The Ethical Motive

Author(s): Franklin H. Giddings

Source: International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Apr., 1898), pp. 316-327
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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complex contentof human life is the source of the error in

each systemand of the ceaseless processionof systemswhich
make up the historyof philosophy.
J.B. BAILLIE.
EDINBURGH

UNIVERSITY.

THE ETHICAL MOTIVE.

NOT least among the contributions
to ethical science which
Mr. HerbertSpencer has made in his " Principlesof Ethics"
is the clear and comprehensivedescriptionof conduct,viewed
observationand
as a naturalphenomenonadmittingofscientific
analysis, which is presented in the opening chapters. We
are thereshown that conductis distinguishedfromactions in
general by the exclusion of acts which are aimlessor purposeless. Conduct is the activityof a volitional being who perceives that he has the power to modifyhis own existence,and
who sets beforehimselfan end to be attained. His conduct,
fromthe merelyphysiologicalactivityof his body
then,differs
in being made up of a seriesof acts adjusted to the end which
he has in view. Good conduct,in turn,may be described as
consistingof acts which as means are, on the whole, well
adapted to the attainmentof an end which a criticaljudgment
to a reason
pronouncesto be in itselfworthwhile,satisfying
that has examinedall of those possible ends or goals of action
which have thus farappealed to the mind.
If this descriptionof conduct is accepted as being a fairly
accurate one, and I thinkthat moralistsof all schools admit
that,as a generalaccount of conduct,Mr. Spencer's chapters
are true,a scientificstudy of moralitynecessarilyincludes a
critical examinationof the ends which purposive activityattemptsto realize,and also a criticalexaminationof the motives
by which we are impelled towards the attainmentof the end
in view.
The study of ethicalends, as all readersof moral systems
are painfullyaware, has produced manydiffering
hypothetical
goals of action. We have theological ethics,which assume
that the chiefend of man is to glorifyGod and enjoy him for-

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The Ethical Motive.

317

ever. We have utilitarianethics,which assume that the only

practicalgood is the greatest happiness of the greatestnumber; and we have idealisticethics,which assume thatthe perfectionof the rational and spiritual natureof conscious personalityitselfis the only end which can satisfythe rational
mind.
In the studyof motives,as it has foundobjectiveexpression
fourdistincthypothesesmaybe discovered.
in moralliterature,
The firstof these is, thatthereis a moral intuitionwhich is at
once a revelationof rightand an impellingforce,drivingus onward towardsthe attainmentof our moral goal. The second
hypothesisis, that thereis a moral instinct,which has either
guide, or has been
been createdin us as a blindbut trustworthy
developed in us by evolutionaryprocesses throughthe experiences of countless generationsof experimentingcreatures
who have learned to go rightaftertryingall the possibleways
of going wrong. The third hypothesisis, thatthereare certain classes and groupsof feelingsmore definitethan instincts,
which move us to moral action; the feelings,namely,which
we know as sympathiesand affections. The fourthhypothesis is, that our rationallyconceived ideas of ethicalends themselves react as motor forces,and draw or impel us to attempt
to realize the conceived ends.
These four hypotheses are commonlyheld to exhaust the
possible explanationsof ethical motive.
In the present paper I shall attemptto prove that neither
any one of the fourhypotheticalassumptionsabout the ethical
motive,nor any combinationof them,gives us an adequate
account of the psychological process wherebyour voluntary
acts are organized into that series which we describe as conduct. There is a phase of this process that has appeared to
me to have a very great importance,and which,I think,has
attention.
hithertonot receiveda sufficient
Since moral conduct consistsof acts adjusted to ends, it is,
of course,impossible to discuss motiveswithoutfirststating
one's position in regard to ends. For my present purpose,
however,it is not necessaryto decide between utilitarianism
to say thatboth of these schemes
and idealism. It is sufficient

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of conduct include in theirconceptionof ends the notionof a

