The Latin American Military: Predatory Reactionaries or Modernizing Patriots?

Author(s): Martin C. Needler

Source: Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Apr., 1969), pp. 237-244
Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/165369
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Martin C. Needler
Division of Inter-American Affairs
The University of New Mexico

THE

LATIN

PREDATORY

AMERICAN

MILITARY:
OR

REACTIONARIES
MODERNIZING

patriots?

politics existed
quite recently, the study of Latin American
in a relatively
occupied
stage. A crude empiricism,
primitive
of events or formal institu?
with the straightforward
Until
description
of an impres?
tions, was relieved only by occasional global generalization
of politics. However,
sionistic character about the informal characteristics
substantial advances have begun to be made in the last few years in the
direction of more systematic
elaboration
of theory to account for the
of politics in the area, and we have begun to see
distinctive characteristics
the confrontation
with each other and with the data themselves
of rival
theoretical

of
Needless
to say, this mutual confrontation
explanations.
rival interpretations
of our under?
is a healthy sign for the deepening
standing of Latin American politics.
One of the areas in which this process is furthest advanced is the
study of the role of the military. Here one school of thought, whose lead?
ing exponent is Edwin Lieuwen, has taken a point of view frankly hostile
to the intervention
of the military in the processes of politics, regarding
such intervention

of a relatively low degree of political

as characteristic
it
in
turn
which
to perpetuate.
Professor
Lieuwen
development,
helps
in politics as "predatory,"
writes of military intervention
and stresses the
motives for such intervention.1
self-interested
1 Lieuwen's views are to be found in his Arms and Politics in Latin America
(New York: Praeger, 1961); Generals vs. Presidents: Neo-Militarism in Latin
America (New York: Praeger, 1964); "Militarism and Politics in Latin America,"
in John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries
237

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Journal

238

of Inter-American

Studies

has been criticized

This point of view, which he calls "traditionalist,"
as
not
that
seizures
of power oc?
McAlister
military
recognizing
by Lyle
cur in response to the dynamics of the total political situation; thus they
calls "revisionist,"
not by the
are caused, in this view which McAlister
but rather by political events occurring
of the military themselves,
even eschews
the military institution. For this reason, McAlister
since he regards the military as an integral part
the term "intervention,"
of the functioning
political process, not as outside it.2 A position similar
to McAlister's has usually been taken by John J. Johnson, although John?
elements and are sometimes
son's views contain mutually contradictory

motives
outside

And far from regarding military intervention

to categorize.3
as
and
the
McAlisterbackwardness,
political
reinforcing
perpetuating
Johnson school of thought stresses the potential of the military as a mod?
difficult

ernizing force.
Although

the basic difference of opinion is over a question of scholar?

the dispute carries personal and ideological
overtones,
ly interpretation,
school regarding the "traditionalists"
with the "revisionist"
as naive and
and the "traditionalists"
as apolo?
moralistic,
viewing the "revisionists"
to constitutional
for the military without commitment
processes.
The issue takes on added significance because of its central relevance
to United States policy in the area. The tendency of United States policy
in recent years, a tendency of which Lieuwen has been especially critical,
gists

has been to regard Latin American armies as partners in the Alliance for
and to attempt to improve their domestic political "image" by
civic action programs.4
of
Despite the intensity of feeling that has accompanied
expression
the two viewpoints,
however, it is in the present writer's view unwarranted
as altogether
to regard these two approaches
exclusive.
In
mutually

Progress
fostering

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); and "The Military: a Force for Con?
tinuity or Change," in John TePaske & Sydney N. Fisher, ed., Explosive Forces in
Latin America (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964).
2 For McAlister's views, see "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America,"
Journal of Inter-American Studies, July, 1961; "The Military," in John J. Johnson,
ed., Continuity and Change in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1964); "Changing Concepts of the Role of the Military in Latin America," The An?
nals, July, 1965; and "Recent Research and Writings on the Role of the Military in
Latin America," Latin American Research Review, vol. II, no. 1, Fall, 1966.
3 See his The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford Uni?
versity Press, 1964); and "The Military as a Politically Competing Group in a
Transitional Society," in his The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries,
cited above.
4 These programs are discussed in Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning,
Internal Security and Military Power: Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in
Latin America (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966).

