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For purposes of legal research, readers may find useful the discussions/citations in the
position paper below that I have prepared in an ejectment case which involved the issues
of stature of frauds and formalities of contracts.
x x x.
1. That plaintiff is of legal age, Filipino and a resident of
xxx Street, Unit xxx, xxx Subdivision, xxx City
where she may be served with summons and other
processes of this Honorable Court;
2. That defendants are all of legal age and are presently
unlawfully residing at xxx Avenue, xxx Subdivision,
xxx II, xxx City and may served with summons and
other legal processes therein by this Honorable
Court;
X x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully
prayed that after due hearing judgment be rendered as to the
principal cause of action:
a) Ordering defendant A to execute the deed of
sale in favor of the plaintiff over the house and
lot located at No. xxx Avenue, xxx Subdivision,
xxx City and covered by the Transfer Certificate
of Title No. xxx of the registry of Deeds of xxx
City;
b) Ordering defendant A to pay plaintiff the
following amount:
i) P300,000.00, as moral damages;
ii) P200,000.00, as exemplary damages;
iii) P100,000.00, as attorneys fees; and
iv) To pay the costs of suit:
In the alternative, judgment be rendered:
a) Ordering defendant A to pay plaintiff the
following sums:
i) P1,351,265.66 representing reimbursement to
the plaintiff for the expenses of the renovations
and Improvements, insurance premiums, real
property taxes homeowners association dues and
payment for compromise settlement on the
property in question, plus legal interest thereof
from the date of the filing of the complaint:
ii) P55,000.00, representing the funeral expenses
of defendant A minor son, K, plus legal interest
thereof from the filing of the complaint:
b) Ordering defendants A and V to pay plaintiff
jointly and severally the following:
i) P1,414,928.20, representing reimbursement to
the plaintiff for the payment of defendant Vs
car, including the insurance thereof, as well as
payment for the debts and loans incurred by
defendant A son, herein defendant V, plus legal
interest thereof from the filing of the complaint:
Xxx.
1. Defendants deny the allegations stated in paragraph 6 of the
complaint. The truth of the matter being that no written nor oral
arrangement was ever reached by the parties with respect to the
sale or transfer of the paraphernal house and lot registered under
the name of the Defendant A before she contracted marriage with
defendant K;
2. Defendants resolutely maintain that no earnest efforts towards an
amicable settlement were conducted between the parties. She was
surprised to find out that the instant case was filed by the plaintiff
and that inappropriate and dishonest measures were undertaken
which evidently showed her ungratefulness and greediness towards
her sister, defendant A.
3. Plaintiff has no legal right over the property of the defendant.
Plaintiff was permitted by tolerance to stay at the property of the
defendant as a mere transient. It is solely by reason of the
compassion of the defendant towards her sister, the plaintiff herein
and her brothers that they were permitted to stay at
her paraphernal house and lot located at No. xxx Avenue, xxx
Subdivision, xxx City. Along with them then was their biological
mother, C who had predeceased this controversy and her ungrateful
children, B, R and C. Defendants mother stood as the guardian of
V, K1 and K2 as opposed to the allegation of the plaintiff that she
agreed to the proposal that she would stand as the guardian of the
X x x.
By way of COUNTER-CLAIM, the foregoing paragraphs are
herein repleaded and reproduced insofar as they are herein
relevant, material and significant;
11. As a result of this present controversy, defendant was
compelled to stay at the Philippines for a period of time and
as a result lost her employment in Japan. Defendant
receives a monthly equivalent of Forty Thousand Pesos
(Php 40,000.00) a month as salary from her employment for
which the plaintiff must be required to pay by way of actual
damages. A copy of the Certificate of Possible Salary
Payment, the Withholding Exemption Certificate of earned
Income, and the Incumbency Certificate of the defendant
are herein attached and made an integral part of this Answer
with Counter-Claim x x x.
12. Likewise and as a result of the unlawful possession by the
plaintiff of the residential house and lot of the defendant,
the latter was constrained to rent a residential townhouse
unit at xxx Subdivision for which the defendant was
constrained to pay a monthly rental of EIGHT
THOUSAND (Php 8,000.00) pesos a month for which once
again the plaintiff must be compelled to pay by way of
actual damages. X x x.
