonstrate
that he is potentially eligible for said nonimmigrant status. As such, "good cause" has not been
shown to exist to continue these proceedings in order to afford the respondent to request
U nonimmigrant status from United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. See 8 C.F.R.
1003.29, 1240.6; Matter of Sanchez Sosa, 25 I&N Dec. 807, 815. (BIA 2012) (recognizing
that an alien seeking U nonimmigrant status should not be granted a continuance "as a dilatory
tactic to forestall the conclusion of removal proceedings" where it is unlikely that his application
will be granted).
File: A206-016-315
In the Matter of
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RESPONDENT
CHARGES:
APPLICATIONS:
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for a period of time on cruise ships and traveled in and out of the United States. He
does not recall for sure when he last arrived in the United States, but believes it was in
2005. He indicated that he was admitted in Miami, but did not depart. The thereafter
remained in the United States and came to Illinois for work. He is now married to a
United States citizen and she apparently has children born in the United States.
After being sworn, the respondent has admitted that he is not a citizen of
the United States and that he is a citizen of Guatemala. He has denied that he arrived
in the United States illegally. However, the evidence presented by the Government at
Exhibit 2 establishes that his passport which he traveled on was issued in January of
2002 and expired in 2007. The respondent was issued a C- 1/B visa on December 18,
2002, which was valid for one year. He traveled to the United States prior to the
issuance of that visa, apparently on September 14, 2002, so it appears he may have
actually had an earlier passport with a visa that had been issued to him previously, but
he traveled at least once on this visa on September 8, 2003, and was admitted through
Miami. It is not entirely sure the classification of visa. There are no entry stamps to the
United States after the September 8, 2003, admission. There are numerous stamps on
the respondent's passport establishing that he traveled, for example, in and out of
Honduras in February of 2005 and January of 2006, and that he traveled and was
admitted to Guatemala in August of 2004, February of 2005, November of 2005,
today's date and has testified concerning his manner of entry. The respondent worked
January of 2006, and then again January 20, 2006, and there are other entry stamps
which this Court has a hard time reading, it looks like in and out of France, Switzerland
and Greece, all after 2003.
A206-016-315
_....LB.
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It is the respondent's burden 'to establish both a lawful entry and that he
has remained in a lawful status since his arrival. The evidence at Exhibit 2 establishes
evidence that the was readmitted to the United States. The respondent's passport
expired in 2007. He has a new passport issued in 2010. There may have been an
intervening passport, but the Court does not have that. The respondent's testimony
concerning his admission to the United States in 2005 was vague and the Court would
not only that even if he was readmitted in 2005 on some other document thereafter, it
appears he did travel back to Guatemala and also then to Honduras in 2006. Based on
this evidence I find that the respondent is in fact removable for being present in the
United States without having been lawfully inspected, admitted or paroled this most
recent time.
The respondent is married to a United States citizen, but she has not filed
a visa petition for him. He is not eligible for cancellation of removal, although he is
married to a U.S. citizen. He does not have the 10 years needed to establish eligibility
for cancellation of removal. Respondent is not afraid of returning to Guatemala. The
respondent would potentially be eligible for voluntary departure, but has indicated that
the is unable to pay for his travel to Guatemala and, accordingly, cannot establish
eligibility for that form of relief.
Accordingly, then, it is the order of this Court that the respondent be
removed from the United States to Guatemala on the charges contained in the Notice to
Appear.
ELIZA C. KLEIN
Immigration Judge
A206-016-315
that he departed the United States after his entry on September 8, 2003, and there is no
-----
I hereby certify that the attached proceeding before JUDGE ELIZA C. KLEIN, in
A206-016-315
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
was held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of
the Executive Office for Immigration Review.