POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE

Notes from Gibbs

Luz v. People
February 29, 2012
(Search and Arrest for Traffic Violation)
Facts: While driving along a highway in Naga City, Rodelo Luz was flagged down by a policeman/traffic
enforcer, who was then assigned in that area, for violation of a traffic ordinance, particularly driving
without a helmet. Luz was invited to the nearby police station. While the policeman prepared for the
citation ticket for the violation, he noticed Luz to be "uneasy and kept on getting something from his
jacket." With this suspicion, he asked Luz to take out all the contents inside of his jacket. Among the
things revealed was a metal container. Policeman asked him to open the same. It contained 2 sachets of
shabu. [to cut the long story short] Luz was convicted by the RTC for violation of RA 9165, particularly for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The CA affirmed the decision in toto. Hence, this appeal.
Luz's contention: search incidental to a LAWFUL arrest is inapplicable, because he was not
lawfully arrested; thus, search was invalid.
People's contention: there was a lawful arrest because Luz committed a violation of traffic
ordinance right there and then; thus, search was also valid as it is incidental to a lawful arrest,
and Luz consented to the search.
ISSUE 1: Was there a valid arrest? NO. [thus, search incidental to a lawful arrest not valid]
Under RA 4136 or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing
with a traffic violation is NOT the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver's
license of the latter. In addition thereto, under the PNP Operations Manual, if the cause for the
flagging down of a vehicle is a traffic violation, the officer's duty is only to issue Traffic Citation
Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR), and never to indulge in prolonged, unnecessary
conversation or argument with the driver violator.
The roadside questioning of a motorist does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be
considered a formal arrest.
ISSUE 2: Were Luz's constitutional rights violated? YES.
At the time a person is arrested, the latter shall be informed of their constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against
them. In the case at bar, the police officers informed Luz of his aforementioned rights only after
he had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US 420 (1984) Miranda warnings must also be given to a
person apprehended due to a traffic violation.

 Knowles v. Iowa, 525 US 113 (1998) When a police officer stops a person for [traffic
violation] and correspondingly issues a citation, this procedure does not authorized the
officer to conduct a full search of the car.
ISSUE 3: Assuming search incidental to a lawful arrest was invalid, was there a consented search? NO.
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from
the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent in given: (1)
the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3)
whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of the coercive police procedures; (6) the
defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of
proving that the necessary consent was given freely and voluntarily given. In this case, all that
was alleged was that the petitioner was alone at the police station at 3:00 AM, accompanied by
several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against the finding of valid consent to
a warrantless search.
- IN SUM, Luz acquitted of the offense charged.

Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et.al. v. Republic, et.al.

January 24, 2012
(Nature of Coconut Levy Funds)

Civil Procedure: "Participation in all stages of a case before the trial court effectively estops a
party from challenging its jurisdiction."
Bill of Rights; Right to Speedy Trial vs. Right to Speedy Disposition: "The right to speedy trail is
available only to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law concept, while the broader right to a
speedy disposition of cases may be tapped in any proceedings conducted by state agencies."
Coconut Levy Funds: "Coconut levy funds are not only affected with public interest; THEY ARE
PRIMA FACIE PUBLIC FUNDS. They are treated as a SPECIAL FUNDS by the very laws which
created them."
That being the case, they cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive
benefit of private persons. TAXES ARE IMPOSED ONLY FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE.
Hence, subject to examination and audit by COA.
Any property purchased by means of the coconut levy funds should likewise be treated
as public funds or public property.

Vda. de Ouano v. Republic, et.al.

February 9, 2011
(Effect if Expropriated Land NOT Used for the Intended Purpose)
Facts: Private properties of herein petitioners were subjected to expropriation by the Republic for
expansion of the then Lahug Airport. The Republic acquired title over the same. However, in 1991 or
soon after the transfer of the aforesaid lots to Mactan Cebu International airport Authority (MCIAA),
Lahug Airport completely ceased operations. Thus, the expropriated lots were never utilized for the
purpose they were taken as no expansion of Lahug Airport was undertaken. This development
prompted the former lot owners to formally demand from the government that they be allowed to
exercise their right to repurchase. Subject of the present case are actions for reconveyance filed against
the Republic.
Primary Issue: Should the expropriated lands be returned to its respective former owners on ground
that the same were not used for the purpose intended?
In expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will. The mandatory
requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed, such that the State must show, at the
minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to
be specifically alleged or least reasonably deductible from the complaint.
If the genuine public necessity ceases or disappears, then there is NO MORE COGENT POINT
FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF THE EXPROPRIATED LAND (it dishonors the
judgment of expropriation, not in keeping with the idea of fair play.). The same legal situation
should hold if THE GOVERNMENT DEVOTES THE PROPERTY TO ANOTHER PUBLIC USE very much
different from the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another private
person.
[CONTROLLING DOCTRINE] - The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always
conditioned on its continued devotion to its public purpose. Once the purpose is terminated or
peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion
subject of course to the return at the very least of the just compensation received.
[OVERTURNED DOCTRINE] The government via expropriation proceedings acquires
unrestricted ownership over or a fee simple title to the covered land.
There is really no occasion to apply the "fee simple concept" if the transfer is conditional
(such as in expropriation.)
Resolutions:
1. MCIAA is ordered to reconvey the subject lots to petitioners.
2. Ouano, et.al. are ordered to return to MCIAA the just compensation they received.
3. MCIAA shall be entitled to retain whatever fruits and income it may have obtained from the
subject expropriated lots without any obligation to refund the same to the lot owners.
4. Ouano, et.al. shall retain whatever interests the amounts they received as just compensation
may have earned in the meantime without any obligation to refund the same to MCIAA.