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The

Latin

American

Military

239

the present article the writer will instead argue that the perceptions
of the
of the two schools
causality of military intervention held by representatives
of thought are actually complementary
aspects of a single truth: that even
in politics occurs in "patriotic"
though military intervention
response
to the requirements
of the functioning
of political system, it nevertheless
does reflect military self-interest.
On the related question of the putative
role
of
the
the evidence
modernizing
military, however,
suggests that
intervention
contributes
to
the
retardation
of
of
the
military
processes
political

development

rather than to their promotion.

II

The examination
of military intervention
in politics, as expressed at
its maximum in the military coup d'etat, appears to show that the coup
out of the complementary
interaction
between
ex?
develops
pressures
ternal to the military and the predispositions
of the military themselves.
in this sense is frequently met with in studies of causality
Complementarity
in any field; the onset of many diseases, for example, is most reasonably
explained as resulting from both an environmental
weakness or predisposition
tion, and a constitutional

factor, such as infec?

to the disease in the

organism.
In the case of the military coup, external pressures on the military
to intervene are generally present, which come to a head in propaganda
in favor of intervention.
of such campaigns
Many examples
preceding
recent coups d'etat can be cited.5
This incitement
of the military to intervene can follow one of sev?
eral strategies?although
in any given instance all are usually employed
in combination.
The primary technique
is to work through the persua?
sion of individual military officers of importance
through direct face-toface contact. The second is to mount what John P. Harrison has called,
referring to the Argentine situation, "a consistent and conscious effort by
the mass media." 6 The third technique,
which supplements
the other
the political
two, is to manipulate
simulated
strikes, manifestations,

situation
terrorist

itself, by means of fomenting

attacks, and so on, to create

5 See Juan Bosch, The Unfinished Experiment,

Democracy in the Dominican
Republic (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. xi; M. C. Needier, Anatomy of a Coup
d'Etat: Ecuador, 1963 (Washington: Institute for the Comparative Studies of Politi?
cal Systems, 1964), p. 15; John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Under?
developed Countries, cited above, p. 124; A Report to the American Academic Com?
munity on the Present Argentine University Situation, special publication of the
Latin American Studies Association, Austin, 1967, p. 17.
6 A Report to the American Academic
Community on the Present Argentine
University Situation, cited above, p. 17.

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240

Journal

of Inter-American

Studies

of a situation in which there is no solution other than a

the impression
military assumption of power.
At the same time, this external stimulus to a military coup must be
matched by an internal readiness to stage the coup on the part of the
military for the desired result to be achieved. The fact that the military
provided
may be reluctant to intervene, no matter what the provocation
by the external political situation, is suggested by the fact that in some
with?
Latin American countries such external situations have developed
out leading to military coups. This is true not only of countries with an
established tradition of civilian control of the military, such as Chile and
which does have a tra?
Uruguay, but also of countries such as Venezuela,
in politics, but in which the military has
dition of military intervention
in recent years, despite considerable
not intervened
nevertheless
provo?
is necessary,
over and above
cation. Clearly, the internal predisposition
the external stimulus.
Lieuwen argued that the major factor
In Generals vs. Presidents1
to
in the present era was their selfthe
intervene
military
predisposing
of the military institu?
interest in the sense of concern for the preservation
in Cuba but aborted
tion, especially in the light of attempts, successful
the
traditional
to
reduce
eliminate
or
elsewhere,
entirely
army, replacing
of Lieuit with a popular militia. In research conducted
independently
wen's, but about the same time, the present writer found this to be a critical
8 and other observers
factor in the Ecuadorean
coup d'etat of 1963,
discovered the same phenomenon
elsewhere.9 More?
have independently
over, the much-vaunted
programs for the training of Latin American
officers by the United States seem to have had as one of their major
of anti-Communist
results the stimulation
ideology in the Latin Ameri?
that United States ap?
can military,
along with the implicit message
will be
proval of any action taken in the name of anti-communism
But what the Latin American officer understands
by "com?
forthcoming.
munism," or at least as its most salient feature, is precisely the replace?
ment of the traditional
army by a popular militia. As general Alfredo
Ovando Candia, the Bolivian
Commander-in-Chief,
put it in a news?
(the President he
paper interview: He did not think that Paz Estenssoro
7 New York: Praeger, 1964.
8 Anatomy of a Coup d'Etat, cited above.
9 For example, David J. Finlay explained the overthrow of Nkrumah in
Ghana thus: "Also, Nkrumah had decided to form a 'people's militia' as a supple?
ment to his own 'presidential guard.' The existence of such a large private army
would threaten the autonomy, the professionalism, the well-being, and indeed the
very existence of Ghana's 10,000-man army. The army rose against the government
to defend its own existence ..."
"The Ghana Coup ... One Year Later," Trans-action, May, 1967, p. 18.

