Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
This is a special civil action for certiorari seeking the reversal of the 7
October 1994 decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
in NLRC Case No. 00-06-04136-93 (CA No. L-007370-94), which modified the
11 July 1994 decision of the Labor Arbiter by directing the reinstatement of
private respondent Antonio D. Estrada, the complainant, without loss of
seniority rights and benefits.
[1]
[2]
Private respondent National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), a cocomplainant in the labor case, is a labor union of which complainant is a
member.
The factual and procedural antecedents are summarized in the decision of
the Labor Arbiter which we quote verbatim:
Complainant was first employed by respondent on 16 September 1991 as route helper
with the latest daily wage of P119.00. From 19 April 1993 up to 19 May 1993, for a
period of one (1) month, complainant went on absent without permission
(AWOP). On 20 May 1993, respondent thru Mr. Rodolfo Valentin, sent a Memo to
complainant, to wit:
Please explain in writing within 24 hours of your receipt of this memo why no
disciplinary action should be taken against you for the following offense:
You were absent since April 19, 1993 up to May 19, 1993.
For your strict compliance.
In answer to the aforesaid memo, complainant explained:
Sa dahilan po na ako ay hindi nakapagpaalam sainyo [sic] dahil inuwi ko ang mga
anak ko sa Samar dahil ang asawa ko ay lumayas at walang mag-aalaga sa mga anak
ko. Kaya naman hindi ako naka long distance or telegrama dahil wala akong pera at
ibinili ko ng gamot ay puro utang pa.
Finding said explanation unsatisfactory, on 16 June 1993, respondent thru its Sales
Manager, Mr. Henry A. Chongco issued a Notice of Termination which reads:
We received your letter of explanation dated May 21, 1993 but we regret to inform
you that we do not consider it valid. You are aware of the company Rules and
Regulations that absence without permission for six (6) consecutive working days is
considered abandonment of work.
In view of the foregoing, the company has decided to terminate your employment
effective June 17, 1993 for abandonment of work.
Hence, this complaint.
Complainants contend that individual complainants dismissal was done without just
cause; that it was not sufficiently established that individual complainants absence
from April 19, 1993 to June 16, 1993 are unjustified; that the penalty of dismissal for
such violation is too severe; that in imposing such penalty, respondent should have
taken into consideration complainants length of service and as a first offender, a
penalty less punitive will suffice such as suspension for a definite period, (Position
Paper, complainants).
Upon the other hand, respondent contends that individual complainant was dismissed
for cause allowed by the company Rules and Regulations and the Labor Code; that the
act of complainant in absenting from work for one (1) month without official leave is
deleterious to the business of respondent; that it will result to stoppage of production
which will not only destructive to respondents interests but also to the interest of its
employees in general; that the dismissal of complainant from the service is legal,
(Position Paper, respondent).
[3]
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, citing the
principle of managerial control, which recognizes the employers prerogative
to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations to govern the conduct of his
employees. The principle allows the imposition of disciplinary measures
which are necessary for the efficiency of both the employer and the
employees. In complainant's case, he persisted in not reporting for work until
16 June 1993 notwithstanding his receipt of the memorandum requiring him to
explain his absence without approval. The Labor Arbiter, relying
on Shoemart, Inc. vs. NLRC, thus concluded:
[4]
Verily, it is crystal clear that individual complainant has indeed abandoned his
work. The filing of the complaint on 25 June 1993 or almost two (2) months from the
date complainant failed to report for work affirms the findings of this Office and
therefore, under the law and jurisprudence which upholds the right of an employer to
discharge an employee who incurs frequent, prolonged and unexplained absences as
being grossly remiss in his duties to the employer and is therefore, dismissed for
cause, (Shoemart, Inc. vs. NLRC, 176 SCRA 385). An employee is deemed to have
abandoned his position or to have resigned from the same, whenever he has been
absent therefrom without previous permission of the employer for three consecutive
days or more. This justification is the obvious harm to employers interest, resulting
from [sic] the non-availability of the workers services, (Supra). (underscoring
supplied)
[5]
and ruled that complainants termination from his employment was legal, the
same with just or authorized cause and due process.