13. By reason of this baseless complaint, defendant, A suffered
and continuously suffers sleepless nights, serious anxiety
and other similar sufferings from which entitles her to the
recovery of damages in such amount as this Honorable
Court, in its wise and sound discretion, may determine;
For the record, the herein plaintiff A hereby adopts into this Position Paper, by
incorporation and reference, all her foregoing allegations, counterclaims and prayers
as stated in her original Answer in the said Civil Case No. xxx.
III. EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF
IN THE INSTANT EJECTMENT CASE
In addition to the aforementioned Title of the herein plaintiff (TCT No. xxx, marked
as Annex A hereof, supra), the plaintiff respectfully submits to this Honorable
Court the following documentary evidence in support of her ejectment complaint
against the defendants:
1. Annex B - Letter (re: Final Demand Letter To Vacate), dated November
21, 2006, addressed to B signed by Atty. Xxx, former counsel for A.
2. Annex C Letter, dated November 8, 2006, addressed to B Herrera, et.
al., and all persons claiming possession of the subject property owned by
A, signed by Atty. Xxx. Tafalla, former counsel for A. It proves the
jurisdictional demand made by the plaintiff to the defendants to vacate the
subject property under Rule 70 and the earnest efforts of the plaintiff to
exhaust all remedies before commencing the instant court action.
3. Annex D - Letter dated November 24, 2006, addressed to Atty. Xxx,
former counsel for A, signed by Atty. Xxx of xxx Law Offices, counsel for
B, et. al., denying and rejecting the demand of plaintiff B to vacate the
subject property. It proves the recalcitrance of the defendants in ignoring
and rejecting the extrajudicial demands of the plaintiff.
4. Annex E Patawag issued by Barangay Pamplona II, dated November
13, 2006, addressed to A and B, et. al.. (Although defendant Maria xxx
was not named therein, she had actual and constructive knowledge thereof,
being an actual resident of the property under the control and subsidy of B;
but Maria xxx chose not to voluntarily participate therein)
5. Annex F Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman, dated November
17, 2006, issued by the said Barangay addressed to A and B, et. Al.. It
shows the failure of the defendants to settle with the plaintiff the instant
ejectment controversy, thus, compelling the plaintiff to seek judicial
redress.
6. Annex G Engagement Contract, dated September 26, 2006, addressed
to A, signed by her former Atty. Xxx, showing the expenses for
professional fees incurred by the plaintiff in hiring the services of Atty.
Xxx to protect her rights against the unjust acts of the defendants.
7. Annex H Letter, dated April 15, 2007, addressed to Atty. Xxx, re: Notice
of Termination of Lawyer-Client Relationship and Legal Services, signed
by A and K.
8. Annex I Letter, dated April 3, 2007, addressed to A and K thru N re:
Attorneys Fees, signed by Atty. Manuel Laserna Jr., current counsel for A.
9. Annex J Legal Retainership Agreement, dated April 3, 2007, signed
by N and the Laserna Cueva-Mercader Law Offices, thru Atty. Manuel
Laserna, Jr., showing the litigation expenses incurred by A in hiring the
legal services of the said law firm to protect her rights against the
unjust acts of defendants B, et. al.
spending for the maintenance of the subject property or that she was the
one who funded the burial of the deceased K.
18. Annex R (with sub-markings) - Various business records of xxx
Enterprise owned by the son of the plaintiff, V, which the plaintiff had
helped fund and organize. They show the financial capacity of V to
support himself, his wife, his business-related transactions, and his costs of
living expenses, contrary to the claim of defendant B that she was the one
who had funded the same.
19. Annex S - The passports of V showing his business travels abroad. They
show the financial capacity, personal maturity, and business acumen of V
as a businessman, contrary to the claim of defendant B that she was the
one who was supporting the personal maintenance and business operations
of V.
