Meiji Restoration in Japan

Meiji Restoration in Japan
Introduction
In 1868, the long rule of the Tokugawa regime came to an end and full
sovereign powers were restored to the new Meiji Emperor. Opposition to
Tokugawa rule had been growing for a long time, but it was not until the 19th
century that several lines, ideological, of attack on the Shogun were
available. From these various lines of attack, the Restoration leaders
emphasized the theory that in ancient days, the Emperor had enjoyed great
power and prestige and that the Shogun was a usurper who had taken all real
authority away from the Emperor. Such a line of attack on the Shogun
became more and more effective as Tokugawa power progressively declined.
The Theories accounting for the Downfall of the Shogunate
Among historians, there have been two main schools of opinion on what
really caused the downfall of the Shogunate.
The first school believed that the Tokugawa system of government might
have continued essentially unchanged had it not been for the forcible opening
of the closed door by the United States and other countries. It had been
customary for these historians to refer to the primitive nature of Japan's
economy before 1867 and to treat the Tokugawa period as though it were an
era of almost stagnation. Therefore, the school of opinion argued that it was
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only the coming of the foreigners that undermined the authority of the
Tokugawa government and so ruined it.
The second school of opinion, however, emphasized the undoubted fact that
the whole regime had been under indirect attack from many directions inside
Japan long before Perry arrived.
In the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, rapid economic growth had produced an
advanced economy capable of ready transformation into an entirely new
political and social order.
By the middle of the 19th century, the antiquated political system and absurd
political and social philosophy of the Tokugawa were more than 200 years
out of date. The simple concept of the division of classes into rulers, warriors
and commoners had little relation to Japan of the 19th century with its
teeming cities, rich merchants, restless samurai and discontent peasantry.
Despite the division of the land into a large number of feudal fiefs, the people
had developed a strong sense of national consciousness. The growth of
nationalism and the development of a modern commercial economy had
made Japan ready for the more efficient political forms of the modern nation.
The coming of the foreigners, symbolized by the Perry expedition, merely
provided the final impulse towards a collapse that was unavoidable.
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The theory that the main cause of the Shogunate's collapse was the forced
opening of Japan to foreigners cannot of course be accepted, but the 2nd
school of thought has perhaps inclined to go too far in underestimating the
impact of successful Western pressure on Japan in the 1850's. It is hardly
believable that the Shogunate would have collapsed had it been able to resist
the demands made by the United States, Russia, Great Britain and other
countries of the West. It must be noted that so well had the early Tokugawa
succeeded in creating a system capable of preserving political stability that
the machine was still running relatively, smoothly. It was therefore necessary
for an external pressure to disrupt it. This pressure provided by the foreigners
was consequently fatal to the power of the Tokugawa which had already been
weakened by other forces.
Another point to notice is that the economic weakening of the Tokugawa
feudalism which has been serious by the early 18th century and was actually
not much worse by the middle of the 19th century. Moreover, the Shogunate
itself was on the whole better off than most of the daimyo. It could debase the
currency to its own advantage and it controlled all the great cities and most of
the economically advanced parts of the country. It would be hard to argue
that the Shogunate fell from the economic difficulties, all the easier. The
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downfall of the Tokugawa regime was thus the result of the conjunction of 2
processes:
the internal decay of feudal society
pressure from the Western nations
It was only through the coincidence of these two forces of internal decay and
external pressure that contributed to the so-called Meiji Restoration in 1868.
The Parties Overthrowing the Tokugawa
The overthrow of the Tokugawa was finally accomplished through the union
of anti-Tokugawa parties. These parties included:
The lower samurai and ronin, particularly the great western clans of Satsuma,
Choshu, Tosa & Hizen which provided the armies and the territorial base of
operations;
The kuge, i.e. the court nobility and the Emperor who served as the
ideological justification for the overthrow of the usurping Shogun;
The merchants, especially of Osaka and Kyoto, who contributed money to
the revolution;
The peasants who not only served as soldiers but whose general discontent
weakened the Tokugawa domains.
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The leadership of this alliance was in the hands of the lower samurai, some of
whom were administrators, some were intellectuals or warriors and all of
whom were concerned that the Tokugawa had to go. However, these samurai
and ronin could not have overthrown the Tokugawa only by their strength
and determination. Less dramatic than the political and military achievement
of the samurai but more far-reaching in accomplishing both the overthrow of
the Shogunate and the stabilization of the new regime was the financial
support of the chonin, especially of Osaka where it is said 70% of Japan's
wealth was concentrated.