[6]
NLRC ruled that prolonged absence does not, by itself, necessarily mean
abandonment. Accordingly, there must be a concurrence of intention and
overt acts from which it can be inferred that the employee is no longer
interested in working. Complainant likewise invoked compassion in the
application of sanctions, as dismissal from employment brings untold hardship
and sorrows on the dependents of the wage earners. In his case, a penalty
less punitive than dismissal could have sufficed.
In the assailed decision of 7 October 1994, the NLRC modified the Labor
Arbiter's decision and held that complainants dismissal was invalid for the
following reasons:
[8]
to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits, but without
backwages. The other findings in the appealed decision stand AFFIRMED.
[10]
Petitioners motion for the reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its
7 December 1994 resolution. Petitioner thus filed this special civil action
contending that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
complainant's reinstatement, which in effect countenances the reinstatement
of an employee who is found guilty of excessive absences without prior
approval. It further argued that the NLRC failed to consider the rationale
behind petitioners Rules and Regulations; that it was deprived of its
prerogative to enforce them; and that complainant's reinstatement would
adversely affect its business and send the wrong signals to its employees.
[11]
[12]
In its comment for public respondent NLRC, the Office of the Solicitor
General maintained that dismissal from employment was too severe a penalty
for a first time offender like complainant. Although he violated petitioners
rules and regulations, his absences were justified: he had to bring his children
to Samar, his home province, as his wife deserted him. While that by itself
might not excuse the failure to seek permission, the Office of the Solicitor
General submitted, however, that it would be at [sic] the height of callousness
if one, considering his plight under the circumstance[s], would not give due
consideration to [complainants] explanation. There has to be an exception.
[13]
[14]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[22]
[23]
271 SCRA 670 Labor Law Labor Standards Abandonment of Work Loss of Confidence
Norma Mabeza was an employee hired by Hotel Supreme in Baguio City. In 1991, an inspection was
made by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at Hotel Supreme and the DOLE
inspectors discovered several violations by the hotel management. Immediately, the owner of the
hotel, Peter Ng, directed his employees to execute an affidavit which would purport that they have
no complaints whatsoever against Hotel Supreme. Mabeza signed the affidavit but she refused to
certify it with the prosecutors office. Later, when she reported to work, she was not allowed to take
her shift. She then asked for a leave but was not granted yet shes not being allowed to work. In May
1991, she then sued Peter Ng for illegal dismissal. Peter Ng, in his defense, said that Mabeza
abandoned her work. In July 1991, Peter Ng also filed a criminal complaint against Mabeza as he
alleged that she had stolen a blanket and some other stuff from the hotel. Peter Ng went on to
amend his reply in the labor case to make it appear that the reason why he dismissed Mabeza was
because of his loss of confidence by reason of the theft allegedly committed by Mabeza. The labor
arbiter who handled the case, a certain Felipe Pati, ruled in favor of Peter Ng.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is abandonment in the case at bar. Whether or not loss of confidence
as ground for dismissal applies in the case at bar.
HELD: No. The side of Peter Ng is bereft of merit so is the decision of the Labor Arbiter which was
unfortunately affirmed by the NLRC.
Abandonment
Abandonment is not present. Mabeza returned several times to inquire about the status of her work
or her employment status. She even asked for a leave but was not granted. Her asking for leave is a
clear indication that she has no intention to abandon her work with the hotel. Even the employer
knows that his purported reason of dismissing her due to abandonment will not fly so he amended
his reply to indicate that it is actually loss of confidence that led to Mabezas dismissal.