20. Annex T (with sub-markings) - Business records of xxx Enterprise and
yyy Collection (registered in the names of defendants B and R), which the
plaintiff A, as we well-earning Japan-based employee, had helped put up
and fund at a time when the said B and R were basically penniless or under
financial straits. Please note that the business names xxx and yyy were
patterned after the names of the children of the plaintiff.
21. Annex U (with sub-markings) Records of the checking account of V in
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank (HSBC), showing that he had paid his
business loans thru his said account, contrary to the claim of the defendant
B that she was the she who paid such business loans of V.
22. Annex V (with sub-markings) - Business and financial records of xxx
Management Inc., re: the purchase and full payment of a Mitsubishi
Lancer vehicle made by the said corporation, whose major stockholders
are the xxx Clan. The natural father of V belonged to the said Clan. The
said records show that the amortizations for the said car were made and
paid by the said Corporation and xxx Clan for the benefit of the latter and
that the payments were made thru the account of the said corporation in
BPI Family Bank, contrary to the claim of defendant B that she was the
one who had paid for the said car.
23. Annex W (with sub-markings) Records of the amicable settlement of
Civil Case No. xxx (RTC Branch xxx, xxx City), entitled Sps. N v. A
(represented by her [late] mother C), involving the subject property. They
prove that plaintiff A had paid for all the expenses (taxes, registration fees,
etc.) related to the Deed of Exchange, the Compromise Agreement, and the
registration of the titles involved therein, contrary to the claim of
defendant B that she was the one who paid for all such expenses.
24. Annex X (with sub-markings) Records of the amicable settlement of
Civil Case xxx (RTC, Branch xxx, xxx City) which A filed against the
University of Perpetual Help Hospital and its attending doctors to seek
damages for the death of K, a son of the plaintiff A. The records show that
amount and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the
purchasers and person on whose account the sale is made, it is a
sufficient memorandum;
(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or
for the sale of real property or of an interest therein;
(f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.
The Statute of Frauds was enacted for the purpose of preventing frauds. Under
the Statute of Frauds, the only formality required is that the contract or agreement
must be in writing and subscribed by party charged or by his agent. For example, a
telegram advising a person to whom a verbal promise for the sale of land had been
previously made to come at once in order to complete the purchase, but which
telegram neither describes the property nor states the purchase price, and which is not
signed by any person having authority to bind the seller, is not a sufficient
memorandum of sale to satisfy the requirement of the statue.
Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds are susceptible of
ratification. According to Art. 1405 of the Civil Code, such contracts may be ratified
either (1) by the failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence to prove the
same, or (2) by the acceptance of benefits under them. Art. 1405 provides that
contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds, referred to in No. 2 of article 1403, are
ratified by the failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence to prove the same,
or by the acceptance of benefits under them while Art. 1406 provides that when a
contract is enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and a public document is
necessary for its registration in the Registry of Deeds, the parties may avail
themselves of the right under article 1357.
The primordial aim of the provisions is to prevent fraud and perjury in the
enforcement of obligations depending for their evidence upon the unassisted memory
of witnesses (Shoemaker vs. La Tondea, 68 Phil. 24). Although the said
provisions simply provides for the form or method by which contracts coming within
its terms may be proved, nonetheless, the claimant must first prove the existence and
due execution of such a contract, notwithstanding its formal defects, if any. (Conlu v.
Araneta, 15 Phil. 387; Gallemit v. Tabiliran, 20 Phil. 241; Kuenzler & Streff v.
Jiongco, 22 Phil. 111; Gomez v. Salcedo, [26 Phil. 485]; Domalagan v. Bolifer, 33
Phil. 471; Magalona v. Paratcim 59 Phil. 543).
Although the Supreme Court has held in many cases that no particular form or
language or instrument is necessary to constitute a memorandum or note in writing
under the statute of frauds, nonetheless, such memorandum of note should be in the
form of a document or writing, formal or informal, which had been written either for
the purpose of furnishing evidence of the contract or for another purpose which
satisfies all the statutes requirements as to contents and signature would be sufficient.
