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Rodolfo Elman) 1
1ST EXAM COVERAGE CASE COMPILATION
HERNANDEZ v. LANZUELA
Thus, the term of the office being disputed in this case an ex officio membership in the Sangguniang Bayan of
Nabua - had long expired. This case, therefore, is already
moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
FUNA v. COA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
S.Y. 2014-2015
- versus -
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65, Dennis A. B. Funa challenges the constitutionality of
the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the
Commission on Audit and accordingly prays that a judgment
issue declaring the unconstitutionality of the appointment.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On February 15, 2001, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) appointed Guillermo
N. Carague (Carague) as Chairman of the Commission on
Audit (COA) for a term of seven (7) years, pursuant to the
1987 Constitution.[1] Caragues term of office started on
February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008.
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of
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in
the
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three
years,
without
reappointment. Appointment
to
any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessor.
x x x (Emphasis added.)
The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA
Chairman shall be appointed by the President for a term of
seven years, and if he has served the full term, then he can
no longer be reappointed or extended another
appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was
appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served the
full term is barred from being reappointed. In short, once the
Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full term of
seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either
the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious
intent of the framers is to prevent the president from
dominating the Commission by allowing him to appoint an
additional or two more commissioners.
(2)
The Chairman
and
Commissioners
[on
Audit] shall
be appointed by the President with the
consent
of
the
Commission
on
Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office
for seven years, one commissioner for five
years, and the other commissioner for
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opinion
by the
was
expressed in the
concurring Justice Angelo
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SO ORDERED.
DATU ABAS KIDA v. SENATE
1.
The appointment of members of any of
the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of
the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners,
shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an
appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional.
CADIENTE v. SANTOS
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
2.
Appointments to vacancies resulting
from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or
impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the
term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be
less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt
the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3.
Members of the Commission, e.g.
COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full term
of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred
from
reappointment
to
any
position
in
the
Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the
Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the
prohibition against reappointment.
4.
A commissioner who resigns after
serving in the Commission for less than seven years is
eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for
the unexpired portion of the term of the departing
chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the
length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period
of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7)
years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of
Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or
removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that
reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a
movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to
Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other
hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different
position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would
constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict
legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.
5.
Any member of the Commission
cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
WHEREFORE the
petition
is PARTLY
GRANTED. The appointment of then Commissioner
Reynaldo A. Villar to the position of Chairman of the
ALAMPAY, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Davao City, Branch I, in Civil Case No.
7571, entitle Ag. Cadierte vs. Mayor Luis T. Santos, et al."
promulgated on August 23, 1972, which dismissed the
petition for mandamus, quo warranto, with preliminary
injunction filed by herein petitioner.
On September 13, 1971, petitioner Cadiente was appointed
by then Mayor Elias B. Lopez as City Legal Officer of Davao
City. The appointment was duly attested to and/or approved
as "permanent" by the Civil Service Commission under
Section 24(b) of R.A. 2260. On January 6, 1972, the new
and then incumbent City Mayor Luis T. Santos, herein
respondent, sent a letter (Annex "H" to the Petition, p. 43,
Rollo) to the petitioner advising the latter that his services as
City Legal Officer of Davao City "are dispensed with effective
upon receipt of said letter" on the ground that the position of
City Legal Officer was primarily confidential in nature. This
was the opinion rendered by the City Fiscal of Davao City on
January 6, 1972, after being requested to submit his legal
opinion on said matter. Respondent City Mayor appointed
respondent Atty. Victor Clapano as City Legal Officer on
January 6, 1972 to take effect on said date.
Petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission on
January 7, 1982, which rendered its decision in its lst
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GANCAYCO, J.:p
The main issue in this petition is whether or not the position
of a provincial attorney and those of his legal subordinates
are primarily confidential in nature so that the services of
those holding the said items can be terminated upon loss of
confidence.
The facts of this case are simple.
Petitioner Sixto Demaisip was the first appointed Provincial
Attorney of Iloilo. He held this position from April 3, 1973 up
to June 2, 1986 when he offered to resign and his
resignation was accepted by the then Acting Governor. In his
resignation letter, petitioner Demaisip recommended the
elevation of respondent Teotimo Arandela from Senior Legal
Officer to Provincial Attorney. OIC Governor Licurgo Tirador
later on decided to appoint respondent Arandela as the
Provincial Attorney. Respondent Cirilo Gelvezon, on the
other hand, was promoted from Legal Officer II to Senior
Legal Officer. Respondents Teodolfo Dato-on and Nelson
Geduspan were appointed to the position of Legal
Officer II.
On February 2, 1988, petitioner Simplicio Grio assumed
office as the newly elected governor of Iloilo. One month
later, he informed respondent Arandela and all the legal
officers at the Provincial Attorney's Office about his decision
to terminate their services. In his letter, petitioner Grio made
mention of an article pertaining to the Iloilo office of the
Provincial Attorney which appeared in the Panay News and
which "undermined that trust and confidence" that he
reposed on them. Petitioner Demaisip was reappointed by
Governor Grio as the Provincial Attorney, The latter, on the
other hand, arranged the replacements of the other legal
officers. Respondent Cirilo Gelvezon was replaced by
petitioner Santos Aguadera, respondent Nelson Geduspan
was replaced by petitioner Manuel Casumpang and
petitioner Manuel Travia took the place of respondent
Teodolfo Dato-on.
