ASU RaCh Cards CEDA Round 4

1NC

1
A. Our interpretation is that the affirmative should have to
instrumentally defend the institutional implementation of a
topical plan.
Most predictablethe agent and verb indicate a debate about
hypothetical government action
Jon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts California
Polytechnic U., et al., The Debaters Guide, Third Edition, p. 4
The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions,

each topic contains certain key

elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An
agent doing the acting ---The United States in The United States
should adopt a policy of free trade. Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is
the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb shouldthe first part of a verb phrase that urges
action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here
means to put a program or policy into action through governmental
means . 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired.
The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of
increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action.
Nothing has yet occurred.

The entire debate is about whether something ought to

occur . What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling
reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

Legalize is to make an illegal act lawful

Blacks Law Dictionary 95 What is LEGALIZE?
[http://thelawdictionary.org/legalize/]
To make legal or lawful ; to confirm or validate what was before void or
unlawful; to add the sanction and authority of law to that which before was without or
against law.

B. Violation the aff doesnt defend a topical plan.

C. Reasons to Prefer
1. Vote neg on presumption because they have not offered a
reason why you should accept some parametric of the topic.
2. Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue
monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion onesided and subverts any meaningful neg role
Galloway 7Samford Comm prof (Ryan, Contemporary Argumentation and
Debate, Vol. 28, 2007)
Debate as a dialogue

sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity
to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of
the argumentative table a fair hearing.

The affirmative side is set by the topic and

fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the
topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.

Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches
to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical
arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms,

When one side takes more than its share,

competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to
the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it
fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970,
p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a
fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of
a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request
for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to
be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months
of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative
cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular
negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative
table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to
understand what went on and are left to the whims of time and
power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only
tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they
enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound
decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument,
discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only
through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a
common causeIf we are to be equalrelationships among equals must
find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196197). Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a
framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell,
1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend
neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane
each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.s

to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that
state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are
philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the
dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the
negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the
neg ative team, preventing them from offering effective counter-word
and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts.
Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the
dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.

3. Policy debate is good for education, engagement, and

empathy. Clear rules, a stable topic, institutional role-playing
and simulation are integral to the process.
Lantis 8 (Jeffrey S. Lantis is Professor in the Department of Political Science and
Chair of the International Relations Program at The College of Wooster, The State of
the Active Teaching and Learning Literature,
http://www.isacompss.com/info/samples/thestateoftheactiveteachingandlearninglite
rature_sample.pdf)
Simulations, games, and role-play represent a third important set of active
teaching and learning approaches. Educational objectives include deepening
conceptual understandings of a particular phenomenon, sets of interactions, or
socio-political processes by using student interaction to bring abstract
concepts to life. They provide students with a real or imaginary
environment within which to act out a given situation (Crookall 1995; Kaarbo and
Lantis 1997; Kaufman 1998; Jefferson 1999; Flynn 2000; Newmann and Twigg 2000; Thomas 2002; Shellman and
Turan 2003; Hobbs and Moreno 2004; Wheeler 2006; Kanner 2007; Raymond and Sorensen 2008). The aim is to

enable students to actively experience, rather than read or hear about,

the constraints and motivations for action (or inaction) experienced by
real players (Smith and Boyer 1996:691), or to think about what they might do in a
particular situation that the instructor has dramatized for them. As Sutcliffe (2002:3) emphasizes,
Remote theoretical concepts can be given life by placing them in a situation with which students are familiar.

Such exercises capitalize on the strengths of active learning techniques:

creating memorable experiential learning events that tap into multiple senses and
emotions by utilizing visual and verbal stimuli. Early examples of simulations scholarship include works by Harold
Guetzkow and colleagues, who created the Inter-Nation Simulation (INS) in the 1950s. This work sparked wider

political simulations as teaching and research tools. By the 1980s, scholars

had accumulated a number of sophisticated simulations of international politics,
with names like Crisis, Grand Strategy, ICONS, and SALT III. More recent
literature on simulations stresses opportunities to reflect dynamics faced
in the real world by individual decision makers, by small groups like the US National
Security Council, or even global summits organized around international issues, and provides
for a focus on contemporary global problems (Lantis et al. 2000; Boyer 2000). Some of the
interest in

most popular simulations involve modeling international organizations, in particular United Nations and European
Union simulations (Van Dyke et al. 2000; McIntosh 2001; Dunn 2002; Zeff 2003; Switky 2004; Chasek 2005).

Simulations may be employed in one class meeting, through one week, or even over an entire semester.
Alternatively, they may be designed to take place outside of the classroom in local,
national, or international competitions . The scholarship on the use of games in international studies sets
these approaches apart slightly from simulations. For example, Van Ments (1989:14) argues that games are
structured systems of competitive play with specific defined endpoints or
solutions that incorporate the material to be learnt. They are similar to simulations,
but contain specific structures or rules that dictate what it means to win
the simulated interactions. Games place the participants in positions to
make choices that 10 affect outcomes, but do not require that they take on the persona of a real
world actor. Examples range from interactive prisoner dilemma exercises to the use of board games in
international studies classes (Hart and Simon 1988; Marks 1998; Brauer and Delemeester 2001; Ender 2004; Asal

Like simulations, roleplay

places students within a structured environment and asks them to take on
a specific role. Role-plays differ from simulations in that rather than having their actions prescribed by a
2005; Ehrhardt 2008) A final subset of this type of approach is the role-play.

role-plays provide more leeway for students

to think about how they might act when placed in the position of their
slightly less well-defined persona (Sutcliffe 2002). Role-play allows students to create their own
interpretation of the roles because of role-plays less goal oriented focus. The primary aim of the
role-play is to dramatize for the students the relative positions of the
actors involved and/or the challenges facing them (Andrianoff and Levine 2002). This
set of well-defined preferences or objectives,

dramatization can be very simple (such as roleplaying a two-person conversation) or complex (such as role-playing

The reality of the scenario and its

proximity to a students personal experience is also flexible. While few examples of
effective roleplay that are clearly distinguished from simulations or games have been published, some recent
work has laid out some very useful role-play exercises with clear procedures
for use in the international studies classroom (Syler et al. 1997; Alden 1999; Johnston
numerous actors interconnected within a network).

2003; Krain and Shadle 2006; Williams 2006; Belloni 2008).

Taken as a whole, the applications and procedures for

Experts
recommend a set of core considerations that should be taken into account
when designing effective simulations (Winham 1991; Smith and Boyer 1996; Lantis 1998;
Shaw 2004; 2006; Asal and Blake 2006; Ellington et al. 2006). These include building the simulation
design around specific educational objectives, carefully selecting the
situation or topic to be addressed, establishing the needed roles to be played
by both students and instructor, providing clear rules, specific
instructions and background material, and having debriefing and
assessment plans in place in advance. There are also an increasing number of simulation designs
simulations, games, and role-play are well detailed in the active teaching and learning literature.

published and disseminated in the discipline, whose procedures can be adopted (or adapted for use) depending
upon an instructors educational objectives (Beriker and Druckman 1996; Lantis 1996; 1998; Lowry 1999; Boyer
2000; Kille 2002; Shaw 2004; Switky and Aviles 2007; Tessman 2007; Kelle 2008). Finally, there is growing

these methods are particularly

effective in bridging the gap between academic knowledge and everyday
life. Such exercises also lead to enhanced student interest in the topic,
the development of empathy, and acquisition and retention of knowledge.
attention in this literature to assessment. Scholars have found that

4. Through discussing paths of government action, debate

teaches us to be better organizational decision makers.
Learning about the uniquely different considerations of
organizations is necessary to affecting change in a world
overwhelmingly dominated by institutions.
Algoso 2011 Masters in Public Administration (May 31, Dave, Why I got an
MPA: Because organizations matter
http://findwhatworks.wordpress.com/2011/05/31/why-i-got-an-mpa-becauseorganizations-matter/)
organizations matter. Forget the stories of heroic individuals written in your middle school
civics textbook. Nothing of great importance is ever accomplished by a single
Because

person . Thomas Edison had lab assistants, George Washingtons army had thousands of troops, and Mother
Teresas Missionaries of Charity had over a million staff and volunteers when she passed away. Even Jesus had a 12-

Pick your
favorite historical figure or contemporary hero, and I can almost
guarantee that their greatest successes occurred as part of an
organization. Even the most charismatic, visionary and inspiring leaders have to be able to manage people,
man posse. In different ways and in vastly different contexts, these were all organizations.

or find someone who can do it for them. International development work is no different .
Regardless of your issue of interest whether private sector investment, rural development, basic health care,
government capacity, girls education, or democracy promotion your work will almost always involve operating
within an organization. How well or poorly that organization functions will have dramatic implications for the results

A well-run organization makes better decisions about staffing

and operations; learns more from its mistakes; generates resources and
commitment from external stakeholders; and structures itself to better
promote its goals. None of this is easy or straightforward. We screw it up fairly often.
Complaints about NGO management and government bureaucracy are not
new. We all recognize the need for improvement. In my mind, the greatest challenges and
of your work.

constraints facing international development are managerial and

organizational, rather than technical . Put another way: the greatest
opportunities and leverage points lie in how we run our organizations . Yet our
discourse about the international development industry focuses largely on how much money donors should commit

We
give short shrift to the questions around how organizations can actually
turn those funds into the technical solutions. The closest we come is to discuss the
to development and what technical solutions (e.g. deworming, elections, roads, whatever) deserve the funds.

incentives facing organizations due to donor or political requirements. I think we can go deeper in addressing the
management and organizational issues mentioned above. This thinking led me to an MPA degree because it

A degree in economics or international

affairs could teach you all about the problems in the world, and you may even
learn how to address them. But if you dont learn how to operate in an
straddles that space between organizations and issues.

organization, you may not be able to channel the resources needed to

implement solutions . On the flip side, a typical degree in management offers relevant skills, but without
the content knowledge necessary to understand the context and the issues. I think the MPA, if you choose the right
program for you and use your time well, can do both.