The official record of the House of Mitsui says, "The loans required for the
military operations of the Imperial forces were largely furnished by the
House of Mitsui". The Meiji Restoration thus was the outcome of this
coalition of merchant class with the lower samurai. The political settlement
of the Meiji and especially the abolition of feudalism in 1871 can only be
understood by an examination of this feudal-merchant alliance?
The Feudal Merchant Coalition
In studying Japanese social history, it becomes apparent that one must
dismiss all preconceptions based on a class-struggle interpretation as
sometimes applied to the French revolutions. In the case of political struggle
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against the feudal aristocracy against the Church and the Crown and
eventually winning a clear-cut victory in France. In Japan, however, the
interests of the feudal ruling class and the big merchants became so closely
connected that whatever hurt one easily injured the other. Should a daimyo
refuse to pay his debts or threaten the merchant in order to obtain their
cancellation, he soon found that whenever he applied elsewhere for loan, he
met with a polite but firm refusal. The big merchants depended on the interest
of the loans to daimyo and samurai for their livelihood. The samurai and the
daimyo who together with their followers were compelled by the sankin-kotai
system to spend 1/2 of their time in Edo, became the chief customers of the
chonin.
Quite logically then, the chonin felt that their own prosperity was closely tied
to that of the warrior and noble classes, their customers and debtors. For this
reason, the chonin never dreamed of attacking feudalism as a system though
they were prepared to finance a political movement against the Shogunate in
connection with rival feudal elements. Takigawa Masajiro in his "Nihon
Shakai Shi" or "A Social History of Japan", therefore said, "The reason why
this nascent class of chonin did not even think of overthrowing the bushi
class was the latter were their customers and if they ruined their customers, if
only for a brief period, the shock to their own economic power would have
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been disastrous. For this reason, the samurai were able to maintain their
position right to the Restoration, long after they had lost their real power in
the country." This aristocratic class therefore stood shoulder to shoulder with
the despised but economically powerful merchant and usurer class. As the
Tokugawa period advanced, these 2 groups drew closer together making
possible the co-operation between the big merchants of Osaka and the
leading anti-Tokugawa clans. Thus, the Meiji Revolution was not the story of
a rising business class which destroyed the structure of feudalism and
established its supremacy in a mercantile state. Still less was it a democratic
revolt transferring political power to representative of the mass of the
peasants and workers.
The Rise of Satsuma and Choshu
But what really sealed the fate of the Tokugawa was its failure to deal
effectively in 1866 with the military opposition from the Satsuma-Choshu
coalition. Satsuma and Choshu were outer clans of daimyos. They were
tozama. Satsuma was in the southern Kyushu and Choshu was in the western
end of Honshu. They were both traditional rivals of the Tokugawa. By the
middle of the 19th century owing to the economic and social changes they
were in a position to challenge the authority of the Bakufu.
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Both Satsuma and Choshu had a combination of advantages.
1. They were among the biggest domains that had any hope of influencing
national politics.
2. Satsuma was officially ranked 2nd among the hans in tax yield and Choshu
the 9th; and there were altogether 165 hans in Japan. In actual tax income
they were actually the 4th and 5th. The wealth of Satsuma and Choshu in the
mid-19th century was probably a factor leading to their success, for without
adequate financial resources they would have had neither the strong morale
nor the western arms which made possible their triumph.
3. In both clans, the ratio of fighting men to fix income was much higher than
the national average, giving them greater military manpower than their
economic strength would suggest. Satsuma had about 27,000 samurais.
Choshu had about 11,000 samurais.
4. Another strength in the strength of Satsuma and Choshu was their internal
solidality and union. They were located far from the major urban centres.
Both (particularly Satsuma) were backward economically and socially
compared with some of the strongholds of the Tokugawa. Hence the morale
of their feudal warrior aristocracy was less roded and they were able to take
more effective action than the hans located in economically more advanced
area. Their very backwardness contributed to their strength.
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5. Satsuma was lucky to have to strong daimyo in Shimazu Shigehide and later
in his great grandson Nariskira, Satsuma also had the advantages of trade and
contact with the outside world through its vessel domain, Ryukyu Islands,
and had become a leading area in the study of western science and
technology. In Satsuma there were a comparatively profitable mining
industry, textile mills and trade monopoly. The latter probed particularly
successful with sugar because Satsuma controlled the only parts of Japan
where sugar can grow well. Like most other hans it was burdened at the very
beginning of so-called "Tempo Reform". This effort enabled it in clearing the
han debt.
