Coca To Canque

G.R. No.
133739
May 29, 2002
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TOMAS COCA JR., RICARDO COCA and RAMIL COCA, accused-appellants.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-43013 convicting accused-appellants of the crime of
murder; sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00, plus the
costs.1wphi1.nt
The Information against accused-appellants states:
That on or about the 20 th day of March, 1996, at about 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a gun, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate
intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there suddenly and unexpectedly attack, assault and use personal
violence upon one Edilberto Banate, by shooting him with said gun, thereby
inflicting upon him physical injuries:
"GUNSHOT WOUND"
as a consequence of which said Edilberto Banate died after four (4) months.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment on January 23, 1997, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty.3 Trial
on the merits thereafter followed.
Accused-appellants and the victim, Edilberto Banate, were related by affinity, and all
residents of Cabulihan, Guba, Cebu City. Brothers Ricardo Coca and Tomas Coca, Jr.
are the first degree cousins of Merolina Banate, the victim's wife; while Ramil Coca is
the son of Ricardo Coca.4
At about 9:00 in the evening of March 13, 1996, Tomas, Ricardo and Ramil Coca
mauled the victim, as a result of which the latter sustained several injuries and
seriously broke his left shoulder.5 Unluckily, this was just the beginning of the dangers
yet to beset him.
A week later, on March 20, 1996, at 7:00 in the evening, while the victim was having
supper with his wife Merolina and their two children inside their kitchen, a sudden
burst of gunfire emanated from underneath the house. Merolina peeped through the
slits on the floor and saw three persons sitting on their heels. The fluorescent lamp
which illuminated their kitchen and the 100 watt bulb of the adjacent house directly
opposite the kitchen enabled Merolina to identify accused-appellant Tomas, Ricardo
and Ramil Coca, who were all underneath the house and looking upwards. Tomas
Coca was positioned between Ricardo and Ramil and aiming a gun at Edilberto. She
turned and saw her husband, slumped on the floor with blood oozing from his body.6
Meanwhile, Alexander Singson, a visitor at Merolina's house who left earlier to buy
cigarettes was alerted by the gunshots. He hurried to the scene and saw the three
accused-appellants running away from the house of the victim. Thereafter, he rushed
to the house of the victim and helped bring him to the hospital.7
The victim sustained a massive gunshot would on the chest. The bullet pierced the
right rib, penetrating the pulmonary region all the way to, and fracturing the spinal
column, where the slug was embedded. As a consequence, the victim became
paralyzed from waist down. He eventually died on July 2, 1996.8
Meronila purposely withheld the identity of the culprits. She feared that revealing the
names of the persons who shot her husband would endanger not only her life but also
that of her children who were alone in their house all through out the time that she
was in the hospital with her injured husband. It was only after almost five months, or
on August 19, 1996, that she finally divulged the identities of the perpetrators.9
Accused-appellants, on the other hand, raised the defense of denial and alibi. Tomas
Coca, Jr. testified that at about 7:00 in the evening of March 20, 1996, he and Ricardo
Coca attended a birthday party in the house of a certain Mario Rebales 10 at
Calubihan, Guba, Cebu City. Sometime that evening, Ramil Coca arrived and
informed them that Edilberto Banate was shot. Then, he followed Ricardo Coca and
Pedro Soquib to the house of the victim but he did not proceed when he noticed that
there were no more people there.11 This was corroborated by Ricardo Coca who
declared that on the night of March 20, 1996, he and Tomas were in the house of
Mario Rebales, as he was hired to cook the food for the birthday party of Rebales'
daughter. After sometime, his son, Ramil Coca, arrived and told them that Edilberto
Banate was shot. Thereafter, he and Pedro Soquib, followed by Ramil and Tomas,
proceeded to the house of the victim, but the latter was already brought to the
hospital.12
EVIDENCE: COCA TO CANQUE 1
Ramil Coca affirmed the version of Ricardo and Tomas and added that on the night of
March 20, 1996, he was eating supper with his family when they heard three
successive gunshots. When he and his mother went out to check what happened,
they saw Roel Soquib and Melino Leyson carrying the body of Edilberto Banate.
Then, at the instruction of his mother, he proceeded to the house of Mario Rebales to
inform his father of the shooting incident. Thereafter, his father, Ricardo and Pedro
Soquib followed by Tomas, proceeded to the scene of the crime; while he went
home.13
The version of the defense was further corroborated by the testimonies of defense
witnesses Pedro Soquib and Mario Rebales.14 Defense witnesses Sergio Borres and
Roel Soquib, who helped bring the victim to the hospital, further narrated that
Merolina Banate told them that she was not able to recognize the culprit because it
was dark.15
On July 30, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment of conviction. The
dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts and circumstances, accused
Tomas Coca, Jr., Ricardo Coca and Ramil Coca are hereby imposed each
the penalty of RECLUSON PERPETUA with the accessory penalties of the
law; to jointly indemnify the heirs of the deceased Edilberto Banate in the
sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. The accused, however, are
credited in full during the whole period of their detention provided that they
will signify in writing that they will abide by all the rules and regulations of the
penitentiary.
SO ORDERED.16
In their appeal, accused-appellants contend that the prosecution failed to establish
beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the perpetrators. They claimed that at 7:00 in
the evening, it was impossible for Merolina Banate to recognize the culprits through a
inch gap on the bamboo flooring, considering that the area underneath the house
where the gunfire allegedly came from was dark. In the same vein, accusedappellants assert that the testimony of Alexander Singson is fabricated. According to
them, it is unbelievable that Singson had committed to memory the appearance of the
assailants not only because it was dark, but also because Singson himself admitted
that he saw the assailants only for the first time during the incident. They further
argued that if Merolina indeed recognized the perpetrators, she would have
immediately revealed their names to those who responded and to the members of the
media who interviewed her. Accused-appellants likewise alleged that Merolina's
reaction immediately after the gun bursts was contrary to human experience. The
natural reaction would have been to seek cover, turn off the light, shout for help, or
cuddle the injured, and not to peep through the floor where the shots came from.
Finally, accused-appellants Ricardo and Ramil Coca contend that even assuming that
the version of the prosecution were true, they should have been acquitted considering
that there was no evidence to show that they connived with accused-appellant Tomas
Coca, Jr.
The contentions are without merit.
Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness
have identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions
of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their
assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. Illumination
produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow identification of
persons. Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations,
be considered sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses
solely on that ground unmeritorious.17
In the case at bar, the kitchen/dining area where the victim was shot from underneath
the house was illuminated by a fluorescent lamp. There would therefore be light
falling on the faces of accused-appellants, especially so that they were all facing
upwards. Ordinary human experience would tell us that bamboo flooring with gaps
smaller than an inch allows every ray of light emanating from a fluorescent lamp to
freely penetrate through the bamboo slats. With this environmental milieu, the
fluorescent lamp would indeed provide sufficient illumination to identify the accusedappellants underneath a 3 to 4 feet high bamboo flooring. What is more, the 100 watt
bulb of the adjacent house, six meters away, and directly opposite the kitchen where
the victim was shot, provided additional illumination below the victim's house. Clearly,
therefore, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime certainly
obliterate the slightest shred of doubt on the veracity of accused-appellant's
identification.
Moreover, it is not amiss to state that "relatives of a victim of a crime have a natural
knack for remembering the face of the assailant and they, more than anybody else,
would be concerned with obtaining justice for the victim by the malefactor being
brought to the face of the law." Indeed, family members who have witnessed the
killing of a loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants.18 With
more reason therefore that we should believe the positive identification of accusedappellants by Merolina Banate. Being close blood relatives and residents of the same
barangay, Merolina would naturally and particularly be familiar with the face and build
of accused-appellants.
A reading of the transcript of stenographic notes shows that even under crossexamination, Merolina stayed firm and consistent in her identification of accusedappellants, thus
WITNESS:
A.
It was a 100 watt bulb near our house. It gave bright light from the
outside.
ATTY. VAILOCES:
Q.
How far is that bulb outside to the place where you allegedly saw
Tomas Coca?
Q.
You will admit that you did not see the person or persons in the act of
shooting your husband?
xxx
A.
I do not admit because I actually saw the persons who actually shot
my husband.
xxx
Q.
What did you see?
A.
I saw the three of them.
xxx
A.
xxx
There was a portion not translated:
xxx
x x x20
A.
xxx
xxx
The three of them. It was Jr. Coca who held the firearm.
xxx
ATTY. VAILOCES:
Q.
Now, what were the other two doing at the time you saw them?
A.
They were by the side also looking towards us.
WITNESS:
COURT:
A.
And even the adjacent area it was also well lighted. Moreover, they
are my close relatives even by their smell I could sense they were (sic).
Q.
You are sure of that?
A.
I am sure Your Honor.21
xxx
Q.
xxx
Witness indicating a distance of six (6) meters
Q.
When you said you saw Tomas Coca underneath your house and
then left your house of course he was the only one you saw and no other
persons?
Q.
You said that you saw Tomas Coca in the act of shooting although
that is not stated in your affidavit. My question now is: how were you able to
see when it was nighttime?
FISCAL GALANIDA:
xxx
xxx
ATTY. VAILOCES:
x x x19
A.
I intently peep through the floor and because it was well-lighted by the
fluorescent lamp I vividly saw them underneath the house. I know them
because they are my close relatives.
xxx
xxx
xxx
What light illumines (sic) from (sic) the outside portion of the house?
xxx
Accused-appellants were likewise positively identified by prosecution witness

Alexander Singson as the persons he saw running away from the house of the victim
right after he heard the gunshots. But even if we disregard the testimony of Singson,
the persuasive and compelling testimony of the victim's wife, juxtaposed with the
circumstances which proved feasible the identification of accused-appellants, are

enough to prove their culpability beyond any scintilla of doubt.
Neither does the failure of Merolina to immediately reveal the identity of the culprits
cast doubt on the truthfulness of her testimony. It must be stressed that Merolina was
anxious of her and her children's safety. The threat on their lives was indeed a
deterrent strong enough to mute her. As consistently held by the Court, fear of reprisal
and death threats are accepted as adequate explanations for the delay in reporting
crimes.22
Moreover, Merolina's act of peeping through the flooring immediately after they were
fired upon was not contrary to human experience. Merolina was not yet aware that
her husband was hit when she instinctively looked through the gaps in the bamboo
floor. Hence, her instinct could not have told her at that time to cuddle her husband. At
any rate, it is a settled jurisprudence that different people react differently to a given
situation and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. One person's spontaneous
response may be aggression while another person's reaction may be cold
indifference.23
While it is true that accused-appellants Ricardo and Ramil Coca did not actually shoot
the victim, their conspiratorial acts and omissions would likewise make them liable for
his death. Ricardo and Ramil purposely accompanied Tomas underneath the house
of the victim, such that they could not be considered innocent spectators. They
simultaneously left the scene of the crime together with Tomas and did nothing to stop
or prevent the latter from shooting the victim. Finally, they had the motive to kill the
victim as they in fact previously mauled him after a misunderstanding.
So also, the defenses of denial and alibi raised by accused-appellants must fail. Not
only are said defenses inherently weak, they cannot likewise prevail over their
positive identification24 by prosecution witness Merolina Banate, who was not shown
to have been impelled by any ill-motive to falsely impute the commission of the crime
against them, her very own relatives. Furthermore, the locus criminis is only 300
meters25 and 40 meters26 away, respectively, from the place where accusedappellants Ricardo and Tomas, as well as Ramil, were allegedly at when the crime
occurred. This negates the physical impossibility of their presence at the scene of the
crime at the time the felony was committed.27
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly
and specially insure the execution of the crime, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the
sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the person of the victim, without the
slightest provocation on the part of the latter.28 Judging from the circumstances which
attended the shooting of the deceased, treachery undoubtedly qualified the present
case to murder. This is so because accused-appellants obviously devised a way, that
is, by shooting the victim from underneath the house, to effectively execute the crime
without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the unsuspecting victim
might put up.1wphi1.nt
In sum, the Court finds that the trial court did not err in upholding the version of the
prosecution and disregarding the defenses put up by accused-appellants. Though
Merolina did not see the actual shooting of her husband, the circumstantial evidences
presented by the prosecution are sufficient to sustain a conviction. Under the Rules of
Court, conviction based on circumstantial evidence is sufficient if: (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.29 Here, more than one circumstance was
presented by the prosecution. The victim's wife heard gunshots from underneath their
house. Immediately thereafter, she peeped through their bamboo flooring and saw the
three accused-appellants sitting on their heels and looking upwards. Accusedappellant Tomas Coca, Jr. was holding a gun pointed upwards while seated between
accused-appellants Ricardo and Ramil Coca. When she turned to her husband, she
saw that he was shot. As the three accused-appellants fled, prosecution witness
Alexander Singson saw them running away from the house of the victim. All these,
added to accused-appellants' previous altercation with the victim, form an unbroken
chain of circumstances pointing to accused-appellants, and no other, as the persons
responsible for the victim's death.
The trial court did not overlook any fact of weight and substance which, if properly
considered, would have altered the result of the case. Hence, its findings of facts and
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses deserve to be sustained on appeal. For
having had the distinct opportunity of directly observing the demeanor and conduct of
the witnesses under oath, the trial court is in a better position to ascertain whether or
not a witness is telling the truth.30
The penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death.31 The two
penalties being both indivisible, and there being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance in the commission of the offense, the lesser of the two penalties, which
is reclusion perpetua, should be applied pursuant to the second paragraph of Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code.
As for accused-appellant's civil liability, he should, in addition to the P50,000.00 civil
indemnity and the costs, further pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages in line with recent jurisprudence.32
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-43013, finding accused-appellants
Tomas Coca, Jr., Ricardo Coca, and Ramil Coca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in addition to the P50,000.00
civil indemnity and the costs, accused-appellants are further ordered to pay the heirs
of the deceased, jointly and severally, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127745
April 22, 2003
FELICITO G. SANSON, CELEDONIA SANSON-SAQUIN, ANGELES A.

MONTINOLA,
EDUARDO
A.
MONTINOLA,
JR., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION and MELECIA T. SY, as
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the Late Juan Bon Fing Sy, respondentsappellees.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Court of Appeals Decision of May 31, 1996 and Resolution of
December 9, 1996.
On February 7, 1990, herein petitioner-appellant Felicito G. Sanson (Sanson), in his
capacity as creditor, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City a petition,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 4497, for the settlement of the estate of Juan
Bon Fing Sy (the deceased) who died on January 10, 1990. Sanson claimed that the
deceased was indebted to him in the amount of P603,000.00 and to his sister
Celedonia Sanson-Saquin (Celedonia) in the amount of P360,000.00.1
Petitioners-appellants Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and his mother Angeles Montinola
(Angeles) later filed separate claims against the estate, alleging that the deceased
owed them P50,000.00 and P150,000.00, respectively.2
By Order of February 12, 1991, Branch 28 of the Iloilo RTC to which the petition was
raffled, appointed Melecia T. Sy, surviving spouse of the deceased, as administratrix
of his estate, following which she was issued letters of administration.3
During the hearing of the claims against the estate, Sanson, Celedonia, and Jade
Montinola, wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., testified on the transactions that
gave rise thereto, over the objection of the administratrix who invoked Section 23,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court otherwise known as the Dead Mans Statute
which reads:
SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party.
Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of
a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or
demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person
of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the
death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound
mind. (Emphasis supplied)
Sanson, in support of the claim of his sister Celedonia, testified that she had a
transaction with the deceased which is evidenced by six checks 4 issued by him before
his death; before the deceased died, Celedonia tried to enforce settlement of the
checks from his (the deceaseds) son Jerry who told her that his father would settle
them once he got well but he never did; and after the death of the deceased,
Celedonia presented the checks to the bank for payment but were dishonored 5 due to
the closure of his account.6
Celedonia, in support of the claim of her brother Sanson, testified that she knew that
the deceased issued five checks7 to Sanson in settlement of a debt; and after the
death of the deceased, Sanson presented the checks to the bank for payment but
were returned due to the closure of his account.8
Jade, in support of the claims of her husband Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and mother-inlaw Angeles, testified that on separate occasions, the deceased borrowed P50,000
and P150,000 from her husband and mother-in-law, respectively, as shown by three
checks issued by the deceased,9 two to Angeles and the other10 to Eduardo
Montinola, Jr.; before the deceased died or sometime in August 1989, they advised
him that they would be depositing the checks, but he told them not to as he would pay
them cash, but he never did; and after the deceased died on January 10, 1990, they
deposited the checks but were dishonored as the account against which they were
drawn was closed,11 hence, their legal counsel sent a demand letter12 dated February
6, 1990 addressed to the deceaseds heirs Melicia, James, Mini and Jerry Sy, and
Symmels I & II but the checks have remained unsettled.13
The administratrix, denying having any knowledge or information sufficient to form a

belief as to the truth of the claims, nevertheless alleged that if they ever existed, they
had been paid and extinguished, are usurious and illegal and are, in any event,
barred by prescription.14 And she objected to the admission of the checks and check
return slips-exhibits offered in evidence by the claimants upon the ground that the
witnesses who testified thereon are disqualified under the Dead Mans Statute.
Specifically with respect to the checks-exhibits identified by Jade, the administratrix
asserted that they are inadmissible because Jade is the daughter-in-law of claimant
Angeles and wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., hence, she is covered by the
above-said rule on disqualification.
At all events, the administratrix denied that the checks-exhibits were issued by the
deceased and that the return slips were issued by the depository/clearing bank.15
After the claimants rested their case, the administratrix filed four separate
manifestations informing the trial court that she was dispensing with the presentation
of evidence against their claims.16
Finding that the Dead Mans Statute does not apply to the witnesses who testified in
support of the subject claims against the estate, the trial court issued an Order of
December 8, 1993,17 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judicial Administratrix Melecia T. Sy, is hereby ordered, to
pay, in due course of administration, creditors-claimants Felicito G. Sanson,
in the amount of P603,500.00; Celedonia S. Saquin, in the amount of
P315,000.00;18 Angeles A. Montinola, in the amount of P150,000.00 and
Eduardo Montinola, Jr., in the amount of P50,000.00, from the assets and/or
properties of the above-entitled intestate estate.
On appeal by the administratrix upon the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CLAIM[S] FOR
FAILURE TO PAY THE FILING FEES THEREON
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CLAIM[S]
BECAUSE [THEY ARE] ALREADY BARRED BY THE LAW OF
LIMITATIONS OR STATUTE OF NON-CLAIMS
III.
SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT CLAIMANT[S]

EVIDENCE OF THE CLAIM IS INCOMPETENT UNDER THE DEAD MANS
STATUTE, AND INADMISSIBLE
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, 4TH DIVISION, ERRED IN FINDING

THAT CLAIMANT FELICITO G. SANSON IS DISQUALIFIED TO TESTIFY
[ON] THE CLAIM OF CELEDONIA SANSON-SA[Q]UIN AND VI[C]E VERSA.
(Underscoring in the original)23
IV.
THE ALLEGED
DOCUMENTS,19
CHECKS
ARE
INADMISSIBLE
AS
PRIVATE
the Court of Appeals set aside the December 8, 1993 Order of the trial court, by
Decision of May 31, 1996, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and another
order is entered dismissing the claims of:
1. Felicito G. Sanson, in the amount of P603,500.00;
2. Celdonia S. Saquin, in the amount of P315,000.00;20
3. Angeles A. Montinola, in the amount of P150,000.00; and
4. Eduardo Montinola, Jr., in the amount of P50,000.00 against the estate of
the deceased JUAN BON FING SY.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Italics supplied)
With respect to the first assigned error, petitioners argue that since the administratrix
did not deny the testimony of Jade nor present any evidence to controvert it, and
neither did she deny the execution and genuineness of the checks issued by the
deceased (as well as the check return slips issued by the clearing bank), it was error
for the Court of Appeals to find the evidence of the Montinolas insufficient to prove
their claims.
The administratrix counters that the due execution and authenticity of the checksexhibits of the Montinolas were not duly proven since Jade did not categorically state
that she saw the filling up and signing of the checks by the deceased, hence, her
testimony is self-serving; besides, as Jade had identical and unitary interest with her
husband and mother-in-law, her testimony was a circumvention of the Dead Mans
Statute.24
The administratrixs counter-argument does not lie. Relationship to a party has never
been recognized as an adverse factor in determining either the credibility of the
witness orsubject only to well recognized exceptions none of which is here present
the admissibility of the testimony. At most, closeness of relationship to a party, or
bias, may indicate the need for a little more caution in the assessment of a witness
testimony but is not necessarily a negative element which should be taken as
diminishing the credit otherwise accorded to it.25
Jades testimony on the genuineness of the deceaseds signature on the checksexhibits of the Montinolas is clear:
The claimants Motion for Reconsideration21 of the Court of Appeals decision having
been denied by Resolution of December 9, 1996, 22 they filed the present petition
anchored on the following assigned errors:
FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, 4TH DIVISION, ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE TESTIMONY OF JADE MONTINOLA IS INSUFFICIENT TO
PROVE THE CLAIMS OF CLAIMANTS ANGELES A. MONTINOLA AND
EDUARDO A. MONTINOLA, JR..
xxx
Q:
Showing to you this check dated July 16, 1989, Far East Bank and
Trust Company Check No. 84262, in the amount of P100,000.00, is this the
check you are referring to?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
There appears a signature in the face of the check. Whose signature
is this?
A:
That is the signature of Mr. Sy.
Q:
Why do you know that this is the signature of Mr. Sy?
A:
Because he signed this check I was . . . I was present when he
signed this check.
xxx
Q:
Showing to you this check dated September 8, 1989, is this the
check you are referring to?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Why do you know that this is his signature?
A:
I was there when he signed the same.

xxx
Q:
Showing to you this Far East Bank and Trust Company Check No.
84262 dated July 6, 1989, in the amount of P50,000.00, in the name of
Eduardo Montinola, are you referring to this check?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Whose signature is this appearing on the face of this check?
A:
Mr. Sys signature.
Q:
Why do you know that it is his signature?
A:
I was there when he signed the same.

x x x26 (Emphasis supplied)
The genuineness of the deceaseds signature having been shown, he is prima

facie presumed to have become a party to the check for value, following Section 24 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law which reads:
Section 24. Presumption of Consideration. Every negotiable instrument

is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable
consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon to
have become a party thereto for value. (Underscoring and italics in the
original; emphasis supplied),
Since, with respect to the checks issued to the Montinolas, the prima
facie presumption was not rebutted or contradicted by the administratrix who
expressly manifested that she was dispensing with the presentation of evidence
against their claims, it has become conclusive.
As for the administratrixs invocation of the Dead Mans Statute, the same does not
likewise lie. The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or
3) persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
xxx
The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by
implication so as to disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere
witnesses who are not included in the above enumeration are not prohibited
from testifying as to a conversation or transaction between the deceased
and a third person, if he took no active part therein.
x x x27 (Italics supplied)
Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose
behalf the case is being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In
transactions similar to those involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly
family members or relatives of the parties. Should their testimonies be excluded due
to their apparent interest as a result of their relationship to the parties, there would be
a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In any event, as will be discussed
later, independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would still
prosper on the basis of their documentary evidencethe checks.
As to the second assigned error, petitioners argue that the testimonies of Sanson and
Celedonia as witnesses to each others claim against the deceased are not covered
by the Dead Mans Statute;28 besides, the administratrix waived the application of the
law when she cross-examined them.
The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its
decision on review, the pertinent portion of which reads:
The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like

interest, from testifying in each others favor as to acts occurring prior to the
death of the deceased.
Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without
distinguishing between testimony in his own behalf and that in behalf of
others, he should be disqualified from testifying for his co-parties. The law
speaks of "parties or assignors of parties to a case." Apparently, the
testimonies of Sanson and Saquin on each others behalf, as co-parties to
the same case, falls under the prohibition. (Citation omitted; underscoring in
the original and emphasis supplied)
But Sansons and Celedonias claims against the same estate arose from separate
transactions. Sanson is a third party with respect to Celedonias claim. And Celedonia
is a third party with respect to Sansons claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on
the others transaction.
In any event, what the Dead Mans Statute proscribes is the admission
of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose before the death of the deceased.
The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony.29 Since the separate claims
of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-documentary evidence, their
claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.
This brings this Court to the matter of the authenticity of the signature of the
deceased appearing on the checks issued to Sanson and Celedonia. By Celedonias
account, she "knows" the signature of the deceased.
xxx
Q:
Showing to you these checks already marked as Exhibit "A" to "E",
please go over these checks if you know the signatures of the late Juan Bon
Fing Sy? on these checks?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Insofar as the amount that he borrowed from you, he also issued
checks?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
And therefore, you know his signature?
A:
Yes, sir.
x x x30
Sanson testified too that he "knows" the signature of the deceased:

xxx
Q:
I show you now checks which were already marked as Exhibit "A" to
"G-1" Saquin, please go over this if these are the checks that you said was
issued by the late Juan Bon Fing Sy in favor of your sister?
A:
Yes, these are the same che[c]ks.
Q:
Do you know the signature of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
And these signatures are the same signatures that you know?
A:
Yes, sir.
x x x31
While the foregoing testimonies of the Sanson siblings have not faithfully discharged
the quantum of proof under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
which reads:
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a
person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting
of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged and
has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. x x x,
not only did the administratrix fail to controvert the same; from a comparison 32 with
the naked eye of the deceaseds signature appearing on each of the checks-exhibits
of the Montinolas with that of the checks-exhibits of the Sanson siblings all of which
checks were drawn from the same account, they appear to have been affixed by one
and the same hand.
In fine, as the claimants-herein petitioners have, by their evidence, substantiated their
claims against the estate of the deceased, the burden of evidence had shifted to the
administratrix who, however, expressly opted not to discharge the same when she
manifested that she was dispensing with the presentation of evidence against the
claims.
WHEREFORE, the impugned May 31, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby SET ASIDE and another rendered ordering the intestate estate of the late
Juan Bon Fing Sy, through Administratrix Melecia T. Sy, to pay:
1) Felicito G. Sanson, the amount of P603,500.00;
2) Celedonia S. Saquin, the amount of P315.000.00;33
3) Angeles Montinola, the amount of P150,000.00; and
4) Eduardo Montinola, Jr., the amount of P50,000.00.
representing unsettled checks issued by the deceased.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143340
August 15, 2001
LILIBETH
SUNGA-CHAN
vs.
LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondent.
and
CECILIA
SUNGA, petitioners,
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 2000 in the case entitled
"Lamberto T. Chua vs. Lilibeth Sunga Chan and Cecilia Sunga" and of the Resolution
dated May 23, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners
Lilibeth Sunga and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter collectively referred to as petitioners).
The pertinent facts of this case are as follows:

On June 22, 1992, Lamberto T. Chua (hereafter respondent) filed a complaint against
Lilibeth Sunga Chan (hereafter petitioner Lilibeth) and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter
petitioner Cecilia), daughter and wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga
(hereafter Jacinto), for "Winding Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and
Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment" with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.
Respondent alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto
in the distribution of Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business
convenience, respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name
of their partnership, SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER (hereafter Shellite), under
the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. Respondent allegedly delivered his
initial capital contribution of P100,000.00 to Jacinto while the latter in turn produced
P100,000.00 as his counterpart contribution, with the intention that the profits would
be equally divided between them. The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager,
assisted by Josephine Sy (hereafter Josephine), a sister of the wife respondent,
Erlinda Sy. As compensation, Jacinto would receive a manager's fee or remuneration
of 10% of the gross profit and Josephine would receive 10% of the net profits, in
addition to her wages and other remuneration from the business.
Allegedly, from the time that Shellite opened for business on July 8, 1977, its
business operation went quite and was profitable. Respondent claimed that he could
attest to success of their business because of the volume of orders and deliveries of
filled Shellane cylinder tanks supplied by Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. While
Jacinto furnished respondent with the merchandise inventories, balance sheets and
net worth of Shellite from 1977 to 1989, respondent however suspected that the
amount indicated in these documents were understated and undervalued by Jacinto
and Josephine for their own selfish reasons and for tax avoidance.
Upon Jacinto's death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and
particularly his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody,
disposition and management of Shellite without respondent's consent. Despite
respondent's repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal,
winding up and restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to
comply. Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly continued the operations of Shellite, converting to
her own use and advantage its properties.
On March 31, 1991, respondent claimed that after petitioner Lilibeth ran out the alibis
and reasons to evade respondent's demands, she disbursed out of the partnership
funds the amount of P200,000.00 and partially paid the same to respondent.
Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly informed respondent that the P200,000.00 represented
partial payment of the latter's share in the partnership, with a promise that the former
would make the complete inventory and winding up of the properties of the business
establishment. Despite such commitment, petitioners allegedly failed to comply with
their duty to account, and continued to benefit from the assets and income of Shellite
to the damage and prejudice of respondent.
On December 19, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in Manila, not the Regional Trial Court in
Zamboanga del Norte had jurisdiction over the action. Respondent opposed the
motion to dismiss.
On January 12, 1993, the trial court finding the complaint sufficient in from and
substance denied the motion to dismiss.
On January 30, 1993, petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claims,
contending that they are not liable for partnership shares, unreceived income/profits,
interests, damages and attorney's fees, that respondent does not have a cause of
action against them, and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the
action, the SEC being the agency that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
case. As counterclaim, petitioner sought attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
On August 2, 1993, petitioner filed a second Motion to Dismiss this time on the
ground that the claim for winding up of partnership affairs, accounting and recovery of
shares in partnership affairs, accounting and recovery of shares in partnership
assets/properties should be dismissed and prosecuted against the estate of
deceased Jacinto in a probate or intestate proceeding.
On August 16, 1993, the trial denied the second motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
On November 26, 1993, petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32499 questioning
the denial of the motion to dismiss.
On November 29, 1993, petitioners filed with the trial court a Motion to Suspend Pretrial Conference.
On December 13, 1993, the trial court granted the motion to suspend pre-trial
conference.
On November 15, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit.
On January 16, 1995, this Court denied the petition for review on certiorari filed by
petitioner, "as petitioners failed to show that a reversible error was committed by the
appellate court."2
On February 20, 1995, entry of judgment was made by the Clerk of Court and the
case was remanded to the trial court on April 26, 1995.
On September 25, 1995, the trial court terminated the pre-trial conference and set the
hearing of the case of January 17, 1996. Respondent presented his evidence while
petitioners were considered to have waived their right to present evidence for their
failure to attend the scheduled date for reception of evidence despite notice.
On October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision ruling for respondent. The
dispositive of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants, as follows:
(1) DIRECTING them to render an accounting in acceptable form
under accounting procedures and standards of the properties,
assets, income and profits of the Shellite Gas Appliance Center
Since the time of death of Jacinto L. Sunga, from whom they
continued the business operations including all businesses derived
from Shellite Gas Appliance Center, submit an inventory, and
appraisal of all these properties, assets, income, profits etc. to the
Court and to plaintiff for approval or disapproval;
(2) ORDERING them to return and restitute to the partnership any
and all properties, assets, income and profits they misapplied and
converted to their own use and advantage the legally pertain to the
plaintiff and account for the properties mentioned in pars. A and B
on pages 4-5 of this petition as basis;
(3) DIRECTING them to restitute and pay to the plaintiff shares
and interest of the plaintiff in the partnership of the listed properties,
assets and good will (sic) in schedules A, B and C, on pages 4-5 of
the petition;
(4) ORDERING them to pay the plaintiff earned but unreceived
income and profits from the partnership from 1988 to May 30, 1992,
when the plaintiff learned of the closure of the store the sum of
P35,000.00 per month, with legal rate of interest until fully paid;
(5) ORDERING them to wind up the affairs of the partnership and

terminate its business activities pursuant to law, after delivering to
the plaintiff all the interest, shares, participation and equity in the
partnership, or the value thereof in money or money's worth, if the
properties are not physically divisible;
(6) FINDING them especially Lilibeth Sunga-Chan guilty of breach
of trust and in bad faith and hold them liable to the plaintiff the sum
of P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and,
(7) DIRECTING them to reimburse and pay the sum of P25,000.00
as attorney's (sic) and P25,000.00 as litigation expenses.
NO special pronouncements as to COSTS.
SO ORDERED."3
On October 28, 1997, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court,
appealing the case to the Court of Appeals.
On January 31, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed. The appealed decision is
AFFIRMED in all respects."4
On May 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner.
Hence, this petition wherein petitioner relies upon following grounds:
"1. The Court of Appeals erred in making a legal conclusion that there
existed a partnership between respondent Lamberto T. Chua and the late
Jacinto L. Sunga upon the latter'' invitation and offer and that upon his death
the partnership assets and business were taken over by petitioners.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that laches
and/or prescription did not apply in the instant case.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that there was
competent and credible evidence to warrant the finding of a partnership, and
assuming arguendo that indeed there was a partnership, the finding of

highly exaggerated amounts or values in the partnership assets and profits."5
unexplained account of the transaction.9 But before this rule can be successfully
invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that a partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until
Jacinto's death. In the absence of any written document to show such partnership
between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argues that these courts were proscribes
from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the
alleged partnership three years after Jacinto's death. To support this argument,
petitioners invoke the "Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule" under Section 23,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that provides:
"1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose

behalf a case in prosecuted.
"SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party.

Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of
a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or
demand against the estate of such deceased person, or against such person
of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the
mind."
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the
mind."10
Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and his
alter ego, Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain claims against a
deceased person (Jacinto), now represented by petitioners.
We are not persuaded.
A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable property of
real rights are contributed thereto, in which case a public instrument shall
necessary.6 Hence, based on the intention of the parties, as gathered from the facts
and ascertained from their language and conduct, a verbal contract of partnership
may arise.7 The essential profits that must be proven to that a partnership was agreed
upon are (1) mutual contribution to a common stock, and (2) a joint interest in the
profits.8 Understandably so, in view of the absence of the written contract of
partnership between respondent and Jacinto, respondent resorted to the introduction
of documentary and testimonial evidence to prove said partnership. The crucial issue
to settle then is to whether or not the "Dead Man's Statute" applies to this case so as
to render inadmissible respondent's testimony and that of his witness, Josephine.
The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving
party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative

of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of
such deceased person or against person of unsound mind;
Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim11 against respondents in their
answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners
themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the "Dead Man's
Statute".12 Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or
representatives of the estates that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein
respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the
counterclaim.13 Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not
disqualified from testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death of the
deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate or
representatives of the deceased.14
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for
the simple reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons
in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." Records show that respondent offered the
testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between
respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners' insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of
respondent does not make her an assignor because the term "assignor" of a party
means "assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right
assigned before any cause of action has arisen."15 Plainly then, Josephine is merely a
witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.
We are not convinced by petitioners' allegation that Josephine's testimony lacks
probative value because she was allegedly coerced coerced by respondent, her
brother-in-law, to testify in his favor, Josephine merely declared in court that she was
requested by respondent to testify and that if she were not requested to do so she
would not have testified. We fail to see how we can conclude from this candid
admission that Josephine's testimony is involuntary when she did not in any way
categorically say that she was forced to be a witness of respondent.
Also, the fact that Josephine is the sister of the wife of respondent does not diminish
the value of her testimony since relationship per se, without more, does not affect the
credibility of witnesses.16
Petitioners' reliance alone on the "Dead Man's Statute" to defeat respondent's claim
cannot prevail over the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
a partnership was established between respondent and Jacinto. Based not only on
the testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as well, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals considered the evidence for respondent as sufficient to prove the
formation of partnership, albeit an informal one.
Notably, petitioners did not present any evidence in their favor during trial. By the
weight of judicial precedents, a factual matter like the finding of the existence of a
partnership between respondent and Jacinto cannot be inquired into by this Court on
review.17 This Court can no longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the
parties and analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and the
appellate court were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of
evidence of one party or the other.18 It must be also pointed out that petitioners failed
to attend the presentation of evidence of respondent. Petitioners cannot now turn to
this Court to question the admissibility and authenticity of the documentary evidence
of respondent when petitioners failed to object to the admissibility of the evidence at
the time that such evidence was offered.19
In a desperate bid to cast doubt on the validity of the oral partnership between
respondent and Jacinto, petitioners maintain that said partnership that had initial
capital of P200,000.00 should have been registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) since registration is mandated by the Civil Code, True, Article
1772 of the Civil Code requires that partnerships with a capital of P3,000.00 or more
must register with the SEC, however, this registration requirement is not mandatory.
Article 1768 of the Civil Code25 explicitly provides that the partnership retains its
juridical personality even if it fails to register. The failure to register the contract of
partnership does not invalidate the same as among the partners, so long as the
contract has the essential requisites, because the main purpose of registration is to
give notice to third parties, and it can be assumed that the members themselves
knew of the contents of their contract. 26 In the case at bar, non-compliance with this
directory provision of the law will not invalidate the partnership considering that the
totality of the evidence proves that respondent and Jacinto indeed forged the
partnership in question.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the appealed
decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt
With regard to petitioners' insistence that laches and/or prescription should have
extinguished respondent's claim, we agree with the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the action for accounting filed by respondents three (3) years after
Jacinto's death was well within the prescribed period. The Civil Code provides that an
action to enforce an oral contract prescribes in six (6) years 20 while the right to
demand an accounting for a partner's interest as against the person continuing the
business accrues at the date of dissolution, in the absence of any contrary
agreement.21 Considering that the death of a partner results in the dissolution of the
partnership22, in this case, it was Jacinto's death that respondent as the surviving
partner had the right to an account of his interest as against petitioners. It bears
stressing that while Jacinto's death dissolved the partnership, the dissolution did not
immediately terminate the partnership. The Civil Code23 expressly provides that upon
dissolution, the partnership continues and its legal personality is retained until the
complete winding up of its business, culminating in its termination.24
G.R. No. 107383
February 20, 1996
CECILIA
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
ZULUETA, petitioner,
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and
papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in
her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a
case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner
had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which,
after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or
those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and
any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay
him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to
pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and
petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or
submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent,
Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his
knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to
be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and
enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso
Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of
respondent's comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by
petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For this
reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among
other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in
using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct
because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix,
Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed
with merit:"2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he

maintains that:
....
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig
Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court
prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6,
1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari,
this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set
aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order,
respondent's request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the
subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin
finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes, At that point in
time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's admission as
evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court
of Makati? Respondent submits it is not malpractice.
for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the
prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" 3 is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."4 Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. 6 Neither may be examined without the consent
of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin
himself under oath, Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore,
receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For
Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and use the same in her action for
legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a
declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's
admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive
order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of
the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used
the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained
by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action 2 for the cancellation of respondent
Paredes' patent and certificate of title since the land had been designated and reserved as
a school site in the aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court rendered
judgment 3 nullifying said patent and title after finding that respondent Paredes had
obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application. Pertinently,
respondent Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case. 4
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon the subsequent complaint of
the Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary investigation conducted thereon, an
information for perjury 5 was filed against respondent Paredes in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court. 6 On November 27, 1985, the Provincial Fiscal was, however, directed by the Deputy
Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground inter alia of
prescription, hence the proceedings were terminated. 7 In this criminal case, respondent
Paredes was likewise represented by respondent Sansaet as counsel.
G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S.
PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar, petitioner seeks the annulment of the
resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan, promulgated on December 22, 1993, which
denied petitioner's motion for the discharge of respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be
utilized as a state witness, and its resolution of March 7, 1994 denying the motion for
reconsideration of its preceding disposition. 1
The records show that during the dates material to this case, respondent Honrada was the
Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San
Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes was successively the
Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same province, and is at
present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney who served as
counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the
present recourse.
The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent Paredes applied for a
free patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His
application was approved and, pursuant to a free patent granted to him, an original
certificate of title was issued in his favor for that lot which is situated in the poblacion of San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
Nonetheless, respondent Sansaet was thereafter haled before the Tanodbayan for
preliminary investigation on the charge that, by using his former position as Provincial
Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his
application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. For the third time, respondent Sansaet was Paredes' counsel of record therein.
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a resolution 8 recommending the criminal
prosecution of respondent Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his aforenamed corespondent, moved for reconsideration and, because of its legal significance in this case,
we quote some of his allegations in that motion:
. . . respondent had been charged already by the complainants before
the Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to
jail on detention in 1984 under the same set of facts and the same
evidence . . . but said case after arraignment, was ordered dismissed
by the court upon recommendation of the Department of Justice. Copy
of
the dismissal
order, certificate
of
arraignmentand
the recommendation of the Department of Justice are hereto attached
for ready reference; thus the filing of this case will be a case of double
jeopardy for respondent herein . . . 9 (Emphasis supplied.)
A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan 10 charging respondent
Paredes with a violation of Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. However,
a motion to quash filed by the defense was later granted in respondent court's resolution of
August 1, 1991 11 and the case was dismissed on the ground of prescription.
On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and
graft charges against respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the
investigation of the three respondents herein for falsification of public documents. 12 He
claimed that respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his herein co-respondents, simulated
and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment,

dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the
arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge. 13These falsified documents were annexed
to respondent Paredes' motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for the
filing of a graft charge against him, in order to support his contention that the same would
constitute double jeopardy.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of
arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in
connection with that perjury case; and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ario that
said perjury case in his court did not reach the arraignment stage since action thereon was
suspended pending the review of the case by the Department of Justice. 14
Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently discarded
and repudiated the submissions he had made in his counter-affidavit. In a so-called
Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications, 15respondent Sansaet revealed that Paredes
contrived to have the graft case under preliminary investigation dismissed on the ground of
double jeopardy by making it appear that the perjury case had been dismissed by the trial
court after he had been arraigned therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by respondent Sansaet in the
preliminary investigation were prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in
the house of respondent Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own participation in the
scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and inducement of respondent
Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for his discharge as a government witness in
the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefor was filed by the prosecution pursuant
to their agreement.
Withal, in a resolution 16 dated February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman approved the filing of
falsification charges against all the herein private respondents. The proposal for the
discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by the Ombudsman on
this evaluative legal position:
. . . Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer of his
stature, in the absence of deliberate intent to conspire, would be
unwittingly induced by another to commit a crime. As counsel for the
accused in those criminal cases, Atty. Sansaet had control over the
case theory and the evidence which the defense was going to present.
Moreover, the testimony or confession of Atty. Sansaet falls under the
mantle of privileged communication between the lawyer and his client
which may be objected to, if presented in the trial.
The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution 17 and, ostensibly to forestall any
further controversy, he decided to file separate informations for falsification of public
documents against each of the herein respondents. Thus, three criminal cases, 18 each of
which named one of the three private respondents here as the accused therein, were filed
in the graft court. However, the same were consolidated for joint trial in the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan.
As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People on July 27, 1993 for the discharge
of respondent Sansaet as a state witness. It was submitted that all the requisites therefor,
as provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, were satisfied insofar as
respondent Sansaet was concerned. The basic postulate was that, except for the
eyewitness testimony of respondent Sansaet, there was no other direct evidence to prove
the confabulated falsification of documents by respondents Honrada and Paredes.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the
attorney-client privilege adverted to by the Ombudsman and invoked by the two other
private respondents in their opposition to the prosecution's motion, resolved to deny the
desired discharge on this ratiocination:
From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish that
client and lawyer relationship existed between Atty. Sansaet and
Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and after the period alleged in the
information. In view of such relationship, the facts surrounding the case,
and other confidential matter must have been disclosed by accused
Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his
professional capacity. Therefore, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the
facts surrounding the offense charged in the information is privileged. 19
Reconsideration of said resolution having been likewise denied, 20 the controversy was
elevated to this Court by the prosecution in an original action for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari against respondent Sandiganbayan.
The principal issues on which the resolution of the petition at bar actually turns are
therefore (1) whether or not the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed
state witness, is barred by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) whether or not, as a
consequence thereof, he is eligible for discharge to testify as a particeps criminis.
As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the lawyer-client
relationship which existed between herein respondents Paredes and Sansaet during the
relevant periods, the facts surrounding the case and other confidential matters must have
been disclosed by respondent Paredes, as client, to respondent Sansaet, as his lawyer.
Accordingly, it found "no reason to discuss it further since Atty. Sansaet cannot be
presented as a witness against accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latter's
consent." 21
The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these
cases, as the facts thereof and actuations of both respondents therein constitute an
exception to the rule. For a clearer understanding of that evidential rule, we will first sweep
aside some distracting mental cobwebs in these cases.
1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication made by
Paredes to Sansaet in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification
before respondent court, and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the
accused and Sansaet his counsel therein. Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called to
witness the preparation of the falsified documents by Paredes and Honrada was as
eloquent a communication, if not more, than verbal statements being made to him by
Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification. It is significant that the evidentiary
rule on this point has always referred to "any communication," without distinction or
qualification. 22
In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule was taken, there is no
particular mode by which a confidential communication shall be made by a client to his
attorney. The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications made by the
client to his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by the client to the
attorney by other means. 23
Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering their past and existing
relations as counsel and client and, further, in view of the purpose for which such falsified
documents were prepared, no word at all passed between Paredes and Sansaet on the
subject matter of that criminal act. The clincher for this conclusion is the undisputed fact
that said documents were thereafter filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to
the motion for reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the graft case before the
Tanodbayan. 24 Also, the acts and words of the parties during the period when the
documents were being falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes would not
have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the same except under
conditions of secrecy and confidence.
2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the instance of Paredes in the
criminal act for which the latter stands charged, a distinction must be made between
confidential communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes
intended to be committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced
intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which his
attorney is bound to respect. Respondent court appears, however, to believe that in the
instant case it is dealing with a past crime, and that respondent Sansaet is set to testify on
alleged criminal acts of respondents Paredes and Honrada that have already been
committed and consummated.
The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a somewhat inaccurate basis.
It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are
concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for the application of
the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered is the date when the
privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a
crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the
future. In other words, if the client seeks his lawyer's advice with respect to a crime that the
former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal
which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the
client's consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard
to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of
which he seeks the lawyer's advice.
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed,
made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such,
are privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the
effect that communications between attorney and client having to do with the
client'scontemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the
cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and
client. 25 (Emphases supplied.)
3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansate as state witness
are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of
Parades at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of
Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which were
later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges now
pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications
thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime of
falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in
confederacy with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for
purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the attorneyclient privilege.
4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of
falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It
is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be
privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence
of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. 26 In fact, it has also been
pointed out to the Court that the "prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and
client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to
an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy
which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain circumstances may
be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice." 27
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such
unlawful communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are
nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel
from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy,
because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst
travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.
II
On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the consequential inquiry as to whether

respondent Sansaet qualifies, as a particeps criminis, for discharge from the criminal
prosecution in order to testify for the State. Parenthetically, respondent court, having
arrived at a contrary conclusion on the preceding issue, did not pass upon this second
aspect and the relief sought by the prosecution which are now submitted for our resolution
in the petition at bar. We shall, however, first dispose likewise of some ancillary questions
requiring preludial clarification.
1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not fully pass upon the query as to whether
or not respondent Sansaet was qualified to be a state witness need not prevent this Court
from resolving that issue as prayed for by petitioner. Where the determinative facts and
evidence have been submitted to this Court such that it is in a position to finally resolve the
dispute, it will be in the pursuance of the ends of justice and the expeditious administration
thereof to resolve the case on the merits, instead of remanding it to the trial court. 28
2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private respondents here stand
charged in three separate informations. It will be recalled that in its resolution of February
24, 1992, the Ombudsman recommended the filing of criminal charges for falsification of
public documents against all the respondents herein. That resolution was affirmed but,
reportedly in order to obviate further controversy, one information was filed against each of
the three respondents here, resulting in three informations for the same acts of falsification.
This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away during the deliberations in this
case by the following discussion thereof by Mr. Justice Davide, to wit:
and became a single action in which a single judgment is rendered, the same as if the
different causes of action involved had originally been joined in a single action. 29
Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to the situation "(w)hen two or more
persons are charged with the commission of a certain offense" was too broad and
indefinite; hence the word "joint" was added to indicate the identity of the charge and the
fact that the accused are all together charged therewith substantially in the same manner
in point of commission and time. The word "joint" means "common to two or more," as
"involving the united activity of two or more," or "done or produced by two or more working
together," or "shared by or affecting two or more. 30 Had it been intended that all the
accused should always be indicted in one and the same information, the Rules could have
said so with facility, but it did not so require in consideration of the circumstances obtaining
in the present case and the problems that may arise from amending the information. After
all, the purpose of the Rule can be achieved by consolidation of the cases as an alternative
mode.
2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification, and the
rule is that since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, the same penalty shall be
imposed on all members of the conspiracy. Now, one of the requirements for a state
witness is that he "does not appear to be the most guilty." 31 not that he must be the least
guilty 32 as is so often erroneously framed or submitted. The query would then be whether
an accused who was held guilty by reason of membership in a conspiracy is eligible to be
a state witness.
To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al. 33 we find this obiter:
Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block Sansaet's

discharge as state witness, he can, nevertheless, be discharged even if
indicted under a separate information. I suppose the three cases were
consolidated for joint trial since they were all raffled to the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV of the Revised
Rules of the Sandiganbayan allows consolidation in only one Division of
cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving
common questions of law and fact. Accordingly, for all legal intents and
purposes, Sansaet stood as co-accused and he could be discharged as
state witness. It is of no moment that he was charged separately from
his co-accused. While Section 9 of Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure uses the word jointly, which was absent in the old
provision, the consolidated and joint trial has the effect of making the
three accused co-accused or joint defendants, especially considering
that they are charged for the same offense. In criminal law, persons
indicted for the same offense and tried together are called joint
defendants.
As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco along the same vein, there having
been a consolidation of the three cases, the several actions lost their separate identities
It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real mastermind. It is

believable that he persuaded the others to rob Paterno, not to kill him
for a promised fee. Although he did not actually commit any of the
stabbings, it was a mistake to discharge Bagispas as a state witness.
All the perpetrators of the offense, including him, were bound in a
conspiracy that made them equally guilty.
However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et al., 34 two conspirators charged with five
others in three separate informations for multiple murder were discharged and used as
state witnesses against their confederates. Subsequent thereto, in Lugtu, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 35 one of the co-conspirators was discharged from the information charging
him and two others with the crime of estafa. The trial court found that he was not the most
guilty as, being a poor and ignorant man, he was easily convinced by his two co-accused
to open the account with the bank and which led to the commission of the crime.
On appeal, this Court held that the finding of respondent appellate court that Lugtu was
just as guilty as his co-accused, and should not be discharged as he did not appear to be
not the most guilty, is untenable. In other words, the Court took into account the gravity or
nature of the acts committed by the accused to be discharged compared to those of his co-
accused, and not merely the fact that in law the same or equal penalty is imposable on all
of them.
Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not explicity articulated found expression
in People vs. Ocimar, et al., 36 which we quote in extenso:
Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez does not satisfy the conditions for the
discharge of a co-accused to become a state witness. He argues that no accused in a
conspiracy can lawfully be discharged and utilized as a state witness, for not one of them
could satisfy the requisite of appearing not to be the most guilty. Appellant asserts that
since accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is equally guilty as the others.
We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Bermudez. For,
despite the presentation of four (4) other witnesses, none of them could positively identify
the accused except Bermudez who was one of those who pulled the highway heist which
resulted not only in the loss of cash, jewelry and other valuables, but even the life of Capt.
Caeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of Bermudez that clinched the case for the
prosecution. Second, without his testimony, no other direct evidence was available for the
prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. Third, his testimony could be, as indeed it
was, substantially corroborated in its material points as indicated by the trial court in its
well-reasoned decision. Fourth, he does not appear to be the most guilty. As the evidence
reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party without having any prior knowledge of the
plot to stage a highway robbery. But even assuming that he later became part of the
conspiracy, he does not appear to be the most guilty. What the law prohibits is that the
most guilty will be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty will be sent to jail. And
by "most guilty" we mean the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the
commission of the offense and not necessarily the severity of the penalty imposed. While
all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be
considered least guilty if We take into account his degree of participation in the
perpetration of the offense. Fifth, there is no evidence that he has at any time been
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon conspirators found guilty
of a criminal offense is based on the concurrence of criminal intent in their minds
and translated into concerted physical action although of varying acts or degrees
of depravity. Since the Revised Penal Code is based on the classical school of
thought, it is the identity of the mens rea which is considered the predominant
consideration and, therefore, warrants the imposition of the same penalty on the
consequential theory that the act of one is thereby the act of all.
Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should not be equated with the
procedural rule on the discharge of particeps criminis. This adjective device is
based on other considerations, such as the need for giving immunity to one of
them in order that not all shall escape, and the judicial experience that the candid
admission of an accused regarding his participation is a guaranty that he will
testify truthfully. For those reasons, the Rules provide for certain qualifying
criteria which, again, are based on judicial experience distilled into a judgmental
policy.
III
The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds, that the other requisites for the
discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness are present and should have been
favorably appreciated by the Sandiganbayan.
Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual commission of the
falsification charged in the criminal cases pending before respondent court, and the
prosecution is faced with the formidable task of establishing the guilt of the two other corespondents who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest their innocence. There is
thus no other direct evidence available for the prosecution of the case, hence there is
absolute necessity for the testimony of Sansaet whose discharge is sought precisely for
that purpose. Said respondent has indicated his conformity thereto and has, for the
purposes required by the Rules, detailed the substance of his projected testimony in his
Affidavit of Explanation and Rectifications.
xxx xxx xxx

Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that the
rule on the discharge of an accused to be utilized as state witness
clearly looks at his actual and individual participation in the commission
of the crime, which may or may not have been perpetrated in
conspiracy with the other accused. Since Bermudez was not
individually responsible for the killing committed on the occasion of the
robbery except by reason of conspiracy, it cannot be said then that
Bermudez appears to be the most guilty. Hence, his discharge to be a
witness for the government is clearly warranted. (Emphasis ours.)
His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points by reputable

witnesses, identified in the basic petition with a digest of their prospective testimonies, as
follows: Judge Ciriaco C. Ario, Municipal Circuit Trial Court in San Francisco, Agusan del
Sur; Provincial Prosecutor and Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor Claudio A. Nistal;
Teofilo Gelacio, private complainant who initiated the criminal cases through his lettercomplaint; Alberto Juvilan of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Fernando, Agusan del Sur,
who participated in the resolution asking their Provincial Governor to file the appropriate
case against respondent Paredes, and Francisco Macalit, who obtained the certification of
non-arraignment from Judge Ario.
On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not appear that respondent Sansaet has at
any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Thus, with the
confluence of all the requirements for the discharge of this respondent, both the Special
Prosecutor and the Solicitor General strongly urge and propose that he be allowed to
testify as a state witness.
This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this procedural aspect, the
prosecution may propose but it is for the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion,
to determine the merits of the proposal and make the corresponding disposition. It must be
emphasized, however, that such discretion should have been exercised, and the
disposition taken on a holistic view of all the facts and issues herein discussed, and not
merely on the sole issue of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.
This change of heart and direction respondent Sandiganbayan eventually assumed, after
the
retirement
of
two
members
of
its
Second
Division 37 and
the reconstitution thereof. In an inversely anticlimactic Manifestation and Comment 38 dated
June 14, 1995, as required by this Court in its resolution on December 5, 1994, the
chairman and new members thereof 39 declared:
4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22, 1993 and March
7, 1994 upon which the Petition for Certiorari filed by the prosecution
are based, was penned by Associate Justice Narciso T. Atienza and
concurred in by the undersigned and Associate Justice Augusto M.
Amores;
5) That while the legal issues involved had been already discussed and
passed upon by the Second Division in the aforesaid Resolution,
however, after going over the arguments submitted by the SolicitorGeneral and re-assessing Our position on the matter, We respectfully
beg leave of the Honorable Supreme Court to manifest that We are
amenable to setting aside the questioned Resolutions and to grant the
prosecution's motion to discharge accused Generoso Sansaet as state
witness, upon authority of the Honorable Supreme Court for the
issuance of the proper Resolution to that effect within fifteen (15) days
from notice thereof.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted SETTING ASIDE the
impunged resolutions and ORDERING that the present reliefs sought in these cases by
petitioner be allowed and given due course by respondent Sandiganbayan.
G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996

TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C.
CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN and EDUARDO U.
ESCUETA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and
RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.
G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996
PARAJA
G.
HAYUDINI, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
These case touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which the workings
of the contentious and adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based the
sanctity of fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and
advocate is also what makes the law profession a unique position of trust and confidence, which
distinguishes it from any other calling. In this instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and
strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to the confidentiality that proceeds from the
performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987
before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal
defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the
named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the
Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al." 1
Among the dependants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J.
Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U.
Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then
partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter
referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients,
which included, among others, the organization and acquisition of business associations and/or
organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where its members acted as
incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of these services,
the members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's
equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in
the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said shares. In the course of
their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the
assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As members of the
ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the
organization and acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping
with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said
corporations involved in sequestration proceedings. 2
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government (hereinafter
referred to as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third
Amended Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in
PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant. 3Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private
respondent Roco as party-defendant on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the
principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case
No. 33. 4
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the following
allegations:
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C.
Concepcion, Teodoro Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo
U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the Angara Concepcion
Cruz Regala and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed
conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use
of the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE,
COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty other coconut levy funded
corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares
and its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut
monopoly. Through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, being the
wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became
the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3%
of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This
ranks ACCRA Investments Corporation number 44 among the top 100
biggest stockholders of UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000
shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books show the name Edgardo
J. Angara as holding approximately3,744 shares as of February, 1984. 5
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:
4.4 Defendants-ACCRA lawyers' participation in the acts with which their
codefendants are charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.
4.4.1 In the course of rendering professional and legal
services to clients, defendants-ACCRA lawyers, Jose
C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Rogelio A. Vinluan
and Eduardo U. Escueta, became holders of shares of
stock in the corporations listed under their respective
names in Annex "A" of the expanded Amended
Complaint as incorporating or acquiring stockholders
only and, as such, they do not claim any proprietary
interest in the said shares of stock.
4.5 Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the incorporators
in 1976 of Mermaid Marketing Corporation, which was organized for
legitimate business purposes not related to the allegations of the expanded
Amended Complaint. However, he has long ago transferred any material
interest therein and therefore denies that the "shares" appearing in his
name in Annex "A" of the expanded Amended Complaint are his assets. 6
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer
denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth. 7
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated
October 8, 1991 with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment
to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco. 8 The CounterMotion for dropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set for hearing on October 18, 1991
in accordance with the requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of
petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments
petitioners
executed
shareholdings. 9
in
favor
of
its
client
covering
their
respective
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by

private respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as partydefendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of
respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the
PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by private respondent
Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and
Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent PCGG in behalf of private
respondent Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the evidence
of the PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33. 10
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not refute petitioners'
contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No.
33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nomineestockholder. 11
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned,
denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the
conditions required by respondent PCGG. It held:
The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping
them as party defendants. In the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG
to be accorded the same treatment accorded to Roco.
Neither can this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the
ACCRA lawyers and joined in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same
treatment by the PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of
merit. 12
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied
by the respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 105938, invoking the following grounds:
I
The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting
petitioners ACCRA lawyers who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as
nominee-stockholders, to the strict application of the law of agency.
xxx xxx xxx
II
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of
the client for whom they have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their
choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations of whether or
not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to
be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the
consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis for
recognizing the privilege; the existence andidentity of the client.
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not

considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated
and, therefore, deserving of equal treatment.
1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had
revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of
the client(s) for whom he acted as nomineestockholder.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded
by the PCGG as defendants herein.
2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had

undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s), the
disclosure does not constitute a substantial distinction
as would make the classification reasonable under the
equal protection clause.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency
and that Roco has apparently identified his principal, which revelation could
show the lack of cause against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to
exercise its power both under the rules of Agency and under Section 5 of
E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the Supreme Court's ruling in Republic
v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same
conditions availed of by Roco; full disclosure in exchange for exclusion from
these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT dated November 4, 1991).
The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the disclosures required by
the PCGG.
3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism

and undue preference in favor of Mr. Roco in violation
of the equal protection clause.
III
holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their

client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG.
1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorneyclient privilege includes the identity of the client(s).
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them
to disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the
"bigger fish" as they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGG's willingness
to cut a deal with petitioners the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the
complaint. The statement of the Sandiganbayan in its questioned resolution dated March 18,
1992 is explicit:
2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are

not limited to the identity of petitioners ACCRA lawyers'
alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged matters.
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of
the client for whom they have acted, i.e, their principal, and that will be their
choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations of whether or
not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to
be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the
consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis for
recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.
IV
requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based
on reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration to the
constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection of
the law.
Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for reconsideration of the March 18,
1991 resolution which was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate
petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's
resolution on essentially the same grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case
No. 33 grants him a favorable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the
identity of his client, giving him an advantage over them who are in the same footing as partners
in the ACCRA law firm. Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an undertaking has
been assumed by private respondent Roco, they are prohibited from revealing the identity of
their principal under their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the
confidentiality of information obtained during such lawyer-client relationship.
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the
revelation of the identity of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege, nor are the documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected, because they are
evidence of nominee status. 13
In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent PCGG acted correctly in
excluding him as party-defendant because he "(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG had
therefore the right to dismiss Civil Case No.0033 as to Roco 'without an order of court by filing a
notice of dismissal'," 14 and he has undertaken to identify his principal. 15
Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.
I
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded
by the PCGG as defendants herein. (Emphasis ours)
In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled
"Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government" respondent
PCGG, through counsel Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the
PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA that their "so called client is Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco;" that "it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to those
subscription payments in corporations included in Annex "A" of the Third Amended Complaint;
that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust and deeds of assignment, some in the name of
particular persons; some in blank.
We quote Atty. Ongkiko:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish through these
ACCRA lawyers that, one, their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco.
Second, it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to
these subscription payments of these corporations who are now the
petitioners in this case. Third, that these lawyers executed deeds of trust,
some in the name of a particular person, some in blank. Now, these blank
deeds are important to our claim that some of the shares are actually being
held by the nominees for the late President Marcos. Fourth, they also
executed deeds of assignment and some of these assignments have also
blank assignees. Again, this is important to our claim that some of the
shares are for Mr. Conjuangco and some are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that most
of thes e corporations are really just paper corporations. Why do we say
that? One: There are no really fixed sets of officers, no fixed sets of
directors at the time of incorporation and even up to 1986, which is the
crucial year. And not only that, they have no permits from the municipal
authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their addresses now are care of
Villareal Law Office. They really have no address on records. These are
some of the principal things that we would ask of these nominees

stockholders, as they called themselves. 16
watchful and industrious, to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be
used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it. 27
It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the
complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services
performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners' inclusion as codefendants in the complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to name their
clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the case,
respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and should exclude them
from the Third Amended Complaint.
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the
Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids counsel,
without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his
advice given thereon in the course of professional employment." 28 Passed on into various
provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:
II
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio
conductio operarum(contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and
another hires them without reference to the object of which the services are to be performed,
wherein
lawyers'
services
may
be
compensated
by honorariumor
for
hire, 17 and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed
makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person who
requested him. 18 But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principal-agent and
lessor-lessee.
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The

following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney's
secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the
client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has
been acquired in such capacity. 29
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere
agent or servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him
by his client. 19 A lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are
entirely different from and superior to those of an ordinary agent. 20 Moreover, an attorney also
occupies what may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the
Court 21 and exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to
his client.
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that
breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate,
exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, 22 that
is required by reason of necessity and public interest 23based on the hypothesis that abstinence
from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of
justice. 24
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that:
Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence,
and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to
accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from
him or with his knowledge and approval.
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes
him from any other professional in society. This conception is entrenched
and embodies centuries of established and stable tradition. 25 In Stockton
v. Ford, 26 the U. S. Supreme Court held:
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and
confidence than that of attorney and client, or generally speaking, one more
honorably and faithfully discharged; few more anxiously guarded by the law,
or governed by the sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is the
duty of the court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be
The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from
him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or
public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In
the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy
and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be
borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and
not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit,
much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any
manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not
that of his client.
Considerations favoring confidentially in lawyer-client relationships are many and serve several
constitutional and policy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of
the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to
choose between legal representation without effective communication and disclosure and legal
representation with all his secrets revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to
either opt to stay away from the judicial system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of
disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of information would be
curtailed thereby rendering the right practically nugatory. The threat this represents against
another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed innocent is at once self-evident.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the door to a whole
spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited information
engendered by a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent
upon the degree of confidence which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a
situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information. It
necessarily follows that in order to attain effective representation, the lawyer must invoke the
privilege not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the
name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in
the instant case, the answer must be in the affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery 30 Under this
premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may
not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client. 31
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important
exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name
would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor, 34 a state supreme court reversed a lower court order requiring a lawyer to
divulge the name of her client on the ground that the subject matter of the relationship was so
closely related to the issue of the client's identity that the privilege actually attached to both.
In Enzor, the unidentified client, an election official, informed his attorney in confidence that he
had been offered a bribe to violate election laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end. In
her testimony, the attorney revealed that she had advised her client to count the votes correctly,
but averred that she could not remember whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer
was cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal his client's identity before a grand jury. Reversing
the lower court's contempt orders, the state supreme court held that under the circumstances of
the case, and under the exceptions described above, even the name of the client was privileged.
U .S. v. Hodge and Zweig, 35 involved the same exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged in
those instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would
implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyer's legal advice was obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of the
"Sandino Gang," a gang involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United States. The
respondents, law partners, represented key witnesses and suspects including the leader of the
gang, Joe Sandino.
In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge
and Zweig, requiring them to produce documents and information regarding payment received
by Sandino on behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to divulge the
names. The Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under
the facts and circumstances of the case, held:
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule,
know his adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." 32 He cannot
be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces. 33
A client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may be
privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong
probability exists that disclosure of such information would implicate that
client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was soughtBaird
v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d at 680. While in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a
matter of California law, the rule also reflects federal law. Appellants contend
that the Baird exception applies to this case.
The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal policy behind
the attorney-client privilege. "In order to promote freedom of consultation of
legal advisors by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure from the
legal advisors must be removed; hence, the law must prohibit such
disclosure except on the client's consent." 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec. 2291, at
545. In furtherance of this policy, the client's identity and the nature of his
fee arrangements are, in exceptional cases, protected as confidential

communications. 36
refused and brought the question to the State Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyer's refusal to
divulge the names of his clients the court held:
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his identity is privileged. For instance,
the peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation, 37 prompted the
New York Supreme Court to allow a lawyer's claim to the effect that he could not reveal the
name of his client because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.
If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealed from,
that he represented certain persons in the purchase or sale of these mines,
it has made progress in establishing by such evidence their version of the
litigation. As already suggested, such testimony by the witness would
compel him to disclose not only that he was attorney for certain people, but
that, as the result of communications made to him in the course of such
employment as such attorney, he knew that they were interested in certain
transactions. We feel sure that under such conditions no case has ever
gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile
litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to
which it related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit
against his client. 41
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned
by respondent corporation, collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff
brought action both against defendant corporation and the owner of the second cab, identified in
the information only as John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney of defendant corporation
appeared on preliminary examination, the fact was somehow revealed that the lawyer came to
know the name of the owner of the second cab when a man, a client of the insurance company,
prior to the institution of legal action, came to him and reported that he was involved in a car
accident. It was apparent under the circumstances that the man was the owner of the second
cab. The state supreme court held that the reports were clearly made to the lawyer in his
professional capacity. The court said:
That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance
company had hired him to defend its policyholders seems immaterial. The
attorney is such cases is clearly the attorney for the policyholder when the
policyholder goes to him to report an occurrence contemplating that it would
be used in an action or claim against him. 38
xxx xxx xxx
All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of
professional advice or assistance, are privileged, whether they relate to a
suit pending or contemplated, or to any other matter proper for such advice
or aid; . . . And whenever the communication made, relates to a matter so
connected with the employment as attorney or counsel as to afford
presumption that it was the ground of the address by the client, then it is
privileged from disclosure. . .
It appears . . . that the name and address of the owner of the second cab
came to the attorney in this case as a confidential communication. His client
is not seeking to use the courts, and his address cannot be disclosed on
that theory, nor is the present action pending against him as service of the
summons on him has not been effected. The objections on which the court
reserved decision are sustained. 39
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company, 40 the lawyer involved was required by a
lower court to disclose whether he represented certain clients in a certain transaction. The
purpose of the court's request was to determine whether the unnamed persons as interested
parties were connected with the purchase of properties involved in the action. The lawyer
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by
revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain
of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.
In Baird vs. Korner, 42 a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain
undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a
favorable position in case criminal charges were brought against them by the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service (IRS).
It appeared that the taxpayers' returns of previous years were probably incorrect and the taxes
understated. The clients themselves were unsure about whether or not they violated tax laws
and sought advice from Baird on the hypothetical possibility that they had. No investigation was
then being undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers
delivered to Baird the sum of $12, 706.85, which had been previously assessed as the tax due,
and another amount of money representing his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a check
for $12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the payment, but
without naming his clients. The IRS demanded that Baird identify the lawyers, accountants, and
other clients involved. Baird refused on the ground that he did not know their names, and
declined to name the attorney and accountants because this constituted privileged
communication. A petition was filed for the enforcement of the IRS summons. For Baird's
repeated refusal to name his clients he was found guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that, a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who
employed him to pay sums of money to the government voluntarily in settlement of
undetermined income taxes, unsued on, and with no government audit or investigation into that
client's income tax liability pending. The court emphasized the exception that a client's name is
privileged when so much has been revealed concerning the legal services rendered that the
disclosure of the client's identity exposes him to possible investigation and sanction by
government agencies. The Court held:
The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the
general rule. Here money was received by the government, paid by persons
who thereby admitted they had not paid a sufficient amount in income taxes
some one or more years in the past. The names of the clients are useful to
the government for but one purpose to ascertain which taxpayers think
they were delinquent, so that it may check the records for that one year or
several years. The voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief by the
taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties are due than the sum
previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes,
though whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be the link
that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
federal crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are the reasons
the attorney here involved was employed to advise his clients what,
under the circumstances, should be done. 43
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed
consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate
structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their
professional advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment
covering their client's shareholdings.
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as
exceptions to the general rule.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously
provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is
the link, in the words of Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to
convict the (client) of a . . . crime." 47
For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is
relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance. 44 Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously
disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has
been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the
entire transaction. 45
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the
ambit of the privilege when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that
disclosure would then reveal client confidences. 46
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly
reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First,
disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the
very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated
earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there would be not attorneyclient relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was
duly establishes in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three
specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to nonprosecution should they accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship;
and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor
of their clients covering their respective shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of
petitioners' legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their
duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would
implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.
An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the services of
an attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose of
committing illegal activities and a case where a client thinks he might have previously committed
something illegal and consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall within the
privilege because the same cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The second case falls within
the exception because whether or not the act for which the client sought advice turns out to be
illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the
hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible action against him.
These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or used as
a shield for an illegal act, as in the first example; while the prosecution may not have a case
against the client in the second example and cannot use the attorney client relationship to build
up a case against the latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not within the professional
character of a lawyer to give advice on the commission of a crime.48 The reason for the second
has been stated in the cases above discussed and are founded on the same policy grounds for
which the attorney-client privilege, in general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated that "under such
conditions no case has ever yet gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a
hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it
related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his
client." 49 "Communications made to an attorney in the course of any personal employment,
relating to the subject thereof, and which may be supposed to be drawn out in consequence of
the relation in which the parties stand to each other, are under the seal of confidence and
entitled to protection as privileged communications." 50 Where the communicated information,
which clearly falls within the privilege, would suggest possible criminal activity but there would be
not much in the information known to the prosecution which would sustain a charge except that
revealing the name of the client would open up other privileged information which would
substantiate the prosecution's suspicions, then the client's identity is so inextricably linked to the
subject matter itself that it falls within the protection. The Baird exception, applicable to the
instant case, is consonant with the principal policy behind the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose
of promoting freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled

disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated. This exception has likewise been sustained in In
re Grand Jury Proceedings 51 and Tillotson v. Boughner. 52 What these cases unanimously seek
to avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to a fishing expedition by the
prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative source of information available to the prosecutor which do not
depend on utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily available source of
information in the building of a case against the latter. Compelling disclosure of the client's name
in circumstances such as the one which exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning
fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and will not countenance.
When the nature of the transaction would be revealed by disclosure of an attorney's retainer,
such retainer is obviously protected by the privilege. 53 It follows that petitioner attorneys in the
instant case owe their client(s) a duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter's identity which
in turn requires them to invoke the privilege.
In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the
prosecution has a case against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence
painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and not from compelled testimony
requiring them to reveal the name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much
about the nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal. The logical nexus between
name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case the it would be difficult to simply
dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as much "communication" as
information revealed directly about the transaction in question itself, a communication which is
clearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing
himself to charges of violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client
relationship.
The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore imposes a strict liability
for negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing to the client, including confidentiality,
loyalty, competence, diligence as well as the responsibility to keep clients informed and protect
their rights to make decisions have been zealously sustained. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and
McCloy v. Boon, 54 the US Second District Court rejected the plea of the petitioner law firm that it
breached its fiduciary duty to its client by helping the latter's former agent in closing a deal for
the agent's benefit only after its client hesitated in proceeding with the transaction, thus causing
no harm to its client. The Court instead ruled that breaches of a fiduciary relationship in any
context comprise a special breed of cases that often loosen normally stringent requirements of
causation and damages, and found in favor of the client.
To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley
P.A. v. Scheller 55 requiring strict obligation of lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent
fee lawyer was fired shortly before the end of completion of his work, and sought
payment quantum meruit of work done. The court, however, found that the lawyer was fired for
cause after he sought to pressure his client into signing a new fee agreement while settlement
negotiations were at a critical stage. While the client found a new lawyer during the interregnum,
events forced the client to settle for less than what was originally offered. Reiterating the
principle of fiduciary duty of lawyers to clients in Meinhard v. Salmon 56 famously attributed to
Justice Benjamin Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior," the US Court found that the lawyer involved was
fired for cause, thus deserved no attorney's fees at all.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and
lawyer's loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only
during the relationship, but extends even after the termination of the relationship. 57
Such are the unrelenting duties required by lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which
the lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 58 ". . . is an exacting
goddess, demanding of her votaries in intellectual and moral discipline." The Court, no less, is
not prepared to accept respondents' position without denigrating the noble profession that is
lawyering, so extolled by Justice Holmes in this wise:
Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such
scope to realize the spontaneous energy of one's soul? In what other does
one plunge so deep in the stream of life so share its passions its battles,
its despair, its triumphs, both as witness and actor? . . . But that is not all.
What a subject is this in which we are united this abstraction called the
Law, wherein as in a magic mirror, we see reflected, not only in our lives, but
the lives of all men that have been. When I think on this majestic theme my
eyes dazzle. If we are to speak of the law as our mistress, we who are here
know that she is a mistress only to be won with sustained and lonely
passion only to be won by straining all the faculties by which man is
likened to God.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under
pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case
clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged
information.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege under the
circumstances obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it would expose the
lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary
responsibility imposed on them in the exercise of their duties.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the defendants therein, including
herein petitioners and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up
through the use of coconut levy funds the financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and that
through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned
investment arm, ACCRA Investment Corporation, became the holder of approximately
fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as
of 31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA lawyers that
Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the
subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents
by allowing themselves, among others, to be used as instrument in accumulating illgotten wealth through government concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross
abuse of official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust, unjust
enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
No such substantial distinctions exist from the records of the case at bench, in
violation of the equal protection clause.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to
submit to the PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well
as deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their
respective shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from petitioners a link "that would
inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a crime."
The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against
uneven application of status and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee
operates
against
uneven application of
legal
norms
so
that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same
treatment. 62 Those who fall within a particular class ought to be treated alike not only
as to privileges granted but also as to the liabilities imposed.
III
In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents alleged that the
private respondent was dropped as party defendant not only because of his admission
that he acted merely as a nominee but also because of his undertaking to testify to
such facts and circumstances "as the interest of truth may require, which includes . . .
the identity of the principal." 59
First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted as a lawyer and
nominee, a statement made in his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is
sufficient to state that petitioners have likewise made the same claim not merely outof-court but also in the Answer to plaintiff's Expanded Amended Complaint, signed by
counsel, claiming that their acts were made in furtherance of "legitimate
lawyering." 60Being "similarly situated" in this regard, public respondents must show
that there exist other conditions and circumstances which would warrant their treating
the private respondent differently from petitioners in the case at bench in order to
evade a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
To this end, public respondents contend that the primary consideration behind their
decision to sustain the PCGG's dropping of private respondent as a defendant was his
promise to disclose the identities of the clients in question. However, respondents
failed to show and absolute nothing exists in the records of the case at bar that
private respondent actually revealed the identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Since
the undertaking happens to be the leitmotif of the entire arrangement between Mr.
Roco and the PCGG, an undertaking which is so material as to have justified PCGG's
special treatment exempting the private respondent from prosecution, respondent
Sandiganbayan should have required proof of the undertaking more substantial than a
"bare assertion" that private respondent did indeed comply with the undertaking.
Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only three documents were submitted for the
purpose, two of which were mere requests for re-investigation and one simply
disclosed certain clients which petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were themselves willing to
reveal. These were clients to whom both petitioners and private respondent rendered
legal services while all of them were partners at ACCRA, and were not the clients
which the PCGG wanted disclosed for the alleged questioned transactions. 61
To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the filing of the suit
in the respondent court without him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show
that Mr. Roco was treated as species apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the
basis of a classification which made substantial distinctions based on real differences.
. . . What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform

operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances
would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges conferred and
the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: "Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances,
which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of
burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
binding the rest. 63
We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the
petitioners for their exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the
lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. The condition also constitutes a transgression by
respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. 64 It is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from
prosecution without allowing the same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGG's
demand not only touches upon the question of the identity of their clients but also on
documents related to the suspected transactions, not only in violation of the attorneyclient privilege but also of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Whichever
way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the expense of such
rights.
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorneyclient confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should
wait until they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in
confidence before they can raise their objections. But petitioners are not mere
witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth.
They have made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not willing to
testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional right
against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the
privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.
It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full
course in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of
further litigation when it is obvious that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a
privileged attorney-client relationship and as a means of coercing them to disclose the
identities of their clients. To allow the case to continue with respect to them when this
Court could nip the problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction
an unjust situation which we should not here countenance. The case hangs as a real
and palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should
not be allowed to continue a day longer.
While we are aware of respondent PCGG's legal mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth,
we will not sanction acts which violate the equal protection guarantee and the right
against self-incrimination and subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent
Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to
exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C.
Concepcion, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayuduni as
parties-defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v.
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al."
SO ORDERED.
On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de
Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa
Abad, before the then Court of First Instance of Manila. In their petition, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 86792, petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa
Abad, as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. On May 9, 1972, petitioners amended their petition by alleging that the
real properties covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021, listed therein as belonging to the
decedent, were actually only administered by the latter, the true owner being their late mother,
Lucila de Mesa. On June 16, 1972, the trial court appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as
administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad.
Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their
late mother Lucila de Mesa, copying therein the technical descriptions of the lots covered by
TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021. By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled the
above-mentioned TCTs in the name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT No.
108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina Abad Gonzales. The three promptly
executed real estate mortgages over the real properties in favor of Mrs. Josefina Viola, the wife
of their counsel, Escolastico Viola.
On July 7, 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and
Marian Abad Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition
in Special Proceedings No. 86792. In their motion, they alleged that Honoria Empaynado had
been the common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven years before his death, or from
1943 to 1971, and that during this period, their union had produced two children, Cecilia Abad
Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado. Private respondents also disclosed the existence of
Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad with another woman, Dolores
Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to the surviving children to the exclusion of
collateral relatives, private respondents charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the
existence of said three children in other to deprive the latter of their rights to the estate of
Ricardo Abad.
G.R. No. 117740 October 30, 1998
CAROLINA
ABAD
GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORIA EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H. ABAD, MARIAN H. ABAD and
ROSEMARIE S. ABAD, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October
19, 1994, finding private respondents as the heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad as well as annulling
petitioners' extra-judicial partition of the decedent's estate.
On July 24, 1972, private respondents filed a motion to withdraw their first motion and, in lieu
thereof, filed a motion for reconsideration praying that Cecilia Abad be appointed administrator
instead of Cesar Tioseco. The trial court denied private respondents' motion to remove Cesar
Tioseco as administrator, but allowed them to appear in the proceedings to establish their right
as alleged heirs of Ricardo Abad.
Private respondents later discovered that petitioners had managed to cancel TCT Nos. 13530,
53671, and 64021 through the stratagem of extra-judicially partitioning their mother's estate.
Accordingly, on October 4, 1973, private respondents filed a motion to annul the extra-judicial
partition executed by petitioners, as well as TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484, the Torrens
titles issued in substitution of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 and the real estate mortgages
constituted by the latter on said properties.
After due trial, the lower court, on November 2, 1973, rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad and

Rosemarie S. Abad acknowledged natural children of
the deceased Ricardo M. Abad;
2. Declares the deed of Extra Judicial Settlement of the

Estate of the Deceased Lucila de Mesa, executed on
May 2, 1972 (Doc. No. 445, Page No. 86, Book No. VII,
Series of 1972 of the notarial book of Faustino S. Cruz)
by petitioners and Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, to
be inexistent and void from the beginning;
(2) Declaring said acknowledged natural children,

namely: Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad, and
Rosemarie S. Abad the only surviving legal heirs of the
deceased Ricardo M. Abad and as such entitled to
succeed to the entire estate of said deceased, subject
to the rights of Honoria Empaynado, if any, as co-owner
of any of the property of said estate that may have been
acquired thru her joint efforts with the deceased during
the period they lived together as husband and wife;
3. Declares as null and void the cancellation of TCT

Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 and issuance in lieu
thereof, of TCT Nos. 108482, 108483 and 108484;
4. Orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel
TCT No. 108482 of Dolores de Mesa Abad; TCT No.
108483 of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco; and TCT No.
108484 of Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales and in lieu
thereof, restore and/or issue the corresponding
certificate of title in the name of Ricardo Abad;
(3) Denying the petition of decedent's collateral

relatives, namely: Dolores M. Abad, Cesar M. Tioseco
and Carolina M. Abad to be declared as heirs and
excluding them from participating in the administration
and settlement of the estate of Ricardo Abad;
5. Declares as inexistent and void from the beginning

the three (3) real estate mortgages executed on July 7,
1972 executed by (a) petitioner Dolores de Mesa Abad,
identified as Doc. No. 145, Page No. 30, Book No. XX,
Series of 1972, (b) petitioner Cesar de Mesa Tioseco,
identified as Doc. No. 146, Page 31, Book No. XX,
Series of 1972; and (c) Carolina de Mesa AbadGonzales, identified as Doe. No. 144, Page No. 30,
Book No. XX, Series of 1972, all of the notarial book of
Ricardo P. Yap of Manila, in favor of Mrs. Josefina C.
Viola, and orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to
cancel the registration or annotation thereof from the
back of the torrens title of Ricardo Abad; and
(4) Appointing
Honoria
Empaynado
as
the
administratrix in this intestacy with a bond of THIRTY
THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS; and
(5) Ordering Cesar Tioseco to surrender to the new
administratrix all property or properties, monies and
such papers that came into his possession by virtue of
his appointment as administrator, which appointment is
hereby revoked. 1
The trial court, likewise, found in favor of private respondents with respect to the latter's motion
for annulment of certain documents. On November 19, 1974, it rendered the following judgment:
6. Orders Atty. Escolastico R. Viola and his law

associate and wife, Josefina C. Viola, to surrender to
the new administratrix, Honoria Empaynado, TCT Nos.
108482, 108483, and 108484 within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds oppositors' Motion for Annulment, dated

October 4, 1973 to be meritorious and accordingly
1. Declares that the six (6) parcels of land described in
TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021, all registered in the
name of Ricardo Abad, as replaced by TCT No. 108482
in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483
in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No.
108484 in the name of Carolina de Mesa AbadGonzales, and the residential house situated at 2432
Opalo Street, San Andres Subdivision, Manila, to be the
properties of the late Ricardo Abad;
SO ORDERED. 2
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 1973 decision was denied by the trial
court. Their notice of appeal was likewise denied on the ground that the same had been filed out
of time. Because of this ruling, petitioners, instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings with
the Court of Appeals, docketed there as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-03268-R. On November 2, 1974, the
appellate court granted petitioners' petition and ordered the lower court to give due course to the
latter's appeal. The trial court, however, again dismissed petitioners' appeal on the ground that
their record on appeal was filed out of time.
Likewise, on January 4, 1975, petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the November 19, 1974
ruling of the trial court. On March 21, 1975, this appeal was similarly denied on the ground that it
had been filed out of time.
RESPONDENTS CECILIA E. ABAD, MARIAN E. ABAD

AND
ROSEMARIE
S.
ABAD
ARE
THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN OF THE
DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
Due
to
the
dismissal
of
their
two
appeals,
petitioners
again
instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings with the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as
C.A.-G.R. No. SP-04352. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the two appeals,
prompting petitioners to appeal to the Supreme Court. On July 9, 1985, this Court directed the
trial court to give due course to petitioners' appeal from the order of November 2, 1973 declaring
private respondents heirs of the deceased Ricardo Abad, and the order dated November 19,
1974, annulling certain documents pertaining to the intestate estate of deceased.
II. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE SUBJECT

ESTATE WHETHER THE SAME IS OWNED BY THE
DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD OR BY
LUCILA DE MESA, THE MOTHER OF PETITIONERS
AND RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
We are not persuaded.
The two appeals were accordingly elevated by the trial court to the appellate court. On October
19, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is DENIED
for lack of merit. The orders of the court a quo in SP No. 86792, to wit:
1. Order dated November 2, 1973, declaring in
substance that Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie, all
surnamed Abad as the acknowledged natural children
and the only surviving heirs of the deceased Ricardo
Abad;
2. Order dated November 19, 1974, declaring in
substance that the six (6) parcels of land described in
TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 are the properties
of Ricardo Abad; that the extra-judicial partition of the
estate of the deceased Lucila de Mesa executed on
May 2, 1972 is inexistent and void from the beginning,
the cancellation of the aforementioned TCTs is null and
void; the Register of Deeds be ordered to restore
and/or issue the corresponding Certificates of Title in
the name of Ricardo Abad; and
3. Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of
Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco
from the latter Order, for being filed out of time, are all
AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against petitionerappellants.
SO ORDERED. 3
Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abad's filiation, submit the startling
theory that the husband of Honoria Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and
Marian Abad were born in 1948 and 1954, respectively.
It is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was
married to Jose Libunao, their union having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria
Nina, prior to the birth of Cecilia and Marian. But while private respondents claim that Jose
Libunao died in 1943, petitioners claim that the latter died sometime in 1971.
The date of Jose Libunao's death is important, for if he was still alive in 1971, and given that he
was legally married to Honoria Empaynado, the presumption would be that Cecilia and Marian
are not Ricardo Abad's children with the latter, but of Jose Libunao and Honoria Empaynado.
Article 256, the applicable provision of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress. 4
To bolster their theory, petitioners presented in evidence the application for enrolment at Mapua
Institute of Technology of Angelita Libunao, accomplished in 1956, which states:
Father's Name: Jose Libunao
Occupation: engineer (mining)
Mother's Name: Honoria Empaynado 5
as well as Cesar Libunao's 1958 application for enrolment at the Mapua Institute of
Technology, which states:
Petitioners now seek to annul the foregoing judgment on the following grounds:
Father's Name: Jose Libunao
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY
ERRED
IN
HOLDING
THAT
Occupation: none
Mother's Name: Honoria Empaynado 6

Petitioners claim that had Jose Libunao been dead during the time when said applications were
accomplished, the enrolment forms of his children would have stated so. These not being the
case, they conclude that Jose Libunao must have still been alive in 1956 and 1958.
Additionally, petitioners presented the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro
Ramos 7 stating that to their knowledge Jose Libunao had died in 1971, leaving as his widow,
Honoria Empaynado, and that the former had been interred at the Loyola Memorial Park.
Lastly, petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, 8 Ricardo Abad's physician,
declaring that in 1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected with
gonorrhea, and that the latter had become sterile as a consequence thereof.
With these pieces of evidence, petitioners claim that Cecilia and Marian Abad are not the
illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, but rather the legitimate children of the spouses Jose
Libunao and Honoria Empaynado.
At the outset, it must be noted that petitioners are disputing the veracity of the trial court's finding
of facts. It is a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and
confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal. 9 Petitioners, however, argue that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not binding
on this Court when there appears in the record of the case some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence which has been overlooked, or the significance of which has been misinterpreted,
that if considered, would affect the result of the case. 10
This Court finds no justifiable reason to apply this exception to the case at bar.
First, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to say
the least, far from conclusive. Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that one's parent is
"deceased" is not necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was
being accomplished. Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos as
to the supposed death of Jose Libunao in 1971 is not competent evidence to prove the latter's
death at that time, being merely secondary evidence thereof. Jose Libunao's death certificate
would have been the best evidence as to when the latter died. Petitioners have, however,
inexplicably failed to present the same, although there is no showing that said death certificate
has been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof of Jose Libunao's death. More telling,
while the records of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain Jose Bautista Libunao was
indeed buried there in 1971, this person appears to be different from Honoria Empaynado's first
husband, the latter's name being Jose Santos Libunao. Even the name of the wife is different.
Jose Bautista Libunao's wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while the wife of Jose Santos Libunao
was Honoria Empaynado.
As to Dr. Arenas' affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being privileged
communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 11 The rule on confidential
communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice
or treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and
patient existed between the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and the
physician; c) the advice or treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the
physician while professionally attending the patient; d) the information was necessary for the
performance of his professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the information would tend to
blacken the reputation of the patient. 12
Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert, however,
that the finding as to Ricardo Abad's "sterility" does not blacken the character of the deceased.
Petitioners conveniently forget that Ricardo Abad's "sterility" arose when the latter contracted
gonorrhea, a fact which most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds
virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a
sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient. We
thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence. And the same remains inadmissible in evidence,
notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad. As stated by the trial court:
In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it
was pointed out that: "The privilege of secrecy is not abolished or
terminated because of death as stated in established precedents. It is an
established rule that the purpose of the law would be thwarted and the
policy intended to be promoted thereby would be defeated, if death
removed the seal of secrecy, from the communications and disclosures
which a patient should make to his physician. After one has gone to his
grave, the living are not permitted to impair his name and disgrace his
memory by dragging to light communications and disclosures made under
the seal of the statute.
Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to establish their
claim by the quantum of evidence required by law. On the other hand, the evidence presented
by private respondents overwhelmingly prove that they are the acknowledged natural children of
Ricardo Abad. We quote with approval the trial court's decision, thus:
In his individual statements of income and assets for the calendar years
1958 and 1970, and in all his individual income tax returns for the years
1964, 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970, he has declared therein as his
legitimate wife, Honoria Empaynado; and as his legitimate dependent
children, Cecilia, Marian (except in Exh. 12) and Rosemarie Abad (Exhs. 12
to 19; TSN, February 26, 1973, pp. 33-44).
xxx xxx xxx
In December 1959, Ricardo Abad insured his daughters Cecilia, then eleven
(11) years old, and Marian, then (5) years old, on [a] twenty (20) yearendowment plan with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and paid for their
premiums (Exh. 34 and 34-A; 34-B to C; 35, 35-A to D; TSN, February 27,
1973, pp. 7-20).
In 1966, he and his daughter Cecilia Abad opened a trust fund account of
P100,000,00 with the People's Bank and Trust Company which was
renewed until (sic) 1971, payable to either of them in the event of death
(Exhs. 36-A; 36-E). On January 5, 1971, Ricardo Abad opened a trust fund
of P100,000.00 with the same bank, payable to his daughter Marian (Exh.
37-A). On January 4, 1971, Ricardo Abad and his sister Dolores Abad had
(sic) agreed to stipulate in their PBTC Trust Agreement that the 9% income
of their P100,000.00 trust fund shall (sic) be paid monthly to the account
reserved for Cecilia, under PBTC Savings Account No. 49053 in the name
of Ricardo Abad and/or Cecilia Abad (Exh. 38) where the income of the trust
fund intended for Cecilia was also deposited monthly (TSN, February 27,
1973, pp. 21-36). Ricardo Abad had also deposited (money) with the Monte
de Piedad and Savings Bank in the name of his daughter Marian,
represented by him, as father, under Savings Account 17348 which has (sic)
a balance of P34,812.28 as of June 30, 1972. (Exh. 60-B). . .
With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners
are precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother. The applicable provisions are:
Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the
illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 1003. If there are no . . . illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles. (Emphasis supplied).
As to petitioners' claim that the properties m the name of Ricardo Abad actually belong to their
mother Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and the appellate court ruled that the evidence
presented by private respondents proved that said properties in truth belong to Ricardo Abad. As
stated earlier, the findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be
disturbed on appeal, it being in a better position to examine the real evidence, as well as to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case. 13 In fact, petitioners seem to
accept this conclusion, their contention being that they are entitled to the subject estate whether
the same is owned by Ricardo Abad or by Lucila de Mesa.
Digressing from the main issue, in its decision dated October 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa
Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco on the ground that the same was filed out of time. This
affirmance is erroneous, for on July 9, 1985, this Court had already ruled that the same
was not filed out of time. Well-settled is the dictum that the rulings of the Supreme Court are
binding upon and may not be reversed by a lower court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30184 dated October 19, 1994 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the affirmance of the Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of
Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco for being filed out of time is SET ASIDE.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD
DIVISION
[G.R.
No.
91114.
September
25,
1992.]
NELLY LIM, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL D. VICTORIO, as

Presiding Judge of RTC-Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, and JUAN SIM, Respondents.
Quisumbing,
Torres
&
Evangelista
for Petitioner.
Bince, Oficiana & Dancel for Private Respondent.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This petition brings into focus the rule on the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship.
Petitioner urges this Court to strike down as being violative thereof the resolution of public
respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991 denying due course to a petition to
annul the order of the trial court allowing a Psychiatrist of the National Mental Hospital to testify
as an expert witness and not as an attending physician of petitioner.
The parties are in agreement as to the following facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner
and
private
respondent
are
lawfully
married
to
each
other.
On 25 November 1987, private respondent filed with Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground that petitioner has
been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and after the
marriage and until the present." After the issues were joined and the pre-trial was terminated,
trial on the merits ensued. Private respondent presented three (3) witnesses before taking the
witness stand himself to testify on his own behalf. On 11 January 1989, private respondents
counsel announced that he would present as his next witness the Chief of the Female Services
of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in
Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum
requiring Dr. Acampado to testify on 25 January 1989. Petitioners counsel opposed the motion
on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since the
latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be
suffering from schizophrenia. Over such opposition, the subpoena was issued on 12 January
1989.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
On 24 January 1989, petitioners counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash the subpoena
and
suspend
the
proceedings
pending
resolution
of
the
motion.
Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand on 25 January 1989, the court heard this urgent
motion. Movant argued that having seen and examined the petitioner in a professional capacity,
Dr. Acampado is barred from testifying under the rule on the confidentiality of a physician-patient
relationship. Counsel for private respondent contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be
presented as an expert witness and would not testify on any information acquired while
attending to the petitioner in a professional capacity. The trial court, per respondent Judge,
denied the motion and allowed the witness to testify. Dr. Acampado thus took the witness stand,
was qualified by counsel for private respondent as an expert witness and was asked
hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise. She neither revealed the illness she
examined and treated the petitioner for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the
medicines
she
had
prescribed.
Since petitioners counsel insisted that the ruling of the court on the motion be reduced to
writing, respondent Judge issued the following Order on the same date:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In his omnibus motion filed with the Court only yesterday, January 24, 1989, petitioner seeks to
prevent Dr. Lydia Acampado from testifying because she saw and examined respondent Nelly
Lim in her professional capacity perforce her testimony is covered by the privileged (sic)
communication
rule.
Petitioner contends that Dr. Acampado is being presented as an expert witness and that she will
not testify on any information she acquired in (sic) attending to Nelly Lim in her professional
capacity.
Based on the foregoing manifestation of counsel for petitioner, the Court denied the
respondents motion and forthwith allowed Dr. Acampado to testify. However, the Court advised
counsel for respondent to interpose his objection once it becomes apparent that the testimony
sought to
be
elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule.
On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered routinary (sic) questions to qualify her as an expert
in psychiatry; she was asked to render an opinion as to what kind of illness (sic) are stelazine
tablets applied to; she was asked to render an opinion on a (sic) hypothetical facts respecting
certain behaviours of a person; and finally she admitted she saw and treated Nelly Lim but she
never revealed what illness she examined and treated her (sic); nor (sic) the result of her
examination
of
Nelly
Lim,
nor
(sic)
the
medicines
she
prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the omnibus motion dated January 19, 1989 is hereby DENIED." 1
On 3 March 1989, petitioner filed with the public respondent Court of Appeals a petition 2
forcertiorari and prohibition, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991, to annul the aforesaid
order of respondent Judge on the ground that the same was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and to prohibit him from proceeding with the
reception
of
Dr. Acampados
testimony.chanrobles.com
:
virtual
law
library
On 18 September 1989, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution 3 denying due course to
the petition on the ground that "the petitioner failed in establishing the confidential nature of the
testimony given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado when she testified on January 25, 1989."
Hence, the respondent Judge committed no grave abuse of discretion. In support thereof, the
respondent Court discussed the conditions which would render as inadmissible testimonial
evidence between a physician and his patient under paragraph (c), Section 24, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court and made the following findings:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The present suit is a civil case for annulment of marriage and the person whose testimony is
sought to be stopped as a privileged communication is a physician, who was summoned by the
patient in her professional capacity for curative remedy or treatment. The divergence in views is
whether the information given by the physician in her testimony in open court on January 25,
1989 was a privileged communication. We are of the opinion that they do not fall within the realm
of a privileged communication because the information were (sic) not obtained from the patient
while attending her in her professional capacity and neither were (sic) the information necessary
to enable the physician to prescribe or give treatment to the patient Nelly Lim. And neither does
the information obtained from the physician tend to blacken the character of the patient or bring
disgrace to her or invite reproach. Dr. Acampado is a Medical Specialist II and in-charge (sic) of
the Female Service of the National Center for Mental Health a fellow of the Philippine
Psychiatrist Association and a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatrists. She was
summoned to testify as an expert witness and not as an attending physician of petitioner.
After a careful scrutiny of the transcript of Dr. Acampados testimony, We find no declaration that
touched (sic) or disclosed any information which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim,
during the period she attended her patient in a professional capacity. Although she testified that
she examined and interviewed the patient, she did not disclose anything she obtained in the
course of her examination, interview and treatment of her patient. Given a set of facts and asked
a hypothetical question, Dr. Acampado rendered an opinion regarding the history and behaviour
of the fictitious character in the hypothetical problem. The facts and conditions alleged in the
hypothetical problem did not refer and (sic) had no bearing to (sic) whatever information or
findings the doctor obtained from attending the (sic) patient. A physician is not disqualified to
testify as an expert concerning a patients ailment, when he can disregard knowledge acquired
in attending such patient and make answer solely on facts related in (sic) the hypothetical
question. (Butler v. Role, 242 Pac. 436; Supreme Court of Arizona Jan. 7, 1926). Expert
testimony of a physician based on hypothetical question (sic) as to cause of illness of a person
whom he has attended is not privileged, provided the physician does not give testimony tending
to disclose confidential information related to him in his professional capacity while attending to
the patient. (Crago v. City of Cedar Rapids, 98 NW 354, see Jones on Evidence, Vol. 3, p. 843,
3rd
Ed.).
The rule on privilege (sic) communication in the relation of physician and patient proceeds from
the fundamental assumption that the communication to deserve protection must be confidential
in their origin. Confidentiality is not to be blindly implied from the mere relation of physician and
patient. It might be implied according to circumstances of each case, taking into consideration
the nature of the ailment and the occasion of the consultation. The claimant of the privilege has
the burden of establishing in each instance all the facts necessary to create the privilege,
including
the
confidential
nature
of
the
information
given."
4
Her motion to reconsider the resolution having been denied, petitioner took this recourse under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In her view, the respondent Court of Appeals "seriously
erred" :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"I.
. . . in not finding that all the essential elements of the rule on physician-patient privileged
communication under Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 24, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence) exist in the case at bar.
II.
. . . in believing that Dr. Acampado was summoned as an expert witness and not as an
attending physician of petitioner.
III.
. . . in concluding that Dr. Acampado made no declaration that touched (sic) or disclosed any
information which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim, during the period she attended
her patient in a professional capacity.
IV.
. . . in declaring that the petitioner failed in establishing the confidential nature of the testimony
given
by
or
obtained
from
Dr.
Acampado."
5
We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda 6 after the private respondent filed his Comment 7 and the petitioner submitted her
reply 8 thereto. The parties subsequently filed their separate Memoranda.
In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must
concur:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1.
the
privilege
is
claimed
in
civil
case;
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery
or
obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional
capacity;
4.
the
information
was
necessary
to
enable
him
to
act
in
that
capacity;
and
The petition is devoid of any merit. Respondent Court of Appeals committed no reversible error
in
its
challenged
resolution.
5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly
character)
of
the
patient."
14
The law in point is paragraph (c), Section 24 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the
establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons

cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
x
x
x
"1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the
relation
between
the
parties.
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without
the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any
information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity,
which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken
the
reputation
of
the
patient." chanrobles
virtual
lawlibrary
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered
This is a reproduction of paragraph (c), Section 21, Rule 130 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court
with two (2) modifications, namely: (a) the inclusion of the phrase "advice or treatment given by
him," and (b) substitution of the word reputation for the word character. Said Section 21 in turn is
a reproduction of paragraph (f), Section 26, Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court with a
modification consisting in the change of the phrase "which would tend to blacken" in the latter to
"would blacken." 9 Verily, these changes affected the meaning of the provision. Under the 1940
Rules of Court, it was sufficient if the information would tend to blacken the character of the
patient. In the 1964 Rules of Court, a stricter requirement was imposed; it was imperative that
the information would blacken such character. With the advent of the Revised Rules on
Evidence on 1 July 1989, the rule was relaxed once more by the substitution of the word
character with the word reputation. There is a distinction between these two concepts."
Character is what a man is, and reputation is what he is supposed to be in what people say he
is.Character depends on attributes possessed, and reputation on attributes which others
believe one to possess. The former signifies reality and the latter merely what is accepted to be
reality
at
present."
10
The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to
the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would
have been made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are
covered by the privilege. 16 It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication
that is privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a
consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so
long
as
the
subject
communicated
is
not
stated."
17
This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and
confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms,
untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on
the witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled
safely and efficaciously to treat his patient. 11 It rests in public policy and is for the general
interest
of
the
community.
12
Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is
made
to
the
physicians
testimony.
13
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." 15
One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned requisites. 18
Our careful evaluation of the submitted pleadings leads Us to no other course of action but to
agree with the respondent Courts observation that the petitioner failed to discharge that burden.
In the first place, Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. As correctly
held by the Court of Appeals, she did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her
examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner; moreover, the facts and conditions
alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing on whatever information
or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing that
Dr. Acampados answers to the questions propounded to her relating to the hypothetical problem
were influenced by the information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert
opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which was
acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert
witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded. The rule on this point is
summarized
as
follows:chanrobles
virtual
lawlibrary
"The predominating view, with some scant authority otherwise, is that the statutory physicianpatient privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated by permitting a physician to give expert
opinion testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the

physical mental condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where his opinion is
based strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal
professional knowledge he may have concerning such patient. But in order to avoid the bar of
the physician-patient privilege where it is asserted in such a case, the physician must base his
opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized in the question, excluding from consideration his
personal knowledge of the patient acquired through the physician and patient relationship. If he
cannot or does not exclude from consideration his personal professional knowledge of the
patients condition he should not be permitted to testify as to his expert opinion." 19
Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampados testimony that the petitioner was never
interviewed alone. Said interviews were always conducted in the presence of a third party,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Finally, while it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for the
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for the
quashal of the said subpoena a day before the witness was to testify, the petitioner makes no
claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel had objected to any question asked of the witness
on the ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the privilege, despite the trial courts
advise that said counsel may interpose his objection to the testimony "once it becomes apparent
that the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule." The
particular portions of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in the
petitioners Petition 23 and Memorandum, 24 and in the private respondents Memorandum, 25
do not at all show that any objections were interposed. Even granting ex gratia that the
testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the failure to seasonably object
thereto
amounted
to
a
waiver
thereof.
"Q
WHEREFORE,
am
asking
you,
doctor,
whom
did
you
interview?
A I interviewed the husband first, then the father and after having the history, I interviewed the
patient,
Nelly.
the
instant
Costs
petition
is
DENIED
for
against
lack
of
merit.
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Q
How
many
times
did
Juan
Sim
and
Nelly
Lim
go
to
your
office?
A Now, the two (2) of them came three (3) times. As I have stated before, once in the month of
April of 1987 and two (2) times for the month of June 1987, and after that, since July of 1987, it
was the father of Nelly, Dr. Lim, who was bringing Nelly to me until November of 1987.
Q
Now,
Dr.
Lim
is
Yes,
fellow
physician?
understand.
Q Was there anything that he told you when he visited with you in a clinic?
A I would say that there was none. Even if I asked information about Nelly, I could not get
anything
from
Dr.
Lim.
G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994

