This article was downloaded by: [80.80.33.

195]
On: 09 March 2015, At: 12:08
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registere
d
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Click for updates
Journal of Transatlantic Studies
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjts20
Saving Bosnia on Capitol Hill: the case
of Senator Bob Dole
Hamza Karia
a Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo,
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Published online: 06 Mar 2015.
To cite this article: Hamza Kari (2015) Saving Bosnia on Capitol Hill: the case of
Senator Bob
Dole, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 13:1, 20-39, DOI: 10.1080/14794012.2014.
990734
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2014.990734
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the informatio
n (the
Content ) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever a
s to
the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any o
pinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the author
s,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Co
ntent
should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sour
ces
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions,
claims,
proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever
or
howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation
to or arising
out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-lic
ensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
Terms &

Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/ter

msandconditions
Downloaded by [80.80.33.195] at 12:08 09 March 2015

Journal
of
Transatlantic
Studies,
2015
Vol.
13,
No.
1,
20 39,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2014.990734

Saving
Bosnia
on
Capitol
Hill:
the
case
of
Senator
Bob
Dole
Hamza
Kari*
Faculty
of
Political
Science,
University
of
Sarajevo,
Sarajevo,
Bosnia
and
Herzegovina
(Received
13
November
2013;
accepted
13
May
2014
)
The
aim
of
this

article
is
to
analyse
the
role
played
by
former
US
Senator
Bob
Dole
in
the
formulation
of
American
foreign
policy
towards
Bosnia
from
1992
to
1995.
While
the
existing
literature
on
US
policy
during
the
war
in
Bosnia
almost
exclusively
focuses
on
the
Clinton
administration,
this
article
argues
that
the
administration
was
reacting
to
pressure
from
Senator
Dole
and
other

congressional
Bosnia
hawks.
The
article
will
provide
a
narrative
of
Senator
Dole s
activism
and
contend
that
he
was
consistently
the
most
active
senator
on
the
issue
of
Bosnia;
and
it
will
show
that
congressional
pressure
prodded
the
Clinton
administration
into
taking
a
more
forceful
policy
aimed
at
ending
the
Bosnian
war.
Keywords:
Bob
Dole;
Senate;
Congress;
Bosnia;
war

in
Bosnia;
Yugoslavia
Several
years
after
French
President
Jacques
Chirac s
June
1995
visit
to
Washington,
DC,
Richard
Holbrooke
recalled
that
Clinton:
sent
Chirac
on
an
impromptu
trip
to
Capitol
Hill
to
see
Senate
Majority
Leader
Bob
Dole
and
Speaker
Newt
Gingrich,
hoping
that
he
would
be
able
to
persuade
the
Republican
leaders
to
give
the
Administration
greater
support

on
Bosnia. 1
This
is
a
testament
to
how
far
the
executive
and
legislative
branches
had
parted
ways
on
the
issue
of
Bosnia.
In
fact,
Holbrooke,
the
chief
architect
of
the
Dayton
Peace
Accords,
wrote
later
that
congressional
efforts
by
Senators
Joseph
Lieberman,
Joe
Biden
and
Bob
Dole
to
unilaterally
lift
the
embargo
on
Bosnia
led
to
some
of
the
most

emotional
and
contentious
struggles
of
the
Clinton
Administration. 2
And
according
to
Holbrooke,
Dole
had
made
Bosnia
his
personal
project. 3
In
the
literature
on
US
policy
towards
Bosnia
during
the
1992 1995
war,
the
role
of
Senator
Bob
Dole
in
advocating
for
a
more
forceful
policy
has
been
noted;
yet,
for
the
most
part,
authors
have
focused
on
his
1995

bipartisan
legislative
proposal
the
Dole Lieberman
bill
that
sought
to
unilaterally
lift
the
arms
embargo
on
Bosnia.4
But
this
legislation
represented
the
culmination
of
Senator
Dole s
active
involvement
on
the
issue
of
Bosnia
since
the
beginning
of
the
conflict.
This
article
seeks
to
trace
Dole s
Bosnia
policy
activism
throughout
the
Bosnian
war
and,
based
primarily
on
the
archives
of

the
Robert
J.
Dole
Institute
of
Politics
at
the
University
of
Kansas,
*Email:
karcich@fpn.unsa.ba
This
article
is
dedicated
to
my
parents
Hamida
and
Fikret
Kari.

2015
Board
of
Transatlantic
Studies

Journal
of
Transatlantic
Studies
21
will
provide
a
narrative
of
how
this
activism
shaped
US
policy
towards
Bosnia
from
the
dissolution
of
Yugoslavia
until
the
crafting
of
the
Dayton
Peace
Accords.
By
the
time
the
Bosnian
war
raged
in
the
early
1990s,
Senator
Bob
Dole
already
had
a
distinguished
legislative
career
behind
him.
Born
in

1923,
the
Kansas
Republican
was
first
elected
to
Congress
in
1960
and
to
the
US
Senate
in
1968,
where
he
served
until
1996.
He
was
chairman
of
the
Republican
National
Committee
in
1971
and1972
and
was
President
Gerald
Ford s
running
mate
in
1976.
Dole
was
also
the
longest-serving
Republican
leader
in
the
Senate,
having
first
been
elected
as
majority
leader

in
1984
a
position
he
held
from
1985
to
1987
and
again
from
1995
to
1996
and
serving
as
minority
leader
in
the
interim,
from
1987
to
1995.
A
senator
with
presidential
ambitions,
he
ran
in
the
Republican
primary
in
1988
and
became
the
Republican
nominee
in
1996.
To
campaign
full-time
for
the
presidency,
Dole
resigned
from
the

Senate
in
June
1996.
His
advocacy
for
Bosnia
throughout
the
1992 1995
war
and
his
increasing
criticism
of
the
Clinton
administration s
handling
of
Bosnia
threatened
to
spill
over
into
the
1996
presidential
race.
For
the
Democratic
incumbent,
resolving
the
Bosnian
conflict
prior
to
the
1996
election
seemed
politically
prudent.
For
Bob
Dole,
Bosnia
was
not
simply
a
political
issue
to
be

exploited;
indeed,
his
interest
in
the
Balkans
dated
as
far
back
as
the
mid-1980s.
The
collapse
of
Yugoslavia
As
the
process
of
Yugoslavia s
demise
began
to
unfold
in
the
early
1990s,
the
Republican
administration
of
George
H.
W.
Bush
was
also
coping
with
the
dissolution
of
the
Soviet
Union,
the
unification
of
Germany,
the
democratisation
of

Eastern
Europe,
and
a
host
of
other
foreign
policy
challenges.
In
the
wake
of
this
geostrategic
realignment,
the
future
direction
of
US
foreign
policy
had
yet
to
be
clearly
articulated.
The
Republican
Party
itself
comprised
several
factions,
with
antiinterventionists
like
Pat
Buchanan
arguing
for
US
disengagement
from
global
commitments,
realists
calling
for
action
where
national
interest
was
at
stake
and

nationalists
who
remained
focused
on
domestic
issues.5
Top
officials
in
the
Bush
administration
including
James
Baker,
Brent
Scowcroft
and
Dick
Cheney
were
all
realists
who
were
sceptical
of
interventions
in
strategically
peripheral
regions,
and
in
their
view,
Yugoslavia
was
precisely
that.
In
fact,
Baker
was
quoted
as
saying
that
the
USA
had
no
dog
in
this
fight.
The
realist
views

of
the
administration
notwithstanding,
pressure
did
build
over
time
for
action
to
be
taken
in
both
Bosnia
and
Somalia.
In
a
pre-election
year,
the
reluctance
of
the
administration
to
get
involved
in
a
potential
quagmire
seemed
practical,
and
the
only
substantial
policy
implemented
by
the
administration
was
the
establishment
of
a
no-fly
zone
over
Bosnia.6
Though
his
party

was
in
power
in
Washington,
Senator
Bob
Dole
soon
distanced
himself
from
the
Bush
administration s
cautious
approach
to
Yugoslavia,
and
the
Kansas
Republican
stood
out
in
Congress
for
his
interest
in
the
Balkans.
The
senator,
himself
a
Second
World
War
veteran,
had
been
following
human
rights
issues
in
Yugoslavia
since
1986.
His
focus
had
been
on
violations
of
human
rights

of
Albanians
in
the
country,7
and
his
previous
exposure
to
Yugoslavia
left
him
well
positioned
to
understand
the
nuances
of
Yugoslav
politics
and
the
federation s
path
to
disintegration.

22
H.
Kari
As
one
of
its
first
policies
towards
Yugoslavia,
the
Congress
adopted
the
Nickles
Amendment
in
1990
as
part
of
the
Foreign
Operations,
Export
Financing
and
Related
Programs
Appropriations
Act
of
1991,
which
became
Public
Law
101 513
on
5
November
1990.8
The
legislation
called
for
the
termination
of
aid
to
Yugoslavia
if
certain
human
rights

abuses
were
not
addressed,
and
implementation
of
sanctions
began
on
5
May
1991.
But
less
than
three
weeks
later,
Secretary
of
State
James
Baker
suspended
sanctions,
declaring
that
Yugoslavia
was
respecting
Helsinki
Accord
principles.
The
Nickles
Amendment
mandated
that
financial
appropriations
could
not
be
used
to
provide
direct
aid
to
Yugoslavia
and
US
representatives
in
international
financial
institutions
were
also

instructed
not
to
support
the
provision
of
such
aid.
The
legislation
was
not
to
apply
to
those
Yugoslav
republics
that
had
conducted
free
and
fair
elections.9
Senator
Dole
had
taken
an
active
role
in
promoting
these
measures,
writing
to
his
colleagues
in
the
Subcommittee
on
Foreign
Operations
and
in
the
Appropriations
Committee
beginning
in
October
1990,
urging
them
to
support

the
legislation,10
which
had
been
introduced
by
Senators
Donald
Nickles
and
Alfonse
D'Amato.11
As
the
Bush
administration
prepared
to
reinstate
aid
in
late
May
1991,
Dole
and
Nickles
wrote
to
President
George
H.W.
Bush
to
express
their
opposition,
stating
that
provisions
of
the
law
conditionalising
the
possible
resumption
of
aid
had
not
been
fulfilled.12
Dole
continued
to
advocate

this
policy
approach
in
March
1991
when
he
published
an
op-ed
in
which
he
argued
that
foreign
aid
represented
a
tool
for
supporting
democracy
and
freedom.
He
wrote
that
he
had
introduced
legislation
providing
for
direct
aid
to
those
republics
on
the
road
to
democracy,
while
at
the
same
time
denying
aid
to
communist
central
governments
in
Belgrade
and
Moscow.