The aff cannot access this - meta-consensus is key to actualize

pluralism
John Dryzek 6, Professor of Social and Political Theory, The Australian National
University, Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals, American Journal
of Political Science,Vol. 50, No. 3, July 2006, Pp. 634649
Epistemic meta-consensus

for its part

could be desirable on the grounds of

deliberative economy . That is, to the extent a set of beliefs is accepted as

credible and

relevant , there is an understanding of what the main issues are ,

and so no need to debate fundamentals each time a claim is made . A parallel

with paradigms in scientific communities can be drawn here. A paradigm by definition features strong
epistemic meta-consensus, releasing practitioners from the sheer amount
of time and effort it takes to get beyond debating basic assumptions and first
principles. Of course, nothing as strong as a paradigm will normally be
available (or necessarily desirable ) in a political context. Epistemic metaconsensus permits the pluralism at the simple level required for complex
issues to be scrutinized from a number of directions in the search for

creative solutions that respond to different facets of issues (see our earlier
discussion of Poppers argument for the rationality of simple pluralism in policy making). In effect, epistemic metaconsensus creates a problem-solving public in the sense of pragmatist philosophers such as
John Dewey (1927). To return to our toxic pollution example, government officials wielding epidemiological studies and local
residents reporting particular experiences would not be stuck in ridiculing the methodological basis of each others claims, but
instead devote energy to joint problem solving. This effort might, for example, involve deploying some version of the precautionary
principle in environmental policy, which is designed to inform policy making in situations of substantial uncertainty about the
content and magnitude of risks. Such an outcome would not be in any sense a mere compromise between the epistemic positions of
the two sides that would involve an assessment of risks somewhere between that of the epidemiologists and local residents, but
rather a wholly new way of looking at decision in the context of risk.

The impact outweighsdeliberative debate models impart

skills vital to respond to existential threats
Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill, Tradition of Debate in North Carolina in Navigating
Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311
The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it

the democratic
capacities built by debate are not limited to speechas indicated earlier, debate
builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed
decision making, and better public judgment . If the picture of modem
political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view
of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid
scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and
ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a
puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving
up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the
challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities
presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But

can change , which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of

democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on
education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem
articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry
to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to
sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for
and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and
to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter
the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic
capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of
information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of
modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to
match with the challenges of a new information environment . This is a
problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin,
for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices
against an increasingly complex and multimediated information
environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills
and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to
navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the selfreport ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance

on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that

not matter which topic students had been assigned

it did

. . . students in the Instnictional

[debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that
they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among
students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project
on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however:
After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their
ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-

Larkin's study
substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the
college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving
skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information
environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual
efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question
facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best
evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.
There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic

the evidence presented here warrants strong support

for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing
democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical
thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral
communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open
engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial
component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in
achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched
practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical
students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political
engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this
practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can
actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we
are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy
is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of
challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial
justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid
climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of
terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and
increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global
economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and
active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one
of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and
by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential
challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.
deliberation. But cumulatively,

5. Refusal to engage in institutional reform reduces inquiry to

narcissism. There is a direct tradeoff with productive
discussion and research.
Chandler 9 (David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the
University of Westminster, Questioning Global Political Activism, What is Radical
Politics Today?, Edited by Jonathan Pugh, pp. 81-2)

Today more and more people are doing politics in their academic work. This is the reason for the boom in
International Relations (IR) study and the attraction of other social sciences to the global sphere. I would argue

the attraction of IR for many people has not been IR theory but the
desire to practise global ethics. The boom in the IR discipline has
coincided with a rejection of Realist theoretical frameworks of power
and interests and the sovereignty/anarchy problematic. However, I would argue that this
rejection has not been a product of theoretical engagement with
Realism but an ethical act of rejection of Realisms ontological focus . It
seems that our ideas and our theories say much more about us than the
world we live in. Normative theorists and Constructivists tend to support the global ethical turn arguing
that

that we should not be as concerned with what is as with the potential for the emergence of a global ethical
community. Constructivists, in particular, focus upon the ethical language which political elites espouse rather

the most dangerous trends in the discipline today

are those frameworks which have taken up Critical Theory and argue
that focusing on the world as it exists is conservative problem-solving
while the task for critical theorists is to focus on emancipatory
alternative forms of living or of thinking about the world. Critical thought
then becomes a process of wishful thinking rather than one of
engagement, with its advocates arguing that we need to focus on
clarifying our own ethical frameworks and biases and positionality, before thinking
about or teaching on world affairs. This becomes me-search rather
than research. We have moved a long way from Hedley Bulls (1995) perspective that, for academic
than the practices of power. But

research to be truly radical, we had to put our values to the side to follow where the question or inquiry might

The inward-looking and narcissistic trends in academia, where we

are more concerned with our reflectivity the awareness of our own ethics and values
than with engaging with the world, was brought home to me when I
asked my IR students which theoretical frameworks they agreed with
most. They mostly replied Critical Theory and Constructivism . This is
despite the fact that the students thought that states operated on the
basis of power and self-interest in a world of anarchy . Their theoretical
preferences were based more on what their choices said about them as
ethical individuals, than about how theory might be used to understand
and engage with the world. Conclusion I have attempted to argue that there is a lot at
stake in the radical understanding of engagement in global politics .
Politics has become a religious activity, an activity which is no longer
socially mediated; it is less and less an activity based on social
engagement and the testing of ideas in public debate or in the academy.
lead.

Doing politics today, whether in radical activism, government policy-making or in academia, seems to bring
people into a one-to-one relationship with global issues in the same way religious people have a one-to-one

Politics is increasingly like religion because when we

look for meaning we find it inside ourselves rather than in the external
consequences of our political acts. What matters is the conviction or
the act in itself: its connection to the global sphere is one that we
increasingly tend to provide idealistically. Another way of expressing this
limited sense of our subjectivity is in the popularity of globalisation theory the idea
that instrumentality is no longer possible today because the world is such
a complex and interconnected place and therefore there is no way of
knowing the consequences of our actions. The more we engage in the
new politics where there is an unmediated relationship between us as
relationship with their God.

individuals and global issues, the less we engage instrumentally with

the outside world, and the less we engage with our peers and colleagues at the
level of political or intellectual debate and organisation.

6. Topic education detailed debate on government policy

regarding crime is key to liberalizing the penal system the
impact is sustained inequality
Barker 9 Vanessa, Assistant Professor of Criminology Florida State University,
The Politics of Imprisonment How the Democratic Process Shapes the Way America
Punishes Offenders,pp 182-188
This study has some important and potentially unpopular policy implications. First, I think

the public needs to be

more not less involved in crime control policy. Second, I think it is a mistake for penal policy
makers to retreat behind bureaucratic insulation or expert commissions. The public is not stupid, cultural
dupes, nor a uniform source of vengeance and irrationality. That
relationship is dependent on specific historical conditions and political
configurations , none of which are universal across the American states. Given the opportunity for
deliberative discussion , ordinary people can support more rational and
pragmatic responses to crime. Given the opportunity to

interact with one another,

debate a range of policy proposals , learn from experts, and hold state
lawmakers and policy makers accountable , citizens can make informed
decisions about crime control policy . Deliberative forums can promote compromise. Consider, for
example, that Jason Barabas has shown how deliberative forums can alter a person's
deeply held views even on such sensitive policy issues as Social Security .4
David Green found that citizens' participation led to more liberalizing views on
crime and punishment and decreased their demands for vengeance and
custodial sanctions .5 Likewise, Gerry Johnstone has argued that public
participation can (p.182) expose more people to the negative effects of penal
sanctioning and expand their views of the public interest.6 Moreover, public support is
necessary for state legitimacy. Public support is especially critical in policy areas fraught with emotional and moral dilemmas. Crime
and punishment raise unresolved moral questions about pain, suffering, the value of human life, the limits of freedom, justice, and
the principles of safety and security in highly complex democracies that value personal liberty. How these problems are temporarily
resolved depends on the nature and character of collective agency. This means that attempts to block public access to crime control
policy can backfire, creating legitimacy problems for the state. Purely technocratic responses to crime, generated by bureaucratic
insulation, may provoke more populist and punitive responses. The public may feel that their concerns, insecurities, and anxieties
about their own safety and security are either taken for granted or deemed irrelevant by policy makers. When people feel excluded,
they may withdraw their trust and confidence in government, intensifying their moral outrage and redirecting it against more
vulnerable and less integrated social groups. This is what happened in California. By contrast, in Washington, state officials
consistently incorporated citizen input into policy making. Washington created its Sentencing Commission through a highprofile and
highly public process and included citizen representatives on the commission itself. The findings of this study are limited. It would be
useful to be clear about their generalizability. The small number of cases raises doubts about whether we can extend the findings to
other times and places. It is entirely possible the findings may only account for the penal regime variation in California, Washington,
and New York and may not explain the full range of penal sanctioning in the United States. There is good reason, however, to think
that the findings may be applicable to other cases. First, these three cases are certainly not the same thing as three observations.
Comparing the policymaking process spatially and temporally in cases that represent common patterns rather than extreme cases
substantially increases the number of observations and improves analytical leverage. Because the findings are grounded in
empirical detail, prior research, and comparative methodology, the core theoretical framework developed here may provide some
insight into other contexts within the United States and beyond. To be sure, more research is necessary to (p.183) assess these
claims, but the point here is to highlight implications for future thinking about penal sanctioning. The selected cases represent major
democratic traditions in the United States: populism, pragmatism, and deliberative democracy. The arguments developed here have
relevance for other American states steeped in those traditions.