MA.
PAZ
FERNANDEZ
KROHN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR KROHN, JR., respondents.
Cruz, Durian, Agabin, Atienza, Alday and Tuason for petitioner.
Oscar F. Martinez for private respondent.
Q Now, when Dr. Lim and his daughter went to your clinic, was there any doctor who was also
present
during
that
interview?
A
No,
sir,
dont
remember
any."
20
There is authority to the effect that information elicited during consultation with a physician in the
presence of third parties removes such information from the mantle of the
privilege:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Some courts have held that the casual presence of a third person destroys the confidential
nature of the communication between doctor and patient and thus destroys the privilege, and
that under such circumstances the doctor may testify. Other courts have reached a contrary
result."
21
Thirdly, except for the petitioners sweeping claim that" (T)he information given by Dr.
Acampado brings disgrace and invite (sic) reproach to petitioner by falsely making it appear in
the eyes of the trial court and the public that the latter was suffering from a mental disturbance
called schizophrenia which caused, and continues to cause, irreparable injury to the name
and reputation of petitioner and her family," 22 which is based on a wrong premise, nothing
specific or concrete was offered to show that indeed, the information obtained from Dr.
Acampado would blacken the formers "character" (or "reputation"). Dr. Acampado never
disclosed any information obtained from the petitioner regarding the latters ailment and the
treatment
recommended
therefor.chanrobles.com
:
virtual
law
library
BELLOSILLO, J.:
A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence before the
trial court in a petition for annulment of marriage grounded on psychological
incapacity. The witness testifying on the report is the husband who initiated the
annulment proceedings, not the physician who prepared the report.
The subject of the evaluation report, Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, invoking the rule on
privileged communication between physician and patient, seeks to enjoin her
husband from disclosing the contents of the report. After failing to convince the trial
court and the appellate court, she is now before us on a petition for review
oncertiorari.
On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married at the
Saint Vincent de Paul Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The union produced three
children, Edgar Johannes, Karl Wilhelm and Alexandra. Their blessings
notwithstanding, the relationship between the couple developed into a stormy one. In
1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the
marital strain. The effort however proved futile. In 1973, they finally separated in fact.
On 4 June 1991, the trial court issued an Order admitting the Confidential Psychiatric
Evaluation Report in evidence and ruling that
Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Pasig, Br. II, issued an order granting the voluntary dissolution of the
conjugal partnership.
. . . the Court resolves to overrule the objection and to sustain the

Opposition to the respondent's Motion; first, because the very issue
in this case is whether or not the respondent had been suffering
from psychological incapacity; and secondly, when the said
psychiatric report was referred to in the complaint, the respondent
did not object thereto on the ground of the supposed privileged
communication between patient and physician. What was raised by
the respondent was that the said psychiatric report was irrelevant.
So, the Court feels that in the interest of justice and for the purpose
of determining whether the respondent as alleged in the petition
was suffering from psychological incapacity, the said psychiatric
report is very material and may be testified to by petitioner (Edgar
Krohn, Jr.) without prejudice on the part of the respondent to
dispute the said report or to cross-examination first the petitioner
and later the psychiatrist who prepared the same if the latter will be
presented. 9
On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma.
Paz before the trial court. 3In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric
Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer as "either unfounded
or irrelevant." 4
On 27 November 1991, the trial court denied the Motion to Reconsider Order dated
June 4, 1991, and directed that the Statement for the Record filed by Ma. Paz be
stricken off the record. A subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by her counsel
was likewise denied.
At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the
contents of the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was objected to on
the ground that it violated the rule on privileged communication between physician
and patient. Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation expressing her "continuing
objection" to any evidence, oral or documentary, "that would thwart the physicianpatient privileged communication rule," 5 and thereafter submitted a Statement for the
Record asserting among others that "there is no factual or legal basis whatsoever for
petitioner (Edgar) to claim 'psychological incapacity' to annul their marriage, such
ground being completely false, fabricated and merely an afterthought." 6 Before
leaving for Spain where she has since resided after their separation, Ma. Paz also
authorized and instructed her counsel to oppose the suit and pursue her counterclaim
even during her absence.
Counsel of Ma. Paz then elevated the issue to respondent Court of Appeals. In a
Decision promulgated 30 October 1992, the appellate court dismissed the petition
for certiorari. 10 On 5 February 1993, the motion to reconsider the dismissal was
likewise denied. Hence, the instant petition for review.
In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma.
Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. On 2
November 1978, presenting the report among others, he obtained a decree
("Conclusion") from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his
church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera
conjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent at the time of the wedding and
thereafter." 1 On 10 July 1979, the decree was confirmed and pronounced "Final and
Definite." 2
On 29 May 1991, Edgar opposed Ma. Paz' motion to disallow the introduction of the
confidential psychiatric report as evidence, 7 and afterwards moved to strike out Ma.
Paz' Statement for the Record. 8
Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation and disclosure of the contents of the
psychiatric report and prays for the admission of her Statement for the Record to form
part
of
the
records
of
the
case.
She
argues
that
since
Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court 11 prohibits a physician from
testifying on matters which he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a
professional capacity, "WITH MORE REASON should be third person (like
respondent-husband in this particular instance) be PROHIBITED from testifying on
privileged matters between a physician and patient or from submitting any medical
report, findings or evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired as
a result of his confidential and privileged relation with a patient." 12 She says that the
reason behind the prohibition is
. . . to facilitate and make safe, full and confidential disclosure by a

patient to his physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms,
untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced
disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the
physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and
efficaciously to treat his patient. 13
She further argues that to allow her husband to testify on the contents of the
psychiatric evaluation report "will set a very bad and dangerous precedent because it
abets circumvention of the rule's intent in preserving the sanctity, security and
confidence to the relation of physician and his patient." 14 Her thesis is that what
cannot be done directly should not be allowed to be done indirectly.
Petitioner submits that her Statement for the Record simply reiterates under oath
what she asserted in her Answer, which she failed to verify as she had already left for
Spain when her Answer was filed. She maintains that her "Statement for the Record
is a plain and simple pleading and is not as it has never been intended to take the
place of her testimony;" 15 hence, there is no factual and legal basis whatsoever to
expunge it from the records.
Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that "the rules are very
explicit: the prohibition applies only to a physician. Thus . . . the legal prohibition to
testify is not applicable to the case at bar where the person sought to be barred from
testifying on the privileged communication is the husband and not the physician of the
petitioner." 16 In fact, according to him, the Rules sanction his testimony considering
that a husband may testify against his wife in a civil case filed by one against the
other.
Besides, private respondent submits that privileged communication may be waived by
the person entitled thereto, and this petitioner expressly did when she gave her
unconditional consent to the use of the psychiatric evaluation report when it was
presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale which took it into account
among others in deciding the case and declaring their marriage null and void. Private
respondent further argues that petitioner also gave her implied consent when she
failed to specifically object to the admissibility of the report in her Answer where she
merely described the evaluation report as "either unfounded or irrelevant." At any
rate, failure to interpose a timely objection at the earliest opportunity to the evidence
presented on privileged matters may be construed as an implied waiver.
With regard to the Statement for the Record filed by petitioner, private respondent
posits that this in reality is an amendment of her Answer and thus should comply with
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, hence, its exclusion from the records for
failure to comply with the Rules is proper.
The treatise presented by petitioner on the privileged nature of the communication

between physician and patient, as well as the reasons therefor, is not doubted.
Indeed, statutes making communications between physician and patient privileged
are intended to inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him to make a full
disclosure to his physician of his symptoms and condition. 17 Consequently, this
prevents the physician from making public information that will result in humiliation,
embarrassment, or disgrace to the patient. 18 For, the patient should rest assured with
the knowledge that the law recognizes the communication as confidential, and guards
against the possibility of his feelings being shocked or his reputation tarnished by
their subsequent disclosure. 19 The physician-patient privilege creates a zone of
privacy, intended to preclude the humiliation of the patient that may follow the
disclosure of his ailments. Indeed, certain types of information communicated in the
context of the physician-patient relationship fall within the constitutionally protected
zone of privacy, 20 including a patient's interest in keeping his mental health records
confidential. 21 Thus, it has been observed that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is
founded upon the notion that certain forms of antisocial behavior may be prevented
by encouraging those in need of treatment for emotional problems to secure the
services of a psychotherapist.
Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however misplaced. Lim v. Court of
Appeals 22 clearly lays down the requisites in order that the privilege may be
successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against
whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the
patient in his professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary to enable him
to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed,
would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient.
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's
husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners.
Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his
testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony
cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the
patient and executed the report.
Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private
respondent on the ground that it was privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial
court dated 10 May 1991, he invoked the rule on privileged communications but never
questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to
the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make
such objection and, consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.
The other issue raised by petitioner is too trivial to merit the full attention of this Court.
The allegations contained in the Statement for the Records are but refutations of
private respondent's declarations which may be denied or disproved during the trial.
The instant appeal has taken its toll on the petition for annulment. Three years have
already lapsed and private respondent herein, as petitioner before the trial court, has
yet to conclude his testimony thereat. We thus enjoin the trial judge and the parties'
respective counsel to act with deliberate speed in resolving the main action, and
avoid any and all stratagems that may further delay this case. If all lawyers are
allowed to appeal every perceived indiscretion of a judge in the course of trial and
include in their appeals depthless issues, there will be no end to litigations, and the
docket of appellate courts will forever be clogged with inconsequential cases. Hence,
counsel should exercise prudence in appealing lower court rulings and raise only
legitimate issues so as not to retard the resolution of cases. Indeed, there is no point
in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the petition and prolonging the agony of the
wedded couple who after coming out from a storm still have the right to a renewed
blissful life either alone or in the company of each other. 23
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on 30 October 1992 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 131636
March 5, 2003
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
ARTEMIO INVENCION Y SORIANO, appellant.
PHILIPPINES, appellee,
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Before us for automatic review1 is the Decision2 dated 22 September 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 9375, finding
accused-appellant Artemio Invencion y Soriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape committed against his 16-year-old daughter Cynthia P. Invencion, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay Cynthia the sum of P50,000
as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit.
Artemio was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac with thirteen counts of
rape in separate complaints docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9363 to 9375, all dated
17 October 1996. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At his arraignment
Artemio entered a plea of not guilty in each case.
The witnesses presented by the prosecution in its evidence in chief were Elven
Invencion, Eddie Sicat, Gloria Pagala, Dr. Rosario Fider, and Atty. Florencio Canlas.
Presented as rebuttal witnesses were Gloria Pagala and Celestino Navarro.
Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two pupil of Sapang Tagalog Elementary School
in Tarlac, Tarlac, testified that he is a half-brother of Cynthia and son of Artemio with
his second common-law wife. Sometime before the end of the school year in 1996,
while he was sleeping in one room with his father Artemio, Cynthia, and two other
younger brothers, he was awakened by Cynthias loud cries. Looking towards her, he
saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing a pumping motion. After about two minutes,
his father put on his short pants.3
Elven further declared that Artemio was a very strict and cruel father and a drunkard.
He angrily prohibited Cynthia from entertaining any of her suitors. Whenever he was
drunk, he would maul Elven and quarrel with his stepfather, Celestino Navarro.4
Eddie Sicat, a 40-year-old farmer and neighbor of Artemio in Barangay Sapang

Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac, testified that on the second week of March 1996, between
6:00 and 7:00 a.m., while he was passing by the house of Artemio on his way to the
field to catch fish, he heard somebody crying. He then peeped through a small
opening in the destroyed portion of the sawali wall of Artemios house. He saw
Cynthia lying on her back and crying, while her father was on top of her, doing a
pumping motion. Eddie observed them for about fifteen seconds, and then he left and
proceeded to the field to catch fish.5 He reported what he had witnessed to Artemios
stepfather, Celestino, later that morning.6
Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia and former common-law wife of Artemio,
testified that she and Artemio started living together in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, in
February 1969. Out of their common-law relationship, they had six children, one of
whom was Cynthia. In March 1982, she and Artemio parted ways permanently. Later,
Gloria and her children lived in Pura, Tarlac. When Artemios mother died sometime in
1996, Cynthia lived with Artemio in a small one-room dwelling owned by Celestino
and located in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac.7 On 30 August 1996, her
son Novelito told her that Cynthia was pregnant. Gloria then went to the house of
Artemio and asked Cynthia about her condition. The latter confessed that she had
been sexually abused by her father. Gloria then went to the office of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Tarlac and reported what Artemio had done to their
daughter Cynthia.8
Dr. Rosario Fider of Tarlac Provincial Hospital testified that she examined Cynthia on
16 September 1996. She found Cynthia to be five to six months pregnant and to have
incomplete, healed hymenal lacerations at 3, 5, 8 oclock positions, which could have
been caused by sexual intercourse or any foreign body inserted in her private part.9
Atty. Florencio Canlas, an NBI agent, testified that on 18 September 1996, Cynthia,
accompanied by her mother, complained before him and NBI Supervising Agent
Rolando Vergara that she was raped by her father Artemio. She then executed a
written statement,10 which she subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Canlas.11
The defense did not present Artemio as a witness. Instead, his counsel de parte, Atty.
Isabelo Salamida, took the witness stand and testified for the defense. He declared
that on 24 June 1997 (the same day when he testified before the court), between
10:45 and 11:00 a.m., he and his secretary went to the house of Artemio in Barangay
Sapang Tagalog. The hut was made of sawali. Its door was padlocked, and its
windows were shut. When he went around the house and tried to peep through the
old sawali walls on the front and left and right sides of the hut, he could not see
anything inside the room where Artemio and his children used to sleep. Although it
was then about noontime, it was dark inside. 12 Atty. Salamida then concluded that
prosecution witness Eddie Sicat was not telling the truth when he declared having
seen what Artemio did to Cynthia when he peeped through a small opening in the
sawali wall of the house in the early morning sometime on the second week of March
1996.
On rebuttal, Gloria Pagala testified that the house where Artemio used to live was a
small hut with some destroyed portions in its sawali walls. When she went there to
visit her children sometime in December 1995, there was a hole in front and at the
sidewall of the hut facing a vacant lot where people passed by to fish in a nearby
brook.13 When she went to the place again sometime in September 1996 after she
was informed of Cynthias pregnancy, she noticed that the destroyed portions of the
huts sawali walls were not yet repaired.14
The second rebuttal witness Celestino Navarro, stepfather of Artemio, testified that he
is the owner of the small house where Artemio and his children used to reside. At the
time that Artemio and his children, including Cynthia, were living in that house, the
huts old sawali walls had some small holes in them, thus confirming the testimony of
Eddie Sicat. After Artemio was arrested on the basis of Cynthias complaint before the
NBI, Celestino made some repairs in the hut by, among other things, placing
galvanized iron sheets to cover the holes at the destroyed portions of the sawali
walls. Thereafter, a person named Alvin occupied the house.15
In its Decision of 22 September 1997, the trial court convicted Artemio in Criminal
Case No. 9375. It, however, acquitted him in all the other twelve cases for lack of
evidence.
In his Appellants Brief, Artemio contends that the trial court erred in
I
x x x BELIEVING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES;
II
x x xNOT DISMISSING THIS CASE FOR FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE [HIS] GUILT x x x BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
Artemio attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that
Elven, as his son, should have been disqualified as a witness against him under
Section 20(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 16 Besides, Elvens testimony appears
not to be his but what the prosecution wanted him to say, as the questions asked
were mostly leading questions. Moreover, Elven had ill-motive in testifying against
him, as he (Artemio) was cruel to him.
In another attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses,
Artemio points to the following inconsistencies in their testimonies: (1) as to the time
of the commission of the crime, Elven testified having seen Artemio on top of his
sister one night in March 1996, while Eddie Sicat testified having seen them in the
same position between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. in the second week of March 1996; (2) as
to the residence of Cynthia in 1996, Gloria testified that the former was living with her
in Guimba from November 1995 to September 1996, while Elven and Eddie declared
that she was in Sapang Tagalog in March 1996; and (3) as to the residence of
Artemio, Jr., Gloria stated that he was living with the appellant, but later she declared
that he was living with her in Pura.
Artemio also argues that since his house had no electricity and was dark even at
daytime, it was impossible for Elven and Eddie to see him allegedly doing pumping
motion on top of Cynthia. In his Reply Brief, he likewise urges us to disregard the
testimonies of rebuttal witnesses Celestino and Gloria. According to him, Celestino
had an ax to grind against him (Artemio) because he had been badgering Celestino
for his share of the lot where the hut stands, which was owned by Artemios deceased
mother. On the other hand, Gloria wanted to get rid of Artemio because she was
already cohabiting with another man.
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the
affirmation of Artemios conviction and sentence, but recommends that a civil
indemnity in the amount of P75,000 be awarded in addition to the awards of moral
and exemplary damages.
We find no cogent reason to overturn the findings of the trial court on the culpability of
Artemio.
It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the
credibility of the witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal. This is so because the trial court has the advantage of observing
the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the
angry flush of an insisted assertion, the sudden pallor of a discovered lie, the
tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer, the forthright tone of a ready reply, the furtive
glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the yawn, the sigh, the candor
or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, or the carriage and
mien.17 This rule, however, admits of exceptions, as where there exists a fact or
circumstance of weight and influence that has been ignored or misconstrued by the
court, or where the trial court has acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of the facts. 18 We
do not find any of these exceptions in the case at bar.
As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected by Section
25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, 19 otherwise known as the rule on "filial privilege."
This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is not
incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant. 20 The rule refers to a
privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges. As
correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his
father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against
Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his
own accord and only "to tell the truth."21
Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecutions act of propounding leading questions
on Elven. Section 10(c) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court 22 expressly allows leading
questions when the witness is a child of tender years like Elven.
The alleged ulterior motive of Elven in testifying against his father also deserves scant
consideration. Such insinuation of ill-motive is too lame and flimsy. As observed by
the OSG, Elven, who was of tender age, could not have subjected himself to the
ordeal of a public trial had he not been compelled by a motive other than to bring to
justice the despoiler of his sisters virtue. There is no indication that Elven testified
because of anger or any ill-motive against his father, nor is there any showing that he
was unduly pressured or influenced by his mother or by anyone to testify against his
father. The rule is that where there is no evidence that the principal witness for the
prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so
actuated and his testimony is entitled to full credence.23
We find as inconsequential the alleged variance or difference in the time that the rape
was committed, i.e., during the night as testified to by Elven, or between 6:00 and
7:00 a.m. per the testimony of Eddie. The exact time or date of the commission of
rape is not an element of the crime. What is decisive in a rape charge is that the
commission of the rape by the accused has been sufficiently proved. Inconsistencies
and discrepancies as to minor matters irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot
be considered grounds for acquittal.24 In this case, we believe that the crime of rape
was, indeed, committed as testified to by Elven and Eddie.
The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of both Elven and Gloria do not impair
the credibility of these witnesses. We agree with the trial court that they are minor
inconsistencies, which do not affect the credibility of the witnesses. We have held in a
number of cases that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses that refer to
minor and insignificant details do not destroy the witnesses credibility. 25 On the
contrary, they may even be considered badges of veracity or manifestations of
truthfulness on the material points in the testimonies. What is important is that the
testimonies agree on essential facts and substantially corroborate a consistent and
coherent whole.26
Artemios allegation that it was impossible for both Elven and Eddie to have seen and
witnessed the crime because the room was dark even at daytime was convincingly
disputed by rebuttal witnesses Gloria Pagala and Celestino Navarro. Furthermore, as
observed by the OSG, even if the hut was without electricity, Elven could not have
been mistaken in his identification of Artemio because he had known the latter for a
long time. Moreover, Elven was at the time only two meters away from Cynthia and
Artemio. Even without sufficient illumination, Elven, who was jostled out of his sleep
by Cynthias loud cry, could observe the pumping motion made by his father.27
The alleged ill-motives on the part of Gloria and Celestino were not sufficiently
proved. Nothing in the records suggests any reason that would motivate Gloria to
testify falsely against Artemio, who is the father of her other children. Moreover, we
have repeatedly held that no mother would subject her child to the humiliation,
disgrace, and trauma attendant to the prosecution for rape if she were not motivated
solely by the desire to have the person responsible for her childs defilement
incarcerated.28 As for Celestino, he testified that the lot where the hut stands is owned
by his daughter Erlinda, and not by Artemios mother.29 At any rate, even without
Celestinos testimony, Artemios conviction would stand.
The remaining issue for our resolution is the correctness of the penalty of death
imposed by the trial court. The death penalty was imposed because of the trial courts
appreciation of the special qualifying circumstances that Artemio is the father of the
victim and the latter was less than 18 years old at the time the crime was committed.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, which is the
governing law in this case, pertinently reads:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
To justify the imposition of the death penalty in a rape committed by a father on a

daughter, the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender, which are
special qualifying circumstances, must be alleged in the complaint or information and
proved by the prosecution during the trial by the quantum of proof required for
conviction. The accusatory portion of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 9375 reads
as follows:
That on or about the month of March 1996 at Sapang Tagalog, Municipality
of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Artemio S. Invencion did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by using force and intimidation have
carnal knowledge of his daughter Cynthia P. Invencion who was sixteen (16)
years old, in their house.
CONTRARY TO LAW.30
Although the relationship of Cynthia with her father Artemio was alleged in the
complaint and duly established by evidence during trial, the allegation in the
complaint regarding her age was not clearly proved.
In the very recent case of People v. Pruna,31 we set the guidelines in appreciating age
either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents
such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth
of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been
lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and
credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such
as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section
40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is

sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the
testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the
complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac, Tarlac, in
Criminal Case No. 9375 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that that accused
Artemio Invencion y Soriano is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the
crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to pay the victim Cynthia Invencion the sums of P50,000 as indemnity; P50,000 as
moral damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of
the victim.
In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was
presented and offered in evidence to prove Cynthias age. The statement in the
medical certificate showing Cynthias age is not proof thereof, since a medical
certificate does not authenticate the date of birth of the victim. Moreover, pursuant
to Pruna, Glorias testimony regarding Cynthias age was insufficient, since Cynthia
was alleged to be 16 years old already at the time of the rape and what is sought to
be proved is that she was then 18 years old. Moreover, the trial court did not even
make a categorical finding on Cynthias minority. Finally, the silence of Artemio or his
failure to object to the testimonial evidence regarding Cynthias age could not be
taken against him.
It must be stressed that the severity of death penalty, especially its irreversible and
final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses
aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence. 32 Accordingly, in
the absence of sufficient proof of Cynthias minority, Artemio cannot be convicted of
qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. He should only be convicted
of simple rape and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As regards the civil liability of Artemio, the awards of moral damages in the amount of
P50,000 and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000 are insufficient. Civil
indemnity, which is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape, 33 should also be
awarded. In simple rape, the civil indemnity for the victim shall not be less than
P50,000.
G.R. No. 136051
June 8, 2006
ALFREDO P. ROSETE, OSCAR P. MAPALO and CHITO P. ROSETE, Petitioners,

vs.
JULIANO LIM and LILIA LIM, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45400 dated 24 August 1998
which upheld the Orders of Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City in Civil Case No. Q-95-25803 dated 22 July 19972 and 27 August 1997,3 allowing
the taking of deposition upon oral examination of petitioners Oscar P. Mapalo and
Chito P. Rosete, and its Resolution4 dated 19 October 1998 denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.
Relevant to the petition are the following antecedents:
On 5 December 1995, respondents Juliano Lim and Lilia Lim filed before Branch 77
of the RTC of Quezon City a Complaint for Annulment, Specific Performance with
Damages against AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS),
Espreme Realty and Development Corporation (Espreme Realty), Alfredo P. Rosete,
Maj. Oscar Mapalo, Chito P. Rosete, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), and
Register of Deeds of the Province of Mindoro Occidental, docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-95-25803.5 It asked, among other things, that the Deed of Sale executed by AFPRSBS covering certain parcels of lands in favor of Espreme Realty and the titles
thereof under the name of the latter be annulled; and that the AFP-RSBS and
Espreme Realty be ordered to execute the necessary documents to restore
ownership and title of said lands to respondents, and that the Register of Deeds be
ordered to cancel the titles of said land under the name of Espreme Realty and to
transfer the same in the names of respondents.
On 18 January 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit and that venue
has been improperly laid.6 A Supplemental Motion to Dismiss was filed by petitioner
Alfredo P. Rosete on 23 January 1996.7 Respondents opposed the Motion to Dismiss
filed by petitioners8 to which petitioners filed their Reply.9 Respondents filed a
Comment on the Reply.10AFP-RSBS,11 Espreme Realty,12 and, BPI13 filed their
respective Motions to Dismiss which respondents opposed.
In an Order dated 12 March 1996, the Motions to Dismiss filed by all the defendants
were denied.14 The Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners15 and BPI,16 which
respondents opposed,17 were also denied in an Order dated 24 May 1996.18
On 6 June 1996, BPI filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Crossclaim19 to
which
respondents
filed
their
Reply
and
Answer
to
Counterclaim.20 Respondents also filed a Motion21 to Serve Supplemental Allegation
against BPI and petitioner Chito Rosete which the trial court granted in an order dated
28 July 1996.22
On 7 June 1996, petitioners manifested that on 5 June 1996, they filed a Petition 23 for
Certiorari and Prohibition in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
40837, challenging the trial courts Orders dated 12 March 1996 and 24 May 1996
that denied their Motions to Dismiss and Reconsideration, respectively.24 They
likewise informed the trial court that on 6 June 1996, they filed an Ex-Parte
Motion25 to Admit Answers Ex Abudanti Cautela.26lavvphi1.net
On 7 August 1996, petitioner Chito Rosete filed a motion asking that the order
granting the Motion to Serve Supplemental Allegation against BPI and him be
reconsidered and set aside, and that respondents be ordered to reduce their
supplemental allegations in the form and manner required by the Rules of
Court.27 Same was denied in an order dated 12 August 1996.28 This denial was
appealed to the Court of Appeals on 26 August 1996, which was docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 41821.29
Petitioner Chito Rosete filed his Supplemental Answer (Ex Abudanti Cautela) on 9
September 1996.30
On 28 May 1997, respondents filed a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral
Examination giving notice that on June 18 and 20, 1997 at 9:00 a.m., they will cause
the deposition of petitioners Oscar Mapalo and Chito Rosete.31
On 13 June 1997, petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion and Objection to Take
Deposition Upon Oral Examination.32 They argued that the deposition may not be
taken without leave of court as no answer has yet been served and the issues have
not yet been joined since their Answer was filed ex abudanti cautela, pending
resolution of the Petition for Certiorari challenging the orders dated 12 March 1996
and 24 May 1996 that denied their Motions to Dismiss and for Reconsideration,
respectively. This is in addition to the fact that they challenged via a Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals the lower courts Orders dated 23 July 1996
and 12 August 1996 which, respectively, granted respondents Motion to Serve
Supplemental Allegation Against Defendants BPI and Chito Rosete, and for the latter
to plead thereto, and denied Chito Rosetes Motion for Reconsideration of the order
dated 23 July 1996. Moreover, they contend that since there are two criminal cases
pending before the City Prosecutors of Mandaluyong City and Pasig City involving the
same set of facts as in the present case wherein respondent Juliano Lim is the private
complainant and petitioners are the respondents, to permit the taking of the
deposition would be violative of their right against self-incrimination because by

means of the oral deposition, respondents would seek to establish the allegations of
fact in the complaint which are also the allegations of fact in the complaint-affidavits in
the said criminal cases.
In an Order dated 11 December 1997, the lower court denied petitioners urgent exparte omnibus motion.48 On even date, the ex-parte presentation of evidence against
petitioners Mapalo and Chito Rosete was terminated.49
Respondents filed their Comment on the Objection to Deposition Taking to which

petitioners filed their Reply.34
On 10 February 1998, petitioners filed a Petition 50 for Certiorari and Prohibition before
the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 46774) questioning the lower courts Orders
dated 29 October 1997 and 11 December 1997.51
In an Order dated 22 July 1997, the lower court denied petitioners motion and
objection to take deposition upon oral examination, and scheduled the taking
thereof.35 On 7 August 1997, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.36 They
filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on 11 August 1997.37
On 24 August 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition, and upheld the Orders of the lower court dated 22 July 1997 and 27
August 1997 (CA-G.R. SP No. 45400). 52 The Motion for Reconsideration53 which was
opposed54 by respondents was denied on 19 October 1998.55
On 13 August 1997, petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Cancel or Suspend

the Taking of the Deposition Upon Oral Examination.38
Petitioners assail the ruling of the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review on
Certiorari. They anchor their petition on the following grounds:
In an Order dated 27 August 1997, the lower court denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, and scheduled the
taking of the Deposition Upon Oral Examination.39
I.
33
On 22 September1997, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion: (1) To Strike Out

Answer of Defendants Mapalo and Chito Rosete; (2) to Declare Defendants Mapalo
and Chito Rosete In Default; and (3) For Reception of Plaintiffs Evidence Exparte,40 which petitioners opposed.41
On 29 September 1997, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition (CA-G.R. SP No. 45400) assailing the Orders of the lower
court dated 22 July 1997 and 27 August 1997.42
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DECLARING IN
ITS ORDER DATED AUGUST 27, 1997 THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION OF OSCAR MAPALO AND CHITO ROSETE
WOULD NOT BE VIOLATED BY THE TAKING OF THEIR DEPOSITION IN THE
CIVIL CASE FILED IN THE LOWER COURT ALTHOUGH THEY ARE ALSO
RESPONDENTS OR DEFENDANTS IN THE AFOREMENTIONED CRIMINAL
CASES FILED BY HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENT JULIANO LIM INVOLVING
THE SAME OR IDENTICAL SET OF FACTS; AND
II.
In an Order dated 29 October 1997, the lower court: (1) ordered the striking out from
the record of the Answer ex abudanti cautela filed by petitioners Mapalo and Chito
Rosete for their continued unjustified refusal to be sworn pursuant to Rule 29 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) declared defendants Mapalo and Chito Rosete in
default; and I allowed plaintiffs to present their evidence ex-parte as regards the
latter.43 On 25 November 1997, petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-parte Omnibus Motion
(1) For Reconsideration; (2) To Lift Order of Default; and (3) To Hold In Abeyance
Presentation of Plaintiffs Evidence Ex-parte. 44 The day after, petitioners filed an
Amended Omnibus Motion.45
On 28 November 1997, respondents filed a Motion to Set Case for Ex-parte
Presentation of Evidence46 which the lower court set for 11 December 1997.47
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DECLARING IN
ITS ORDER DATED JULY 22, 1997 THAT (A) THE NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION
UPON ORAL EXAMINATION NEED NOT BE WITH LEAVE OF COURT BECAUSE
AN ANSWER EX ABUDANTE CAUTELA HAS BEEN FILED; AND (B) JOINDER OF
ISSUES IS NOT REQUIRED IN ORDER THAT THE SECTION 1, RULE 23 56 OF THE
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE MAY BE AVAILED OF.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it found that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to recognize petitioners Oscar
Mapalo and Chito Rosetes constitutional right against self-incrimination when,
through its Orders dated 22 July 1997 and 27 August 1997, it allowed and scheduled
the taking of their depositions by way of oral examination. They explain they refuse to
give their depositions due to the pendency of two criminal cases against them,
namely, Batasan Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa, because their answers would expose
them to criminal action or liability since they would be furnishing evidence against
themselves in said criminal cases. They allege there can be no doubt that the
questions to be asked during the taking of the deposition would revolve around the
allegations in the complaint in the civil case which are identical to the allegations in
the complaint-affidavits in the two criminal cases, thus, there is a tendency to
incriminate both Oscar Mapalo and Chito Rosete. Moreover, they explain that while
an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the
privilege against self-incrimination as each question requiring an incriminating answer
is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to answer any and all questions
because the right against self-incrimination includes the right to refuse to testify.
In short, petitioners Mapalo and Chito Rosete refuse to have their depositions taken
in the civil case because they allegedly would be incriminating themselves in the
criminal cases because the testimony that would be elicited from them may be used
in the criminal cases. As defendants in the civil case, it is their claim that to allow their
depositions to be taken would violate their constitutional right against selfincrimination because said right includes the right to refuse to take the witness stand.
In order to resolve this issue, we must determine the extent of a persons right against
self-incrimination. A persons right against self-incrimination is enshrined in Section
17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads: "No person shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself."
The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence,
whether voluntary or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or
administrative proceeding. The right is not to be compelled to be a witness against
himself. It secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to
answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a
tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only
when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It
cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a
subpoena, decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to
testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required,
take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question
is addressed to which may incriminate himself for some offense that he may refuse to
answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.57
As to an accused in a criminal case, it is settled that he can refuse outright to take the
stand as a witness. In People v. Ayson, 58 this Court clarified the rights of an accused
in the matter of giving testimony or refusing to do so. We said:
An accused "occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness." Under

the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others
1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, and