He
warned
that
the
situation
in
Yugoslavia
was
worsening
and
pointed
out
that,
of
the
six
federal
Yugoslav
republics,
Bosnia
and
three
others
had
held
free
elections.
He
ended
the
article
by
declaring
that
this
is
no
time
to
be
rewarding
Belgrade
with
American
taxpayer
dollars. 13
In
April
1991,
the
Senate
adopted
resolution
S.Res.106
introduced
by
Senator
Dole,

calling
on
the
Yugoslav
president
and
army
to
cease
the
use
of
force
against
Bosnia
and
other
federal
republics.
The
resolution
reflected
the
Senate s
majority
view
that
US
policy
should
be
based
on
human
rights
for
all
in
Yugoslavia.14
After
the
adoption
of
the
resolution,
Dole
wrote
to
Bosnian
President
Alija
Izetbegovic
informing
him
of
the
Senate s
vote.
In
his

letter,
Dole
stated
that
the
resolution
did
not
take
a
stand
on
the
future
of
Yugoslavia
but
did
take
a
stand
against
the
Yugoslav
army
using
coercion
and
force
against
Bosnia
and
other
federal
republics.15
As
the
situation
in
Yugoslavia
deteriorated,
Secretary
of
State
James
Baker
visited
Belgrade
on
21
June
1991.
He
was
to
write
in
his

memoirs
that
the
purpose
of
his
visit
was
to
convey
a
message
that
would
try
to
shock
the
various
republic
leaders
into
accepting
two
basic
realities:
that
they
needed
to
negotiate
their
differences,
not
act
unilaterally;
and
that
under
no
circumstances
would
the
international
community
tolerate
the
use
of
force. 16
Several
days
prior
to
this
visit,
Dole
sent
Baker
a

letter
commending
him
on
the
decision
to
make
an
appearance
in
Yugoslavia.
Dole
wrote
that
it
was
his
and
the
Senate s
view
that
it
would
be
wrong
to
undermine
those
democratic
forces
within
the
country
who
are
seeking
to
achieve
alternative
structures
of
government. 17
His
aim
was
to
emphasise
that
those

Journal
of
Transatlantic
Studies
23
Yugoslav
federal
republics
which
were
on
the
path
to
democratisation
should
not
be
undermined
in
the
name
of
maintaining
Yugoslav
unity
at
any
cost.
The
following
month,
Dole
wrote
to
President
Bush
stating
that
the
situation
in
Yugoslavia
was
worsening.
He
urged
Bush
to
take
steps
to
pressure,
and
if

necessary
compel,
the
Yugoslav
army
to
halt
its
aggression ,
and
he
recommended
that
Bush
personally
appeal
to
Soviet
leader
Mikhail
Gorbachev
to
use
his
influence
with
the
Yugoslav
Government
to
end
all
military
operations,
to
establish
a
NATO
peacekeeping
force,
and
to
call
for
a
Security
Council
meeting
to
consider
a
UN
peacekeeping
force.18
In
August
1991,
Senator
Dole
again

wrote
to
President
Bush,
this
time
together
with
13
of
his
Senate
colleagues,
to
draw
the
president s
attention
to
the
situation
in
Yugoslavia.
They
urged
him
to
send
a
special
envoy
to
the
country.19
National
Security
Advisor
Brent
Scowcroft
replied
stating,
We
believe
it
is
critical
that
our
immediate
focus
be
in
support
of
EC
efforts
in
Yugoslavia.20
In
September,

Dole
wrote
another
letter
to
President
Bush,
again
urging
him
to
send
a
special
envoy
to
Yugoslavia
to
provide
US
leadership,
and
he
asserted
that
allowing
the
European
Community
to
take
the
lead
on
Yugoslavia
had
not
produced
conclusive
positive
results. 21
By
November
of
that
year,
Senator
Dole
sought
to
impose
punitive
measures
on
Serbia
for
its
role

in
Yugoslavia s
descent
into
chaos.
He
signed
a
letter,
along
with
seven
other
senators,
addressed
to
fellow
lawmakers
and
stating
that
the
situation
in
Yugoslavia
had
become
a
war,
that
the
efforts
of
the
European
Community
had
been
ineffective,
and
that
the
USA
must
become
actively
involved.
The
authors
stated
that
the
Yugoslav
army
was
controlled
by
Serbian
strongman
Slobodan

Milosevic,
who
they
described
him
as
the
last
hardline
communist
leader
in
Europe.
These
senators
felt
that
the
USA
had
to
send
a
clear
message
to
Milosevic
and
that
their
legislative
measure
S.1793
was
geared
to
this
end
by
forbidding
US
assistance
to
Serbia
and
the
parts
of
Yugoslavia
under
Serbian
control,
and
putting
an
end
to
US-facilitated
multinational
aid,

air
travel
and
all
trade
unless
the
president
certified
that
Serbia
had
ended
armed
conflict,
respected
internal
borders
and
ceased
all
human
rights
abuses.22
The
Bush
administration
and
Bosnia
The
European
Economic
Community
decided
in
December
1991
to
recognise
the
independence
of
former
Yugoslav
republics
Slovenia
and
Croatia.
Bosnian
leadership
faced
two
choices:
to
remain
part

of
a
Serbian-dominated
Yugoslavia
or
to
opt
for
independence.
The
choice
was
clear.
The
Bosnian
referendum
on
independence
was
held
on
29
February
and
1
March
1992.
Despite
the
Serbian
Democratic
Party s
campaign
to
discourage
Bosnian
Serbs
from
voting,
the
turnout
was
approximately
64%,
with
overwhelming
support
in
favour
of
independence.23
On
6
April,
the
EEC
recognised
Bosnia,
followed
by

US
recognition
the
next
day.
The
Yugoslav
National
Army
(JNA)
and
Serb
paramilitaries
in
Bosnia
commenced
their
genocidal
war.
In
the
last
year
of
the
Bush
administration,
Senator
Dole
continued
to
advocate
for
a
stronger
US
role
in
ending
the
conflict
and
pushed
for
punitive
measures
against
Serbia
for
its
role
in
the
violence.
He
framed
the
debate

by
representing
the
nature
of
the
conflict
in
Bosnia
as
one
of
aggression
and
genocide
and
his
press
statements
from
the
period
are
marked
by
this
terminology.
His
critique
of
the
Western
approach
to
Bosnia
was
marked
by
references
to
appeasement.

24
H.
Kari
Senator
Dole s
advocacy
for
Bosnia
was
not
a
matter
of
partisan
politics.
He
had
been
calling
for
more
vigorous
policy
during
the
Republican
Bush
administration
and
continued
this
advocacy
into
President
Clinton s
first
term.
Indeed,
the
domestic
US
debate
over
Bosnia
cut
across
party
lines.
Interventionists
comprised
both
former
doves
like
Congressman
Frank
McCloskey

and
neoconservatives
such
as
Richard
Perle.
The
anti-interventionist
camp
similarly
comprised
both
Democrats
and
Republicans.
As
the
Bush
administration
proceeded
to
diplomatically
isolate
Serbia,
Senator
Bob
Dole
and
Democratic
Senator
George
Mitchell
wrote
to
Russian
President
Boris
Yeltsin
on
11
May
1992
to
express
their
dismay
that
Russia
supported
Serbia
in
the
Conference
on
Security
and
Cooperation
in

Europe
and
that
it
recognised
the
new
Yugoslavia.
We
find
Russia's
recognition
and
support
for
the
present
Serbian
government
indefensible,
they
wrote,
and
they
urged
Yeltsin
to
refrain
from
establishing
diplomatic
relations
with
Serbia
until
Serbia
began
respecting
Helsinki
Accord
principles.24
In
a
letter
to
President
Bush
written
the
next
day,
Dole
and
12
of
his
Senate
colleagues
supported
the

President s
decision
to
recall
the
US
ambassador
in
Belgrade
and
encouraged
efforts
to
expel
the
then
rump
Yugoslavia
from
the
CSCE.
They
argued
again
that
the
USA
should
play
a
more
active
role
in
Bosnia.
Specifically,
the
senators
raised
the
idea
of
the
establishment
of
a
security
zone
around
the
Bosnian
capital
of
Sarajevo
to
allow
for
the
functioning
of

the
Bosnian
state.25
In
late
May
1992,
in
a
Commencement
Address
he
delivered
at
Sterling
College
in
Kansas,
Dole
called
for
a
total
economic
blockade
of
Serbia,
a
freeze
of
Serbia s
assets
in
the
USA
and
across
the
globe,
and
a
suspension
of
all
diplomatic
relations
with
Serbia.
He
further
called
for
the
USA
to
take
the
lead
in
diplomatic

efforts
to
move
peacekeepers
into
Bosnia.26
In
September
1992,
Senators
Dole
and
Biden
introduced
bipartisan
legislation
that
provided
for
US
military
assistance
not
exceeding
$50
million
in
equipment
to
be
made
available
to
the
Bosnian
Government
once
the
embargo
was
lifted.27
This
was
the
first
legislative
initiative
aimed
at
providing
military
assistance
to
Bosnia,
and
it
was
conditional

on
the
preparedness
of
US
allies
to
join
in
such
an
assistance
effort.28
Though
it
was
dependent
on
the
lifting
of
the
embargo,
this
legislation
was
to
herald
a
series
of
legislative
initiatives
with
a
similar
policy
aim;
and
by
the
end
of
1992,
Dole
had
come
to
the
conclusion
that
lifting
the
embargo
was
the
best
policy.
The
UN

arms
embargo
imposed
on
Yugoslavia
in
1991
had
remained
in
place
after
Bosnia s
independence,
depriving
Bosnia
of
its
right
to
self-defence.
The
embargo
had
frozen
the
military
advantage
in
favour
of
Serbia
and
the
Bosnian
Serbs.
Efforts
to
lift
the
arms
embargo
soon
became
the
focus
of
Congress
as
it
formulated
US
policy
towards
Bosnia.
On
17
December

1992,
Dole
and
12
other
senators
wrote
to
President
Bush
stating
that
the
genocide
of
the
people
of
Bosnia
is
continuing
we
believe
that
the
UN
arms
embargo
against
Bosnia
must
now
be
lifted.
While
they
lauded
humanitarian
effort
and
sanctions
against
Serbia,
they
also
felt
that
allowing
Bosnians
to
defend
themselves
was
critical.
In
a
dramatic
tone,
the

senators
wrote,
What
is
at
stake
is
the
survival
of
an
entire
nation. 29
Thus
began
a
three-year
congressional
campaign
aimed
at
allowing
the
Bosnian
Government
to
defend
its
people
and
territory.
At
the
end
of
that
year,
Dole
published
an
open
letter
to
Milosevic
in
which
he
stated
that
Milosevic
had
been
pursuing
the
dream
of
a
Greater