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GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari* seeking to set aside
Administrative Order No. 122 of the Office of the President,
finding the petitioner guilty of dishonesty and meting upon
her, after appreciating certain mitigating circumstances in her
favor, the penalty of reprimand with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more severely. The President affirmed Assignment Order No.
58/88 dated April 27, 1988 of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
recalling the petitioner to the home office from her post as
permanent representative to the Philippine Mission to the
United Nations and other International Organizations
(MISUNPHIL, for short) in Geneva, Switzerland (pp. 8499, Rollo).
Petitioner Rosalinda de Perio-Santos, a career service officer
with the rank of Chief of Mission II and Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, was appointed on July 24,
1986, by her Excellency, President Corazon C. Aguino, to the
position of Permanent Representative of the Philippines to
the Philippine Mission to the United Nations and other
International Organizations with station in Geneva,
Switzerland (Annexes A and B, pp. 33-34,Rollo).
On April 6, 1987, petitioner sought a leave of absence from
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to spend the Easter
Holidays in New York, U.S.A., with her mother, brothers and
sisters at no expense to the Government (p. 84, Rollo). She
bought two (2) non-transferable, non-refundable discounted
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September 7, 1965
September 7, 1965
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Leon G. Maquera in his own behalf as petitioner.
Ramon Barrios for respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Upon consideration of case G.R. No. L-24761, "Leon G.
Maquera vs. Juan Borra, et al.," and case G.R. No. L-24828,
"Felipe N. Aurea and Melecio Malabanan vs. Commission on
Elections," and it appearing:
1. That Republic Act No. 4421 requires "all candidates for
national, provincial, city and municipal offices" to post a
surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or emoluments
of the position to which he is a candidate, which bond shall
be forfeited in favor of the national, provincial, city or
municipal government concerned if the candidate, except
when declared winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of the
votes cast for the office to which he has filed his certificate of
candidacy, there being not more than four (4) candidates for
the same office;"
2. That, in compliance with said Republic Act No. 4421, the
Commission on Elections had, on July 20, 1965, decided to
require all candidates for President, Vice-President, Senator
and Member of the House of Representatives to file a surety
bond, by a bonding company of good reputation, acceptable
to the Commission, in the sums of P60,000.00 and
P40,000.00, for President and Vice-President, respectively,
and P32,000.00 for Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives;
3. That, in consequence of said Republic Act No. 4421 and
the aforementioned action of the Commission on Elections,
every candidate has to pay the premium charged by bonding
companies, and, to offer thereto, either his own properties,
worth, at least, the amount of the surety bond, or properties
of the same worth, belonging to other persons willing to
accommodate him, by way of counter-bond in favor of said
bonding companies;
4. That the effect of said Republic Act No. 4421 is, therefore,
to prevent or disqualify from running for President, VicePresident, Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives those persons who, although having the
qualifications prescribed by the Constitution therefore,
cannot file the surety bond aforementioned, owing to failure
to pay the premium charged by the bonding company and/or
lack of the property necessary for said counter-bond;
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CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on
Elections from looking into the question of his citizenship as
a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The
allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue.
The issue is whether or not the public respondent has
jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter,
considering that the petition for quo warranto against him
was not filed on time.
It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged
tardiness not of the petition itself but of the payment of the
filing fee, which the petitioner contends was an
indispensable requirement. The fee is, curiously enough, all
of P300.00 only. This brings to mind the popular verse that
for want of a horse the kingdom was lost. Still, if it is shown
that the petition was indeed filed beyond the reglementary
period, there is no question that this petition must be granted
and the challenge abated.
The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed
mayor-elect of Baguio City, on January 20, 1988. The
petition for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent
on January 26, 1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date.
This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or twentyone days after his proclamation. As the petition by itself
alone was ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be
deemed filed only when the fee was paid. This was done
beyond the reglementary period provided for under Section
253 of the Omnibus Election Code reading as follows:
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting
the election of a Member of the Batasang Pambansa,
regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility
or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a
sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within
ten days after the proclamation of the result of the election.
The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is
required under Rule 36, Section 5, of the Procedural Rules
of the COMELEC providing that
Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due
course without the payment of a filing fee in the amount of
Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and the legal research fee
as required by law.
and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding
that the payment of the filing fee is essential to the timeliness
of the filling of the petition itself. He cites many rulings of the
Court to this effect, specifically Manchester v. Court of
Appeals. 1
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The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local
elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In
fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution
itself because of his alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible
as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of
the Local Government Code providing in material part as
follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age
on election day, a qualified voter registered as such in the
barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes to
be elected, a resident therein for at least one year at the time
of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read
and write English, Filipino, or any other local language or
dialect.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a
"futile technicality" that should not frustrate the will of the
electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a "resonant
and thunderous majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud
as all that, for his lead over the second-placer was only
about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that locality
could not have, even unanimously, changed the
requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a
foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia,
or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of
their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege
over their countrymen.
The probability that many of those who voted for the
petitioner may have done so in the belief that he was
qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of
the election cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now
held by him. These qualifications are continuing
requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency,
title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar,
the citizenship and voting requirements were not
subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first
place on the day of the election. The petitioner was
disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is
not now qualified to serve as such.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private
respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace
the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that
as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in
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Eighth Congress
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