National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay

August 24, 2011
(Inverse Condemnation)

CA's restrictive construal of Sec. 3(i) of RA 9395 as "exclusive of tunnels" was obviously
unwarranted, for the provision applies not only to development works easily discoverable or on
the surface of the earth but also to subterranean works like tunnels. When the law does not
distinguish, so must we not.
The term "works" should be construed as embracing ALL kinds of constructions,
facilities, and other developments that can enable or help NPC to meet its objectives of
developing hydraulic power.
Inverse Condemnation; Damages: The action to recover just compensation from the State or its
expropriating agency (inverse condemnation) differs from the action for damages.
Inverse Condemnation objective is to recover the value of the property taken in fact
by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of
eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.
Action for Damages objective is to vindicate the legal wrong through damages, which
may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary.
Just Compensation: It is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss.
Prescription: The fact that the owner rather that the expropriator brings the action to recover
just compensation does not change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation,
for the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of
property without just compensation. It would very well be contrary to the clear language of
the Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for private property taken for public
use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.
The taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical
taking or appropriation the expropriator's action may be short of acquisition of title, physical
possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes
destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common
and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its
value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor
material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner. [just
compensation should still cover the entire land.]
Reckoning Value: It shall be reckoned at the time of the filing of the complaint. xxxx NPC's entry
denied elementary due process of the law to the owners since then until the owners
commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the
necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from its deliberate acts of denying due process
of law to the owners. As a measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, therefore,

reckoning just compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse
condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted.
The award of interest fixed at 12% per annum on the amount of just compensation
renders the grant of back rentals unwarranted.
Attorney's fees:
Ordinary the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal
services he has rendered to the latter. The basis is the fact of his employment by and his
agreement with the client.
Extraordinary an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing
party in a litigation. The basis is Art. 2208 of NCC, and is payable to the client, unless
there is an agreement that the award shall pertain to the lwyer as additional
compensation or as part therof.
Attorney's fees are not awarded every time a part prevails in a suit, nor should
an adverse decision ipso facto justify an award of the same to the winning party.
xxxx It is subject to review by the SC, even if not specifically raised or assigned as
error by the parties.

Del Castillo v. People

January 30, 2012
(Presence of Barangay Tanod will NOT Validate an Illegal Service of Search Warrant)
Facts: Acting upon a confidential report that Del Castillo is engaged in the illegal sale of drugs, police
officers secured search warrant. On their way to Del Castillo's house, someone shouted for "raid" which
caused for the commotion in the place. Police officers hurriedly went to the house; the latter was able
to escape. The wife was present. In the presence of the barangay tanod, the officers searched the house
but they found nothing. It was a barangay tanod who found 4 plastic packs of a crystalline substance. [to
cut the long story short] Del Castillo was convicted by the RTC, affirmed by CA. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Was the irregularity in the content and service of the search warrant (particularly the requirement
on particularity) validated by the presence of the barangay tanod?

No. A barangay tanod is not a private individual. The Local Government Code contains provision
which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority. Hence,
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures is applicable as against
government authorities.

Magallona, et.al. v. Sec. Ermita, et.al.

GR No. 187167. August 16, 2011

FACTS:
In March 2009, Congress passed RA 9522 (the present Philippine Baselines Law), as compliance
to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).
RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the
Philippine archipelago and classified the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal,
as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners (as citizens, taxpayers, and/or legislators) assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on
two principal grounds: (1) the law reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach
of the Philippine state's sovereign power in violation of Art. 1 of the 1987 Constitution, and (2)
the law opens the country's waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security.
Respondents defended RA 9522 as the country's compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones, i.e. territorial waters (12 nautical
miles from the baselines); contiguous zone (24 na); exclusive economic zone (200 na); and
continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.
Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III State parties to delimit
with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves.
Far from surrendering the PH's claims over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress'
decision to classify them as "rgime of islands" consistent with Art. 121 of UNCLOS III manifests
the State's responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Art.
121 thereof states, any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above
water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of
islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioner's assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under
RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the
location of basepoints, increased the PH's total maritime space by 145, 216 square nautical
miles.
UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space the EEZ - in waters previously part of the high
seas. However, it preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached
to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the PH will find itself
devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and
continental shelf is measured. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the PH in
safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp v. Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc.

GR Nos. 175769-70. January 19, 2009

FACTS:
ABS-CBN is engaged in television and radio broadcasting through wireless and satellite means
while Philippine Multi-Media Systems Inc. (PMSI for brevity), the operator of Dream
Broadcasting System provides direct-to-home (DTH) television via satellite to its subscribers all
over the Philippines.
PMSI was granted legislative franchise under RA 8630 to install, operate and maintain a
nationwide DTH satellite service and is obligated under by NTC Memorandum Circular No. 4-0888, Section 6.2 of which requires all cable television system operators operating in a community
within Grade A or B contours to carry the television signals of the authorized television
broadcast stations (must-carry rule).
ABS-CBN filed a complaint with Intellectual Property Office (IPO) for violation of laws involving
property rights. It alleged that PMSIs unauthorized rebroadcasting of Channels 2 and 23
infringed on its broadcasting rights and copyright and that the NTC circular only covers cable
television system operators and not DTH satellitetelevision operators. Moreover, NTC Circular 408-88 violates Sec. 9 of Art. III of the Constitution because it allows the taking of property for
public use without payment of just compensation.
PMSI argued that its rebroadcasting of Channels 2 and 23 is sanctioned by Memorandum
Circular No. 04-08-88; that the must-carry rule under the Memorandum Circular is a valid
exercise of police power.
IPO and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of PMSI.
ISSUE: Whether or not ABS-CBN's rights are violated.
RULING:
PMSI was granted a legislative franchise under Republic Act No. 8630, Section 4 of which
similarly states that it shall provide adequate public service time to enable the government,
through the said broadcasting stations, to reach the population on important public issues;
provide at all times sound and balanced programming; promote public participation such as in
community programming; assist in the functions of public information and education x x
x. Section 5, paragraph 2 of the same law provides that the radio spectrum is a finite
resource that is a part of the national patrimony and the use thereof is a privilege conferred
upon the grantee by the State and may be withdrawn anytime, after due process.
In Telecom. & Broadcast Attys. of the Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC the Court held that a franchise is a
mere privilege which may be reasonably burdened with some form of public service. Thus: All
broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave
frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than
there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to
amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that any such
franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the
Congress when the common good so requires.

