Introduction

The paper focuses on Pakistan's relations with the Muslim Countries, particularly
with the neighboring countries, constitutes an important aspect of foreign policy.
The neighboring border Muslim countries of Pakistan specifically Iran, not only
supported the creation of Pakistan but established friendly relations after her
creation and with the passage of time these relations became stronger and
strengthened further the article concentrates on the Baghdad pact, which was
milestone in Pak-Iran geo-political geo- strategic relations. The same views and
convergence of interests of the two countries compelled them to make friendly
relations with USA; reference to their security and economy along with Iran's moral
and political and diplomatic support to Pakistan during two Indo - Pak wars. The
significance of the present analysis stems out same views; convergence of interests
and understandings between the two countries due to geo-strategic and socioeconomic relations towards their friendship since 1947.
Iran support for Pakistan in the post war (1971 war) period was total. Iran supported
Pakistan whole heartedly in the 93000 prisoners of war dispute. Iran assured
Pakistan security and territorial integrity.
Iran welcomed the conclusion of Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan. The
Shah of Iran appreciated Zulfiqar Ali Bhotto but soon the relations between the two
countries turned tense due to Bhatto determined efforts towards the Arab World.
This was strongly apposed by Iran because there were centuries old bitter relations
between Iran and Arabs.
Zia accession to power opened a new chapter in Pak-Iran relations. The relations
during the time ofZia-ul-Haq were normal but not cordial. Their came Islamic revo
lution in Iran which opened a new chapter in Pakistan's Iran relations.
Baghdad Pact
One of the characteristic of small power behaviour is to have closer relations with
either a superpower or a great power so as to guard its security interests. David
Vital has called this the "Pilot- Fish" behaviour of keeping close to the shark to avoid
being eaten.\ Given the geographic proximity of the Soviet Union to both Iran and
Pakistan it seems logical to think that both these states would have tried to
cultivate the friendship of the USSR. A change in Pakistan's policy came when the
USA showed its disillusionment with India after India's Prime Minister visited
Washington in 1949. Meanwhile Pakistan had received an invitation for its prime
Minister for a visit to Moscow. A similar invitation was secured later from the United
States. Pakistan's Prime Minister LiaquatAIi Khan decided in favour of going to the
United States. Two factors seem to have motivated this change of preference. One
could be that Pakistan tried to exploit the disillusionment of US administration in
winning over India to their anti-communist alliance system to its own benefit. The
second factor could be the fact that the USA was both technologically and
economically far ahead ofthe USSR in the late forties and the early fifties. Economic
benefits from the United States could, therefore, be an important factor in Pakistan's

preference for the Americans. This has later been acknowledged by Pakistan's
President, Ayoub Khan.2
Viewed from the point of the United States, it would not be out of place here to
mention that two of the fundamental conditions of a successful foreign policy
established by Richelieu: Ie secret and I unite de direction are particularly
impossible to create in America and hence it is an ideal terrain for small state
manipulation. The governmental structure in the United States based upon the
theory of separation of powers with checks and balances among three organs of
government upon each-other makes the Congress and also the public more vocal
and important in foreign policy matters. The US administration was therefore,
prepared to go to only a limited extent in being friendly with India and when the
latter refused to cooperate in the anti-communist alliance, United States took up
Pakistan as a counterweight against India in the subcontinent. As regards the US
choice for Iran beginning with Frenklin D. Roosevelt, who characterized Iran as the
"bridge to victory" in the Second World War, every US President has acknowledged
the strategic importance of the country located atthe crossroads between East and
West, between Asia, Europe and Africa and also considered its importance for its oil
wealth.J
Iran had already ruled out any proximity with the Soviet Union. When the Baghdad
Pact was concluded with the initiative of the US, comprising Iraq, Turkey and Britain,
Iran also became a member of the Pact. This Pact was renamed the Centrial Treaty
Organisation when Iraq withdrew from it in 1958. USA won a supporter against the
communists and Iran gained the support of the United States in keeping the newborn monarchy propped up.
The CENTO was later joined by Pakistan too which had already signed the Mutual
Defence Assistance Agreement with the US in 1954 and had later become the
member ofthe US-sponsored South EastAsia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1955. .
Thus in the fifties, Pakistan and Iran came closer to each other through their
common friendship with the US and participation in the US-sponsored alliance
systems such as the CENTO. Inside the CENTO too both these counties shared
identical approach to various procedural matters. It were only Pakistan and Iran who
insisted that a unified command structure be imposed on the CENTO Army.4
Probably the reason for this was that whereas the other CENTO members were also
members of other defence alliances or had their independent or bi-Iateral defence
arrangements such was not the case with either Iran or Pakistan wich were weak
initially. Pakistan and Iran continued to collaborate under the auspices ofthe CENTO
till Iran left it after the fall of Shah in 1979.
The Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD)
A small state has also possibilities for defending its interests against great power in
bilateral relationships outside international institutional framework. They can also
develop their regional institutions to safeguard their national interests. The Regional
Cooperation for Development, a tripartite agreement among Turkey, Iran and
Pakistan for non-political cooperation, born in 1964, was one such regional