relativelylarge and growingmentallife,and of a more varied
voluntaryactivity,as distinguishedfroma diminishingconsciousness, and froma reductionof purposiveto automatic or
mechanicalaction. The utilitariandoes not set beforehimself
a temporaryor exhausting pleasure; he pictures rather the
happinesswhich is concomitantof large and varied life. The
idealist no less distinctlylooks to the enlargementof the
rationaland spiritualnatureas an essential phase of that perfectionwhich he desires.
For the purposes of the present argument,then,it is sufficient to say that the moral motiveis one thatmakes forlargeness of conscious life.
If so much is granted,the reader is prepared fora suggestion which I have now to make. It is that,as a result of
studies which,in recent years,have been made in quite anotherpart of the psychological field,we are now, forthe first
time,in a positionto make discoveriesin regardto the origin
and the strengthof the moral impulses and in regard to the
conditionsof theirgrowth.
The studies to which I referare those that have been made
in the psychologyof economic activity,and which have undertaken to explain the nature and to formulatethe laws of
economic motive. Most readers,even those who are not particularlyinterestedin economic discussions,have by this time
some notion of the modern psychological theoriesof utility
and value. The names of Cournot, Walras, Menger, and
Jevons have crept into currentliterature,and nearlyeverybody knows the essentialdoctrineforwhich they stand. We
no longer think of utilityas a quality inherentin objective
things or conditions. Objects of our strongestdesire afford
us more or less satisfactionaccordingto ever varyingcircumstances. Food itselfmay please or disgust according as we
are still hungryor have over-indulgedthe appetite. Every
commodityofferedin the marketappeals stronglyor in slight
degree, or not at all, to the desires of possible purchasers,
according as they have been able already to satisfythose
desiresin some measurethrougha precedingsupply. Psycho-

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The EthicalMotive.

319

logically,then,utilityand value are phenomena that diminish

as the consumptionof the means of satisfyingdesire increases.
Every want admitsof satisfaction,and everysatisfactionmay
become satiety.
There are certain implicationsof this theorythat have not
yet been dulyexaminedby eithereconomistsor psychologists.
It is implied that an economic satisfactionis the pleasurable
activityof a particularorgan or group of organs,at a particular time and in a particularway. For example, to returnto
the illustrationof the consumptionof food,it is notmaintained,
and, of course, no one could maintain,that food has a diminishing subjective utilityat all times. Its value to the organism fallsas hungeris appeased. But withthe returnof appetitethe subjectivevalue of food again rises. In like manner
it could not be maintainedthat the subjectivevalue of food
must followa descendingcurve if food articleshad the power
of ministeringin equal degree to every organ of the body.
If, forexample, a single class of materialgoods affordedus all
the pleasures thatwe craved,so thatby means of commodities
fitforfoodwe could satisfythe desires forclothing,forshelter,
for amusement,and for instruction,the subjective value of
these commoditieswould remain foreverat their maximum
point. Subjective values then rise and fall simply because
each commodityhas-thepower of satisfyingonlythe cravings
of some particular organ or group of organs, and usually
under some particularcombinationof conditionsexisting at a
given time.
Of course, it is unnecessary to prove that within certain
limitsthese particularsatisfactionsindirectlyministerto other
organs than those immediatelyactive, and, indeed, to the
whole organism. Food not only satisfies the immediate
cravingsof the stomach,but it affordsthe pleasures which
springfromthe organic sensationsof vigor. Nevertheless,it
is perfectlyobvious that there are limits beyond which the
satisfactionof a particularorgan or group of organs may deprive other organs of those means of satisfactionwhich they
crave, inhibitvarious activities,and deplete the entire organism. The man who should spend all his substance upon his

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InternationalYournal of Ethics.

table would forthat reason be compelled to do withoutother

material gratifications;he undoubtedlywould starve his intellectualnature,and,sooner or later,he would reduce a large
part of his physical systemalso to a conditionof atrophy.
This implicationof the modern theoryof subjectiveutility
is so obvious that furtherinsistenceupon it would seem to be
quite unnecessary. A second implication,if not quite so obvious,is not less certain. If the cravingsof a particularorgan
or groupof organsare being liberallymetwithappropriatesatisfactions,while otherorgans sufferdeprivation,the neglected
importuorgans set up a protest,which usually is sufficiently
nate to compel us to attempttheirappeasing. The hunger of
the neglected parts of our nature normallytakes possession
of consciousness, and diverts our attentionand our effort
fromthe organ which is receiving more than its due share of
indulgence. Now this hunger of the entire organism for a
varied satisfaction,and this protest of the entire organism
against the over-indulgenceof any one appetite,is obviouslya
desiresfor
phenomenonquite distinctfromthose particularistic
specificsatisfactionswhich in recent years have been recognized as the specificeconomic motives.
Thus distinctand general,the cravingof the organism for
and theorganic protestagainstany excess
integralsatisfaction,
of particularisticindulgence, constitute,I think, the ethical
motive in its original,physiologicalform.
There is thus a real and fundamentaldifferencebetween
the economic motive and the ethical motive. The economic
motiveis the desire fora particularsatisfactionof a particular
organ in a particularway at a particular time. The ethical
motive is the desire for the varied satisfactionof the entire
organismthroughcontinuingtime.
This account of the subject is, of course, merely physiological; and I suppose that no modern psychologist will
object to discoveringthat even ethical phenomena have their
origin in physiological processes. Let us, however,turn to
the psychologicalaspect. A sharp organic cravingfora particular satisfactionalways receives a preferentialattentionin
attentionwhich is liable
consciousness. It is this preferential

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The Ethical Motive.