In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own
the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and
images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a
mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance
by the grantee of some form of public service. x x x There is likewise no merit to ABS-CBNs claim
that PMSIs carriage of its signals is for a commercial purpose; that its being the countrys top
broadcasting company, the availability of its signals allegedly enhances PMSIs attractiveness to
potential customers; or that the unauthorized carriage of its signals by PMSI has created
competition between its Metro Manila and regional stations.
The Must-Carry Rule favors both broadcasting organizations and the public. It prevents cable
television companies from excluding broadcasting organization especially in those places not
reached by signal. Also, the rule prevents cable television companies from depriving viewers in
far-flung areas the enjoyment of programs available to city viewers. In fact, this Office finds the
rule more burdensome on the part of the cable television companies. The latter carries the
television signals and shoulders the costs without any recourse of charging. On the other hand,
the signals that are carried by cable television companies are dispersed and scattered by the
television stations and anybody with a television set is free to pick them up.
The carriage of ABS-CBNs signals by virtue of the must-carry rule in Memorandum Circular No.
04-08-88 is under the direction and control of the government though the NTC which is vested
with exclusive jurisdiction to supervise, regulate and control telecommunications and
broadcast services/facilities in the Philippines. The imposition of the must-carry rule is within
the NTCs power to promulgate rules and regulations, as public safety and interest may require,
to encourage a larger and more effective use of communications, radio and television
broadcasting facilities, and to maintain effective competition among private entities.

Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.

GR No. 162994. September 17, 2004
FACTS:
Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of
employment signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by
the existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees with competing drug companies and
should management find that such relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest, to resign
from the company. Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation
that management may transfer the employee to another department in a non-counterchecking
position or preparation for employment outside of the company after 6 months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
area and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo's
competition. Before getting married, Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of
the conflict of interest but marriage took place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors

informed him of conflict of intrest. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that
either he or Betsy resign from their respective positions). Unable to comply with condition,
Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his request
against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee and
while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines
Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that
Glaxo's policy was valid...
ISSUE on Equal Protection:
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies, and
other confidential programs and information from competitors. The prohibition against pesonal
or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees is
reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the
interests of the company. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interestcannot
be denied.
It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only
to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long
array of US Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects to shield against
merely privately conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.
The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply
with the policy. Indeed the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed
manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.
ISSUE on Constructive Dismissal:
Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued
employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is demotion in rank, or
diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee. None of these conditions are present in the instant case.
Other Issues/Ruling:
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than
the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect
its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our
laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of
labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law
also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement
in the interest of fair play.
In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee
handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships
between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate
relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to

avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise out of such
relationships.

In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Capt. Gary Alejano, et.al.
GR No. 160792. August 25, 2005
FACTS:
Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers,
entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (Oakwood), an upscale
apartment complex, located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the
security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The
junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for the
resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members. Around 7:00
p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several
negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they
had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks.
On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major
Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center
On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup detat with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003
Oakwood incident. The trial court later issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior
officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of
ISAFP. On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take
into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood
incident except the detained junior officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.
On August 11, 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with SC. The Supreme Court
issued a resolution, which required respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and
produce the persons of the detainees before the CA. On the same date, the detainees and their
other co-accused filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a Motion for Preliminary
Investigation, which the trial court granted.
The Court of appeals dismissed the petition. Nonetheless, the CA ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was
in charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the
rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The
appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already charged of coup detat before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees
confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees and petitioners do
not even question. The Court of Appeals recognized that habeas corpus may also be the
appropriate remedy to assail the legality of detention if there is a deprivation of a
constitutional right. However, the appellate court held that the constitutional rights alleged to
have been violated in this case do not directly affect the detainees liberty. The appellate court
ruled that the regulation of the detainees right to confer with their counsels is reasonable

under the circumstances. The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of
Trillanes letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not
justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint,
which is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can avail of the remedy for petition of habeas corpus.
RULING:
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy
to address the detainees complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP
Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of
detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being
illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders
the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas
corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of
error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.
Case law has expanded the writs application to circumstances where there is deprivation of a
persons constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person continues to be unlawfully
denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process,
where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are also unnecessary, and where a
deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. However, a mere allegation
of a violation of ones constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will extend the scope of
the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is
void as to the excess. Whatever situation the petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high.
The violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizens privacy rights is a
guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or
imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as
to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their
detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of
privacy rights.
The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted
prisoners from petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions
in detention and prison facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and
prisoners will be reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford
injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners subjected to arbitrary and inhumane
conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of
confinement. The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or
duration of confinement.

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 148560. November 19, 2001
FACTS:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by R.A. No.
7659 substantially provides that any public officer who amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts in the aggregate amount or total value
of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder. Petitioner Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, being prosecuted under the said Act, assailed its constitutionality, wishes to impress
upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line
which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects
of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt"
standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal
point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are:
combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the
validity of the mentioned law.
ISSUE on whether or not Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.
No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have
committed. We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse
petitioner in his defense.
Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms combination and series in the key phrase a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for
being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because
of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting
some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected

speech of other may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech.
ISSUE on whether or not the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of
plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process
No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it
shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance
of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient
to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor
the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds
in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled
to an acquittal.
The reasonable doubt standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of
constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged. Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every
element of the crime chargedthe element of the offense.
Relative to petitioners contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that
pattern is a very important element of the crime of plunder; and that Sec. 4 is twopronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime, such that
without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder. We do not subscribe to petitioners
stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its
definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe a
rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural
measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but
only operated in furtherance of a remedy. What is crucial for the prosecution is to present
sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE on whether or not Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is
within the power of Congress to so classify it.
No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive
crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is
noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed
willfully, unlawfully and criminally. It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is
the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the remarks of Senator Taada made
during the deliberation on S.B. No.733. Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is

conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done
to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far
as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must
be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown. The application of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder
Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of
responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent.
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to
have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among
the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The evil of a crime may take
various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life
was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to
completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being.
There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of
the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in
which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and
underprivileged masses. The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous
offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a
special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.