Serbia
and
that
this

Journal
of
Transatlantic
Studies
25
had
resulted
in
genocide
in
Bosnia.
He
called
for
air
strikes
against
Serbia s
military
assets
if
Milosevic
did
not
end
the
bloodshed
in
Bosnia.
The
fate
of
Hitler s
Germany
awaits
you
and
Serbia,
wrote
Dole.30
Dole s
efforts
to
shape
US
policy
on
Bosnia
were
assisted
in
no
small
part
by

his
foreign
policy
adviser
Mira
Baratta.31
Of
Croatian
ancestry,
Baratta
was
prescient
on
a
number
of
policy
issues
as
they
evolved.
The
Dole
Library
archive
shows
that
as
early
as
late
August
1992
long
before
the
failure
of
the
London
Peace
Conference
was
evident
Baratta
had
written
to
the
senator
that
principles
espoused
in
London
were
worthy,
but

that
the
absence
of
starting
dates
and
deadlines
for
their
implementation
and
the
fact
that
there
were
no
enforcement
mechanisms
were
problems.32
Barratta
was
to
remain
Dole s
adviser
through
1995.
The
Clinton
administration
and
Bosnia
With
Democrats
in
power
in
Washington,
the
Republican
Party
found
itself
in
disarray
on
foreign
policy.
The
GOP
opposed
Clinton
on

a
number
of
issues
but
had
yet
to
formulate
and
articulate
an
alternative
foreign
policy
vision.
Officially,
the
party
opted
for
unilateralism;
but
in
fact,
Republicans
comprised
realists,
nationalists,
interventionists
and
anti-interventionists
with
sometimes
very
divergent
views.
Realists
put
forth
arguments
for
the
selective
use
of
US
force
for
strategic
national
interests.
Humanitarian
interventions
were
frowned
upon.
Nationalists
were
sceptical

of
international
institutions
and
called
for
a
freer
hand
in
foreign
policy,
as
they
saw
institutions
and
treaties
as
hampering
an
assertion
of
US
power.
Interventionists
argued
for
US
military
dominance
in
the
world
and
viewed
the
USA
as
crucial
for
achieving
international
order;
they
were
supportive
of
US
interventions
on
the
global
periphery
because
they
viewed
them
as
crucial

for
maintaining
US
credibility
on
the
world
stage.
This
group
frequently
found
itself
outnumbered
within
its
own
party.
Lastly,
there
were
anti-interventionists
who
called
for
US
disengagement
from
its
global
role.33
Disunity
in
the
Republican
Party
on
foreign
affairs
was
illustrated
in
the
variety
of
positions
party
members
promoted
on
the
question
of
Bosnia.
While
Dole
argued
for

lifting
the
embargo
and
arming
the
Bosnian
Government,
Senator
John
McCain
opposed
this
on
the
grounds
that
such
an
intervention
would
lead
to
a
quagmire.
The
1994
congressional
elections
ushered
in
the
first
Republican
majority
in
40
years
and
a
new
class
of
freshmen
legislators,
but
most
of
whom
had
little
interest
in
foreign
policy.
The
GOP s
Contract
with
America

had,
after
all,
been
primarily
focused
on
domestic
issues.34
These
differences
among
Republicans
further
crystallised
the
internationalist
and
interventionist
role
played
by
Dole.
His
public
pronouncements
on
the
rationale
for
US
intervention
in
Bosnia
consistently
underscored
the
implications
of
non-intervention
for
US
credibility
and
its
repercussions
on
the
international
order.
Upon
assuming
office,
Clinton
inherited
a
US
and

Western
policy
towards
Bosnia
that
had
been
left
to
the
Europeans
to
shape.
It
included
deployment
of
a
UN
peacekeeping
force,
sanctions
on
Serbia
and
criticism
of
Serb
atrocities.
It
was
clear
that,
absent
US
engagement,
the
conflict
in
Bosnia
would
be
a
protracted
one.35
Former
British
Prime
Minister
John
Major
wrote
in
his
memoirs
that
following
Clinton s
election
victory

in
November
1992,
the
USA
and
Britain
differed
on
two
issues
Northern
Ireland
and
Bosnia.
Indeed,
Major
recalled
that:

26
H.
Kari
the
conflict
in
Bosnia
was
a
preoccupation
on
both
sides
of
the
Atlantic.
For
two
years
it
remained
a
running
sore
between
us.
The
most
strident
criticism
of
our
policy
came
from
American
Senate
and
Congressional
hawks,
who
were
both
keen
to
dictate
policy
and
unwilling
to
deploy
American
serviceman
to
Bosnia,
where
they

would
face
the
hazards
that
confronted
European
troops.36
The
Bosnian
crisis
occurred
in
the
immediate
post-Cold
War
period
as
the
both
the
European
Community
and
NATO
were
in
the
process
of
transformation.
The
European
Community
was
in
the
last
stages
of
evolving
into
the
European
Union;
and
in
the
midst
of
early
confidence
among
Europeans
that
they
could

manage
Yugoslavia s
disintegration,
Luxembourg s
foreign
minister
Jacques
Poos
declared
that
if
anyone
can
do
anything
here,
it
is
the
EC. 37
It
was
soon
evident,
though,
that
the
European
Community
was
ill-equipped
to
respond
adequately
to
the
crisis
in
Bosnia.
And
NATO,
too,
was
faced
with
a
changing
strategic
landscape
in
Europe.
Events
since
1989
had
ushered
in
a
new
approach

by
NATO
to
Central
and
Eastern
Europe.
In
fact,
at
a
London
summit
in
July
1990,
NATO
invited
Central
and
Eastern
European
countries
and
the
Soviet
Union
to
establish
diplomatic
liaisons
with
the
Alliance.38
This
was
one
of
the
steps
towards
greater
cooperation
in
and
eventual
enlargement
of
NATO.
But
as
NATO
was
redefining
its
raison
d'etre
in
the
aftermath

of
the
Cold
War,
the
crisis
in
Bosnia
threatened
to
spill
over
into
the
rest
of
the
Balkans
region.
This
potential
scenario
had
security
implications
for
NATO,
which
led
to
the
Alliance s
involvement
in
Bosnia.
Both
the
European
Community
and
NATO
were
accustomed
to
incremental
change
during
the
Cold
War
and
their
response
to
the
Bosnian
war
exposed
the
slow

pace
at
which
they
were
able
to
adapt
to
the
conflict
in
the
former
Yugoslavia.
And,
in
the
USA,
Bosnia
was
not
the
only
foreign
policy
crisis
on
the
agenda.
The
Clinton
administration
was
faced
with
an
inherited
commitment
to
a
humanitarian
mission
in
Somalia,
made
by
the
Bush
administration
in
August
1992.
Part
of
the
reason
the

Bush
administration
had
decided
to
take
action
in
Somalia
was
due
to
pressure
from
then
Governor
Clinton
over
Bosnia.
David
Halberstam
notes
that
it
was
a
widespread
belief
at
top
levels
of
the
administration
that
deploying
troops
to
Somalia
was
Chairman
of
the
Joint
Chiefs
of
Staff
Colin
Powell s
way
of
doing
something
humanitarian
but,
equally
important,
of
not
sending

troops
to
Bosnia,
a
place
that,
as
far
as
he
was
concerned,
was
far
more
dangerous. 39
If
Senator
Dole
agreed
with
candidate
Clinton s
publicly
articulated
interventionist
policies
during
the
election
campaign,
it
did
not
take
long
for
Dole
to
criticise
the
incoming
administration
for
distancing
itself
from
those
campaign
pledges.
As
Clinton
wrote
in
his
memoirs,
he
was

faced
with
dug-in
positions
when
he
assumed
office.
I
was
reluctant
to
go
along
with
Senator
Dole
in
unilaterally
lifting
the
arms
embargo,
for
fear
of
weakening
the
United
Nations,
wrote
Clinton,
adding
that
he
was
also
not
in
favour
of
using
unilateral
airpower
that
would
strain
the
NATO
alliance.40
Since
1992,
Senator
Dole
had
been
calling
for
an
end

to
the
arms
embargo
and
use
of
air
power
against
the
Bosnian
Serb
military;
and
Democratic
congressman
Frank
McCloskey
had
been
advocating
an
identical
policy.
Bosnian
Government
officials
had
also
been
proposing
the
same
thing
for
some
time.
While
the
exact
origins
and
ownership
of
lift
and
strike
cannot
be
attributed
to
one
individual,
the
policy
was
officially
adopted
by

the
incoming
Democratic
administration
in
early

Journal
of
Transatlantic
Studies
27
1993.
John
Major
recalled
that
when
he
visited
Washington
in
February
1993,
the
American
opinion
had
become
almost
evangelical
for
the
policy
of
lift
and
strike
lifting
the
arms
embargo
and
starting
air
strikes
against
Bosnian
Serbs
which
greatly
concerned
us. 41
Former
British
Foreign
Secretary
Douglas
Hurd
was
to
write
many

years
later
that
the
American
administration
was
under
constant
pressure
from
Senator
Bob
Dole,
Margaret
Thatcher,
and
other
partisans
of
lift .42
It
was
clear
that
Dole s
advocacy
for
this
policy
option
was
starting
to
have
an
impact.
In
fact,
as
early
as
10
February
1993,
Dole
issued
a
statement
in
response
to
the
nascent
Clinton
administration s
plan

for
Bosnia.
Secretary
of
State
Warren
Christopher
had
unveiled
a
policy
that
excluded
any
military
option
for
Bosnia
and
committed
the
deployment
of
US
troops
to
Bosnia
only
if
a
comprehensive
peace
arrangement
agreed
to
by
all
sides
was
reached.
Reluctant
to
support
the
Vance-Owen
peace
proposal,
which
imagined
a
division
of
Bosnia
into
provinces,
the
administration
did
express
its

support
for
the
peace
process.43
Dole
criticised
the
administration s
plan
as
falling
short
of
candidate
Clinton s
promises
and
he
rejected
the
Vance-Owen
peace
plan
as
fundamentally
flawed. 44
The
legitimate
Bosnian
Government
and
Bosnian
Croats
agreed
to
the
VanceOwen
peace
plan
in
March
1993,
but
Bosnian
Serbs
continued
to
reject
the
plan.
Europeans
had
by
then
made
clear

to
the
US
administration
that
they
objected
to
allied
use
of
force
in
Bosnia.
And
unilateral
American
action
in
Bosnia
was
not
an
option
as
the
administration
did
not
want
to
become
solely
responsible
for
Bosnia.
The
top
ranks
of
the
administration
were
divided
on
the
use
of
force,
with
Vice
President
Al
Gore
and
US
Ambassador
to
the
UN