321

to cause excessive indulto be undulycontinued,and therefore

gence. A mere organic cravingwould diminishas the point
of satietywas approached. The least intelligentanimals are
less likely than man to carryany particularformof consumption or activityto excess. It is thereforeeven more true of
man than of the lower animals that the hungerand protestof
neglectedorgans musttake possession of consciousness before
the course of consumptionor activitycan be diverted into
new channels. In otherwords,the ethical motiveplays psychologicallya largerpart in beings having the greaterpower
of attention,and especially of attentioncolored by imagination.
In more technical terms,then,the economic motive is the
sum of those normal desires to which,at any given moment,
attention. The ethical motive is
we are giving a preferential
the sum of those normal desires to which,at the same given
moment,we are denyingattentionor forcingout of consciousness by neglect,but which will presentlyassert themselves
stronglyenough to divertattention.
of the truthof this analysis is afforded
Strong confirmation
by the popular view of that class of economic activitieswhich
is most remotelyand indirectlyrelated to the immediatesatisfactionof particular wants. If the foregoing reasoning is
sound, the prudentand enterprisingman, in laying by a portion of his income,convertingsavings into working capital,
energeticallyimprovingnew conditions,and organizingindustrial methods,is acting frommixed motives. He is moved
partlyby economic,but partly,also, by powerfulethical desires. It is thereforeinterestingto rememberthatthese forms
of industrialactivityhave always been regarded as no less
ethical than economic. Saving, frugality,thrift,have, from
immemorialtime,been inculcated as duties. In other words,
when economy broadens out into a provision for the expansion and the future development of life, economic activity
merges into ethical conduct.
In this broad distinctionbetween economic and ethical
motives,I think we may discern the ground of a persistent
dissatisfactionwith utilitarianethics. The common mind
does not to any great extent think of pleasure in general
VOL. VIII.-No.

22

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terms. The average man thinksof pleasure concretelyand

in termsof particularsatisfactions. Duty or right,
specifically,
on the contrary,the average man thinksof vaguely,as something indefinableimposed upon him by a mass of feelings
which he cannotanalyze and does not understand,but which
constrainhim to inhibitspecificdesires and to deny himself
particular enjoyments. The common mind thereforeassociates self-denialratherthan pleasure with organic well-being
and witha continuousdevelopmentof eitherthe bodilyor the
mental nature. The end to which the acts of the ordinary
individualare adjusted is a vaguely conceived " welfare" or
"salvation." It is only the cultivated mind that can distinctlypictureto itselfa greaterpleasure,a deeper happiness,
as the concomitantof a larger and sounder life. Consequently,the common mind always shows a strongantipathy
to systems of ethics which make pleasure the end of moral
action. Yet objectors have seldom been able to meet the
utilitarianargument. In other words,it has been felt,rather
than clearlyseen, thatbetween economics and ethics thereis
a distinctionwhichshould be discovered; and thattheremust
be somethingwrong about an ethical theory that calls both
motivesby the same name.
Anotherand vastly more importantphase of popular thinking is similarlyexplained by the foregoingaccount of the
ethical motive. When we have discovered that the ethical
motive arises as a reactionof the organism upon the organ,
of vague feelings en masse upon specific feeling,we have
discerned the real source of moral authorityand the origin
of that half-superstitious
conception of authoritywhich still
holds the common mind in dumb distrustof reason. The
mass of mankind thinks of authorityas something so absofromreason that it may oppose reason. The
lutely different
mass of mankindalso thinksof moral conduct as a course of
action which is prescribedby authority; while it thinks of
economic activityas being indicated and guided by reason.
The explanation is not difficultto findif there is a real and
between the economic and the ethical motive.
great difference
By authoritythe average man means a power which con-