In one case, the Supreme Court held that a voucher or entry in an
accountants book of account purporting to show payment of a specified amount as
consideration for the sale of leasehold right over a house was, however, held
insufficient where the same was not signed by the alleged vendor but merely by the
accountant who claimed (without establishing) that he was the vendors agent (Reyes
vs. Lopez, 76 Phil. 568).
The settled rule is that the statute applies only to executory (Factoran vs.
Laban, 81 Phil. 512; Cocjin vs. Libo, 91 Phil. 777), that is, a contract that has not been
completed or executed yet. Performance, whether total or partial, takes a contact out
of the operation of the statute. (Arroyo v. Azur, 76 Phil. 493; Hernandez v. Adal, 78
Phil. 196; Almirol vs. Monserrat, 48 Phil. 512; Robles vs. Lizarraga
Hermanos, 50 Phil. 387; Diama vs. Macalibo, I74 Phil. 70; Barcelona vs.
Barcelona, 53 O.G. 373; Carbonnel v. Poncio, 55 O.G. 2415). Performance must be
duly proved.
Examples of performance include: (a) a sale of real property which has been
consummated by the delivery of the property to the vendee (Soriano v. Heirs of
Magali, L-15133, July 31, 1963; Diama vs. Macalibo, supra); (b) or which has been
partially executed by payment of a part of the price to the vendors and the
delivery of the land to the vendees (Almirol vs. Lizarraga Hermanos, 50 Phil. 387).
In one case, it was held that the transaction is not taken out of the coverage of
the statute of frauds by the mere allegation that plaintiff had taken possession of the
land as a tenant and that he had made substantial improvements thereon, such
allegation being an insufficient basis for proving the oral contract had been executed
or performed. There must be an allegation to the effect that he had taken possession
of the land in view of a supposed verbal contract he had with the defendant to
purchase it, or that he has made improvements thereon because and as a consequence
of said supposed contract to sell (Pascual vs. realty Investment, Inc. 91 Phil. 257).
Partial performance does not of itself exclude the application of the Statute of
Frauds. Firstly, in order that a contract not to be performed within one year may be
taken out of the operation of the statue, it must appear clearly that full or complete
performance has been made by one party; nothing less will suffice, and if anything
remains to be done after the expiration of the year besides the mere payment of
money, the statute would apply (Babao vs. Perez, 54 O.G. 2888).
The doctrine of partial performance cannot be invoked against the statute
where the contract is vague, ambiguous and uncertain in its terms and as to subject
matter. For, obviously, there can be no partial performance until there is a definite
and complete agreement between the parties. For the doctrine to be availed of, the
parol agreement relied upon must be certain, definite, clear, unambiguous, and
unequivocal in this terms and as to subject matter, aside from being fair, reasonable,
and just in this provisions. This is so because the doctrine is based on equity, and it
would be inequitable to enforce an agreement that does not satisfy the above
requirements (Babao vs. Perez, Babao v. Perez, 54 OG 2888).
B. Forms of Contracts
The defense of the defendants that plaintiff A had allegedly sold the subject property
to defendant B fails to meet and comply with the strict procedural and evidentiary
requirements set forth in Articles 1358, et. seq. of the Civil Code as to the forms or
formalities of a contract or an agreement.
Under Art. 1358, Civil Code, the following must appear in a public
instrument:
(1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of real
property or of an interest therein are governed by articles 1403, No. 2, and 1405;
(2) The cession, repudiation or enunciation of hereditary rights or of those of the
conjugal partnership of gains;
(3) The power to administer property, or any other power which has for its object an act
appearing or which should appear in a public document, or should prejudice a third
person;
(4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding from an act appearing in a public
document.
Although, as a general rule, contracts hall be obligatory, in whatever from they may
have been entered into, yet there are certain contracts falling within the purview or
scope of this rule which, by reason of their importance, should be executed in
accordance with certain formalities in order to insure their efficacy and to protect the
interests of the contracting parties as well as that of third persons. The Civil Code,
recognizing this necessity, enumerates in Art. 1358 the different classes of contracts
which must appear either in a public or in a private document, and grants in Art. 1357
a coercive power to the contracting parties by which they can reciprocally compel the
observance of the required form.