Texas and many other western states grew up with

populist politics and retributive penal policies; Pennsylvania and Illinois

may provide further examples of pragmatic politics and its associated
managerial penal regime; whereas Maine and Vermont may provide
examples of deliberative democracy with its associated less coercive penal
sanctioning. Minnesota may represent the corporatist type (illustrated in Table 6.1) with a high degree of civic
engagement, high social trust, and relatively high degree of centralization and associated low imprisonment rates. States that fall

state that
fall along the bottom dimensions with lower rates of civic engagement,
more social polarization, or more elite dominated politics tend to have
more coercive penal regimes. To get a preliminary look at how this study might help explain differences
along the top tier in Table 6.1 with higher rates of civic engagement tend to have less coercive penal regimes;

across the fifty states, we can graph the relationship between the democratic process and penal regimes. Figure 6.1 maps the
relationship between social capital (as a composite measure of social trust and civic engagement taken from Putnam) and
imprisonment rates across the nation. Of course, this is only a crude illustration and reduction of a much more complicated process,
but the figure provides a visual reference point to an intriguing finding. In states with a high degree of social capital, like Vermont
and Minnesota, we tend to see lower rates of imprisonment. In states with low degrees of social capital, like Alabama, Texas, and
Louisiana, we tend to see higher imprisonment rates. More research is needed to assess the degree to which this is a significant
relationship across the states given varying degrees of crime, economic inequality, and ethnic diversity. I suspect that this
relationship will be important because social trust underpins more general social processes of inclusion and exclusion. From this
configuration, I suggest a further argument about the general upward trend in American punishment. Despite the important

If we
extend the findings from the case studies, (p.184) it may be
dedemocratization, the retrenchment of American democracy, that
partially accounts for high rates of imprisonment in the U nited S tates.
Americans by and large have retreated into the private sphere, becoming
detached from a sense of mutual obligation and civic responsibility,
instead experiencing social isolation and social polarization. They have weakened the
emotional and political support necessary to sustain inclusive public
policies, policies that are responsive to public welfare and not just private
interest. Concomitantly, they have failed to restrain the repressive powers of the
state, especially as they have been directed at the most vulnerable social
groupsthe poor and racial and ethnic minorities. Of course, more research is needed to
differences we continue to see across the states, the United States as a whole has increased its reliance on imprisonment.

confirm this claim. It is nevertheless a provocative claim worth exploring in further detail. What about the South? Some readers may
argue that the South has high imprisonment rates because southern states continue to maintain racial hierarchies and rely on the
criminal law to repress African Americans. The racial dynamics in the cases were much more complicated and perhaps more
insidious than a strict racial social control perspective allows. This book does (p.185) not dispute the importance of race, but it tries
to connect racial dynamics to the democratic process. To fully account for penal regime variation in the South, this study suggests
that we trace out the effects of black incorporation and black exclusion. In the aftermath of the civil rights movement, some
southern states did incorporate African Americans politically and economically, whereas others continued to resist with force.

Where we see higher rates of civic engagement, white and black, we

might see greater social trust across diverse social groups, increasing
norms of mutual obligation and reciprocity, forces that undermine
punitiveness and may support more lenient penal regimes . Southern states as a whole
tend to have lower rates of civic engagement and social capital, but where we see variation, we may see variation in imprisonment
rates. On a related point, we would want to further investigate the extent to which racial diversity can generate or limit social trust,
especially across social groups. This study also suggests that the structure of political power plays an important role in shaping
penal outcomes. It suggests that we take a look at how modes of governance facilitate the provision of public welfare or private self
interest. In the southern states, I expect that some are more or less centralized and more or less open to public participation. Unlike
the western states, the southern states, except Florida, do not allow for the initiative or direct democracy measures. But neither are
the southern states especially centralized like their northeastern counterparts. At the same time, many southern states have
historical roots in more feudallike political orders in which a group of power elites (landowners, planters) dominate governing, using

In these types of underdemocratized polities,

likely to reaffirm their political authority and

public office for private gains rather than the general welfare.

state officials are more

legitimacy through the criminal law and penal sanctioning. Here penal
sanctioning is visible, forceful, and a brutal reminder of unequal power

relations . It is also one of the few policy mechanisms available to states

that fail to invest in public goods and public welfare. According to this perspective, it is not
all that surprising that many of these underdemocratized southern states have relatively high imprisonment rates. Most American
criminological research has been focused on the United States. However, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many
researchers have been forced to take a look at crime control, policing, and other security (p.186) concerns beyond the U.S. border.
Those tragic and bloody events may spark some muchneeded comparative criminology, opening up the field to global trends,
international justice, and nationspecific particularities of criminal justice. This book may provide some groundwork for future
comparative research, despite its focus on American states. European governance is being transformed in real time. Governments
there are facing increased immigration and ethnic diversity, rising crime, economic restructuring, and changing political borders.
These postcold war developments have raised questions about the nature and character of national sovereignty and citizenship.
They have raised questions about group membership and social classification, pushing nationstates into a rapid process of social
incorporation and exclusion. An understanding of the criminal law and penal sanctioning will be key to explaining the remaking of
European nationstates. Take the case of Sweden, for example. This is a country with one of the highest levels of social trust,
intensive civic engagement, a corporatist or powersharing political structure. This is also a country with a historically lenient
approach to crime and punishment. Yet it also has a long history of social engineers, a moralizing civil society, and strict prohibitions
against alcohol. Sweden now has one of the largest foreignborn populations in Europe. Swedish criminologists have tied the
country's zerotolerance approach to drugs to fear of outsiders, especially those coming from former Soviet satellites and the
Balkans.7 Given the country's historically generous social welfare state and inclusive notions of citizenship, it is an interesting and
pressing empirical question as to how or to what degree Swedes will mobilize the criminal law and penal sanctioning to resolve new
questions of social order. Sweden is not alone in this dilemma. France and Germany, among many others, have experienced rapidly
changing social orders, particularly the confluence of crime and immigration. France recently watched its suburbs burned by second
and thirdgeneration North African immigrants frustrated by their social exclusion and conflicts over policing. France provides an
interesting counterpoint to Sweden because it has a highly centralized government but weak civil society, weak ties between civil
society and the state, and relatively low social trust. So far, France has responded to these changing social conditions with much
more stringent police regulation and state coercion. Germany may provide another contrasting case; it has a decentralized
government, much more local input, and midlevel social trust, but it has created exclusionary conditions (p.187) of citizenship,
especially for its Turkish guest workers and other immigrant groups. Its period of imprisonment liberalization may be under threat.
Given these historical conditions, some democracies more than others will come to rely on the criminal law and penal sanctioning to
reestablish social order, redefining group membership and collective identity through coercive means. These responses most likely
will be filtered and made meaningful through culturally distinct legal traditions, political institutions, and forms of collective agency
as well as by global trends. By focusing on the diversity of democratic processes across Europe, researchers may be better able to
explain crossnational penal regime variation.8 By focusing on the nature of collective agency and the intensity of social trust,
researchers may gain some insight into the way criminal law and penal sanctioning bring societies together and tear them apart.

comparative focus on other Western democracies may also illustrate that

there is nothing inevitable about democratization and punitiveness. This book
has pointed to the longterm institutional and cultural differences in American democracy as the explanation for the longterm
differences in American penal sanctioning. This kind of argument raises some troubling questions about the nature and possibility of
change. If current patterns of punishment are inextricably tied to past policies, how can we change them? Can California become
more like Washington or New York? Or vice versa? Can the United States as a whole reverse its prison boom? The response is both

From a pessimistic view, penal reformers, social activists, and state officials
cannot just shake off past policies, cultural legacies, or entrenched political
structures because these are overriding causal forces that continue to shape penal sanctioning today. It is difficult to undo
yes and no.

enduring political traditions and years of harsh punishment. Even under the best conditions, reformers cannot focus exclusively on
revising the criminal law, lessening or abolishing penal sanctions, because they also need to consider broader social support. In
policy areas such as crime and punishmentareas that generate moral and emotional struggles about life and death, justice, and
group membershippublic engagement and public support are necessary to develop and sustain legitimate public (p.188) policies.
Prison populations are dependent on both immediate events like legislative reform and longterm processes like cultural values and
democratic institutions. Both aspects are hard to change but necessary for meaningful reform. To reverse the U.S. case, we would
need to see serious legislative activity coupled with significant increases in social trust across diverse social groups and sustained
efforts at social integration, including efforts to reincorporate the most marginalized people, like exoffenders, the poor, the
undereducated, and racial and ethnic minorities.

On the more optimistic side, reformers can

take advantage of this particular political moment, which offers a rare

opportunity for change. State governments are indeed faced with tough
budget choices, and many have been forced to rethink their approaches to
crime control. Many state officials are coming to realize that imprisonment
has tended to generate more social problems than its resolves, creating a
revolving door of social exclusion that brings with it tremendous economic
and social costs. Plus, crime rates are down. Reformers can try to
leverage the institutional and cultural tools available at this moment and
in particular places to bring about change. By being cognizant of how

institutional environments frame policy debates and policy problems,

reformers can better develop proposals that resonate rather than repel
state officials and the public . Taking examples from the case studies, in
New York reforms that highlight crime and punishment as a public health
issue with pragmatic solutions may be more effective than mobilizing
moral outrage. In California, reformers could channel populist fervor
against the prison itself as a failed institution and graphic reminder of the
excesses of state power. In Washington, reforms that come from below may be more effective than reforms from
above. In other words, reformers can use the institutional environment to change
existing policies . Moreover, the history of American social movements tells us
that sustained collective action that is strategic and morally pressing has
successfully brought about radical social change

in American public life,

as it could

be with American penal sanctioning.