zowt morf tsegiDruofenoore:

Atong Paglaum v. Commission on Elections
Facts:
52 party- list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC)
in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them
from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November
and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to
represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a
marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly
representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress.
Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying some of the
petitioners application for accreditation and cancelling the existing accreditation of the rest. They also
lamented the poll bodys denial to accord them due process in the evaluation proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not the said party-list groups were validly disqualified
Held:

The 54 petitions were remanded these petitions to the Comelec. The party-list groups and organizations
covered by the 41 petitions that obtained mandatory injunction orders from the high court still stand a
chance to make it to the 2013 party-list race as the high court ordered the poll body to determine
whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters set forth in the Decision. The rest, meaning,
the 13 other petitions, were remanded to the poll body merely for purposes of determining whether
they may be granted accreditation under the new parameters but may not participate in the May 2013
elections.
The Decision, however, clarified that the poll body may not be faulted for acting on the basis of previous
rulings (Ang Bagong Bayani, BANAT) of the high court regarding the party-list system. These earlier
rulings enumerated guidelines on who may participate in the party-list system.
There are three groups that may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
On the part of national parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations which intend to
participate in the party-list race, the new guidelines state that these parties do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized or underrepresented sector.
As for political parties, they may participate in the party-list race by registering under the party-list
system and no longer field congressional candidates. These parties, if they field congressional
candidates, however, are not barred from participating in the party-list elections; what they need to do
is register their sectoral wing or party under the party-list system. This sectoral wing shall be considered
an independent sectoral party linked to a political party through a coalition.
The question is: where does representation of marginalized and underrepresented sectors come in?
The answer: on the sectoral parties or organizations that intend to participate in the party-list system.
The high court held that purely sectoral parties or organizations may either represent marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies or those lacking well-defined political constituencies. The high
court went on to enumerate marginalized and underrepresented sectors, as follows: labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers.
The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women,
and the youth.
The rule on nominees and members coming from the sector they intend to represent also applies only
to the sectoral parties or organizations. The high court ruled that it is enough that *a+ majority of the
members of the sectoral parties or organizations must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. The same is true for those who lack well-defined political
constituencies.
As for the nominees of these sectoral parties and organizations, the new guidelines provide that they
must either be members of the sector or have a track record of advocacy for their sector.

Should some of the nominees of these national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations be
disqualified, the party or organization itself will not be disqualified provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.
The party list system, according to the Decision Quoting Christian Monsod, the main proponent of the
party-list system, the high court stated that it is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation. The high court stressed that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to
leave out non-sectoral parties in the party-list system and exclusively limit it to sectoral groups.
The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list
system In fact, the framers voted down , 19-22, a proposal to reserve the party-list system exclusively
to sectoral parties.
There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the
proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly
intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties, the Decision read.
To amplify its position, the high court pointed out Sec. 5(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.
WHAT IS THE PROOF THAT THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM IS NOT EXCLUSIVELY FOR SECTORAL PARTIES?
SECTION 5(2), ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION WHICH MANDATES THAT, DURING THE FIRST
THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF CONGRESS AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
ONE-HALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED, AS PROVIDED
BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS
CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW,
EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors
as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. This provision clearly shows again that the
party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to
non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively

for sectoral parties representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Second, the reservation of
one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the
first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any
class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties
only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
The Decision also pointed out pertinent provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, also known as the
Party-list System Act, specifically from Sec. 3 (Definition of Terms):
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means
of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated
in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector
Again, the high court noted that defining these parties or groups, one from the others, could only mean
that they are not one and the same.
Previous rulings reversed by Atong Paglaum
As earlier stated, there are previous rulings on the party-list system in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/147589_decision.htm) and BANAT v. Comelec
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/179271.htm ).

CITY OF MANILA VS. TE

Digested by: Chin Rojas
FACTS: City of Manila instituted a complaint for expropriation against herein respondent. The latter filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that Ordinance 7951 (an expropriation measure enacted on February
3, 1998 by the city council authorizing him to acquire by negotiation or expropriation certain pieces of
real property along Maria Clara and Governor Forbes Streets) was an invalid expropriation measure
because it violated the rule against taking private property without just compensation and that it did not
comply with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Furthermore, respondent is qualified as
a small property owner and, hence, exempt from the operation of RA 7279, the subject lot being the
only piece of realty that she owned. Motion to dismiss was granted by RTC. Petitioners appeal to CA but
to no avail. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a motion to dismiss by the respondent is improper.

HELD: Yes, it was improper.