2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness
he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or
refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against
him.
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness
against himself" signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence
in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be
compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He
cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or
even for himself. In other words unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil
action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse
to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him the
defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take
the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. X x x (Underscoring supplied.)
It is clear, therefore, that only an accused in a criminal case can refuse to take the
witness stand. The right to refuse to take the stand does not generally apply to parties
in administrative cases or proceedings. The parties thereto can only refuse to answer
if incriminating questions are propounded. This Court applied the exception a party
who is not an accused in a criminal case is allowed not to take the witness stand in
administrative cases/proceedings that partook of the nature of a criminal proceeding
or analogous to a criminal proceeding.59 It is likewise the opinion of the Court that said
exception applies to parties in civil actions which are criminal in nature. As long as the
suit is criminal in nature, the party thereto can altogether decline to take the witness
stand. It is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that
controls.60
In the Ayson case, it is evident that the Court treats a party in a civil case as an
ordinary witness, who can invoke the right against self-incrimination only when the
incriminating question is propounded. Thus, for a party in a civil case to possess the
right to refuse to take the witness stand, the civil case must also partake of the nature
of a criminal proceeding.
In the present controversy, the case is civil it being a suit for Annulment, Specific
Performance with Damages. In order for petitioners to exercise the right to refuse to
take the witness stand and to give their depositions, the case must partake of the
nature of a criminal proceeding. The case on hand certainly cannot be categorized as

such. The fact that there are two criminal cases pending which are allegedly based on
the same set of facts as that of the civil case will not give them the right to refuse to
take the witness stand and to give their depositions. They are not facing criminal
charges in the civil case. Like an ordinary witness, they can invoke the right against
self-incrimination only when the incriminating question is actually asked of them. Only
if and when incriminating questions are thrown their way can they refuse to answer on
the ground of their right against self-incrimination.
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the taking of their oral
depositions should not be allowed without leave of court as no answer has yet been
served and the issues have not yet been joined because their answers were filed ex
abudanti cautela pending final resolution of the petition for certiorari challenging the
trial courts Orders dated 12 March 1996 and 24 May 1996 that denied their motions
to dismiss and for reconsideration, respectively.
Section 1 of Rule 2461 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. By leave of court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the
subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the
testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any
party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The attendance
of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 23.
Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these rules. The deposition of a
person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the
court prescribes.
default.64 Thus, petitioners, knowing fully well the effect of the non-filing of an answer,
filed their answers despite the pendency of their appeal with the Court of Appeals on
the denial of their motion to dismiss.
Petitioners argument that the issues of the case have not yet been joined must
necessarily fail in light of our ruling that petitioners have filed their answers although
the same were made ex abudanti cautela. Issues are joined when all the parties have
pleaded their respective theories and the terms of the dispute are plain before the
court.65 In the present case, the issues have, indeed, been joined when petitioners, as
well as the other defendants, filed their answers. The respective claims and defenses
of the parties have been defined and the issues to be decided by the trial court have
been laid down.
We cannot also sustain petitioners contention that the lower court erred when it said
that the joinder of issues is not required in order that Section 1, Rule 23 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure may be availed of. Under said section, a deposition pending
action may be availed of: (1) with leave of court when an answer has not yet been
filed but after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or property subject of
the action, or (2) without leave of court after an answer to the complaint has been
served. In the instant case, the taking of the deposition may be availed of even
without leave of court because petitioners have already served their answers to the
complaint.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant petition is dismissed for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
From the quoted section, it is evident that once an answer has been served, the
testimony of a person, whether a party or not, may be taken by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories. In the case before us, petitioners contend they
have not yet served an answer to respondents because the answers that they have
filed with the trial court were made ex abudanti cautela. In other words, they do not
consider the answers they filed in court and served on respondents as answers
contemplated by the Rules of Court on the ground that same were filed ex abudanti
cautela.
We find petitioners contention to be untenable. Ex abudanti cautela means "out of
abundant caution" or "to be on the safe side." 62 An answer ex abudanti cautela does
not make their answer less of an answer. A cursory look at the answers filed by
petitioners shows that they contain their respective defenses. An answer is a pleading
in which a defending party sets forth his defenses 63 and the failure to file one within
the time allowed herefore may cause a defending party to be declared in
What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the equation by the respondent Judge
of the right of an individual not to "be compelled to be a witness against
himself" accorded by Section 20, Article III of the Constitution, with the right of any
person "under investigation for the commission of an offense . . . to remain silent and
to counsel, and to be informed of such right," granted by the same provision. The
relevant facts are not disputed.
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines
(PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was
involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, 1 the PAL management notified
him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986. That
investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and
Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine
Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. 2
On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a
handwritten notes 3 reading as follows:
2-8-86
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS
WILLING TO SETTLE IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED
VS. HIM IN THE AMT. OF P 76,000 (APPROX.) SUBJECT TO
CONDITIONS AS MAY BE IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR BEFORE
1700/9 FEB 86.(s) Felipe Ramos(Printed) F. Ramos
G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial Court,
First Judicial Region, Baguio City, and FELIPE RAMOS, respondents.
Nelson Lidua for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in

Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo,
Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo,
Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team." Thereafter, his
answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken down in writing. Ramos'
answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the
tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been "misused"
by him, that although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been
prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his
obligation, and proferred a "compromise x x to pay on staggered basis, (and) the
amount would be known in the next investigation;" that he desired the next
investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and that he should be
represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing
to sign his statement (as he in fact afterwards did). 4 How the investigation turned out
is not dealt with the parties at all; but it would seem that no compromise agreement
was reached much less consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging
him with the crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from
March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987. In that place and during that time, according to
the indictment, 5 he (Ramos)
.. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and
there willfully ... defraud the Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch,
... in the following manner, to wit: said accused ... having been
entrusted with and received in trust fare tickets of passengers for
one-way trip and round-trip in the total amount of P76,700.65, with
the express obligation to remit all the proceeds of the sale, account
for it and/or to return those unsold, ... once in possession thereof
and instead of complying with his obligation, with intent to defraud,
did then and there ... misappropriate, misapply and convert the
value of the tickets in the sum of P76,700.65 and in spite of
repeated demands, ... failed and refused to make good his
obligation, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party .. .
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial
thereafter ensued. The prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers of PAL
under the direction and supervision of the Fiscal.
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of
evidence dated June 21, 1988, 6which included "the (above mentioned) statement of
accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket
Office," which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten admission x
x given on February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which had been marked as
Exhibit K.
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiff s
Evidence." 7 Particularly as regards the peoples' Exhibit A, the objection was that "said
document, which appears to be a confession, was taken without the accused being
represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for the same reasons interposed
under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.'
By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge admitted all the exhibits "as
part of the testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for
whatever they are worth," except Exhibits A and K, which it rejected. His Honor
declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that it is the statement of
accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in
an investigation conducted by the Branch Manager x x since it does not appear that
the accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have
counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the
assistance actually of a counsel." He also declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the
handwritten admission made by accused Felipe J. Ramos, given on February 8, 1986
x x for the same reason stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear
that the accused was assisted by counsel when he made said admission."
The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. 9 It was denied, by Order
dated September 14, 1988. 10 In justification of said Order, respondent Judge invoked
this Court's rulings in Morales, Jr. v. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 121 SCRA 538, People
v. Galit, 135 SCRA 467, People. v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219, and People v.
Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496, among others, to the effect that "in custodial investigations
the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with
the assistance of counsel," and the explicit precept in the present Constitution that the
rights in custodial investigation "cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel." He pointed out that the investigation of Felipe Ramos at the
PAL Baguio Station was one "for the offense of allegedly misappropriating the
proceeds of the tickets issued to him' and therefore clearly fell "within the coverage of
the constitutional provisions;" and the fact that Ramos was not detained at the time,
or the investigation was administrative in character could not operate to except the
case "from the ambit of the constitutional provision cited."
These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are now assailed in the
petition for certiorari and prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the private
prosecutors in the name of the People of the Philippines. By Resolution dated
October 26, 1988, the Court required Judge Ayson and Felipe Ramos to comment on
the petition, and directed issuance of a "TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER . . .
ENJOINING the respondents from proceeding further with the trial and/or hearing of
Criminal Case No. 3488-R (People ... vs. Felipe Ramos), including the issuance of
any order, decision or judgment in the aforesaid case or on any matter in relation to
the same case, now pending before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Br. 6,
First Judicial Region." The Court also subsequently required the Solicitor General to
comment on the petition. The comments of Judge Ayson, Felipe Ramos, and the
Solicitor General have all been filed. The Solicitor General has made common cause
with the petitioner and prays "that the petition be given due course and thereafter
judgment be rendered setting aside respondent Judge's Orders . . . and ordering him
to admit Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the prosecution." The Solicitor General has thereby
removed whatever impropriety might have attended the institution of the instant action
in the name of the People of the Philippines by lawyers de parte of the offended party
in the criminal action in question.
The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue of whether or not
it was grave abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to have excluded the People's
Exhibits A and K. It will now proceed to resolve it.
At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, 11 to
which respondent Judge has given a construction that is disputed by the People. The
section reads as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to
be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or
any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with
in the section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of a person
not to be compelled to be a witness against himself set out in the
first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18,
Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by
the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution, 12 and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of
every suspect "under investigation for the commission of an
offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality
and disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The
right against self- incrimination, "No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself," is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The lights of a person in custodial interrogation, which have been made more explicit,
are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III. 13
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether
voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative
proceeding. 14 The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself"
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. 15 It prescribes an
"option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of
inquiry." 16 It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to
refue to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which
has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed
only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the
witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to
disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or
to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear
as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a
particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for
some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional
guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose
on the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any
affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right against self-incrimination. It is a
right that a witness knows or should know, in accordance with the well known axiom
that every one is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no
one. Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the witness can
be expected to know in advance the character or effect of a question to be put to the
latter. 17
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational.
It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does
not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as
by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. 18
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or better
said, group of rights. These rights apply to persons "under investigation for the
commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by police authorities;
and this is what makes these rights different from that embodied in the first sentence,
that against self-incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any
person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense
was not in the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 19 a decision described as an "earthquake in
the world of law enforcement." 20
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the
commission of an offense"-1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right, 21
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiates the free will shall be used against him; 22 and
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights shall be
inadmissible in evidence. 23
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down
for a person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the
commencement of an adversary proceeding against the suspect.24
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise
those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings
have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and
intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless
and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial,
no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a policedominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings
of constitutional rights." 25
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "incustody interrogation of accused persons." 26 And, as this Court has already stated,
by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way." 27 The situation contemplated has also been more
precisely described by this Court." 28
.. . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins
a confrontation arises which at best may be tanned unequal. The
detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and
there questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but as
many investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale.
He finds himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and every
person he meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are

well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the
methods and means that experience and study have taught them to
extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most
detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional
rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive
presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere
overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks
to remedy this imbalance.
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within
the scope of the constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation,"
or "under investigation for the commission of an offense," the statement is not
protected. Thus, in one case, 29 where a person went to a police precinct and before
any sort of investigation could be initiated, declared that he was giving himself up for
the killing of an old woman because she was threatening to kill him by barang, or
witchcraft, this Court ruled that such a statement was admissible, compliance with the
constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation not being exigible under the
circumstances.
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
As Regards Giving of Testimony
It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just discussed, i.e., (1) that
against self-incrimination and (2) those during custodial interrogation apply to persons
under preliminary investigation or already charged in court for a crime.
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is
not under custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been
would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court
(or the public prosecutors' office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal
case already pending in court (or the public prosecutor's office), there is no occasion
to speak of his right while under "custodial interrogation" laid down by the second and
subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the
obvious reason that he is no longer under "custodial interrogation."
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation
before the public prosecutor), in common with all other persons, possesses the right
against self- incrimination set out in the first sentence of Section 20 Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse to answer a specific incriminatory question
at the time that it is put to him. 30
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in the matter of
giving testimony or refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a different tier of
protection from an ordinary witness." Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal
prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, 31 and 2) to testify as witness in
his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as
any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any
manner prejudice or be used against him. 32
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness
against himself' signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence
in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be
compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He
cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or
even for himself. 33 In other words unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil
action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse
to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the defendant
in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness
stand, be sworn, answer any question. 34 And, as the law categorically states, "his
neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used
against him." 35
If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so. This is his right.
But if he does testify, then he "may be cross- examined as any other witness." He
may be cross-examined as to any matters stated in his direct examination, or
connected therewith . 36 He may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any
question on the ground that the answer that he will give, or the evidence he will
produce, would have a tendency to incriminate him for the crime with which he is
charged.
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a
question which might incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is charged, but
for some other crime, distinct from that of which he is accused, he may decline to
answer that specific question, on the strength of the right against self-incrimination
granted by the first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (now
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution). Thus, assuming that in a prosecution for murder,
the accused should testify in his behalf, he may not on cross-examination refuse to
answer any question on the ground that he might be implicated in that crime of
murder; but he may decline to answer any particular question which might implicate
him for a different and distinct offense, say, estafa.
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged

with its commission in court, has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or
producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public
prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some
significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the
continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed
thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or
any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence
obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT 37
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to
him by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to crossexamination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a
specific question which tends to incriminate him
for some crime other than that for which he is
then prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has misapprehended
the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution. He has taken them as applying to the same juridical situation,
equating one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred. To be sure, His Honor
sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The
thesis was however so far divorced from the actual and correct state of the
constitutional and legal principles involved as to make application of said thesis to the
case before him tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of
power. His Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should be
as they are hereby, annulled and set aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any
sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior
to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales
in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under
custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not
therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that
Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the
administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings
should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the
criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that
the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986,
the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged
irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be
excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to
Ramos.
vitiating consent, not because of a violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, but simply on the general, incontestable proposition that involuntary or
coerced statements may not in justice be received against the makers thereof, and
really should not be accorded any evidentiary value at all.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the Orders
of the respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated August 9, 1988 and
September 14, 1988, and he is hereby ordered to admit in evidence Exhibits "A" and
"K" of the prosecution in said Criminal Case No. 3488-R, and thereafter proceed with
the trial and adjudgment thereof. The temporary restraining order of October 26, 1988
having become functus officio, is now declared of no further force and effect.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger x x (of) the violation
of the right of any person against self-incrimination when the investigation is
conducted by the complaining parties, complaining companies, or complaining
employers because being interested parties, unlike the police agencies who have no
propriety or pecuniary interest to protect, they may in their over-eagerness or
zealousness bear heavily on their hapless suspects, whether employees or not, to
give statements under an atmosphere of moral coercion, undue ascendancy and
undue influence." It suffices to draw attention to the specific and peremptory
requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed on any
employee by his employer until and unless the employee has been accorded due
process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed of the offenses ascribed
to him and afforded adequate time and opportunity to explain his side. The
requirement entails the making of statements, oral or written, by the employee under
such administrative investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the
assistance of counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of course,
refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he
should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd
to reject his statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or at a
subsequent criminal action brought against him, because he had not been accorded,
prior to his making and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to
counsel and to be informed thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only in
custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's statements,
whether called "position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely so that
they may be admitted and duly considered by the investigating officer or committee,
in negation or mitigation of his liability.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the judge's
expressed apprehensions may be realized, that violence or intimidation, undue
pressure or influence be brought to bear on an employee under investigation or for
that matter, on a person being interrogated by another whom he has supposedly
offended. In such an event, any admission or confession wrung from the person
under interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence, on proof of the vice or defect
G.R. No. 127073 January 29, 1998
JOSE
P.
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DANS,
JR., petitioner,
G.R. No. 126995 January 29, 1998

IMELDA
R.
MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
A man's signature, even if merely a flourish or even if indecipherable, may signify authority,
agreement, acknowledgment and ownership. As indelible as his fingerprints, dental records or
DNA genetic map, it denotes trust and honor. But the same trust and honor may be tainted by
polluted intentions, as when signing is done in bad faith, or to perpetrate a fraud, to deceive
others, or to commit a crime. The petitions at bar will illustrate how one's John Hancock can
bring a man, or a woman for that matter, to ruin.
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I, Office of the Special

Prosecutor, hereby accuses IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR.
of Violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:
That on or about September 8, 1982, and for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR., public
officers, being then the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the
Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created
under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage
of their positions and committing the crime in relation to their offices, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally conspiring with one another,
enter on behalf of the aforesaid government corporation into an agreement
for the development of the areas adjacent to the LRTA stations and the
management and operation of the concession areas therein, with the
Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise,
under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 17450
Sometime in 1984, then Minister of Human Settlements Imelda R. Marcos and then
Transportation and Communications Minister Jose P. Dans, Jr., petitioners herein, entered into
several contracts involving the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and the Philippine General
Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI). Concurrently and respectively, Marcos and Dans served
as ex-oficio Chairman and ex-oficio Vice-Chairman of the LRTA, and as Chairman and Director
of the Board of Trustees of the PGHFI. By virtue of these agreements, which were authorized
and in fact ratified by the LRTA Board of Directors, two vacant LRTA lots consisting of a 7,340square meter parcel of land located in Pasay City (the Pasay lot), and a 1,141.20-square meter
lot in Carriedo, Sta. Cruz, Manila (the Sta. Cruz lot), were leased out to the PGHFI. Specifically,
the LRTA and the PGHFI, represented by Dans and Marcos, respectively, approved three deeds,
namely, an "Agreement for the Development of the Areas Adjacent to the Light Rail Transit
System Stations and the Management and Operation of the Concession Areas Therein," 1 and
two lease agreements 2 dated June 8 and June 18, 1984, covering the Pasay and the Sta. Cruz
lots. The terms of the lease agreements were identical except as to the price: the lease would be
good for 25 years subject to an annual escalation of 7.5%; PGHFI had the right to sublease the
lots; and the monthly lease was P102,760.00 for the Pasay lot and P92,437.20 for the Sta. Cruz
lot. Within the same month, the Pasay lot was subleased by PGHFI, through Marcos to
Transnational Construction Corporation (TNCC) 3 for P734,000.00 a month, while the Sta. Cruz
lot was allegedly 4 subleased to Joy Mart Consolidated Corporation (Joy Mart) 5 for P199,710.00
per month.
Because of these deeds, petitioners were charged on January 14, 1992, with a violation of
Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), to wit:

That on or about June 8, 1984, and for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P.
DANS, JR., public officers, being then the Chairman and Vice-Chairman,
respectively, of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government
corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of their official
functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing the crime in
relation to their offices, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
conspiring with one another, enter on behalf of the aforesaid government
corporation into a Lease Agreement covering LRTA property located in
Pasay City, with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a
private enterprise, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Prosecutor, hereby accuses IMELDA R. MARCOS of Violation of Section
3(d) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:
this Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS, a public officer,
being then the Chairman of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a
government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of her
official functions, taking advantage of her position and committing the
offense in relation to her office, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally accepted employment and/or acted as Chairman of (the)
Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private corporation
duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, which private enterprise
had, at that time(,) pending business transactions with the accused, in her
capacity as Chairman of LRTA.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Prosecutor, hereby accuses JOSE P. DANS, JR. of Violation of Section 3(d)
of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:
this Honorable Court, the accused JOSE P. DANS, JR., a public officer,
being then the Vice-Chairman of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a
government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of his
official functions, taking advantage of his position and committing the
offense in relation to his office, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally accepted employment and/or acted as Director of (the) Philippine
General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private corporation duly
organized under the laws of the Philippines, which private enterprise had, at
that time(,) pending business transactions with the accused, in his capacity
as Vice-Chairman of LRTA.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer, Office of the Special
corporation into a Lease Agreement covering LRTA property located in Sta.
Cruz, Manila, with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI),
a private enterprise, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In short, Marcos and Dans were separately charged under Criminal Case Nos. 17451 and
17452 for accepting employment in and/or acting as Chairman and Director, respectively, of the
PGHFI while the latter had pending business (the lease agreements) with the LRTA, which they
both also headed. With regard to the other cases, Criminal Case Nos. 17449, 17450 and 17453,
the accusations against both of them stemmed from the contracts they signed in representation
of the LRTA and of the PGHFI which were allegedly entered into "under terms and conditions
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government."
When arraigned, petitioners pleaded "not guilty" to all of the charges. Before trial could
commence, Dans moved for the advance examination of defense witness Ramon F. Cuervo, Jr.,
a real estate broker, appraiser and friend of Dans who, as an expert witness, was in a position to
inform court that the agreed lease prices stated in the subject agreements were fair based on
standard industry valuation standards. The court a quo granted said motion, and Cuervo was
allowed to testify on August 12, 13, and 19, 1992. During this time, Marcos never questioned
Cuervo and later expressed that she had no desire to further examine him. 6 Five days after the
final hearing of Cuervo's testimony, the trial of the five cases opened with the formal offer of the
prosecution's documentary evidence, which included, inter alia, the five agreements mentioned
earlier. On November 23, 1992, the court issued an order admitting all the exhibits except
Exhibits "D" and "E" as to Dans, who challenged the two sublease agreements, and Exhibit "E1" as to Marcos, who, while accepting the validity of said sublease agreements, nevertheless
questioned the authenticity of her signature thereon.
In Criminal Case No. 17543, Dans filed a Motion to Dismiss (demurrer to evidence) dated
December 7, 1992, but the court denied the same, as well as his motion for reconsideration
thereof.
By the time the case was submitted for decision, Marcos had neither submitted a formal offer of
evidence, despite notice of the court's orders 7 to do so, nor the required memorandum. She did
file a motion for inhibition of the justices of the Sandiganbayan's First Division on the ground of
pre-judgment of her case based on the court's denial of Dans' demurrer to evidence, but this
was denied in the court's resolution of May 20, 1993.
On September 24, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment, 8 acquitting petitioners in Criminal
Case Nos. 17449, 17451, and 17452, but convicting them in Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and
17453. The decretal portion of the assailed decision is reproduced hereunder:
WHEREFORE, judgment is now rendered.
1. ACQUITTING the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and the accused JOSE
P. DANS, JR. of the charge in Criminal Case No. 17449, there being no
manifest and gross disadvantage brought about by the contract dated
September 8, 1982.
2. ACQUITTING accused IMELDA R. MARCOS in Criminal Case No.
17451, it not having been demonstrated that the Information charging her
had given her adequate notice of the acts for which she could be held liable
under the law;
3. ACQUITTING accused JOSE P. DANS, JR. in Criminal Case No. 17452,
it not having been demonstrated that the Information charging him had
given him adequate notice of the acts for which he could be held liable
under the law;
and considering that the charges against them have been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
4. CONVICTING accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR. in
Criminal Case No. 17450 under Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby imposes
upon each accused the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period
of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum to twelve (12) years and ten
(10) days as maximum.
Both accused shall also suffer the additional penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office as provided in Sec. 9 of R.A. No. 3019;
5. CONVICTING accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR. in
Criminal Case No. 17453 under Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby imposes
upon each accused the penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate
period of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum to twelve (12) years
and ten (10) days as maximum.
Both accused shall also suffer the additional penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office as provided in Sec. 9 of R.A. No. 3019.
The Ombudsman is given thirty (30) days from today within which to make a
determination of whether or not the other members of the Board of Directors
of the Light Rail Transit Authority during the relevant periods with respect to
the lease contracts dated June 8, 1984 and June 18, 1984 executed by said
Authority with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. may also be
prosecuted under Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No 3019, and to report to this Court at
the end of said period whatever determination he has made including the
steps intended to be taken hereon towards a new preliminary investigation,
if the same is appropriate.
The bonds posted for the provisional liberty of accused IMELDA R.
MARCOS and accused JOSE P. DANS, JR. in Criminal Case No. 17449,
No. 17451 and No. 17452 are hereby CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the court's decision on October 8,
1993. The Office of the Solicitor General also filed a motion for partial reconsideration on the
same date, seeking civil indemnity for the People of the Philippines. On November 13, 1996,
respondent court promulgated two resolutions, one denying the motion of Dans, 9 and another
denying that of Marcos and modifying the assailed September 24, 1993, decision with the
addition of a sixth paragraph in the dispositive portion which dealt with the civil liability of
petitioners, viz.:10
6. Accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR. are hereby
ordered jointly and solidarily to reimburse the Light Railway Transit Authority
for the prejudice that they have accused to said Light Railway Transit
Authority through the lease contracts which they executed.
(a) Under Criminal Case No. 17450, the sum of THIRTY TWO MILLION
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P32,172,000.00);
(b) Under Criminal Case No. 17453, the sum of NINETY TWO MILLION
TWO HUNDRED SIXTY EIGHT THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY
PESOS (P92,268840.00).
Aggrieved, petitioners separately elevated their case to this Court for a review on the following
grounds:
G.R. No. 127073
I. Respondent Court erred in denying petitioner's demurrer to evidence in
Criminal Case No. 17453 on the basis of baseless assumptions and
conjectures not established by evidence. Worse, in violation of mandatory
rules of evidence, the denial of the demurrer was made to rest on the
advance, conditional testimony of defense witness Ramon Cuervo which
had not yet been offered in evidence.
II. Respondent Court erred in concluding that the two lease contracts in
question were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government
despite unrebutted evidence that their terms and conditions were fair and
reasonable and did not prejudice the Government.
III. Respondent Court erred when it assumed without evidentiary basis that
LRTA had put up or would put up buildings on the leased land.
IV. Respondent Court erred in holding that the lease contracts were also
grossly disadvantageous to the Government because "non-payment of
rentals . . . was not actionable unless the rentals were in arrears for one
year", citing the stipulation. "Should there be a delay in any payment of the
rental consideration equivalent to one year, the lessor shall have the right to
take possession of the premises, the property and improvements thereon,
the ownership of all improvements thereby accruing to the lessor. (Stip. II,
par. 4).
V. Assuming without admitting that LRTA would receive less than fair rental
under the disputed lease contracts, respondent Court erred when it
considered injury to LRTA as necessarily an injury to the Government,
notwithstanding that such supposed injury to LRTA was offset by the
corresponding benefit enuring to the Philippine General Hospital (a
government hospital funded by government funds), which is inconsistent
with the theory that the disputed lease contracts were disadvantageous to
"the Government." Under Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 which seeks to protect
public interest in general by condemning contracts disadvantageous to the
Government, the term "government" is used in its widest sense so as to
include "the national government, the government-owned and governmentcontrolled corporations, and all other instrumentalities or agencies of the
Republic of the Philippines and their branches." [Sec. 2(a)].
VI. While respondent Court was duty-bound to be just and impartial, it failed
to give petitioner a fair trial, who was thereby denied due process of law.
Respondent Court was plainly biased against, if not downright hostile to,
petitioner; it unfairly allied itself with the prosecution, which made it
prosecutor and judge at the same time.
VII. Aside from the foregoing, the appealed decision is flawed by fatal
infirmities which have effectively denied petitioner due process of law.
G.R. No. 126995
A. The questioned Decision is a nullity because Section 3 (g) of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended) is unconstitutional
for being, on its face, void for vagueness.
B. The questioned Decision is a nullity because Section 3 (g) of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended) is unconstitutional
for being a "rider."
C. The questioned Decision is a nullity because the Informations in SB
Criminal Cases Nos. 17450 and 17453 did not state all the essential facts
constituting the offense but instead stated conclusions of law, thereby
denying the Petitioner her constitutional right to be informed of "the nature
and the cause of the accusation" against her (Sec. 14 (2), Bill of Rights).
D. The questioned Decision is a nullity because the Information in said SB
Criminal Cases Nos. 17450 and 17453 charged only two of the total number
of members in the Board of Directors of the LRTA and the Board of
Directors of the PGH Foundation, who had participated in the collective
acts, thereby singling Petitioner and her companion for discriminatory
prosecution, in violation of her right to Equal protection of the Laws, which
violation existed from the filing of the information and cannot be cured by
post hoc proceedings.
E. The questioned Decision is a nullity because of the participation therein
of Mr. Justice Garchitorena, whose long-standing bias and hostility towards
President Marcos and Petitioner Imelda R. Marcos prevented him from
having the requisite "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," violation of her
right as an accused person to procedural Due Process of Law.
F. The questioned Decision is a nullity because Petitioner was denied of her
Constitutional Right to counsel.
1. Facts of record showing that Petitioner was deprived
of and denied her Right to Counsel.
2. Under the circumstances of record, the absence of
counsel resulting from imposition of suspension from
the practice of law upon her retained counsel,
constituted deprivation of or denial of the Right to
Counsel.
3. Facts of record showing legal representation of
Petitioner Imelda Marcos was not adequate.
G. The questioned Decision is premature and had disregarded the
constitutional right of the Petitioner to present evidence in her behalf. Her
right to testify in her own behalf is a guaranteed right, the exercise of which
is her personal choice alone, and which counsel had no authority to waive in
her behalf. Besides, counsel being suspended, he could not have made a
waiver. This constitutional right "to be heard by himself and counsel" she is
invoking now, as part of her right to due process (Sec. 14 (1) and (2), Bill of
Rights).
5. Conviction was based on weakness of defense evidence and not (on)

strength of prosecution's evidence.
H. The questioned Decision is a nullity for it was rendered in derogation of

Petitioner's subsisting right to be heard and to submit evidence in her
defense. The finding of waiver is a prejudicial error. The evidence thereof on
the record is tenuous. A waiver by an accused person of the right to be
heard in her defense, including her right to testify in her own behalf must be
indubitable, and is valid only if personally exercised through her own
manifestation in open court.
J. The questioned Decision and Resolution are null and void because the
Respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) acted without jurisdiction in
issuing the questioned Decision and Resolution since the records clearly
show that the Court with jurisdiction over these cases is the Special Division
of Five Justices created by Admin. Order 288-93 pursuant to Sec. 5 of PD
1606 as amended and not Respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division).
I. The questioned Decision is a nullity because the crime charged was not
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the presumption of innocence was
not overcome, which is required by Due Process.
The Court resolved to consolidate the two cases inasmuch as they raise similar issues and seek
the same reliefs. The questions may be stated thus:
1) Was respondent court correct in denying the demurrer to evidence of petitioner Dans in
Criminal Case No.17453?
1. There was no disadvantage to the Government.

i. PGH Foundation is part of the "Government".
ii. There was no disadvantage to the "Government"
because the PGH, which is part of the Government
benefitted.
iii. Facts of record, especially the questioned leases,
show no disadvantage.
iv. Conviction was based on pure speculation.
v. Respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) erred in
holding the leases disadvantageous as to rental in
absence of evidence existing at the time that higher
rentals should have been paid.
vi. Respondent Sandiganbayan erred in holding that
rentals for sub-leases were evidence of disadvantage
when such sub-leases were made later and negotiated
by a charitable foundation deserving of support through
higher rentals.
2. Assuming arguendo alleged disadvantage, the same was not manifest
nor gross.
3. Petitioner Marcos did not enter into the questioned lease contracts on
behalf of the Government.
4. The charge of conspiracy was not proved hence no basis for liability.
After the prosecution had rested its case, Dans filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence)
dated December 7, 1992, based on Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. 11 He argued that
the prosecution failed to establish the fact that the lease agreement covering the Sta. Cruz lot
(Exhibit "C") was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. 12
On February 10, 1993, the court a quo denied the said motion in this wise:
Since per testimony of witness Ramon Cuervo, Jr. (tsn, pp. 20 to 26, August
13, 1992) that considering the nature of the terminal at the Sta. Cruz
Station, which would be (the) subject of the lease contract between the
Light Rail Transit Authority and the PGH Foundation, Inc. (Exhibit "C"), the
rental of the premises in question could go up to P400,000.00 per month if
the LRTA would put up the building as against the stipulated rental of
P92,437.00 actually entered into between the parties, there would appear
cause to believe that the lease contract in question was grossly
disadvantageous for (sic) the government.
For this reason, the Demurrer to Evidence of accused Jose P. Dans, Jr.
dated December 7, 1992, is DENIED for lack of merit.
Dans questioned the denial on the ground that the demurrer should have been resolved solely
on the basis of the prosecution's evidence and even assuming that it could be resolved using the
evidence for the defense, the latter must have been previously formally offered. 13
These arguments are specious and must, therefore, be rejected.
Although a demurrer to evidence must be resolved based on the evidence of the prosecution,
there is nothing in the rules which would bar the court from taking cognizance of any matter
taken up during the trial or which has become part of the records of the case, especially in this
instance where the disputed evidence was taken in advance at the request of the defendant
himself . Additionally it is erroneous to suppose that Cuervo's testimony was not formally offered
at the time because "(t)estimonial evidence is formally offered by the calling of the witness to the
stand." 14 Thus, we find merit in the manner by which the trial court justified the denial of Dans'
demurrer to evidence, 15 viz.:
exhibits constitute solid documentary proof of petitioners' liability under Section 3(g) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, as will be shown later in our discussion of Issue No. 5, "Was the evidence
properly appreciated by respondent court?"
2) Were the informations filed in Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453 sufficient in form?
First, the advance testimony of Mr. Cuervo taken at the instance of Engr.
Dans on August 12 and 13, 1992, was already part of the record(s) in these
cases when the Demurrer to Evidence was filed by Engr. Dans on
December 7, 1992. The testimony was introduced into the record in exactly
the same manner as any other testimony would be presented in evidence
during trial. . . . .
Being already part of the record in these cases, the advance testimony of
Mr. Cuervo could be taken judicial notice of.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . (J)udicial notice takes the place of proof and is of equal force. As a
means of establishing facts it is therefore superior to evidence. In its
appropriate field it displaces evidence since, as it stands for proof, it fulfills
the objects which the evidence is designed to fulfill and makes evidence
unnecessary.16 Consequently, "the party desiring to establish a fact is
relieved, when judicial notice is taken of the fact, from introducing evidence
to prove it." 17
Second, having been given in the course of the proceedings in these cases,
the testimony of Mr. Cuervo constitutes judicial admission of Engr. Dans
who made it part of the record of these cases.
xxx xxx xxx
As in judicial notice of a fact, "admissions made in the course of the judicial
proceedings are substitutes for, and dispense with, the actual proof of
facts." 18 The party benefited by the admission is relieved of the duty of
presenting evidence of the admitted fact and "(t)he court, for the proper
decision of the case, may and should consider, without the introduction of
evidence, the fact admitted by the parties." 19
Third, since the advance testimony of Mr. Cuervo was given in open court
and duly recorded, the Court could not just ignore the solemn declarations
therein on the technicality that the testimony had not been formally offered
evidence. . . .
In any event, even if the testimony of Cuervo were to be excluded, there was enough evidence
proffered by the prosecution, particularly Exhibits "B" (the lease agreement in favor of the
PGHFI) and "D" (the sublease agreement in favor of TNCC) which would have more than
justified the denial of the demurrer. In other words, notwithstanding Cuervo's testimony, these
There appears to be no doubt that the questioned informations are reasonably adequate as to
apprise Marcos on the nature and cause of the accusations against her. In the case of Luciano
v. Estrella, 20 the Court had occasion to enumerate the elements of the crime under Section 3(g),
R.A. No. 3019, namely, (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract
or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly
and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The allegations in the two informations are
hereby reproduced for quick reference:
That on or about June 8 [18], 1984, and for sometime prior or subsequent
corporation into a Lease Agreement covering LRTA property located in
Pasay City [Sta. Cruz, Manila], with the Philippine General Hospital
Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise, under terms and conditions
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. 21 (Emphasis
supplied).
As can be readily observed, the informations meet the minimum requirements for them to be
upheld in court.
It is also alleged that "for a criminal complaint or information to sufficiency inform the accused of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, all the essential facts constituting the
offense must be stated therein, and not mere conclusions of law. 22
Assuming that the matters which Marcos wanted to see alleged in the informations are not
evidentiary in character, and that they are really vague and ambiguous, other courses of action
could have been taken, such as filing a motion for a bill of particulars. This is what the Court
precisely suggested in People v. Arlegui, 23 viz.:
A bill of particulars while provided for under Section 6 of Rule 116 is not a
popular procedure among lawyers for the accused in criminal cases. For
one thing, it may invite an amended information which is not only clearer but
may also be stronger and more incriminating. However, it would have
clarified and corrected at any early stage the kind of doubt which the
accused in this particular case alleged to have entertained. Section 6 of