arrangement came largely from Ayoub Khan, the President of Pakistan who was
critical of the US acting as a "master" dictating terms against India rather than
behaving as a "Friend" .5
The formation of the RCD proved a very useful for the Shah of Iran and Ayoub Khan
for winning support to their respective governments at home. The "Liberation" from
the US was hailed by the opposition in both countries. Yusuf Khatak, the leader of
the opposition in the Pakistan National Assembly called it a "Step in the right
direction".6 Similarly another member of the Assembly said that RCD members will
be able to "get rid of the curse of CENTO".7 There were certain discordant notes as
well, but these were not of much significance as they came from staunch friends of
the USA who would not see the demerits of the US friendship.s The reaction to the
formation of the RCD in Tehran was also highly favourable. Senate President Jafar
Sharif Emami described the Union as a political master stroke, but perhaps
emphasizing the non-political content of the Agreement added, "I believe in
particular, that there is a good place in the Union for Afghanistan".9
The Majlis speaker Abdullah Riazi commenting on the Union said, "It would
contribute to development of the member nations and to the cause of world
peace".10 Premier HasanAli Mansur Speaking at Sanaday, the capital city
ofKurdistan, hailed the Iran-Pak- Turkey decision on closer cooperation as a great
political, social, economic and cultural union of 150 million Muslims.11
The India Factor in Pak - Iran Relations
As referred to earlier, Pakistan sought to cultivate the friendship of its Muslim
neighbors in order to strengthen itself against India and gain diplomatic support
over various issues against India in the UN. In the late forties and fifties Iran was not
hostilIe to India but it was clearly more friendly towards Pakistan. It was the first
Muslim country to recognize Pakistan.12
Iran gave diplomatic support to Pakistan over Kashmir, the most crucial test of a
country's friendship in the eyes of Pakistan. In the Iranian Parliament Kashmir was
discussed as an "inseparable part of Pakistan". Deputy Speaker, Sayed Ahmed Sarai
said:
We believe the decision of the Security Council should be binding, and the Kashmir
issue settled through plebiscite under the auspices of United Nations. It is, however,
regrettable that India on the one hand criticized even defence arrangements as
envisaged in the Baghdad Pact and on the other hand believed in the outmoded
maxim of might is rightl3
In 1952 Iran volunteered to act as a mediator between India and Pakistan over the
Kashmir issue but the tilt was clearly in Pakistan's favour. Iran's Foreign Minister
Ardeshir Zahedi, for instance, declared that "Iran had been telling India to solve the
kashmir problem with Pakistan on the basis of self-determination" .14
In 1956 when India showed her resentment over the mention of Kashmir issue in the
Baghdad Pact ministerial communiques, Iran did not pay any heed to India's
protestations.ls