7. Only debates about engaging institutions can produce social

change. Disengagement from politics fractures coalitions and
reinforces conservatism.
Mouffe 2009 (Chantal Mouffe is Professor of Political Theory at the Centre for
the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, The Importance of Engaging
the State, What is Radical Politics Today?, Edited by Jonathan Pugh, pp. 233-7)
In both Hardt and Negri, and Virno,

there is therefore emphasis upon critique as

withdrawal. They all call for the development of a non-state public sphere. They call for self-organisation,
experimentation, non-representative and extra-parliamentary politics. They see forms of traditional
representative politics as inherently oppressive. So they do not seek to
engage with them, in order to challenge them. They seek to get rid of
them altogether. This disengagement is, for such influential personalities in radical politics today, the key to
every political position in the world. The Multitude must recognise imperial sovereignty itself as the enemy and
discover adequate means of subverting its power. Whereas in the disciplinary era I spoke about earlier, sabotage
was the fundamental form of political resistance, these authors claim that, today, it should be desertion. It is indeed
through desertion, through the evacuation of the places of power, that they think that battles against Empire might
be won. Desertion and exodus are, for these important thinkers, a powerful form of class struggle against imperial
postmodernity. According to Hardt and Negri, and Virno, radical politics in the past was dominated by the notion of
the people. This was, according to them, a unity, acting with one will. And this unity is linked to the existence of
the state. The Multitude, on the contrary, shuns political unity. It is not representable because it is an active selforganising agent that can never achieve the status of a juridical personage. It can never converge in a general will,
because the present globalisation of capital and workers struggles will not permit this. It is anti-state and antipopular. Hardt and Negri claim that the Multitude cannot be conceived any more in terms of a sovereign authority
that is representative of the people. They therefore argue that new forms of politics, which are non-representative,

They advocate a withdrawal from existing institutions. This is

characterises much of radical politics today. The emphasis is
not upon challenging the state. Radical politics today is often characterised
by a mood, a sense and a feeling, that the state itself is inherently the problem .
Critique as engagement I will now turn to presenting the way I envisage the form of social
criticism best suited to radical politics today . I agree with Hardt and Negri that it is
are needed.

something which

important to understand the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. But I consider that the dynamics of this
transition is better apprehended within the framework of the approach outlined in the book Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). What I want to stress is that many
factors have contributed to this transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, and that it is necessary to recognise its

complex nature. My problem with Hardt and Negris view is that, by putting so much emphasis on the workers
struggles, they tend to see this transition as if it was driven by one single logic: the workers resistance to the forces
of capitalism in the post-Fordist era. They put too much emphasis upon immaterial labour. In their view, capitalism
can only be reactive and they refuse to accept the creative role played both by capital and by labour. To put it

they deny the positive role of political struggle . In Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics we use the word hegemony to describe
the way in which meaning is given to institutions or practices : for example,
the way in which a given institution or practice is defined as oppressive to
women, racist or environmentally destructive. We also point out that every
hegemonic order is therefore susceptible to being challenged by counterhegemonic practices feminist, anti-racist, environmentalist, for example. This
is illustrated by the plethora of new social movements which presently exist in radical
politics today (Christian, anti-war, counter-globalisation, Muslim, and so on). Clearly not all of these are
workers struggles. In their various ways they have nevertheless attempted to
influence and have influenced a new hegemonic order. This means that
when we talk about the political, we do not lose sight of the ever present
possibility of heterogeneity and antagonism within society . There are many
another way,

different ways of being antagonistic to a dominant order in a heterogeneous society it need not only refer to the

it is necessary to introduce this hegemonic

dimension when one envisages the transition from Fordism to postFordism. This means abandoning the view that a single logic (workers struggles) is at work in the evolution of
workers struggles. I submit that

the work process; as well as acknowledging the pro-active role played by capital. In order to do this we can find
interesting insights in the work of Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello who, in their book The New Spirit of Capitalism

capitalists manage to use the demands for

autonomy of the new movements that developed in the 1960s, harnessing
them in the development of the post-Fordist networked economy and
transforming them into new forms of control. They use the term artistic
critique to refer to how the strategies of the counter-culture (the search for
authenticity, the ideal of selfmanagement and the anti-hierarchical
exigency) were used to promote the conditions required by the new mode of
capitalist regulation, replacing the disciplinary framework characteristic of the Fordist period. From my
(2005), bring to light the way in which

point of view, what is interesting in this approach is that it shows how an important dimension of the transition from
Fordism to post- Fordism involves rearticulating existing discourses and practices in new ways. It allows us to
visualise the transition from Fordism to post- Fordism in terms of a hegemonic intervention. To be sure, Boltanski
and Chiapello never use this vocabulary, but their analysis is a clear example of what Gramsci called hegemony

demands which
challenge the hegemonic order are recuperated by the existing system,
which is achieved by satisfying them in a way that neutralises their
subversive potential. When we apprehend the transition from Fordism to
post- Fordism within such a framework, we can understand it as a
hegemonic move by capital to re-establish its leading role and restore its
challenged legitimacy. We did not witness a revolution, in Marxs sense of the term.
Rather, there have been many different interventions, challenging dominant hegemonic practices. It is clear
that, once we envisage social reality in terms of hegemonic and counterhegemonic practices, radical politics is not about withdrawing completely
from existing institutions. Rather, we have no other choice but to engage
with hegemonic practices, in order to challenge them. This is crucial; otherwise we will
be faced with a chaotic situation. Moreover, if we do not engage with and challenge the
existing order, if we instead choose to simply escape the state completely, we
leave the door open for others to take control of systems of authority and
through neutralisation or passive revolution. This refers to a situation where

regulation. Indeed there are many historical (and not so historical) examples of this. When the Left
shows little interest, Right-wing and authoritarian groups are only too
happy to take over the state. The strategy of exodus could be seen as the reformulation of the idea
of communism, as it was found in Marx. There are many points in common between the two perspectives. To be
sure, for Hardt and Negri it is no longer the proletariat, but the Multitude which is the privileged political subject.

the state is seen as a monolithic apparatus of domination that

cannot be transformed. It has to wither away in order to leave room for a reconciled
society beyond law, power and sovereignty. In reality, as Ive already noted, others are often
perfectly willing to take control. If my approach supporting new social movements and
But in both cases

counterhegemonic practices has been called post-Marxist by many, it is precisely because I have challenged the
very possibility of such a reconciled society. To acknowledge the ever present possibility of antagonism to the

As far as politics is
concerned, this means the need to envisage it in terms of a hegemonic
struggle between conflicting hegemonic projects attempting to incarnate the universal and to define the
symbolic parameters of social life. A successful hegemony fixes the
meaning of institutions and social practices and defines the common
sense through which a given conception of reality is established . However,
such a result is always contingent, precarious and susceptible to being
challenged by counter-hegemonic interventions. Politics always takes
place in a field criss-crossed by antagonisms. A properly political
intervention is always one that engages with a certain aspect of the
existing hegemony. It can never be merely oppositional or conceived as
desertion, because it aims to challenge the existing order, so that it may reidentify
and feel more comfortable with that order. Another important aspect of a hegemonic politics
lies in establishing linkages between various demands (such as
environmentalists, feminists, anti-racist groups ), so as to transform them
into claims that will challenge the existing structure of power relations.
This is a further reason why critique involves engagement, rather than
disengagement. It is clear that the different demands that exist in our societies
are often in conflict with each other. This is why they need to be articulated
politically, which obviously involves the creation of a collective will, a we .
existing order implies recognising that heterogeneity cannot be eliminated.

This, in turn, requires the determination of a them. This obvious and simple point is missed by the various
advocates of the Multitude. For they seem to believe that the Multitude possesses a natural unity which does not
need political articulation. Hardt and Negri see the People as homogeneous and expressed in a unitary general

Counter-hegemonic practices, by contrast,

do not eliminate differences. Rather, they are what could be called an ensemble
of differences, all coming together, only at a given moment, against a
common adversary. Such as when different groups from many backgrounds come together to protest
will, rather than divided by different political conflicts.

against a war perpetuated by a state, or when environmentalists, feminists, anti-racists and others come together

In these cases, the adversary

cannot be defined in broad general terms like Empire, or for that matter
Capitalism. It is instead contingent upon the particular circumstances in question
the specific states, international institutions or governmental practices that
are to be challenged. Put another way, the construction of political demands is
dependent upon the specific relations of power that need to be targeted
and transformed, in order to create the conditions for a new hegemony. This is clearly not an
exodus from politics. It is not critique as withdrawal, but critique as
engagement. It is a war of position that needs to be launched , often across a
range of sites, involving the coming together of a range of interests. This can
to challenge dominant models of development and progress.

only be done by establishing links between social movements, political

parties and trade unions, for example. The aim is to create a common bond
and collective will, engaging with a wide range of sites, and often institutions,
with the aim of transforming them. This, in my view, is how we should conceive
the nature of radical politics.

Case
Attaching their affect to the ballot replicates the politics of
liberalism. This means the 1AC is not a reason to vote aff.
Berlant, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of
Chicago, 11
[Lauren, Cruel Optimism, Duke University Press, pg. 223-228, 2011, RSR]
Intensely political seasons spawn reveries of a different immediacy.
People imagine alternative environments where authenticity trumps
ideology, truths cannot be concealed, and communication feels intimate,
face-to face. In these times, even politicians imagine occupying a postpublic
sphere public where they might just somehow make an unmediated
transmission to the body politic. Somehow you just got to go over the
heads of the filter and speak directly to the people, then- President
George W. Bush commented in October 2003, echoing a long tradition of
sentimental political fantasies and soon followed by condemnations of the
filter by the Republican National Committee and the presidential
campaign of John McCain and Sarah Palin.1 What is the filter that demands
circumnavigation? Bush seems to be inverting the meaning of his own, mixed, metaphor. A filter, after all, separates
out noise from communication and, in so doing, makes communication possible. Jacques Attali and Michel Serres
have both argued that there is no communication without noise, as noise interferes from within any utterance,

The performance of distortion that constitutes

communication therefore demands discernment, or filtering. However
steadfast ones commitment to truth, there is no avoiding the noise . Yet
Bushs wish to skirt the filter points to something profound in the desire
for the political. He wants to transmit not the message but the noise. He wants the public to
feel the funk, the live intensities and desires that make messages
affectively immediate, seductive, and binding .3 In his head a publics binding
threatening its tractability.2

to the political is best achieved neither by policy nor ideology but the
affect of feeling political together , an effect of having communicated true
feeling without the distancing mediation of speech.4 The transmission of
noise performs political attachment as a sustaining intimate relation ,
without which great dramas of betrayal are felt and staged . In The Ethical
Soundscape, Charles Hirschkind talks about the role of maieutic listening in constructing the intimate political
publics of Egypt.5 There, the feeling tones of the affective soundscape produce attachments to and investments in

This process
involves taking on listening together as itself an object/scene of desire.
The attainment of that attunement produces a sense of shared
a sense of political and social mutuality that is performed in moments of collective audition.