Rule 116 provides:
Sec. 6. Bill of Particulars. Defendant may, at any time on or before
arraignment, mover for or demand a more definite statement or a bill of
particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable him properly to plead or prepare for trial. The motion
shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. 24
The more appropriate procedure under the circumstances would have been
an order from the court directing the Fiscal to amend the
information because the defect, if there aver was one, was curable by the
simplest of amendments or clarifications. (Emphasis supplied)
In fact, the records reveal that Marcos did file such a motion. 25 After the prosecution
had filed its answer thereto, she was given an opportunity to file a reply, but she did
not, thereby indicating that she was satisfied with what was already stated in the
answer.
3) Is Section 3(g), R.A. No. 3019, as amended, constitutional?
The validity of this provision is being assailed by petitioner Marcos on grounds of vagueness and
superfluity. She claims that the phrase "manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government" is vague for it does not set a definite standard by which the court will be guided,
thus, leaving it open to human subjectivity.
There is, however, nothing "vague" about the statute. The assailed provision answers the basic
query "What is the violation?" Anything beyond this, the "how's" and the "why's," are evidentiary
matters which the law itself cannot possibly disclose in view of the uniqueness of every case.
The "disadvantage" in this instance is something that still has to be addressed by the State's
evidence as the trial progresses. It may be said that the law is intended to be flexible in order to
allows the judge a certain latitude in determining if the disadvantage to the government
occasioned by the act of a public officer in entering into a particular contract is, indeed, gross
and manifest.
The
personal
circumstances
of
an
accused
are,
in
this
regard,
also immaterial, because of the nature of the statute. As the Court declared in Luciano. 26
. . . In other words, the act treated thereunder partakes of the nature of
a malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by the law,
not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the
provision has been violated. And this construction would be in consonance
with the announced purpose for which Republic Act (No.) 3019 was
enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of public officers and private
persons constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.
Note that the law does not merely contemplate repression of acts that are
unlawful or corrupt per se, but even of those that may lead to or result in
graft and corruption. Thus, to require for conviction under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act that the validity of the contract or transaction be first
proved would be to enervate, if not defeat, the intention of the Act.
We, therefore, affirm the constitutionality of Section 3(g) of R.A No. 3019, as amended.
4) Was petitioner deprived of her constitutional right to be heard by herself or counsel?
Marcos claims that she was not adequately represented by counsel at the trial due to the
suspension from the practice of law of her counsel of record, Atty. Antonio Coronel. It appears
from the records, however, that during the absence of Atty. Coronel and sometime thereafter,
she was still represented by other lawyers, including Renato Dilag, Luis Sillano, Perfecto V.
Fernandez, Jose and Cristobal Fernandez, Vicente D. Millora, Juan T. David, Balbino Diego, and
the law firm of Manuel M. Lazaro and Associates. The representation of Atty. Millora and the
Fernandezes subsisted even in this Court, where they were later substituted by Atty. Estelito
Mendoza. In any event, at the time Atty. Coronel and his replacements withdrew their respective
appearances, all evidence had already been presented. It is just that Marcos opted not to
present any evidence for her defense, relying perhaps, on what she perceived to be glaringly
weak prosecution evidence. Or it is not impossible or far-fetched that her refusal may have been
due to her indifference to or open defiance of the justice system.
5) Was the evidence properly appreciated by respondent court?
In proclaiming his innocence, Dans relied only on his and Cuervo's testimony. Marcos, on the
other hand, presented no evidence at all, claiming that she had been prejudged by respondent
court. The prosecution submitted documentary evidence and nothing else. The question that
must first be answered, thereto, is: Was the State's evidence sufficient to prove beyond a
shadow of a doubt that the accused, petitioners herein, committed the crimes for which they
were held accountable?
Petitioners were charged with and found guilty of violating Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended. It states thus:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the
public officer profited or will profit thereby.
It is clear that for liability to attach under the aforequoted provision, the public officer concerned
must have entered into a contract which is "manifestly and grossly disadvantageous" to the
Government. The court a quophrased the focal issue in these petitions in this wise: "(A)re
exhibits 'A,' 'B' and 'C', the Lease Agreements executed by the LRTA with the PGH Foundation
over the LRT property at the stations in Pasay City and Sta. Cruz (Manila) 'manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government'?"
A perusal of the prosecution's documentary evidence would readily reveal, even from a layman's
perspective, that the Government was seriously prejudiced in the transactions under review.
We concur with the observation of the court a quo that, by itself, Exhibit "A," the "mother
contract" which initially granted the PGHFI a virtual exclusive license or franchise over the
subject properties, "would neither be prejudicial (n)or beneficial to anybody," because it did not
refer to any specific property or consideration. Hence, petitioners were correctly acquitted in
Criminal Case No. 17449, which was based on this agreement.
With regard to Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453, the Court is likewise constrained to agree
with the trial court that the Government suffered a manifest and gross disadvantage with the
execution of the two lease agreements, Exhibits "B" and "C." The facts in this regard are
undisputed.
The monthly rental price agreed upon between the LRTA and the PGHFI for the lease of the
Pasay lot was P102,760.00, and for the Sta. Cruz lot, it was P92,437.20. Barely ten days later,
the very same properties were subleased by PGHFI to private entities for P734,000.00 (for the
Pasay lot) and P199,710.00 (for the Sta. Cruz lot). The difference in the lease price is too
enormous to ignore, for no market force could possibly have raised the rental cost in the same
site by that margin in just over a week. Even by conservative estimates, the properties could
have originally been leased out for at least P500,000.00 27 more. The Government was thereby
deprived of at least an additional half a million pesos per month.
P73,400.00 29and the Sta. Cruz lot at P80,825.64,

industry.
30
using standard appraisal techniques in the
The court, on the other hand, interpreted his testimony differently and arrived at a much higher
valuation, that is, P210,000.00 a month for the Pasay lot and P400,000.00 monthly for the Sta.
Cruz lot.
In view of this conflict in opinion, with petitioners and respondent court holding steadfast to their
respective interpretations of Cuervo's testimony, this Court has no alternative but to fall back on
the documentary evidence.
Dans, in his motion to dismiss dated December 7, 1992, actually made an implied recognition
that the prosecution was able to establish the manifest and gross disadvantage to the
government brought about by the lease agreement over the Pasay lot (Exhibit "B"), when he
raised no objection to the presentation by the prosecution of the sublease agreement between
the PGHFI and TNCC over the same property (Exhibit "D"). Just as he read the lease and
sublease agreements over the Sta. Cruz lot (Exhibits "C" and "E") together in order to
demonstrate to the court that the prosecution's evidence in Criminal Case No. 17453 was weak,
Exhibit "B" must also be appreciated in connection with Exhibit "D" so that the "gross and
manifest" disadvantage to the government in Criminal Case No. 17450 can be established.
It must be noted that Dans objected vigorously to Exhibit "E" on the ground that it was a mere
photocopy of the original. Despite diligent efforts to locate an original duplicate or an authentic
copy, the prosecution could not produce one, so that as to Dans, said exhibit was not admitted.
The same cannot be said of Marcos who never challenged the authenticity of Exhibit "E,"
although she contested the validity of her signature thereon as representative of the PGHFI, the
lessor
Indubitably, there was some kind of conflict of interest in the premises. Marcos and Dans, who
were then Cabinet members, occupied the highest positions in the Boards of the LRTA and the
PGHFI in a concurrent capacity at the time the questioned deals were made. They were, as it
were, playing both ends; but on paper, one was acting for the lessor and the other for the lessee.
The fact that petitioners were cleared of the charge that they acted improperly in accepting seats
in the PGHFI Board of Trustees at the time when it had pending business transactions with the
LRTA, of which they were also officers is of no moment. First, their acquittal in Criminal Case No.
17451 and No. 17452 was simply due to the insufficiency of informations. Second, the
accusation in said informations have no bearing whatsoever on the subject matter of the other
cases filed against them as signatories to the assailed lease agreements. Even Justice
Garchitorena had occasion to advert to this conflict of interest in his resolution of November 13,
1996. 28
For a better appreciation of the evidence at hand, the lease agreements (Exhibits "B" and "C")
must be read simultaneously with the sublease agreements (Exhibits "D" and "E"). While Dans
signed the lease agreements in behalf of the LRTA, he apparently had no hand in the ensuing
sublease of the properties, as indicated by the absence of his signature from the two
subsequent agreements. Marcos, on the other hand, represented the PGHFI twice, first in the
lease contract and later in the sublease agreements. Within the very brief period of time that
separated the lease and the sublease of the LRTA's prime lots, Marcos inevitably generated a
situation where the LRTA, a government corporation, 31 lost out to the, PGHFI, a private
enterprise 32 headed by Marcos herself.
The focus now shifts to the testimony of defense witness Ramon Cuervo. An examination of the
pleadings filed in these petitions, including all their attachments, would demonstrate the
confusion sown by Cuervo's expert opinion. Petitioners insist that Cuervo confirmed their
allegation that the lease price stated in the questioned agreements was a fair valuation based on
the comparative rental costs in the immediate vicinity of the subject properties. This inference
was drawn from Cuervo's calculation of the fair monthly rental value of the Pasay lot at
The court a quo entertained no doubt that the prosecution's evidence amply established a
conspiracy between Dans and Marcos, thus:
But, considering that there is an allegation of conspiracy in the informations, the sufficiency of
which we have earlier upheld, should the liability of Dans be the same as that of Marcos?
. . . (T)he avowed purpose of both accused in entering into the Lease

Agreements was not to earn additional income for the use of the LRTA in its
operations, but to give financial assistance to the PGHF in the pursuit of its
charitable objectives.
xxx xxx xxx
This expressly admitted purpose explains why the rentals stipulated in the
Lease Agreements were so low that when compared with the rentals
provided in the Sub-Lease Agreements, the latter deceivingly appear, to
borrow the words of Mr. Cuervo, to be "extra-ordinarily high." To have fixed
much higher rentals would have been to reduce the income which both the
accused would like the PGHF to earn from the lease contracts. And the
rentals in the Lease Agreements all the more became very low in light of the
fact
that
the
Agreement
for
the
development
of
the areas adjacent to the LRT stations was without any valuable
consideration. 33
xxx xxx xxx
In these cases, Engr. Dans and Mrs. Marcos had a common objective,
namely, to lease in favor of the PGHF the Pasay City and Sta. Cruz
properties under such terms and conditions so favorable to the PGHF as to
result in manifest and gross disadvantage to the LRTA. This common
purpose they pursued together and in concert with each other, being in the
position to do so because they were both ranking officials of the LRTA and
the PGHF.
Thus, on September 8, 1982, avowedly desirous to extend financial support
to the PGHF (not to the PGH), Engr. Dans, representing the LRTA, and Mrs.
Marcos, as chairman of the PGHF, executed an agreement wherein without
any valuable consideration, the latter was granted (exclusive) authority to
develop areas adjacent to the LRT stations and to operate commercial
concessions therein.
In furtherance of their common design and pursuant to their intention to
financially benefit the PGHF, Engr. Dans and Mrs. Marcos, acting in their
said representative capacities, entered into a Lease Agreement on June 8,
1984, over the Pasay City area for P102,760.00 a month and another Lease
Agreement ten days later over the Sta. Cruz Area for P92,437.20 per
month. As already demonstrated, the monthly rentals and other stipulations
in both contracts placed the LRTA in a manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous position.
Engr. Dans and Mrs. Marcos were, therefore, both co-conspirators for
having acted in conspiracy with each other and co-principals by direct
participation for having taken direct part in the execution of the acts
charged. Engr. Dans could not have committed the offenses without Mrs.
Marcos and vice-versa. 34
While these observations cannot be said to be flawed, they were made only after the trial, in
fact, after the assailed decision was promulgated, and these conclusions are the court's alone.
The prosecution never attempted to establish a connection between the two defendants in
committing the acts for which they were charged. It is a fundamental rule, however, that a
charge of conspiracy must be proven just like any other criminal accusation, that is,
"independently and beyond reasonable doubt." 35 In this regard, therefore, this Court's opinion
that the alleged conspiracy between the petitioners was not sufficiency established by the
State's evidence.
6) Were the members of the Sandiganbayan's First Division biased
petitioners? Consequently, is the assailed decision dated September 24, 1993, valid?
against
Petitioners consider erroneous the active participation of the members of the Sandiganbayan's
First Division during the hearing of Cuervo's testimony. The records reveal that, indeed, the
court a quo may have participated more actively than usual in the examination of Cuervo in
order to elicit from him the information that would nail down the prosecution's basic theory, thus
rendering unassailable the conclusions which are now being impugned by petitioners who argue
that the extensive questioning of Cuervo 36 made the Sandiganbayan, particularly Justice
Garchitorena, not only a judge, but a prosecutor as well.
To be sure, instead of being satisfied with Cuervo's testimonial affirmation of what it had all along
considered to be the fair rental value of the properties, the court a quo relied on his responses to
numerous postulated queries thereby concluding there was a "gross disparity" in the lease price,
as agreed upon by the parties, and the projected rental price, as estimated by Cuervo. Indeed, if
the trial court's conclusions were to be followed, the Pasay lot should fetch a monthly rental of
P210,000.00 and the Sta. Cruz lot, P400,000.00. These figures are extrapolated from the
potential rental price of the lots, considering its location.
Petitioners point out that the limitations on the right of judges to ask questions during the trial
were not observed by the Sandiganbayan. They accuse Justice Garchitorena of acting more of a
prosecutor than the impartial judge he is supposed to be, particularly during the examination of
Cuervo. Lest we be distracted by this allegation of bias on the part of respondent court, it must
be remembered that petitioners were never prejudiced by such questioning, 37 which is about the
only thing that would make a string of queries by a judge objectionable. As the following
discussion will reveal, the trial court's interpretation of Cuervo's testimony is immaterial because
of the sufficiency of the documentary evidence of the questions prosecution to prove the charges
against herein petitioners.
In view of the circumstances obtaining here, we find that the trial court's active role in this regard
was necessary to clarify the mostly technical aspect of Cuervo's testimony. Respondent court
defended its action by declaring that:
It was precisely for the reason that Mr. Cuervo was merely asked by Engr.
Dans' lawyer as to the fair and reasonable rentals of the leased premises as
without improvements, without the LRT stations being adjacent thereto, and
no parts of commercial centers, that the Court, through Presiding Justice
Garchitorena, was constrained to propound questions on the fair and
reasonable rentals of the leased areas by considering them as not ordinary

parcels of land. 38
The Court notes that while petitioners have been making such an outcry since the promulgation
of the questioned judgment regarding the line of questioning followed by respondent court, none
of them ever objected to such queries during the trial. Neither did they attempt to salvage the
situation by asking questions on re-direct examination if they harbored the impression that the
court's cross-examination seriously prejudiced their case. This observation was likewise made
by the court a quo, to wit:
It is now too late in the day to object to the alleged leading, misleading, and
badgering questions of the Presiding Justice Garchitorena and to ask (the
court) to expunge the answers thereto from the record. Needless to say,
Engr. Dans (and Marcos, for that matter) should have done so when the
supposed objectionable nature of the questions and/or answers were
propounded or given. (Section 36, Rule 132, 1985 Rules on Evidence). As it
happened, he (and she) did not even raise his (and her) objections at the
close of the testimony of Mr. Cuervo. He (and she) did not also ask re-direct
questions to correct whatever mistakes or misimpressions allegedly crept
into Mr. Cuervo's testimony. Instead, he formally offered the entire testimony
without making any exceptions or reservations. 39
We should stress that in affirming the conviction of petitioner Marcos, this Court relies mainly on
the prosecution's documentary evidence showing the chasmic disparity between the
P102,760.00 monthly rental stipulated in Exhibit "B" and the P734,000.00 monthly rental
provided in Exhibit "D." The testimony of Cuervo is, at best,opinion only, but the amounts
mentioned in the said two exhibits are facts which cannot be altered by opinion, however
"expert." Regardless of Cuervo's expert opinion on the probable rental rate of the Pasay lot, the
stubborn fact and cold reality is that the PGHFI was able to lease it out for an amount that was
seven times more than what it stipulated to pay the government. The sublease (Exhibit "D") is
the best monument to the "gross and manifest disadvantage" suffered by the government due to
the willful actions of Marcos. Hence, even if the questions of Justice Garchitorena and the
answers thereto of Cuervo were totally ignored by this Court, the prosecution's evidence would
still firmly stand, and would definitely be more than sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Going further, petitioners insist that some impropriety attended the promulgation of the
challenged decision. This allegation stems from the dissolution of the Special Division earlier
created by Justice Garchitorena because of the lack of unanimity among the members of the
First Division.
It appears from the records that Justice Narciso T. Atienza initially wanted to acquit the
defendants in Criminal Case Nos. 17449, 17451 and 17452, while Justices Garchitorena and
Balajadia wanted to convict them in Criminal Case Nos. 17450, 17451, 17452 and 17453. There
was, therefore, no unanimous vote in Criminal Case Nos. 17451 and 17452. Thereupon, a
Special Division was constituted, with the addition of Justices Augusto M. Amores and Cipriano
A. del Rosario. Over an informal luncheon among the members of the newly-created Special
Division, 40 however, where the merits of the cases were incidentally discussed, an
understanding was reached whereby the two newly-appointed members agreed with Justice
Atienza that the defendants should be cleared of the charges in Criminal Case Nos. 17451 and
17452. The stance of those present was that if the actual voting were to take place, the majority
would acquit the defendants in Criminal Case Nos. 17451 and 17452. Consequently, Justices
Garchitorena and Balajadia decided to change their opinions in said two cases, thus giving the
First Division a unanimous vote in all the cases. There seemed to be no further need for the
Special Division; hence, it was dissolved. The result is the assailed decision promulgated, as
scheduled, on September 24, 1993.
Petitioners point out that once the Special Division was created, the First Division was thereby
divested of jurisdiction to decide the case. They also maintain that the informal discussion of the
merits of the cases inside a restaurant was unofficial business and, therefore, should have no
binding effect.
While it is true that under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, when a
unanimous vote is not reached by a division, two other justices shall be designated by the
Presiding Justice to sit in a special division, and their majority vote shall be required to reach a
valid verdict, this provision does not totally rule out a situation where all members of the 3-justice
division eventually come to a common agreement to reach a unanimous decision, thus, making
another division's participation in these cases redundant. This is exactly what transpired in this
case. The change of heart of Justices Garchitorena and Balajadia, though reached unofficially,
may be perceived as a supervening event which rendered the Special Division's functions
superfluous. In any case, the fact that Justice Atienza signed his concurrence cured the defect, if
any, in the questioned judgment; again, an illustration of the "curative" effect of one's signature.
Petitioners are of the impression that this chain of events was meant to 'railroad' their conviction,
thus making the magistrates concerned vulnerable to criticism. While the Court is averse to
encouraging this kind of behavior in judges, it is of the view, however, that the assailed decision
is in harmony with the basic right of an accused to a speedy disposition of his case. This, to our
mind, is more important than any consideration of technical impropriety in resolving a case.
Summing up, was the guilt of petitioners proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution?
We distinguish.
In Criminal Case No. 17453, we do not concur with the conclusions reached by the court a quo.
The culpability of petitioners in this case stems from their entering into the lease agreement
(Exhibit "C") over the Sta. Cruz lot under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government, which, in this instance, is the LRTA. To prove this assertion,
the prosecution presented in evidence the sublease agreement (Exhibit "E") over the same
property showing the disparity in the rental price. While the authenticity of Exhibit "D," which was
used to prove the manifest and gross disadvantage to the government occasioned by Exhibit
"B," was admitted by the court and by the parties themselves, the validity of Exhibit "E" cannot,
even up to this point, be determined with certainty because it is a mere uncertified photocopy of
the original. Thus, the "gross and manifest" disadvantage to the government, which Exhibit "E"
was supposed to engender, remains an allegation which cannot be proved by other direct
evidence. The fact that only Dans objected to its admissibility does not mean that it is valid as to
Marcos. As a result, both petitioners should be, as they are hereby, acquitted in Criminal Case
No. 17453 on ground of reasonable doubt.
In Criminal Case No. 17450, we must further qualify our judgment.

As regards petitioner Dans, the Court is of the opinion that the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt in committing the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. We believe that his liability,
if any, could only stem from a knowledge of the terms of the sublease agreements, Exhibits "D"
and "E," which formed the core of the Court's appraisal of the manifest and gross disadvantage
to the government. Exhibit "E," as already discussed, was correctly disregarded by the court a
quo for being unauthenticated. Even though he was a Board Director of the PGHFI, Dans denied
any knowledge of the execution of Exhibits "D" and "E," and his denial was never disproved by
the prosecution. In fact, his signature does not appear in either sublease agreements. Neither
was the alleged conspiracy between him and Marcos established by the prosecution.
It is this Court's opinion, however, that the guilt of petitioner Marcos was proved by the State
beyond reasonable doubt. She was charged with violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, for executing a lease agreement (Exhibit "B") in behalf of the PGHFI, a private
enterprise of which she was the Chairman, over a lot located in Pasay City owned by the LRTA,
a government corporation of which she was undeniably also the Chairman. The consideration
therefor was shown to be unfair and unreasonable upon comparison with the rental price
stipulated in the sublease agreement (Exhibit "D") which she subsequently signed for the PGHFI
in favor of TNCC. That she should be held responsible is shown by the presence of her
signature in Exhibits "A" to "E," where she acts in different capacities. She cannot, under these
circumstances, claim ignorance of the great disparity between the rental price stipulated in the
lease and the sublease agreements. Consequently, in Criminal Case No. 17450, the conviction
of petitioner Marcos should be, as it is hereby, upheld.
Finally, the Court observes that the Sandiganbayan awarded damages to the People in the
amount of P32,172,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 17450 and P92,268,840.00 in Criminal Case
No. 17453. This must be accordingly corrected.
Considering that petitioners were acquitted in Criminal Case No. 17453 due to lack of evidence,
the Court deems them likewise free from any civil liability since the fact from which such liability
might arise no longer exists. 41
On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 17450, the Court observes that an error has been
committed in the computation of the damages to be awarded to the People. The trial court based
its figures on the amount it perceived to be the fair rental value of the Pasay lot, as estimated by
Cuervo, less the rental price stated in Exhibit "B." Thus, it deducted P102,760.00 (the stipulated
monthly rental for the Pasay lot) from P210,000.00 (Cuervo's estimate, as interpreted by the
court a quo) to arrive at a difference of P107,240.00, which was multiplied by 12 months to reach
an "annual loss" of P1,286,880.00. 42 This amount was then multiplied by the life span of the
lease contract, which is 25 years, to come up with the final award of P32,172,000.00. 43
Since the estimates of Cuervo were found to be mere "estimates," it is difficult to imagine why
the trial court used them as basis for its calculation of damages. As we have already
demonstrated, the gross and manifest disadvantage to the government in Criminal Case No.
17450 was determined by comparing Exhibits "B" and "D." The conviction of Marcos was
predicated on the nexus between these two documents, as well as on her obvious conflict of
interest in entering into them. By the same token, her civil liability must also be made to depend
on these two pieces of evidence. The correct figures should be those stated in Exhibits "B" and
"D," to wit: P734,000.00 (the stipulated monthly sublease rental for the Pasay lot) less
P102,760.00 (the agreed monthly lease price for said property) times 12 months times 25 years.
Thus, P734,000.00 - P102,760.00 = P631,240.00 x 12 months = P7,574,880.00 x 25 years =
P189,372,000.00.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) AFFIRMING the CONVICTION of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos in Criminal Case No. 17450,
with the modification that said petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the Light Rail Transit Authority
(LRTA) the amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE MILLION, THREE HUNDRED SEVENTYTWO THOUSAND PESOS (P189,372,000.00), as and by way of reimbursement for the
prejudice caused thereto resulting from the execution of the lease contract dated June 8, 1984;
and
2) REVERSING the CONVICTION of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos in Criminal Case No. 17453
and of petitioner Jose P. Dans, Jr. in Criminal Case No. 17450 and No. 17453, on ground of
reasonable doubt.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
FRANCISCO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I join the ponencia in the acquittal of petitioner Jose P. Dans, Jr. but find myself unable to agree
with the conviction of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, in the light of the peculiar circumstances
attendant herein.
This controversy raises seven issues:
1.) the constitutionality of Sec. 3(g) of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
2.) the sufficiency of the criminal informations,
3.) whether petitioner Marcos was properly represented by counsel during the trial,
4.) the validity of the decision rendered by the First Division of Sandiganbayan,
5.) the denial of petitioner Dans' demurrer,
For this reason, the Demurrer to Evidence of accused Jose P. Dans, Jr.,
dated December 7, 1992 is DENIED for lack of merit.
6.) appreciation/weight of the evidence, and

7.) the alleged lack of fair trial.
I concede the correctness of the ponencia's findings as to the: (a) constitutionality of Sec. 3(g) of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, (b) sufficiency of the informations, and (c) proper
representation of petitioner Marcos by counsel. However, with respect to the constitutionality
issued, I hasten to add that contrary to petitioner Marcos' claim, Sec. 3(g) is not a rider and
therefore is not violative of the "one-title-one-subject" provision of the Constitution. There is
nothing in the subject of Section 3(g), which reads:
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the
public officer profited or will profit thereby.
that is not germane to the title of RA 3019 which is "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act". This law covers wrongdoings committed by public officers. Section 3(g) does not
deal with "negligence/mistake" as erroneously argued by petitioner Marcos. Rather it
deals with a public officer's act of entering into a "dishonest transaction in relation to
official acts" per petitioner Marcos' own definition of "corruption." 1 Even
assuming arguendo, that the act punished under Section 3(g) may be considered as
negligent by nature, yet the opening statement of Section 3 clearly defined and
classified it as one "constituting a corrupt practice." 2 It is within the province of the
legislative body to define and describe what acts are criminal and to prescribe the
penalty therefor. In any case, petitioner Marcos failed to show a clear case of
unconstitutionality of Section 3(g) and thus was not able to rebut, even by a mere
scintilla of evidence or argument, the presumption of constitutionality of the assailed
provision.
I, however, strongly disagree with the ponencia's stand on the following points:
1. Re: Demurrer
The Sandiganbayan Resolution dated February 10, 1993 denying petitioner Dans' demurrer to
evidence, reads.
Since per testimony of witness Ramon Cuervo, Jr. (tsn., pp. 20 to 26,
August 13, 1992) that considering the nature of the terminal at the Sta. Cruz
Station, which would be subject of the lease contract between the Light Rail
Transit Authority and the PGH Foundation Inc. (Exhibit C), the rental of the
premises in question could go up to P400,000.00 per month if the LRTA
would put up the building as against the stipulated rental of P92,437.00
actually entered into between the parties, there would appear cause to
believe that the lease contract in question was grossly disadvantageous for
the government.
It was highly improper for the Sandiganbayan to have ruled on the demurrer on the
basis of the advanced testimony of defense witness Cuervo. A demurrer tests the
sufficiency or insufficiency solely of the prosecution evidence and the trial court's
resolution in connection therewith should be strictly limited to that. This is
unmistakably deducible from Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which states that a demurrer is filed and resolved when it is only the
prosecution that has rested its case. Thus:
Sec. 15. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution has rested its case,
the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence;
(1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be
heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss
without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and
submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution.
That witness Cuervo's testimony was taken in advance which the Sandiganbayan took judicial
notice of, is no justification at all for the premature consideration of said defense evidence. For
otherwise, it is tantamount to an adjudication on the merits even before the defense takes its
turn to present all evidence it deems necessary to its cause.
2. The jurisdictional fiasco between the First and Special Division.
There is merit in petitioner Marcos' contention that it should not be the First Division (with 3
members namely, Justices Garchitorena, Balajadia and Atienza) but the Special Division (with 5
members namely, Justices Garchitorena, Balajadia, Atienza, Del Rosario and Amores) that has
jurisdiction to render a "decision" on the case. The legal requirement of the unanimity in the
votes of three members of the (First) Division was not obtained due to the dissent of Justice
Atienza. As culled from the "Response" of Justice Garchitorena 3 to petitioner Marcos' motion for
his inhibition, in the initial voting, Justices Garchitorena and Balajadia voted to convict petitioner
Marcos in Criminal Cases 17450, 17451 and 17449 and to acquit her in Criminal Case 17453,
whereas Justice Atienza voted to convict her in Criminal Cases 17450 and 17453 and acquit her
in Criminal Cases 17449 and 17451. Thus, on September 15, 1993, Justice Garchitorena issued
Administrative Order 288-93 forming a Special Division and designated Justices Amores and Del
Rosario to "sit and participate in the rendition of a decision in Criminal Cases 17449 17453
People of the Philippines v. Imelda Marcos and Jose Dans." 4 On September 21, 1993, Justices
Garchitorena, Balajadia and Del Rosario, in the presence of another Sandiganbayan
Justices 5 not a member of either the First or Special Division, discussed their respective
positions while having lunch in a Quezon City restaurant. Justice Del Rosario had similar
conclusions with that of Justice Atienza. That same day (September 21), Justice Amores sent a
written request that he be given 15 days before submitting his "manifestation" which request was
considered by Justice Garchitorena as "pointless because of the agreement of Justice Balajadia
and the undersigned with the conclusion reached by Justice Atienza." 6 Upon arriving at the
Sandiganbayan office on the same day of September 21, 1993 Justice Garchitorena issued
Administrative Order 293-93 7dissolving the Special Division "after deliberation and discussion
among the members of the First Division," thus, not only pre-empting whatever opinion Justice
Amores might render in his manifestation but likewise rendering nugatory the formation of the
special division. A decision was earlier scheduled for promulgation on September 24, 1993
which turned out to be the now-assailed decision of the Sandiganbayan First Division.
From the foregoing, it is very disturbing why it was the First Division which rendered a "decision"
notwithstanding the fact that the Special Division had already been created precisely because
the First Division could no longer render any "decision" for lack of unanimity among its members,
as required by Section 5 of the Sandiganbayan law (P.D. 1606 as amended), which reads:
Sec. 5. Proceedings, how conducted; votes required. The unanimous
votes of the three justices in a division shall be necessary for the
pronouncement of a judgment. In the event that the three justices do not
reached a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate two other
justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them,
forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such
division shall be necessary for rendering a judgment. (emphasis supplied).
Verily, by virtue of the creation of the Special Division, it is axiomatic that the First
Division is divested of jurisdiction to pass judgment over the case in favor of the
Special Division. And there is nothing in the law or rules that allows the original
division to "re-render" a decision once a Special Division is already in place. Moreover,
it was too speculative for Justice Garchitorena to consider as pointless Justice
Amores' manifestation. Who knows, Justice Amores' opinion could have swayed the
other Justices, and thus a different outcome may have possibly resulted.
Another point. The Sandiganbayan law provides that:
The Sandiganbayan shall have its principal office in the Metro Manila area
and shall hold sessions thereat for the trial and determination of all cases
filed with it irrespective of the place where they may have arisen, . . . . 8
And its Rules of Procedure particularly clarifies that:
sessions of the Sandiganbayan, whether en banc or division, shall be held
in its principal office in the Metropolitan Manila area where it shall try and
determine all cases filed with it . . . . 9 (Emphasis supplied)
The Quezon City restaurant where Justices (Garchitorena, Balajadia and Del Rosario)
took lunch and where they, as per Justice Garchitorena's account, "discussed their
positions in these cases" 10 is not the principal office or an extension of
the Sandiganbayan. Neither was there any prior valid authorization to hold sessions
therein. Clearly then, whatever discussion and agreement was made among the
above-mentioned Justices present in that restaurant cannot be considered as "official

business" therefore, had no binding effect.
Moreover, the presence of a non-member of the First Division in the deliberation of the cases
likewise taints the decision with irregularity. Needless to state, the actual decision-making
process is supposed to be conducted onlyby the designated members of the First Division in
strict confidentiality. The "non-member" justice's presence in said deliberation is tantamount to a
public disclosure of court proceedings that require utmost secrecy. This, and the jurisdictional
fiasco between the First and Special Division as previously discussed, rendered the assailed
decision, sad to say, void.
3. Appreciation/Weight of evidence.
The centerpiece evidence for petitioners is the testimony of Mr. Cuervo who, in the light of his
unquestioned credentials as a reputable veteran real estate broker and appraiser, 11 qualified as
an expert witness. He gave a brief description of what a real estate broker and an appraiser do.
A broker earns his living through services by offering for sale properties that had been entrusted
to him, or to lease or administer them, or even for mortgage purposes. An appraiser, witness
Cuervo continues, gives a knowledgeable opinion on what would be a fair market value for a
specific property whether it be for sale, lease, mortgage or exchange. He also gives an opinion
on what should be a fair rental for the property, or what should be the selling price of a property if
the owner wishes to sell or exchange it with another property. 12
Now to the heart of Cuervo's testimony, hereby reduced to its simplest presentation. In
determining fair rental value of properties, first to be determined is the fair market value (FMV) of
the property. FMV of properties already for sale in the market is based on the market data
approach which considers how much properties in that particular area were sold, how much
properties were being offered for sale in said area and also inputs from fellow appraisers and
brokers. 13 The size, shape, frontage and configuration of the property are also very relevant in
determining FMV. 14 Fair rental is then computed on 6% to 8% of the FMV of the property, this
being the most reasonable and commonly used value for long-term leases of land in areas
where the value of the land appreciates more rapidly. 15
Thus, for the 7,340 sq. m. Pasay property, which is bare, Cuervo determined its FMV at
P1,000.00 to P1,500.00 per square meter. 16 This valuation considered offers for sale, actual
sales and appraisal jobs by witness Cuervo's own real estate firm of comparable lots in the
same vicinity which, as testified to by witness Cuervo and summarized by the Sandiganbayan,
are:
Offers for sale in the "Bulletin Today"
On January 20, 1984
629 sq. m. located along Taft
Avenue Pasay City, offered for sale
by Polo Manrique Realty with an
asking price of P2,500 per square

meter.
On October 16, 1983
RGV Realty offered for sale 1,000
sq. m. with improvement thereon
along Taft Avenue, Pasay City, at
P1.7 million or an average per
square meter of P1,688.
On September 4, 1984
average of P2,111.58 per square

meter. 17
FMV of the entire land, computed on P1,500.00/sq. m., is therefore, P11,010,000.00.
Multiplied by the higher value of 8%, P880,800.00 then will be the fair rental value of
the Pasay property per annum, 18 or P73,400.00 a month.
For the 1,141.2 sq. m. Sta. Cruz property, Cuervo assigned P10,000.00 to P15,000.00 as FMV
per square meter, also by means of "comparables" of offers for sale, appraisals made and
information from fellow realtors/appraisers, such as:
On May 28, 1983
R.F. Pula, another broker, offered

for sale 300 sq. m. of lot located on
F.B. Harrison near Libertad St.,
Pasay City, for P1,500 per square
meter.
604 sq. m. lot located along

Escolta offered by Uni-Invest
Management
Corporation
at
P6,000 per square meter;
On June 13, 1982
The firm of the witness itself had also made the following appraisal jobs:
323 sq. m. lot along Carriedo
Street near Plaza Miranda offered
for sale by Realtor R.F. Pula at
P18,575.00 per square meter;
On June 7, 1984
Property along EDSA and Vizcarra
St. close to Taft Avenue with an
area of 823 sq. m. at P2,500 per
square meter.
On April 5, 1982
439 sq. m. lot along Echague St. in
Quiapo offered for sale by Honoria
Development at P12,000 per
square meter.
On June 6, 1984
25 contiguous lots along Taft
Avenue, Maria Lim and Donada
Streets near De la Salle College
with a total area of 12,000 sq. m. at
P1,129 per square meter, with the
area
along
Taft
Avenue
corresponding to 2,156 square
meters at P1,700 per square meter.
His company, the Cuervo Appraisers Company, appraised two (2) properties
in that year, viz:
On August 1, 1984
for purposes of selling, the Odeon
Theater at Rizal Avenue cor. Recto
Avenue with an area of 1,580 sq.
m. appraised at P14,500 per
square meter (excluding the movie
house); and
On June 1, 1984
6 contiguous lots along Taft
Avenue, Buendia and Donada Sts.
with an area of 3,772 sq. m. at a
total value of P7,964,900 or an
On March 19, 1984
The
Philippine
Commercial
International (sic) Bank's site at
Plaza Sta. Cruz, more or less
diagonally across Dasmarias, with
an area of 679 sq. m. was
appraised at P8,500 per square
meter. 19
The problem with the Sandiganbayan's findings is that it completely ignored the
unchallenged testimony of witness Cuervo and instead supplanted the same with
valuations based on unfounded assumptions and/or hypothetical situations. For the
Pasay property, for instance the Sandiganbayan particularly Justice Garchitorena,
proceeded from his insistent assumed premise that the property was with "substantial
amount of improvement." We quote the pertinent sequence of questioning from the
transcript of stenographic notes, viz:
Fair rental value for this property was pegged at P969,907.68 per annum, or
P80,825.64 a month. 20 This assumed that the FMV per sq. m. is P10,623.76 at the
same value of 8%.
ATTY. BELO
Q What percent therefore of the fair market value
constitute the rental of this property we are talking
about?
The defense's position, in sum, is that the two (2) lease agreements could not have been grossly
disadvantageous to the government since the stipulated rentals for the Pasay and Sta. Cruz
properties (P102,760.00/month and P92,437.20/month, respectively) in fact exceed the
uncontradicted fair rental values assigned by expert witness Cuervo for both properties
(P73,400.00/month and P80,825.64/month, respectively). The lease agreements, obviously,
generated very fair rentals for the government.
A P880,800 per annum, which would be a fair rental.