The real test ofIran- Pakistan friendship, however, came during the two IndoPakwars ofl965 and 1971.16
Time Tested Friend
The. first instance of military assistance from Iran to Pakistan was the 1965 Indo-Pak
War. Iran considered the defence of Pakistan its own defence. Abdur Rasul Azimi,
the editor or Paigham-ilmroze Clearly stated that "Iran came out to help Pakistan
against Indian aggression with full consciousness that it was helping the defense. 17
0 Its own country.
The official Iranian circle also confirmed this. A statement issued by the Iranian
Foreign Minister declared that Iran was concerned about India's aggression against
Pakistan, a fraternal Muslim Nation.'8
Iran's supply of arms to Pakistan was no secret. YB Chavan, India's Minister for
Defence informed the Rajya Sabha on 2nd August 1965 that besides China, Iran and
Turkey were also supplying arms to Pakistan.'9 In response to earlier Indian
statements, the Shah of Iran had accepted the fact that Iran was supplying arms to
Pakistan. He had also justified his stand on the ground that had Iran not helped
Pakistan with arms, Pakistan would have certainly jumped into the Chinese lap.2O
Warof1971 and Iranian Response
Pakistan received full military and diplomatic support from Iran again in the 1971
war against India.
Iran called Indian attack as an "aggression" and the Indian action as interference in
Pakistan's domestic affairs. The Shah of Iran in an interview to a Paris paper openly
acknowledged, "We are opposed to all interference in its (Pakistan's) internal affairs,
we are hundred per cent behind Pakistan".21 The Iranian Prime Minister also toed
his ruler's line and said that "Pakistan was being subjected to violence and force".22
Iran's attitude and actions in both the Indo-Pak wars show that though Iran was proPakistan, it was hesitant in totally spoiling its relations with India. Iran tried again
and again to make it clear that it did not want the dismemberment of Pakistan
because that would have adversely affected the domestic stability and security
ofIran. The Kurds in Iran would be encouraged to rise up against the Iranian
government and thus jeopardize the security of Iran. In the same vein, Iran tried to
justify the supply of arms to Pakistan on the ground that in its desperation Pakistan
may fall into the Chinese lap. Further, as, a positive proof of their continuing good
relations with India, Iran did not either stop or slow down the flow of oil supplies to
India. During the later oil crisis too, Iran did not create much financial hardship.23 .
Though Iran and Pakistan have never been hostile to each other yet there, have
been times when they have taken widely divergent stands on various issues. This
divergence has been dictated by the fact that whereas Pakistan thought and acted
as a small power, Iran, in the late sixties and the seventies considered itself as a
medium range power. In addition to this, Iran's total dependence on the US for its
economic development and military build-up won for it the hostility of Arab States.
It was not merely an accident that while almost the whole of the Muslim world

including Pakistan was in favour of the boycott oflsrael after the burning of AI-Aqsa
Mosque on 21 st August 1969, Iran and Turkey refused to follow suit. Similarly, the
Shah ofIran did not attend the Islamic Conference in Lahore because Gaddafi of
Libya was invited to it despite the known hostility of the Shah for Gaddafi. A few
months before his removal, Bhutto was reported to have paid a visit to Iran to win
Iranian support over the nuclearisation of Pakistan. Though the Iranian reaction was
not known; yet there were indications that the Shah had refused to oblige Bhutto.24
Conclusion
By way of summing up, one can safely say that the two small powers under
discussion have shown remarkable consistency in their relations with each other
despite certain minor ups and downs. Their bilateral relations made them important
for the other regional powers-specially India. Their individual strategic locations
made them important for the superpowers for keeping their hold on the oil-rich
region of Asia.
Pak-Iran Gas Pipeline:

President Asif Ali Zardari and his Iranian counterpart Dr Mahmoud Ahmadinejad performed on
Monday groundbreaking of the long-awaited $7.5 billion gas pipeline project, laying the
foundation of bilateral energy cooperation and defying western opposition.
The project will deliver 750 million cubic feet of gas per day to Pakistan by Jan 2015.
The Iran-Pakistan gaslifeline will help eradicate terrorism, bring prosperity to the region and
overcome poverty, President Zardari said after he and Mr Ahmadinejad unveiled the plaque of
the project at a ceremony in the Iranian city of Chabahar, near the Pakistan border. They also saw
welding of pieces of pipeline painted with flags of the two nations.
Mr Zardari described the event as a historic moment not only for the two countries but also for
the region. He said many countries in the world had prospered by doing trade within their
regions, adding that economic and energy cooperation could make Pakistan and Iran prosperous.
Relations could be cold and warm, but geographic neighbours cannot change. Let us live
together in prosperity and cooperation. Adviser to the Prime Minister on Petroleum, Dr Asim
Hussain, announced that Gwadar port would soon have Pakistans largest refinery, which would
be built jointly by the two countries.
President Zardari said the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project was not against any country. It is in
the national interests of Pakistan, Iran and countries in the region. By promoting regional
integration, these countries will be better placed to fight terrorism and extremism.

He said the pipeline project marked a new chapter in the history of Pakistan-Iran relations. It is
also a leap forward in regional cooperation and integration.
Muslim countries faced big challenges because the world does not understand us and does not
want to understand our problems. They wish well for us but dont know how to help us; so we
have to build and strengthen ourselves. Let us do it for ourselves, President Zardari observed.
The pipeline project and other bilateral cooperation would help fight terrorism through prosperity
and wellbeing of the people. I urge the international community dont put in us different
definitions. We have our own definition and we know what is good for us, he said.
He said no matter what our detractors say about this pipeline, but work on it will go on. Our
detractors never believed that our democracy will survive, but we have survived and gave five
years to democracy.
President Ahmadinejad said the project had nothing to do with its nuclear programme because
the gas pipeline cannot help make bombs. This is a peace pipeline and if the world wants peace
it should refrain from creating hurdles, he said. This pipeline will become a milestone in
regional cooperation and this event is a message to opponents.
The future of Pakistan and Iran depended on cooperation, Ahmadinejad said, adding that while
Pakistan had agriculture, commodities and value-added goods, his country had abundant energy
resources which should become the basis of bilateral trade.
Analysts were of the opinion that the groundbreaking was a big step forward, but the success lay
in steadfastness. This is the first big step towards gas pipelines in the region, former petroleum
secretary Dr Gulfaraz Ahmad said. If we remain steadfast and show resolve to complete it, the
US pressure will not matter and in fact subside, but if we waver they will exert more pressure,
he said. The caveat lies in resisting pressures and implementing the project with full focus,
said Ahmad Waqar, another former petroleum secretary. He said national interest demanded
pursuing the project as it would contribute to prosperity of the people of Pakistan.
The project, conceived in the early 1990s, envisages delivery of 750MMCFD of gas from Irans
South Pars field at the Pakistan-Iran border through a 56-inch 1150-km pipeline.
A 900-km pipeline from South Pars to Sheher in Iran has already been laid while the construction
of a 200-km pipeline up to Gabd-zero point is in the final stages of design.
The 781-km Pakistani section of the pipeline (42 inch diameter) is to be laid close to Makran
coastal highway from Gabd-zero point to Nawabshah, in Sindh. On completion, it will help
generate 4000MW of electricity.