Madeleine
Albright
vocally
advocating
the
use
of
air
strikes.
Eventually,
on
1
May
1993,
Clinton
made
the
decision
to
adopt
the
lift
and
strike
policy
that
Senator
Dole
and
Representative
McCloskey
had
been
advocating.45
But
this
policy
was
abandoned
soon
after
because
Secretary
of
State
Warren
Christopher
failed
to
get
the
support
of
allies
in
Europe.
Why
did

the
new
Administration
fail
to
use
force
in
Bosnia
early
on?
Samantha
Power
proffered
three
reasons:
(1)
the
US
military
was
opposed
to
intervention,
(2)
the
administration s
foreign
policy
team
comprised
multilateralists
not
keen
on
acting
without
the
support
of
European
allies
and
(3)
Clinton
was
concerned
about
domestic
public
opinion.46
Further,
American
allies,
particularly
the
British
and
the
French,

had
troops
in
Bosnia
as
part
of
the
UN
force.
They
objected
to
air
strikes
on
Serb
targets
on
the
ground
that
could
lead
to
retaliation
against
their
peacekeepers;
and
they
objected
to
lifting
the
arms
embargo
on
Bosnia,
too.
According
to
Ivo
Daalder,
containment
of
the
Bosnian
conflict
rather
than
intervention
became
the
basis
of
US
policy.47
Undaunted,
Senator

Dole
was
to
champion
the
lift
and
strike
policy
and
insist
on
it
for
the
remainder
of
the
Bosnian
war.
He
also
remained
a
fierce
critic
of
the
Vance-Owen,
and
later
the
Owen-Stoltenberg,
peace
plans.
On
16
April
1993,
Dole
wrote
to
President
Clinton
urging
him
to
take
the
lead
in
providing
a
strong
response
to
the
Serbian

attack
on
Srebrenica.
Dole
pushed
for
an
ultimatum
in
eastern
Bosnia:
the
withdrawal
of
Serbian
troops
or
NATO
air
strikes.
He
argued
that
resolutions
adopted
up
to
that
point
provided
the
necessary
authorization,
and
he
emphasised
that
he
was
not
calling
for
the
deployment
of
ground
troops.
He
again
urged
Clinton
to
lift
the
embargo
against
the
Bosnian
Government.48
President

Clinton
replied
on
22
April,
stating
that
he
was
pursuing

28
H.
Kari
policies
focused
on
diplomatic
isolation
and
the
toughening
of
sanctions
but
that
other
options
remained
on
the
table.49
Later
that
month
on
30
April
1993
Dole
and
16
of
his
Senate
colleagues
wrote
once
more
to
the
president,
warning
of
the
risk
of
not
acting
to
stop
Milosevic s
aggression.
The
senators
acknowledged

that
the
Senate
had
favoured
multilateral
action
until
then
and
stated
that
they
would
support
a
Presidential
decision
to
participate
in
multinational
air
and
missile
strikes
on
Serbian
military
targets.
They
further
stated
that
these
actions
could
lead
to
a
negotiated
settlement
and
that
to
achieve
this
aim,
we
would
also
support
a
Presidential
decision
to
lift
the
arms
embargo

so
the
Bosnians
could
defend
themselves. 50
Though
supportive
of
a
more
forceful
policy
towards
Bosnia,
Congress
had
yet
to
obtain
sufficient
support
for
the
use
of
airpower;
and
one
significant
obstacle
was
the
long
shadow
of
the
Vietnam
War
and
concomitant
fears
of
a
similar
quagmire. 51
Bob
Dole s
first
legislative
proposal
to
end
the
embargo
on
Bosnia
came

in
May
1993,
only
four
months
after
the
new
administration
had
taken
over.
On
27
May
1993,
Dole
introduced
the
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Self-Defense
Act
of
1993
to
lift
the
embargo
on
Bosnia
and
authorise
up
to
$200
million
in
military
aid
to
the
Bosnian
Government.
In
a
press
statement,
Dole
emphasised
that
the
embargo
was
introduced
prior
to
Bosnia s
independence
and

prior
to
the
aggression
on
Bosnia.
He
argued
that
continued
application
of
the
embargo
continues
to
impair
Bosnia s
right
to
self-defence.
encouraging
further
aggression.
He
also
acknowledged
the
multilateral
approach
favoured
by
President
Clinton
but
criticised
the
focus
on
multilateralism
as
a
goal
in
itself.52
On
20
July
1993,
Clinton
wrote
to
Dole
stating
that
he
supported
lifting
the
arms

embargo
on
Bosnia
and
that
the
USA
supported
an
attempt
by
the
Non-Aligned
Movement
in
the
UN
to
lift
it.
The
effort
failed
to
convince
the
allies,
though,
and
Clinton
reiterated
that
the
approach
from
the
beginning
had
been
to
maintain
Western
unity
and
preserve
alliance
cohesion. 53
Serb
forces
increased
their
pressure
on
the
besieged
Bosnian
capital
of

Sarajevo
in
the
summer
of
1993,
and
Dole
concluded
by
August
of
that
year
that
the
UN
effort
in
Bosnia
was
futile.
NATO
involvement
in
Bosnia,
which
began
with
the
enforcement
of
the
no-fly
zone
in
April
1993,
appeared
to
offer
a
more
promising
avenue
for
ending
the
conflict.
On
6
August
1993,
when
the
Bosnian
capital
was
on
the

verge
on
falling,
Dole
issued
a
statement
pressing
NATO
to
act
and
declaring
that
the
Alliance
had
the
authority
to
do
so,
based
on
Article
51
of
the
UN
charter.
He
claimed
that
NATO s
credibility
was
on
the
line
and
said
that
only
NATO,
and
not
the
UN,
could
do
the
job.
He
criticised
the
Owen
and
Stoltenberg-led
peace
talks

and
called
on
Clinton
to
reconsider
his
position
on
the
Geneva
talks.54
Lift
by
legislation
Dole
had
tested
the
congressional
waters
on
Bosnia
with
the
resolution
he
introduced
in
May
1993
to
lift
the
embargo.
Having
failed
to
garner
sufficient
support
for
this
legislation,
he
stepped
up
his
efforts
in
1994.
His
next
aim
was
to

put
the
Senate
on
the
record
as
supporting
this
policy
goal.
On
27
January
1994,
the
Senate
adopted
an
amendment
(S.AMDT.1281)
introduced
by
Dole,
which
stated
that
Serbia
was
directly
involved
in
the
conflict
in
Bosnia
and
had
been
supporting
irregular
forces
in
the
country.
It
further
stated
that
Bosnia
had
been
unable
to
defend
itself
due
to
the
international

arms
embargo
and
that
the
Bosnian
Government
had
the
right,
under

Journal
of
Transatlantic
Studies
29
Article
51
of
the
UN
Charter,
to
seek
assistance
for
self-defence.
The
amendment
expressed
the
sense
of
the
Senate
that
the
US
embargo
on
Bosnia
should
be
lifted
and
stipulated
that
the
president
should
not
only
terminate
the
embargo
upon
receipt
of
such
a
request
from
the
Bosnian
Government
but
that
he

should
also
provide
military
assistance
to
Bosnia
if
requested.
The
amendment
was
adopted
in
the
Senate
by
a
vote
of
87 9.55
This
was
to
be
a
first
and
symbolic
legislative
victory
for
Dole
on
the
issue
of
Bosnia.
Buoyed
by
the
success
of
this
amendment
in
early
1994,
in
April,
Dole
introduced
a
bill
to
lift
the
arms

embargo.
The
proposed
legislation
had
33
cosponsors
and
reflected
the
January
amendment
by
stipulating
once
again
that
the
president
should
terminate
the
embargo
after
receiving
a
request
from
Bosnia
for
assistance
with
self-defence,
under
Article
51
of
the
UN
Charter.56
In
a
statement
to
the
press
on
21
April
1994,
Dole
said
that
he
was
authoring
bipartisan
legislation,
along
with

Senator
Joe
Lieberman,
to
lift
the
embargo.
Clinton s
announcement
of
a
new
initiative
to
expand
the
use
of
NATO
air
power
to
protect
safe
havens
in
Bosnia
notwithstanding,
Dole
wrote
that:
now
is
the
time
to
strengthen
the
President's
hand
by
letting
the
British,
the
French,
and
the
Russians
who
have
objected
to
lifting
the
embargo
on

Bosnia
know
that
the
US
Congress
fully
supports
going
it
alone
if
necessary
because
this
embargo
has
no
legal
basis
and
is
unjust.
In
other
words,
Dole
saw
his
legislation
as
leverage
that
Clinton
could
use
in
discussions
with
allies
who
opposed
lifting
the
embargo.
Dole
pointed
out
that
his
proposal
went
further
than
my
earlier
amendment

and
mandates
a
termination
of
the
US
arms
embargo,
adding
that
the
best
way
to
ensure
that
US
forces
will
not
be
sent
on
the
ground
to
fight
this
war
for
the
Bosnians
is
to
lift
the
embargo
and
give
them
the
means
to
fight
it
themselves. 57
Senator
George
Mitchell,
who
had
worked
with
the
administration
to
put
together
an

alternative
proposal,
offered
an
amendment
which
stipulated
that
the
USA
would
act
multilaterally,
through
the
UN
Security
Council,
to
lift
the
embargo.58
Bosnian
Prime
Minister
Haris
Silajdzic
had
written
in
early
May
to
both
Senators
Dole
and
Lieberman
on
the
eve
of
the
vote
on
their
legislation.
Silajdzic
wrote
that
the
hopes
of
the
Bosnian
people
are
turned

to
the
United
States
Senate ,
and
argued
that
peace
was
not
possible
without
a
balance
of
power.
He
said
that
the
Bosnian
Government
had
participated
in
all
peace
talks
but
that
the
illegal
embargo
prevented
the
country
from
defending
itself.
Since
the
embargo
had
failed
to
end
the
war,
Silajdzic
urged
a
change
of
course.59
Interestingly,
both
the
Dole
and