Q On the other hand, the rental stipulated in this
contract is what?
But the Sandiganbayan, in convicting petitioners, found a much higher valuation. It said.
A P1,233,120.00, sir.
So we summarize.
Q So the rental stipulated in the contract exceeds what

you call fair rental for this property?
Considering the real estate values given by appraiser Cuervo,
A Yes, sir.
(1) compared with the fair rental value of P80,825.65 under moral
circumstances for ordinary properties there, the rental value the Sta. Cruz
area of the LRTA property (Exhibit "E") would go up by 5 times or up to
P400,000 "if they would use that space available for shops" (p. 23, TSN,
August 13, 1992); and
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q That is on the presumption that there are no buildings
on the land you are renting?
(2) the estimate given by witness Cuervo for the Pasay City Station would
still be twice as much as the stipulated rental in the lease agreement. "It
would be that way, your Honor, if they would put up the shops . . . ." (p.
25, id.)
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
In sum, according to witness Ramon F. Cuervo, Jr., whom accused Dans

qualified as a real estate broker and appraiser,
Q However, here we are talking of property with

substantial amount of improvement?
(a) the LRTA property in Pasay City was leased to the PGH Foundation at
1/2 of what the property should have been leased out for; and
A I am computing it based on bare land, your

Honor. 22 (Emphasis supplied).
(b) the Sta. Cruz property was leased to the PGH Foundation for 1/4 of what
that property should have been leased out for.
Obviously there is gross disparity here. 21
xxx xxx xxx

PJ GARCHITORENA
Now, the Court will ask questions.
Q Yes.
Q Mr. Cuervo, when you were talking about real estate

both in Pasay and in Sta. Cruz, you were talking about
buildings and properties that are either empty or of
buildings in the same vein of no useful construction or
else of ordinary construction.
A That is because those improvements were not yet

there. I am giving the value of the land as fair (sic,
should be bare) not as already a station.
WITNESS
A In this particular property, the one in Sta. Cruz, the
building was demolished.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q We are talking of Pasay.
WITNESS
A The one in Pasay, I was told some improvements
there were not yet existing at that time.
Q Obviously from your information the construction
were of no significant value?
A Right.
Q We, of course, know that these properties are. These
were the terminals, the important stations of the Light
Railway Transport System, and if we did not know then,
we know now that these constructions were of heavy
designs and because of the nature of the activity there
it will be a higher pedestrian traffic area which for retail
purposes would be, presumably, a very important
valuable piece of property, do you agree with that?
A Yes, for retail specially.
Q In that light, are you still prepared to tell us that
insofar as Pasay is concerned, your appraisal in 1984
would still be rated at the same level that you were
rating similar property which were listed among realtors
in 1984?
Q So that while, as a general statement, you would say

for ordinary realtor in the Pasay area, your listing on
Exhibit 4 would be valid. In fact, everybody in this
courtroom knows that the property we are discussing
here was not an ordinary piece of land?
A Was never an ordinary piece of property before it was
built. . . .
Q Insofar as the subject matter now is concerned which
is an LRT terminal?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you now be in a position to make a statement as
to what a fair market value of the property would be, if
not for acquisition, . . . . . what would be the value which
would give you a fair rental?
A If that land would fair now?
Q Considering what it is being used for.
A The only thing that could be of value is the potential
of what rental it could get by retailing but not as station.
Q So, as a retail outlet, or whatever, supposing you are
going to lease it so that you could turn around and use
it for advertising space, use it for particular stalls,
stores, may be jeepney or tricycle terminal or whatever
because it is an exchange, would you be in a position to
do appraisals for rental value?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Supposing the LRT at that time had engaged you
and say, "Mr. Cuervo, we want to make money
additionally out of this area, can you consult with us"?
A The value that I gave between P1,000 to P1,500?
A We would go on hypothetical. If there were no stores

there at this point and time, then we will consider the
rental rates of commercial properties of the immediate
area, and with the market there we will also go to
hypothetical approach to this area. Considering that it is
a catchment area where thousands of people would be
passing by in front of . . . . .
Q That was your assumed fair market value for what

period?
PJ GARCHITORENA
A That is the valuation.
Q Have you thought of what values you would put

there?
Q No, Mr. Cuervo, we are taking this out in testimony

and we want to be able to read well. What was your
estimates for the fair rental value per square meter of
Pasay, the one that you gave us yesterday.
A No I did not get to that point.
A Then we have P425,885.

Q Would be for what period, monthly period?
Q Would you be in a position, no you would not. But

obviously, it would be much more than the values you
gavr (sic) us on the basis of your listings?
You gave us a figure yesterday. You were telling us that

your land value is ranged from P1,000 to P1,500 in that
area. Under this circumstances, what would be your fair
rental at that time?
A The value that I gave you in 1983?
You can use your calculator.
Q We are talking of 1984. We are talking about whether

Mr. Dans was remiss in that property in 1984. What
would be the multiples that you would use if you were
the consultant of the LRTA?
A Taking a high figure of P1,500 times .08 would be

P120.00 per square meter, your Honor.
A I would go to the prevailing rental rates of CANTIMAR

(sic) and all the other stores, and the Baclaran activity,
and then . . . .
Q Rental?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q So, for the entire property of 7,340 square meters
Q Can you given (sic) us the multiples that you would

use if this is the latest rental ub (sic) the area, would it
be more, the same or less?
A P10.00 per square meter.

Q P10.00 per square meter would be fair rental?
A Definitely more comparing it to Cantimar (sic) and the

Baclaran area would probably be 2 to 3 times more.
Q Alright, let's take it at 3. So, your testimony yesterday
was what? Do you recall? Your estimate yesterday
without inputing the LRT, was what again?
A P63,039.00
PJ GARCHITORENA
A Fair rental at that time

Q With an area of 7,340, you were saying that 73,400
would be of the ordinary property then?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Now, if we talk of a multiple of 3, then we are talking
of P210,000 more or less?
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q Per month, what was the rental agreement under
Exhibit 3-C?
ATTY. BELO
It was P102,760 monthly.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q So, if we are going to look at your figures, your
estimated rental of P210,000 per month would be twice
as much as the rental fixed in the Lease Contract of the
LRTA with the PGH Foundation?
A Yes, your Honor. 23 (Emphasis supplied)
From the assumption/hypothesis that the Pasay property was with "substantial
amount of improvement" ("LRT station" of "heavy design" which makes it a "higher
pedestrian traffic area"), the Sandiganbayan was able to extract from witness Cuervo
a valuation "2 to 3 times more" of Cuervo's original input of P73,400.00/month. The
court then multiplied P73,400.00 by the higher multiple of 3, yielding the figure
"P210,000.00 more or less" which led it to conclude that the P102,760.00/month lease
of the Pasay property is only "1/2 of what the property should have been leased out
for." Certainly, witness Cuervo had no choice but to give answers to the series of
hypothetical questions hurled by the Sandiganbayan. It is evident, however, that
witness Cuervo was keen enough to protect his original figures from being lost in the
court's sea of assumptions, as he vigilantly pointed out, at certain points, that:
as based on the environment there, all the way to

Escolta and going all the way to North to Recto, and the
fair lease rental that you gave us, at that time, would
have been what?
A We came out with P969,970 against the P1,109,246
which was the contract.
Q So the contract was . . . .
A Was a little bit high.
Q So the contract was reading at P1.1 million?
A That is right, your Honor?.
Q That was the lease rental of LRTA in favor of PGH
Foundation. But we are talking about a general
situation. Now, we have this particular station which
was not only terminal but a crossroad really because
you had people from all sides of Quiapo, Sta. Cruz,
Rizal Avenue which will board presumably all the way to
Baclaran and all the way to Caloocan. So, you have a
bigger mixture of people coming in. What would be your
multiple here?
WITNESS
A I would go as high as 5, your Honor.
(1) his computation is based on bare land, 24 and not as station because the improvements
mentioned by the Sandiganbayan (LRT terminals, constructions of heavy designs) were not yet
there, 25
Q Now, you estimated the proper rental value per

month for the property to be what?
(2) that some improvements on the property were of no significant value, 26 and
A (Witness making his computation), P80,825.64, your

Honor.
(3) he and the Sandiganbayan were "going on hypothetical". 27
Q For the total area monthly?
Similar state of affairs was present in connection with the Sta. Cruz property. Here, the
Sandiganbayan arrived at P400,000.00/month rental for the property, or about 5 times witness
Cuervo's valuation of P80,654.64/month, on the same assumed premise that the property was
with "substantial amount of improvement." We go again to the transcript of stenographic notes:
A The total area divided by . . . . . P70.82 per square

meter, your Honor. P70.82 per square meter was the
multiple for the 1,141 square meters.
Q Now with regard to the Sta. Cruz terminal, again the

figures you gave us in Exhibit 7 which is the lower half
of your listings were again on the basis of the property
Q That was your professional opinion?

A Yes, your Honor.
Q One more time. Your estimated professional opinion

at that time, the rental value would be. . . .
WITNESS
A Yes, if they would use that space available for shops.
A I came out with the figure P969,970.49 for the year.

PJ GARCHITORENA
Q Is this per square meter or for the entire property?
A For the entire property divided by 12, we come out
with P80,825.64.
Yes, of course. We are talking here of all other things

being equal except the fact that we have a railroad
station, a cross terminal.
Q So, this would be our fair rental on the optimum

condition?
So, here we are saying that P400,000 a month would

be a good rental?
A Yes, sir.
A Will they be putting up the building?
Q Now, our Lease Contract there, Exhibit 6, tells us. . . .

.
PJ GARCHITORENA
ATTY. BELO
It does not matter. See, if the LRT put up the building it

will ask for a fair return of the property. Whoever put up
the building will charge for the rent.
Under the Lease Contract is P92,437.20 a month.

WITNESS
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q If you say that the fair rental value was P80,000 but
because of the construction of the particular nature of
the condition of the Sta. Cruz Station or the Carriedo
Station, you would use a factor of 5, a multiple of 5,
then you would be talking something like P400,000 per
month rental. So on that basis, the rental of the LRT
authority in favor of the PGH was almost 1/4 as much
as you think the rental should have been?
ATTY. BELO
A If the tenant will put up the building his capital outlay

on his own will be beside the rent. While if the LRT will
put up the building, then the rent. . . . . . . .
PJ GARCHITORENA
That is correct, we are talking here about cost of
money. There is a beautiful phrase for that in finance,
how you project the value of the money-etc.
Objection, your Honor, that is not the conclusion. You

see this Honorable Court is inputing the value as station
now but the witness is testifying on the fair market value
at that time.
So, these are our figures now, P400,000 more or less is

a good asking price or fair rental price insofar as the
LRT authority were concerned. Nonetheless, we are
told that the monthly rental for the Sub-Lease in the
Sta. Cruz property is how much per much, (sic) for the
entire property?
PJ GARCHITORENA
A The Lease Contract is P255,797.50 a month.
Correct, but we also ask him to input now the character

of the railway station. That is why he said the railway
station would make it much valuable 5 times more.
Q For the entire property?

A For the entire property.
Q So, based on your estimates it will still be 1/2 as

much as you would charge if you were the LRT on the
basis of the input? So, even if sub-leased to TransNational Construction Corporation was still 50 per cent
cheaper than what you would have charge if you were
going to advice the LRT as to what the rental would be.
A It would be that way, you Honor, if they would put up
the shop, this is just the land.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q Except that we know now that what was being leased
was not land but the facilities which would be available
in the LRT terminal.
WITNESS
A The building was built by the lessee. 28
Note that counsel for petitioner Dans, Atty. Belo, apparently disturbed by the trend of
the Sandiganbayan's questioning, could no longer help but raise the objection that the
court is "inputing the value as station now but the witness is testifying on the fair
market value at that time." Atty. Belo's objection is well-taken inasmuch as witness
Cuervo's uncontradicted valuation of P80,825.64 as fair rental on the "optimum
condition" 29 is premised on the fact that the Sta. Cruz property is bare, ". . . just a
land" 30 the Isetann building which used to stand thereon having been demolished
prior to the execution of the lease agreement. 31 This is supported by the Sta. Cruz
property lease agreement itself which, in its first "WHEREAS" clause, described the
Sta. Cruz property to be "located at the former site of the Isetann Building at the
President Hotel Building in the District of Santa Cruz, City of Manila, . . . ." 32
The Sandiganbayan, in the course of the examination, would also appear to make issue of the
fact that the PGHFI-TNCC sublease agreement over the Pasay property for
P734,000/month 33 was very much higher than the P102,760.00/month rental under the LRTAPGHFI lease contract or even witness Cuervo's valuation of P73,400.00/month, which witness
Cuervo admitted to be "extraordinary high" the reason/s for which is beyond his knowledge.
Q As a professional because you are presented here as
an expert, do you know of any reason why the
consideration in the Sub-Lease Agreement was very
much higher than the consideration in the Lease
Contract after only 19 days?
A I am sorry I cannot give you an answer to that. All I

know is that the rental of the sub-lease is extra-ordinary
high. There must be some other reasons other than my
knowledge. 34
This, however, is useless against petitioner Dans since his signature, it must be stressed, does
not appear on the sublease agreement, the only signatory therein in behalf of the PGHFI is, to
repeat, petitioner Marcos as Chairman of the Board. Furthermore, petitioner Dans testified that
he did not participate in the negotiation for the PGHFI-TNCC sublease contract. 35 It was only a
few months after the execution of the sublease agreement that petitioner Dans learned about
it. 36 In fact, petitioner Dans, as PGHFI board member, was able to attend only one board
meeting the very first which was the organizational meeting but the PGHFI-TNCC sublease
contract was not discussed therein. 37
The Sandiganbayan also sniped at the following stipulation found in both lease contracts:
Should there be a delay in any payment of the rental consideration
equivalent to one year, the LESSOR shall have the right to take possession
of the premises, the property and improvements thereon, the ownership of
all improvements thereby accruing to the LESSOR. 38
and then proceeded to say that:
As if this disadvantage were not enough, in both acts, non-payment of
rentals by the PGH Foundation was not actionable unless the rentals were
in arrears for one year (par. II, 4, Exhibits "B" and "C"). The LRTA could be,
therefore, deprived of the enjoyment of the rentals from its two valuable
pieces of real estate or of the interest income therefrom for almost one year
without any recourse for the LRTA. And if the LRTA needed any money
which it could have otherwise gotten from the rentals of the properties, it
would have to borrow money from other sources and pay interest for eleven
(11) months because the PGH Foundation had to be in arrears for twelve
(12) months before the LRTA could take any action.
This was not only being over generous; it was cross abandonment of any
effort to get decent terms for the LRTA. 39
This is a very narrow interpretation of said stipulation. I subscribe to petitioner Dans'
view that the stipulation gives the LRTA as lessor the "additional right" to recover
possession of the two (2) leased properties and to acquire ownership of all
improvements introduced thereon if and when PGHFI incurs arrears equivalent to one
year rental. It certainly does not bar the LRTA from availing of other legal remedies not
expressly contained in the contract, for the principle is well settled that an existing law
enters into and forms part of a valid contract without need for the parties expressly
making reference to it. 40
The bottomline of it all is that the evidence, as I see it, tilts heavily in favor of petitioners.
Conviction must rest, as well-settled jurisprudence tells us, not only the weakness of the defense
but on the strength of the prosecution. 41"When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden, an
accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf." 42 The weakness of the State's case is
made glaringly evident not only because the documentary evidence it presented do not, by
themselves, prove the crime/s charged against petitioners, but by its dismal failure to debunk
witness Cuervo's expert testimony in open court. And the Sandiganbayan cannot save the day
for the prosecution by considering as evidence testimony made in response to its hypothetical
questions that find no basis at all on the records. The guiding rule is that hypothetical questions
must include only facts that are supported by evidence and should embody substantially all facts
relating to the particular matter upon which an expert opinion is sought to be elicited, but they
need not include all facts pertinent to the ultimate issue. 43 The chief test, therefore, of the
competency of a hypothetical question is whether it is a full and fair recital of all the essential
evidence disclosed by the record on the particular issue which is involved. But where (as in this
case) the question assumes facts in direct conflict with the undisputed evidence , or omits
material facts upon which a determination of the problem depends, the hypothetical questions
become misleading and it is then likely to lead the witness to a false conclusion. 44 Thus, the
testimony given by witness Cuervo is, to my mind, the most telling evidence in this case, for
testimony to the value of real estate by experts whose opinions are derived from an intimate
knowledge of the property in question and of the sales made in the immediate vicinity carries
great weight 45 if not the greatest weight when, as in this case, it is uncontradicted.
A Yes, your Honor.

Q However, here we are talking of property with
substantial amount of improvement?
A I am computing it based on bare land, your
Honor. 47 (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
PJ GARCHITORENA
Now, the Court will ask questions.
Q Mr. Cuervo, when you were talking about real estate
both in Pasay and in Sta. Cruz, you were talking about
buildings and properties that are either empty or of
buildings in the same vein of no useful construction or
else of ordinary construction.
4. The undue interference of the Sandiganbayan Justices in the presentation of the case.
WITNESS
The transcript of stenographic notes supports petitioner Dans' charge of "unfair alliance" of the
Sandiganbayan with the prosecution during the trial particularly in the examination of the
witnesses.
A In this particular property, the one in Sta. Cruz, the

building was demolished.
PJ GARCHITORENA
For starters, the court questions were so numerous which, as per petitioner Dans' count, totalled
179 compared to prosecutor Queruben's questions which numbered merely 73. 46 More
noteworthy, however, is that the court propounded leading, misleading and baseless hypothetical
questions all rolled into one. And what appears to be the central assumption of the court is the
following:
Q We are talking of Pasay.

WITNESS
A The one in Pasay, I was told some improvements
there were not yet existing at that time.
xxx xxx xxx

Q So the rental stipulated in the contract exceeds what
you call fair rental for this property?
A Yes, sir.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q That is on the presumption that there are no buildings
on the land you are renting?
WITNESS
Q Obviously from your information the construction

were of no significant value?
A Right.
Q We, of course, know what these properties
are. These were the terminals, the important stations of
the Light Railway Transport System, and if we did not
know then, we know now that these constructions were
of heavy designs and because of the nature of the
activity there it will be a higher pedestrian traffic area
which for retail purposes would be, presumably, a very

important valuable piece of property, do you agree with
that?
Q Will you now be in a position to make a statement as

to what a fair market value of the property would be, if
not for acquisition, . . . . . what would be the value which
would give you a fair rental?
A Yes, for retail specially.

A If that land would fair now?
Q In that light, are you still prepared to tell us that
insofar as Pasay is concerned, your appraisal in 1984
would still be rated at the same level that you were
rating similar property which were listed among realtors
in 1984?
A The value that I gave between P1,000 to P1,500?
Q Yes.
A That is because those improvements were not yet
there. I am giving the value of the land as fair not as
already a station.
Q Considering what it is being used for.

A The only thing that could be of value is the potential
of what rental it could get by retailing but not as station.
Q So, as a retail outlet, or whatever, supposing you are
going to lease it so that you could turn around and use
it for advertising space, use it for particular stalls,
stores, may be jeepney or tricycle terminal or whatever
because it is an exchange, would you be in a position
to do appraisal for rental value?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q So that while, as a general statement, you would say

for ordinary realtor in the Pasay area, your listing on
Exhibit 4 would be valid. In fact, everybody in this
courtroom knows that the property we are discussing
here was not an ordinary piece of land?
A Was never an ordinary piece of property before it was
built . . . . . .
Q Insofar as the subject matter now is concerned which
is an LRT terminal?
A Yes, sir. 48 (Emphasis ours)
Aware that witness Cuervo's assessments of FMV of the property pertains to bare land,
respondent court (PJ Garchitorena), during the examination of the witness, cunningly entices
and misleads the latter that the subject conversation is a piece of land with substantial
improvements. A priori convinced that the rentals were disadvantageous to the government, the
court was not only assuming, but likewise insisting upon Cuervo that the valuation he gives
pertains to land with improvements contrary to what the witness had testified that what he is
giving value is a bare land.
From this "mother" assumption flowed the continuous string of follow-up assumptions of the
court scattered all over the transcript of stenographic notes. Thus:
Q Supposing the LRT at that time had engaged you

and say, "Mr. Cuervo, we want to make money
additionally out of this area, can you consult with us"?
A We would go on hypothetical. If there were no stores
there at this point and time, then we will consider the
rental rates of commercial properties of the immediate
area, and with the market there we will also go to
hypothetical approach to this area. Considering that it is
a catchment area where thousands of people would be
passing by in front of . . . . . . . . . . .
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q Have you thought of what values you would put
there?
A No I did not get to that point.
Q Would be in a position, no you would not. But,
obviously, it would be much more than the values you
gavr (sic) us on the basis of your listings?
A The value that I gave you in 1983?
(For the Pasay Property)
Q We are talking of 1984. We are talking about whether

Mr. Dans was remiss in that property in 1984. What
would be the multiples that you would us if you were
the consultant of the LRTA?
A Taking a high figure of P1,500 times .08 would be

P120.00 per square meter, your Honor.
A I would go to the prevailing rental rates of CANTIMAR

(sic) and all the other stores, and the Baclaran activity,
and then . . . .
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Can you given us the multiples that you would use if

this is the latest rental ub (sic) the area, would it be
more, the same or less?
Q Rental?
Q So, for the entire property of 7,340 square meters

A P10.00 per square meter.
Q P10.00 per square meter would be fair rental?
A Definitely more comparing it to Cantinmar (sic) and

the Baclaran area would probably be 2 to 3 times more.
Q Alright, let's take it at 3. So, your testimony yesterday
was what? Do You recall? Your estimate yesterday
without imputing the LRT, was what again?
A Fair rental at that time.

Q With an area or 7,340, you were saying that 73,400
would be of the ordinary property then?
A Yes, your Honor.
A P63,039.00.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q That was your assumed fair market value for what
period?
Q Now, if we talk of a multiple of 3, then we are talking

of P210,000 more or less?
PJ GARCHITORENA
A Then we have P425,885.
Q Per month, what was the rental agreement under

Exhibit 3-C?
Q Would be for what period, monthly period?
ATTY. BELO
A That is the valuation.
It was P102,760 monthly.
Q No, Mr. Cuervo, we are taking this out in testimony

and we want to be able to read well. What was your
estimates for the fair rental value per square meter of
Pasay, the one that you gave us yesterday.
PJ GARCHITORENA
You gave us a figure yesterday. You were telling us that

your land value is ranged from P1,000 to P1,500 in that
area. Under this circumstances, what would be your fair
rental at that time?
You can use your calculator.
Q So, if we are going to look at your figures, your

estimated rental of P210,000 per month would be twice
as much as the rental fixed in the Lease Contract of the
LRTA with the PGH Foundation?
A Yes, your Honor. 49
(For the Sta. Cruz Property)
Q Now with regard to the Sta. Cruz terminal, again the

figures you gave us in Exhibit 7 which is the lower half
of your listings were again on the basis of the property
as based on the environment there, all the way to
Escolta and going all the way to North to Recto, and
the fair lease rental that you gave us, at that time,
would have been what?
A Yes, your Honor.
A We came out with P969,970 against the P1,109,246

which was the contract.
Q Is this per square meter or for the entire property?
Q So the contract was . . . . . . . . .

A Was a little bit high.
Q So the contract was reading at P1.1 million?
A That is right, your Honor?
Q That was the lease rental of LRTA in favor of PGH
Foundation. But we are talking about a general
situation. Now, we have this particular station which
was not only terminal but a crossroad really because
you had people from all sides of Quiapo, Sta.Cruz,
Rizal Avenue which will board presumably all the way
to Baclaran and all the way to Caloocan. So, you have
a bigger mixture of people coming in. What would be
your multiple here?
WITNESS
A I would go as high as 5, your Honor.
Q Now, you estimated the proper rental value per
month for the property to be what?
A (Witness making his computation). P80,825.64, your
Honor.
Q For the total area monthly?
A The total area divided by. . . . . . . . . P70.82 per
square meter, your Honor, P70.82 per square meter
was the multiple for the 1,141 square meters.
Q One more time. You estimated professional opinion

at that time, the rental value would be. . . . . . . .
A I came out with the figure P969,970.49 for the year.
A For the entire property divided by 12, we come out

with P80,825.64.
Q So, this would be our fair rental on the optimum
condition?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, our Lease Contract there, Exhibit 6, tells us. . . .
...
ATTY. BELO
Under the Lease Contract is P92,437.20 a month.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q If you say that the fair rental value was P80,000 but
because of the construction of the particular nature of
the condition of the Sta. Cruz Station or the Carriedo
Station, you would use a factor of 5, a multiple of 5,
then you would be talking something like P400,000 per
month rental. So on that basis, the rental of the LRT
authority in favor of the PGH was almost 1/4 as much
as you think the rental should have been?
ATTY. BELO
Objection, your Honor, that is not the conclusion. You
see this Honorable Court is inputing the value as
station now but the witness is testifying on the fair
market value at that time.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q That was your professional opinion?
Correct, but we also ask him to input now the character

of the railway station. That is why he said the railway
station would make it much valuable 5 times more.
Q For the entire property?
WITNESS
Q So, based on your estimates it will still be 1/2 as

much as you would charge if you were the LRT on the
basis of the input? So, even if sub-leased to TransNational Construction Corporation was still 50 per cent
cheaper than what you would have charge if you were
going to advice the LRT as to what the rental would be.
A Yes, if they would use that space available for shops.

PJ GARCHITORENA
Yes, of course. We are talking here of all other things
being equal except the fact that we have a railroad
station, a cross terminal.
So, here we are saying that P400,000 a month would
be a good rental?
A Will they be putting up the building?
PJ GARCHITORENA.
It does not matter. See, if the LRT put up the building it
will ask for a fair return of the property. Whoever put up
the building will charge for the rent. . . .
WITNESS
A If the tenant will put up the building his capital outlay
on his own will be beside the rent. While if the LRT will
put up the building, then the rent. . . .
PJ GARCHITORENA
That is correct, we are talking here about cost of
money. There is a beautiful phrase for that in finance,
how you project the value of the money- etc.
So, these are our figures now, P400,000 more or less is
a good asking price or fair rental price insofar as the
LRT authority were concerned. Nonetheless, we are
told that the monthly rental for the Sub-Lease in the
Sta. Cruz property is how much per much, for the entire
property?
A The Lease Contract is P255,797.50 a month.
A For the entire property.
A It would be that way, your Honor, if they would put up

the shop. This is just a land.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q Except that we know now that what was being
leased was not land but the facilities which would be
available in the LRT terminal.
WITNESS
A The building was built by the lessee. 50
The court questions were far from being clarificatory. They were, in the main, queries
that have no basis on the records. It has been said that purely abstract questions,
assuming facts or theories for which there is no foundation in the evidence, are not
admissible as a matter of right, although such questions may be permitted on crossexamination for the purpose of testing the knowledge of the witness as to the subject
on which he has testified. 51 But cross-examination is the exclusive function of the
advocate. Thus, any trend of court questioning which shows even a slight semblance
of cross-examination is already offensive to fundamental requirements of due process,
for, this Court in "People v. Opida" 52 has admonished that: ". . . the judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to the
parties that his decision will be just. The parties are entitled to no less than this, as a
minimum guaranty of due process." In "Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan", 53 this Court en
banc highlighted the following observation and limitations of a judge's/justice's
participation in the conduct of the trial. Thus:
. . . It is indeed an impressive proportion (referring to the volume of
questions of the trial judge), but no such mathematical computation is of
itself determinative. However, taking all this in conjunction with the long and
vigorous examination of the defendant himself by the judge, . . . , we fear
that in its zeal for arriving at the facts the court here conveyed to the jury too
strong an impression of the court's belief in the defendant's probable guilt to
permit the jury freely to perform its own function of independent
determination of the facts.
xxx xxx xxx

This Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses
with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material point which presents
itself during the trial of a case over which he presides. But not only should
his examination be limited to asking "clarificatory" questions, the right
should be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should
stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the
conduct of the trial.
xxx xxx xxx
A trial judge should not participate in the examination of witnesses as to
create the impression that he is allied with the prosecution.
We doubt not that the sole motive of the learned judge was to ascertain the
truth of the transaction, but it is never proper for a judge to discharge the
duties of a prosecuting attorney. However anxious a judge may be for the
enforcement of the law, he should always remember that he is as much
judge in behalf of the defendant accused of crime, and whose liberty is in
jeopardy, as he is judge in behalf of the state, for the purpose of
safeguarding the interests of society.
Ordinarily it is not good practice for the presiding judge himself to examine
witnesses at length. The circumstances may be such in a given case as to
justify the court in so doing. . . . This court, however, has more than once
said that the examination of witnesses is the more appropriate function of
counsel, and the instances are rare and the conditions exceptional which
will justify the presiding judge in conducting an extensive examination. It is
always embarrassing for counsel to object to what he may deem improper
questions by the court. Then, in conducting a lengthy examination, it would
be almost impossible for the judge to preserve a judicial attitude. While he is
not a mere figurehead or umpire in a trial, and it is his duty to see that
justice is done, he will usually not find it necessary to conduct such
examinations. The extent to which this shall be done must largely be a
matter of discretion, to be determined by the circumstances of each
particular case, but in so doing he must not forget the function of the judge
and assume that of an advocate. . . .
While it is true that the manner in which a witness shall be examined is
largely in the discretion of the trial judge, it must be understood that we
have not adopted in this country the practice of making the presiding judge
the chief inquisitor. It is better to observe our time-honored custom of orderly
judicial procedure, even at the expense of occasional delays. . . . The judge
is an important figure in the trial of a cause, and while he has the right, and
it is often his duty, to question witnesses to the end that justice shall prevail,
we can conceive of no other reason, for him to take the trial of the cause out
of the hands of counsel.
The examination of witnesses is the more appropriate function of counsel,

and it is believed the instances are rare and the conditions exceptional in a
high degree which will justify the presiding judge in entering upon and
conducting an extended examination of a witness, and that the exercise of a
sound discretion will seldom deem such action necessary or advisable.
He [the judge] may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote
expedition, and prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some
obscurity, but he should bear in mind that his undue interference,
impatience, or participation in the examination of witnesses, or a severe
attitude on his part toward witnesses, especially those who are excited or
terrified by the unusual circumstances of a trial, may tend to prevent the
proper presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in
respect thereto.
The impartiality of the judge his avoidance of the appearance of
becoming the advocate of either one side or the other of the pending
controversy is a fundamental and essential rule of special importance in
criminal cases. . . . .
Our courts, while never unmindful of their primary duty to administer justice,
without fear or favor, and to dispose of these cases speedily and in as
inexpensive a manner as is possible for the court and the parties, should
refrain from showing any semblance of one-sided or more or less partial
attitude in order not to create any false impression in the minds of the
litigants. For obvious reasons, it is the bounden duty of all to strive for the
preservation of the people's faith in our courts.
Time and again this Court has declared that due process requires no less
than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Bolstering this requirement, we
have added that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear
to be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will
be just. The parties are entitled to no less than this, as a minimum guaranty
of due process.
Let it thus be stressed anew at this juncture that convictions are based on the actual
commission of crimes, to be ascertained with the pure objectivity of the true judge who
must uphold the law for all without favor or malice and always with justice. 54
Finally, it is incorrect for the Sandiganbayan, per its Resolution of November 13, 1996 denying
petitioner Dans' motion for reconsideration, to say, in response to petitioner's objection anent
Presiding Justice Garchitorena's questions during the trial, that:
. . . It is now too late in the day to object to the alleged leading, misleading,
and badgering questions of the Presiding Justice Garchitorena and to ask to
expunge the answers thereto from the record. Needless to say, Engr. Dans
should have done so when the supposed objectionable nature of the
questions and/or answers were propounded or given. As it happened, he

did not even raise his objections at the close of the testimony of Mr. Cuervo.
He did not also ask re-direct questions to correct whatever mistakes or
misimpressions allegedly crept into Mr. Cuervo's testimony. Instead, he
formally offered the entire testimony without making any exceptions or
reservations. 55
In "Tabuena", this Court took cognizance of the Sandiganbayan's active participation
in the examination of witnesses even when petitioners did not raise this issue at all
either in the trial court or in their appeal before us, justifying the same under the
doctrine that "an appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the
duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment
appealed from whether they are made the subject of assignments of error or
not." 56 What more when, as in this case, this objection has been raised while the case
is still within the power of review of the trial court.
Thus, purely from the legal standpoint, with the evident weakness of the prosecution's case and
the procedural aberrations that marred the trial, it is simply unsound and impossible to treat
differently each petitioner who found themselves in one and the same situation. Indeed, our
regained democracy, creditably, is successfully bailing us out from the ruins of the authoritarian
regime, and it expects that government efforts in going after the plunderers of that dark past
remain unrelenting and decisive. But let us not, in our anxiety to carry out this duty, for a moment
forget that our criminal justice system is not a popularity contest where freedom and punishment
are determined merely by the fame or infamy of the litigants. "The scales of justice", it has been
aptly said, 57 "must hang equal and, in fact, should even be tipped in favor of the accused
because of the constitutional presumption of innocence.Needless to stress, this right is available
to every accused, whatever his present circumstance and no matter how dark and repellent his
past." Culpability for crimes must always take its bearing from evidence and universal precepts
of due process lest we sacrifice in mocking shame once again the very liberties we are
defending.
I, therefore, vote also for the acquittal of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos in Criminal Case No.
17450.
Melo, J., concurs and dissents.
1. Stab wounds which was approximately two inches

in length, parallel to the ribs and is located 1 1/2
inches below the right nipple on the right anterior
axillary line and on the fifth intercostal space. On
probing the wound was penetrating immediately up
to the left parasternal border approximately hitting
the heart;
2. Hacking wound 9 inches in length extending from
the coracoid process of the left clavicle passing
between the left anterior and the left mid axillary line
up to the left 4th intercostal space including all
muscle underlying the skin exposing the ribs.
Cause of death: Internal hemorrhage due to stab
wound.
G.R. No. 90198 November 7, 1995