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Motive.
The EthicalA

323

strainshis will withouthis knowingor being able to findout

why. By reason he means a knowingwhy. Now it is perfectlyclear that,in pursuingeconomic ends, the average man
thinksthat he knows why he does this or that. He acts in a
particular way because specific,clearly apprehended wants
clamor forsatisfaction. It is not less clear that,in obeying
what he regardsas an ethical mandate,the average man acts
withoutknowingwhy. A mass of vague feelingsand ideas
arise withinhis consciousnessin protestagainst certainindulgences, or constraininghim to somethingwhich he feelsto be
a duty,although he cannot possibly explain to himselfwhy
he feels or calls it duty. That is to say, the average man can
clearly apprehend the economic motive; he knows,or thinks
he knows, the whys and the whereforesof his economic life;
and thereforehe thinksthat the economic lifelies withinthe
domain of reason. The average man cannot clearly apprehend the ethical motive,analyze it into its elements,or discover its origins. He does not know why he is moral; yet
he feels himselfconstrainedto tryto be moral. Therefore
he believes that moralityis imposed upon him by authority;
in otherwords,by a power thatconstrainshis will withoutrevealing to him how or why; and he regardswith distrustany
intrusionof reason into the ethical domain. So conceiving
of reason and authority,and havingwithinhis own consciousness an experimentalacquaintance with authority,the average man easily passes froma deferenceto the moral authority
that is internallyknown,to a reverencefor any external authoritythat is impressivelyasserted, and allows himself to
regard the external authority as, like the moral authority
withinhimself,superiorto reason.
Has this discriminationof the ethical fromthe economic
motivea practicalvalue, or is itof merelytheoreticalinterest?
It has, I think,a twofoldpracticalvalue.
First, if a truthfulaccount has been given of the relations
which the common notion of authoritybears to the ethical
motive, the importanceof cultivatingrationalistichabits of
thoughtis stronglyemphasized. Moral authorityis real,and,
in a sense, it is independentof reason. It is deeper, more

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more nearlyprimitiveas a part of human confundamental,

sciousness thanreason is; but it is not independentof organic
conditions,and thereforeis not apart from or in any way
independentof the complex processes of natural causation.
Reason alone can enable man to perceivethe true natureand
originof moral authority,and therebyto avoid the dangersto
human well-beingthat still lingerin the popular confusionof
moral with external or supposedly supernatural authority.
Only through the rationalistichabit of mind can men come
to understandhow importantit is, on the one hand, to assert
the rightfulsupremacyof moral authority,and, on the other
of any externalauthorityother
hand, to deny the rightfulness
than a common or social consciousness of the realityand
of the moral authorityin each individual. It is
rightfulness
thereforeof supreme importanceto continuewithoutquarter
to fightthat obscurantismwhich is still endeavoringto keep
the controlof thoughtand conduct withinthe hands of those
who assume to rule the spiritual domain by rightof divine
anointment.
of the ethical fromthe economic motive
The discrimination
has, I think,secondly,a practicalvalue because it enables us
withrenewedassurancecertainrulesforthestrengthto reaffirm
eningof ethicalimpulseswhichhave long been recognized,but
which have neverbeen regardedas authoritative. If theyfollow legitimatelyas deductions fromthe principlewhich has
here been laid down,theirauthorityis clear.
Ethical motives,as all recognize,may be strengthenedboth
by teachingand by activity. If I have rightlydescribed the
ethical motive,it is possible to see with much clearness what
teaching and what activityare necessary for ethical culture,
and to see, also, the orderin which principlesare to be emphasized and activitiesare to be encouraged.
Ethical motives,then,are to be strengthenedfirstby reaffirmingthe doctrine,older even than any teaching of the
Greeks, that the efficientcause of morality is manly and
womanlypower,is that vitalitywhich, by its own insistence,
creates a demand for expansion and variation of life. The
ethical motive,as we have seen, springs fromphysiological