Loss of Confidence
It is true that loss of confidence is a valid ground to dismiss an employee. But this is ideally only
applied to workers whose positions require a certain level or degree of trust particularly those who
are members of the managerial staff. Evidently, an ordinary chambermaid who has to sign out for
linen and other hotel property from the property custodian each day and who has to account for each
and every towel or bedsheet utilized by the hotels guests at the end of her shift would not fall under
any of these two classes of employees for which loss of confidence, if ably supported by evidence,
would normally apply. Further, the suspicious filing by Peter Ng of a criminal case against Mabeza
long after she initiated her labor complaint against him hardly warrants serious consideration of loss
of confidence as a ground of Mabezas dismissal.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118506. April 18, 1997]
compliance with minimum wage and other labor standard provisions of law.
[1]
JOINT AFFIDAVIT
We, SYLVIA IGANA, HERMINIGILDO AQUINO, EVELYN OGOY,
MACARIA JUGUETA, ADELAIDA NONOG, NORMA MABEZA,
JONATHAN PICART and JOSE DIZON, all of legal ages (sic), Filipinos and
residents of Baguio City, under oath, depose and say:
1. That we are employees of Mr. Peter L. Ng of his Hotel Supreme situated at No. 416
Magsaysay Ave., Baguio City;
2. That the said Hotel is separately operated from the Ivy's Grill and Restaurant;
3. That we are all (8) employees in the hotel and assigned in each respective shifts;
4. That we have no complaints against the management of the Hotel Supreme as we
are paid accordingly and that we are treated well.
5. That we are executing this affidavit voluntarily without any force or intimidation
and for the purpose of informing the authorities concerned and to dispute the alleged
report of the Labor Inspector of the Department of Labor and Employment conducted
on the said establishment on February 2, 1991.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands this 7th day of
May, 1991 at Baguio City, Philippines.
(Sgd.)
(Sgd.)
(Sgd.)
SYLVIA IGAMA
HERMINIGILDO
AQUINO
EVELYN OGOY
(Sgd)
(Sgd.)
(Sgd.)
MACARIA JUGUETA
ADELAIDA
NONOG
NORMA MABEZA
(Sgd)
JONATHAN PICART
(Sgd.)
JOSE DIZON
After she refused to proceed to the City Prosecutor's Office - on the same
day the affidavit was submitted to the Cordillera Regional Office of DOLE petitioner avers that she was ordered by the hotel management to turn over
the keys to her living quarters and to remove her belongings from the hotel
premises. According to her, respondent strongly chided her for refusing to
proceed to the City Prosecutor's Office to attest to the affidavit. She thereafter
reluctantly filed a leave of absence from her job which was denied by
management. When she attempted to return to work on May 10, 1991, the
hotel's cashier, Margarita Choy, informed her that she should not report to
work
and,
instead,
continue
with
her
unofficial
leave
of
absence. Consequently, on May 13, 1991, three days after her attempt to
return to work, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission - CAR Baguio
City. In addition to her complaint for illegal dismissal, she alleged
underpayment of wages, non-payment of holiday pay, service incentive leave
pay, 13th month pay, night differential and other benefits. The complaint was
[4]
[5]
[7]
[8]
[11]
[12]
1.
2.
3.
We agree.
It is settled that in termination cases the employer bears the burden of
proof to show that the dismissal is for just cause, the failure of which would
mean that the dismissal is not justified and the employee is entitled to
reinstatement.
[14]
In the case at bar, the private respondent initially claimed that petitioner
abandoned her job when she failed to return to work on May 8,
1991. Additionally, in order to strengthen his contention that there existed
sufficient cause for the termination of petitioner, he belatedly included a
complaint for loss of confidence, supporting this with charges that petitioner
had stolen a blanket, a bedsheet and two towels from the hotel. Appended to
his last complaint was a suit for qualified theft filed with the Baguio City
prosecutor's office.
[15]
[17]
In the instant case, respondent does not dispute the fact that petitioner
tried to file a leave of absence when she learned that the hotel management
was displeased with her refusal to attest to the affidavit. The fact that she
made this attempt clearly indicates not an intention to abandon but an
intention to return to work after the period of her leave of absence, had it been
granted, shall have expired.