worldness , apart from whatever aim or claim the listening public might
later bring to a particular political world because of what they have heard .
From Hirschkinds perspective the social circulation of noise, of affective binding,
converts the world to a space of moral action that seems juxtapolitical
proximate to, without being compromised by, the instrumentalities of
power that govern social life.6 Speaking above the filter would confirm to

Bushs whole listening audience that they already share an affective

environment ; mobilizing the ethical and therapeutic virtues of the ear7 would accomplish the visceral
transmission of his assurance not only that he has made a better good life possible for Americans and humans
around the globe, but that, affectively speaking, there is already a better sensorial world right here, right now, more

This
vision locates the desire for the political in an alternative commons in the
present that the senses confirm and circulate as though without
mediation. What exactly is the problem with the filter? The contemporary filtered or
mediated political sphere in the United States transmits news 24/7 from a
new ordinary created by crisis, in which life seems reduced to discussions
about tactics for survival and who is to blame . The filter tells you that the
public has entered a historical situation whose contours it does not know.
It impresses itself upon mass consciousness as an epochal crisis ,
unfolding like a disaster film made up of human- interest stories and
stories about institutions that have lost their way .8 It is a moment on the verge of a
intimate and secure and just as real as the world made by the medias anxiogenic sensationalist analysis.

postnormative phase, in which fantasmatic clarities about the conditions for enduring collectivity, historical
continuity, and infrastructural stability have melted away, along with predictable relations between event and
effect. Living amidst war and environmental disaster, people are shown constantly being surprised at what does

Living amid economic crisis, people are

shown constantly being surprised at the amount, location, and enormity of
moral and affective irregulation that come from fading rules of
accountability and recognition. What will govern the terms and relations of reliable reciprocity
and does not seem to have a transformative impact.

among governments, intimates, workers, owners, churches, citizens, political parties, or strangers? What forms of
life will secure the sense of affective democracy that people have been educated to expect from their publics?
Nobody knows. The news about the recent past and the pressures of the near future demand constant emergency
cleanup and hyperspeculation about what it means to live in the ongoing present among piles of cases where things
didnt work out or seem to make sense, at least not yet. There are vigils; there is witnessing, testimony, and yelling.

The affective
structure of the situation is therefore anxious and the political emotions
attached to it veer wildly from recognition of the enigma that is clearly
there to explanations that make sense, the kind of satisfying sense that
enables enduring. Uncertainty is the material that Bush wished to bracket .
His desire for a politics of ambient noise , prepropositional transmission,
and intuitive reciprocity sought to displace the filtered story of instability
and contradiction from the center of sociality. He also wishfully banished
self- reflexive, cultivated opinion and judgment from their central publicsphere function. In short, as Jacques Rancire would put it, Bushs
But there is not yet a consensual rubric that would shape these matters into an event.

wishful feeling was to separate the political from politics as such .9 In so

doing he would cast the ongoing activity of social antagonism to the realm
of the epiphenomenal, in contrast to which the affective feedback loop of
the political would make stronger the true soul- to- soul continuity
between politicians and their public. Foucault used to call sexuality that noisy affectivity that
Bush wanted to transmit from mouth to ear, heart to heart, gut to gut.10 From his perspective, at least, the political

when Bush
uttered his desire for affective communication to be the medium of the
political, he was trying cynically to distract the public gaze from some of
his particular actions. But the wish to inhabit a vaguely warm sense of alreadyestablished, autonomic,
is best lodged in the appetites. These are not politically tendentious observations. Perhaps

and atmospheric solidarity with the body politic is hardly his special desire. Indeed, in his preference for the noise of

he has many bedfellows in the body politic with whom he shares

little else politically, namely, the ones who prefer political meetings in
town halls, caucuses, demonstrations, and other intimate assemblies to
the pleasure of disembodied migratory identification that constitutes
mass publics. He also joins his antagonists in the nondominant classes
who have long produced intimate publics to provide the feeling of
immediacy and solidarity by establishing in the public sphere an affective
immediacy,

register of belonging to inhabit when there are few adequate normative

institutions to fall back on, rest in, or return to. Public spheres are always
affect worlds, worlds to which people are bound, when they are, by
affective projections of a constantly negotiated common interestedness .
But an intimate public is more specific.

In an intimate public one senses that matters of

survival are at stake and that collective mediation through narration and
audition might provide some routes out of the impasse and the struggle of
the present, or at least some sense that there would be recognition were
the participants in the room together.11 An intimate public promises the
sense of being held in its penumbra. You do not need to audition for
membership in it. Minimally, you need just to perform audition, to listen
and to be interested in the scenes visceral impact. 12 You might have been drawn to it
because of a curiosity about something minor, unassociated with catastrophe, like knitting or collecting something,
or having a certain kind of sexuality, only after which it became a community of support, offering tones of suffering,
humor, and cheerleading. Perhaps an illness led to seeking out a community of survival tacticians. In either case,

any person can contribute to an intimate public a personal story about not
being defeated by what is overwhelming. More likely, though, participants take
things in and sometimes circulate what they hear, captioning them with
opinion or wonder. But they do not have to do anything to belong . They can be
passive and lurk, deciding when to appear and disappear, and consider the freedom to come and go the exercise of

Indeed, in liberal societies, freedom includes freedom from

the obligation to pay attention to much, whether personal or political noone is obliged to be conscious or socially active in their modes and scenes
of belonging. For many this means that political attention is usually something
delegated and politics is something overheard, encountered indirectly and
unsystematically, through a kind of communication more akin to gossip
than to cultivated rationality.13 But there is nothing fundamentally passive or superficial in
sovereign freedom.

overhearing the political. What hits a person encountering the dissemination of news about power has nothing to do

Amidst all of
the chaos, crisis, and injustice in front of us, the desire for alternative
filters that produce the senseif not the sceneof a more livable and
intimate sociality is another name for the desire for the political . This is
why an intimate attachment to the political can amount to a relation of
cruel optimism . I have argued throughout this book that an optimistic
attachment is cruel when the object/scene of desire is itself an obstacle to
fulfilling the very wants that bring people to it : but its life- organizing
status can trump interfering with the damage it provokes . It may be a
with how thorough or cultivated their knowledge is or how they integrate the impact into living.

relation of cruel optimism, when, despite an awareness that the

normative political sphere appears as a shrunken, broken, or distant
place of activity among elites, members of the body politic return
periodically to its recommitment ceremonies and scenes . Voting is one
thing; collective caring, listening, and scanning the airwaves, are others .
All of these modes of orientation and having a feeling about it confirm our
attachment to the system and thereby confirm the system and the
legitimacy of the affects that make one feel bound to it , even if the
manifest content of the binding has the negative force of cynicism or the
dark attenuation of political depression. How and why does this attachment persist? Is it out
of habit? Is it in hopes of the potentiality embedded in the political as such? Or, from a stance of critical

The exhausting repetition of the

politically depressed position that seeks repair of what may be
constitutively broken can eventually split the activity of optimism from
expectation and demand.14 Maintaining this split enables one to sustain ones attachment to the
engagement, an investment in the possibility of its repair?

political as such and to ones sense of membership in the idea of the polity, which is a virtualbut sensual, not
abstractspace of the commons. And so, detaching from it could induce many potential losses along with new

Grant Farred calls fidelity to the political without expectation of

recognition, representation, or return a profoundly ethical act .15 His exemplary
freedoms.

case derives from voting patterns of African Americans in the 2004 presidential election, but the anxiety about the
costs of this ethical commitment has only increased with the election of Barack Obama as the President of the
emotional infrastructure of the United States as well as of its governing and administrative ones.16 What is the
relation between the Yes We Can! optimism for the political and how politics actually works? What is the effect of
Obamas optimization of political optimism against the political depression of the historically disappointed,
especially given any Presidents limited sovereignty as a transformative agent in ordinary life? How can we track
the divergences between politically orchestrated emotions and their affective environments? Traditionally,

political solidarity is a more of a structure than a feelingan identification

with other people who are similarly committed to a project that does not
require affective continuity or warm personal feeling to sustain itself . But
maintaining solidarity requires skills for adjudicating incommensurate
visions of the better good life. The atrophy of these skills is at risk when
politics is reduced to the demand for affective attunement, insofar as the
sense of belonging is threatened by the inconvenience of antagonistic
aims. Add to this the possibility that the political as we know it in mass
democracy requires such a splitting of attachment and expectation.
Splitting off political optimism from the way things are can sustain many
kinds of the cruelest optimism.

Claiming there is a truth or meaning to their comedic

performance replicates epistemological authoritarianism of the
status quo.
Hemmings, Professor of Feminist Theory at the London School of Economics and
Political Science, 5 [Claire, Invoking affect: cultural theory and the ontological
turn, Cultural Studies Vol. 19, No. 5 September 2005, pp. 548 -567, RSR]

Tomkins asked us to think of the contagious nature

of a yawn, smile or blush. It is transferred to others and doubles back,
increasing its original intensity. Affect can thus be said to place the
individual in a circuit of feeling and response, rather than opposition to
others. Further, Tomkins argues that we all develop complex affect theories as a way
of negotiating the social world as unique individuals . An affect theory is all of our
In terms of our relations with others,

affective experiences to date that are remembered (or better, perhaps, registered) in the moment of responding to
a new situation, such that we keep a trace, within [our] constitution of those experiences (Al-Saji 2000, p. 56). For
Tomkins, then, affect connects us to others, and provides the individual with a way of narrating their own inner life

Thus one of the main reasons

affect has been taken up as the hopeful alternative to social determinism
is its positioning of the individual as possessing a degree of control over
(likes, dislikes, desires and revulsions) to themselves and others.