Under Art. 1359, Civil Code, when, there having been a meeting of the minds of the
parties to a contract, their true intention is not expressed in the instrument purporting
to embody the agreement, by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or
accident, one of the parties may ask for the reformation of the instrument to the end
that such true intention may be expressed. If mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or
accident has prevented a meeting of the minds of the parties, the proper remedy is not
reformation of the instrument but annulment of the contract.
C. EJECTMENT LAW AND CASES
The instant ejectment complaint fully complies with technical and substantive
requirements of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and with the relevant jurisprudence
applicable thereto.
Thus, considering the summary nature of the instant ejectment suit, the same
should be resolved by the Honorable Court on the merits in favor of the plaintiff ASeiwa, regardless of the pendency of the RTC-level case filed by B.
The only issue in forcible entry and detainer cases is the physical possession
of real property possession de facto and not possession de jure (Gutierrez vs.
Magat, 67 SCRA 262). The subject matter thereof merely is the material possession or
possession de facto over the real property. The questions to be resolved simply are
these: First, who had actual possession over the piece of real property? Second, was
the possessor ousted therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint by
force, threat, strategy, or stealth? And lastly, does he ask for the restoration of his
possession? Any controversy over ownership rights should be settled after the party
who had the prior, peaceful and actual possession is returned to the property (Dizon
vs. Concina, 30 SCRA 897).
The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective
with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of
the land or building and that such judgment shall not bar an action between the same
parties respecting title to the land or building, nor shall it be held conclusive of the fact
therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action not
involving possession.
Section 1, Rule 70 provides that a person deprived of the possession of any land
or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial
Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or
any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs.
Section 2, Rule 70 provides that, unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the
lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the
lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such
demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the
premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after
fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.
Under Sec. 3 of Rule 70, an ejectment case is a summary procedure, and that all
actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or
unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the summary procedure
hereunder provided.
Under Sec. 16 of Rule 70, when the defendant raises the defense of ownership in
his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue
of possession. Under Sec. 18 of the Rule, the judgment rendered in an action for forcible
entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no
wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not
bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building.
Sec. 17 of the Rule provides that if after trial the court finds that the allegations of
the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of
the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the premises, attorneys fees and costs. If it finds that said
allegations are not true, it shall render judgment
for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall
render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice
requires.
In view of the summary nature of an ejectment suit, Sec. 19 of Rule 70 provides
that if judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately
upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution
files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed
in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of
the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits
with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if
any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a
contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use
and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined
by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month
or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with
the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
Under Sec. 21 of the Rule, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the
defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may
be taken therefrom.
The action for unlawful detainer is summary in nature (Devesa vs. Montecillo, 27
SCRA 822; Sarona vs. Villegas, 22 SCRA 1256). As such, it is inadequate for the
ventilation of issues involving title or ownership of controverted real property. In an
unlawful detainer case suit, while the court cannot adjudicate on the issue of
ownership, it may receive evidence on possession de jure to determine the nature of
possession (Consing vs. Jamandre, 64 SCRA 1).
It is fundamental principle in the law governing unlawful detainer cases that a mere
plea of title or ownership over the disputed land by the defendant cannot be used as a
sound basis for dismissing an action for recovery of possession because an action for
recovery of possession can be maintained even against the very owner of the property
(Prado vs. Calpo, et. al., G.R. No. L-19379, April 30, 1964, cited in Spouses medina
and Bernal vs. Valdellon, 63 SCRA 278).
In actions of forcible entry and detainer, the main issue is possession de facto,
independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may
se forth in his pleading. As incidents of the main issue of possession de facto, the
inferior court can decide the questions of (a) whether or not the relationship between
the parties is one of landlord and tenant; (b) whether or not there is a lease contract
between the parties, the period of such lease contract and whether or not the lease
contract has already expired; (c) the just and reasonable amount of the rent and the
date when it will take effect; (d) the right of the tenant to keep the premises against
the will of the landlord; and (e) if the defendant has built on the land a substantial and
valuable building and there is no dispute between the parties as to the ownership of
the land and the building, their rights according to the Civil Code. Defendants claim
of ownership of the property from which plaintiff seeks to eject him is not sufficient
to divest the inferior detainer. (Alvir vs. Vera, 130 SCRA 357).