Furthermore, while absence from work for a prolonged period may
suggest abandonment in certain instances, mere absence of one or two days
would not be enough to sustain such a claim. The overt act (absence) ought
to unerringly point to the fact that the employee has no intention to return to
work, which is patently not the case here. In fact, several days after she had
been advised to take an informal leave, petitioner tried to resume working with
the hotel, to no avail. It was only after she had been repeatedly rebuffed that
she filed a case for illegal dismissal. These acts militate against the private
respondent's claim that petitioner abandoned her job. As the Solicitor General
in his manifestation observed:
[18]
To be sure, every employee must enjoy some degree of trust and confidence
from the employer as that is one reason why he was employed in the first
place. One certainly does not employ a person he distrusts. Indeed, even the
lowly janitor must enjoy that trust and confidence in some measure if only
because he is the one who opens the office in the morning and closes it at
night and in this sense is entrusted with the care or protection of the
employer's property. The keys he holds are the symbol of that trust and
confidence.
By the same token, the security guard must also be considered as enjoying the
trust and confidence of his employer, whose property he is safeguarding. Like
the janitor, he has access to this property. He too, is charged with its care and
protection.
Notably, however, and like the janitor again, he is entrusted only with
the physical task of protecting that property. The employer's trust and
confidence in him is limited to that ministerial function. He is not entrusted,
in the Labor Arbiter's words, 'with the duties of safekeeping and safeguarding
company policies, management instructions, and company secrets such as
operation devices.' He is not privy to these confidential matters, which are
shared only in the higher echelons of management. It is the persons on such
levels who, because they discharge these sensitive duties, may be considered
holding positions of trust and confidence. The security guard does not belong
in such category.
[21]
hotel's scheme (to avoid its obligations as employer under the Labor Code) by
her act of filing illegal dismissal charges against the private respondent would
hardly warrant serious consideration of loss of confidence as a valid ground
for dismissal. Notably, the Solicitor General has himself taken a position
opposite the public respondent and has observed that:
If petitioner had really committed the acts charged against her by private
respondents (stealing supplies of respondent hotel), private respondents should
have confronted her before dismissing her on that ground. Private respondents
did not do so. In fact, private respondent Ng did not raise the matter when
petitioner went to see him on May 9, 1991, and handed him her application for
leave. It took private respondents 52 days or up to July 4, 1991 before finally
deciding to file a criminal complaint against petitioner, in an obvious attempt
to build a case against her.
The manipulations of private respondents should not be countenanced.
[23]
labor practice. The first act clearly preempts the right of the hotel's workers to
seek better terms and conditions of employment through concerted action.
We agree with the Solicitor General's observation in his manifestation that
"[t]his actuation... is analogous to the situation envisaged in paragraph (f) of
Article 248 of the Labor Code" which distinctly makes it an unfair labor
practice "to dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against
an employee for having given or being about to give testimony" under the
Labor Code. For in not giving positive testimony in favor of her employer,
petitioner had reserved not only her right to dispute the claim and proffer
evidence in support thereof but also to work for better terms and conditions of
employment.
[24]
[25]
received during the period in her computations. Granting that meals and
lodging were provided and indeed constituted facilities, such facilities could
not be deducted without the employer complying first with certain legal
requirements. Without satisfying these requirements, the employer simply
cannot deduct the value from the employee's wages. First, proof must be
shown that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade. Second, the
provision of deductible facilities must be voluntarily accepted in writing by the
employee. Finally, facilities must be charged at fair and reasonable value.
[26]
[27]
These requirements were not met in the instant case. Private respondent
"failed to present any company policy or guideline to show that the meal and
lodging . . . (are) part of the salary;" he failed to provide proof of the
employee's written authorization; and, he failed to show how he arrived at the
valuations.
[28]
[29]
Curiously, in the case at bench, the only valuations relied upon by the
labor arbiter in his decision were figures furnished by the private respondent's
own accountant, without corroborative evidence. On the pretext that records
prior to the July 16, 1990 earthquake were lost or destroyed, respondent failed
to produce payroll records, receipts and other relevant documents, where he
could have, as has been pointed out in the Solicitor General's manifestation,
"secured certified copies thereof from the nearest regional office of the
Department of Labor, the SSS or the BIR."