their future , rather than as raw material responding rather passively to

cognitive or learned phenomena. Tomkins is joined by Gilles Deleuze to
form an unlikely couple dominating the contemporary affective imaginary
of cultural theory. Deleuze (1997) proposes affect as distinct from
emotion, as bodily meaning that pierces social interpretation ,
confounding its logic , and scrambling its expectations . In contrast to Tomkins, who
breaks down affect into a topography of myriad, distinct parts, Deleuze understands affect as
describing the passage from one state to another, as an intensity
characterized by an increase or decrease in power (1997, p. 181). Deleuze
takes two examples from his reading of T. E. Lawrences experiences in the
desert to illustrate the bodys capacity to interrupt social logic . In both
examples, he paraphrases Lawrences description of violent events in the
desert. The first is the grisly spectacle of the gestures of the dying, that
attempt at raising their hands that makes all the agonizing Turks ripple
together, as if they had practiced the same theatrical gesture, provoking
Lawrences mad laughter (1997, p. 123). The second is Deleuzes account of Lawrences experience
of being gang raped: in the midst of his tortures, an erection; even in the state of sludge, there are convulsions that
jolt the body (1997: 123). For Deleuze, both instances index the unpredictable autonomy of the bodys encounter
with the event, its shattering ability to go its own way. In Deleuzes account, Lawrence does experience shame, but
not in alignment with social prohibition, rather as a judgement on his bodys response to rape: it is his erection that

one cannot do justice to Lawrences unruly body by

reducing it to its social organization . To do so would be to miss the dramatic significance of the

gives rise to shame. For Deleuze,

bodys own asocial trace. Instead,

Deleuze proposes a cartographic approach to the

body and its affects where the critical focus is on bodily displacement ,
the movement between bodily states that is its intensity (1997, p. 63), its refrain.
For many theorists of affect Deleuzes approach provides insight into thinking through the body in a non-essentialist
way that remains faithful to many different levels and modes of bodily experience (e.g. Spinks 2001). As inheritors
of this affective legacy, contemporary critical theorists tend to prefer either Tomkins pragmatism or Deleuzes
imaginative flights. Eve Sedgwicks new work takes up Tomkins suggestion that a focus on affect sidesteps a
myopic attention to structural prohibition. While Tomkins is concerned with differentiating affect from drives,

Sedgwick is interested in using affect theory to challenge what

Probyn calls the twinned problematics of discipline or transgression
(2000, p. 13), which anchor poststructuralist critical inquiry . Sedgwick
believes that the central problem facing Theory today is its own critical
however,

paranoia , where the project of a poststructuralist critical imaginary has

become reduced to the search for, and deadening (re)discovery of,
prohibition everywhere : prohibition where it appeared there was
freedom, prohibition in a space we had not, until now, thought to look. Sedgwick
argues that such paranoia makes cultural investigation protectionist
instead of expansive, as theorists ward off other critical imaginaries as
duped unless they too come to the same conspiratorial conclusions, unless
they too find violence where there had appeared to be possibility (2003, pp.
123/51). For Sedgwick such a hermeneutics of suspicion and exposure that is
at once smug and sour, is not merely an unattractive trait in a critical
theorist, it also makes her or him ill equipped for analysing contemporary
social formations in which visibility itself constitutes much of the
violence (2003, p. 140). In current global contexts where violence is anything but hidden, is
disconcertingly proud rather than covert, Sedgwick asks what use is paranoid theory? Part of what
makes

critical theory so uninventive for Sedgwick is its privileging of the

epistemological , since a relentless attention to the structures of truth
and knowledge obscures our experience of those structures. She
advocates instead a reparative return to the ontological and
intersubjective , to the surprising and enlivening texture of individuality
and community (2003, p. 17). Again following Tomkins, Sedgwick rather
provocatively invites us to consider affect as the key to that texture,
because of its capacity to link us creatively to others. I say provocatively, because
throughout her text, Sedgwick acknowledges that our learned instinct as cultural theorists is to reject Tomkins for
his insistence on affect as innate. Indeed, this is precisely Sedgwicks challenge / do cultural theorists shy away
from affect a` la Tomkins for any other reasons than its essentialism? For Sedgwick, if the answer is no, as she
assumes it is, the rejection of Tomkins model is itself evidence of paranoid cultural theorists characteristic disposal
of both baby and bathwater. Brian Massumi similarly intervenes in the contemporary terrain of cultural theory to
propose affect as a new way out of the pernicious reign of signification that dominates the field. Mirroring Sedgwick,

Massumis irritation is chiefly reserved for the cultural theorist whose

ability for critical thinking has become reduced to identifying points on a
stable map of the always already known (Massumi 2002, p. 12). Interpretation
through the overlaying of this map can only capture certain moments and
certain experiences, which will invariably reflect the framework they are
interpreted through. For Massumi, such critical impoverishment means
that cultural theorists consistently miss both the matter of bodies and,
since his framework is Deleuzian rather than Tomkinsian, the unceasing
movement that constitutes the process of becoming . And without this
investment in movement between states and bodies, Massumi asks, how

do we account for let alone encourage, change (2002, p. 3)? Affect attracts
Massumi, then, since it is part of a different order of experience to the
epistemological (as defined by Sedgwick): it is the unassimilable (2002, p.
3). His point is that in order to study the unknowable, cultural theorists will have to abandon the certainty that has
come to characterize the field. What is clear then, is that Sedgwick and Massumi emerge as champions of affect in

The particular
form of these arguments is often disciplinespecific, but what all critiques
share is a lamenting of the turn to language represented by
poststructuralism. Within the context I am most familiar with, of feminist
debate, this turn to language is usually critiqued for one of two reasons
that are somewhat at odds with one another. The first laments the
increasing theoretical abstraction of feminist writing, associating it with
an increase in professionalization and a concomitant decrease in political
accountability (Gubar 1998, Stanley and Wise 2000, Jackson 2001). Poststructuralist feminist writing is often
a more general context of the critique of what is usually understood as the cultural turn.

aggressively damned for its inaccessibility, and for its perceived lack of attention to what is often invoked as the
material. These arguments have been raging within feminist academic and political contexts for a long time, but
cross over into more mainstream critical terrain through the debates between Judith Butler and Nancy Fraser in the
late 1990s (Butler 1997b, Fraser 1997). In the second critique of the cultural turn within feminism,
poststructuralism is understood in contrast to have over-emphasized power-relations and their framing of both what
we do and who we are, to the extent that there appears to be no hope of liberation. We are effectively caught in
culture. Critics viewing poststructuralism in this way advocate not a material return but an ontological one, a
revaluing of individual difference and capacity for change over time (Prosser 1998, Mitchell 2000). A number of
theorists / most notably, perhaps, Rosi Braidotti (2002) combine these two critiques in their focus on the lived
materiality of bodies. Sedgwick and Massumis interest in affect must therefore be seen within the context of
broader challenges to poststructuralist approaches to language, power and subjectivity, and particularly in line with
the second trajectory detailed here.

2NC Round 4 CEDA

FW
The T version of the aff is participatory satire they could tie
their aff to an advocacy for political progressivism like Colbert
does. They could have satirized the ban on marijuana as a way
to spur citizenry participation and advocate for The United
States should legalize marihuana in the United States,
including the establishment of a minority-owned business setaside licensing system as reparations for those
disproportionately affected by the war on drugs.
Gilkerson, PhD in Philosophy, 12 [Nathan, Participatory Satire? Political Humor,
the Colbert Super PAC Project, and the Colliding Worlds of Late Night Comedy and
Modern American Politics, September 2012,
http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/142345/Gilkerson_umn_0130E_
13192.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, RSR]
The last set of research questions more broadly considered whether the
Colbert Super PAC phenomenon has served to influence the debate about
money and politics, and whether it can be considered to represent a new
form of advocacy based political satire. Through consideration of twenty individual interviews
with journalists, campaign finance advocates, and election law experts as well as analysis of significant media

it is clearly evident that the Colberts Super PAC initiative

has influenced the perspectives of many involved within the political
debate over campaign finance regulation. With recent news articles reporting that campaign
coverage on the topic

spending in the upcoming 2012 presidential election season is expected to smash all previous records of political
contribution levels (Wilson, 2012),

it also seems clear that the debate over the

influence of money within election campaigns is only likely to grow

louder . Over the past year and a half, Stephen Colbert has used his satirical persona
to play a significant role in shaping the debate and influencing the
perspectives not only his own viewers, but also of political experts and
many within the news media. Comments made about Colberts initiative from the interview
conducted with Charles McGrath from the New York Times were especially useful to this research, since McGraths
profile of the comedian allowed him to spend significant time getting to know Colbert and exploring his motivations

McGraths quote below conveys his

view that Colberts satire is indeed something new and different: its a
new kind of satire because I mean, traditional satire seems to be merely
poking fun at things really from the outside. I mean, the satirist is just by
definition a kind of outsider. And this thing as he is doing it from within, he is not just
for spearheading the Super PAC project. As discussed earlier,

making fun of Super PACs, he has one . And he has one that is a real Super PAC. It has real
money. Real people have given to it, have contributed to it. And hes actively trying to insert his PAC into the
process. The very process that hes extensively making fun of, he is also a part of. And so, its like

its

participatory satire . Or its satire raised to the point of performance art . I

think it is something different. Charles McGrath, New York Times Through the Super PAC project,

Colbert has

created a new model for political participation a kind of political

activism which employs messages of ironic support, and sarcastic dissent,

as well as real world participation, for voicing strong opposition to a
political issue . As became clear this past spring, when he successfully
recruited hundreds of college students to join him in creating their own
spin-off Super PAC entities, Colbert sees a future in political activism
through what could be considered earnest sarcasm. There are many potential avenues
for continued research into the dynamics and effects of this particular form of political satire. Topping the
list may be further exploration of citizens actual understanding of the
messages embedded within complex and nuanced political humor such as
Colberts.

Opportunities for more in-depth exploration of the publics perceptions of Colberts satirical

activities exist through focus group studies and open-ended interviews, as well as more quantitative methodologies
such as online surveys. Experimental research could examine partisan effects related to individuals appreciation of
political satire and variables such as perceived fairness and accuracy in experiencing certain types of political
humor. Monitoring of the political environment could examine whether the notion of participatory satire is
proliferating as a model for political activism, especially online through user generated videos and social media
initiatives, and whether new examples show that this strategy is becoming embraced as a technique for voicing
dissent. Finally an opportunity exists to examine the continued progression of the Colbert Super PAC initiative,
especially focusing on the efforts of college students who have been motivated to political activism through
Colberts satire. Research could seek to better understanding what inspired these students to political advocacy,
and whether there might be something uniquely appealing, especially to young people, related to political activity
through satire. Considering Colberts motivation in creating his own Super PAC organization, it is clear that much of
his inspiration for taking action came from watching the, arguably drastic, transformation of our nations political
environment with recent changes in how money is regulated in elections. During brief moments throughout the
progression of the Super PAC effort, Colbert has frequently hinted at his own perspective on the state of American
political speech, often with a variation of one simple and distilled, yet powerful quip: Because money equals speech,
the more money you have, the more speech you should have. Stephen Colbert Employing his trademark sarcasm,
Colberts undying support for the recent explosion of unbridled political campaign spending helps to drive home

his essential, populist message that our system has become

undemocratic, and that ultimately, progressive change is needed . The
strategic use of satire to not only call for that change, but to also help in
leading the movement, is a political phenomenon that is only likely to
grow and is worth our continued attention .