Mitchell
amendments
were
agreed
to
in
the
Senate,
by
a
vote
of
50 49.
The
Washington
Post
observed
that
the
contradictory
messages
communicated
by
the
adoption
of
these
two
different
legislative
proposals
were
a
testament
to
the
Senate s
ambivalence
about
US
policy
towards
Bosnia.
Still,
the
Senate
was
in
favour
of
lifting
the
embargo
even
if
it
had
not
reached
consensus

on
how
to
achieve
it.60
It
was
in
the
summer
of
1994
that
Senator
Dole
paid
a
visit
to
Bosnia,
his
only
one
during
the
war.
In
Europe
to
mark
the
Normandy
commemoration,
his
congressional
delegation
visited
the
Bosnian
capital
in
early
June.
Along
with
Senators
John
Warner
and
Joe
Biden,
Dole
met
with
President
Alija
Izetbegovic
and

other
high-ranking
Bosnian
officials.
Dole
declared
that
it
was
incomprehensible
that

30
H.
Kari
ethnic
cleansing
and
genocide
were
taking
place
in
Europe
at
the
end
of
the
twentieth
century.61
Following
his
visit,
Dole
wrote
to
Izetbegovic,
saying
that
he
was
deeply
moved
by
the
courage
of
the
Sarajevans
he
met
during
his
visit.62
A
change
in
tactics
Following
the
failure
of
his
April

bill
to
inspire
concrete
action,
Dole
opted
for
a
new
legislative
tactic:
to
attach
his
amendment
to
larger
binding
legislation.
On
24
June
1994,
Senator
Dole
proposed
such
an
amendment,
which
provided
that
the
president
would
terminate
the
embargo
on
Bosnia.
Dole s
measure
was
supported
once
again
by
Senator
Lieberman.
The
amendment
was
to
the
National
Defence
Authorization
Act
for

Fiscal
Year
1995.
In
view
of
Clinton s
pledge
to
veto
legislation
demanding
unilateral
lifting
of
the
embargo,
Dole
attached
his
amendment
to
the
defence
authorization
bill
because
he
knew
it
would
be
difficult
for
Clinton
to
veto
the
entire
bill.
On
1
July
1994,
the
amendment
did
not
pass
the
Senate,
with
a
split
vote
of
50
50.63

Senator
Sam
Nunn
had
offered
a
counter
amendment
on
26
June
1994,
stating
that
Congress
supported
a
multilateral
lifting
of
the
embargo
but
that
a
unilateral
lifting
of
it
would
result
in
several
unwanted
consequences,
including
disruption
of
Contact
Group
peace
efforts,
withdrawal
of
NATO
troops
from
Yugoslavia,
and
damage
to
NATO,
and
that
it
would
negatively
affect
the
cooperation

of
other
states
in
the
enforcement
of
other
sanctions.
The
amendment
provided
that
the
lifting
of
the
embargo
would
be
undertaken
if
the
Bosnian
Serb
side
refused
to
accept
the
Contact
Group
peace
proposal
or
that
a
partial
lifting
would
take
place
if
Bosnian
Serbs
attacked
the
UN
safe
areas
while
the
peace
proposal
was
being
discussed.
According
to
the

Washington
Post,
on
23
June,
military
officials
from
Denmark,
Britain,
France
and
Spain
testified
before
the
Senate
Armed
Services
Committee
and
urged
Congress
not
to
unilaterally
lift
the
embargo
on
Bosnia.
They
argued
that
such
a
move
would
escalate
the
violence
and
affect
the
enforcement
of
other
embargoes.
Later
that
day,
Bosnia s
member
of
the
presidency,
Ejup
Ganic,
testified
as

well,
arguing
that
the
embargo
was
imposed
on
the
former
Yugoslavia
but
had
left
newly
independent
Bosnia
defenceless.
He
also
stated
that
the
UN
safe
areas
were
in
fact
the
most
unsafe
places
in
the
country.
Ganic
emphasised
that
he
was
not
calling
for
the
deployment
of
US
troops
but
simply
wanted
to
be
allowed
to
defend
Bosnia.64
According
to

the
New
York
Times,
the
Clinton
administration
had
already
been
conducting
a
furious
diplomatic
and
lobbying
campaign
aimed
at
heading
off
Senator
Dole s
legislation
for
a
unilateral
lifting
of
the
embargo;
and
the
administration
threw
its
support
behind
Senator
Nunn s
legislative
proposal
instead.65
The
amendment
was
passed
by
a
vote
of
52 48.
Phone
calls
by
President
Clinton
and
Vice
President

Al
Gore
to
various
senators
to
garner
support
for
Nunn s
amendment
had
apparently
been
effective.66
But
Senator
Dole
pressed
on,
and
on
8
August
1994,
he
introduced
another
amendment
on
behalf
of
11
other
senators,
including
Lieberman,
McCain,
Moynihan,
DeConcini
and
Helms
(No.
2479),
which
stated
that:
the
President
shall
terminate
the
United
States
arms
embargo

of
the
Government
of
Bosnia
and
Herzegovina
no
later
than
November
15,
1994
so
that
the
Government
may
exercise
its
right
of
self-defence
under
Article
51
of
the
United
Nations
Charter.

Journal
of
Transatlantic
Studies
31
Then,
on
10
August
1994,
Nunn
introduced
his
own
amendment
on
behalf
of
four
other
senators
(No.
2524),
which
sought
to
initiate
a
process
to
lift
the
embargo
on
Bosnia.
Known
as
the
Nunn Mitchell
amendment,
the
legislation
provided
for
the
administration
to
introduce
an
embargo-lifting
resolution
in
the
UN
Security
Council
if

Bosnian
Serbs
failed
to
accept
the
Contact
Group
peace
proposal
within
a
specified
period
of
time.
In
the
case
that
the
Security
Council
failed
to
vote
on
the
resolution
and
Bosnian
Serbs
refused
to
accept
the
Contact
Group
plan,
then:
None
of
the
funds
available
to
the
Department
of
Defence
for
any
fiscal
year
shall
thereafter
be
used

for
the
purpose
of
participation
in,
support
for,
or
assistance
to
the
enforcement
of
the
arms
embargo
on
the
Government
of
Bosnia
and
Hercegovina 67
In
a
letter
to
Senator
Nunn,
Clinton
reaffirmed
his
commitment
to
ending
the
arms
embargo
on
Bosnia.
I
believe
lifting
the
embargo
unilaterally
would
have
serious
implications
going
well
beyond
the
conflict
in
Bosnia

itself,
wrote
Clinton,
pointing
out
that
such
an
approach
would
disrupt
the
ongoing
negotiation
process,
strain
relations
with
European
allies,
adversely
affect
NATO
cohesiveness
and
damage
relations
with
Russia.
He
committed
his
administration
to
introducing
a
Security
Council
resolution
on
lifting
the
embargo
if
Bosnian
Serbs
did
not
accept
Contact
Group
proposal
by
mid-October
of
that
year.
He
also
indicated

that
he
would
consult
with
Congress
on
unilaterally
lifting
the
embargo
if
the
Security
Council
failed
to
pass
such
a
resolution.68
Steven
Greenhouse
of
The
New
York
Times
quoted
administration
officials
as
saying
that
it
was
under
intense
pressure
from
Capitol
Hill
that
Clinton
set
a
deadline
to
discourage
Congress
from
supporting
the
unilateral
lifting
of
the
embargo. 69

Dole s
latest
amendment
to
the
defence
appropriations
bill
was
adopted
on
11
August
in
the
Senate
by
a
58 42
vote.
In
addition
to
37
Republicans,
21
Democrats
voted
for
the
amendment,
revealing
the
bipartisan
nature
of
support
for
the
proposal.
The
Nunn Mitchell
amendment
was
also
passed,
by
a
56 44
vote,
with
the
support
of
46
Democrats
and
10
Republicans.
Finally,

in
early
November
1994,
the
Clinton
administration
announced
that
it
had
ordered
the
military
to
end
its
participation
in
the
enforcement
of
the
arms
embargo
on
the
Bosnian
Government.70
In
his
memoirs,
Clinton
wrote
that
on
10
November
1994,
he
announced
that
the
United
States
would
no
longer
enforce
the
arms
embargo
in
Bosnia.
The
move
had
strong
support
in

Congress
and
was
necessary
because
the
Serbs
had
resumed
their
aggression 71
In
fact,
this
decision
was
imposed
on
the
administration
by
Congress
and
was
strongly
influenced
by
the
sustained
campaigning
of
Senator
Dole
on
the
issue.
The
decision
not
to
enforce
the
embargo,
as
Ivo
H.
Daalder
put
it,
came
about
because
Clinton
agreed
to
this
action
in

negotiations
with
Congress
in
order
to
prevent
passage
of
a
law
that
would
have
unilaterally
lifted
the
embargo 72
The
Nunn Mitchell
amendment
was
therefore
adopted
to
stave
off
Dole s
far
more
sweeping
legislative
proposal.
Daalder
observed
that
Congress
had
succeeded
in
forcing
an
end
to
US
enforcement
of
the
embargo ,73
and
Michael
Haltzel,
a
former
adviser
to
Senator
Joseph
Biden,
singled

out
the
Nunn Mitchell
amendment
as
one
of
the
most
important
congressional
decisions
on
US
policy
towards
Bosnia.74
Analysts
have
pointed
to
the
implications
of
this
congressional
pressure
on
transatlantic
relations.
The
congressional
decision
to
cut
off
funds
for
embargo

32
H.
Kari
enforcement
severely
damaged
the
trans-Atlantic
bond
that
is
the
basis
of
the
North
Atlantic
Alliance,
asserted
Frederick
Bonnart.75
George
Melloan
wrote
that
a
quarrel
between
US
and
European
allies
erupted:
when
the
Clinton
administration
on
Nov
11
refused
to
further
enforce
the
UN
arms
embargo
with
regard
to
any
weapons
destined
for

the
Bosnian
government.
Congress
had
demanded
this
because
of
rising
disgust
in
America
over
an
embargo
that
mainly
handicaps
the
war's
victims.
As
Melloan
pointed
out,
European
shock
over
this
decision
was
surprising
unless
they
thought
Bill
Clinton
would
ignore
Congress. 76
The
new
majority
leader s
first
order
of
business
The
legislative
proposals
introduced
by

Senator
Dole
had
kept
attention
on
Bosnia
on
Capitol
Hill
and
beyond.
However,
it
was
with
the
Republican
victory
in
the
November
1994
congressional
elections
that
pro-intervention
voices
on
the
Hill
gained
a
new
political
ally:
the
new
Majority
Leader.
With
Dole s
advocacy
for
the
lifting
of
the
embargo
well
known,
Clinton
was
therefore
in
no
position
to
ignore
congressional

sentiment
on
the
embargo
question. 77
After
his
election
as
Majority
Leader,
Dole
turned
to
Bosnia
as
one
of
the
first
legislative
initiatives
in
his
new
capacity.
He
introduced
what
was
by
far
the
most
significant
legislation
on
Bosnia
on
4
January
1995
the
Bosnia
and
Herzegovina
Self-Defense
Act
of
1995.
In
the
final
version
of
the
bill

as
passed
by
both
Houses,
it
stipulated
that
the
president
would
terminate
the
US
arms
embargo
on
Bosnia
following
receipt
from
the
Bosnian
Government
of
such
a
request
or
after
a
decision
to
withdraw
UNPROFOR
from
Bosnia.
Termination
of
the
embargo
would
be
undertaken
twelve
weeks
after
the
Bosnian
Government
requested
the
departure
of
UNPROFOR.78
Administration
opposition,
the
relative
quiet

in
Bosnia,
and
a
laser
beam-like
focus
on
domestic
issues
in
the
Republican-led
Congress
combined
to
shelve
the
Dole
bill
through
the
winter
and
early
spring
of
1995,
observed
Daalder.79
The
proposal
languished
in
the
Senate
from
January
to
July
when
it
was
taken
up
again.
It
was
in
the
wake
of
Srebrenica
that
congressional
pressure
on
the
administration
mounted.