[30]
More significantly, the food and lodging, or the electricity and water
consumed by the petitioner were not facilities but supplements. A benefit or
privilege granted to an employee for the convenience of the employer is not a
facility. The criterion in making a distinction between the two not so much lies
in the kind (food, lodging) but the purpose. Considering, therefore, that hotel
workers are required to work different shifts and are expected to be available
at various odd hours, their ready availability is a necessary matter in the
operations of a small hotel, such as the private respondent's hotel.
[31]
Finally, in dismissal cases, the law requires that the employer must furnish
the employee sought to be terminated from employment with two written
notices before the same may be legally effected. The first is a written notice
containing a statement of the cause(s) for dismissal; the second is a notice
informing the employee of the employer's decision to terminate him stating the
basis of the dismissal. During the process leading to the second notice, the
employer must give the employee ample opportunity to be heard and defend
himself, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires.
Given the seriousness of the second cause (qualified theft) of the
petitioner's dismissal, it is noteworthy that the private respondent never even
5)
P1.000.00.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should
be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire:
a.....What is one's domicile?
b.....Where is one's home economy?
c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the
School and was the School responsible for bringing that individual
to the Philippines?
[2]
Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty
member is classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreignhire.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.
These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave
travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent
(25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two
"significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely:
(a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School explains:
A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his
home country, leave his family and friends, and take the risk of
deviating from a promising career path-all for the purpose of
pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign
land. The new foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent
abode for oneself and/or for one's family, effective means of
transportation, allowance for the education of one's children,
adequate insurance against illness and death, and of course the
primary benefit of a basic salary/retirement compensation.
Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again
with the same economic reality after his term: that he will
eventually and inevitably return to his home country where he will
The Acting Secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction
in salary rates:
The principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find application
in the present case. The international character of the School
requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal with different
nationalities and different cultures, among the student population.
We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries
and benefits accorded to foreign hired personnel which system is
universally recognized. We agree that certain amenities have to
be provided to these people in order to entice them to render their
services in the Philippines and in the process remain competitive
in the international market.
Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have
limited contract of employment unlike the local hires who enjoy
security of tenure. To apply parity therefore, in wages and other
benefits would also require parity in other terms and conditions of
employment which include the employment contract.
A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the
conditions and provisions for salary and professional
compensation wherein the parties agree as follows:
All members of the bargaining unit shall be
compensated only in accordance with Appendix C
hereof provided that the Superintendent of the School
has the discretion to recruit and hire expatriate
teachers from abroad, under terms and conditions
that are consistent with accepted international
practice.
We cannot agree.
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention.
Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The
Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect
and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires
every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith."
[8]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often
skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are
all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane
conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical
workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but include as well the manner
by which employers treat their employees.
[17]
[19]
[20]
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires
perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a
little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank,
the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This
presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays
one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he
receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to
injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the
employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
[23]
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no
evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively
than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities,
which they perform under similar working conditions.
The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their
domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the
principle of equal work for equal pay.
"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or
recompense for services performed." Similarly, the Philippine Legal
Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid at regular
intervals for the rendering of services." In Songco v. National Labor
Relations Commission, we said that:
[24]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[30]
[31]
FIRST DIVISION
G & M PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
- versus -
ROMIL V. CUAMBOT,
Respondent.
When respondent asked Motairi for his salary, he was told that since a huge
sum had been paid to the agency for his recruitment and deployment, he would
only be paid after the said amount had already been recovered. He was also told
that his salary was only 800 Saudi Riyals (SAR) per month, in contrast to the
SAR1200 that was promised him under the contract. Motairi warned that he would
be sent home the next time he demanded for his salary. Due to his familys
incessant letters asking for financial support, however, respondent mustered the
courage to again demand for his salaries during the second week of July 1996. True
to his word, Motairi ordered him to pack up and leave. He was able to purchase his
plane ticket only through the contributions of his fellow Filipinos. Motairi even
accompanied him to the airport when he bought his plane ticket. In the meantime,
his wife had been making inquiries about him.