6. Choshu situated across the straits of Shimonoseki through which all marine
transport between Korea, China and Osaka had to pass was able by means of
trade and transport monopoly to accumulate considerable wealth. The
Choshu, led by young commanders of exceptional ability, were armed and to
some extent, clothed after the European pattern. More revolutionary,
however, was that these forces were not confined to the members of the
traditional warrior class but accepted small townsmen and peasants as
volunteers. The military competence shown by the Choshu commanders was
to secure for their own clan after the collapse of the Shogunate a dominant
role in the organization of a Westernized imperial army. Indeed for more than
50 years until after the First World War, the highest appointments in the
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Japanese army were held as a rule by members of the Choshu clan or their
followers. On the other hand, the Choshu "Tempo Reform" was started in
1838 and succeeded in cutting down the han expenditure and holding down
the ever mounting han debt.
Thus, both Satsuma and Choshu were in good position to challenge the
Tokugawa supremacy. The main political development of the 1860's proved
to be a series of competition for national leadership between Choshu and
Satsuma until finally in 1866, the two reached an understanding and entered
into a secrete alliance to overthrow the Shogunate.
Rivalry between Satsuma and Choshu for National Leadership
The movement for "The Union of Court and Shogunate" (Kobu Gattai)
In the year 1857 the emperor sent a secret message to Choshu and 13 other
hans seeking support in his opposition to the Shogun's power.
Choshu
The Moderate Reform Party which was in power at the time decided that
Choshu should begin to take a part in national politics. Their decision was
motivated primarily by the long smouldering resentment against the
Tokugawa rule and by the memory of Choshu's greatness before 1800.
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These reformers proposed that Choshu should mediate in bringing Edo and
Kyoto together and this policy came to be known as "The Union of Court and
Shogunate".
They also suggested that the emperor should order the Shogun to embark on
the policy of "extension across the sea". Kyoto accepted this proposal
because it was the first open admission of its political supremacy. The
Shogun also accepted because he was delighted to have full support from the
imperial court for the foreign policy he had been forced to accept. But in the
end nothing came of the Choshu's effort at mediation. The policy was
undercut within Choshu itself both by the opposition from the Extreme ProImperial Party and by the doubts of other influential reformers. Moreover,
their failure was due to the more daring bid for national leadership by
Satsuma.
Satsuma
In 1862, Satsuma proposed itself as mediator between Kyoto and Edo.
To secure more Shogunate respect for the imperial court
To secure the release from confinement of Keiki (son of the Lord Mito and
defeated candidate for the Shogunship, was pro-emperor and kept in
confinement since 1859)
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The appointment of Keiki as the Great Elder and guardian of the new
Shogun.
Satsuma won imperial support for this proposal and with the court's censor it
proceeded to suppress the Extreme Pro-Imperial Samurais from Satsuma and
other hans. Then Satsuma presented the demands to Edo. Yielding to
pressure, the Shogunate accepted the demands and made Keiki the Great
Elder and Guardian of the Shogun, with Lord of Hizen (Matsudaira Keiki)
had strong imperial leanings as a form believer in national unity. Under his
influence the whole Tokugawa hostage system ("Sankin-kotai") was
abandoned and the attendance of the daimyos 100 days every 3 years. These
startling measures made obvious a change that had already occurred. The
Shogunate no longer could exercise effective control over the hans.
Pro-Imperial Movement
Choshu effort
The Choshu was not content to see national leadership fall into the hands of
its Satsuma rival. Out beaten by Satsuma in the movement for A Union of
Court and Shogunate ("Kobu Gattai"), Choshu adopted a new approach
which took an open Pro-imperial stand and supported the sentiment of "Expel
the Barbarians" that was obviously favoured by the Court. This change of
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policy united the Extreme Pro-Imperial Party with the reformers, the
Extremists were now rising in influence in the han government. Choshu also
gained the support of a few extremist court nobles and gradually won the
control over the imperial court. It was further strengthened by the official
support of Tosa (and of the major outer hans on the island of Shikoku).
So, in December 1862, the Choshu dominated Court got the Shogunate to
agree to the expulsion of the barbarians. The Shogun was forced to set a date
June 25, 1863 before which all foreigners would be expelled, although he
knew that it was impossible. So, by this time the Choshu had placed the
Shogunate in an impossible position. The Shogunate was caught between the
pressure from the Kyoto Court and the superior military power of the West. It
became ineffective. It was unable to make any step of policy, as it merely
waited.