An unlawful detainer is the act of unlawfully withholding the possession of the land
or building against or from a landlord, vendor or vendee or other person after the
expiration or termination of the detainers right to hold possession by virtue of a
contract express or implied (Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court; Pharma Industries,
Inc., vs. Pajarillaga, L-53788, October 17, 1980, 100 SCRA 339; Ching Pue vs.
Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81 (1950); Lim Si vs. Lim, 98 Phil 868 (1956); Teodoro vs.
Mirasol, 99 Phil. 150 (1956); Pardo de Tavera vs. Encarnacion, et. al., 22 SCRA 632
(1968).
An unlawful detainer action has an entirely different subject from that of an action for
reconveyance of title. What is involved in unlawful detainer case is merely the issue
of material possession or possession de facto; whereas in an action for reconveyance,
ownership is the issue. So much so that the pendency of an action for reconveyance of
title over the same property does not divest the city or municipal court of its
jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case, nor will it preclude or
bar execution of judgment in the ejectment case where the only issue involved is
material possession or possession de facto (Ramirez vs. Bleza, L-45640, July 30,
1981, 106 SCRA 187).
This is so because the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or
detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no case bind the
title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an
action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be
held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case of action not involving possession.
The rationale is that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary
proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual
possession or the right to possession of the property involved (Republic vs. Guarin,
81 SCRA 269). It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is time
procedure designed to remedy the situation (Mabalot vs. Madela, Jr. 121 SCRA
347).Procedural technicality is therefore obviated and reliance thereon to stay eviction
from the property should not be tolerated and cannot override substantial justice
(Dakudao vs. Consolacion, 122 SCRA 877). So much so that judgment must be
executed immediately when it is in favor of the plaintiff in order to prevent further
damages arising from loss of possession (Salinas vs. Navarro 126 SCRA 167).
Well-settled is the rule that inferior courts may not be divested of its jurisdiction over
ejectment cases simply because the defendant sets up a claim of ownership over the
litigated property (Alilaya vs. Espaola, 107 SCRA 564; Dehesa vs. Macalalag, 81
SCRA 543; Castro vs. delos Reyes, 109 Phil. 64). Even where defendant in a detainer
or forcible entry alleges title to the property in his answer, it is declared in a great
number of cases that the trial court will not be divested of its jurisdiction by such
allegations alone (Savinada v. Tuason, et. al., G.R. No. L-2132, May 30, 1949; Loo
Soo v. Osorio, R.G. No. L-1364, May 30, 1951; Cruz v. Lunsang, G.R. No. L-2332,
October 4, 1959; De Los Rey7es v. Elepanio, et al., G.R. No. L-3466, October 13,
1950; Mediran V. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752).
Where the possession of defendant is by tolerance on the part of the plaintiff, or his
predecessor, the possession or detainer becomes illegal from the time that there is a
demand to vacate (Amis vs. Aragon, L-4684, April 28, 1951). It is not necessary that
there be a formal agreement or contract of lease before an unlawful detainer suit may
be filed against a possessor by tolerance. Neither is prior physical possession of the
property by plaintiff necessary (Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136; Pharma
Industries, Inc. vs. Pajarillaga, 100 SCRA 339). When consent is withdrawn and
owner demands tenants to leave the property, the owners right of possession is
deemed asserted. (Philippine National Bank vs. Animas, 117 SCRA 735).
A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that
he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy against them. The status of defendant is analogous to that of a lease
continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to
vacate (Calubayan vs. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146; Canaynay vs. Sarmiento, 79 Phil. 36;
Robles vs. San Jose, 52 O.G. 6193; Sarona vs. Villegas, 22 SCRA 1257, citing
Montelibano vs. Hingaran Sugar Plantation, 63 Phil. 797, 802-803).
D. RECENT EJECTMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The plaintiff A further cites the following recent ejectment-related jurisprudence in support
of her complaint.