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO PLASENCIA y DESAMPARADO alias "Tonying," ROBERTO DESCARTIN y
PASICARAN alias"Ruby"
and
JOELITO
(JULITO),
DESCARTIN
y
PASICARAN, accused-appellants.
VITUG, J.:
Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and Joelito (Julito) Descartin were accused of
robbery with homicide in an information, dated 20 December 1984, that read:
That on or about the 29th day of November, 1984 at around 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon, more or less, in sitio San Juan, Barangay
Patao, Municipality of Bantayan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with
treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior
number and strength and with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault
and use personal violence upon Herminio Mansueto, thereby inflicting
upon him the following physical injuries:
after which the body was placed inside a plastic bag and brought to an
open sea by the pump boat owned by Roberto Descartin y Pasicaran
and operated by Joelito Descartin y Pasicaran and dumped to the water
by herein accused, and as a result of which said Herminio Mansueto
died, herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to gain, took and carried away
the personal property belonging to Herminio Mansueto, namely: one (1)
Seiko 5 "Stop Watch" valued at P3,000.00; one (1) Bicycle (standard
size) valued at P1,000.00; and cash in the amount of P10,000.00, all in
the total amount of FOUR-TEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P14,000.00),
Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of said oner (sic) in
the said total sum.
All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, and
the generic aggravating circumstance of known premeditation.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
When arraigned, all the accused entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge; whereupon,
trial commenced.
The prosecution sought to establish, as follows:
At around ten o'clock in the morning of 29 November 1984, Herminio Mansueto, wearing a
blue and white striped t-shirt, maong pants, Seiko 5 stop watch and a pandan hat, left on
his bicycle for Barangay Patao, Bantayan, Cebu. He had with him P10,000.00 cash which
he would use to purchase hogs from a certain "Ruby."
In Patao, Francisca Espina, also known in the locality as Pansing and whose house was
just across the street from the respective residences of the three accused, saw at the
roadside Herminio Mansueto and Roberto Descartin alias "Ruby" engaged in conversation.
Pansing approached them and asked Mansueto if he would be interested in buying two of
her pigs for P1,400.00. Mansueto said "yes" and promised that he would be right back.
Tonying paddled the pumpboat to the island of Po-Po'o where he picked up some pieces of
stones. Then, again paddling the pumpboat farther away from the island, he ordered
Joelito to start the engine of the boat. They headed for the islet of Gilotongin (Hilotongan).
On the way, Tonying filled the sack with stones and, using a rope, tied to it the body of the
victim. Tonying then unloaded their cargo into the sea.
Mansueto and Ruby meantime proceeded to the latter's piggery. Joelito Descartin and his
brother-in-law Rene were also seen going to the place. After some time, Pansing noticed
Joelito take Mansueto's bicycle. Believing that Mansueto was already preparing to leave
and in her desire to catch up with him, Pansing promptly walked towards the piggery which
was around 100 meters away from her house. She could see Mansueto leaning on the
pigsty with Ruby on his right side and Antonio Plasencia alias "Tonying" on his left; behind
was Joelito. 2 Midway, she was halted on her tracks; she suddenly saw Antonio stab
Mansueto. The latter staggered towards Ruby who himself then delivered another stab
blow. Mansueto fell on his back. Joelito started hitting Mansueto on the forehead while
Rene held Mansueto's legs. 3 Except for a coconut tree and some ipil-ipil trees around the
area, nothing obstructed Pansing's line of vision. Pansing rushed back home. The image of
Antonio waving the weapon and the thought that she might herself be killed kept her from
revealing to anyone what she saw. 4
Guided by Joelito, members of the Bantayan police force headed for the islet of Hilotongan
on two pumpboats 9 in the area pinpointed to be the place where the body was dumped.
On the second day of the search, the group was informed that the body had already
surfaced near the vicinity of the search and delivered to the municipal building. 10
The following day, in Kodia, Madridejos, Cebu, where Mansueto resided, his daughter
Rosalinda reported to Francisca Tayo, the barangay captain, that her father had not
returned home. Tayo proceeded to Putian, which was in Mansueto's itinerary, and then to
Ruby's piggery in Patao, where a youngster, who turned out to be Ruby's son, innocently
informed her that Mansueto's bicycle was taken by Joelito. 5
The day after, Francisca Tayo, accompanied by police officers of Madridejos, Cebu, and
some relatives of Mansueto, went back to Ruby's place. On a railing of the pigpen, she
saw blood stains. When she asked Ruby's father about it, he said that the stains had come
from chicken blood. Going around the piggery, she also saw blood stains on a bamboo
pole, which Ruby's father once again so identified as chicken blood. At the back of the
piggery, Francisca noticed a digging which looked like an empty grave. The digging was
measured and photos were taken. The police found a hat at the back of a hut beside the
piggery, which was later recognized to be that which belonged to Mansueto. 6
In the morning of 30 November 1984, Patrolman Elpidio Desquitado of the Bantayan police
went back to the piggery. This time, the police learned from Pansing herself that Joelito
took Mansueto's bicycle. 7 Joelito was invited to the police headquarters to shed light on
the case. Later, Joelito, waiving his right to counsel, executed a "confession." 8
Joelito narrated that, upon Ruby's instruction, he brought the bicycle to the piggery.
Unexpectedly, he said, Tonying Plasencia stabbed Mansueto. Stunned, Joelito tried to run
away but Tonying stopped him. Tonying then dragged the victim to a nearby house.
Threatened by Tonying, Joelito agreed to later return to where the victim's body was
dragged. At around eleven o'clock that evening, tonying and Joelito placed the body in a
sack. Tonying asked Ruby to allow the use of the latter's pumpboat to ferry the body.
The municipal health officer of Bantayan, Dr. Oscar Quirante, examined the body and
concluded that the victim died of internal hemorrhage due to stab wounds. 11 The bloated
body was in a late stage of decomposition and its skin had sloughed off. 12 He found the
victim's face to be "beyond recognition." There were "some rope signs in the body
particularly in the waistline and in the knees." 13
The main defense interposed is one of alibi.
Antonio stated that on the whole day of 29 November 1984, he was out at sea fishing with
his son. Joelito, on his part, asserted that he was in Barrio Baod, about an hour's walk from
his residence, at the house of his fiancee. He returned to his house, he said, only the day
after. Roberto ("Ruby"), Joelito's uncle, testified that on that fateful day, he was in Samoco
Purok 2, Iligan City, and then left for Cebu on 06 December 1984 only after receiving a
telegraph that Joelito was implicated in the crime.
The Regional Trial Court 14 did not give credence to the defense of alibi. It convicted the
three accused of murder (punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code),
instead of robbery with homicide, explaining that the term "homicide" was used in the
information in its generic sense. 15 Finding conspiracy, the trial court ruled that the killing
was qualified by both treachery and abuse of superior strength with the latter, however,
being absorbed by the former. No other aggravating or mitigating circumstances being
attendant in the commission of the crime, the trial court said, the penalty that could be
imposed upon each of the accused was reclusion perpetua with a joint and several civil
liability for indemnification to the heirs of Herminio Mansueto in the amount of P30,000.00.
The instant appeal was interposed by the three convicted appellants.
Appellant Antonio Plasencia attacks the credibility of the prosecution's lone eyewitness,
Francisca Espina, alleging that she is a pejured witness who has an axe to grind against
him because his dog had once bitten Francisca's child. 16 He bewails the fact that it has
taken Francisca until 29 December 1984 to reveal what she supposedly has seen to the
police authorities. Contending that treachery has not been duly proven as "no wound was
inflicted at the back and as a matter of fact only one wound was fatal," 17 appellant argues
that even if conspiracy were to be considered to have attended the commission of the
crime, he could be held liable with the others, if at all, only for homicide.
Appellant Roberto Descartin, likewise challenging Francisca Espina's credibility because of
her alleged inconsistencies, faults the trial court for allowing the witness to glance at the
notes written on her palm while testifying. He also argues that his alibi, being corroborated,
should have been given weight.
Q Mrs. witness, you cannot deny of what these

physical evidences or writings on the palm of your
left hand. I want you to be honest, the law will not
allow you to lie, you are subject to punishment and
penalty. My question is, who wrote this on the palm
of your left hand?
A I was the one who wrote this.
Appellant Joelito Descartin, in assailing the credibility of Francisca, has noted her "jittery
actuation" while giving her testimony. He also questions the findings of the ponente for not
being the presiding judge during the examination of Francisca on the witness stand.
Q Why did you write that down?

A I was the one who wrote this.
The focus of this appeal is clearly one of credibility. The initial assessment on the
testimony of a witness is done by the trial court, and its findings still deserve due regard
notwithstanding that the presiding judge who pens the decision is not the one who
personally may have heard the testimony. 18 The reliance on the transcript of stenographic
notes should not, for that reason alone, render the judgment subject to challenge. 19 The
continuity of the court and the efficacy of its decision are not affected by the cessation from
the service of the judge presiding it 20 or by the fact that its writer merely took over from a
colleague who presided at the trial. 21
It is asserted that the testimony of Francisca Espina should not be given worth since, while
testifying, she would at times be seen reading some notes written on her left palm. Thus
Q. May I see your left hand, may I see what is
written there?
A. Witness showing to the court her left palm and
the following words have been written in her palm in
ball pen handwritten words and number of the
pumpboat No. 56 and there is another word "petsa"
and there are words which cannot be deciphered
and all found in the palm of the left hand.
ATTY. MONTECLAR:
That is all.
ATTY. GONZALES: RE-CROSS
Q Why, what was your purpose of writing that in

your palm?
A I wrote this in my palm because I wanted to be
sure of what time the incident happened, was the
same as that I wrote in my palm.
Q And who furnished you the data in which you
wrote in the palm of your hand?
A I was the one who made that.
ATTY. GONZALES:
Q You don't understand my question. You wrote that
writing but where did you get that data?
A. This is just of what I know.
Q Since you claim to have all this knowledge of your
mind, why did you find it necessary to write that in
the palm of your hand and I notice during the trial
that you used to look in your palm, why, is that
necessary in your believe to testify here to what you
knew about the incident.
A Because of the fact that I have an headache.
Q When did this headache occur?
A After I left my house because my sick child.

Q Now, knowing that you have an headache, did
you not bring this to the attention of the Fiscal?
A No, I did not tell the Fiscal.
Q Do you know of your own that doing this is unfair
and is not allowable while testifying in open court, do
you know that is illegal act?
A No, I did not, know.
Q And you did all of this claiming that you do not
know about the incident for the purpose of giving
here testimony against the accused?
A Yes, sir. 22
The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed.
Section 16, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may
be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written
or recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact
occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact
was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly
written or recorded; but in such case the writing or record must be
produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he
chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it and may read it in
evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing or record,
though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to
swear that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction when
made; but such evidence must be received with caution. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial
court. 23 In this case, the exercise of that discretion has not been abused; the
witness herself has explained that she merely wanted to be accurate on dates
and like details.
Appellants see inadvertency on Francisca's appearing to be "jittery" on the witness stand.

Nervousness and anxiety of a witness is a natural reaction particularly in the case of those
who are called to testify for the first time. The real concern, in fact, should be when they
show no such emotions.
Francisca did fail in immediately reporting the killing to the police authorities. Delay or
vacillation, however, in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily adulterate the
credibility of the witness. 24 Francisca, in her case, has expressed fears for her life
considering that the assailants, being her neighbors, could easily exact retribution on
her. 25 Also, the hesitancy in reporting the occurrence of a crime in rural areas is not
unknown. 26
Francisca's inability to respond to the summons for another appearance in court for further
questioning was satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. Francisca at the time just had
a miscarriage and was found to be too weak to travel. The recall of the witness was, after
all, at the sound discretion of the trial court. 27
The claim of appellant Roberto Descartin that Francisca and her husband, a tuba-gatherer,
owed him P300.00, and the assertion made by appellant Antonio Plasencia on the dogbiting story involving Francisca's son truly were too petty to consider. It would be absurd to
think that Francisca, for such trivial reasons was actually impelled to falsely implicate
appellants for so grave an offense as murder.
Appellants questioned Francisca's ability to recognize them from a distance. Francisca
knew appellants well; they all were her neighbors while Antonio Plasencia himself was her
cousin. 28 The crime occurred at around three o'clock in the afternoon only about fifty (50)
meters away from her. With an unobstructed view, Francisca's positive identification of the
culprits should be a foregone matter. 29
The alleged inconsistencies in Francisca's testimony and in her sworn statement of 18
December 1984, cover matters of little significance. Minor inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses do not detract from their credibility; 30 on the contrary, they serve
to strengthen their credibility and are taken as badges of truth rather than asindicia of
falsehood 31 even as they also erase suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 32
All considered, the case against the appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt
even with the retracted extra-judicial admission of Joelito Descartin. 33 The testimony of a
single witness, if found to be credible, is adequate for conviction, 34 The defense
of alibi hardly can overcome the positive identification of an unprejudiced eyewitness. 35
Like the trial court, we are not persuaded that robbery has been proven to be the principal
motive for the crime that can warrant the conviction of appellants for the complex crime of
robbery with homicide. 36 Appellants could only thus be held responsible for the killing of
Mansueto. Conspiracy among the appellants has been established beyond doubt by the
sum of their deeds pointing to a joint purpose and design. 37
Three aggravating circumstances were alleged in the information, i.e., treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength. The trial court disregarded the circumstance
of evident premeditation and concluded that the attack upon Mansueto was committed with
treachery and abuse of superior strength. On its finding that the assault was unexpectedly
perpetrated upon the unarmed victim to ensure its execution without risk to themselves
from the defense that the victim might make, the trial court appreciated treachery, which it
deemed as having so absorbed abuse of superior strength.
The trial court was correct when it concluded that the crime committed was murder, a
crime technically lower than robbery with homicide, 38 not, however, because of the
attendance of treachery but of abuse of superior strength. Treachery, in our view, was not
satisfactorily proven by the prosecution. Francisca Espina simply testified that appellant
Plasencia stabbed Mansueto while the latter and the appellants were in a huddle. There
was nothing adduced on whether or not the victim gave provocation, an indispensable
issue in the proper appreciation of treachery. 39 The presence, nonetheless, of the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength qualified the killing to
murder. 40 The three appellants utilized superiority in numbers and employed deadly
weapons in assaulting the unarmed Mansueto.
There being no other aggravating or mitigating circumstances to consider, the trial court
aptly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the medium period 41 of the penalty
of reclusion temporal maximum to death prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. In conformity with prevailing jurisprudential law, the heirs of the victim should be
indemnified in the amount of P50,000.00. 42
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court convicting appellants Antonio Plasencia,
Roberto Descartin and Joelito (Julito) Descartin of the crime of murder and imposing on
each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification
that the indemnity to the heirs of the victim, Herminio Mansueto, is raised to P50,000.00.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 96202 April 13, 1999
ROSELLA
D.
CANQUE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.
d. That the Contractor shall pay the Sub-Contractor the volume of the supplied Item based on
the actual weight in Metric Tons delivered, laid and compacted and accepted by the MPWH;
e. The construction will commence upon the acceptance of the offer.
The second contract (Exh. B), 5 dated July 23, 1985, stated:
MENDOZA, J
This petition for review on certiorari seeks a reversal of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
affirming the judgment 2of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City ordering petitioner
The Supplier (SOCOR Construction) and the Contractor (RDC Construction)

for the consideration hereinafter named, hereby agree as follows:
1. SCOPE OF WORK:
. . . to pay [private respondent] the principal sum of Two Hundred Ninety

Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Seventeen Pesos and Seventy Five
Centavos (P299,717.75) plus interest thereon at 12%per annum from
September 22, 1986, the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid; to
pay [private respondent] the further sum of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) for reasonable attorney's fees; to pay the sum of Five Hundred
Fifty Two Pesos and Eighty Six Centavos (P552.86) for filing fees and to
pay the costs of suit. Since [private respondent] withdrew its prayer for
an alias writ
of
preliminary
attachment vis-a-vis the
[petitioner's]
counterbound, the incident on the alias writ of preliminary attachment has
become moot and academic.
a. The Supplier agrees to perform and execute the delivery of Item 310 and Item 302 to the
jobsite for the Asphalting of DAS Access Road and the Front Gate of ACMDC, Toledo City;
b. That the Contractor should inform or give notice to the Supplier two (2) days before the
delivery of such items;
c. That the Contractor shall pay the Supplier the volume of the supplied items on the actual
weight in metric tons delivered and accepted by the MPWH fifteen (15) days after the
submission of the bill;
d. The delivery will commence upon the acceptance of the offer.
Petitioner Rosella D. Canque is a contractor doing business under the name and style RDC
Construction. At the time material to this case, she had contracts with the government for (a) the
restoration of Cebu-Toledo wharf road; (b) the asphalting of Lutopan access road; and (c) the
asphalting of Babag road in Lapulapu City. 3 In connection with these projects, petitioner entered
into two contracts with private respondent Socor Construction Corporation. The first contract
(Exh. A), 4 dated April 26, 1985, provided:
On May 28, 1986, private respondent sent petitioner a bill (Exh. C), containing a revised
computation, 6 for P299,717.75, plus interest at rate of 3% a month, representing the balance of
petitioner's total account of P2,098,400.25 for materials delivered and services rendered by
private respondent under the two contracts. However, petitioner refused to pay the amount,
claiming that private respondent failed to submit the delivery receipts showing the actual weight
in metric tons of the items delivered and the acceptance thereof by the government. 7
The Sub-Contractor (SOCOR Corporation) and the Contractor (RDC

Construction) for the consideration hereinafter named, hereby agree as
follows:
Hence, on September 22, 1986, private respondent brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu to recover from petitioner the sum of P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3% a month.
1. SCOPE OF WORK:
a. The Sub-Contractor agrees to perform and execute the Supply, Lay and Compact Item 310
and Item 302;
b. That Contractor shall provide the labor and materials needed to complete the project;
c. That the Contractor agrees to pay the Sub-Contractor the price of One Thousand Pesos only
(P1,000.00) per Metric Ton of Item 310 and Eight Thousand Only (P8,000.00) per Metric Ton of
Item 302.
In her answer, petitioner admitted the existence of the contracts with private respondent as well
as receipt of the billing (Exh. C), dated May 28, 1986. However, she disputed the correctness of
the bill
. . . considering that the deliveries of [private respondent] were not signed
and acknowledged by the checkers of [petitioner], the bituminous tack coat
it delivered to [petitioner] consisted of 60% water, and [petitioner] has
already paid [private respondent] about P1,400,000.00 but [private
respondent] has not issued any receipt to [petitioner] for said payments and
there is no agreement that [private respondent] will charge 3% per month
interest. 8
Petitioner subsequently amended her answer denying she had entered into sub-contracts with
private respondent. 9
During the trial, private respondent, as plaintiff, presented its vice-president, Sofia O. Sanchez,
and Dolores Aday, its bookkeeper.
Petitioner's evidence consisted of her lone testimony. 10
On June 22, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision ordering petitioner to pay private
respondent the sum of P299,717.75 plus interest at 12% per annum, and costs. It held:
. . . . [B]y analyzing the plaintiff's Book of Collectible Accounts particularly
page 17 thereof (Exh. "K") this Court is convinced that the entries (both
payments and billings) recorded thereat are credible. Undeniably, the book
contains a detailed account of SOCOR's commercial transactions with RDC
which were entered therein in the course of business. We cannot therefore
disregard the entries recorded under Exhibit "K" because the fact of their
having been made in the course of business carries with it some degree of
trustworthiness. Besides, no proof was ever offered to demonstrate the
irregularity of the said entries thus, there is then no cogent reason for us to
doubt their authenticity.11
The trial court further ruled that in spite of the fact that the contracts did not have any stipulation
on interest, interest may be awarded in the form of damages under Article 2209 of the Civil
Code. 12
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It upheld the trial court's' reliance on private
respondent's Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) on the basis of Rule 130, 37 13 of the Rules
of Court.
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner contends that
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
IN EVIDENCE AS ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF
BUSINESS
THE
ENTRIES
IN
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S
BOOK
OF
COLLECTIBLE
ACCOUNTS CONSIDERING THAT THE PERSON
WHO MADE SAID ENTRIES ACTUALLY TESTIFIED
IN THIS CASE BUT UNFORTUNATELY HAD NO
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF SAID ENTRIES.
II. THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT
SHOULD BE REVERSED AS IT HAS ONLY
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT.
First. Petitioner contends that the presentation of the delivery receipts duly accepted by the then
Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) is required under the contracts (Exhs. A and B)
and is a condition precedent for her payment of the amount claimed by private respondent.
Petitioner argues that the entries in private respondent's Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K)
cannot take the place of the delivery receipts and that such entries are mere hearsay and, thus,
inadmissible in evidence. 14
We agree with the appellate court that the stipulation in the two contracts requiring the
submission of delivery receipts does not preclude proof of delivery of materials by private
respondent in some other way. The question is whether the entries in the Book of Collectible
Accounts (Exh. K) constitute competent evidence to show such delivery. Private respondent
cites Rule 130, 37 of the Rules of Court and argues that the entries in question constitute
"entries in the course of business" sufficient to prove deliveries made for the government
projects. This provision reads:
Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, outside of the
Philippines or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts
therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person
made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty
and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. 15
The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the following
conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or
unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which
they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance
of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or
duty. 16
As petitioner points out, the business entries in question (Exh. K) do not meet the first and third
requisites. Dolores Aday, who made the entries, was presented by private respondent to testify
on the account of RDC Construction. It was in the course of her testimony that the entries were
presented and marked in evidence. There was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity for
the presentation of the entries as the person who made them was available to testify in court.
Necessity is given as a ground for admitting entries, in that they are the best
available evidence. Said a learned judge: "What a man has actually done
and committed to writing when under obligation to do the act, it being in the
course of the business he has undertaken, and he being dead, there seems
to be no danger in submitting to the consideration of the court." The person
who maybe called to court to testify on these entries being dead, there
arises the necessity of their admission without the one who made them
being called to court be sworn and subjected to cross-examination. And this
is permissible in order to prevent a failure of justice. 17
Moreover, Aday admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entry.
She said she made the entries based on the bills given to her. But she has no knowledge of the
truth or falsity of the facts stated in the bills. The deliveries of the materials stated in the bills
were supervised by "an engineer for (such) functions." 18 The person, therefore, who has
personal knowledge of the facts stated in the entries, i.e., that such deliveries were made in the
amounts and on the dates stated, was the company's project engineer. The entries made by
Aday show only that the billings had been submitted to her by the engineer and that she
faithfully recorded the amounts stared therein in the books of account. Whether or not the bills
given to Aday correctly reflected the deliveries made in the amounts and on the dates indicated
was a fact that could be established by the project engineer alone who, however, was not
presented during trial. The rule is stated by former Chief Justice Moran, thus:
[W]hen the witness had no personal knowledge of the facts entered by him,
and the person who gave him the information is individually known and may
testify as to the facts stated in the entry which is not part of a system of
entries where scores of employees have intervened, such entry is not
admissible without the testimony of the informer. 19
Second. It is nonetheless argued by private respondent that although the entries cannot be
considered an exception to the hearsay rule, they may be admitted under Rule 132, 10 20 of the
Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 10. When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be
allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written by
himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or
immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his
memory and he knew that the same was correctly stated in the writing; but
in such case the writing must be produced and may be inspected by the
adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it,
and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a
writing, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to
swear that the writing correctly stated the transaction when made; but such
evidence must be received with caution.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that evidence which is inadmissible for the purpose for
which it was offered cannot be admitted for another purpose. She cites the following from Chief
Justice Moran's commentaries:
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. Where the
offer is general, and the evidence is admissible for one purpose and
inadmissible for another, the evidence should be rejected. Likewise, where
the offer is made for two or more purposes and the evidence is incompetent
for one of them, the evidence should be excluded. The reason for the rule is
that "it is the duty of a party to select the competent from the incompetent in
offering testimony, and he cannot impose this duty upon the trial court."
Where the evidence is inadmissible for the purpose stated in the offer, it
must be rejected, though the same may be admissible for another purpose.
The rule is stated thus: "If a party . . . opens the particular view with which
he offers any part of his evidence, or states the object to be attained by it,
he precludes himself from insisting on its operation in any other direction, or
for any other object; and the reason is, that the opposite party is prevented
from objecting to its competency in any view different from the one
proposed. 21
It should be noted, however, that Exh. K is not really being presented for another purpose.
Private respondent's counsel offered it for the purpose of showing the amount of petitioner's
indebtedness. He said:
Exhibit "K," your Honor faithful
reproduction of page (17) of the book on
Collectible Accounts of the plaintiff, reflecting
the principal indebtedness of defendant in the
amount of Two hundred ninety-nine thousand
seven hundred seventeen pesos and
seventy-five centavos (P299,717.75) and
reflecting as well the accumulated interest of
three percent (3%) monthly compounded
such that as of December 11, 1987, the
amount collectible from the defendant by the
plaintiff is Six hundred sixteen thousand four
hundred thirty-five pesos and seventy-two
centavos (P616,435.72); 22
This is also the purpose for which its admission is sought as a memorandum to
refresh the memory of Dolores Aday as a witness. In other words, it is the nature of
the evidence that is changed, not the purpose for which it is offered.
Be that as it may, considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not itself constitute evidence. As
explained inBorromeo v. Court of Appeals: 23
Under the above provision (Rule 132, 10), the memorandum used to
refresh the memory of the witness does not constitute evidence, and may
not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has just the
same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where the
witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has been
refreshed by a memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is
not admissible as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a witness

may not be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him.
He cannot be more credible just because he supports his open-court
declaration with written statements of the same facts even if he did prepare
them during the occasion in dispute, unless the proper predicate of his
failing memory is priorly laid down. What is more, even where this
requirement has been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is
that such evidence must be received with caution, if only because it is not
very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly
true when the witness stands to gain materially or otherwise from the
admission of such evidence . . . . 24
As the entries in question (Exh. K) were not made based on personal knowledge, they could
only corroborate Dolores Aday's testimony that she made the entries as she received the bills.
Third. Does this, therefore, mean there is no competent evidence of private respondent's claim
as petitioner argues? 25 The answer is in the negative. Aside from Exh. K, private respondent
presented the following documents:
1) Exhibits A Contract Agreement dated 26 April 1985 which contract
covers both the Toledo wharf project and the Babag Road project in
Lapulapu City.
2) Exhibit B Contract Agreement dated 23 July 1985 which covers the
DAS Asphalting Project.
3) Exhibit C Revised Computation of Billings submitted on May 28, 1986.
4) Exhibit D an affidavit executed by [petitioner] to the effect that she has
no more pending or unsettled obligations as far as Toledo Wharf Road is
concerned.
5) Exhibit D-1 Statement of Work Accomplished on the Road Restoration
of Cebu-Toledo wharf project.
6) Exhibit E another affidavit executed by [petitioner] attesting that she
has completely paid her laborers at the project located at Babag, Lapulapu
City
7) Exhibits F, G, G-1, G-2, G-3 Premiums paid by [private respondent]
together with the receipts for filing fees.
8) Exhibits H, I, J certifications issued by OIC, MPWH, Regional Office;
Lapulapu City, City Engineer; Toledo City Treasurer's Office respectively,
proving that RDC construction has no more collectibles with all the said
government offices in connection with its projects.
10) Exhibit L Bill No. 057 under the account of RDC Construction in the
amount of P153,382.75 dated August 24, 1985.
11) Exhibit M Bill No. 069 (RDC's account), in the amount of
P1,701,795.00 dated November 20, 1985.
12) Exhibit N Bill No. 071 (RDC's account) in the amount of P47,250.00
dated November 22, 1985.
13) Exhibit O Bill No. 079 (RDC's account) in the amount of P7,290.00
dated December 6, 1985.
As the trial court found:
The entries recorded under Exhibit "K" were supported by Exhibits "L", "M",
"N", "O" which are all Socor Billings under the account of RDC Construction.
These billings were presented and duly received by the authorized
representatives of defendant. The circumstances obtaining in the case at
bar clearly show that for a long period of time after receipt thereof, RDC
never manifested its dissatisfaction or objection to the aforestated billings
submitted by plaintiff. Neither did defendant immediately protest to plaintiff's
alleged incomplete or irregular performance. In view of these facts, we
believe Art. 1235 of the New Civil Code is applicable.
Art. 1235. When the obligee accepts the performance,
knowing its incompleteness and irregularity and without
expressing any protest or objection, the obligation is
deemed complied with.
FINALLY, after a conscientious scrutiny of the records, we find Exhibit "D-1"
(p. 85 record) to be a material proof of plaintiff's complete fulfillment of its
obligation.
There is no question that plaintiff supplied RDC Construction with Item 302
(Bitunimous Prime Coat), Item 303 (Bituminous Tack Coat) and Item 310
(Bitunimous Concrete Surface Course) in all the three projects of the latter.
The Lutopan Access Road project, the Toledo wharf project and the BabagLapulapu Road project.
On the other hand, no proof was ever offered by defendant to show the
presence of other contractors in those projects. We can therefore conclude
that it was Socor Construction Corp.ALONE who supplied RDC with
Bituminous Prime Coat, Bituminous Tack Coat and Bituminous Concrete
Surface Course for all the aforenamed three projects. 26
Indeed, while petitioner had previously paid private respondent about P1,400,000.00 for
deliveries made in the past, she did not show that she made such payments only after the
delivery receipts had been presented by private respondent. On the other hand, it appears that
petitioner was able to collect the full amount of project costs from the government, so that
petitioner would be unjustly enriched at the expense of private respondent if she is not made to
pay what is her just obligation the contracts.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No.

May 29, 2002

EVIDENCE: COCA TO CANQUE 1

EVIDENCE: COCA TO CANQUE 2

What did you see?

I saw the three of them.

There was a portion not translated:

They were by the side also looking towards us.

You are sure of that?

I am sure Your Honor.21

Witness indicating a distance of six (6) meters

Accused-appellants were likewise positively identified by prosecution witness

EVIDENCE: COCA TO CANQUE 3

circumstances which proved feasible the identification of accused-appellants, are

EVIDENCE: COCA TO CANQUE 4

G.R. No. 127745

April 22, 2003

FELICITO G. SANSON, CELEDONIA SANSON-SAQUIN, ANGELES A.

EVIDENCE: COCA TO CANQUE 5

The administratrix, denying having any knowledge or information sufficient to form a

EVIDENCE: COCA TO CANQUE 6

SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT CLAIMANT[S]

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, 4TH DIVISION, ERRED IN FINDING

EVIDENCE: COCA TO CANQUE 7

That is the signature of Mr. Sy.

Why do you know that this is the signature of Mr. Sy?

Why do you know that this is his signature?

I was there when he signed the same.

Whose signature is this appearing on the face of this check?

Mr. Sys signature.

Why do you know that it is his signature?

I was there when he signed the same.

The genuineness of the deceaseds signature having been shown, he is prima

Section 24. Presumption of Consideration. Every negotiable instrument

EVIDENCE: COCA TO CANQUE 8

The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like

And therefore, you know his signature?

Sanson testified too that he "knows" the signature of the deceased:

Yes, these are the same che[c]ks.

EVIDENCE: COCA TO CANQUE 9

G.R. No. 143340

August 15, 2001

EVIDENCE: COCA TO CANQUE 10

The pertinent facts of this case are as follows:

EVIDENCE: COCA TO CANQUE 11

(5) ORDERING them to wind up the affairs of the partnership and

EVIDENCE: COCA TO CANQUE 12

assuming arguendo that indeed there was a partnership, the finding of

"1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose

"SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party.

2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative

EVIDENCE: COCA TO CANQUE 13

EVIDENCE: COCA TO CANQUE 14

G.R. No. 107383

February 20, 1996

EVIDENCE: COCA TO CANQUE 15

On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he

EVIDENCE: COCA TO CANQUE 16

EVIDENCE: COCA TO CANQUE 17

and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment,

EVIDENCE: COCA TO CANQUE 18