To corroborate his claims, respondent submitted the following documents:
an undated letter[5] he had written addressed to the Philippine Labor Attach in
Riyadh, with Arabic translation;[6] his wifes letter[7] dated June 28, 1995 addressed
to the Gulangco Monteverde Agency, Manila Head Office, asking for a favor to
help [her] husband to come home as early as possible; a fax message [8] dated July
17, 1995 from a representative of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to a
counterpart in Riyadh, asking for assistance to locate respondent;[9] and the
reply[10] from the Riyadh LBP representative requesting for contact numbers to
facilitate communication with respondent.
Respondent further claimed that his employers actuations violated Articles
83 and 103 of the Labor Code. While he was entitled to terminate his employment
in accordance with Article 285 (b) due to the treatment he received, he did not
exercise this right. He was nevertheless illegally dismissed by his employer when
he tried to collect the salaries due him. Respondent further claimed that the
reduction of his monthly salary from SAR1,200 to SAR800 and petitioners failure
to furnish him a copy of the employment contract before his departure amounted to
prohibited practices under Article 34 (i) and (k) of the Labor Code.
Respondent prayed for the following relief:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, complainant most respectfully prays
unto this Honorable Office that the instant complaint be given due course and that
a
decision
be
rendered
in
his
favor
and
against
respondents
G
&
M
(Phils.),
Inc., Alwaha (sic) Workshop
and/or Muhamd (sic) Muthiri, as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
In its position paper, petitioner alleged that respondent was deployed for
overseas work as car body builder for its Principal Golden Wings Est. for General
Services and Recruitment in Saudi Arabia for an employment period of 24 months,
with a monthly salary of US$400.00.[12] It insisted that respondent was religiously
paid his salaries as they fell due. After working for a little over seven months,
respondent pleaded with his employer to be allowed to return home since there
were family problems he had to settle personally. Respondent even submitted a
resignation letter[13] dated July 23, 1995.
To support its claim that respondent had been paid his salaries as they fell
due, petitioner submitted in evidence copies of seven payslip[14] authenticated by
the Philippine Labor Attach in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Petitioner asserted that since
respondent only worked for a little over seven months and did not finish his
contract, he should pay the cost of the plane ticket. It pointed out that according to
the standard employment contract, the employer would provide the employee with
a free plane ticket for the flight home only if the worker finishes his contract.
Respondent countered that his signatures in the purported payslips were
forged. He denied having received his salaries for the said period, except only for
the SAR100 as monthly allowance. He pointed out that the authentication of the
alleged pay slips and resignation letter before the labor attach in Riyadh is
immaterial, since the documents themselves were falsified.
Respondent further claimed that petitioner required him to pay a P10,000.00
placement fee and that he had to borrow P2,000.00 from a relative. He was then
told that the amount would be considered as an advance payment and that the
balance would be deducted from his salary. He was not, however, given any
receipt. He insisted that the employment contract which he signed indicated that he
was supposed to receive a monthly salary of SAR1,200 for working eight hours a
day, excluding overtime pay. He was repeatedly promised to be furnished a copy of
the contract and was later told that it would be given to his wife, Minda. However,
she was also given the run-around and was told that the contract had already been
given to her husband.
To counter the allegation of forgery, petitioner claimed that there was a great
possibility that respondent had changed his signature while abroad so that he could
file a complaint for illegal dismissal upon his return. The argument that the stroke
and handwriting on the payslip was written by one and the same person is mere
conjecture, as respondent could have requested someone, i.e., the cashier, to
prepare the resignation letter for him. While it is the employer who fills up the pay
slip, respondent could have asked another employee to prepare the resignation
letter, particularly if he (respondent) did not know how to phrase it himself.