The Shimonoseki Affair
It soon turned out that Choshu's anti-foreign feeling had gone too far. The
folly of such an unrealistic foreign policy was soon revealed. Choshu seeing
that the Shogunate had taken no action to expel the barbarians attempted to
act alone on the expulsion order. So, on the appointed day, its forts along the
Strait of Shimonoseki at the western end of the Inland Sea fired on the
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American, French and Dutch ships. In response the American and French
warships destroyed the forts on July 16-20 - known as the Shimonoseki
Affair. Alarmingly, the Shogunate ordered Choshu to stop its action. But
instead, the Shogun's envoy was captured and killed.
The Satsuma Coup d'etat (Restoration of Moderates)
Meanwhile, alarmed by this unrealistic foreign policy Satsuma had taken
more effective action in Kyoto aided by the domain issued in Aizu (in
northern Honshu). Satsuma organised a coup d'etat on September 30, 1863
and troops were sent to the gate of the imperial palace. The more moderate
nobles were restored to control and the court councils and imperial troops
created under the Choshu leadership were dissolved. The Choshu troops were
forced to withdraw from Kyoto to their own han.
Foreign attacks on Choshu and Satsuma
Choshu
At the end of May 1864, foreign ministers renewed their demands for the
opening of the Shimonoseki Straits, threatening to take action themselves if
Edo failed to do so. When Edo failed to give a reply, the ministers organised
a joint naval expedition against Choshu. In September 1864, 17 foreign
warships destroyed all the Choshu forts on the Shimonoseki Straits and
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forced Choshu to agree to the opening of the Straits. The Bakufu had to pay a
war indemnity which was abolished after the Bakufu agreed in June 1866 to a
new commercial treaty which reduced import duties to 5% and removed
nearly all the restrictions on foreign made.
Effects
Choshu realized that their "Expel the barbarians" policy was impractical.
From then on there was a change of policy putting greater reliance on
westernized military units and on individuals who knew and understood the
West. Two of their samurais Inoue Kaoru and Ito Hirobumi who had just
returned from Britain persuaded Choshu to adopt western ways. In the rapid
modernization of Japan which started a few years later, Choshu became the
patron and backbone of the new Japanese Army first with the French and
then with the German army as its model. The consequent pro-Britain attitude
of the Japanese Navy and the pro-German attitude of the Japanese Army were
to exert a strong influence on Japanese policy from then onwards until the
Pearl Harbour Attack.
Satsuma
In Satsuma the feeling of expelling the barbarians was also strong and would
be illustrated by the Richardson Affair on September 14, 1862. This incident
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involved 4 Englishmen who were riding in the city of Yokohama and
encountered the procession of Shimazu Hisamitsu. Richardson was killed by
an enraged samurai who felt that the foreigner had not shown proper respect
for their great lord. The British reaction was quick and by threats of naval
power Britain forced the Shogunate to pay an indemnity of L100,000. She
also demanded an indemnity from Satsuma and punishment for the murderer.
On August 15, 1863, the Satsuma forts at Kagoshima fired on the 7 British
ships which gathered there to force their demands. The British proceeded to
destroy much of Kogoshima and to sink most of the Japanese ships. Satsuma
agreed to pay an indemnity of $25,000 and this sum was to be borrowed from
the Bakufu.
Effect
The incident naturally confirmed the Satsuma leaders' respect for Western
military power and also produced a deep interest on their part in the British
navy. The Lord of Satsuma was so impressed by this display of naval force
that, less than 3 years later, he invited the new British Minister, and the
Western naval ships for Satsuma. The friendly relations thereby established
between Britain and the House of Satsuma played an important part, not only
in the restoration of the Emperor a few years later but also in the British
Navy's being chosen as the model on which the future Japanese Navy was
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founded and built up. Meanwhile, the inability of the Shogunate to punish the
unruly clans or to obtain satisfaction from the foreign powers for the attacks
made on their nationals and their property had revealed the growing
powerlessness of the Shogunate. Many of the daimyo considered that the
treaties were not binding on them as they had not been approved by the
Emperor, who had in fact ordered the expulsion of the foreigners. For the
same reason, they were beginning to feel themselves exempted from further
loyalty to the Shogunate. The long established authority of Edo was therefore
rapidly being replaced by the long-last authority of Kyoto. The movement to
revive the Emperor's supremacy gained strength very rapidly. Indeed, it was
evident that, if the anti-Tokugawa forced were to combine, there would
probably be civil war in which the Shogunate might well be defeated.