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The

American

Latin

Military

241

"but some of the

had helped to overthrow in 1964) was a Communist,
leaders of his party are, as they showed during their time in office that
they armed militias, wanted to put an end to the army, and sponsored
10
Communist movements."
be naive to posit an opposition
between this type of selfand a concern for the national interest. Johnson falls
into this trap when, in criticizing a paper presented
at a
by Lieuwen
1964 West Point conference,
he says: "I feel that Professor Lieuwen is
perhaps unduly severe when he holds that officers are concerned
only
with the welfare of their institutions.
Certainly there is too much selfIt would

interested

motive

interest

in the military as there is among civilians, but it

believe, that there are many officers who are dedicated to
their countries the same as there are civilians who are so
What this attitude misses is that to the military officer
and preservation
of the military institution is conceived of

is also true, I
the welfare of
dedicated." X1
the well-being
as a necessary

aspect of the national interest, since the mission of the military is to

defend the nation against its foreign and domestic
enemies. The point
that Johnson
wanted
to make, that there are many public-spirited
to defend national interests, is prefectly cor?
military officers concerned
rect; but it remains true that for many of them the defense of national
interests begins with the defense of the military institution?the
two
concerns are not mutually opposed but are synonymous.
Nor does the fact that military intervention
can be regarded as a
function of general political processes mean that one is precluded from
assigning praise or blame to the actions of individual military officers or
of the circumstantial
factors contributing
to produce
groups. Knowledge
certain

from responsi?
types of behavior does not exempt individuals
for
their
actions.
the
On
one
can
handle this
bility
philosophical
plane,
a
in
of
as
the
of
free will
problem
variety
ways,
problem
reconciling
and determinism,
or in terms of refuting the reductionist
fallacy, but in
to deny the legitimacy
of assessing in?
any event it remains impossible
dividual responsibility.
Ill
In opposition
to the "traditionalist"
of the military as a
conception
conservative
or reactionary
of the "revisionist"
force, exponents
ap?
of archaic social,
proach have urged the view that the modernization
and administrative
structures can come about during an aueconomic,
1(> La Opinidn (Los Angeles), April 1,1967.
n The West Point Conference on Latin American Problems, 15-17 April 1964:
Final Report, p. 70.

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242

Journal

of Inter-American

Studies

does not have

interlude, when a military government
from civilian politicians.
The army is of course for
the argument goes, since it is concerned
with technical

thoritarian military
to face obstruction
modernization,
training and with

a sophisticated
industrial
base that can
developing
and
because
its
concern
with the pos?
also
arms,
provide high-quality
a
war
induces
the
of
desire
to
have
nation
function
at its
sibility
foreign
maximum
maximum
to
the
in
national
efficiency,
generate
power. The
concept of the "modernizing
military" clearly has a solid base in African
and Asian experience,
President Nasser being a common
example for
citation by this school of thought.
It is certainly true that many of the military figures active in recent
and the manifestos
is?
orientation,
coups d'etat have the modernizing
sued by new military juntas nowadays invariably cite the need to reform
traditional structures, along with the more conventional
anti-Communist
rationalizations
of the coup. Nevertheless,
the
despite
great number of
seizures of power by
have figured, the only
recent history of Latin
permanent is that of El

in which people of this tendency

plausible example of a modernizing
military in the
America that has actually accomplished
anything
Salvador.
struc?
rarely get a chance to achieve permanent
military

forces

The modernizers
tural changes for a variety of reasons. In the first place, the
tendency is only one element in the coalition of a variety of
tions that organized the coup. In the second place, the drive
zation itself is broken up among several schools of thought

modernizing
military fac?
for moderni?