Moreover, it could not be presumed that the payslip and resignation letter were
prepared by one and the same person, as respondent is not a handwriting expert.
Petitioner further pointed out that respondent has different signatures, not only in
the pleadings submitted before the Labor Arbiter, but also in respondents personal
documents.
On January 30, 1997, Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera ruled in favor of
respondent on the following ratiocination:
What convinced this Arbitration Branch about the unreliability of the
complainants signature in the payslip is the close semblance of the handwritings
in the payslips and the handwritings in the purported handwritten resignation of
the complainant. It unmistakably appears to this Arbitration Branch that
the payslips as well as the handwritten letter-resignation were prepared by one
and the same person. If it were true that the handwritten letter-resignation was
prepared by the complainant, it follows that he also prepared the payslips because
the handwritings in both documents are exactly the same and identical. But [this]
is quite unbelievable that complainant himself as the payee prepared
the payslips with the corresponding entries therein in his own handwriting. Under
the circumstances, the only logical conclusion is that both the payslips and the
handwritten letter-resignation were prepared and signed by one and the same
person definitely not the complainant.
With the foregoing findings and conclusions, this Arbitration Branch is of
the well-considered view that complainant was not paid his salaries from January
5, 1995 up to July 23, 1995 and that he was unjustifiably dismissed from his
employment when he repeatedly demanded for his unpaid salaries. Respondents
are, therefore, liable to pay the complainant his salaries from January 5, 1995 up
to July 23, 1995 which amount to US$2,640.00 (US$400 x 6.6 mos). Further,
respondents are also liable to the complainant for the latters salaries for the
unexpired portion of his contract up to the maximum of three (3) months pursuant
to Section 10 of RA 8042, which amount to US$1,200.00. Respondents must also
refund complainants plane fare for his return flight. And finally, being compelled
to litigate his claims, it is but just and x x x that complainant must be awarded
attorneys fees at the rate of ten percent (10%) of the judgment award.
Petitioner appealed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, alleging
that the Labor Arbiter, not being a handwriting expert, committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in finding for respondent. In its
Decision[16] dated December 9, 1997, the NLRC upheld this contention
and remanded the case to the Arbitration Branch of origin for referral to the
government agency concerned for calligraphy examination of the questioned
documents.[17]
The case was then re-raffled to Labor Arbiter Enrico Angelo Portillo.
On September 11, 1998, the parties agreed to a resetting to enable petitioner to
secure the original copies of documents from its foreign principal. However,
on December 9, 1998, the parties agreed to submit the case for resolution based on
the pleadings and on the evidence on record.
This time, the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. According to Labor
Arbiter Portillo, aside from respondents bare allegations, he failed to substantiate
his claim of poor working conditions and long hours of employment. The fact that
he executed a handwritten resignation letter is enough evidence of the fact that he
voluntarily resigned from work. Moreover, respondent failed to submit any
evidence to refute the pay slips duly signed and authenticated by the labor attach
in Saudi Arabia, inasmuch as their probative value cannot be impugned by mere
self-serving allegations. The Labor Arbiter concluded that as between the oral
allegations of workers that they were not paid monetary benefits and the
documentary evidence presented by employer, the latter should prevail. [18]
Respondent appealed the decision before the NLRC, alleging that the Labor
Arbiter failed to consider the genuineness of the signature which appears in the
purported resignation letter dated July 23, 1995, as well as those that appear in the
seven pay slips. He insisted that these documents should have been endorsed to the
National Bureau of Investigation Questioned Documents Division or the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory for calligraphy examination.
The NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit in a
Resolution[19] dated December 27, 2000. It held that the questioned documents
could not be endorsed to the agency concerned since mere photocopies had been
submitted in evidence. The records also revealed that petitioner had communicated
to the foreign employer abroad, who sent the original copies, but there was no
response from respondent. It also stressed that during the December 9, 1998
hearing, the parties agreed to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings and the evidence on record; if respondent had wanted to have the
documents endorsed to the NBI or the PNP, he should have insisted that the
documents be examined by a handwriting expert of the government. Thus,
respondent was estopped from assailing the Labor Arbiters ruling.