The Satsuma - Choshu Alliance (March 1866)
Satsuma and Choshu at the beginning were unfriendly. But their difference
had gradually disappeared after 1861 because Satsuma had lost confidence in
the Shogunate and doubted the real motive of the Shogunate. They came to
decide that Choshu was a better ally than the Shogunate. Reconciliation
between the two was brought about the pro-imperial ronin from Tosa. On
March 7, 1866, a secret alliance was drawn up in Kyoto. This alliance meant
the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate.
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Death of the Shogun and the Emperor

1866 - The Shogun Iemochi died and Tokugawa Keiki was his successor. He
prepared to further progress of the nation by opening the country more fully
to foreign intercourse.
1867 - Emperor Komei died and was succeeded by one who was not so
hindered by the traditions and hostility of the past, he was Mutsuhito who
took up his title as Meiji.
The Civil War
It became the customs in the 20th century for foreigners as well as Japanese to
look back at the Meiji Restoration of 1867-68 as smooth, aimest, bloodless
transfer of power. But in reality, there was civil war for several months. The
Shogun, Keiki, voluntarily surrendered his administrative powers to the
youthful Emperor, Meiji, in November 1867. So ended the 2-1/2 centuries of
Tokugawa rule, and on December 9, 1867, the Imperial Restoration was
formally proclaimed. The ending of the Shogunate and the Restoration of the
Emperor, however, was actually the beginning of a further struggle before
peace was finally restored. Following the formal proclamation of the
Restoration, the formation of a new government was announced on January
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3, 1868. To the indignation of the ex-Shogun's supporters, not only was Keiki
excluded from its membership, his lands were ordered to be confiscated.
Keiki himself was prepared to accept this treatment in silence but his
adherents were not. He was persuaded to take up arms and on January 27,
1868 met with overwhelming defeat at the Battle of Fushimi. Following the
defeat of his army, Keiki took ship to Edo and ordered the city to be
surrendered to the Imperial troops.
Elsewhere certain clans loyal to the Tokugawa fought on firmly. The last area
of resistance was at Hokkaido where an admiral of the Shogun's navy held
out for some months in 1869. Thus ended the supremacy of the House of
Tokugawa which provided Japan with 15 Shoguns.
The Changing Attitude towards Foreigners
The forces that overthrew the Shogunate had long been associated with the
slogan "Expel the Barbarians" and it might have been expected that with their
victory, anti-foreign sentiment would become more serious and widespread.
There were, of course, still a few isolated instances of anti-foreign agitation
before Japan finally settled down to the task of modernization, but prompt
and drastic punishment was given by the new government to those guilty of
attacks on foreigners. It was no part of the policy of the new men who ruled
Japan to antagonize, much less drive away, the barbarians. They realized that
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to achieve a position of power in the world, their country would have to be
modernized. With all speed, it would have to catch up with the
technologically advanced nations of the West.
However, modernization could never be accomplished without Western help
and advice. A number of foreign technicians had already been employed both
by the Shogunate and by certain feudal lords before 1868. But after that year,
there were many more of them - British, American, French, German and
Dutch - engaged by the Japanese government as pilots, railways and marine
engineers, financial and legal advisers, agricultural experts, university and
school teachers, military and naval instructors and at the same time, Japanese
were sent abroad to learn from the West. But among the Japanese, there has
never been the scornful indifference that has often characterized the Chinese
attitude towards foreigners. The Japanese have never been too proud to learn.
It appeared therefore strange reversal of the whole situation for the antiforeign monarchical party and, in effect, became pro-foreign almost
overnight. In April 1869 the Emperor and his court left Kyoto to take up
residence in Edo which was renamed Tokyo or Eastern Capital, had remained
the imperial and administration centre of Japan ever since.
Conclusion
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The steps leading to the Meiji Restoration had been complex and largely
haphazard rather than simple, straight-forward and planned. Conflicting
interests had been drawn together in the final stages, but there had been more
disunity than unity among those who eventually restored the throne to its
legitimate position. In these respects, as well as in the national aspects, the
movement had a striking resemblance to the Unification of Italy though the
parallel cannot go too far. The forces that were to win the national revolution
came from the imperial ideology that justified the revolution, the "Expel the
Barbarians" spirit that gave it power and the ambition of young samurai of
relatively humble birth that gave it daring drive. From then onwards, military
power rather than traditional authority, public opinion or political skill was to
be deciding future in Japanese politics.
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Meiji Restoration in Japan

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