Dole s
non-partisan
policy
activism
towards
the
Balkans,
his
own
war
experience
and
the
aftermath
of
Srebrenica
were
factors
that
appeared
to
pit
the
Republican
would-be
presidential
challenger
against
the
Democratic
incumbent.80
Two
important
amendments
were
offered
and
adopted
to
the
1995
legislative
proposal.
Senator
Nunn
put
forth
an
amendment
that
reiterated
the
Contact
Group s
pledge
that
a
UN

Security
Council
resolution
lifting
the
embargo
would
be
pursued
if
Bosnian
Serbs
rejected
the
Contact
Group
peace
plan.81
Senator
William
Cohen s
amendment
called
for
the
USA
to
bring
the
issue
of
lifting
the
embargo
before
the
UN
General
Assembly
if
the
Security
Council
failed
to
adopt
such
a
resolution.82
As
the
Senate
prepared
to
vote
on
Dole s
bill
in
July

1995,
according
to
Bob
Woodward,
Dole
assured
Secretary
of
State
Warren
Christopher
that
he
was
not
seeking
to
take
over
the
foreign
policy.
A
Senate
resolution,
Dole
pointed
out,
would
give
Clinton
leverage
with
the
Europeans
to
claim
that
his
hands
were
being
tied
by
Congress. 83
Indeed,
President
Clinton
recalled
later
that
in
the

Journal
of
Transatlantic
Studies
33
summer
of
1995,
in
the
aftermath
of
Srebrenica,
the
congressional
move
to
lift
the
arms
embargo
had
strengthened
our
ability
to
push
for
a
more
aggressive
action
in
dealings
with
the
allies.84
The
Senate
resolution
passed
by
a
vote
of
69 29
and
had
the
support
of
21
Democrats
and
48
Republicans.
According

to
Woodward,
it
was
seen
as
stunning
and
direct
repudiation
of
Clinton
and
his
policy
It
was
binding
legislation
and
an
open
challenge
to
Clinton s
authority. 85
The
legislation
had
even
gained
the
vote
of
influential
Senator
Sam
Nunn,
who
had
previously
supported
the
administration,
as
well
as
that
of
Republican
Senator
John
Warner.86
As
Daalder
noted,
Congress
sent
a

strong
message
to
the
administration
when
the
bill
passed
both
houses
of
Congress
by
margins
sufficient
to
override
a
presidential
veto.
Further,
the
prevailing
congressional
view
had
shifted
towards
support
for
arming
Bosnians
and
away
from
a
policy
of
supporting
UNPROFOR
in
Bosnia,
which
was
seen
as
no
longer
viable.87
According
to
the
New
York
Times,
the
vote
represented
a

rare
frontal
legislative
attack
on
a
President s
foreign
policy
and
the
first
time
Congress
[had]
intervened
so
forcibly
in
Mr.
Clinton's
Presidency. 88
Still,
the
proposal
was
vetoed
by
President
Clinton
on
11
August
1995.
The
problem
for
Clinton
was
that
European
allies
with
troops
on
the
ground
in
Bosnia
warned
that
they
would
withdraw
their
peacekeeping
troops
if

the
US
Congress
unilaterally
lifted
the
embargo.
President
Clinton
had
previously
pledged
that
he
would
assist
NATO
allies
in
case
of
their
withdrawal;
but
he
had
also
conditionalised
troop
deployment
on
the
achievement
of
real
peace
in
Bosnia.
The
success
of
Dole s
Senate
resolution
was
leading
the
USA
on
a
path
towards
troop
deployment
to
assist
in
the
withdrawal
of

allied
peacekeepers
and
this
was
something
the
administration
was
determined
to
avoid.89
British
Defence
Minister
Malcolm
Rifkind,
attending
a
foreign
policy
conference
in
Congress
in
June
1995,
sharply
criticised
lawmakers
who
supported
the
withdrawal
of
UNPROFOR
from
Bosnia,
stating
that
this
would
result
in
an
escalation
of
violence.
Rifkind
was
critical
of
members
of
Congress
who
did
not
heed
European

views
on
the
conflict
in
Bosnia.90
As
Colin
Dueck
put
it,
This
congressional
pressure,
combined
with
deteriorating
events
on
the
ground
in
the
Balkans,
finally
forced
Clinton
to
seize
the
initiative. 91
David
Halberstam
noted
that
Clinton
was
also
under
specific
pressure
to
act
in
Bosnia
from
Senator
Bob
Dole,
who
was
both
a
presidential
contender
and
the
Majority

Leader,
and
who
likely
had
enough
votes
to
override
a
Clinton
veto
on
arms
embargo
legislation.92
After
the
Senate
vote
in
July,
National
Security
Adviser
Anthony
Lake
was
dispatched
in
early
August
1995
to
Europe
to
present
the
allies
with
his
new
Endgame
Strategy
for
wrapping
up
the
conflict
in
Bosnia.
The
strategy
had
been
debated
that
summer,
when
the

administration
found
its
options
in
Bosnia
limited
by
the
UN
command,
a
Congress
which
demanded
action,
and
allies
reluctant
to
use
force.93
As
the
election
year
approached,
resolving
the
Bosnian
conflict
became
an
imperative.
The
new
strategy
included
both
a
new
initiative
for
peace
talks
and
the
decision
to
use
air
power.
According
to
Woodward,
the
allies
were
to
be

told
that
Clinton
would
veto
the
legislation
but
that
he
was
unsure
whether
he
had
enough
support
in
Congress
to
sustain
the
veto.94
Among
others,
Lake s
plan
called
for
a
comprehensive
peace
plan
based
on
the
Contact
Group
proposal;
mutual
recognitions
of
Bosnia,
Croatia
and
the
Federal
Republic
of
Yugoslavia;
a
plan
for
regional
economic
integration;
and
the
provision
of

military
assistance
to
the
Bosnian
Government,
with
the
goal
of
establishing
a
balance
of
95
power.

34
H.
Kari
In
his
study
of
US
policy
towards
Bosnia,
Daalder
writes
that
a
changing
domestic
political
context
was
one
of
the
factors
that
led
the
USA
to
actively
engage
in
Bosnia
in
the
summer
of
1995.
The
congressional
votes
with
which
the
legislation
on
lifting
the
embargo
were
passed
indicated
that
Congress
could
override
Clinton s

early
August
veto.
Aware
of
this,
the
Clinton
Administration
had
to
provide
Congress
with
a
credible
alternative
course
if
its
inevitable
veto
was
going
to
be
sustained. 96
This
alternative
course
was
Lake s
Endgame
Strategy.
Enforcing
the
peace
The
Endgame
Strategy
as
pursued
by
Richard
Holbrooke
led
to
the
Dayton
peace
talks
in
November
1995,
which
ended

the
war
in
Bosnia.
After
the
success
of
the
peace
talks,
Clinton
asked
Congress
for
support
in
implementing
the
peace.
Republicans
in
Congress,
particularly
in
the
House
of
Representatives,
vigorously
opposed
the
deployment
of
US
troops
to
Bosnia.97
Dole
joined
Senator
John
McCain
in
supporting
Clinton's
decision
to
deploy
troops
and
Dole
was
instrumental
in
convincing
twenty-eight
Republicans
to
support

the
deployment
decision,
resulting
in
a
Senate
vote
to
support
it,
of
60 39.98
Senator
Dole
had
once
again
risen
to
the
occasion,
and
this
was
not
lost
on
either
side
of
the
aisle.
Former
President
Gerald
R.
Ford
wrote
to
Dole
in
early
December
1995
congratulating
him
on
his
statesmanship
in
support
of
the
deployment
of
troops
as

part
of
the
NATO
peacekeeping
force
to
Bosnia.
Ford
praised
this
example
of
bipartisanship
in
foreign
policy
and
considered
Dole's
support
most
helpful
in
convincing
the
Congress
and
the
American
People
that
the
decision
is
appropriate
diplomatically
and
militarily. 99
Former
President
George
Bush
similarly
praised
Dole's
support
of
Clinton's
decision
and
for
putting
the
interests
of
the
country
before
his

political
interests.100
Holbrooke
also
acknowledged
that
Senator
Dole
deserved
credit,
saying
he
had
ignored
every
opportunity
to
exploit
the
issue. 101
David
Halbsertam
similarly
observed
that
Dole
had
not
only
been
helpful
to
Clinton
on
Bosnia,
but
would
not
use
it
as
a
campaign
issue. 102
Leon
Fuerth,
former
national
security
adviser
to
Vice
President
Al
Gore,
disagreed
with
the
notion
that

Congress
shaped
the
Clinton
Administration's
policy
towards
Bosnia,
but
did
single
out
Bob
Dole
as
the
leading
congressional
voice
on
the
issue.103
Interviews
conducted
by
this
author
with
former
senior
Bosnian
officials
many
years
after
the
war
all
pointed
to
the
crucial
role
played
by
Senator
Dole.
Former
Foreign
Minister
and
Prime
Minister
Haris
Silajd i
recalled
that
US

policy
towards
Bosnia
evolved
through
the
lens
of
the
question
of
whether
the
arms
embargo
should
be
lifted.
He
believed
that
the
congressional
vote
on
lifting
the
embargo
led
to
the
decision
to
conduct
air
strikes
on
Bosnian
Serb
positions
in
the
summer
of
1995.
In
this
context,
Silajd i
particularly
recalled
the
role
played
by
Dole
and
his
adviser
Mira