Unsatisfied, respondent elevated the matter to the CA via petition
for certiorari. He pointed out that he merely acceded to the submission of the case
for resolution due to the inordinate delays in the case. Moreover, the questioned
documents were within petitioners control, and it was petitioner that repeatedly
failed to produce the original copies.
The CA reversed the ruling of the NLRC. According to the appellate court, a
visual examination of the questioned signatures would instantly reveal significant
differences in the handwriting movement, stroke, and structure, as well as the
quality of lines of the signatures; Labor Arbiter Portillo committed patent error in
examining the signatures, and it is the decision of Labor Arbiter De Vera which
must be upheld. The CA also pointed out the initial ruling of the NLRC (Second
Division) dated December 9, 1997 which set aside the earlier decision of Labor
Arbiter De Vera included a special directive to the Arbitration Branch of origin to
endorse the questioned documents for calligraphy examination. However,
respondent Cuambot failed to produce original copies of the documents; hence,
Labor Arbiter Portillo proceeded with the case and ruled in favor of
petitionerG.M.Phils. The dispositive portion of the CA ruling reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Resolutions dated 27 December
2000 and 12 February 2001, respectively, of the NLRC Second Division are
hereby SET ASIDE and the Decision dated 20 February 1997 rendered by Labor
Arbiter Jose De Vera is hereby REINSTATED.[20]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied for lack
of merit in its Resolution[21] dated February 20, 2004.
Hence, the present petition, where petitioner claims that
Petitioner points out that most of the signatures which Labor Arbiter De Vera
used as standards for comparison with the signatures appearing on the questioned
documents were those in the pleadings filed by the respondent long after the
questioned documents had been supposedly signed by him. It claims that
respondent affixed his signatures on the pleadings in question and intentionally
made them different from his true signature so that he could later on conveniently
impugn their authenticity. Petitioner claims that had Labor Arbiter De Vera taken
pains in considering these circumstances, he could have determined that
respondent may have actually intentionally given a different name and slightly
changed his signature in his application, which name and signature he used when
he signed the questioned letter of resignation and payslips, only to conveniently
disown the same when he came back to the country to file the present
case.[23] Thus, according to petitioner, the CA clearly committed a palpable error
of law when it reversed the ruling of the NLRC, which in turn affirmed Labor
Arbiter Portillos decision.
For his part, respondent contends that petitioners arguments were already
raised in the pleadings filed before Labor Arbiter De Vera which had already been
passed upon squarely in the Labor Arbiters Decision of January 30, 1997.
The determinative issues in this case are essentially factual in nature - (a)
whether the signatures of respondent in the payslips are mere forgeries, and (b)
whether respondent executed the resignation letter. Generally, it is not our function
to review findings of fact. However, in case of a divergence in the findings and
conclusions of the NLRC on the one hand, and those of the Labor Arbiter and the
CA on the other, the Court may examine the evidence presented by the parties to
determine whether or not the employee was illegally dismissed or voluntarily
resigned from employment.[24] The instant case thus falls within the exception.
We have carefully examined the evidence on record and find that the petition
must fail.
In its Decision[25] dated December 9, 1997, the NLRC had ordered the case
remanded to the Labor Arbiter precisely so that the questioned documents
Moreover, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. The reason
for the rule is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and
other similar documents which will show that overtime, differentials, service
incentive leave, and other claims of workers have been paid are not in the
possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute control of the employer.
Thus, the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been
discharged with payment falls on the debtor, in accordance with the rule that one
who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. [38] Only when the debtor
introduces evidence that the obligation has been extinguished does the burden shift
to the creditor, who is then under a duty of producing evidence to show why
payment does not extinguish the obligation. [39] In this case, petitioner was unable to
present ample evidence to prove its claim that respondent had received all his
salaries and benefits in full.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64744
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.