The price of gas is currently estimated at 78 per cent of the international oil price, but subject to
revision a year before first flows on the basis of comparative energy sources, notably Turkmen
gas.
The 781km sections consultants include Germanys Beratende Ingenieure GmbH and Pakistans
Nespak. Construction work will be undertaken by Tadbir Energy of Iran at an estimated cost of
$1.3 billion. Iran will provide $500 million half through a government loan and half through
an Iranian bank. The remaining cost will be arranged through a Chinese loan and gas
infrastructure development cess.
The two countries had signed intergovernmental framework and gas sale and purchase
agreements in 2009, which legally became effective on June 13, 2010.
Dr Asim Hussain said the project on completion would contribute about five per cent to
Pakistans gross domestic product and create 10,000 jobs during construction and about 3,000
after completion.
The groundbreaking ceremony was attended by delegations from Kuwait, Turkmenistan, the
UAE, Oman, Afghanistan and Qatar, according to an announcement made from the podium.
Pakistans delegation, led by President Zardari, was flown in three planes to Chabahar airport,
about 200km from Gabd-zero point on the Pakistan-Iran border.
Besides ministers, the delegation included former prime minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, the
Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly, retired generals and almost all former
secretaries of the petroleum ministry.
Twists and Turns:
1994: Pakistan and Iran start discussing gas pipeline project.
1995: Governments of Pakistan and Iran sign preliminary agreement.
1998: Iran proposes extension of pipeline to India.
1999: Governments of Iran and India sign preliminary agreement.
2003: Iran and Pakistan form Working Group.
2005: MoU is signed to include India in the project.
2007: After a long break, Pakistan, Iran and India resume talks on the project and agree on a
tariff of $4.93 per million British thermal units. However, many of the technical details and
issues related to price revision mechanism remain unresolved.

2008: Iran expresses interest in Chinese involvement in the project.

2009: India withdraws from the project after signing civilian nuclear deal with the US in 2008
citing security and pricing issues.
2009 (April): Pakistans cabinet approves Gas Sales Purchase Agreement (GSPA) with Iran.
2009 (May): Presidents Zardari and Ahmedinejad sign Inter-Governmental Framework
Declaration. GSPA is also initialled on the occasion.
2010 (January): US asks Pakistan to quit the project and in return offered to assist in construction
of LNG terminal and import of electricity from Tajikistan.
2010 (March): Pakistan and Iran sign agreement in Turkey for the construction of the
pipeline.2010 (May): Iran and Pakistan sign sovereign guarantees agreement.
2010 (June): Pakistan and Iran sign export contract, binding Iran to supply gas from 2014.
2010 (June): US for the first time warns Pakistan of sanctions because of involvement with the
project.
2011 (July): Iran announces that it has completed its section of the pipeline.
2012 (March): Industrial and Commercial Bank of China backs out of agreement to finance the
gas pipeline because of US sanctions on Iran. Pakistan starts looking for alternate sources.
Russian energy giant Gazprom expresses interest in the project.
2012 (April): Pakistans petroleum ministry floats tenders for construction of the gas pipeline.
2012 (October): Iran offers to finance one third of the cost of laying pipeline in Pakistans
territory.
2013 (January): Pakistans federal cabinet ratifies the project.
2013 (February): Iran and Pakistan agree on financing deal and conclude technical negotiations
in Tehran. Irans Supreme leader Ayatollah Khameini tells President Zardari to disregard US
pressure and go ahead with the project.
2013 (March 11): Ground breaking is performed.

Pakistan's relationship with Iran (all aspects)

In the post-Cold War era, Pak-Iran relations have suffered owing to the unruly situation in
Afghanistan.
The Taliban pheno-menon is related to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The US