The present state of Rule 67 dispenses with the filing of an extraordinary motion to dismiss such as that
required before in response to a complaint for expropriation. The present rule requires the filing of an
answer as responsive pleading to the complaint. Section 3 thereof provides:
If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or
defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the summons.
The answer shall specifically designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an interest,
state the nature and extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the
taking of his property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed
in the answer or any subsequent pleading.
Thus, the trial court in this case should have denied respondents motion to dismiss and required her to
submit in its stead an answer within the reglementary period.
Petition was granted. The dismissal was set aside and the case was remanded to the lower court.
Important notes:
- Expropriation is a two-pronged proceeding: first, the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts which terminates in an
order of dismissal or an order of condemnation affirming the plaintiff's lawful right to take the property
for the public use or purpose described in the complaint and second, the determination by the court of
the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated.
- the concept of socialized housing, whereby housing units are distributed and/or sold to qualified
beneficiaries on much easier terms, has already been included in the expanded definition of public use
or purpose in the context of the States exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Heirs of lazaro gallardo vs. porferio soliman, vivian valete and antonio soliman (case digest)
When one party enters into a covenant with another, he must perform his obligations with fealty and
good faith. This becomes more imperative where such party has been given a grant, such as land, under
the land reform laws. While the tenant is emancipated from bondage to the soil, the landowner is
entitled to his just compensation for the deprivation of his land.
FACTS:
Lazaro and Prosperidad are the registered owners of a 4.3699-hectare parcel of land in Tarlac. The land
was placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27 and respondent Porferio
Soliman was instituted as a qualified farmer tenant-transferee thereof. In 1995, petitioners (heirs of
Lazaro) filed a Complaint for collection of land amortizations, dispossession, ejectment, and cancellation
of Deed of Transfer and Emancipation Patent against respondent before the Office of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD).

It appears that a Kasunduan in 1985 and a notarized Deed of Transfer were executed by Lazaro and
Porferio. Under said deeds, Porferio (as sole farmer-beneficiary and in consideration for the transfer of
the whole of the land in his favor), obliged himself to pay the petitioners 999 cavans of palay in 15 equal
yearly amortizations under the Direct Payment Scheme of PD 27. An advance payment of 66 cavans and
28 kilos, representing total lease payments made by Porferio to Lazaro since 1973, shall be deducted
from the 999 cavans, leaving an annual amortization to be made by Porferio of 62 cavans or 16 cavans
per hectare per year. But Porferio paid only 121.2 cavans or 480.9 cavans short of the total
amortizations due from 1986 to 1995, into the deed.
Porferio failed/refused to attend mediation with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) and
pay amortizations on the land. (The Tarlac PARO issued Emancipation Patents not only in favor of
Porferio but also to his children who were not legally instituted farmer tenant-transferees of the land
under PD 27.) In their Answer, Porferio and his children alleged the title of the subject land was already
transferred registered accordingly to their names. They argued that the PARAD has no jurisdiction over
the case and no authority to cancel such titles as the same pertain to the regular courts. They further
contended that between them and the petitioners, there is no tenancy relationship; and that they have
exceeded payments for the land.
PARAD ruling:
- that It had jurisdiction over the controversy which partakes of an agrarian dispute.
- Despite the Kasunduan and the Deed of Transfer were defective for non-compliance with certain
requirements of PD 27. said deeds were "within the context of PD 27"
- Porferio still owes petitioners 597.8 cavans of palay.
- the failure of Porferio, Vivian and Antonio to pay rentals/amortizations cannot be considered as
deliberate because they "labored under the honest belief that they are now vested with absolute
ownership" of the land
- respondents to pay petitioners the remaining 478.24 cavans of palay
DARAB ruling:
-upheld the validity of the Emancipation Patents following the ratiocination of the PARAD that they have
been regularly issued.
-Affirmed PARADs finding that respondents failure to pay the rentals/amortizations was not deliberate
and willful and that respondents to pay the remaining balance
CA ruling:
-the issuance of the Emancipation Patents in respondents name was irregular, and that Porferios
deliberate failure and refusal to pay the annual amortizations since 1986 despite demand should result
in the cancellation of his title.

-Resolution dismissing petitioners Petition for Review on the ground that the verification and
certification against forum shopping was signed by only four of the six petitioners. Petitioners Mario
Lazaro P. Gallardo and Lazaro P. Gallardo, Jr. did not sign, and no special power of attorney to sign in
their favor accompanied the Petition.
-that the certification against forum shopping must be executed and signed by all of the petitioners, or
else it is insufficient.
ISSUES:
WON CA erred in holding that the signing of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping by
only 4 of the 6 petitioners is insufficient to meet the requirements of the rule
WON CA erred in outrightly dismissing the petition for review on purely technical ground:
RULING:
Yes; It was an error for the CA to have dismissed the Petition for Review.
despite 2 of the petitioners did not sign on the verification & certification, Petitioners are all heirs of
the deceased Lazaro. As such, they undoubtedly share a common interest in the land, as well as
common claims and defenses, as against respondents
Yes; CA should not have dismissed the petition on purely technical ground
CA to decide the case on the merits considering the vital issues presented in the Petition. There is a
need for the CA to resolve whether the Emancipation Patents issued in the name of Vivian and Antonio
were valid, considering that by the evidence presented, they were never instituted as tenants to the
land.
CA should also settle the issue as to whether Porferio may be said to have deliberately refused to
honor his obligation to pay the amortizations on the land, per the Kasunduan and Deed of Transfer,
considering that on record, written demand has been served upon him, and despite such demand,
Porferio failed to pay the amortizations.
Gamboa v. Chan, et.al.
GR No. 193636. July 24, 2012
Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom
from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, it is to be repository of freedom.
The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional right.
This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc (22 S 424) (1968), thus enunciated: The due process question touching on
an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by

plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is
violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas:
Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental
restraint; it must include privacy as well, it it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is
indeed the beginning of all freedom. As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr.
Justice Brandeis the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. The
concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a
unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.
Same; Same; The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from
intrusion or constraint.
However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks (541 S 456) (2007), this
Court underscored that the right to privacy is NOT ABSOLUTE, viz: With respect to the right of privacy
which the petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute
right. While it is true that Section 21, Art. VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of
persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be
allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of
the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to
privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not
absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship
test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the
requirement to disclosure of information is for valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the
government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who
invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state the this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to
proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.
Same; Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed
to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and informational privacy.
The writ of habeas datait seeks to protect a persons right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be
granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other.
Same; Private Armies; The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other
armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups
not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment of one police

force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national
police commission.
ISSUES:
1.
WON the trial court erred in ruling that the Zenarosa Commission be impleaded as either a
necessary or indispensable party;
2.
WON the trial court erred in clearing in declaring that (Gamboa) failed to present sufficient
proof to link respondents as the informant to the Zenarosa Commission;
3.
WON the trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
4.
WON the trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zenarosa Commission to the
PNP as alleged by Gamboa is an assumption;
WON the trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an agency.