Establishing a minority set aside system ensures legalization is

done in a way that avoids white monopolies and provides
reparations for the war on drugs
Wallace 14 [07/17/14, Anne Wallace is a New York lawyer who writes extensively
on legal and business issues. She also teaches law at the college and professional
level., Black Enterprise and Marijuana, http://www.mjinews.com/black-enterprisemarijuana/]
Nobody says it better than Michelle Alexander, author of The New Jim Crow: After 40
years of impoverished black men getting prison time for selling weed ,
white men are planning to get rich doing the same thing s . So thats why I think we
have to start talking about reparations for the war on drugs. How do we repair the harms
caused? The idea of reparations has a lot of moral suasion. But the task of
repairing the grievous harm caused by the misguided War on Drugs and

much of the other 200 years of American history will take more than one
approach, more a smorgasbord than a silver bullet . Perhaps the most
interesting development to watch is what black entrepreneurs are doing
and talking about in the world of legalized marijuana . A Deep Strain of Social
Conservatism The black community is as diverse as any other, but has suffered
disproportionately from the ravages of drug abuse and biased drug law
enforcement. Add to that the socially conservative influence of the black church, and it becomes
possible to understand the reluctance of many black entrepreneurs to
embrace the legal marijuana industry. In an interview with Black Enterprise, Art Way, Colorado
senior drug policy manager for the Drug Policy Alliance noted, Many of those over 50 years old or who came from
the old civil rights guard did not support marijuana legalization and really took a hardline in the drug war. On the
other hand, however, many are beginning to look at what legalization might mean for black enterprise and how to
get a piece of the action. Grow Your Own with Budtending One of the collateral effects of a rocky history is is the
damage to capital accumulation. Corey Barnette, owner at District Growers in the District of Columbia, recommends
growing your own marijuana enterprise by starting out as a budtender, building industry experience, credentials
and capital along the way. Barnette describes a career path that moves from trainee to grower to senior cultivator
or senior grower (at which point you should be able to turn a product into concentrate or edibles) and then on to
garden manager, running the entire facility. The advantage of this route, although long, is that it permits individuals
to participate in the industry by investing time and talent, rather than cash. The Redistributive Argument

Reparations is one part of the conversation , the part most likely to raise the hackles of
those for whom the redistribution of assets to achieve common good is already something to fight about. Another
approach recognizes that state governments are likely to collect substantial revenues from a legalized industry. A
2010 a study done by the Cato Institute, a conservative think tank, suggested that legalizing marijuana would

Some recommend that this

revenue be invested in communities devastated by draconian drug
policies, as Rep. Jared Polis of Colorado did, citing the potential for school improvement in poorer districts.
Another option would be to set aside a certain percentage of state
generate $8.7 billion in federal and state tax revenues annually.

marijuana business licenses for minority-owned businesses . This could

resemble existing programs that call for women and minority owned
business set-asides for government contracting work. However, state business licenses
rather than government contracts are the vehicle here. Some states, such as
Washington, New York and Massachusetts, strictly limit the number of marijuana business
licenses. This makes the licenses extremely valuable . What if a certain
percentage were set aside the communities most damaged by bad public
policy decisions of the past ? To harness the economic power of legalized marijuana, it is important
to listen to the voices of all players, going beyond the usual collection of investors, college kids turned weed
innovators, patients and now-aging children of the 60s. Some of the best thinkers may be those black
entrepreneurs ready to reap reparations, rethink social conservatism and build industry relationships.

The most comprehensive study ever done proves set asides

are key
Chatterji et al 13, Professors of Business and Economics [March
2013, Aaron Chatterji, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor (with tenure) at Duke
Universitys Fuqua School of Business. He previously served as a Senior Economist
at the White House Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) where he worked on a wide
range of policies relating to entrepreneurship, innovation, infrastructure and
economic growth, Kenneth Chay is a Professor of Economics, Professor of Health
Services, Policy and Practice, and Robert W. Fairlie Professor and Chair of Economics

Department of Economics. University of California, Santa Cru, The Impact of City

Contracting Set-Asides on Black Self-Employment and Employment, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 18884,
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18884]
This study quantified the impact of city set-aside programs

affirmative

action policies that are among the most significant , racially-based

interventions since the 1960s . We construct a new database of program
dates that enables a more comprehensive and reliable analysis than
previously possible . We find that set-asides had a large and significant impact
on African-American business ownership

during the 1980s,

with the black-white

self-employment gap falling by three percentage points. These gains were

realized entirely in the industries targeted by set-asides and correspond
with other information on the growth in, and the set-aside amounts
awarded to, black-owned businesses . The better-educated were the primary beneficiaries, and
the programs appear to have reallocated self-employment from white to
black men. There is no evidence that the new, black businesses were less productive than the white-owned
businesses that were replaced. Consistent with black-owned firms hiring a
disproportionate number of blacks, the racial gap in employment fell
roughly four percentage points after set-asides. These results, however, are
sensitive to beliefs about the continuation of pre-existing trends , as the
programs were preceded by several years of declining employment in the industries that did not benefit from the

Black employment rates in the sector

most affected by set-asides are more stable in the pre-program period . The
programs (e.g., manufacturing and the public sector).

effects in the most affected sector imply that set-aside programs had larger impacts on black employment than
affirmative action programs that explicitly set goals for minority hiring in firms receiving federal contracts (as
summarized in Leonard 1990). Nationally, the relative self-employment rate of blacks declined in the 1970s but

in the absence of city setaside programs, the black self-employment rate would have continued to
decline relative to the white rate during the 1980s. The finding of increased
black employment provides support for the view that growth in black
businesses may reduce black unemployment more than general economic
development. The results are also consistent with the existence of entry
constraints that suppress black self-employment. If liquidity constraints
are especially binding for blacks perhaps due to low levels of wealth and
lending discrimination then set -aside programs can lead to a large
rebounded in the 1980s (Fairlie and Meyer 2000). Our estimates imply that

increase in the number of black-owned businesses . Black entrepreneurs

facing financing constraints may have been able to more easily borrow
against the accounts receivable from government contracts or use the
initial receipt of city contracts to grow to a sustainable size . City setasides may have also diminished other barriers arising from consumer,
supplier, and prime contractor discrimination.

Parrhesia
Engaging with electoral, state-based politics is necessary to
dismantle systems of anti-blackness and settler colonialism.
THEIR AUTHOR Smith, Associate Professor at UC Riverside, 10 [Andrea,
Building Unlikely Alliances: An Interview with Andrea Smith, Upping the Anti,
Number 10, http://uppingtheanti.org/journal/article/10-building-unlikely-alliances-aninterview-with-andrea-smith/, RSR]
What are
your thoughts about electoral politics and the role of the state in terms of
the question of power? Until you have an alternative system, then there is no outside
Youve said that you saw the Obama election as a moment for social movements to build themselves.

of the current system . I dont think there is a pure place in which to work,
so you can work in many places, including inside the state . I think there
is no reason not to engage in electoral politics or any other thing. But it
would probably be a lot more effective if, while we are doing that, we are
also building alternatives. If we build the alternatives, we have movements
to hold us accountable when we work within the system and we also have
more negotiating power. It can actually be helpful . In terms of, say, state
repression, if we have some critical people within the state then we might
be able to do something about it. We might think about them as a way to
relieve some of the pressure while trying to build the alternatives. I dont
think it is un-strategic to think about it like that. I am just not the kind of
person who ever says, never do x. You always have to be open-minded
and creative. It may not work out . You may get co-opted or something bad
might happen. But if we really knew the correct way to do something we
would have done it by now .

The logic of survivability reinscribes the social values and

coherence of whiteness instead of survival strategies we
need collective strategies for livability. The debate community
needs to be more.
Cacho 12 Lisa Marie, Associate Professor of English, Asian American Studies, Latina/Latino

Studies, and Gender and Womens Studies, Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the
Criminalization of the Unprotected. P. 31-33
This book is not a critique of activists and academics who ascribe social value to devalued people and places
but rather an analysis of our limits and an examination of the reasons why
other options are less accessible, less influential, and, perhaps more often than we think, less
intelligible. Contemporary progressive politics must rely not only on what dominant groups
find palatable (i.e., the family, legality) but also on the value practices that will
make social statuses recognizable as valuable to (and often for) the very
privileged of U.S. society. Because value is fundamentally relational despite

to ascribe (legible) value to devalued populations,

we have to evaluate them in relation to differently devalued groups and
according to normative criteria. Indeed, as an explicitly comparative race project, my analyses
all appearances to the contrary,82

cannot escape these contradictions; nor can they offer a politics that finds a way out of the violence of value.

Because we cannot escape the devaluation in revaluation, I instead take up Barretts

challenge: to re-member the Other by dismembering value. 83 For me, this
means suspending the impulse to reject criminalizing stereotypes
precisely because the mere chance to recuperate social value is
contingent on that rejection.