Barrata.104
Former
Bosnian
Ambassador
at
the
UN
and
Foreign
Minister
towards
the
end
of
the
war,
Muhamed
airbey,
also
recalled
that
Dole
and
his
staff
were
very
well
informed
and
very
active
on
Bosnia.105
Selmo
Cikoti,
Defence
Attach
in
the
Bosnian
Embassy
in
Washington,
DC
from
1994
onwards
concurred
with
this
characterization,
as
did
Mirko
Pejanovi,
a
wartime
member
of

the
Bosnian
Presidency.106
Former
European
negotiator
Carl
Bildt
also
noted
in
his
memoirs
that
Bosnian
government
officials
had
maintained
contact
with
their
friends
in
Congress
and
particularly
pointed
to
Bosnian
Foreign
Minister
Muhamed

Journal
of
Transatlantic
Studies
35
airbey's
contact
with
the
office
of
Senator
Bob
Dole.107
For
his
unwavering
support
for
Bosnia
during
the
war,
the
Canton
of
Sarajevo
in
April
2014
awarded
former
Senator
Bob
Dole
the
title
of
Honorary
Citizen.
Conclusion
The
foreign
policy
activism
of
Senator
Bob
Dole
in
shaping
US
policy

towards
Bosnia,
from
the
dissolution
of
Yugoslavia
until
the
Dayton
Peace
Accords,
is
often
overlooked
but
its
impact
cannot
be
overstated.
Dole s
interest
in
Yugoslavia
extended
back
to
the
mid-1980s,
positioning
him
to
understand
the
currents
of
change
that
overwhelmed
the
country
in
the
early
1990s.
He
was
among
the
first
legislators
in
the
Western
world
to
understand
the
nature

of
Milosevic s
policy
of
territorial
expansion
and
he
sought
to
frame
the
policy
debate
accordingly.
And
during
the
war
in
Bosnia,
Dole
focused
his
legislative
spotlight
on
lifting
the
arms
embargo
imposed
on
Yugoslavia
but
applied
to
Bosnia.
Realising
very
early
on
that
this
impaired
Bosnia s
ability
to
defend
itself,
Dole
worked
tirelessly
to
repeal
this
policy.
He
undertook
five

major
legislative
proposals
including
introducing
a
bill,
offering
an
amendment,
attaching
an
amendment
to
a
defence
authorization
bill,
and
introducing
new
legislation
in
1995
in
his
capacity
as
Majority
Leader.
Though
supportive
of
multilaterally
lifting
the
embargo,
Dole
quickly
realised
the
infeasibility
of
this
approach
and
from
1993
pushed
for
a
unilateral
approach.
His
legislative
efforts
served
to

pressure
the
Clinton
administration
and
provided
the
administration
with
potential
leverage
in
its
dealings
with
reluctant
allies.
And
after
the
Dayton
Peace
Accords
were
reached,
Dole
again
asserted
himself,
persuading
a
number
of
fellow
Republicans
to
support
Clinton s
decision
to
deploy
US
troops
to
enforce
the
peace
in
Bosnia.
Senator
Bob
Dole
was
at
the
forefront
of
congressional

efforts
to
shape
US
policy
on
Bosnia
and
was
unquestionably
committed
to
keeping
the
issue
of
Bosnia
at
the
top
of
the
legislative
agenda.
Struggling
against
the
instincts
of
both
the
Bush
and
Clinton
administrations
as
well
as
many
members
of
Congress,
the
senior
legislator
and
war
veteran
nonetheless
sought
to
steer
American
policy
towards
a
more
assertive
position
in

Bosnia.
It
is
only
by
considering
his
crucial
role
that
we
can
obtain
a
clear
picture
of
the
transformation
and
formulation
of
US
policy
towards
Bosnia
during
the
war.
Senator
Dole s
efforts
to
work
across
party
lines
were
not
always
a
politically
expedient
choice,
yet
his
willingness
to
do
so
shaped
his
legacy,
especially
on
the
issue
of
Bosnia.
Indeed,

as
David
Halberstam
noted,
Dole
was
perhaps
one
of
the
last
figures
from
the
internationalist
bipartisan
generation
of
the
past.
Acknowledgement
I
would
like
to
thank
the
Robert
J.
Dole
Institute
of
Politics
at
the
University
of
Kansas,
Kimberly
Storr
for
editing
and
two
anonymous
reviewers
for
their
useful
comments.
Notes
1.

Richard
Holbrooke,
To
End
a
War
(New
York:
The
Modern
Library,
1998),
67.
2.
Ibid.,
30 31.
3.
Ibid.,
173.

36
H.
Kari
4.
Samantha
Power,
A
Problem
From
Hell :
America
and
the
Age
of
Genocide
(New
York:
Harper
Perennial,
2002);
Bob
Woodward,
The
Choice:
How
Bill
Clinton
Won
(New
York:
Simon
&
Schuster,
1996);
David
Halberstam,
War
in
a
Time
of
Peace:
Bush,
Clinton,
and
the
Generals
(New
York:
Scribner,
2001).
5.
Colin
Dueck,
Hard
Line:

The
Republican
Party
and
U.S.
Foreign
Policy
since
World
War
II
(New
Jersey:
Princeton
University
Press,
2010),
232 3.
6.
Dueck,
Hard
Line,
246 7.
7.
Power,
A
Problem
from
Hell,
253.
8.
Stephen
John
Stedman,
The
Former
Yugoslavia ,in
Economic
Sanctions
and
American
Diplomacy,
ed.
Richard
Haas
(New
York:
Council
on
Foreign
Relations,
1998),
181.
9.
Public
Law
No:
101 513.
10.
Senate

Papers
Republican
Leadership
Collection,
Box
124,
Folder
7,
Foreign
Policy
Issues
Relating
to
Balkan
States,
1990 1994
(2
of
2) ;
Senate
Papers
Legislative
Relations,
Box
210,
Folder
1,
Foreign
Policy
Dick
Yugoslavia,
1991 1992
(1
of
2),
Robert
J.
Dole
Institute
of
Politics
Archive
and
Special
Collections,
University
of
Kansas;
Foreign
Operations
Conference
Sends
Strong
Message,
Senate,
October

27,
1990,
Congressional
Record,
101st
Congress,
2nd
Session.
11.
Republican
Leadership
Collection,
Box
124,
Folder
7,
Foreign
Policy
Issues
Relating
to
Balkan
States,
1990 1994
(2
of
2),
Robert
J.
Dole
Institute
of
Politics
Archive
and
Special
Collections,
University
of
Kansas.
12.
Republican
Leadership
Collection,
Box
124,
Folder
6,
Foreign
Policy
Issues
to
Balkan
States
1990 1994
(1
of
2),
Robert

J.
Dole
Institute
of
Politics
Archive
and
Special
Collections,
University
of
Kansas.
13.
Bob
Dole,
Get
Smart
about
Foreign
Aid ,
Washington
Post,
March
18,
1991,
A11.
14.
S.Res.106
To
express
Senate
support
for
democracy
and
human
rights
in
Yugoslavia
and
Senate
opposition
to
the
use
of
force
against
democratic
republics
governments
in
Yugoslavia,
April
18
(legislative
day,
April
9)

1991,
102nd
Congress,
1st
Session.
15.
Republican
Leadership
Collection,
Box
124,
Folder
6,
Foreign
Policy
Issues
to
Balkan
States
1990 1994
(1
of
2),
Robert
J.
Dole
Institute
of
Politics
Archive
and
Special
Collections,
University
of
Kansas.
16.
James
A.
Baker
III,
and
Thomas
M.
DeFrank,
The
Politics
of
Diplomacy:
Revolution,
War
&
Peace,
1989 1992
(New
York:
G.P.
Putnam s
Sons,

1995),
479.
17.
Republican
Leadership
Collection,
Box
124,
Folder
6,
Foreign
Policy
Issues
to
Balkan
States
1990 1994
(1
of
2),
Robert
J.
Dole
Institute
of
Politics
Archive
and
Special
Collections,
University
of
Kansas.
18.
Ibid.
19.
Ibid.
20.
Ibid.
21.
Ibid.
22.
Republican
Leadership
Collection,
Box
124,
Folder
6,
Foreign
Policy
Issues
to
Balkan
States
1990 1994
(1
of

2),
Robert
J.
Dole
Institute
of
Politics
Archive
and
Special
Collections,
University
of
Kansas.
The
other
signatories
of
the
Dear
Colleague
letter
were
Donald
Riegle,
Al
Gore,
John
Glenn,
Alfonse
D Amato,
Jesse
Helms,
Larry
Pressler,
and
Don
Nickles.
23.
Malcolm,
Bosnia:
A
Short
History,
op.
cit.,
p.
230 1.
24.
Senate
Papers
Legislative
Relations,
Box
210,
Folder
1,
Foreign
Policy

Dick
Yugoslavia,
1991 1992
(1
of
2),
Robert
J.
Dole
Institute
of
Politics
Archive
and
Special
Collections,
University
of
Kansas.
25.
Ibid.
26.
Ibid.
27.
Power,
A
Problem
from
Hell,
301.
28.
H.R.5368
Foreign
Operations,
Export
Financing,
and
Related
programmes
Appropriations
Act,
1993,
102nd
Congress,
2nd
Session.
29.
Senate
Papers
Legislative
Relations,
Box
210,
Folder
1,
Foreign

Policy
Dick
Yugoslavia,
1991 1992
(1
of
2),
Robert
J.
Dole
Institute
of
Politics
Archive
and
Special
Collections,
University
of
Kansas.
30.
Bob
Dole,
An
Ultimatum
to
Mr.
Milosevic ,
Los
Angeles
Times,
December
17,
1992.