In the case of HEIRS OF JACOBO BOLUS, et. al. vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and SPOUSES RICARDO and GLICERIA JIMENEZ, Respondents,G. R. No.
107036, February 9, 1993, it was held ha on the issue of jurisdiction, the firmly settled
principle is that a municipal court has jurisdiction over forcible entry or unlawful detainer
cases even if the question of the ownership of the property is raised by the defendant.
The exception is where the question of title is so involved in the ejectment case that it
cannot be decided unless the title to the property is first ascertained.
In the case of CONCEPCION V. AMAGAN, et. al. vs. TEODORICO T. MARAYAG,
respondent [G.R. No. 138377. February 28, 2000], it was held as a general rule, an
ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere filing before the regional trial
court (RTC) of another action raising ownership of the property as an issue. As an
exception, however, unlawful detainer actions may be suspended even on appeal, on
considerations of equity, such as when the demolition of petitioners' house would result
from the enforcement of the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgment. Thus:
X x x.
Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits under Rule 70 are
designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of
land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived
thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties'
opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate
proceedings. It has been held that these actions "are intended to
avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law
in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of
possession." [Vda [de Legaspi v. Avendao, 79 SCRA 135,
September 27, 1977, per Barredo, J.] In these cases, the issue is
X x x.
The status of petitioner spouses is akin to that of a lessee or a
tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
has continued by tolerance of the owner. A person who
occupies the land of another at the latter's forbearance or
permission without any contract between them is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him. [Vda. De Catchuela v. Francisco, No. L31985, 25 June 1980, 98 SCRA 172, citing Calubayan v.
Pascual, No. L-22645, 18 September 1967, 21 SCRA 146; Yu v.
de Lara, No. L-16084, 30 November 1962, 6 SCRA 785.]. X x
x.
In the case of TERESITA VILLALUZ, CHIT ILAGAN, Spouses ADOR and TESS
TABERNA and MARIO LLAMAS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ** and SPOUSES REYNALDO AND ZENAIDA ANZURES, respondents, [G.R.
No. 106214. September 5, 1997], it was held that the one-year reglamentary period
under Section 1, Rule 70 for filing an unlawful detainer case is counted from the time of
the "unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession". Such unlawful deprivation occurs
upon expiration or termination of the right to hold possession. And such right legally
expires or terminates upon receipt of the last demand to vacate [Sy Oh v. Hon. Garcia
and Lim Chi v. Hon Garcia, 138 Phil. 777]. Thus:
Pascual, 215 SCRA 146] because it is only from that time that
possession becomes illegal. 28[ See Vda. de Prieto v. Reyes, 14
SCRA 430; Canaynay v. Sarmiento, 79 Phil. 36]. Accordingly,
since the complaint for ejectment was instituted on July 12,
1989, or a mere four (4) months from the time of the last
demand to vacate, the same was timely filed within the
prescriptive period. X x x.
In the case of ORO CAM ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
former Fourth Division and ANGEL CHAVES, INC., respondents[G.R. No. 128743.
November 29, 1999], it was held that a judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not only
upon the defendants in the suit but also against those not made parties thereto, if they
are:
a) trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendantfraudulently
occupying the property to frustrate the judgment;
d) sublessee;
e) co-lessee; or
It is an established principle in law that one who comes in equity must come
with clean hands. (Tala Realty Services Corporation vs. Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 137533, 22 November 2002, 392 SCRA 506). One who
seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands. He or she who has done inequity shall not have equity. The courts may deny
equitable relief on the ground that the conduct and actions of a party are inequitable,
unfair, dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. (Miller vs. Miller, G.R. No. 149615, 29
August 2006; Abacus Security vs. Ampil, G.R. No. 160016, 27 February 2006, 483
SCRA 315.)
VI. PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that instant ejectment suit
be decided in favor of the plaintiff A and against all of the defendants, ordering the
defendants to VACATE and SURRENDER the de facto/material possession of the
subject property to the plaintiff or her duly authorized legal representative/s, with awards
of damages, litigation expenses, and costs of suit, as duly proved by the various
documentary evidence attached to this Position Paper.
Las Pinas City, January 9, 2008.