Ouano vs Republic,
February 9, 2011(Expropriation; abandonment of public purpose)
FACTS:

In this case, the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and/or its
predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject of the final decree of
expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by the
government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug Airport. In fact, the Lahug
Airport had been closed and abandoned.

Furthermore, it was established by evidence that the National Airport

Corporation, MCIAAs predecessor, through its team of negotiators, had given assurance
to the affected landowners that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective
lots in the event they are no longer used for airport purposes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the former owners of expropriated lands- not used for the purpose
intended be allowed to recover the same.
HELD:

The SC held that the government only acquires the rights in expropriated parcels
of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties. This means
that in the event the particular public use for which a parcel of land is expropriated is
abandoned, the owner shall not be entitled to recover or repurchase it as a matter of
right, unless such recovery or repurchase is expressed in or irresistibly deducible from

the condemnation judgment. In the present case, the above final decree of
expropriation allows the recovery or repurchase, upon abandonment of the Lahug
airport project, as a condition of approving expropriation. In effect, the government
merely held the properties condemned in trust until the proposed public use or purpose
for which the lots were condemned was actually consummated by the government.

Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the
transfer of the property, then the lot owners can demand the reconveyance of their
old properties after the payment of the condemnation price. A condemnor should
commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not,
then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the
latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in
any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation.

Republic vs Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc. (GR No. 185124 January 25, 2012) 664 SCRA 233
Facts:
National Irrigation Authority (NIA) is a government-owned-and-controlled corporation created
under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3601 on 22 June 1963. It is primarily responsible for irrigation
development and management in the country. Its charter was amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.)
552 on 11 September 1974and P.D. 1702 on 17 July 1980. To carry out its purpose, NIA was specifically
authorized under P.D. 552 to exercise the power of eminent domain.
NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the Malitubog-Marigado
Irrigation Project. On 8 September 1994, it filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint for the
expropriation of a portion of three (3) parcels of land covering a total of 14, 497.91 square meters.
On 25 September 1995, NIA filed a Second Amended Complaint to allege properly the area
sought to be expropriated, the exact address of the expropriated properties and the owners thereof.
NIA further prayed that it be authorized to take immediate possession of the properties after depositing
with the Philippine National Bank the amount of 19, 246.58 representing the provisional value thereof.
On 31 October 1995, respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative and Special Defenses and
Counterclaim. They alleged, inter alia, that NIA had no authority to expropriate portions of their land,
because it was not a sovereign political entity; that it was not necessary to expropriate their properties,
because there was an abandoned government property adjacent theirs, where the project could pass
through; that Lot No. 3080 was no longer owned by Rural Bank of Kabacan; that NIAs valuation of their
expropriated properties was inaccurate because of the improvements on the land that should have
placed its value at % million; and that NIA never negotiated with the landowners before taking their
properties for the project, causing permanent and irreparable damages to their properties.

On 11 September 1996, RTC issued an Order forming a committee tasked to determine the fair
market value of the properties. On 10 October 1996, the lower court issued an Order stating it would
issue a writ of possession in favor of NIA upon the determination of the fair arket value of the
properties. The lower court later amended its ruling and, on 21 October 1996, issued a Writ of
Possession in favor of NIA.
On 15 October 1996, the committee submitted a Commissioners Report to the RTC. The report,
however, stated that the committee members could not agree on the market value of the subject
properties and recommended the appointment of new independent commissioners to replace the ones
coming from the parties only.
On 25 November 1996, the new committee submitted its Commissioners Report to the lower
court. The committee had agreed that the fair market value of the land should be 65 per square meter
based on the zonal valuation of the Bureau if Internal Revenue (BIR.)
On 3 December 1997, the committee submitted to the RTC another report, which had adopted
the first Committee Report, as well as the formers 25 November 1996 report. However, the committee
added to its computation the value of the earthfill excavated from portions of Lot. Nos. 3039 and 3080.
Petitioner objected to the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the computation of the value of
the land.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA seriously erred in affirming the trial courts finding of just compensation of the
land and the improvements thereon based on the report of the commissioners.
Held:
Expropriation Proceedings; Just Compensation --- In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is
defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of
the word compensation and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The constitutional limitation of just
compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly
defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action
and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to
sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.
In National Power Corporation vs. Diato-Bernal, this Court emphasized that the just-ness of the
compensation could only be attained by using reliable and actual data a bases for fixing the value of the
condemned property. The reliable and actual data we referred to in that case were the sworn
declarations of realtors in the area, as well as tax declarations and zonal valuation from the BIR. In
disregarding the Committee Report by the National Power Corporation in the said case, we ruled thus: It
is evident that the above conclusions are highly speculative and devoid of any actual and reliable basis.

First, the market values of the subject propertys neighboring lots were mere estimates and
unsupported by any corroborative documents, such as sworn declarations of realtors in the area
concerned, tax declarations or zonal valuation from the BIR for the contiguous residential dwellings and
commercial establishments. The report also failed to elaborate on how and by how much the
community centers and convenience facilities enhanced the value of respondents property. Finally, the
market sales data and price listings alluded to in the report were not even appended thereto. As
correctly invoked by NAPOCOR, a commissioners report of land prices which is not based on any
documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court. The trial court
adopted the flawed findings of the commissioners hook, line and sinker. It did not even bother to
require the submission of the alleged market sales data and price listings. Further, the RTC
overlooked that fact that the recommended just compensation was gauged as of September 10, 1999 or
more than two years after the complaint was filed on January 8, 1997. It is settled that just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry
into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing pf the
complaint. Clearly, the recommended just compensation in te commissioners report is unacceptable.
We also uphold the CA ruling, which deleted the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the
payment for just compensation. There is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated soil from
that of the expropriated properties, contrary to what the trial court did. In the context of expropriation
proceedings, the soil has no value separate from that of the expropriated land. Just compensation
ordinarily refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the owner actually loses. Such value
could only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking.
Ownership of lands are indivisible, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil
under it.
Note: Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes
entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the
complaint.
Sto. Tomas vs Salac
(G.R. No. 152642 November 13, 2012) 685 SCRA 245
Facts:
On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995bthat, for among other purpose, sets the Governments policies on
overseas employment and establishes a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of
migrant workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in distress.