Journal
of
Transatlantic
Studies
37
31.
Power,
A
Problem
from
Hell,
422.
32.
Senate
Papers
Legislative
Relations,
Box
210,
Folder
2,
Foreign
Policy
Dick
Yugoslavia,
1991 1992
(2
of
2),
Robert
J.
Dole
Institute
of
Politics
Archive
and
Special
Collections,
University
of
Kansas.
33.
Colin
Dueck,
Hard
Line:
The
Republican
Party
and
U.S.
Foreign
Policy

since
World
War
II
(New
Jersey:
Princeton
University
Press,
2010),
253 7.
34.
Dueck,
Hard
Line,
258 9.
35.
Daalder,
Getting
to
Dayton,5 6.
36.
John
Major,
The
Autobiography
(HarperCollins,
1999),
497.
37.
Power,
A
Problem
from
Hell,
258 9.
38.
NATO
Handbook
(NATO
Office
of
Information
and
Press,
2001),
37 8.
39.
David
Halberstam,
War
in
a
Time
of
Peace,
250 1.
40.
Bill
Clinton,

My
Life
(London:
Arrow
Books,
2005),
513.
41.
John
Major,
The
Autobiography,
539.
42.
Douglas
Hurd,
Memoirs
(London:
Little,
Brown,
2003),
471.
43.
Daalder,
Getting
to
Dayton,10 1.
44.
Republican
Leadership
Collection,
Box
130,
Folder
3,
Foreign
Policy
Senate
Foreign
Relations
Committee
Hearing
on
Yugoslavia,
Feb
1991
(2
of
2),
Robert
J.
Dole
Institute
of
Politics
Archive
and
Special
Collections,

University
of
Kansas.
45.
Daalder,
Getting
to
Dayton,13 7.
46.
Power,
A
Problem
from
Hell,
304.
47.
Daalder,
Getting
to
Dayton,
18.
48.
Republican
Leadership
Collection,
Box
230,
Folder
4,
International
Affairs
Yugoslavia,
1992 1993
(2
of
2),
Robert
J.
Dole
Institute
of
Politics
Archive
and
Special
Collections,
University
of
Kansas.
49.
Ibid.
50.
Ibid.
51.
Clifford
Krauss,
Many
in
Congress,

Citing
Vietnam,
Oppose
Attacks ,
New
York
Times,
April
28,
1993.
52.
Republican
Leadership
Collection,
Box
230,
Folder
4,
International
Affairs
Yugoslavia,
1992 1993
(2
of
2),
Robert
J.
Dole
Institute
of
Politics
Archive
and
Special
Collections,
University
of
Kansas.
53.
Republican
Leadership
Collection,
Box
230,
Folder
4,
International
Affairs
Yugoslavia,
1992 1993
(2
of
2),
Robert
J.
Dole
Institute
of

Politics
Archive
and
Special
Collections,
University
of
Kansas.
54.
Ibid.
55.
S.AMDT.1281
Amends
S.
1281
Foreign
Relations
Authorization
Act,
Fiscal
Years
1994
and
1995,
January
27,
1994,
103rd
Congress,
1st
Session.
56.
S.2042
A
bill
to
remove
the
United
States
arms
embargo
of
the
Government
of
Bosnia
and
Herzegovina,
April
21,
1994,
103rd
Congress,
2nd
Session.
57.
Republican

Leadership
Collection,
Box
599,
Folder
10,
Press,
Subject
Files,
Bosnia,
1994,
Robert
J.
Dole
Institute
of
Politics
Archive
and
Special
Collections,
University
of
Kansas.
58.
S.AMDT
1696
Amends
S.2042
A
bill
to
remove
the
United
States
arms
embargo
of
the
Government
of
Bosnia
and
Herzegovina,
April
21,
1994,
103rd
Congress,
2nd
Session.
59.
Republican
Leadership
Collection,
Box
224,
Folder

5,
June
Trip
to
Bosnia
and
Herzegovina,
1994,
Robert
J.
Dole
Institute
of
Politics
Archive
and
Special
Collections,
University
of
Kansas.
60.
Helen
Dewar,
Conflicting
Directives
in
Senate:
Votes
Oppose
Arms
Embargo ,
Washington
Post,
May
13,
1994;
Rowan
Scarborough,
Senate
Action
Sends
Muddled
Message
on
Balkans ,
Washington
Times,
May
13,
1994.
61.
Podijeljeni
na
embargu,
Osloboenje,
6.VI.1994,
3.
62.
Republican

Leadership
Collection,
Box
114,
Folder
8,
Foreign
Policy
Congressional
Delegation
(CODEL)
The
Balkans,
1994
(2
of
2),
Robert
J.
Dole
Institute
of
Politics
Archive
and
Special
Collections,
University
of
Kansas.
63.
S.AMDT.1851
Amends
S.
2181
National
Defense
Authorization
Act
for
Fiscal
Year
1995,
103rd
Congress,
2nd
Session.

38
H.
Kari
64.
John
F.
Harris,
Europeans
Urge
Hill
to
Keep
Arms
Embargo
Against
Bosnia ,
Washington
Post,
June
24,
1994.
65.
Katharine
Q.
Seelye,
Clinton
Tries
to
Head
Off
Senate
on
Bosnia
Embargo ,
New
York
Times,
June
24,
1994.
66.
Katharine
Q.
Seelye,
Senate
Fails
to
Lift
Bosnia
Arms
Embargo ,
New
York
Times,
July
2,
1994.

67.
S.AMDT.2524
Amends
H.R.4650,
103rd
Congress
(1993 1994).
68.
William
J.
Clinton,
Letter
to
the
Chairman
of
the
Senate
Committee
on
Armed
Services
on
the
Arms
Embargo
on
Bosnia-Herzegovina ,
The
American
Presidency
Project,
http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=48968&st=bosnia&st1=congress
(accessed
March
16,
2014).
69.
Steven
Greenhouse,
Clinton
Proposes
Deadline
to
End
Bosnia
Arms
Embargo ,
New
York
Times
August
12,
1994.
70.
Michael
R.
Gordon,
President

Orders
End
to
Enforcing
Bosnian
Embargo ,
New
York
Times,
November
11,
1994.
71.
Clinton,
My
Life,
633.
72.
Ivo
H.
Daalder,
Getting
to
Dayton:
The
Making
of
America's
Bosnia
Policy
(Washington,
DC:
Brookings
Institution
Press,
2000),
31.
73.
Daalder,
Getting
to
Dayton,
61.
74.
Interview
with
Dr.
Michael
Haltzel,
14
June
2011,
Sarajevo.
75.
Frederick
Bonnart,
American
Strikes
a
Body

Blow
to
the
Trans-Atlantic
Security
Alliance ,
New
York
Times,
November
14,
1994.
76.
George
Melloan,
NATO s
Credibility
Is
Again
on
the
Line ,
Wall
Street
Journal,
November
21,
1994.
77.
Daalder,
Getting
to
Dayton,
32.
78.
S.21
Bosnia
and
Herzegovina
Self-Defense
Act
of
1995,
January
4,
1995,
104th
Congress,
1st
Session.
79.
Daalder,
Getting
to
Dayton,
62.
80.
Power,
A

Problem
from
Hell,
423.
81.
S.
AMDT.
1848
to
S.21
Bosnia
and
Herzegovina
Self-Defense
Act
of
1995,
January
4,
1995,
104th
Congress,
1st
Session.
82.
S.AMDT.1851
to
S.21
Bosnia
and
Herzegovina
Self-Defense
Act
of
1995,
January
4,
1995,
104th
Congress,
1st
Session.
83.
Woodward,
The
Choice,
264.
84.
Clinton,
My
Life,
666.
85.
Woodward,
The
Choice,
265.
86.

Elaine
Sciolino,
Senate
Vote
to
End
Embargo
May
Prove
a
Pyrrhic
Victory ,
New
York
Times,
July
28,
1995.
87.
Daalder,
Getting
to
Dayton,
64.
88.
Elaine
Sciolino,
Defiant
Senators
Vote
to
Override
Bosnian
Arms
Ban ,
New
York
Times,
July
27,
1995.
89.
Power,
A
Problem
from
Hell,
423 424.
90.
Steven
Greenhouse,
Britain s
Defense
Chief
Attacks
Some
in
Congress
Over
Bosnia ,

New
York
Times,
June
22,
1995.
91.
Colin
Dueck,
Hard
Line:
The
Republican
Party
and
U.S.
Foreign
Policy
since
World
War
II
(New
Jersey:
Princeton
University
Press,
2010),
260.
92.
Halberstam,
War
in
a
Time
of
Peace,
302 3.
93.
Daalder,
Getting
to
Dayton,
80.
94.
Woodward,
The
Choice,
265.
95.
Daalder,
Getting
to
Dayton,
112 3.
96.
Ibid.,
165.
97.
Dueck,

Hard
Line,
260.
98.
Power,
A
Problem
from
Hell,
441.
99.
Republican
Leadership
Collection,
Box
113,
Folder
4,
Foreign
Policy
Bosnia,
1995,
Robert
J.
Dole
Institute
of
Politics
Archive
and
Special
Collections,
University
of
Kansas.
100.
Ibid.
101.
Holbrooke,
To
End
a
War,
345.

Journal
of
Transatlantic
Studies
39
102.
Halberstam,
War
in
a
Time
of
Peace,
359.
103.
Interview
with
Leon
Fuerth
via
Skype,
11
October
2011.
104.
Interview
with
Haris
Silajd i,
Sarajevo,
27
May
2011.
105.
Telephone
interview
with
Muhamed
airbey,
20
September
2011.
106.
Interview
with
Selmo
Cikoti,
Sarajevo,
20
February
2012;
Interview
with
Mirko
Pejanovi,
Sarajevo,
2

July
2012.
107.
Carl
Bildt,
Misija
mir
(Zid,
Sarajevo,
1998),
translated
from
Swedish
to
Bosnian
by
Amna
Ibri agi,
250.
Notes
on
contributor
Hamza
Kari
is
Assistant
Professor
at
the
Faculty
of
Political
Science,
University
of
Sarajevo.
He
obtained
his
BA
in
Political
Science
and
International
Relations
from
Bogazici
University,
MA
in
International
Relations
and
European
Studies
at
the

Central
European
University
and
an
MA
from
the
Georgetown
University
Walsh
School
of
Foreign
Service.
He
completed
his
Ph.D.
at
the
University
of
Sarajevo
in
2014.
His
recent
publications
include
One-Way
Ticket
to
Kuala
Lumpur:
Bosnian
Muslims
in
Malaysia
in
the
Early
1990s,
Indonesia
and
the
Malay
World,
Volume
42,
Issue
124,
2014,
In
Support
of
a
Non-member
State:
The

Organisation
of
Islamic
Conference
and
the
War
in
Bosnia,
1992 1995
Journal
of
Muslim
Minority
Affairs,
Volume
33,
Issue
3,
2013,
and
Balkans
in
Maryland s
2nd
Congressional
District:
Helen
Delich
Bentley
and
the
War
in
Bosnia,
Croatian
Political
Science
Review,
Volume
50,
Number
5,
2013.