when it be?
desire for modernization
into
necessary to translate a generalized
concrete legislative programs. In the third place, the technicians to whom
the military innovators
turn for advice in the drafting and implementa?
are often conservatives
tion of reformed proposals
inherited from pre?

comes

vious

who exaggerate
the difficulties involved in bringing
governments,
about change. Fourthly,
structural change is normally opposed
by the
civilians who allied themselves
with the military in bringing about the
and oligarchic forces.
coup, since in general these represent conservative
This is so because

today the coup

of center-left
novating government
in part because it was possible to
These difficulties
are accentuated
to devise and implement
solutions

often directed against an in?

which was overthrown
orientation,
ascribe to it Communist
tendencies.12
as the military government
attempts
to the various problems that face it,

at each step of the way alienating

side the military junta.

influential

is most

groups

both inside

and out?

12 Martin C. Needier, "Political Development and Military Intervention in

Latin America," American Political Science Review, vol. LX, no. 3, September,
1966.

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Latin

The

American

Military

243

of the military government

reach a climax
Finally, the problems
the issue of the maintenance
of public order in the face of the
limitation of public political activity invariably imposed by military gov?
ernments.
students demonstrate
Typically,
aganst the regime, and the
dedicated
"order"
to
and
military,
preserving
understanding
only the
over

use of force, break up the demonstration

violently,
leaving one or two
even
whose
funeral
an
occasions
more
martyrs
bigger demonstration,
the
alienation
of
from
the
the
moderates
violence,
military government,
and its eventual confrontation
by a unified civilian opposition that ranges
all the way across the political spectrum. Sooner or later the spiral of
and resistance
reaches this point and sooner or later the
repression
or forced to resign.
is
overthrown
military government
The only way of foreclosing
this outcome is for the military leader?
to
before
issues
have been brought to this extremity.
ship
yield power
a military president formally com?
Sometimes
is
to
power
yielded only
to
mitted
carrying on the programs of the junta, such as Costa e Silva or
while this sort of result may conceal the fact that the goals
Barrientos;
of the junta have been defeated and abandoned,
clearly the institution?
alized rule of a modernizing
military is at an end, and a new president,
a military man, is subject to the same type of
although professionally
situational pressures that would weigh on an elected civilian president,
and he functions
more or less as such a president
would. Thus it is
highly likely that the only abiding result of the coup and the succeeding
of military rule is the removal of the president against whom the
therefore, the only element to benefit by
coup was directed. Typically,
the coup is the conservative
oligarchy that incited the military to stage
the coup in the first place, fearful of the left-wing
tendencies
of the

period

president against whom the coup was directed.

If one wants to minimize the autonomous
role played by the in?
tentions of military leaders, and instead regard their behavior as simply
a function of general political processes,
he is brought to the view that
in intervening
in politics the military is "objectively"
acting as a tool of
the oligarchic forces in society, despite military desires for moderniza?
tion; and that despite its public spirit and its concern for modernization,
the intervention
of the military in politics normally
has the effect of
the
attainment
of
delaying
country's
political maturity.
that charac?
Thus, although the stress on situational
imperatives
terizes the writings of what McAlister
calls the "revisionist"
school adds
of sophistication
a dimension
to the oversimplified
view of the behavior
of military officers as determined
solely by their will, this approach can?
not today be realistically
combined
with a conception
of military inter?
vention in Latin American politics as a progressive or modernizing
force.

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244

Journal

of Inter-American

Studies

The

are those of mass participation

and the
tendencies
modernizing
shift in political power away from the oligarchies.
The policies of those
who cater to the newly politicized
masses may be demagogic;
they may
ruinous and hurtful to good relations
be economically
with Western
Europe and the United States; modernization
may be a painful and
and
for
can be
turbulent
military intervention
process,
justifications
devised with this in mind; but it would be a denial of the evidence of the
last thirty years of Latin American
history to argue that today military
intervention in Latin American politics represents on balance a moderniz?
ing force.

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