Sections 29 and 30 of the Act commanded the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to
begin deregulating within one year of its passage the business of handling the recruitment and
migration of overseas Filipino workers and phase out within five years the regulatory functions of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA.)
On January 8, 2002 respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against petitioners before
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 96.
Salac, et al. sought to: (1) nullify DOLE Department Order 10 and POEA Memorandum Circular
15; (2) prohibit the DOLE, POEA, and TESDA from implementing the same and from further issuing rules
and regulations that would regulate the recruitment and placement of overseas Filipino workers; and (3)
also enjoin them to comply with the policy of deregulation mandated under Sections 29 and 30 of RA
8042.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 8042 is constitutional as a valid exercise of police power.
Held:
Constitutional Law; Police Power --- As the Court held in People vs. Ventura, the State under its police
power may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure the general
welfare of the people, to protect them against the consequence of ignorance and incapacity as well as of
deception and fraud. Police power is that inherent and plenary power of the State which enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.
R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the recruitment and deployment of
OFWs. It aims to curb, if not eliminate, the injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to
work abroad. The rule is settled that every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.
The Court cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the laws enacted by the Legislative
Department. Hence, in the absence of clear and unmistakable case that the statute is unconstitutional,
the Court must uphold its validity.
REPUBLIC V HANS MENZI, GR 183446 NOVEMBER 13, 2012
SYLLABUS
Same; Provisional Remedies; Sequestration; An extraordinary measure in the form of a provisional
remedy, sequestration is merely intended to prevent the destruction, concealment or dissipation of
sequestered properties and, thereby, to conserve and preserve them, pending the judicial
determination in the appropriate proceeding of whether the property was in truth ill-gotten.Given the
finality of the lifting of the writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG and the long-standing failure of the
Republic to allege and prove the illegality of the ownership of the Liwayway shares and the invalidity of
the transfers thereof, we find and so hold that the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted for ordering the

release of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 in favor of the Estate and HMHMI. An extraordinary measure in
the form of a provisional remedy, sequestration is merely intended to prevent the destruction,
concealment or dissipation of sequestered properties and, thereby, to conserve and preserve them,
pending the judicial determination in the appropriate proceeding of whether the property was in truth
ill-gotten. While it is true that the lifting of a writ of sequestration will not necessarily be fatal to the
main case, as it does not ipso facto mean that the sequestered property is not ill-gotten, it cannot be
over-emphasized that there has never been a main case against the Liwayway shares as would justify
the Republics continued claim on the subject TDCs and, for that matter, the prolonged withholding of
the proceeds thereof from the Estate and HMHMI. Although jurisprudence recognizes the possibility of a
resort to other ancillary remedies since the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over sequestration cases
demands that it should also have the authority to preserve the subject matter of the cases or put the
same in custodia legis, this is unavailing to the Republic since, by its own admission, the Liwayway shares
were not litigated in Civil Case No. 0022.
Same; Same; Same; Like the remedies of freeze order and provisional takeover with which the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has been equipped, sequestration is not meant
to deprive the owner or possessor of his title or any right to his property and vest the same in the
sequestering agency, the Government or any other person, as these can be done only for the causes and
by the processes laid down by law.Like the remedies of freeze order and provisional takeover with
which the PCGG has been equipped, sequestration is not meant to deprive the owner or possessor of his
title or any right to his property and vest the same in the sequestering agency, the Government or any
other person, as these can be done only for the causes and by the processes laid down by law. These
remedies are severe, radical measures taken against apparent, ostensible owners of property, or
parties against whom, at the worst, there are merely prima facie indications of having amassed illgotten wealth, indications which must still be shown to lead towards actual facts in accordance with the
judicial procedures of the land. Considering that sequestration is not meant to create a permanent
situation as regards the property subject thereof and subsists only until ownership is finally judicially
determined, it stands to reason that, upon its dissolution, the property sequestered should likewise be
returned to its owner/s. Indeed, sequestration cannot be allowed interminably and forever, if it is to
adhere to constitutional due process.
FACTS:
Petitioner assails the resolution issued by Sandiganbayan ordering Philtrusts to pay the estate of Hans
Menzi for the proceeds of time deposits certificate nos. 162828 and 162829.
On 22 April 1986, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) issued a Writ of
Sequestration over the shares of former President Ferdinand Marcos, Emilio Yap (Yap) and Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. (Cojuangco) in the Bulletin Publishing Corporation (Bulletin), together with those of their
nominees or agents, U.S. Automotive Co., Inc. (US Automotive) and its officers in Liwayway Publishing,
Inc. (Liwayway) as well as the shares of stock, assets, properties, records and documents of Hans Menzi
Holdings and Management, Inc. (HMHMI).