As Hong reminds us, a politics that rejects social value is

inconceivable. When the alternative to social value is social death, and social death means brutally exacerbated
conditions of racialized violence, incarceration, and coercion, the allure of legibility is undeniably difficult to resist.

imagining a politics based on the refusal of social value is an

impossible, unthinkable option, one, in truth, outside of any available
notion of the political.84 Dismembering social value by refusing the lure of
legibility re-members the other because it gives us the space to be more
critical of the automatic, understandable impulse to deny and be offended by
criminalizing stereotypes. In this space, the space of social death, we can re-member the
other by asking ourselves: Whom does this rejection really benefit and
whom does it hurt? This project is not concerned with whether something
is politically practical or logistically possible because these approaches
need to assume that legal apparatuses are legitimate and fixable. If we
suspend the need to be practical, we might be able to see [comprehend]
what is possible differently. A focus on social death enables us to start at
the places we dare not go because it enables us to privilege the
populations who are most frequently and most easily disavowed , those who are
Indeed,

regularly regarded with contempt, whose interests are bracketed at best because to address their needs in
meaningful ways requires taking a step beyond what is palatable, practical, and possible. Like Barrett, Hong, and
Holland, I find empowering oppositional narratives in the devastating spaces of social death and their populations
abstract existences, but empowering narratives do not necessarily give us happy endings. Nor do they always leave

empowerment is not contingent on taking

power or securing small victories. Empowerment comes from deciding that
the outcome of struggle doesnt matter as much as the decision to
struggle. Deciding to struggle against all odds armed only with fingers crossed on both hands is both an
us inspired.85 In the spaces of social death,

unusual political strategy and a well-informed worldview. It is a choice premised upon what Derrick Bell calls racial

Racial realism is a form of unthinkable politics because it proposes we begin battles

weve already lost, that we acknowledge and accept that everything we do
may not ever result in social change. When implementing Racial Realism we must
simultaneously acknowledge that our actions are not likely to lead to
transcendent change and, despite our best efforts, may be of more help to the system we despise than
to the victims of that system we are trying to help. Nevertheless, our realization, and the
dedication based on that realization, can lead to policy positions and
campaigns that are less likely to worsen conditions for those we are trying
to help and more likely to remind those in power that there are
imaginative, unabashed risk-takers who refuse to be trammeled upon. Yet
confrontation with our oppressors is not our sole reason for Racial
Realism. Continued struggle can bring about unexpected benefits and
gains that in themselves justify continued endeavor. The fight itself has
meaning and should give us hope for the future.86 Although racial realism takes
realism.

does not equate failure with defeat. Accepting hopelessness

is not necessarily equivalent to abandoning hope. As Sara Ahmed writes in her critique of
failure for granted, it

happiness, To kill joyis to open a life, to make room for life, to make room for possibility, for chance.87 To take

we need to entertain counterintuitive thoughts and

practice imagining otherwise. To imagine otherwise, Fiona Ngo argues, failure need not be
overcome, rehabilitation need not be desired, subjectivity need not be recovered. Instead, she insists, we
must conceive of an ethical stance that refuses to cover over the violence
that brought us to the present.88 If the critical task is not to resolve the
unthinkable politics seriously,

contradictions of reintegrating the socially dead into a

capitalist

society

that sees most of humanity as a necessary but negative resource , then it

makes sense to mobilize against preserving this way of life or the ways of
knowing that this life preserves. Rather than breathe life into the
spaces of social death (gentrification, privatization, and
democratization), we might conscientiously work against the logic of
survivability,89 which in the United States sees the preservation of U.S.
capital as central and indispensable to the American way of life . In neoliberal
ways of knowing, the value of life is subjected to an economic analysis and assessed accordingly: How has this
person contributed to society? What will he or she accomplish in the future? Is it worthwhile to invest in this
neighborhood and its residents or will such an investment be only a waste of resources? Lives are legibly valuable
when they are assessed comparatively and relationally within economic, legal, and political contexts and
discourses, framed by a culture of punishment according to the market logic of supply and demand. This means

value is not ascribed to living life in meaningful ways, and it

also means that those who are socially devalued do not get to decide what
makes a life meaningful or the terms by which their lives are evaluated as
meaningful or meaningless, as valuable or valueless. By figuring out new contexts
that, for the most part,

and ways of framing why life is valuable, we might figure out how to
talk about social problems in ways that do not require us to appeal to
market values or to redirect juridical and social repudiation toward other
populations that constitute the negative resource to American value.
course, we cannot discount that fighting for basic survival needs in immediate, practical, and strategic ways is

a meaningful life is not a luxury but rather

the purpose of the struggle itself, the difference between surviving and
living.
urgent, important work, but at the same time,

Of

1NR

Case
The affs call for recognition INVERTS the same binaries that
they oppose we should not define our sense of self based on
the recognition of others.
Watkins, Associate Professor in the School of Education at the University of
Western Sydney, 10
[Megan, Desiring Recognition, Accumulating Affect, The Affect Theory Reader,
Duke University Press, 2010, RSR]
Of course there is always the potential for the abuse of power-it is the
tension underpinning the master I slave dialectic-but this need not be the
case. In a pedagogic context the dominant position a teacher exerts need
not simply be read as a type of carte blanche for the maltreatment of
students. This, however, is the perspective taken by progressivists who, in an attempt to neutralize this power
and tip the balance in favor of the student, give emphasis to student-directed pedagogies. Jessica Benjamin
explains, "Every

binary split creates a temptation to merely reverse its terms,

to elevate what has been devalued and denigrate what has been
overvalued," but "what is necessary is not to take sides but to remain
focused on the dualistic structure itself " (Benjamin 1988, 9). This seems a central
point in understanding the pedagogic relation and the role of recognition
within it the relationship between teacher and student may not be an
equal one but its success depends upon mutuality, a recognition of worth
by both parties with this intersubjective acknowledgment being integral
to their sense of self . Honneth (1995) takes a similar view in his account
of recognition. With a more productive perspective on Hegel's
master/slave dialectic, he describes how individual subjectivity is
premised on the recognition of others. Power here is not neutralized .
Rather, it can be conceived in Foucauldian terms as not simply repressive
but enabling, with the moment of recognition involving at one and the
same time a need for acknowledgment and a confirmation of selfworth .
Integral to this process is the role of affect . Honneth explains, "Recognition itself
must possess the character of affective approval or encouragement" (1995>
95). Affects, as such, are the corporeal instantiation of recognition, the
sensations one may feel in being recognized, which accumulate over time,
fostering a sense of self-worth. Moments of recognition, therefore,
function as affective force, or in Spinozan terms, affectus.

While emphasis here is

given to recognition as a positive process with the elicitation of positive affects, this may not always be the case .

Recognition can also function in a negative way, carrying the resultant

force of negative affects. In a classroom context this may involve a
student being singled out for poor academic performance or behavior,
which, if it is a common occurrence, may have a detrimental effect on the
student's self-worth and desire to learn. Similarly, teachers' sense of worth can be shattered
by the failure of students to behave and engage in the lessons they conduct, affecting their desire to teach.

Negative affects, however, should not be viewed as all bad In terms of subjectivity they may have what seems a

As Probyn explains in her account of shame, although it is a

negative affect, it is only possible to feel a sense of shame if one
possesses a degree of interest in the object that engenders this reaction
contradictory effect.

(2005). Shame, as such, has a positive ethical dimension, an essential element of being human. Probyn bases this
insight on the work of Silvan Tomkins (1962), who attaches considerable significance to negative affects in the
process of learning. He provides an interesting critique of progressivist education in this regard and it is worthwhile
to quote him at length on this point. Although the progressive education movement has stressed the importance of
engaging the positive affects in education there has been a gross neglect of the significance of the mastery of
negative affects. The reason is clear. Since the opposing philosophy of education had stressed rote, drill and
discipline it was a natural assumption that the mastery of negative factors was restricted to this particular instance
of puritanism and authoritarianism. But even a progressive philosophy of education must include prominently within
its program the development of those abilities to tolerate negative affects .... (Tomkins 1962, 368 )

At
Tomkins's time of writing, progressivism was simply a movement. It was
yet to achieve a position of paradigmatic dominance as has been the case
in many Western countries from the mid-1970s.3 Yet even at this point,
prior to its mainstreaming as an educational philosophy, Tomkins was of
the view that with an overemphasis on praise and positive reinforcement
progressivism had failed to adequately equip students with the resources
to counter, and perhaps more importantly accept, criticism, which is an
important aspect ofleaming.

No one has any ideas of what their desires are they are all
borne out of the accidents of history. However, we must affirm
our desires acknowledges that there is no meaning outside of
having the desires themselves. All of the Ks impacts only
happens when we attach an affect of belonging to our desires
or try to place meaning outside of ourselves. Thats the wrong
strategies. Instead, we should generate sites of individuated
resistances within the present thats the only strategy to
affirm the individual self and survive within the world.
Berlant, George M. Pullman Professor of English at the University of Chicago, 6
[Lauren, Cruel optimism, DIFFERENCES-A JOURNAL OF FEMINIST CULTURAL
STUDIES, ISSN 1040-7391, 2006, Volume 17, Issue 3, pp. 20 36, RSR]
Baum goes on to write The Wizard of Oz as a gift of alternativity to
the person who cant say or do anything to change her life materially and
who has taken in so much that one moment of relief from herself produces
a permanent crack in the available genres of her survival. In What Is a Minor
Literature? Deleuze and Guattari exhort people to become minor in exactly
that way, to deterritorialize from the normal by digging a hole in sense,
like a dog or a mole. Creating an impasse, a space of internal
In Was,

displacement, in this view, shatters the normal hierarchies, clarities,

tyrannies, and confusions of compliance with autonomous individuality .
This strategy looks promising in the Ashbery poem. But in Exchange Value, a moment of relief produces a
psychotic defense against the risk of loss in optimism. For Dorothy Gael, in Was,

the optimism of

attachment to another living being is itself the cruelest slap of all . From this
cluster we can understand a bit more of the magnetic attraction to cruel optimism, with its suppression of the risks

A change of heart, a sensorial shift, intersubjectivity, or

transference with a promising object cannot generate on its own the
of attachment.

better good life : nor can the collaboration of a couple, brothers, or

pedagogy. The vague futurities of normative optimism produce small self-interruptions as the utopias of
structural inequality. The texts we have looked at here stage moments when it could become otherwise, but

shifts in affective atmosphere are not equal to changing the world . They
are, here, only pieces of an argument about the centrality of optimistic
fantasy to reproducing and surviving in zones of compromised
ordinariness. And that is one way to take the measure of the impasse of
living in the overwhelmingly present moment.