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325

conditions; and, as power,it is derivedfromvitality.To

neglectbodilydevelopment,
is not merelyto do
therefore,
wrongin a sensewhichall intelligent
personsnowrecognize,
by impairing
the healththatis in itselfa good,but in the
much deepersenseof impairingthe veryspringsof moral
conduct.
The ethicalmotivemaybe strengthened,
secondly,by recognizingand teachingthat variedexperiencesof pleasure
withinlimitsof moderation
are essentialto theexistenceof a
consciouslymoral motiveand a moral life. The organism
whichhas had repeatedexperiences
of manydifferent
kinds
of enjoyment,
associatedwiththe normalactivityof every
and vigorously
organ,is the one that reactsmostpromptly
againstanysortofexcessoranyover-indulgence
in a particular pleasure. The Hedonistsare absolutelyrightin their
fundamental
contention.Moralitywithoutpleasureof some
kindor composition
is unthinkable.As certainly
as specific
pleasuresare thespringsof economicaction,so certainly
are
andcombinedpleasuresthespringsofmoral
varied,measured,
action. The task of moral philosophyis not to condemn
pleasure; it is ratherto show how differently
pleasuresare
whenthey enter
combinedand presentedin consciousness,
intothemoralmotive,thanwhentheyinciteeconomiceffort.
admitthe essentialgoodnessof pleasure,
We mustfrankly
and denythatasceticismis in anysenseethical.
The ethicalmotivemay be strengthened,
thirdly,
by rethatexcess is the fundamental
affirming
wrong. By permitto dwelltoo long or too exclusivelyupon any
tingattention
one subjectof desire,we in somemeasuredestroythepower
of otherdesires,and notonlydwarfour lives,butimpairthe
moralmotive. Andthisis just as truewhenourexcessesare
on the side of those thingsthat are conventionally
called
" virtues,"
as whentheyare on theside ofpleasuresthatpublic opinioncondemns.In otherwords,theover-zealous
Puritan,themoralor religiousfanatic,
theuncompromising
political radical,whentheyrefuseto recognizeanyinterest
in life,
otherthan the ones to whichtheyare devoted,are,in the
lightof the physiologicaland psychologicalanalysiswhich

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has been presented,as immoralas the drunkardand the libertine. If this analysis is true,the middle way, which Aristotle
describedas the only true road of virtue,is indeed such; and
no one can wander fromit to the right hand any more than
to the lefthand, withoutfallinginto wrong.
The ethical motive is to be strengthened,fourthly,by
teaching that next to moderation is the importanceof cultivatinga varied outlook and sympathy,and of cherishingideals
as an intellectualduty.
This is an age of specializationand of commercialstandards.
Men judge one anotherby theirbusinesssuccess,and business
bringsa fearfulpressure upon everyman to devote his entire
energyto some one line of activityin which he can hope to
attainpre-eminence. This is in itselfa plain violationof moral
law, and thereis nothing mysteriousin the underminingof
personal and public integritythrough the insidiousaction of
an excessive commercialism. That the business man who
devotes his entire energy and thought to business matters
should look withouthorrorupon the control of politics and
law by an unscrupulous use of money is no occasion for
surprise. It is a normal and necessary consequence of the
conditions supposed. Unhappily, our educational policy,
which should be the great correctiveof such tendencies,has
been corruptedand made to encourage the very evils that
education should prevent. We have encouraged specialization,which is a properthingto do just to the extentthatby
specializationwe mean thoroughness,minuteand exact knowledge withina certain limited field. But specializationin this
sense need not and should not be at the expense of a broad
outlook upon the world and a correlativestrengtheningof
varied sympathies. Education should make the average man
see that business interestsare but one small part of life,and
that citizenship is a word of larger import than trade. It
should make him feela strong sympathywitheveryspontaneous popular movement. He should care about the wellbeing of otherclasses than the one to which he belongs. He
should be interestedin the progressive civilizationof other
nationsthan his own. Above all, he should be interestedin

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327

the historyand developmentof thought,in the broadeningof

the mental horizonof the race, and in the expressionof its
strugglesand aspirations in the enduringformsof literature
and art. If the ethical motiveis what I have here described
it as being,then it is the duty of all teachers of moralityto
insist that any man who knowingly neglects to cultivate
throughouthis business or professionallifesome interestor
intereststhat have no directrelationto his business or profession, who intentionallyor by negligence permitshis sympathies withall mankind,and with the progress of science and
art to die, is an immoralman, as much to be condemnedby a
sound public opinion as one who transgresses the conventional code of rightdoing.
Moreover,the expansion of thought and sympathymust
ideally extend into futuretime. The evolutionof social relations is not ended,and the developmentof the human mind is
not complete. The ethical motivedoes not merelyconstrain
us to act with referenceto the many-sidednessof life; it constrainsus to act also with referenceto the furtherdevelopment
of life. It is thereforeour duty to formand to cherishideals.
We must believe that many thingscan be made betterthan
they are at present,and that life in many ways can be made
more desirable. But these ideals must not be narrow,exclusive, or grotesquelydisproportionedto one another,or to the
world of fact. They must be brought into harmony,order,
and measure. In fine,the ethicalmotivemustbe both strengthened and directedby reaffirming
the Platonic doctrineof correlation,subordination,
and proportionin all thatwe thinkand
in all that we do.
FRANKLIN
COLUMBIA

H. GIDDINGS.

UNIVERSITY.

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