On 2 April 1992 the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution lifting the writ of sequestration issued by the
PCGG. In a Resolution dated 16 July 1996, the Court reversed and set aside the assailed resolution and
referred the case back to the Sandiganbayan for resolution of the preliminary question of whether
there is prima facie factual basis for PCGGs sequestration order. It was pursuant to the foregoing
resolution that the Sandiganbayan went on to conduct hearings on the matter and, later, to issue the
Resolution dated 13 April 1998, discounting the factual bases for PCGGs sequestration order and
granting the Estates motion to lift the writ of sequestration over the shares of stock, assets, properties,
records and documents of HMHMI. Dissatisfied, the Republic filed a petition for certiorari and the Court
rendered a decision dismissing the Republics petition on the ground that the Sandiganbayan had the
authority to resolve all incidents relative to cases involving ill-gotten wealth and that the courts
appellate jurisdiction over the graft courts decisions or final orders is limited to questions of law.
On 29 November 2006, the Republic filed its motion for the execution of the Sandiganbayans March 14,
2002 Decision and prayed for Philtrusts delivery of the sums covered by the decision as well as the
PCGGs Freeze Order which included the sums covered by TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829. Claiming that
only the proceeds of TDC No. 136301 were declared forfeited in favor of the Republic in the decision
sought to be executed, the Estate and HMHMI also filed their motion for execution, praying that
Philtrust be ordered to render an accounting of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 and, thereafter, to deliver
in their favor the principal thereof, together with the stipulated and legal interests they have, in the
meantime, earned.
On 25 January 2007, the Estate and HMHMI also filed their Manifestation with Comment, asserting that
only the proceeds of TDC No. 136301 were declared ill-gotten in the decision sought to be executed;
hence, it necessarily followed that all the other sequestered HMHMI assets including the proceeds of
TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 were not ill-gotten.
The Republic argued that this Courts affirmation of the lifting of the writ of sequestration ordered by
the Sandiganbayan was not fatal to its cause and could not be construed as justification for the release
of the proceeds of the TDCs to the Estate and HMHMI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for ordering Philtrust bank to pay the Estate of Hans Menzi representing the proceeds of TDC
Nos. 16228 and 16229.
RULING:
There was no grave abuse of discretion imputable against the Sandiganbayan for denying the
Republics motion for execution, insofar as it related to the delivery in its favor of the proceeds of TDC
Nos. 162828 and 162829.
Considering the finality of this Courts 23 November 2005 Decision affirming the Sandiganbayans March
14, 2002 Decision in Civil Case No. 0022, the Court ruled that the Estate and HMHMI correctly argued

against the disposition of the proceeds of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 in favor of the Republic by
means of the writ of execution the latter sought a quo. Having been sourced from the disposition of said
Liwayway shares, the proceeds of the subject TDCs cannot be released in favor of the Republic without
varying the decision sought to be executed which, as admitted, did not make any determination
regarding the validity of the ownership of the same shares and/or the legality of the transfer thereof. It
is a matter of settled legal principle that a writ of execution must adhere to every essential particular of
the judgment sought to be executed. The writ cannot vary or go beyond the terms of the judgment and
must conform to the dispositive portion thereof. Time and again, it has been ruled that an order of
execution which varies the tenor of the judgment or, for that matter, exceeds the terms thereof is a
nullity.
While it is true that the lifting of a writ of sequestration will not necessarily be fatal to the main case, as
it does not ipso facto mean that the sequestered property is not ill-gotten, it cannot be over-emphasized
that there has never been a main case against the Liwayway shares as would justify the Republics
continued claim on the subject TDCs and, for that matter, the prolonged withholding of the proceeds
thereof from the Estate and HMHMI.
Petition is dismissed.
Office of the Court Administrator, petitioner
vs
Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et. al, respondents
A.M. No. MTJ 07 1691
FACTS:
This is an administrative case that stemmed from the Memorandum of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). The judicial audit team created by the OCA reported alleged irregularities in the
solemnization of marriages in several branches of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and
Regional trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City. Certain package fees were offered to interested parties by
fixers or facilitators for instant marriages.
In the report of the audit team, out of the 643 marriage certificates examined 280 marriages
were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code (no need for marriage license for man and woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and without impediment to marry).
The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of solemnized marriages than the number
of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registry. There were even marriages solemnized at 9
a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the same day.
OCA found Judges Anatalio Necessario, Gil Acosta, Rosabella Tormis and Edgemelo Rosales and
a number of court personnel guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages
One of the arguments on the side of the judges is the presumption of
with questionable document
regularity of the documents presented by the contracting parties.

Issue:
Whether or not the judges and court personnel of the MTCC and RTC Cebu are guilty of gross
ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct and in turn
warrant the most severe penalty of dismissal from service.
Ruling:
Yes, the judges and court personnel of the MTCC and RTC Cebu are guilty of gross ignorance of
the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct and in turn warrant the most
severe penalty of dismissal from service.
The respondents disregarded laws and procedure to the prejudice of the parties and the proper
administration of justice.
In other case, the Court held that inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and
carelessness.
Neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give ones attention to a task expected of him and it is
gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the frequesncy of instances, the offense is so serious in its
character as to endanger or threaten public welfare.
The court does not accept the argument that the ascertainment of the validity of the marriage
license is beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces
of evidence that point to the contrary. As correctly observed by the OCA, the presumption of regularity
accorded to a marriage license disappears the moment the marriage documents do not appear regular
on its face.
The ignorance of the law on the part of the respondents is manifested by the solemnization of
marriage without marriage license despite the doubtful circumstances of the contracting parties.

tenretni eht morf tsegiD

Chavez vs JBC, 2012
Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one
from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held
in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives
one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that
petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase
a representative of Congress. It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of
Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of Congress, such that the absence of either
divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system

of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of
its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of a
representative from Congress, it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise
the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no real interest in questioning the
constitutionality of the JBCs current composition. The respondents also question petitioners belated filing of
the petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been
met in this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of
whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
(1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must
have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has
sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present,
especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is
not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on the case is
imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can
come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and
nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at all
limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts
all over the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process
of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the
composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a
judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal
blunders.
(2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense.
No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being
referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The
seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there
be a stalemate in voting.
It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government
to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in
the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses
is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply
discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two

houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire
legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official
actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.