President Jimmy Carter approved a broader covert action programme that instructed the
CIA to provide military weapons and ammunition and support for the Afghan anticommunist resistance fighters, who soon became widely known as mujahidin or freedom
fighters. [Charles G. Cogan, Partners in time: the CIA in Afghanistan since 1979, World
Policy Journal (1993)]
In April 1980, the hostage rescue mission in Iran failed which gave impression of declining
US power. In order to counter this impression, the Carter administration continued to seek
a broader security relationship with Pakistan to buttress covert CIA ISI ties. [Dennis Kux,
op.cit., p.253]
On insistence of the US, the Saudis were persuaded to contribute financial assistance in a
way to match the US contribution to the plan dollar for dollar. [Robert M. Gates, From the
Shadows, p.148]
The ISI and Jama'at-e-Islami provided boarding, lodging and housing facilities for military
training to cement mujahidin groups together. According to French scholar Oliver Roy, this
had become a joint plan organized by the Saudis, the Muslim brotherhood and the ISI with
assistance from Pakistan's Jama'at-e-Islami. [Oliver Roy, Afghanistan from holly war to civil
war.]
On insistence of the US, the Saudis were persuaded to contribute financial assistance in a
way to match the US contribution to the plan dollar for dollar.
The JUI set up hundred of madrassas in Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa and Balochistan along the
Pushtun belt. The young Pakistanis and Afghan refugees were provided free education, food
and lodging along with semi-military training. [Lubna Abid Ali, Post Revolutionary Iran,
p.191] The famous deeni madrassa at Akora Khattak (KP) Dar-ul- Uloom Haqqania had been
founded in 1947. There are around 2000 Talibs from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central
Asian states. Senator Sami-ul-Haq is chief of this madrassa. General Zia-ul-Haq had asked
the District Zakat Committees to give madrassas money from Zakat funds. According to a
survey conducted in 1997 by the Home Department of the government of Punjab, there
were 169 deeni madrassas in Rawalpindi. Most of these madrassas were serving as hideouts
for criminals. [The News, May 26, 1997]
The vast majority of Taliban are Sunnis, who follow the Hanfi fiqah. There are about 14 per
cent Shias in Afghanistan who live in province of Bamian. Foreign Minister of Iran Alaudin
Borujerdi visited Bamian in December 1995 and held talks with Karim Khalili to bring Afghan
Shia factions together.
In 1995 when the Taliban captured Herat, the commander Ismail Khan of Herat took shelter
in neighbouring Iran. Heart, with Iranian assistance, was re-captured along with Farah and
Nimroz. Tehran established training camps in eastern Iran where Persian-speaking Afghans
from Herat, Farah and Nimroz were trained to fight the Taliban. (The News, February 1,
1996.] Russian provided Iran $10 billion worth of weapons between 1989 and 1993. Russia
had been apprehensive of Pushtun-dominated Tiban.
Iranian tried to establish a broad-based government in Afghanistan to end the hostilities. On
January 25, 1997 at Tehran conference, Prof Burhanuddin Rabbani, Gulbidin Hikmatyar,
Karim Khalili and representatives of Abdul Rashid Dostum and Ahmad Shah Masood
participated. Additional Secretary Iftikhar Murshid from the Pakistan Foreign Office also
attended. However, Taliban refused to participate. [The News, April 17 and 18, 1996]
The US President Jimmy Carter approved a broader covert action programme that

instructed the CIA to provide military weapons and ammunition and support for the Afghan
anti-communist resistance fighters, who soon became widely known as mujahidin or
freedom fighters.
On August 1998, the Taliban were involved in indiscriminate killings in Mazar-e-Sharif
contrary to Islamic injunctions, no one was allowed to bury the dead for at least a week.
[Michael Winchester, Ethnic cleansing in Afghanistan, Asiaweek, November 6, 1998] The
Taliban wanted to cleanse Shias from the north. The Shia population was given three
choices: to convert to Sunni Islam, leave for Iran or die. The Spah-e-Sahaba party entered
Iranian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif, herded 11 Iranian diplomats, intelligence officers and
journalist into the basement and shot them dead. Tehran had contacted Pakistan
government to guarantee the security of their consulate, because the Iranian knew that ISI
officers had driven into Mazar with the Taliban. [Ahmad Rashid, The Taliban, p.74] Within
three days an intense civil strife ensured in the Mazar when Hazaras resisted being
disarmed. The Taliban were massacred, 250 Pakistanis were killed and 550 captured as
prisoners. The turning point in Pak-Iran relations came when the head of Iranian cultural
centre was killed in Multan in September 1993. The relations suffered a serious blow when
Tehran started military exercises along the Iran-Afghanistan border. The tension subsided
with the intrusion of UN special representative Lakhdar Brahimi who met Mullah Omar in
Kandahar on 14 October 1998. The Taliban killed hundred of Pakistani Shias between 1996
and 1999. The sectarian bloodshed undermined Pakistan's relations with Iran.